

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2735				
Document ID: 9904555				
Stack: V	Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	Samuel Berger to the President (1 page)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to the President, re: Explaining the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (2 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger, re: U/S Pickering's Travel to China to Explain the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1 page)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	[Draft 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)
001e. draft	[Draft 001b - pages 1-2 only] (1 page)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)
001f. email	James Keith to Elaine Wasserman, Re: Revision - Text of Package 4523 (1 page)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)
001g. draft	[Draft of 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)
001h. draft	[Draft of 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904555
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 99 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

KOSOVO

PERSONS: PICKERING, T

SUBJECT: U / S PICKERING TRAVEL TO CHINA TO EXPLAIN BOMBING OF CHINESE
EMBASSY IN BELGRADE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 19 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KEITH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEITH
NSC CHRON
RUDMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *WDE* NARA, Date *4/22/04*
2008-0994-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9904555

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 99061416 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99061416 FOR INFORMATION
X 99061417 NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4555
4523

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>① 6/13</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>encl 6/14</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>② 6/14</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yls

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4555
4523

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓟ 6/13</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>ENK 6/14</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>Ⓟ 6/14</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	Samuel Berger to the President (1 page)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to the President, re: Explaining the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (2 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F
ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

06/12/99 3:40 PM

**Statement to the Chinese Government
on the Belgrade Embassy Bombing**

We are here today to give you the results of our examination of the circumstances that culminated with the mistaken NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999. I will also outline the corrective actions that we are taking within the United States Government to ensure that--as far as humanly possible--mistakes like this do not happen again.

The attack was a mistake. Our examination explains how a series of errors and omissions led to that mistake. Let me emphasize, no one targeted the Chinese Embassy. No one, at any stage in the process, realized that our bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy.

With me today are Mr. James Simon, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Ken Lieberthal, the Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, and Ms. Susan Shirk, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia.

The unintended attack happened because a number of systems and procedures that are used to identify and verify potential targets did not work.

DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There were three basic failures. First, the technique used to locate the intended target - the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) - was severely flawed. Second, none of the military or intelligence data bases used to verify target information contained the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected. No one who might have known that the targeted building was not the FDSP headquarters--but was in fact the Chinese Embassy--was ever consulted.

To help understand the circumstances which led to the mistaken bombing, let me offer a brief chronology of events.

In March of this year, U.S. intelligence officers began considering the FDSP headquarters as a potential target for NATO ALLIED FORCE strike operations. The FDSP clearly was a legitimate target given its role in support of the Yugoslav military effort.

We had a street address of the FDSP headquarters: "Bulevar Umetnosti 2" in New Belgrade. But military forces require precise geographic coordinates to conduct an attack. During a mid-April work-up of the target, three maps were used in an attempt to physically locate the address of the FDSP headquarters: two local commercial maps from 1996 and 1989, and one U.S. government map produced in 1997.

None of these maps had any reference to the FDSP building. And none accurately identified the current location of the Chinese Embassy. (Graphic One: 1997 U.S. Government map of original and current embassy locations.)

As you can see, the 1997 U.S. government city map shows the Embassy in Old Belgrade and depicts an unidentified building at the actual Embassy site in New Belgrade. The 1996 commercial map made no reference to the Embassy at either location. The 1989 map predated the Embassy's move.

Please keep in mind that the location of the Chinese Embassy was not a question that anyone would have asked when assembling this particular target package since it was not connected in any way to our intent to strike the FDSP headquarters.

In an effort to pinpoint the location of the FDSP building at Bulevar Umetmosti 2, an intelligence officer used land navigation techniques taught by the U.S. military to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects. These techniques - known as "intersection" and "resection" - can be used for general geolocation, but are totally inappropriate for precision targeting. Using this process, the individual mistakenly determined that the building which we now know to be the Chinese Embassy was the FDSP headquarters. The techniques used to identify the FDSP building were severely flawed. The true location of the FDSP headquarters was some 300 meters away from the Chinese Embassy. This flaw in the address location process

went undetected by all the others who evaluated the FDSP headquarters as a military target.

The incorrect location of the FDSP building was then fed into several U.S. data bases to determine whether any diplomatic or other facilities off-limits to targeting were nearby. **(Graphic Two and Three: U.S. Government image and map with FDSP headquarters and Chinese embassy)**. We try to avoid damage to sensitive facilities such as embassies, hospitals, schools and places of worship. Viewed from space, there was no indication that the office building being targeted was an embassy. And unfortunately, in this instance, no sources that were checked correctly identified the targeted building as the Chinese Embassy.

Multiple data bases within the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense all reflected the Embassy in its pre-1996 location in Old Belgrade. Despite the fact that U.S. officials had visited the Embassy on a number of occasions in recent years, the new location was never entered into intelligence or military targeting data bases. If the data bases had accurately reflected the current location of the Embassy, the mistaken identification of the FDSP building would have been recognized and corrected.

Why was the Chinese embassy not correctly located? It is important to understand that our ability to verify the location of fixed-targets depends heavily on the accuracy of the data

DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

bases, and the data bases in this case were wrong. Further, it is difficult to keep current data bases for cities around the globe. In general, diplomatic facilities--other than those of the U.S.--have been given relatively little attention in our efforts to update our data bases because such facilities are not targets. Military targets are the top priority in these data bases because of the danger they pose to our own forces.

Once the target was proposed, the focus of the review was on the military value of the target and how best to attack it. No one questioned the accuracy of the location. The formal recommendation of the FDSP target was forwarded in late April to military staffs both in the U.S. and Europe, who were responsible for reviewing and identifying targets for Operation Allied Force. Maps and satellite imagery were analyzed to look for any possible collateral damage concerns near the target. A target review was conducted in Europe, and again, no significant risks to civilian or diplomatic facilities were uncovered.

An administrative error at the Pentagon, however, resulted in the target package not receiving the full review it should have. This review, although truncated, found nothing different from the review that took place in Europe. There were no known collateral damage concerns. From that point on the building incorrectly identified as an FDSP facility was included on a list of potential Allied Force strike targets.

DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We have subsequently determined that there are some maps which show the correct current location of the Chinese Embassy although there are others, including some produced in recent years by the Yugoslav government, which do not.

Some of our employees knew the location of the Chinese embassy. But keep in mind that we were not looking for it. None of these individuals was consulted as the target was reviewed and, as a result, we lost any opportunity to learn that the building targeted was in fact the Chinese Embassy. We have also found one report from 1997 that gave the correct address of the Chinese Embassy but that information was ancillary to the focus of the report and unfortunately the address was not entered into the data base.

Very late in the process, questions were raised by an intelligence officer as to whether the building targeted was in fact the FDSP headquarters or might be some other unidentified building. At no time was there any suspicion that the building might be an Embassy. This question was not raised to senior levels and the strike went ahead.

In summary, there were several crucial errors which led to the Chinese Embassy being struck:

- There were human errors. The approach used to attempt to locate the FDSP building was severely flawed.
- All sources of information used to prevent precisely this type of accident were either inaccurate or incomplete.

DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- The review process was weak, did not catch the locational error, and did not consult anyone who might have been able to prevent this tragedy.

The United States is, as I speak, continuing to conduct an in-depth review of this tragic incident. Based on our initial findings, it is clear that this terrible mistake occurred not because of just one organization, or because of one individual.

The U.S. government is actively implementing a series of corrective actions to prevent such mistakes in the future. They include the following:

- Intelligence and Defense organizations have strengthened their internal mechanisms and procedures for selecting and verifying targets and have placed the highest priority on keeping our data bases current.
- The Department of State will explicitly report whenever foreign embassies move or are rebuilt. This information will then be forwarded and incorporated into our intelligence and military data bases.
- The United States Government will seek direct contact with other governments to obtain their assistance in identifying and locating their facilities and places of interest or concern in areas of potential future conflict.

Experience tells us that humans err. Knowing that, we constructed elaborate procedures to check and double-check our work. In this specific case, the checks and balances failed.

DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Our procedures are being improved to ensure our information is as current as possible. Our goal is to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again.

The United States sincerely regrets the loss of life in this tragic incident and offer our condolences to the Chinese people and especially to the families of those who lost their lives or were injured as a result of this mistaken attack.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

When I called you on May 14 to express my deep regret about the tragic bombing of your Embassy in Belgrade, I promised that I was conducting a thorough investigation, and I would send a personal envoy to give you a comprehensive briefing so that you and the people of China would be able to understand why this terrible accident happened.

I have entrusted this mission to one of our most able diplomats and a man in whom I have the greatest personal confidence. At my behest, Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering will lead a delegation to Beijing to fulfill my commitment to provide to you the results of our investigation. His mission will be undertaken in the spirit of the close and cooperative ties that you and I have worked so hard to establish since our first meeting in Seattle in 1993. Over the course of the last several years we have spared no effort to build a relationship that would not only withstand challenges from critics at home and abroad but also expand and thrive well into the next century. I assure you that I remain committed fully to the path of U.S.-China relations that you and I have constructed with such care and attention.

I am entrusting this letter to Under Secretary Pickering in the hope that his mission will help the Chinese people understand the mistakes that resulted in the tragic suffering and loss of life at the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Under Secretary Pickering will explain how this regrettable incident occurred despite the precautions that we and NATO had in place to prevent such a terrible mistake. I will receive a full briefing from him after the report is delivered.

I remain convinced that we must fulfill our solemn responsibility to our citizens to advance through our cooperation the vital interests of peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia and the rest of the world.

In closing, I want to convey to you once again my deep regret for the suffering and loss of life at your Embassy in Belgrade.

With respect and goodwill,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Jiang Zemin
President of the People's Republic of China
Beijing

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger, re: U/S Pickering's Travel to China to Explain the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1 page)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. draft	[Draft 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F
ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. draft	[Draft 001b - pages 1-2 only] (1 page)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F
ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001f. email	James Keith to Elaine Wasserman, Re: Revision - Text of Package 4523 (1 page)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)
-------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. draft	[Draft of 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. draft	[Draft of 001b] (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904555

2008-0994-F

ke5890

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]