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Original OA/ID Number: 2721				
Document ID: 9902478				
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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902478
RECEIVED: 05 APR 99 15

TO: FEINSTEIN, DIANNE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NATO

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO SENATOR FEINSTEIN RE NATO POLICY IN KOSOVO

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 16 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9902490

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LACKEY
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

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DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902478

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 CHM	Z 99040515 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99042217 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 STEIN, L	Z 99050314 FOR SIGNATURE
003 PRESIDENT	Z 99050514 FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 99051213 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 99051213 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990505	VICE PRESIDENT
003 990505	PODESTA, J
004 990511 WH STRIPPING DESK	
004 990511 FEINSTEIN, DIANNE	

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2478
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>5/11</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>5/11</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>5/12</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CG: _____

COMMENTS:

DATE 5/11/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

National Security Council
The White House

4/22 4/23
1100

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2478
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DK A/O _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 4/22</u>	<u>EO</u>
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Berger	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>TTC 5/3</u>	<u>D P&R</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: Received by NSC 5 Apr. (P)

COMMENTS: POTUS Congressional
correspondence re NATO's
policy on Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

4/28 4/23
1100

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DK A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 4/22</u>	<u>Done</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 4/22</u>	<u>Done</u>
Steinberg	<u>3</u>		<u>Done</u>
Berger	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>TC 5/3</u>	<u>Done</u>
Records Mgt.			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2478
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 5/11</u>	
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 5/11</u>	<u>Done</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>TC 5/12</u>	<u>Done</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

RECEIVED 11/11/99

COMMENTS: DATE 5/11/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1999

Dear Dianne:

Thank you for your support for NATO's current policy in Kosovo. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which the Alliance has stood since its foundation fifty years ago: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression and ethnic cleansing pursued by President Milosevic. We and our allies cannot allow this campaign of terror to continue.

I agree with your views on the importance of clearly articulating our interests and objectives. Our interests are clear. We need to prevent regional instability in one of the least stable corners of Europe. We need to alleviate the humanitarian tragedy being created by Milosevic's repressive policies. And we need to sustain the NATO alliance as a guarantor of stability in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Our objective is equally clear. We want the Kosovars to return to their homes with security and self-government. With this objective in mind, we and our allies have carefully stated our conditions for stopping the bombing: Serbian security forces must leave Kosovo; the displaced Kosovars must be able to return; and there must be an international security force to protect all Kosovars. If Milosevic refuses, NATO's military campaign will continue to destroy as much of his military capability as we can so that each day his capacity for repression will diminish.

I appreciate your thoughts on possible elements of a political settlement. But for a political settlement to be real, it will need to be backed by more than a force of foreign observers. We will need an effective security presence, with NATO at the core. As I made clear earlier this year, if the conditions are right, the United States must be prepared to participate in such a force.

We also need to look beyond the current crisis to what the Balkans, Southeast Europe, indeed the whole continent of Europe should look like in 10 or 20 years. We should try to do for Southeast Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War II, and for Central Europe after the Cold War -- to integrate Southeastern Europe into the Euro-Atlantic Community, a community that upholds standards of human rights, in which borders are open to people for trade, and where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable.

I share your belief that our cause is just, and thank you for your strong support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Clinton".

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9902478

REFERRAL

DATE: 12 MAY 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: FEINSTEIN, DIANNE

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 11 MAY 99

SUBJ: REPLY TO SENATOR FEINSTEIN RE NATO POLICY IN KOSOVO

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 13 MAY 99

COMMENT:



FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9902478
DATE 11 MAY 99

SUBJECT: REPLY TO SENATOR FEINSTEIN RE NATO POLICY IN KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

5-11-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER

LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT:

Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein Regarding
NATO's Current Policy in Kosovo

1999 MAY 5 AM 9:42

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Feinstein.

Background

Senator Feinstein wrote to express her full support for NATO's current policy in Kosovo but also to express her concern that we have failed to clearly articulate our national interest and goals in undertaking this mission. She also describes possible elements of a political settlement including the concept of "protected autonomy" for Kosovo. Your reply thanks her for her support, recalls our interests and objectives and expresses our general support for her concept of a peace plan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2478

April 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein Regarding
NATO's Current Policy in Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a response to Senator Feinstein regarding NATO's current policy in Kosovo.

Concurrence by:  Miles Lackey

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504

(202) 224-3841

April 1, 1999

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, I fully support NATO's current policy in Kosovo. With reports of mass killings and detentions, over a hundred thousand ethnic Albanians forced to flee their homes and become refugees and tens of thousands more internally displaced and living in the woods or on mountain slopes without access to food, water or shelter, I believe we must maintain our resolve to cripple the Yugoslav military which is responsible for these atrocities and for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians.

However, I am deeply concerned that our failure to clearly articulate our national interest and goals in undertaking this mission -- to lay out a vision of what is necessary if NATO is to be able to declare victory -- has created a situation which may see us lose the peace, even if we are successful in our military mission. Needless to say, such clarity is all the more important if a greater degree of military commitment becomes warranted.

As the world's sole remaining superpower, I believe that we have both strategic and moral rationale for our involvement in Kosovo. As a NATO member, the United States cannot and should not be indifferent to events in Kosovo, which have profound implications for U.S. political, security, and economic interests as well as those of our European allies.

I also believe that it is critical that we send a clear and unambiguous message that ethnic cleansing, genocide, and mass rape are not acceptable. The twentieth century has witnessed too much barbarity, and we should not start the new century with a legacy that these savage acts are acceptable.

I am concerned, however, that unless the United States clearly and cogently articulates its end-game for Kosovo, we run the risk that even if we succeed in "bombing the Serbs to accept a peace plan," any such plan may be so fundamentally flawed that it

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton

April 1, 1999

Page 2

will only serve to lay the groundwork for future violence and bloodshed in the region. It is my belief that the Administration's current policy -- that Yugoslav acceptance of the Rambouillet plan, with its apparent favor of Kosovo's independence, as a precondition for any peace plan -- runs just such a risk.


Although the United States has clear interests in peace and stability in Kosovo, as well as in preventing genocide, unless the parties themselves agree on partition there is no reason to prejudge the issue of the final status of Kosovo as an essential element of any peace plan. Indeed, I believe that U.S. interests might be best served by a "protected autonomy" for Kosovo based on the cultural and political autonomy accorded the Kosovars in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.

In addition, I believe the elements of a peace plan include Serb agreement to pull back all military, special police, and paramilitary units from Kosovo; allow the return of all refugees; allow the entry into Kosovo of a foreign observer force; and also allow the entry of a predominantly European peacekeeping force, perhaps drawing on Russian and other Partnership for Peace countries for participation. The foreign observers and the peacekeepers would ensure the safety of returning refugees and the political and cultural rights of Kosovo's majority Albanian population.

Mr. President, I believe our cause in Kosovo is just. But I also believe that we are on the cusp of allowing a major opportunity to set the terms for a real and lasting peace in the region pass us by -- and that to do so would compound the tragedy thus far endured by the people of Kosovo. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this matter, and to working with you to bring peace and justice to Kosovo.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dianne Feinstein". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and a long, sweeping underline.

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator

DF:ma

cc: The Honorable Samuel Berger

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
April 1, 1999
Page 3

Mr. John Podesta
Mr. Jeff Bader

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504

OFFICIAL BUSINESS


Dianne Feinstein
U.S.S.

RECEIVED
WHITE HOUSE MAIL SECTION

1999 APR -5 PM 12:19

Mr. Jeff Bader
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

20500-0003



2478



FAX from . . .

Senator Dianne Feinstein

of California

331 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
(202) 224-3841

DATE: 4/1/99

TIME: _____

TO: The Honorable Samuel Berger
456-9170

FROM: _____

COMMENTS:

APR 117:59

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 4

NOTE: The information contained in this facsimile is confidential. If you receive this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2478

Dear Dianne:

Thank you for your support for NATO's current policy in Kosovo. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which the Alliance has stood since its foundation fifty years ago: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression and ethnic cleansing pursued by President Milosevic. We and our allies cannot allow this campaign of terror to continue.

I agree with your views on the importance of clearly articulating our interests and objectives. Our interests are clear. We need to prevent regional instability in one of the least stable corners of Europe. We need to alleviate the humanitarian tragedy being created by Milosevic's repressive policies. And we need to sustain the NATO alliance as a guarantor of stability in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Our objective is equally clear. We want the Kosovars to return to their homes with security and self-government. With this objective in mind, we and our allies have carefully stated our conditions for stopping the bombing: Serbian security forces must leave Kosovo; the displaced Kosovars must be able to return; and there must be an international security force to protect all Kosovars. If Milosevic refuses, NATO's military campaign will continue to destroy as much of his military capability as we can so that each day his capacity for repression will diminish.

I appreciate your thoughts on possible elements of a political settlement. ~~We believe that the Rambouillet accords still offer a framework for negotiating a political agreement.~~ But for a political settlement to be real, it will need to be backed by more than a force of foreign observers. We will need an effective security presence, with NATO at the core.

As I made clear earlier
this year, if the conditions
are right, the US must be
prepared to participate
in such a force

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if the conditions are right, the U.S. must be
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We also need to look beyond the current crisis to what the Balkans, Southeast Europe, indeed the whole continent of Europe should look like in 10 or 20 years. We should try to do for Southeast Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War II, and for Central Europe after the Cold War -- to help its people build a region of multiethnic democracies, a community that uphold^s standards of human rights, a community in which borders are open to people for trade, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable. and

I share your belief that our cause is just, and thank you for your strong support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

White Sulphur
Bye with the ~~hand~~
of the Euro-Atlantic
Community, a very

integrate Southeastern
Europe into the

of the Euro-Atlantic
Community, a
community

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein Regarding
NATO's Current Policy in Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to an April 1 letter from Senator Feinstein.

Background

Senator Feinstein wrote to express her full support for NATO's current policy in Kosovo but also to express her concern that we have failed to clearly articulate our national interest and goals in undertaking this mission. She also describes possible elements of a political settlement including the concept of "protected autonomy" for Kosovo. Your reply thanks her for her support, recalls our interests and objectives and expresses our general support for her concept of a peace plan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

2478

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dianne:

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with your views
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Our objective is equally clear. ~~we~~ we want to allow the Kosovars to return to their homes with security and self-government. With this objective in mind, we and our allies have carefully stated our conditions for stopping the bombing: Serbian security forces must leave Kosovo; the displaced Kosovars must be able to return; and there must be an international security force to protect all Kosovars. If Milosevic refuses, NATO's military campaign will continue to destroy as much of ~~its~~ his military capability as we can so that each day his capacity for repression will diminish.

I appreciate your thoughts on possible elements of a political settlement. We believe that the Rambouillet accords still offer a framework for negotiating a political agreement. But for a political settlement to be real, it will need to be backed by more than a force of foreign observers. We will need an effective security presence, with NATO at the core.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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