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TO: KWONG, DAVID

FROM: LIEBERTHAL

DOC DATE: 20 JUL 99
SOURCE REF:

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SUBJECT: FWD RPT ON BOMBING OF CHINESE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE

ACTION: LIEBERTHAL SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 23 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KEITH

LOGREF:

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001 KEITH
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Z 99071216 APPROPRIATE ACTION
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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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002 990720 KWONG, DAVID

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1999

Dear Mr. Kwong:

Thank you for your recent letter to National Security Advisor forwarding your report on the tragic accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. On his behalf I would like to express appreciation for your support for the President's policy toward China.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth G. Lieberthal", with a long horizontal line extending to the left.

Kenneth G. Lieberthal
Special Assistant to the
President and Senior
Director for Asian Affairs

Mr. David Kwong
P.O. Box 2000/3A
White Deer, PA 17887

5284

To: ASIA
PLS. DRAFT
RESP. OBO
GRB.

David Kwong
P.O. Box 2000/3A
White Deer, PA 17887

Samuel R. Berger, Esq.,
National Security Adviser
National Security Council
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20506

July 8, 1999

Dear Sir:

Please allow a moment to examine the enclosed English translation of an analytical report I have recently submitted to the politburo of the People's Republic of China via the Chinese ambassador at Washington, D.C. pertaining to NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7.

The purpose of this report was to present a technical analysis of the event, annotated with the relevant circumstances in the past and present, to substantiate the inadvertent nature of the incident. The Chinese text of the report has been juxtaposed on the verso of the English translation to enhance clarity of illustration. The original report was sent by certified mail on May 18 and was actually delivered on May 21.

I hope that the foregoing efforts have adequately demonstrated my appreciation and support for president Clinton's China policy. I would appreciate your comment on my previous actions and I respectfully request your instruction for future endeavors to promote better Sino-American relations.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

David Kwong

JUL 12 16:29

JUL 12 16:29

A R E P O R T T O
T H E P E O P L E O F C H I N A

Written by
David Kwong

May 16, 1999

Original Chinese text with English translation

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T

(1) Letter to the Chinese Ambassador	iii
(2) "A Report to the People of China"	1
(3) Defense News Commentary on the Taiwan Issue	12
(4) Letter to the Editor of the Defense News: One China	13
(5) Certificates of postal delivery	14

LETTER TO THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR

May 18, 1999

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find two copies of a preliminary report I have prepared for your reference pertaining to the recent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

My epistemic background is physicist; I am considerably acquainted with military-related technology. In light of the current situation which confronts our country, I desire to volunteer my service in an academic capacity. I invoke your assistance by forwarding this report to the attention of the relevant bureaus in the central government for evaluation. In the event that my findings are endorsed by the authority, I pray that the information be disseminated to the public to appease inquietude. Thus a modest degree of contribution to the amelioration of Sino-American relations may be ascribed to my efforts.

I hereby express my condolence to the victims and their families who were involved in this incident. With the Taiwan issue still unresolved, we must redouble our efforts to work together for a satisfactory solution.

Respectfully submitted,

David Kwong

A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF CHINA

May 16, 1999

FOREWORD

On May 7, at approximately 11:50 pm Eastern Europe Time, which was May 8, 5:50 am Coastal China Time, the Chinese embassy at Belgrade, Yugoslavia was attacked by NATO's aerial bombardment, resulting in 4 dead¹ and 20 injured. Subsequently, a series of bitter protests erupted in the cities of China and in the Chinese communities throughout the world. Although the public sentiment has abated after U.S. President Bill Clinton made official apologies and explanations on several occasions, there remain many unanswered questions in the minds of the Chinese populace. The purpose of this report is to seek logical answers to the prevailing concerns of the public.

ABIDING CRUX

- (1) How was it possible that the technologically preeminent U.S. military performed so incompetently?
- (2) Possessing satellites capable of reading a license plate from 100 miles above, how did the United States Air Force fail to notice the huge Chinese flag in front of the embassy?
- (3) How did the world's most powerful intelligence agency commit such a delinquent act by providing the military with outdated maps?

1. The Chinese journals reported that an injured victim had died shortly after the attack, bringing the death toll from 3 to 4.

- (4) Was it the perpetration of a mole within the CIA?
- (5) Have there been similar lapses that the CIA was responsible for in the past?
- (6) Was it the workings of a clandestine operation executed by the CIA?

LETHAL INSTRUMENTS

The weapons that damaged the Chinese embassy were four² GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), so called "all-weather precision munitions." When the JDAM's hit the "designated mean point of impact," three of them exploded and one failed to detonate. JDAM's come in payloads of 1,000 and 2,000 pounds. They are guided by NAVSTAR, a navigation system consisting of a 27-satellite network which transmits very accurate position coordinates and time data. The accuracy of JDAM, which is expressed in term of its circular-error-probable (CEP), is estimated to be under 20 feet.³ These advanced technology weapons are launched by B-2A Spirit bombers, or "Stealth" bombers. Each B-2A bomber can carry up to 16 JDAM's.

2. Source: Chinese journals.

3. Previously reported to be under 32.8 feet.

All B-2A bombing missions are flown from the United States Air Force's 509th Bombardment Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to the Balkans and return without stopover.

Each JDAM is composed of a kit manufactured by Boeing Company, Seattle, that converts unguided 1,000- or 2,000-pound free-fall bombs into precision guided munitions (PGM). The JDAM kit costs about \$14,500 each while the entire ordnance set costs about \$18,000. The B-2A bombers are manufactured by Northrop Grumman, Palmdale. The "flyaway cost" of each B-2A (excluding research and development and engineering costs) is \$434.7 millions. The total cost is \$2.2 billions per plane.

EXPOSITION

(1) How was it possible that the technologically preeminent U.S. military performed so incompetently?

A major shortcoming of the U.S. Department of Defense is its blind faith in technology. During the Reagan administration, the Defense Department took an overriding interest in purchasing expensive high-tech weapons and completely neglected to upgrade the unglamorous but essential programs. The consequence of this flamboyant procurement

policy manifested itself during the ensuing Persian Gulf War in which the logistic supports for every branch of the U.S. military was seriously delayed. Due to the lack of effective mine clearing equipments, the U.S. Navy and Marine had to secretly acquire them from the Israelis. The USAF had spent billions on the B-2 bombers, MX missiles, and precision guided munitions but failed to replace the Vietnam War-vintage PRC-90 radios which unsecured transmission could be readily intercepted and "DF'd" (located by directional finding) by the Iraqis. Consequently, many downed airmen were captured by the Iraqis because their positions were compromised by the primitive radios.

In his book "The Generals' War," Major General (Ret.) of the U.S Marine remarked that "the Pentagon behaved like a bachelor who owned a Porche but forgot to pay his electric bill."

(2) Possessing satellites capable of reading a license plate from 100 miles above, how did the United States Air Force fail to notice the huge Chinese flag in front of the embassy?

The guiding system of JDAM -- NAVSTAR -- also called Global Positioning System (GPS), consists of 27 satellites placed into polar orbits

at an altitude of 11,000 miles. NAVSTAR transmits a coded signal restricted for military use and a signal that is intentionally degraded for use by civilians. The accuracy of the civil signal is 328 feet. It can be utilized worldwide with the commercially available GPS devices.

NAVSTAR has no optical capability. The highly publicized spy-satellites capable of reading a license plate from 100 miles above are the KH-11 and KH-12 (Keyhole) reconnaissance satellites. KH-satellites operate in low earth orbits (LEO) by maintaining high apogees and low perigees. Under optimal weather conditions and daylight, at the lowest possible altitude of 70 miles, the maximum resolution of the KH-satellites is approximately 2 inches. However, the orbital speed of a satellite in such low orbit is 4.8 miles per second. Darting onward at such tremendous speed, the optical instruments on board are best suitable for surveying matters on open terrain and are less effective for identifying objects hidden between edifices.

When the power of its optical instruments are pushed to the maximum, the field-of-view of the KH-satellites is only 4 square kilometers, utterly inadequate for cartographic applications. Moreover, the operations of the KH-satellites are extremely expensive. Thus limiting the missions of the KH-satellites to the coverage of strategically important sites and not inconsequential places like Belgrade. Current KH-satellites have no night-vision capability. Finally, the most commonly used satellites for cartographic applications are the American LANDSAT and the French SPOT commercial satellite systems. The resolution of these commercial satellites is about 10 meters with a field-of-view of 3,600 square kilometers, suitable for producing maps of 1:50,000 in ratio.

(3) How did the world's most powerful intelligence agency commit such a delinquent act by providing the military with outdated maps?

It is difficult for those who never have contact with the intelligence community to understand the self-serving nature of the bureaucracies. In 1983, when former U.S. Army Major General Norman Schwarzkopf led the invasion of Grenada, codenamed Urgent Fury, the maps supplied by the CIA contained mostly erroneous information. As a result,

the airborne operations and artillery support for the invading troops were critically curtailed. Eventually, General Schwarzkopf had to rely on the civilian maps acquired from the local gas stations instead. Ironically, the CIA's rendition of outdated maps represented a substantial improvement from the past.

(4) Was it the perpetration of a mole within the CIA?

The answer to this question can be deduced from common logic and the immediate reactions of the U.S. government. Logically, a mole may have been able to supplant certain cybernetic data for map production. But it was impossible for him to retroactively alter the finished hardcopies that had been distributed to various agencies. Judging from the immediate reactions of the U.S. government, it was uncharacteristic for such a diversity of egos to agree upon the fabrication of a plausible excuse in so short a period of time. The customary response should have been a buffer statement such as "no comment, investigation pending" to gain more time for the invention of a consummate lie. From the standpoint of a bureaucrat, the consequence of an inadvertent mistake can be nothing more than an embarrassment. But the intentional concealment of facts may result in his termination, prosecution, and impeachment by opposing

factions. Hence the possibility of a coup by a double-agent is extremely low.

(5) Have there been similar lapses that the CIA was responsible for in the past?

Since its inception on September 18, 1947, eleven accounts of serious intelligence failures can be attributed to the CIA. The aftermath of each event was more damaging than the Belgrade incident.

01/ June 24, 1948

Former Soviet troops suddenly seized Berlin, causing the Cold War to nearly heat up to a hot war. The CIA failed to warn the government ahead of time.

02/ June 24, 1950, 4:00 am local time

North Korean troops launched a massive invasion into South Korea. As much as 6 hours later, the U.S. State Department learned about the invasion from the news announcement of the Associated Press. President Truman was informed by the State Department 2 hours afterward. The CIA was the last to know from the news instead of its own intelligence assets.

03/ November 26, 1950

China entered the Korean War. The intelligence failure of the CIA caused the general retreat of the U.S. troops from North Korea.

04/ April 17, 1961

Under the arrangement of the CIA, a commando regiment formed by 1,400 Cuban exiles invaded the Bay of Pig in Cuba. The invasion was to be coordinated by the U.S. Navy to provide close-air-support. Due to the CIA's oversight of the different time zones, the Navy's action was late by one hour. The result was the dismal failure dubbed the "Bay of Pig fiasco."

05/ June 17, 1972

One active- and three former-employees of the CIA were arrested for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C. The aftermath was the "Watergate scandal" which ultimately brought the impeachment and resignation of former president Richard Nixon.

06/ in 1973, the CIA failed to warn Israel, the American protectorate of an impending attack by Egypt and Syria in what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War.

07/ February, 1978

The CIA reported to president Carter that the situation in Iran would remain stable and the likelihood of rebellion was minimum. Shortly after, violent insurgencies emerged. On November 4, 52 Americans from the U.S. embassy in Tehran were held hostage for a duration of 444 days. The shah of Iran fled in exile in December. In February of the following year, the rebel party established a new government.

08/ October 25, 1983

U.S. troops invaded Grenada. The initial phase of the operation was chaotic because of the inaccurate intelligence provided by the CIA.

09/ August 1, 1990

The day before the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, both the CIA and the DIA dismissed the military posture of the Iraqi troops as pretentious. The outcome was the ensuing Persian Gulf War.

10/ February 13, 1991

Based on the erroneous intelligence provided by the CIA, the USAF designated the Al Firdos bunker, a civilian shelter in Baghdad, as a military installation and attacked it with a laser guided bomb. Several hundred civilians were wounded and killed in the attack.

11/ August 20, 1998

President Clinton ordered missile attacks on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan based on the inaccurate intelligence provided by the CIA claiming that the facility was linked to terrorist activities. An uncertain number of casualties was resulted in the attack.

(6) Was it the workings of a clandestine operation executed by the CIA?

This question can be studied from various angles. Militarily, the bombardment of a foreign embassy has no meaningful effect.

Politically, the consequence is a diplomatic nightmare. Had this been a probe into the national resolve of China as some people had suggested, the forthright apologies offered by the U.S. government defeated its probative purpose. The proposition that it was a clandestine operation executed by the CIA is likewise invalid. The 1974 Hughes Ryan Amendment and the 1980 amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 require the undertaking of each covert action to be preceded by a formal presidential finding declaring that the action is in the national interest and it must be reported to both Select Committees on Intelligence of the House and Senate. Under these multiple layers of supervision, a reckless act like this has no chance of being ratified.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the causation of the bombardment of the Chinese embassy is determined to be accidental.

COMMENTARY

RPC/12

Give Taipei the Tools

Washington should respond favorably to Taipei's requests for advanced defensive weaponry when security officials from the two sides gather in the U.S. capital for annual arms talks.

The classified annual meeting, scheduled for April 27, traditionally has ended in disappointment for Taiwan because its requests for diesel submarines, long-range surveillance radars and other defensive items have been rejected in deference to Beijing.

This year, however, a convergence of events in Washington and on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should prod President Bill Clinton's White House into honoring obligations to its one-time treaty ally as specified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

First, Washington must respond appropriately to Beijing's provocative ballistic and cruise missile development and deployment activities, as described by Pentagon experts in a February report to Congress. That assessment identified 10 key weaknesses in Taiwan's defense capabilities — the results of Chinese military moderniza-

tion and U.S. refusals to provide Taiwan with training, education, and doctrinal planning and support.

Second, a growing number of influential voices in Taiwan are beginning to support the acquisition of offensive, conventional medium-range missiles to deter Beijing. This is potentially destabilizing. However, without new defensive weaponry and military assistance, it will be difficult to persuade Taiwan to abandon this ill-conceived idea.

Finally, a restive Congress, dissatisfied with Mr. Clinton's performance on China, appears ready to move authority for policy formulation on the issue from the White House to the Capitol.

Congressional support is building for the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which would require Mr. Clinton to submit to Congress Taipei's annual arms request list and to justify all administration rejections and postponements of arms sales to Taiwan.

The White House should reverse the course it has followed in recent years and improve all aspects of defense cooperation with Taipei.

Summit Highlight

With Kosovo's shadow shrouding the celebratory lights, NATO's 50th anniversary party has ended in a whimper.

Yet, in the midst of the gloom, there has been at least one ray of hope: the Defense Capabilities Initiative. While embryonic, this agreement among the now 19 allies to begin a process of identifying joint requirements for airlifters and next-generation command and control equipment is promising.

One crucial element of the success NATO has enjoyed as a military alliance over the past five decades has been the commitment of the Western allies to maintain the capability to fight together.

In recent years, however, budgetary and political pressures have led to a gap in NATO's ability to fight the wars of today, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. No allied military properly has invested in the force structure needed for the 21st century.

That equipment gap has been exacerbated by the tendency of the allies to ignore potential joint requirements in favor of pursuing national programs with attendant industrial benefits.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative, if successful, would be a step toward resolving these problems. As such, it could be the Washington summit's one success.

LETTERS

Reality Check

Thanks for those two insightful quotes in your April 12 edition. It is nice to know that one's sense of reality and understanding of the true needs for the individual soldier as well as that of his unit are

"The fact is, nothing can replace hands-on real equipment in real world situations."

all wrong, even if that expert is based on 33 plus years of military service acquired prior to 1990s.

I am speaking of the quote in the article, "Sweden, Norway Maintain Draft" by Army Gen Arne Solli, the Norwegian chief of defense, who warned that: "It is an illusion to believe you can produce on training and on military exercises to the benefit of procurement. If you don't keep a relatively stable level of training, then you lose the habit."

The second quote was by Vice Adm. Mike Bowman, commander of naval air forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, who stated in the "One on One" interview: "We are working harder in the area of simulation but not to substitute more simulation for fewer flight hours. ... Use of simulators instead is to further enhance our readiness."

These words of wisdom need

WORD FOR

From briefing on the stealthiness of aircraft and its loss in combat over

"It's not invisible. It never that can track our stealthy us. The key is that that z-shrunk by orders of magnitud

Answer

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LETTERS

One China

In view of your increasingly frequent coverage of the Taiwan security issue, I offer the following comment:

Notwithstanding all the good intentions and sympathy toward Taiwan, the fact remains that Taiwan is a part of China and its reunification with China is justified and inevitable. U.S. President Bill Clinton's performance is palpably consistent with the provisions of the third Shanghai Communique of 1982, in which the United States committed itself to "the gradual reduction of arms sales to Taiwan and, after an indefinite period, their termination."

I certainly can appreciate the concerns behind the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act and the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Nevertheless, there is no amount of weaponry, debate, strategy, diplomacy, or legislation that can sway the timeless and unified belief of the Chinese people throughout the world that all Chinese should be ruled by one government.

Increasing arms sales to Taiwan will not change its historical and geopolitical reality. They will only embolden the Taiwanese government to indefinitely postpone reunification negotiations, precipitate Chinese military actions, expand the scope of potential destruction to both sides, jeopardize regional stability, and damage American interests and

Sino-American relations.

It is time to stop arming Taiwan and impel it to face reality and begin to negotiate favorable and realistic terms for reunification.

DAVID KWONG
White Deer, Pa.

Digital Disaster

Your newspaper has covered the various aspects of the U.S. Army's digitization effort since 1994. You have presented stories about advanced combat experiments, advanced concept technology demonstrators, battle laboratories, streamlined acquisition, just-in time logistics, tactical Internet, the results of the digitized battalion and digitized brigade experiments at the National Training Center, etc.

And then we read in the March 15 issue, "U.S. Army Expects Approval To Delay Digitization Test."

So, after five years of all this great and innovative work, the equipment still has bugs and is not ready but will be fielded according to schedule anyway; the Army simply will defer testing.

CHESTER KOJRO
Rolla, Mo.

Readers are encouraged to express their views in letters to the editor. Letters may be edited. Unsigned letters will not be published, but the names of letter writers will be deleted upon request. Please include phone number. Send letters to Defense News, Springfield, Va. 22159 USA or e-mail them to 73244.473@compuserve.com.

WORD FOR WORD

From remarks at Capitol Hill Club in Washington:

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PRESIDENT

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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

D Kwong

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.