

Case Number: 2008-0994-F-3

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| Original OA/ID Number:<br>2729 |            |               |             |                |
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| Document ID: 9903646           |            |               |             |                |
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                             | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. fax                 | Fax coversheet, re: Visit Cert - Mrs. Van Cleave (1 page) | 05/11/1999 | b(6)        |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Kosovo])  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

9903646

2008-0994-F

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### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903646  
RECEIVED: 12 MAY 99 14

TO: HELMICK, RAYMOND

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA  
KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: KARIC, BOGOLJUB

STEELE, DAVID

SUBJECT: REPLY OBO POTUS RE KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9904039

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
HURLEY

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 4 OF 4

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903646

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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| 001 SCHULTE | Z 99051214 APPROPRIATE ACTION             |
| 001         | Z 99051219 ACTION TRANSFERRED             |
| 001 HURLEY  | Z 99051219 APPROPRIATE ACTION             |
| 002 BERGER  | Z 99061512 FOR SIGNATURE                  |
| 002 MOYN    | Z 99061714 FOR REDO                       |
| 003 BERGER  | Z 99061716 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE |
| 003 MOYN    | Z 99061811 FOR REDO                       |
| 003 BERGER  | Z 99062109 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE |
| 003 HURLEY  | Z 99062212 FOR REDO                       |
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UNCLASSIFIED



**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3646  
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| DAVIES            | _____       | _____           | _____                      |
| KERRICK           | <u>2</u>    | _____           | _____                      |
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Correspondence on Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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CC:

99 JUN 21 AM 9:22

COMMENTS:

*Correspondence on Kosovo*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

## THE WHITE HOUSE

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COMMENTS:

Correspondence on Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

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sive to Helmick's  
letter to SRB was  
deleted. I recommend  
restoring it. Sam —

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To: Sam Moryn

We missed the mark on this one. Incoming is all about the KLA. We can largely discard the verbiage in the response re short and long-term objectives. Helmick gives very thorough brief on KLA issues. We need a fuller response to the issues he raises. Important to get this one right.

ERic



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To: Sam Moyn

I think Ponus would want to reply  
to Father Helmick. Ponus can reply  
for SRS also. "Thank you for your letter..."  
I know you also wrote to Sandy Berger on these  
issues."

dis attaching language that you should  
draw from for future letters.

Ed Rice

Key -  
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letter to Pote.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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COMMENTS: Correspondence on Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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 Attach copy of  
 Letter to Rie.  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 23, 1999

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter to the President on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward. I know you sent the same materials to Sandy Berger as well, and they asked me to reply.

You have America's gratitude for your participation in Reverend Jackson's delegation to Belgrade and your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will.

Now we are entering a new phase in Kosovo, bringing short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. With the rapid entry of the international security force into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and under self-government is underway.

We especially appreciated your thoughtful comments on American attitudes toward the KLA. As you point out in your letter, the KLA presents a delicate problem. You are right that marginalizing a group and excluding it from a peace process process only delays a reckoning with their interests. For that reason, one of General Mike Jackson's first priorities after entering Kosovo has been to elicit an agreement from the KLA to make them part of the settlement.

We are glad to see that we share the same vision for the basic contours the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo. Like you, we firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province and no Serb forces will remain, the KLA has every incentive to do so. But we also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a role in post-conflict Kosovo. Indeed, we see individual KLA members as applying for the new local police and becoming involved in the government



institutions to be established under the supervision of the United Nations for provisional self-government.

In the long term, the United States will be a driving force in the international community's effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. It is our hope that as part of this process the KLA will work with us towards achieving our goal of an autonomous, self-governed, and multiethnic province within the FRY.

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for your constructive questions and suggestions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Schulte', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for the  
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.  
Jesuit Community  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167-3802



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 11, 1999

Mr. Sandy Berger  
National Security Adviser  
The White House

FAX (202) 456-9300

Dear Mr.

Dear Mr. Berger,

Christ's Peace!

Having traveled to Belgrade last week with the Jackson delegation, I had extensive conversations with Bogoljub Karić, his wife and a number of his assistants, working in those with Landrum Bolling and David Steele.

I came back with the conviction that they and other officials we had met there had little comprehension of the perceptions and objectives behind American policy and actions. I had drawn heavily on the briefing you yourself gave our delegation before we left in trying to explain these things, and promised that I would write a catalogue of then points on which I felt they misunderstood what the U.S. aimed at. I was ready with that by Sunday last, the 9<sup>th</sup>, but had great trouble getting through to them by FAX. The many FAX and phone numbers I had were all in the Karić building, which has been evacuated now because of danger from the bombing. Not until today was I sure I had gotten the FAX through, to a number I had from Aleksandar Vidojević this morning. And then I found that I had succeeded Sunday, when I sent it to Mrs. Karić's London number, in the hope that someone there would be able to send it further.

You should be informed, I know, of any such thing that I send. The whole transmission is here, including the covering sheets to Mrs. Karić in London and to Aleksandar Vidojević, as well as the attached copies of what I had written to Catholic authorities in Rome and Croatia in 1995 and 1997. I waited to send you a copy until I knew it had been received there. I've also just now sent a copy to David Steele at CSIS, so that he and Landrum Bolling would know of it before their State Department meeting today.

With all best wishes,

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

Madame Milanka Karić  
London

FAX: 011 44 181 367-9487

Dear Madame Karić,

Christ's Peace!

You helped us so much when we were in Belgrade last week, the Jackson delegation seeking the release of the three American prisoners. We were seeking more, of course, an opening to diplomacy through this generous gesture. Landrum Bolling, David Steele and I were particularly concerned to foster that in our conversations with your husband. As I watch the new developments of these last few days, I wonder if we may not have had some degree of success at that.

It is in that context that I have written the attached letters, to your husband and to President Milosević. I tried twice today to send these by FAX, to each of the two numbers listed on the letter to your husband. I did not get through, but had only continued ringing of a phone each time.

Perhaps I need only to call tomorrow at a time when people are in the office and can set the machine for FAX reception. But I was not certain whether his building is still undamaged or whether the lines were in order. But I thought it well to send this to the FAX number you gave me for your office in London. I hope there will be someone there who knows how to get it all to you in Belgrade as quickly as possible.

I pray for you as you go through this ordeal of the bombing. Best wishes,

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



THE JESUIT COMMUNITY  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

2380  
Fax: 617-552-~~2877~~

COVER SHEET

FAX #: 011 381 11 3617591

011 381 11 3617747

011 381 11 605353 (Prof. Karic)

TO: Mr. Bogoljub Karic

FROM: Raymond G. Helwick, S. J.

ADDRESS: Jesuit Community at Boston College  
St. Mary's Hall  
140 Commonwealth Avenue  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167  
TEL: 617-552-8200-8215

or 617-325-1300

DATE: May 10, '99

RE:

MESSAGE: Aleksandar - Thank you for giving me  
this FAX number. I have been two days trying all the  
FAX numbers I had, without success, except that I sent  
this message evening to Mr. Karic's number in England.

Number of pages sent 15 (Number includes cover sheet.)

Please notify us (617-552-8200) if any pages of this document  
were not transmitted or if you have received this message in error.  
Thank you.





JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

Mr. Bogoljub Karić  
Nemanjina 11  
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

FAX: 011 381 11 3617591 (or 3617747)

Dear Mr. Karić,

Christ's Peace!

How can I thank you and Mrs. Karić enough for the extraordinary help you gave us of the Jackson delegation in our difficult task last week? I have known you and your good will from last year, and I treasure the friendship of Aleksandar Vidojević. I was glad that I came this time in the company of Landrum Bolling and David Steele. Their long and sympathetic study of your country, their efforts for the healing of wounds and for building relations of civility and respect within and between our countries exceed mine, but I share with them their hopes for your good.

Your help was indispensable to our entire delegation when we faced that crisis over our admission to the prisoners as a religious delegation, and far more so when it came to presenting our case for the release of these three young men to your President Milosević. In addition, it was of great value to the three of us, Landrum Bolling, David Steele and myself, to have that good conversation on Saturday afternoon.

I enclose, with this letter, one for your President Slobodan Milosević. In it I promise him that I will write to you an analysis of what I saw as incomprehension of American thinking from the many conversations I had with you and others. Mrs. Albright told us, on our return, that the Yugoslav government knows exactly what the U.S. and NATO demand, that there could be no misunderstanding. I thought that an example of incomprehension on her part, and said so. What I experienced was that your government receives demands, reads them as ultimatums, darkly suspects their motives and rejects them. Our government receives your proposals, finds them trivial and inadequate and rejects them. Neither seems to comprehend the perceptions behind the other's statements, or the true objectives of the other's policy.

My observations to my own government on this are made directly to them. But I will tell you that we, as a delegation, called strong attention to the Serbian experience of ethnic cleansing in 1995, when the Krajina and West Slavonian Serbs were expelled from Croatia by assaults as cruel as anything that is happening now in Kosovo. To give you some insight into my own attitude and activity on that matter, I will attach to this letter copies of what I wrote at that time. It was not condemnation after the fact, but efforts to

**Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 2**

prevent the evil as it happened, as I wrote to the Vatican Secretary of State requesting papal intervention on behalf of the people of Krajina. I wrote again, this time directly to the Pope, before the return of East Slavonia to Croatian administration in January of 1998. This received a positive response from the *assessore* of the Papal Secretariat of State, though I am not aware of any such active church appeal for the safety of Serbs in the area as I sought.

But I should come to what I have called areas of incomprehension.

**American Intentions as to the Status of Kosovo.**

I kept hearing, from you and others, the belief that the United States intended to set up an independent Kosovo, and that under KLA control. I'm sure this is not true, and that your believing it is an obstacle to understanding that can and should be eliminated.

I have heard high American officials, Sandy Berger and, on our return, President Clinton himself deny it. I know what gravely unacceptable results, for American and NATO interests, would follow either from the independence of Kosovo or from the empowerment of the KLA. And I observe that the U.S. officials, whom I hear denying that this is their policy, understand very well how any such developments would jeopardize their real interests.

Sandy Berger made these points very absolutely before we departed for your country, and wanted to be sure that none of us misunderstood them. An independent Kosovo, he recognized, would launch a "Greater Albania" movement, drastically destabilizing to a fragile Albania itself, and to Macedonia and Montenegro. It would likely engender a war that could quickly involve Greece and Turkey, canceling out the whole Southern reach of NATO, and perhaps spread even wider. American and NATO policy does not accept that and will not permit it. Any expectation on your part that such things are American and NATO objectives are wholly mistaken.

**Retention of Kosovo as Part of Serbia.**

The irony of this is that, as Mr. Berger put it, there appears to be no other way that Kosovo can be retained as territory of Serbia than that it be put under the protection of an adequate international force. Alienation in Kosovo has reached such a pitch that every young man capable of carrying arms will be back from exile with a gun. The U.S., Mr. Berger told us, will not arm them, for the reasons already given, that we too would see them as danger. But they will certainly be armed, and will mount such a long-term insurrection as Yugoslavia will not be able to contain. The province will become unsafe for its Serb population and ungovernable by Serbian force.



**Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 3**

We were told both by Mr. Berger, before our visit to you, and by President Clinton after it, that the U.S. feels itself equally responsible to protect the Serbs in Kosovo, whether from the KLA or from acts of vengeance by non-KLA Albanian residents, as it is for the Albanian Kosovars themselves. President Clinton made it clear that the KLA would have to be disarmed and even that the international force of which he spoke would have to provide that the most dangerous KLA elements were kept outside. Fundamental to this view, as expressed both by Berger and the President, is a recognition that the KLA would not surrender its weapons to any other force than an American-led NATO. That is a basic reason for the American insistence on a NATO core in an international force.

**The Nature of the Conflict in Kosovo.**

American thinking, at an earlier stage of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, was content to believe that people in your part of the world had their ancient quarrels that could never be settled. This gave outside countries a rationalization to believe there was nothing that could be done about war in your countries, that people had always been killing each other and always would.

Our planners have become more sophisticated now. They recognize that people in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated their capacity to live together in peace over many years, and that it took deliberate actions of provocation to create a war. Only so could the ancient hatreds be revisited.

In American opinion, the Kosovo crisis dates only to 1987, when Mr. Milosević made his speech there. In fact all the rest of the Balkan crisis rests on that deliberate and artificial resuscitation of an ethnic nationalism which had to rely on an appeal to religious identity to make it so divisive.

The withdrawal of Kosovo's already established autonomy status is seen as the key decision that has made this division violent. Even so, that followed a period of several years in which Mr. Ibrahim Rugova's non-violent resistance movement provided an opportunity to address the problem in peace. That opportunity was squandered as Mr. Rugova's party was ignored for all that time, until he was discredited by the outbreak of widespread violence March of 1998. Now, because Rugova remained so long in government custody, apparently under duress, American planners fear that he may have become too compromised to retain his standing with his own people.

As for the KLA, our planners do not accept that the war arose from long plotted conspiracy by these militants and their predecessor organizations. The KLA remained a minor element in the situation, not seriously dangerous, until the time last year when the Yugoslav forces over-reacted to provocations and brought about its sudden growth.

**Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 4**

**Character of the International Force.**

When we spoke last week, I interrupted you when I heard you speak of American demand for a purely NATO occupation of Kosovo. I said that I felt you had not heard the significant change in the language used by the American government. Some weeks ago, the U.S. was indeed speaking only of a NATO force. The language has changed, and now calls for "an international force." The U.S. and NATO now actively pursue Russian, Ukrainian and Swedish participation in that force, as well as other neutral nations.

The remaining insistence on U.S. and NATO participation in this force is not based on any desire to dominate Yugoslavia, or even Kosovo itself. It is instead because the exiled Kosovars will not trust any force that does not include them, armed and in adequate numbers, nor will the KLA otherwise agree to be disarmed. A purely UN-led force could simply not accomplish either of those goals.

What I heard frequently from Yugoslav officials, particularly from your Foreign Minister Jovanović, was that only Yugoslav forces would be allowed in Kosovo, and that they alone would protect the Kosovars, who were invited to return. American officials dismiss this as impractical, even evasive. They are convinced that the Kosovar Albanians have been so much traumatized by Yugoslav Army and Police actions of the last year, and especially by the actions of the paramilitary militias, that there is no hope whatever of their returning while those forces are still present in the province.

**Convictions About the Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo.**

When American officials hear the denials by the Yugoslav government that ethnic cleansing happens at all in Kosovo, denials of the specific charges of burning villages, forcing people from their homes, widespread murder of men of military age, or organized mass rape of Kosovar women, they do not believe you at all. The stories told by the refugees are consistent and backed by credible evidence.

They do not doubt that some accounts have been exaggerated or invented. But the total impact of the accounts convinces them. They have aerial photographs to support the tales of military columns burning out villages and driving civilians before them, pictures of new mass graves, medical tests of distraught young women who have been raped. In the case of those still inside Kosovo, they have further aerial photographs of them living out in the open in the forests, deprived of all supplies. All of this is totally consistent with what they have seen of Serbian practice in Bosnia. Denial impresses them simply as evidence of bad faith.

They hear the Yugoslav invitations to the exiles to return, but notice the condition required that they be able to prove their citizenship. So many refugees have told of



**Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 5**

having their passports, identity papers, even the license plates of their cars taken from them and destroyed before they crossed the borders, that this invitation too impresses American and NATO observers as merely pretense.

Consequently these officials firmly believe that your government has driven these exiles from their homes and intends to keep them out of Kosovo despite all claims to the contrary. Just as the U.S. officials reject the proposal of an independent Kosovo because of the dangers of regional destabilization it would pose, they understand that leaving these exiles outside of Kosovo presents exactly the same dangers. The influx of all these ethnic Albanians into Macedonia and Montenegro, the presence of all these angry and dispossessed people in Albania itself, pose the risk of a regional war as much as if there were an independent Kosovo state attempting to construct a Greater Albania. The one can no more be tolerated by the U.S. and NATO than the other.

All of this means that the U.S. and NATO find themselves obligated to win this war. Such episodes as the bombing, surely by accident rather than design, of hospitals, busses, residential neighborhoods, and now the Chinese Embassy embarrasses them gravely. You might expect that these embarrassments would weaken their resolve. But they cannot afford to lose, as it would mean the destruction of their alliance.

Their air war has not done what they expected. Yugoslavia was not brought quickly to its knees as they had thought. The bombing has not stopped or even slowed the process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and may even have accelerated it. But that does not mean that Yugoslavia has won or will win. Instead, the NATO forces are trapped into a continuing air war which they can no longer halt. Because they are so much stronger militarily than Yugoslavia, this will mean eventually the wholesale destruction of your country and its power.

No one, certainly not the American and NATO officials who make the decisions about the war, really wants that. Winning that way will be no real victory, nor will it do any real good for the exiled Kosovo population. But the effective decisions, defective though they are, have already been made irreversibly.

I paint indeed a dreadful picture. As I see it myself, the true American and NATO objectives are in fact honorable. They intend to save the Kosovo population from what has become a genuinely criminal assault. They have no intention of removing Kosovo from the territory of Yugoslavia, but instead have a firm resolve to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia with an autonomous province of Kosovo, as it was before. I have heard your Foreign Minister Jovanović describe the NATO plans for Yugoslavia as "limited sovereignty," like that which first the Nazis and then the Soviets sought to impose. I don't believe that is the case. Rather, I believe the NATO powers are striving to prevent Yugoslavia's total loss of sovereignty over Kosovo, a prospective loss incurred by the massive over-reaction by Yugoslav forces to the unrest in Kosovo last year.



**Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 6**

I see no probability that these disasters can be averted without agreement on the basic demands made by the U.S. and NATO. The refugees must be enabled to return. That cannot happen while the forces that have driven them out remain in place. Another force must necessarily take their place. Otherwise the KLA will fill the vacuum, driving out or murdering the remaining Serb population, and exposing the entire region to the dangers posed by the Greater Albania idea. Allowing the refugees to remain outside of Kosovo threatens exactly the same regional dangers.

The force that could retain Kosovo within Serbia can only be one that convinces the Albanian Kosovars that they can safely return to their homes. That is clearly not the Yugoslav Army and Special Police, who are responsible for the ethnic cleansing in the first place. Your forces have no way of producing that confidence among the critically essential Albanian population. Nor can a force led only by the UN accomplish it. The objective can only be reached if there is the NATO core to the international force that has been demanded. It has become a choice between that and chaotic regional destruction.

For President Milosević, recognition of these realities and acceptance of this way of retaining Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, which is otherwise likely to be forfeit, is an honorable course. The U.S. placed its reliance on him in 1995 to restore safety and civility to the region. We in our religious delegation last week came to him looking, with your invaluable help, for an action of decency and diplomacy. He fulfilled our hopes. He is the President of Yugoslavia, and has the responsibility to provide in this way for the safety of its citizens.

I hope this letter is helpful to you, for its purpose of elucidating, as I truly understand them, the real perceptions that lie behind American actions and demands. It is my conviction that you yourself and your government have understood them mistakenly. I have argued to my own government that they too misunderstand the motives behind Yugoslav actions. What is most necessary to bring about agreement, as I see it, is a kind of communication between your government and ours that is simply not taking place at present. Our delegation's objective was to open this up, and we argued for it here too.

I am grateful for what you, your wife and your President did, in response to our appeal, last week. I wish you, your fellow citizens, and among them the tortured people of Kosovo, only good. That you yourself wish only good for your neighbors and fellow citizens in Kosovo I accept. We have experienced such good will from you in our own mission that I have good hope for your coming to a resolution of these tragic differences. God love you all,

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

President Slobodan Milosević,  
Care of Mr. Bogoljub Karić

Dear President Milosević,

Christ's Peace!

You have my deepest gratitude for the magnanimity with which you allowed us, the American delegation who came with the Reverend Jesse Jackson, to enter your country last week in a time of such violence. Your release of the three captured Americans showed generosity and compassion on your part. I thank you sincerely.

I send this letter in the care of Mr. Bogoljub Karić, who so much helped us and you to reach that humane conclusion to our effort. I will include, in writing to him, other observations which I trust he will share with you.

Our delegation sought to give a witness of religious faith as we appealed to that generosity and compassion in you. It differed from the official diplomacy of our country, to which we are loyal. An action of such decency and honor on your part, we felt, would call for a response of diplomacy rather than war. We hoped this would provide an opportunity to reopen the path of diplomacy.

We could never be unmindful of the desperate condition of the refugees fleeing the action of Serbian forces in Kosovo, nor advocate anything that would mean abandoning them to exile. And yet, at the very moment of the release of these prisoners, a Serbian woman journalist rose to challenge us. She asked about those Serbian citizens, victims in the bombing of the bus near Pristina the previous day, who could not sit at a desk and call their mothers on a cellular phone. We knew she had asked the right question. It was difficult to answer.

I return to the United States with a strong impression that neither side really comprehends the perceptions that govern the other's policies. I do my talking to the American officials to their face. Along with the rest of the Jackson delegation I recommended strongly to President Clinton, Mr. Berger and Mrs. Albright that they needed communication, communication, communication with you and your colleagues. When we heard it said that "we don't trust them and they don't trust us," our response was that precisely that distrust should be overcome by communication.

I found statements from your officials about what they believed were the objectives of American and NATO policy to be wildly inaccurate. In discussing these at




**President Slobodan Milosević, May 9, 1999 -- 2**

length with Mr. Karić, and with our own Mr. Landrum Bolling and David Steele, I felt I should catalogue, for your benefit, the points on which I believe your government has not really understood why the Americans said and demanded what they did.

This is what I will write to your good friend and mine, Mr. Karić. I hope he will not only show it to you but will discuss it as well.

My thanks and deep respect for the generous way you acted with regard to the prisoners. My acknowledgment that, in so acting, you have shown your own openness to breaking the cycle of violence that encompasses us.

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

August 11, 1995

His Eminence  
Angelo Cardinal Sodano  
Secretary of State  
Palazzo Apostolico Vaticano  
FAX 69.88.52.55 -- first of 3 pages

Dear Cardinal Sodano,  
Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

Please excuse my presumption in writing to you so directly. My long experience of dealing with Cardinal Laghi, while he represented the Holy See in the United States and I was mediating very directly in Middle Eastern and Northern Irish conflict situations, emboldens me to do so.

As the Croatian military forces regain control of the Krajina area, it seems to me that a critical moment occurs in the whole conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and one that creates an opportunity for the Catholic community, both the Catholics of Croatia and their fellows in other parts of the world, to make a significant contribution to the peace.

This war has been characterized by the expulsion of civilian populations from their ancestral homelands, with much brutality and frequent outright massacres. Bosnians, especially Muslims but also Catholics of Croatian ethnicity, have been the principal victims, but in the Krajina, previously a mixed area where roughly equal numbers of Croatian Catholics and Serbian Orthodox lived side by side for centuries, practically the whole Croatian population suffered this fate

Cardinal Sodano, August 11, '95 -- 2

in 1991. Now they are returning, and the Serbian population native to the area is in terrified flight.

What can break the cycle of violence and retribution? If at this point the Croatians were to act with great generosity toward the Serbs who have, for centuries, been their neighbors, inviting and welcoming this civilian population back to their homes and, by carefully planned policy, making it practically feasible for them to return, the entire character of this war could be changed decisively. To do this would be strikingly in keeping with their profession of Catholic faith, a response in the loving forgiveness of Christ to the terrible suffering even of those who have most offended them.

I know how much this asks of the Croatian Catholic people. It would call for great resolve and resources of faith. The gravity of the times requires greatness in faith from these afflicted people. I address this to you because I think the Croatians could be helped definitively to see this as their right course, and to follow it, by exhortation from the Holy See, and by such clear leadership from their own hierarchy and clergy, with the support of Catholics elsewhere in the world, as could best be organized from the Holy See.

Would this, at a practical level, be tilting at windmills? I think not, despite the many difficulties that would stand in the way of persuading Croatian leadership to adopt such a policy, or the Serbs to respond to it.

The Serbs of Croatia have been severely shocked by the bombing and shelling of their cities, and the harrassment of refugee columns as they fled the land. The immediate fear of their military joining with the Bosnian Serbs in the ravaging of Muslims and Catholics in that area seems to have passed, as the refugees have moved on into Serbia, their military mostly disarmed.



Cardinal Sodano, August 11, '95 -- 3


But these people now face relocation in Kosovo: settlement in another situation of disputing the land with, this time, an Albanian population, thereby spreading the conflict still more widely and themselves living with further tragedy. They are already disillusioned with the actions of Serbian government, even though for the bad reason that they wanted Serbian military help to defeat the Croatian advance. They can be expected to understand the new dangers they face.

It would take great effort by the Croatian people and government to convince them that they could safely return to their ancestral homes, to live in peace with their old Croatian neighbors. But this is the one development that would really transform the situation, not only for themselves but for the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and make their eventual reconciliation a credible possibility.

This is the Catholic moment of this terrible war. I believe that, with a response worthy of Catholic faith, it could be made a moment of healing and hope, and of great spiritual growth for all these peoples, Catholic, Orthodox Christian and Muslim alike.

I write this with much deference, and prayerful good wishes,

in Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Cc: His Eminence, Pio Cardinal Laghi  
Very Rev. Fr. General Peter Hans Kolvenbach, S.J.  
His Eminence, Bernard Cardinal Law



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

December 19, 1997

His Holiness  
Pope John Paul II  
Città del Vaticano  
Rome, ITALY

Most Holy Father,

Christ's Peace!

As we celebrate this year the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace, the war in what was once Yugoslavia, only partially quieted, approaches a new defining moment. On January 15th, Eastern Slavonia returns from Serbian control to that of Croatia.

Throughout the years of tragedy for Croats and Bosnians, Serbian forces pursued the policy of "ethnic cleansing." Many of us hoped, from the time the tide of war changed in 1995, that Catholic Croatia would not simply repeat that cruel behavior, turning it now against the Serbian population of Western Slavonia and the Krajina. But that is what was done: the Serbs whose ancestors had long lived in those areas were driven out just as their forces had earlier done to Croats. An opportunity for a response of lived Christian faith by the Catholics of Croatia, making it safe for their ethnic Serbian neighbors to live with them in peace, was lost.

Now, as the date for the return of Eastern Slavonia comes near, Serbs, both those whose ancestors have lived for many generations in this part of Croatia, and those who were planted there as colonists after 1991, flee for their lives from Croatian vengeance. It would still change the entire climate of this conflict, making peace among all three major population groups, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, far more possible, if Croatia's Catholics now turned, in the spirit of Christ, to forgiveness, reconciliation, and became protectors of their Serbian neighbors. The Orthodox Christians of Serbia and the Muslims of Bosnia might well respond in kind.

I reverently beg Your Holiness to make this your appeal at Christmas. I will write in like manner to Cardinal Kuharic, as I did in August 1995 to Cardinal Sodano. Every blessing of Christmas be with Your Holiness and all the Church committed to your care.

In Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.





JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

December 19, 1997

His Eminence  
Franjo Cardinal Kuharic  
Archbishop of Zagreb  
Nadbispuški Duhovni Stol  
Kaptol 31, p.p. 553  
10000 Zagreb, CROATIA

Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!


As we celebrate this year the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace, the war, only partially quieted, approaches a new defining moment as, on January 15th, Eastern Slavonia returns from Serbian control to that of Croatia.

I know how terribly your people suffered as, throughout the years of tragedy for Croats and Bosnians, Serbian forces pursued the policy of "ethnic cleansing." Many of us hoped, from the time the tide of war changed in 1995, that Catholic Croatia would not simply repeat that cruel behavior, turning it now against the Serbian population of Western Slavonia and the Krajina. But that is what was done: the Serbs whose ancestors had long lived in those areas were driven out just as their forces had earlier done to Croats. An opportunity for the Catholics of Croatia to make it safe for their ethnic Serbian neighbors to live with them in peace was lost.

Now, as the date for the return of Eastern Slavonia comes near, Serbs, both those whose ancestors have lived for many generations in this part of Croatia, and those who were planted there as colonists after 1991, flee for their lives from Croatian vengeance. It would still change the entire climate of this conflict, making peace among all three major population groups, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, far more possible, if Croatia's Catholics now turned, in the spirit of Christ, to forgiveness and reconciliation, becoming protectors of their Serbian neighbors. The Orthodox Christians of Serbia and the Muslims of Bosnia might well respond in kind.

I fervently beg Your Eminence, and your colleagues of the Catholic hierarchy and clergy of Croatia, to make this your appeal at Christmas. I have written in like manner to His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, as I did in August 1995 to Cardinal Sodano. Every blessing of Christmas be with Your Eminence and all your much-persecuted people.

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.





## SECRETARIAT OF STATE

FIRST SECTION - GENERAL AFFAIRS

From the Vatican, January 5, 1998

Dear Father Helmick,

The Holy Father has received your letter concerning the situation in Eastern Slavonia and he has asked me to send you this acknowledgment. He appreciates the concerns which prompted you to write to him.

His Holiness will remember you in his prayers. He cordially imparts his Apostolic Blessing as a pledge of joy and peace in the Lord.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Monsignor J.M. Harvey  
Assessor

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.  
Jesuit Community  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903646  
RECEIVED: 12 MAY 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: HELMICK, RAYMOND G

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA  
KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: KARIC, BOGOLJUB

STEELE, DAVID

SUBJECT: FWDS FAX TO KARIC RE KOSOVO CRISIS

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
BLINKEN  
HURLEY  
SCHWARTZ  
WEISS

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904039  
RECEIVED: 25 MAY 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HELMICK, RAYMOND

DOC DATE: 22 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KLA

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ACTION: SEE 9903646 FOR FINAL ACTION

DUE DATE: 05 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9903646

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED





JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02467-3802

4039

May 22, 1999

President William Clinton  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton,

Christ's Peace!

After returning with the Jesse Jackson delegation from Belgrade, I wrote back to our hosts there, President Milosevic and Mr. Bogoljub Karic, thanking them for the return of the prisoners and analyzing what I had seen as miscomprehension, on their part, of the objectives behind American policy. I sent a copy of all that, by FAX, to Mr. Berger.

By yesterday I had also finished a report of our visit for the Holy See, of which I FAXed copies to Cardinal Sodano and to Fr. Kolvenbach, the General Superior of my Jesuit order. I enclose a copy of that for you, as the Holy See is another of the diplomatic parties active in this matter.

I am left with one matter left over, on which I felt I needed to write to you. That is **our American attitudes toward the KLA**. Those run a gamut from support of them as Freedom Fighters, which means recruitment, funding and armaments, to classification of them as practically terrorists. I listened carefully as Mr. Berger spoke, before we left, of U.S. policy giving no support either to Kosovo independence or to the arming of the KLA. He was quite sure, however, that if the refugees were not brought back to Kosovo, the KLA would be armed, whether we liked it or not, and would be a dangerous element for the destabilization of the region. When we saw you on our return, you saw as one of the uses of a NATO-core international force in Kosovo that it would bring the right Kosovars back and keep the really dangerous KLA elements out.

h All this needs to be thought through carefully. I think it an error to classify the KLA as "terrorist group." That becomes self-fulfilling prophecy, and we will rue it if we end up having to fight them. They will have many friends right here at home.

I brought back with me from Belgrade a lot of glossy English-language literature full of that "terrorist" language. Serbs of course understand the KLA as their enemy, as Israelis did the PLO, as the British did the IRA (and Sinn Fein), as the Turks do the PKK (and HADEP), as Rhodesians did ZANU and ZAPU, as South Africans did the ANC. Without doubt, the KLA has committed atrocities on Kosovan Serbs, and has murdered its own people who dissented from it. But these are the actions of embattled defenders of a victim people, not of oppressors. Their acts of terrorism are expressions of a people's desperation. That is an aspect that has been ignored in the other cases I refer to, always to our cost or the cost of those who defined their enemies only in this way.



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## President Clinton, May 22, '99 - 2

The KLA is new, despite a lineage that goes back a century and more to conspiratorial separatist groups. Up to the time, early last year, when Yugoslav authorities reacted with massive violence against a village in response to a relatively minor act of guerrilla violence, the KLA was small, of little political importance compared to Ibrahim Rugova's non-violent movement. Yugoslav action was itself responsible for the KLA's growth. In this it resembled the way the moribund IRA was brought back to life in reaction to Unionist and British actions in the early 1970s. The KLA is still not a recognizably unified force with acknowledged leadership.

But the KLA is still not a force to which the U.S. can respond with any degree of trust or cooperation, however much some of our congress and media may want to arm and assist them as "our" ground troops. Their objective is independence, which is truly incompatible with American or European interests. And in victory, they would be a mortal danger to the small (10%) Serb population of Kosovo, which it will be our responsibility to protect. Ethnic cleansing all over again.

The situation bears comparison to that of the Iraqi Kurds. Their two main parties, KDP and PUK, agreed in the late '80s that a non-separatist policy of autonomy within a democratic Iraq was best for them. Even as they have come to fight each other since 1994, they have remained faithful to this resolve. Consequently, when the U.S. and international community decided, since 1991, to provide them protection and air cover, we could leave their Pesh Merga militias in possession of the ground, reasonably confident that they would not dismember Iraq. You have seen something of my own long-term arguments with the PKK in Turkey, urging them also to renounce separatism, and my position that they have effectively been open to that, declaring it their policy since early 1993, and should be dealt with on that basis.

With the KLA, that moderation is lacking. They cannot be trusted not to produce regional havoc if they come to power. Consequently, when the Kosovars are brought back, as we all hope, we need to disarm the KLA, and simultaneously find a way to employ them that respects their dignity as defenders of their people during this crisis.

I see evidence enough that your administration understands the importance of NATO in carrying out that objective. NATO is clearly the only force to which the KLA would even consider handing over its arms. I worry that we may alienate the KLA by treating them as real or potential enemies, even terrorists. Even your own formula, of keeping the most dangerous elements from returning, is very suspect to my way of thinking. We need all of them back in Kosovo, satisfied that the NATO-core international force is making their people safe. Only on that basis can we expect to restore a working autonomy regime within the context of Serbia and Yugoslavia. We could otherwise find ourselves at war with a disillusioned KLA, to our great political damage. It is very much in our interest, and that of peace in Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, to fine-tune our policy in this regard.


**President Clinton, May 22, '99 - 3**

I hope you will understand the point of my concern on this question. My own experience for several decades now has been with a great number of conflicts in which insurgent forces have set themselves up against governments. I have become very wary of the self-fulfilling prophecies by which we or others define such groups as our enemies and end up having to fight them down to some sort of finish. I have adopted it as normal expectation that the people I need to talk to are those who are at the root of whatever trouble I seek to confront, and that I need to talk to them with respect. It is this kind of thinking that brought all of us in the Jackson delegation to Belgrade and Milosevic, and led me afterwards to write to Mr. Karic and President Milosevic as I did.

When we of the Jackson delegation met you after our return, we recommended that you make a telephone call to President Milosevic. This was on the model of the phone call Ronald Reagan had made to President Asad of Syria back in 1984, when Jesse Jackson first brought an American prisoner, airman Goodman, back from captivity. It may be late for that phone call now, but it is in this spirit that we recommended it. And there are surely other ways of accomplishing the same effect.

With all best wishes,

In Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.





JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

1

May 21, 1999

His Eminence  
Angelo Cardinal Sodano  
Secretary of State  
Palazzo Apostolico Vaticano

FAX 69.88.52.55

Dear Cardinal Sodano, Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

Between April 29 and May 3 I took part in the delegation led by the Reverend Jesse Jackson to Belgrade, which resulted in the release of the three American soldiers held prisoner and, we hope, in creating a new opening for diplomacy in this war. I was asked to join the delegation explicitly so that there would be Catholic representation on this broadly interreligious venture.

On my return, pressing teaching duties at the end of our semester in our university delayed me somewhat in writing a full report. But I felt an account of what we had learned, not only on our visit but in our meetings with American authorities before and after it, would be useful to Church authorities.

I attach a list of the delegation. Our intention was to appeal for a generous act of compassion from the widest range of faith communities in the United States: Christians of all the traditions, Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant, as well as Jewish and Muslim. We asked the release of three American soldiers, but in fact looked for much more, that an opening be created for a return from the cycle of violence for violence to diplomacy. That is too subtle a thing to judge. It cannot be *post hoc propter hoc*, but we see with satisfaction the flurry of diplomacy that has taken place since, despite the interruptions of the embassy bombing and the Russian crisis. Reverend Jackson said it best: that he hoped we had opened a key-hole in the door to peace.

American government was very nervous about our mission. White House officials first asked us to postpone our leaving from Saturday, April 24, until after completion of the NATO summit the following day. They then telephoned each of us asking that we not go, and asked NATO to retract a promise that we would have a safe hour to fly into the Belgrade airport. That eventually led to our delaying our departure to Wednesday, April 28, flying commercially to Zagreb and travelling to Belgrade by bus. We left with the released prisoners the same way. Croatian and Yugoslav governments provided the busses on their respective sides of the border.

Mr. Thomas Pickering briefed us for an hour at the State Department the evening before our departure. After saying that our visit did not have government approval and cautioning us against being used for propaganda purposes, he actually wished us well, both for gaining release of the prisoners and for the wider diplomatic goal. We could not in fact have done this as representatives of American government.

Mr. Sandy Berger briefed us for another hour at the White House just before we departed on Wednesday. He began by saying he wished we would not go. He cited physical danger, asserting that there would be no pause in the bombing for us and warning us against being placed in locations of particular danger by accident or calculation. He then said we would be used, which we knew. Our response was that we would willingly be used to open a process of diplomacy but would take precautions against propaganda use. His third *monitum* was that we would be breaking the isolation of President Milosevic that it was U.S./NATO policy to enforce, and that we might thereby prolong the war. We objected to the latter implication and he withdrew it as over-statement, recognizing that the diplomatic isolation of Serbia had not been effective in Greece, Macedonia, Romania and especially Russia and China. At that point Mr. Berger acknowledged that we were surely going, asked that we not regard ourselves as negotiators nor misrepresent U.S. policy.

This was the most interesting part of the conversation, as Mr. Berger wanted to be sure we had no misconceptions of American policy. In particular, he emphasized that the U.S. and NATO did not favor and would not accept an independent Kosovo. As reason, he cited the danger of regional war: turmoil in an already fragile Albania if a Greater-Albania movement were launched, destabilization of Macedonia and Montenegro through Albanian irredentism, leading with some probability to a regional war that could involve Greece and Turkey and possibly widen even more.

The U.S., he said, would not arm the KLA, as its purpose was to create the independent Kosovo that he so rejected. They would nevertheless be armed by other sympathizers, he said, and become an altogether unmanageable force against Serbia if the refugees were left outside of Kosovo. Every young man capable of bearing arms would be back with a gun, and nothing that the U.S. or NATO could do would prevent that. Hence leaving the refugees outside was as dangerous as the independent Kosovo itself, and for the same reasons of regional disruption.

Those perceptions grounded the policy demands made by the U.S. and NATO. In order to return the refugees to their homes, they must be made to feel safe in returning. That required a) removal of the Yugoslav forces, which they would otherwise dread, and also b) provision of an international force in which they would actually place sufficient trust to return. The language had changed from an initial demand for a NATO force to one for an international force, but a force with the NATO core without which the refugees would not have the confidence to return. Russian, Ukrainian, Swedish participation in this force was actively sought, as well as other neutral nations.



The rest of this you have heard. What was of interest was the grounding of the demands in a particular set of perceptions. It was this that we found drastically misconstrued once we began conversations with authorities in Belgrade. The demands made on Yugoslavia were seen there simply as ultimatums to reject, their motivation darkly suspected.

We traveled officially as guests of the Yugoslav religious leaders, meaning principally Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church. There had to be government permission as well, and that had been provided to us principally by Mr. Vuk Draskovic, with whom we maintained telephone contact during our preparations. The Yugoslav *Charge d'affaires*, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, had written assuring us of our welcome. By Wednesday, April 28, the day we were actually able to leave Washington, Draskovic had been dismissed from the cabinet. We asked ourselves whether the mission was still possible and found that elements in the Yugoslav government still encouraged us to go. It took a while for us to understand that the encouragement came from Mr. Bogoljub Karic. But as soon as we arrived a smaller group of us were brought directly to a late-night dinner with Mr. Jivadin Jovanovic, the Foreign Minister.

His discourse admitted nothing of an ethnic cleansing program in Kosovo. All refugee flight resulted from the NATO bombing, and reports of murder and rape met simple denial. More interesting was his view of motivation for the NATO attack. The Nazis, he told us, had tried to impose limited sovereignty on Yugoslavia, and been repulsed by the partisans. The Soviets had tried the same, and Tito had separated Yugoslavia from the Comintern. Now the Americans were at the same game and would also fail. Every generation of Serbs in this century had had to fight for the freedom of the Fatherland, and this generation would fight their war in their turn. No other motive could be seen for the NATO attack than a malicious quest for domination. Jovanovic was quite sure NATO and the U.S. intended independence for Kosovo, and took the Rambouillet formula, with its referendum after three years of protected autonomy, as the sign of that objective.

On Friday morning, April 25, we visited Patriarch Pavle, surrounded by all his bishops in his Synod room. The Patriarch, never hesitant to condemn the several wars and the ethnic cleansing or to criticize President Milosevic directly, received us most cordially. He had asked for the release of the three American prisoners from the time of their capture, and strongly supported our appeal. He also condemned the bombing campaign in the strongest terms. Others of his bishops spoke only of the bombing, as e.g. the "Satanic attack by the American Fascists" (the Bishop of Novi Sad) and had nothing to say of Kosovo, of Bosnia, of Croatia or anything else.

In the afternoon, we went to meet other religious leaders. We had had in mind the Catholic Archbishop (he was away for a surgical procedure in Slovakia but sent his Auxiliary), the Chief Rabbi and the Mufti. The meeting took place under the aegis of the government Minister of Religious Affairs, who presided, in a large hall at his office. Some thirty or so Protestant leaders, of denominations as varied as Lutheran (Austrian from Voivodina) or Reformed (Hungarian), but ranging as far as Jehovah's Witnesses



and Seventh Day Adventists were also present. The Patriarch met us once again, and gave more briefly the same address as in the morning, but most other speeches carefully restricted themselves to condemnation of the bombing – quite sincere, clearly – and nothing else that could upset the hovering government minister. We did not realize it at the time, but a trap awaited us in the matter of visiting the three American prisoners.

Quite suddenly, we received word that two persons only, Reverend Jackson and Congressman Rod Blagojevich, who had accompanied us as the only Serbian-American member of the U.S. Congress, would be allowed to enter the prison – with two media representatives, one reporter and one television cameraman. This, we realized, would effectively negate the religious character of the mission.

As it happened, a delegation of eleven members of the U.S. Congress, meeting with six members of the Russian Duma in Vienna, had wanted to come to Belgrade. This much we knew. What we did not know then, but have read subsequently, is that Mr. Pickering of the U.S. State Department had asked them not to proceed to Belgrade, knowing that the Milosevic government preferred to release the prisoners to them. That would have made it a strictly political exchange, and a *quid pro quo* would be expected. Our religious delegation had no *quid pro quo* to offer, but made a humanitarian plea on a basis of faith conviction.

We had known that the number of our delegation to enter the prison would be limited, but had expected its religious character to be respected. Since our Reverend Jackson is known, in his public image, as a political as well as a religious figure, the effect of limiting the visit to him and the Congressman was to transform it into a visit by two politicians. There seems even to have been some confusion on the part of the Yugoslav government. Reverend Jackson has a son, Jesse Jackson Jr., who is himself a member of Congress, and we noted only later, on a schedule that the Yugoslavs had given us when we first arrived, that they described our delegation as led by Congressmen (in the plural) Jackson and Blagojevich. With or without that error on their part, they were effectively nullifying the religious character of the delegation.

Many of us felt that those two ought not consent to go to the prison under those conditions, but they were faced with an immediate *fiat*: get into the car and go now, or you will not see the prisoners at all. There was turmoil among the rest of the delegation at this turn of events. We were invited to the offices of Mr. Bogoljub Karic, wealthy businessman, intimate of President Milosevic and Minister Without Portfolio in the government, for what appeared to be simply a courtesy reception. The delegation at first refused to go, saying they needed to meet privately among themselves and decide on a course of action. I felt the need, at that point, to confront this issue, and quite deliberately precipitated that by telling the Yugoslav attendants of the delegation that, unless this crisis could be resolved, we would need to return to our hotel and announce the failure of the mission to the international press.

Three of us in the delegation, Mr. Landrum Bolling (Director of Mercy-Corps International), Rev. David Steele (Center for Strategic and International Studies,



Washington) and myself, were already well acquainted with Mr. Karic. We received a promise that we could hold our private meeting, away from the ever-attendant media, at Mr. Karic's office and then present our case to him. On our arrival at his office, the large media party was in fact brought into the meeting room with us, and we had to insist on their withdrawal. Eventually Mr. Karic recognized the nature of our problem, promised that he and his very powerful wife would go to President Milosevic and his wife and get us permission to visit the prisoners as a religious delegation.

He told us also that we could not expect the release of the prisoners, and tried to offer palliatives, such as arranging a visit to the prisoners by their families, as substitute for their release. We regarded any such suggestions as exposing the families to use as propaganda tools, and dismissed them.

While we had carefully kept all this *contretemps* from the media, one of the reporters huddled in the corridor and on the stairs outside our meeting room came to understand what was happening. She reported on the international wires that our religious delegation had been excluded from visiting the prisoners, and that I, in particular, the one Catholic priest in the delegation, prepared to bring communion to the two Catholics among the prisoners, had been prevented from doing that. Many of our delegation were indignant at the reporter for doing that. I felt myself, though we had tried to prevent this, that it may have helped our cause, and told her so.

The actual prison visit by Jackson and Blagojevich had been severely restricted. The three soldiers had been kept in solitary confinement all the thirty days since they had been captured, having seen one another only on the occasion of the Red Cross visit. They were brought without explanation to a place they did not know, and there found Jesse Jackson. They were not permitted to speak to one another. Jackson and Blagojevich were prohibited from asking them anything other than previously agreed questions, of the order of "Are you well?", "Is your food adequate?", "Have you medical care?" etc. They were permitted to give the prisoners Bibles, which all of us had signed. They left with them tape-recorded telephone messages from their families, which the prisoners in fact did not get to hear. Everything was under the direct supervision of the military governor of the prison, whose attitude was massively hostile.

Jackson and Blagojevich came away very discouraged, reading all this as indication that the government had no intention of releasing the prisoners. They had not known what the rest of us had done in the meantime, in our meeting with Mr. Karic, and we had a task of healing relations within our delegation. That was accomplished. On the following day, Saturday, May 1, began with a session at the bombed Foreign Office, where Foreign Minister Jovanovic first gave us a lengthy defense of Yugoslav policy and condemnation of the NATO campaign in the presence of a large party of international and local media. After the media left the room he gave us the seven-point Yugoslav policy proposal as it then was, and as is available from other sources.

Reverend Jackson then went to meet President Milosevic, with a smaller delegation consisting of Joan Campbell, General Secretary of the National Council of



Churches, Congressman Blagojevich, Fr. Leonid Kishkovsky of the Russian Orthodox Church in the U.S., past President of the National Council of Churches, Rabbi Steven Jacobs, and Dr. Nazir Khaja, Chairman of the American Muslim Council. I did not attend this meeting, which lasted three hours, and have therefore only second-hand knowledge of what was said. Instead, I went back with Mr. Landrum Bolling and Rev. David Steele to a further meeting with Mr. Karic.

We had also a lengthy discussion, which covered not only the release of the prisoners but also an analysis of the political situation. Following on that discussion, I later wrote to Mr. Karic, after our return, reviewing that conversation in detail. And I wrote to Mr. Milosevic himself, asking Mr. Karic to deliver that letter and discuss with the President the content of what I had written him regarding misperceptions of American and NATO objectives. Copies of those letters accompany this.

By the end of the Jackson meeting with Mr. Milosevic, the President told him he did not believe he could release the prisoners. Jackson argued essentially, as he reported, that if Yugoslavia were to keep these three young soldiers as trophies of war, hoping to exchange them for some kind of concessions, they would get nothing in return for them. Hence it was better to invest them in an effort for peace.

As soon as the Jackson meeting with Mr. Milosevic finished, Mr. Karic and his wife entered, to spend the next two hours with him and his wife. The decision evidently came during that meeting to release the prisoners. Late in the afternoon, Jackson, Joan Campbell and the Congressman were summoned to the Foreign Office, where Foreign Minister Jovanovic read them the President's letter, instructing him to hand the three prisoners into the custody of our delegation. News of that was posted at once by the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug, and picked up instantly from the Internet by the reporters following us.

We held yet another of our many press conferences as soon as Jackson and party returned to the hotel. Jackson publicly requested, as diplomatic response to this action of diplomacy, that the U.S. and NATO should grant at least one night's pause in the bombing. He noted how tragic it would be if one or more of these young men should be killed in the bombing during the night before the promised release. He requested further that the two Yugoslav soldiers held prisoner by NATO in Germany be released in return.

President Milosevic, in connection with the release, had asked, perhaps rather improbably, to meet President Clinton anywhere: in Belgrade, in Washington, in Geneva or any other agreed place, and had given Jackson a letter to be delivered to President Clinton presenting Yugoslav proposals. Jackson asked that President Clinton make a telephone call to President Milosevic, thanking him for the release of the prisoners. For this, there was a precedent, which he cited. In 1984, Jackson went to Syria and obtained from President Asad the release of a captured American airman, Robert Goodman. President Reagan, on that occasion, telephoned his thanks to President Asad, and the exchange led to continuous diplomatic activity over the next two years.



That night, there was no bombing of Belgrade itself. The rest of Yugoslavia suffered heavy bombardment. In the course of it, an American F16 went down, raising the risk that another American prisoner might have been captured, but the pilot was rescued. At about midnight, Foreign Minister Jovanovic came to our hotel, distraught at the continued bombing. We feared he might announce to us that the promise of release would be retracted, but he did not.

The events of the release itself are fully chronicled elsewhere. We brought the three soldiers out from Belgrade by a bus provided by the Yugoslav government, under military escort. To protect the soldiers from media attention, we had all the attendant reporters and cameras on a second bus, and had to take special measures, surrounding them in the midst of our delegation, to prevent their being overwhelmed by the media when we changed to other busses at the Croatian border.

Of more interest were the comments of high-ranking American generals whom we met while staying overnight at the Ramstein Air Force base in Germany. They spoke with astonishing openness of their criticism of the bombing policy as militarily ill-conceived. The policy, they believed, had been crafted in the State Department, and no military authority gave it approval. The Yugoslav delegation at Rambouillet had been given a choice: sign this or we bomb you, much as had been done to Mr. Milosevic at Dayton in 1995. State Department officials had assumed that a few days of bombing would bring Milosevic to heel. When that failed to happen, they simply had no other policy to fall back on. They were committed to the bombing, which had not prevented the ethnic cleansing, perhaps even accelerated it. NATO could not afford to lose the war, once started, and could only continue the bombing, with drastic results for the infrastructure of Yugoslavia but no hindrance to the atrocities in Kosovo.

On our return to Washington, we met President Clinton, Mr. Berger and Mrs. Albright. The President was delayed somewhat, as his meeting with Mr. Chernomyrdin went longer than programmed. In the meantime, Vice President Gore came into the room, greeted each of us and expressed satisfaction with the results of the mission, both the release of the soldiers and the diplomatic outcome. The President then came in with Mr. Berger and Secretary of State Albright. Mr. Clinton also welcomed the whole result of the intervention, felt that the religiously inclusive character of the delegation had been an advantage, and expressed the hope that the diplomatic opening we had looked for might be achieved. Reverend Jackson gave him a thorough report, especially of his meeting with Milosevic, from carefully prepared notes.

I had the distinct impression that President Clinton understood the implications of the war better than any of his advisers whom we had met, with the possible exception of Mr. Pickering. He was acutely aware of the grievances of the Serbs, and open to the representation by some of our Serbian-American delegation members, particular Fr. Irene Dobrijevic, of the damage done to Serbian consciousness by the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina and other parts of Croatia in 1995.



He reaffirmed what Mr. Berger had told us before our journey of U.S. opposition to Kosovo independence. His description of the KLA as a force that could not be trusted was barely short of what we had heard from the Serbs. He emphasized the responsibility of the international force that he hoped would protect returned refugees in Kosovo to protect the Serbs who lived there as well, and spoke of the international force as a way to ensure that "the right Kosovars" returned to Kosovo, and not those who would create new disorder. Inclusion of a NATO core in the international force was necessary, in his view, partly because it was only to NATO that the KLA would hand in its arms.

Reverend Jackson and several others of us made basically the same requests as we had at the time the release of the soldiers had been announced: a bombing pause, release of the two Yugoslav prisoners, and the phone call to President Milosevic. President Clinton acknowledged all of those, and made no commitment to any one of them, to the obvious relief of Reverend Jackson and several others of us made basically the same requests as we had at the time the release of the soldiers had been announced: a bombing pause, release of the two Yugoslav prisoners, and the phone call to President Milosevic. President Clinton acknowledged all of those, and made no commitment to any one of them, to the relief, as it appeared, of Mr. Berger and Mrs. Albright.

Congressman Blagojevich raised the recommendation he had made several times before, including a written Op-Ed article in the *Chicago Tribune* some days before our departure, of a partition solution for Kosovo. This is a matter on which I had differed with the Congressman several times during our journey, since I see the recommending of it as an endorsement of ethnic cleansing. Eventually I had put it to our delegation as a question, whether we chose to present ourselves under the banner of partition or not. The delegation had rejected it. When the Congressman brought it up to President Clinton, he acknowledged that he was aware of that as Mr. Blagojevich's opinion, and did not accept it as a policy for that same reason.

The President spoke also of initiating a rebuilding and development plan for the entire Balkan region, amply funded so that the whole region would be stabilized. Those things, of course, have a way of falling between the cracks once the Congress is asked to fund them.

When the President and Mr. Berger left, after some three quarters of an hour, Mrs. Albright stayed for another half hour. She was at pains to deny our contention that there was mutual lack of understanding between American and Yugoslav governments and hence need for diplomatic exchange. There could be no misunderstanding, she said. The Yugoslavs knew exactly what was demanded of them, what they must do. Everything was absolutely clear. We responded to that with accounts of the drastic incomprehension we had encountered, and I closed that meeting with a further appeal, on that basis, for the phone call from Mr. Clinton to Mr. Milosevic.

After sending the letters attached here to Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karic, I sent copies to Mr. Berger at the White House.

Angelo Cardinal Sodano, May 21, '99

9

I have made this report ample, in hopes that some items of information in it may actually be of some help to you. I will send a copy, also, to Fr. Kolvenbach. With all best wishes,

in Christ,

  
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



THE JESUIT COMMUNITY  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

Fax: 617-552-2977

COVER SHEET

FAX #: (202) 456-9300

TO: *President Clinton  
The White House  
per Mr. Berger*

FROM: *Raymond G. Helwick, S. J.*

ADDRESS: Jesuit Community at Boston College  
St. Mary's Hall  
140 Commonwealth Avenue  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167  
TEL: 617-552-8200

DATE: *May 22, '99*

RE:

MESSAGE:

Number of pages sent 13 (Number includes cover sheet.)

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**PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE**

**IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED**

ACTION OFFICER:

*Handwritten signature*  
Schulte

LOG NUMBER:

3646

DUE DATE:

5.24

DATE STAFFED:

5.12

**CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:**

☐

PRESIDENT

☒

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

R Helmick

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3646  
REDO

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*  
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*  
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Father Raymond Helmick on Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Proposed Response  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Father Raymond Helmick.

Background

You received a letter from Father Raymond Helmick, a member of Jesse Jackson's delegation to Belgrade, forwarding some correspondence he sent to Mssrs. Milosevic and Karic. He suggests that the KLA be allowed to play a constructive role in post-conflict Kosovo.

Your reply thanks Father Helmick for his useful advice during the course of the air campaign. You touch on NATO's policy regarding the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo. You explain that you do not see KLA members and that NATO envisions an important political role for them in creating a Kosovo at peace with itself.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3646

June 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *js*  
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*  
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Father Raymond Helmick wrote you shortly after participating in Jesse Jackson's delegation to Belgrade forwarding some letters he sent to Mssrs. Milosevic and Karic. Subsequently, he sent the same package to the President along with suggestions that the KLA be allowed to play a constructive role in post-conflict Kosovo. Your reply is also intended to answer this letter.

In the reply, you thank Father Helmick for his contribution to freeing the American servicemen. You thank him for his constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR. Finally, you touch on NATO's policy regarding the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mike Hurley *MH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Response  
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter on NATO's Kosovo policy. I have greatly valued your thoughts on this question over the past several months and your work with the Kosovar Albanians.

Now that Serbian leaders have accepted NATO's conditions, it is clear that force and diplomacy have worked in partnership to bring a necessary conflict to a just and honorable conclusion. Although we could not undo all the terrible things that happened to the people of Kosovo, our firmness finally brought an end to a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing.

NATO met its objectives as an alliance. Nineteen democracies, each with different domestic pressures and historical ties to the Balkans, came together and stayed together through the longest, most difficult military engagement in NATO's 50 year history. The great partnership between the United States, Canada and Europe, on which our security depends, has emerged from a stern test stronger than ever.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout was outstanding. International diplomatic efforts -- including those of our Russian allies -- were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms.

Now we are entering a new phase, bringing short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and under self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to help build a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

The NATO action in Kosovo beat back the greatest remaining outpost of violent, aggressive nationalism in Europe, and opened the way to a Europe that can be, for the first time in its history, undivided, democratic and at peace. We have also reminded the world that when our values and our interests are threatened, Americans will stand up to defend them, today as we have throughout our history.

I hope I can count on your support as we work to bring a brighter future to the people of southeastern Europe.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Dole  
901 15<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W.  
Suite 401  
Washington, D.C. 20005



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward.

I very much appreciated meeting you at the briefing session before your trip. You have the country's gratitude for your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will. You and the others in the Jackson delegation rendered an inestimable service to our country; it will not soon be forgotten.

I am glad to report to you now as I did to the American people the other night that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Their perseverance is all the more remarkable because no NATO country had territorial ambitions on the FRY. Rather, the collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21<sup>st</sup> century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

I know you have also written the President regarding the KLA. ~~While he is unable to reply, allow me to share some thoughts.~~ The KLA presents a delicate problem. Like you, I firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province, the KLA has every incentive to do so completely. But I also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a role in post-conflict Kosovo. In fact, it is likely that Gen. Jackson will invite some of them to participate in local policing.

Sam  
↓

Spill  
ant,  
nextline

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for the constructive suggestions.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

^  
for

The Reverend

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.  
Jesuit Community  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Father Raymond Helmick.

Background

You received a letter from Father Raymond Helmick, a member of Jesse Jackson's delegation to Belgrade, forwarding some correspondence he sent to Mssrs. Milosevic and Karic. He suggests that the KLA be allowed to play a constructive role in post-conflict Kosovo. ~~Earlier, he had sent the same package to Sandy Berger. Your reply is also intended to answer this letter.~~

*Your reply thanks Father Helmick*

~~In the reply, you thank Father Helmick for his contribution to freeing the American servicemen. You thank him for his~~ constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You <sup>to</sup> also explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR; in the long term, to provide for regional stability. Finally, you touch on NATO's policy regarding the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab ~~A~~.

Attachment <sup>7</sup>

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*I especially appreciated your thoughtful  
comments on American attitudes toward the KLA.*

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward. ~~I know you also sent it to Sandy Berger, and I can assure that both he and I took a close look at it.~~

You have <sup>America's</sup> ~~the country's~~ gratitude for your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will. You and the others in the Jackson delegation rendered an inestimable service to our country. ~~It will not soon be forgotten.~~

Now that Serbian leaders have accepted NATO's conditions, it is clear that force and diplomacy have worked in partnership to bring a necessary conflict to a just and honorable conclusion. Although we could not undo all the terrible things that happened to the people of Kosovo, our firmness finally brought an end to a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing.

NATO met its objectives as an alliance. Nineteen democracies, each with different domestic pressures and historical ties to the Balkans, came together and stayed together through the longest, most difficult military engagement in NATO's 50 year history. The great partnership between the United States, Canada and Europe, on which our security depends, has emerged from a stern test stronger than ever.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout was outstanding. International diplomatic efforts -- including those of our Russian allies -- were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms.

Now we are entering a new phase, bringing short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control

and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and under self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

The KLA presents a delicate problem. Like you, I firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province, the KLA has every incentive to do so completely. But I also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a role in post-conflict Kosovo. In fact, it is likely that *NATO military* ~~General Jackson~~ *will* invite some of them to participate in local policing.

In the longer term, we will also be a driving force in the international community's effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to help build a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

The NATO action in Kosovo beat back the greatest remaining outpost of violent, aggressive nationalism in Europe, and opened the way to a Europe that can be, for the first time in its history, undivided, democratic and at peace. We have also reminded the world that when our values and our interests are threatened, Americans will stand up to defend them, today as we have throughout our history.

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for your constructive questions and suggestions.

Sincerely,

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.  
Jesuit Community  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

*Spell out*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter <sup>to the President</sup> on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward. I know you sent it to Sandy Berger as well, and ~~we each closely examined it.~~ <sup>they have asked me to reply,</sup>

You have America's gratitude for your participation in Reverend Jackson's delegation to Belgrade and your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will. You and the others in Jesse's group rendered an ~~inestimable~~ <sup>invaluable</sup> service to our country.

Now we are entering a new phase in Kosovo, bringing short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. With the rapid entry of the international security force into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and under self-government is underway.

<sup>we</sup> I especially appreciated your thoughtful comments on American attitudes toward the KLA. As you point out in your letter, the KLA presents a delicate problem. You are right to point out that marginalizing a group and excluding it from a peace process process only delays a reckoning with their interests. For that reason, one of General Mike Jackson's first priorities after entering Kosovo has been to <sup>elicit</sup> ~~conclude~~ an agreement <sup>from</sup> ~~with~~ the KLA to make them part of the settlement.

~~As of this writing, that agreement has not been concluded, but I~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~am optimistic.~~ <sup>we are</sup> I am glad to see that we share the same vision for the basic contours the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo. Like you, <sup>we</sup> I firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province and no Serb forces will remain, the KLA has every incentive to do so completely. But <sup>we</sup> I also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a



role in post-conflict Kosovo. It is also likely that NATO military commanders will invite some of them to participate in local policing. ~~On the political plane, NATO and American diplomats continue to take them seriously as negotiating partners and as important contributors of a democratic peace.~~

In the long term, the United States will be a driving force in the international community's effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. It is our hope that as part of this process the KLA will work with us towards achieving our goal of an autonomous, self-governed, and multiethnic province within the FRY.

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for your constructive questions and suggestions.

Sincerely,

Greg

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.  
Jesuit Community  
Boston College  
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167-3802

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Really -  
Do we want to  
validate group  
dog, her family  
his  
investigate

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Attachments

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