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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 21 MAY 99
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CONGRESSIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SENATE DEMOCRATIC RETREAT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 27 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LACKEY

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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LACKEY
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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903962

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
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Z 99052119 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99052121 FOR INFORMATION
X 99052513 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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99 MAY 21 PM 5:52

CC: Jacobson ✓ s/es DMC

COMMENTS: Points for Senate Democratic
Retreat

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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cc: Jacobson

COMMENTS: Points for Senate Democratic Retreat

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1999

'99 MAY 21 PM 10:00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *S for*

SUBJECT: Senate Democratic Retreat

Attached for your use at the Senate Democratic Retreat this weekend are points on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage as well as Qs and As. Larry Stein is forwarding a separate package on other issues.

Attachments

Tab A Points on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage
Tab B Qs and As on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
SENATE DEMOCRATS

Kosovo

- First, Kosovo: Grateful for your support on supplemental. Not the bill I wanted or most of you wanted. But crucial to get aid to refugees and neighboring countries. And give military the resources to see mission through, while maintaining overall readiness.
- Wanted to let you know where we are in the campaign against Belgrade's repression.
- Allies continue to display remarkable unity on strategy and goals as we press forward. Italian PM D'Alema faces political pressure in holding his coalition together. Has to deal with political reality but has made clear his intention to stand with alliance. British, French, Germans all on board.
- Two-track strategy: continuing intense military strikes and further degrading Milosevic's war-making machine; pursuing diplomatic track.

MILITARY IMPACT

- The air campaign is exacting a high price from Milosevic. Over 930 aircraft (650 US and 280 allied) assigned. Additional fighters deployed this week, including to new bases in Hungary. Other aircraft on call.
- 22,000 sorties flown to date by 13 nations. Number of daily sorties has risen from approximately 300 in first two weeks to 500 - 600 over the last two weeks. Fixed targets and fielded forces increasingly attacked daily. Over 20 hours per day of continual strike waves planned.
- We have badly damaged Serbia's Integrated Air Defenses and destroyed 80% of its modern fighters.
- We are attacking and hurting Serbia's military industrial assets and infrastructure, the apparatus that sustains the Serb war machine.

- We have functionally destroyed Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and severely degraded its ammunition and armaments production, and disrupted electrical power supply throughout the country.
- NATO aircraft are increasingly engaging and damaging Serb forces deployed in Kosovo. We have destroyed over one-third of the armored vehicles (tanks/APCs) and one-half of artillery deployed there.
- We have destroyed National and Kosovo level leadership facilities, damaged key road and rail links into Kosovo and reduced Serb media broadcast capability.
- I will follow advice of military on use of Apache helicopters. High risks associated with their use, which is not as pressing when weather is good and A-10s can fly lower. I will order them into action at time and place and in manner best designed to take advantage of their capabilities.

FISSURES WITHIN SERBIA

- NATO's resolve is opening fissures in Serbia. In recent days there have been increasing signs that Serbs are growing tired of this conflict and are expressing their discontent through a number of actions directed at Milosevic's regime. There have also been some indications that Milosevic is seeking a way out.
- In Cacak (Kah-Chahk), demonstrations have been ongoing since early May. Citizens there have formed a non-political, anti-war organization called the "civic parliament." They called for an end to NATO air strikes and urged Milosevic to do everything possible to end the bombing.
- In a clear reference to Milosevic, Cacak's mayor said "the one who is going to sign the deal will bear huge responsibility. The Serbian people cannot forgive any longer."
- On May 16 in Krusevac (Crew-seh-vahtch), a demonstration of 5,000 citizens, protesting that their husbands, fathers, and loved ones were being killed in the conflict, called for the return of VJ soldiers from Kosovo. Their slogan: "We want our sons, not coffins."

- The Krusevac protests continued through May 19 when Serb police used fire hoses against the 1,500 women and children demonstrators.
- Reacting to these strong-arm tactics, on the same day 1,000 Yugoslav Army reservists serving in Kosovo left their units and tried to return to Krusevac in order to stop the mistreatment of their families by Serb police. While it now appears that many of these have returned to their units, their impulsive action indicates strong discontent.
- There are indications that a growing number of young men are moving to Belgrade, believing they have a better chance of avoiding conscription by blending into the capital's crowds.
- We and our NATO allies are adding to the pressure through the imposition of a tough sanctions regime. The regime cuts off all U.S. exports to the FRY, except for humanitarian goods. Importantly, it will restrict the flow of oil to Belgrade's war making machine. The European Union has implemented a similar program. Both the U.S. and EU have exempted Montenegro from these restrictions.
- Not to say Milosevic will capitulate tomorrow. But he is feeling pressure; pot boiling.

DIPLOMATIC

- On the diplomatic front, Strobe Talbott just met with Finnish President Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin. Trying to get Chernomyrdin to convey to Milosevic NATO will not stop until Milosevic meets conditions.
- Also working within G-8 to align Russia with NATO's conditions, and to prepare elements of a UNSCR that would reinforce NATO's demands and endorse the establishment of an international security force and provisional administration for Kosovo.
- We have seen indications Milosevic miscalculated NATO's resolve, that NATO's campaign has lasted much longer than he anticipated:
 - His fake announcement of withdrawals last week was clearly intended to ease NATO pressure, divide the alliance, and influence international opinion;

- Last week he acknowledged for the first time many members of Serb armed forces have been killed in the conflict.
- Thursday, for the first time he publicly accepted G-8 principles for negotiating an end to the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the UN.
- Through broadcasts on state media and official announcements, Milosevic is making it clear to his people and to the international community that he wants to begin negotiations to end the bombing.

END GAME

- Milosevic knows he can end it by accepting NATO's basic conditions: end violence and repression; remove security forces from Kosovo; allow the return of refugees; permit an armed international force with NATO at core. Not arbitrary; needed to enable refugees to return and make peace work.
- It is clear that there will be no stability in the Balkans while Milosevic is in power. While his removal is not one of NATO's stated objectives, we are strengthening our efforts to encourage Serbs to oust him.
- At the same time as we are pressing forward on the military and diplomatic tracks, we are also planning for success. This involves revising NATO's plan for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) so that it can be deployed rapidly following a settlement.
- Because of the post-bombing environment, KFOR will have to be larger than we envisioned before the air campaign, and we are evaluating how this will affect the size of our contribution.

HUMANITARIAN

- Concurrently, we're planning and beginning to work with allies to develop the International Provisional Administration for Kosovo that will deploy with KFOR to conduct all of the civilian tasks of the settlement.
- We and our allies are deeply committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of refugees pushed out of Kosovo by Belgrade's brutality.

- Relief assistance is meeting the basic needs of the Kosovar refugees. There have been no disease outbreaks or malnutrition. Beginning to look at the need to prepare the camps for the winter which comes early in the Balkans.
- Have provided \$200 million in assistance for the Kosovo crisis, including \$160 million in the past two months. Also have brought almost 2,500 refugees to the U.S. and just opened our first camp in Albania last week and already 2,500 refugees are settled there.
- The flow from Kosovo has slowed in the past week, but those who arrive continue to tell stories of FRY forces emptying villages and terrorizing families. They also report that Serb forces are occupying civilian houses and using their barns to store ammunition.
- Refugees also report that food within Kosovo is increasingly scarce. We continue to work on ways to get assistance inside Kosovo, none of which are without substantial risk. The Greek initiative and other efforts currently underway are not reaching the most desperate people who we believe are hiding in the mountains.
- Refugees continue to tell us that they desperately want to return to their homes, but cannot do that until their security can be assured.
- That is why NATO will not bend on its demands. We are determined that all the refugees will return to their homes.

China

- Expect House Select Committee report on China to be released early next week.
- As I told Congressmen Cox and Dicks, we take threat of Chinese effort to acquire nuclear secrets and U.S. technology seriously.
- That's why I issued sweeping Presidential directive in February 1998 (even before Cox Committee was set up) to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs.

- Bill Richardson is aggressively implementing new measures; expects to bring lab protections up to par by the end of this year.
- We've already agreed with most of the recommendations of the Cox-Dicks Committee to strengthen protections and ensure against diversion of U.S. technology. We've increased the DOE counterintelligence budget from less than \$3 million in 1996 to over \$39 million in 2000. DOE has hired veteran FBI experts to run its beefed-up counterintelligence operation. It is instituting new programs to polygraph scientists working on sensitive programs and background check foreign visitors from sensitive countries.
- At same time, need to avoid over reaction that could damage national security.
- First, can't turn labs into gulags for scientists. This would cripple their ability to carry out vital national security functions and advance scientific research.
- Don't want to cut off legitimate contacts with foreign scientists that serve our nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives, such as U.S.-Russia programs.
- Edward Teller had a good piece in NYTimes last week. Stressed importance of legitimate engagement with foreign scientists. Also argued persuasively that most important thing we can do to address threat that other countries have acquired our secrets is push ahead with robust research efforts to acquire new knowledge. We are doing so. That, combined with improved security, will allow us to maintain advantages and protect our security.
- Second, shouldn't abandon clear-eyed engagement strategy with China.
- Our strategy has helped produce Chinese adherence to CTBT (which limits future Chinese nuclear development), limited Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to others. We cannot significantly ease tensions and reduce threat on Korean peninsula without Chinese cooperation; same with South Asia.
- Want to work with Congress to enact any additional measures that are necessary to strengthen counterintelligence and prevent diversion, but must resist actions that would damage labs and turn China into an enemy.

Questions and Answers

KOSOVO

Where are we on ground forces?

- First, the air campaign is working. Everyday we attack his forces in the field with more and more effectiveness.
- Part of our strategy entails planning for success, i.e. Milosevic accepting our conditions, including the introduction of an effective international security presence.
- For us this means a military force with NATO at its core. This means NATO command and control, NATO forces in Kosovo, NATO rules of engagement and special arrangements – like in Bosnia – to integrate non-NATO forces.
- NATO had planned for such a force prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning. In that we are requiring the withdrawal of all Serb security forces, the force will need to establish security until we can get an international police force and then local police in place. It will also need to provide more emergency assistance for humanitarian relief than previously foreseen.
- One result is that the force size will be larger: closer to 50,000 soldiers compared to the 28,000 previously planned. This is likely to lead to an increase in the U.S. force contribution from the 4000 previously planned, and we will want to consult closely on this with you.
- KFOR assumes Serb consent. NATO is also updating its assessment of a ground force in a non-permissive environment.
- I have not ruled this out, since it is helpful to keep Milosevic uncertain. At the same time, I can assure you that the focus of planning is on a permissive environment, and I would want to consult with you carefully before any change.

Is Clark pushing for ground troops?

- SACEUR Clark briefed Secretary Cohen on the status of this assessment, and sought no change in NATO policy. He reported that the air campaign is working, and that with each passing day, NATO's position is strengthening and Milosevic's is weakening.

What is your timeline on a decision?

- In updating the ground forces assessment, there are various timelines.
- These timelines entail different assumptions and different risk calculations. Regardless, time is on our side, as Milosevic is weakened by air strikes with each passing day.
- See no reason to change a military strategy that is having a devastating effect.
- But have not ruled out other means, we will achieve our objectives.

Is the Alliance fraying? Can NATO really outlast Milosevic?

- After two months of air strikes, NATO remains remarkably united. Few would have predicted this two months ago.
- At last month's Summit, NATO stated its objectives and associated the conditions for ending the bombing. Not one ally has deviated from those conditions.
- Some have difficult balancing acts to play at home, such as D'Alema. Fischer also has to contend with his government's coalition with the Greens. But all, even the Greeks, have lent their support to the ongoing air campaign.
- Challenge is to hold the allies together, and demonstrate a solid front to Milosevic. If he thinks he can drive wedges, he will try, and he will be encouraged to hold out longer.
- The same way he looks for fissures in the Alliance, he looks for fissures in the U.S. Congress. Hence importance of showing bipartisan support for NATO's actions.

Why didn't we make the air campaign more effective from the outset?

- First task was to degrade air defense so that risk to our pilots would be acceptable. When that was done, allies agreed to expand the range of targeting and intensity of the air campaign.
- NATO had always planned for a phased air operation. And when faced with a defiant Milosevic, the allies quickly agreed to move to subsequent phases and to expand the range of targeting.
- The allies have also been responsive to SACEUR's requests for additional forces. From under 400 aircraft on Day 1, NATO now had over 900, allowing round-the-clock air operations from multiple directions.
- If the US had been conducting this campaign unilaterally, we probably would have planned it differently. However, neither you nor I would have wanted the US to do this alone.
- Having a coalition of 19 democracies, in partnership with a large number of other countries, builds international support for our actions while bringing further pressure and isolation on Milosevic.

Why aren't we using the Apaches?

- When I agreed to the deployment of the Apaches to Albania, I withheld a decision on their employment because the Chiefs were concerned about their safety operating over Kosovo.
- That concern still exists and, as a result, the Pentagon has not yet recommended that we begin to employ them. At the same time, the arrival of good weather and additional A-10s has helped to increase NATO's ability to engage Serb forces in Kosovo.
- The Apaches remain deployed in Albania as part of SACEUR's strategic reserve. We have tried to keep some ambiguity about when and where the Apaches might be used, since their presence creates significant concern and uncertainty in the minds of the Serb military.

Should we be putting more effort into diplomacy? Why not “give peace a chance?”

- Our objective is to isolate Milosevic, make him feel increasing pressure, and communicate to him that NATO is united and uncompromising in its positions.
- We are doing that through various means, including through Chernomyrdin.
- Yeltsin desperately wants a halt to the bombing. By communicating to Moscow that we are prepared to continue until our conditions are met, we seek to have Moscow put increasing pressure on Milosevic.
- A flurry of diplomatic activity and envoys to Moscow would not increase the chances of a diplomatic outcome that would achieve our objectives, but rather leave Milosevic feeling that he is once again the “master of the game” who can divide and outlast the international community.

Why not support a bombing pause?

- NATO has agreed that it will suspend bombing when Milosevic accepts NATO’s conditions and begins to withdraw.
- Some have suggested a bombing pause. Danger that it becomes irreversible and sends mixed messages to Milosevic.
- Have not ruled out as part of a carefully orchestrated end game.

Can we cut a deal with a war criminal?

- Need to think in two time frames.
- In the short-term, we want to create the conditions in which refugees can return. This requires the withdrawal of Serb forces and the introduction of an effective international force.
- In the longer-term, we want a Serbia that is no longer a source of instability and that can be integrated into our vision for south-east Europe. This requires the removal of Milosevic.

- Thus our strategy is to press Milosevic to accept our conditions, while simultaneously setting the conditions for his removal.
- As part of this strategy, we are using various means to communicate two basic messages. First, they must move Milosevic to our conditions, or distance themselves from him. Second, only a Serbia without Milosevic can enter the 21st century and rejoin with Europe.

What are we doing to help IDPs in Kosovo?

- We are very concerned about the status of the estimated 700,000 internally displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- Refugees crossing into Macedonia and Albania increasingly report that lack of food was one of the reasons that they left. Further there are reports that the Serbs are using Kosovar Albanians as human shields, and using civilian homes and barns to store ammunition.
- Despite the horrors they have witnessed and their brutal expulsion from their homes, those Kosovars who have crossed the borders and become refugees are the lucky ones -- at least we are able to reach them with food, health care and humanitarian assistance.
- Some assistance is going in to Kosovo. The Greeks, Swiss and Russians have jointly launched an initiative to provide aid and are sending in regular convoys. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) just reopened its office in Pristina and hopes to begin operations soon. A UN team is also assessing what assistance is possible under the current security conditions.
- We welcome such initiatives but know that agreements from Milosevic to allow relief agencies to reach needy civilians have not amounted to much in the past. Frankly, we have seen no evidence yet that any of the aid going in is reaching ethnic Albanians.
- We continue to plan for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo -- an initiative that we hope to announce soon but would prefer not to share publically right now given the risks involved.

IF PRESSED ON AIRDROPS (and if this is a confidential meeting):

- We envision daily drops of food and medical assistance to displaced people in the hills. AID has lined up an NGO who is willing to run the operation and a civil aviator who is prepared to make the drops.
- We are finalizing the operation, including making sure that it is closely coordinated with the NATO campaign, and hope to begin the drops shortly.

What is the status of talks between the Chernomyrdin and Milosevic? Has Talbott made any progress in Moscow?

- I am awaiting a debrief from Talbott when he returns from Moscow.
- Indications are that Serb officials are now talking about 6 to 8 points, suggesting that Milosevic is looking for a way out.
- But the G-8 principles are not, in themselves, sufficient. We stand by NATO's conditions, and will persist until they are met.

CHINA

I. NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS/THREATS

Was U.S. national security undermined by these security breaches? Do the Chinese now have information on all our nuclear warheads?

- As the IC Damage Assessment concluded, China did obtain some basic nuclear weapons design information on several modern warheads and weapons design concepts that "probably" accelerated its modernization program.
- This clearly harmed U.S. national security.
- The Damage Assessment also concluded that we cannot determine the full extent of information China obtained, for example, whether weapons design documentation or blueprints were acquired.

- Regardless, we must continue to take necessary steps to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs.
- The Damage Assessment also concluded that the aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of China's deployed nuclear forces or any new nuclear weapons deployment.
- The key national security issue is Beijing's political decision on how much to expand and modernize its nuclear force.
- Up to now, the Chinese have maintained a very small and rudimentary strategic force, first deployed in the early 1980s.
- China is expected to deploy a more modern nuclear forces early in the next decade, and they clearly have the resources to develop and deploy a much larger and more sophisticated nuclear force, which would pose an even greater threat to us.
- To protect our national security, we should pursue a China strategy that minimizes how much China expands its nuclear forces.
- The more that our relationship becomes hostile and confrontational, the more it will strengthen those in China that advocate building up China's nuclear forces.

Doesn't this news (about China's activities) argue for speedier development of a missile defense system, to guard against the possibility of a Chinese attack?

- For the foreseeable future, we will continue to rely on our nuclear deterrent forces to provide protection against a deliberate nuclear attack from China (as well as Russia).
- The United States retains a robust strategic (and non-strategic) nuclear deterrent force: any attack against the United States would be met by an overwhelming and devastating response.

- Continue to believe we should focus our NMD program to deal with the emerging threat posed by rogue states. While our NMD program will have some capability against accidental or unauthorized launches from Russia or China, it is not designed to address a deliberate, large-scale attack by these two states.

II. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS/REACTIONS

Did Chinese espionage occur during your Presidency? If so, why did you say in your March 19 press conference that you were not aware of Chinese nuclear espionage at the labs during your Administration?

- In March, I was asked about whether I knew of any specific espionage – theft of nuclear information – from the labs during my term in office. I said that I did not know of any espionage during this period involving the labs, or theft of secrets from the labs. That was an accurate statement.
- Since that time, there have been certain allegations about Chinese espionage that may, or may not, involve the labs. Those investigations are continuing, and no conclusions have been made.
- But I know that the Chinese have continued to attempt to get information from us, and it is possible they have succeeded. We can't be sure at this point in time. Here's the important point: we must do everything we can to secure our secrets in order to minimize the chance that they, or anyone else, will be successful.

Why was no one at the White House coordinating the activities of DOE, FBI, DOJ and CIA on Chinese espionage? Was the White House asleep at the switch while all these agencies were bungling the investigation?

- The National Security Council, and ultimately the President, provide guidance and oversight of counterintelligence policies and programs carried out by federal agencies, including the Departments of Energy and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, The Department of Justice, and the FBI.

- The NSC has played a significant role in coordinating efforts to strengthen counterintelligence at our nuclear labs, in response – in part – to allegations of Chinese espionage. In particular the NSC aggressively pushed the process that resulted in the issuance of PDD 61 and implementation of the changes it directed.
- As for ongoing counterintelligence investigations, the NSC must often be aware of the national security or foreign policy impact of investigations and the criminal conduct that underlies them, but **neither NSC nor White House personnel conduct law enforcement investigations or engage in individual investigative decisions.**
- **This policy protects the quality of investigations – leaving the difficult investigative and prosecutorial decisions to those with the expertise and the facts.**
- **It also protects against even the suggestion of “political” interference in prosecutorial decisions** with respect to the initiation, conduct, and ultimately decisions as to whether to prosecute or decline prosecution.
- A system that had White House officials reviewing individual case files to determine which law enforcement techniques should be used would be unacceptable. (FBI investigations are conducted pursuant to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for such investigations.)
- Where an individual case has national security or foreign policy impact, the NSC will often be briefed on the conduct of the investigation. This is done to understand foreign policy impact, and where appropriate provide law enforcement authorities foreign policy input.

Was the White House aware of the problems in the investigation of the Wen Ho Lee case? If so, why didn’t you do anything?

- NSC staff was briefed on occasion by the FBI about the Wen Ho Lee investigation.

- The NSC staff was told in a briefing by FBI that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) request had been turned down. However, NSC staff members asked and were told at that time that the matter was still being reviewed, that additional investigative steps were being taken that might provide a predicate for FISA coverage, and that NSC assistance was not necessary or requested. (Of course, if such assistance had been requested, consistent with the White House policy on investigations, we would have subsequently considered the propriety of doing so.)

Are you saying the NSC has no role with respect to counterintelligence?

- Absolutely not. The NSC is responsible for providing guidance and coordination with respect to policies and programs involving counterintelligence. The White House has made strengthening U.S. counterintelligence a high priority.
- In 1994 I issued a Presidential Decision Directive on U.S. counterintelligence effectiveness that implemented measures for improved counterintelligence coordination and established
 - A National Counterintelligence Policy Board, and
 - A National Counterintelligence Center.
- In 1998 I issued PDD 61, which made sweeping changes to the DOE Counterintelligence program.
- The NSC is deeply involved – on a day-to-day basis in the implementation of these directives, and in otherwise overseeing counterintelligence policy.

Shouldn't Sandy Berger have briefed you when he learned about Chinese espionage in 1996?

- I believe Sandy Berger acted appropriately.
- It is my understanding that in 1996, the briefing dealt with Chinese espionage that allegedly took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Sandy took this very seriously, and took a number of appropriate actions:

- At the conclusion of the briefing, it was determined that (1) Congress was to be briefed (at Sandy's request), (2) DOE would continue its efforts to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs, and (3) that DOE analysts would conduct an overall investigation of Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive information from the labs.
- In May, 1996 the FBI open a full counterintelligence investigation, with its prime suspect a scientist at Los Alamos
- Based on the information available at this stage, I believe this was the proper course for handling these allegations.
- When DOE returned in 1997 with a broader overview of security at the labs, Sandy briefed me soon after and we launched a comprehensive and systematic review of the issue.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: MILES M. LACKEY *ML*

SUBJECT: Points for Senate Democratic Retreat

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the President with points and Qs and As on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage.

Concurrence by: Mike Hurley *MH*, Gary Samore *GS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached Memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage
Tab B Qs and As on Kosovo and Chinese Espionage