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SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 9 FEB KOSOVO INFLUENTIALS MTG

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DUE DATE: 13 FEB 99 STATUS: C

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Steinberg	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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February 8, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

THROUGH: DAVID LEAVY *DL*
FROM: MATT GOBUSH *mg*
SUBJECT: Kosovo Influentials Meeting

NOTED
Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

You will be meeting with Kosovo influentials Tuesday, February 9, from 1:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. This meeting offers you the opportunity to discuss the latest developments in the region and prospects for ongoing negotiations at Rambouillet. Although many of those attending have been critical of the Administration's Balkans policies, most recently signed an open letter to the President appearing in the New York Times supportive of our overall objectives in Kosovo and of the deployment of NATO ground forces to implement any legitimate political settlement. A copy of this letter is attached at Tab B.

Each of the eight influentials from the list you approved plan to attend. Biographical information on each is attached, as well their recent commentary on Kosovo.

Attachments

Tab A Biographical Information
Tab B Recent Commentary

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Kosovo Influentials Meeting

February 9, 1999

Ivo Daadler

Mr. Daadler, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, was responsible for coordinating Bosnia policy on the National Security Council staff from 1995 to 1997.

Max Kampelman

Dr. Kampelman is currently a Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has also served as vice chairman at the U.S. Institute of Peace and chairman at the American Academy of Diplomacy.

Jeane Kirkpatrick

Currently, Amb. Kirkpatrick is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Professor at Georgetown University. She formerly served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President Reagan.

F. Stephen Larrabee (Steve)

Dr. Larrabee is presently the Senior Staff Member at the International Department of RAND. He was formerly the Vice-President and Director of Studies of the Institute of East-West Security Studies in New York.

Richard Perle

Richard Perle is Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, specializing in national security, military requirements, arms proliferation and defense.

Stephen Solarz (Steve)

Mr. Solarz is a former Democratic representative from New York and is currently vice chairman of the International Crisis Group.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Sonnenfeldt has held prominent positions at the National Security Council and was counselor at the Department of State. He is currently a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution.

Robert Zoellick (Bob)

Mr. Zoellick is currently the President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During the Bush Administration, he served as Deputy Chief of Staff to the President and Counselor at the Department of State.

NATO MUST ACT IN KOSOVO

BALKAN ACTION COUNCIL • COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE • INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP • NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE • PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

January 29, 1999

Dear President Clinton,

Only strong action and sustained U.S. leadership can address the largest security crisis in Europe today. Serbian forces under the command of President Slobodan Milosevic are again slaughtering civilians and threatening the stability of the region, as many of the same forces did in Croatia and Bosnia. Milosevic has broken every commitment he made to the United States and NATO nearly four months ago concerning the Kosovo crisis, underscoring yet again the limits of our ability to rein in Milosevic by diplomacy alone. Rather than reducing and withdrawing his forces, Milosevic has increased and aggressively redeployed them. He has shelled and attacked unarmed civilians with the artillery and tanks he agreed to remove. He has blocked and threatened the unarmed OSCE monitors to whom he promised free access. And his officials are destroying evidence of recent atrocities, such as the summary execution of more than 45 ethnic Albanians at Racak, and are otherwise impeding the investigations of the International War Crimes Tribunal.

We believe the following actions are essential:

- NATO should use air power as necessary to compel the removal of Serbian forces used to attack and repress the civilian population and prepare the way for the introduction of NATO ground troops. Only a NATO ground presence can prevent the return of those forces, the growth of radical Albanian nationalism and spread of war in southeastern Europe. Only NATO troops can shield humanitarian aid workers and the civilian monitors, including hundreds of Americans, who otherwise risk becoming hostages of Serbian forces.
- Implement a three-year cooling-off period by imposing an interim political settlement that restores pre-1989 self-government for Kosovo within a democratic federal framework. Use the interim period to reestablish civilian institutions, return hundreds of thousands of refugees to their homes, restore regional stability, and prepare for a referendum in Kosovo on final status after three years.

Mr. President, all eyes are turned to Washington. Only forceful U.S. leadership can stop Milosevic from continuing with this new round of ethnic cleansing. As a newly expanded NATO approaches its 50th anniversary in Washington, the savagery in Kosovo endangers more than civilian life and regional stability. It threatens the interests of the United States, the credibility of NATO and the gains we have achieved in Bosnia.

Sincerely,

<i>Morton I. Abramowitz</i>	<i>Zbigniew Brzezinski</i>	<i>Richard Burt</i>
<i>Frank Carlucci</i>	<i>Bob Dole</i>	<i>Philip Kaiser</i>
<i>Jeane Kirkpatrick</i>	<i>Peter Kovler</i>	<i>William Kristol</i>
<i>William E. Odom</i>	<i>Wayne Owens</i>	<i>Richard Perle</i>
<i>Stephen Solarz</i>	<i>Helmuth Sonnenfeldt</i>	<i>William Howard Taft IV</i>
<i>Vin Weber</i>	<i>Caspar Weinberger</i>	<i>R. James Woolsey</i>

740 15TH STREET NW • WASHINGTON, DC • 20005

Ivo Daadler

DAALDER, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, was responsible for coordinating Bosnia policy on the National Security Council staff from 1995 to 1997. He is the author of "Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy," which will be published by the Brookings Institution Press in June.

ULTIMATUM ON KOSOVO **An endgame strategy for Kosovo**

The San Diego Union-Tribune
February 07, 1999, Sunday
Pg. G-1, 1872 words

Once again it has taken a massacre of innocent civilians in the Balkans to galvanize U.S. and European action. The slaughter of 45 Albanian men -- mostly peasants, some old, one just a little boy -- has led the six Contact Group countries to demand that the two sides in the Kosovo conflict accept a plan for the Serb province's self-government and to begin negotiating the details at a site outside Paris.

Serb failure to turn up in Rambouillet and finalize a deal by Feb. 19 would result in NATO air strikes to force them to the table.

Kosovar obstinacy would risk a decision by the international community to pull back from the province, leaving the Albanian population to fend for itself.

The feverish diplomatic and military to and fro of recent weeks bears some notable resemblance to the activity of last fall, when the discovery of the brutal slaying of 34 women, children, and elderly in Kosovo strengthened NATO's resolve to act forcefully against Belgrade. NATO air strikes were put on hold only after the last-minute intervention of Richard Holbrooke, the Clinton administration's chief Balkan trouble-shooter, produced an agreement with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to halt the indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

As expected, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement proved short-lived. Although the agreement averted a humanitarian calamity, it only alleviated the symptoms of the conflict without addressing its underlying causes. Holbrooke also failed to secure the means to enforce the agreement's terms, which included an end to fighting, the withdrawal of Serb interior police and regular army forces, acceptance of the International War Crimes Tribunal's jurisdiction, cooperation with international relief agencies, and a commitment to start a political dialogue. Instead, the international community settled for an unarmed presence inside Kosovo -- capable of verifying Serb non-compliance with the agreement but unable to prevent its breakdown or enforce compliance with its terms.

Not surprisingly, Belgrade never fully complied. It maintained many more police and army troops in Kosovo than had been agreed with NATO, continued to patrol with these forces, and engaged in periodic attacks against suspected rebel areas, even using large-caliber artillery in indiscriminate attack against isolated villages.

Since the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had not been a party to the Holbrooke negotiations or resulting agreement, it, too, never accepted the terms of the cease-fire. Provocative actions like the killing of Serb policemen were seen as a means to hasten Western intervention.

Finally, there was no real political dialogue, in part because the sides refused to meet face to face and also because there was no effective deadline for negotiations.

The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement is effectively dead, and last month's massacre in Racak finally convinced everyone -- including the Clinton administration -- that the Holbrooke approach had failed. Moreover, it is now widely recognized that absent effective military intervention the war in Kosovo will escalate in the weeks and months ahead. It will pit a better-organized, financed, and armed KLA against a revanchist and still highly effective Serb security apparatus.

Confronted with this reality -- and knowing that an all-out war in Kosovo would dominate NATO's 50th anniversary celebration at the Washington summit in April -- the United States and its allies have finally abandoned the strategy of muddling through and opted for decisive action.

The allies differed, however, on what kind of action this might entail. Washington favored a reactivation of NATO's air strike threat against Belgrade, which was never officially abandoned in order to provide some pressure for Milosevic to actually implement the October agreement.

This position was opposed by the European allies, who argued that air strikes alone offered no real prospect for a lasting solution to the conflict. Instead, the Europeans insisted that the possible use of force had to be part of a larger political strategy to resolve the conflict. In addition, they argued that if NATO launches air strikes it will have to follow up by deploying ground forces to prevent the KLA from taking military advantage of the attack on Serb forces.

The stalemate among the NATO allies ended last weekend when the United States essentially agreed to follow the European line. The strategy was announced in three stages.

First, on Jan. 29 the Contact Group presented both sides with a clear political plan for Kosovo's autonomy on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Under the

deal, Kosovo would remain part of Yugoslavia for at least a three-year interim period, after which its future status would have to be decided. The Kosovars also would enjoy widespread autonomy at the local level, including over police and judicial affairs, education, health, transportation, and economic development.

Second, key European countries announced that once the plan had been accepted by both sides, they would send thousands of troops to secure its implementation. And in Washington news emerged that American troops could participate in such an operation, albeit not in a leadership role.

Third, on Jan. 30 NATO spelled out the consequences of either side's failure to negotiate a resolution along the lines of the Contact Group plan within the agreed three-week time frame. Belgrade faces the prospect of a phased NATO air campaign along the lines the Alliance threatened last fall. The Alliance also warned that it would take "all appropriate measures" in case the Kosovar side failed to meet the Contact Group's demands.

For the first time since the conflict in Kosovo turned to violence more than 11 months ago, the United States and its European allies have a coherent strategy for bringing the conflict to an end. But there are clear pitfalls to avoid in the next few weeks. One is that diplomatically and militarily the effective lead is in the hands of Europe rather than the United States. This is appropriate, given that the Balkans are in Europe's back yard and that U.S. interests are only tangentially involved in Kosovo.

But Europe's record in the Balkans is not a happy one. Having enthusiastically taken the lead in fashioning an international response to the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, Europe then dithered for months and years, exposing both its internal divisions on how to proceed and its lack of military muscle to back its diplomatic effort. In the end, it had to accept that U.S. leadership remained the sine qua non for effective international action. Thus, while Europe's earlier failure gives it a crucial incentive to succeed in Kosovo, whether it now has both the will and the capacity to follow through remains to be seen.

Another pitfall to avoid is refusing to accept the consequences of the strategy on which the international community has embarked. If negotiations go nowhere, then following through on the military threats is absolutely crucial. As it stands, the threat of air strikes still lacks credibility as long as Washington and its allies are not willing to accept that launching them likely means the end of negotiations and possibly the independence of Kosovo.

While such attacks may force Milosevic to the table and into serious negotiations, the KLA may reach the opposite conclusion, believing instead that military victory is in its grasp as Serb forces are degraded.

Similarly, if the Kosovars refuse to go along with the Contact Group plan, a decision to leave them to their own devices means accepting that Serb forces will establish control in their typical, brutal fashion.

But it is only by being willing to accept these undesirable outcomes that the current strategy can be credible.

It has long been said that there are no good options when it comes to the Balkans. It should be added that the options get worse the longer you wait. Washington and its counterparts have, albeit belatedly, come to understand that the time for dithering has long past. Their decision to intervene will result in one of three outcomes.

In the best case, an agreement is reached and U.S. and NATO troops will deploy in large numbers to supervise its implementation for five or more years to come. Getting to this best-case outcome, however, is possible only if the allies are willing to accept the worst of outcomes -- either an independent Kosovo as a result of Milosevic's failure to deal or large-scale humanitarian suffering as Serb forces restore control over the province. Neither of these outcomes is desirable, but only by making clear that these are the logical consequences of the refusal to deal is a negotiated deal likely to succeed at all.

RAND

February 8, 1999

James Steinberg
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Jim,

In preparation for our meeting on Tuesday, I am sending you a copy of a chapter on "Peace Operations in the Balkans," which is part of a longer study I am leading on Prospects for Security in Southeastern Europe. The latter half of the chapter examines options in Kosovo. I'd suggest you glance over the first 12 pages or so and concentrate on pages 12 ff, especially the section on "Options in Kosovo" (p. 15 ff).

The chapter was written before Rambouillet, but many of the considerations are still valid. The chapter, however, is a draft not a finished product and should be read with that in mind. Any comments would be welcome. I'd be glad to share other parts of the study with you.

Best regards,


Steve

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-DRAFT-

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9. PEACE OPERATIONS: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALKANS

The highly unstable Balkans are the most likely venue for new NATO peace operations. Indeed, pressure is already growing for NATO to expand its operations to include Kosovo. Before NATO takes such a step, it needs to develop a clear understanding of the mission. More fundamentally, it needs to understand what peace operations can and cannot accomplish. During recent years, the United Nations and NATO have acquired experience of peace operations, especially in the Balkans, that contains important lessons. This chapter examines those lessons and suggests implications for future peace operations.

After a brief definition of peace operations, the chapter examines the reasons why United Nations-led operations failed in Bosnia-Herzegovina but NATO-led operations succeeded. It then reviews the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, discusses similarities and differences between Bosnia and Kosovo, and discerns what lessons learned in Bosnia are relevant to Kosovo. The subsequent section examines broad policy options regarding Kosovo and military operations that might be associated with these options. The conclusion summarizes important considerations in framing policy toward Kosovo.

DEFINING PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations Security Council invented peace operations and was long the only practitioner but in recent years regional alliances and coalitions of willing countries have also begun to conduct peace operations. Usually such operations are conducted pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council, as currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, but there is no absolute requirement to seek such a resolution.

Consent and Impartiality

Two criteria define peace operations: impartiality and consent of the parties.

Impartiality means refusal to take sides, based on a judgment that all parties share responsibility for a conflict. It does not imply that

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every aspect of a peace operation would affect all parties equally. A coercive operation, for example, is directed against violators of an agreement, not all parties equally.

Consent means that the parties to a conflict, so far as parties exist and are recognized as such, are at least initially willing to help accomplish the mandate. Of course, they might subsequently withdraw their consent and indeed often have done so.

Non-Coercive versus Coercive Peace Operations

Peace operations may be non-coercive (invoking Chapter VI of the Charter if the Security Council is involved) or coercive (invoking Chapter VII of the Charter). If non-coercive, the force may employ its weapons in self-defense, but not to coerce any party to the conflict. If coercive, the force may employ its weapons for purposes exceeding self-defense. Current NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a classic example of coercive peace operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII with explicit consent of the parties as formalized in the Dayton agreement.¹

Non-coercive and coercive operations are incompatible and should never be mixed. Either the peace force is non-belligerent, and hence to be spared, or it is belligerent, and hence a legitimate target for destruction; it cannot be both. When these incompatible types were mixed during United Nations-led operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the results were humiliating.

WHY UNITED NATIONS-LED PEACE OPERATIONS FAILED IN BOSNIA

As Western policymakers consider their options in Kosovo--and the military implications of these options--it may be useful to review why UN-led peace operations failed in Bosnia. This may hold some lessons for the future, even if the considerations for future operations in the Balkans may not be exactly the same.

¹For example, Paragraph 4.b., Article IV, Annex 1A: "All Parties understand that they will be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance..." [there follows a list of prohibited actions].

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In Bosnia, the major European powers--Britain, France, and Russia--participated in UNPROFOR, but were unwilling to enforce their own resolutions. The parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs, recognized that the strong words were not backed by force and regarded the United Nations with disdain. Eventually, the Bosnian Serbs humiliated the United Nations by taking its personnel hostage and by overrunning the so-called "safe areas."

UNPROFOR failed in Bosnia for several different but closely related reasons:

Seduction of Near Agreement

During 1992-1995, the parties negotiated on numerous occasions under various auspices and several times appeared close to general agreement. They were persistently willing to conclude cease-fires, but seldom observed them. Near agreement encouraged the Security Council to continue a failing operation in the hope that the parties would soon conclude an agreement in good faith that would make non-coercive peace operations feasible. In general, the parties displayed an opportunistic attitude toward agreements. They treated their agreements as gestures to propitiate outsiders, as position statements, and as momentary indications of relative advantage, but not as binding commitments.

Inadequate Consensus among Major Powers

Major powers, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, failed to develop a consensus for resolute action and agreed instead to meddle on the fringes. For historical reasons, Russia tended to support the Serbs and some Russian units showed shameless partiality, especially in Eastern Slavonia (Sector East). France tried unsuccessfully to tamp down the conflict with inadequate means, eventually threatening to withdraw its forces unless France received more support from other major powers. The British kept in step with the French, although usually favoring less forceful action. Following Srebrenica, the Western allies decided to deploy a Rapid Reaction Force under national control, but eventually deployed only part of the planned force with the mission of securing the Mount Igman road into Sarajevo. From the perspective of its European allies, the United States played an

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unhelpful role, carping but refusing to be involved, trying instead to maneuver them into deeper involvement.

Mismatch of Force and Mandate

The Security Council issued mandates that implied coercion, but provided forces armed only for self-defense, a gross mismatch of force and mandate. It also made the error of controlling these forces through the United Nations system, although the United Nations is not a war-fighting organization. As a result, operations in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the fall of Srebrenica, were the most humiliating and expensive failures in United Nations history. In the United States, this performance gave powerful arguments to detractors of the United Nations, although the permanent members of the Security Council, not the United Nations itself, were responsible.

Mingling Non-Coercive and Coercive Operations

The Security Council also blundered by mingling non-coercive peace-keeping (Chapter VI) with peace enforcement (Chapter VII). A peace force should not try to claim the immunity of a non-belligerent while simultaneously trying to enforce decisions of the Security Council. Beginning at the latest in early 1993, the Bosnian Serbs correctly perceived the United Nations Protection Force as a belligerent, albeit of a peculiarly hapless sort. The Serbs acted rationally when they took United Nations troops hostage. It is much harder to understand why the permanent members of the Security Council exposed their own troops to ill treatment without preparing a satisfactory response.

Negation of NATO Air Power

The Security Council envisioned that NATO air power would compensate for the weakness of forces on the ground. Instead, weakness on the ground negated air power, until United Nations troops withdrew into territory held by the Croat-Muslim federation, in effect accepting the protection of parties to the conflict.

Initially, NATO air power enjoyed considerable success. It enforced a no-fly zone over Bosnia, provided close air support to United Nations forces, and enforced weapons exclusion zones by threatening air

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strikes. It also enforced a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. But eventually the Bosnian Serbs saw that UNPROFOR's weakness would negate NATO's strength. They withdrew their weapons from collection sites and resumed the siege of Sarajevo.

For several years, the Clinton Administration advocated increased use of air power, most notably in its "lift and strike" (lift the arms embargo and strike the Bosnian Serbs) proposal that its European allies rejected, in part because they feared the implications for their weak ground forces. These forces were too weak even to defend themselves and therefore too weak to make effective use of the close air support that was on call. European powers resented American appeals to use air power more vigorously, pointing out that the United States had no ground forces in Bosnia that would have to bear the consequences. Moreover, the effectiveness of air power was severely constrained by the nature of the conflict, essentially a militia war of numerous local engagements with little sustained offensive capability on any side and hence few lucrative targets for air.

Toward the end of the war, NATO applied air power effectively in Operation Deliberate Force. After years of pin-trick attacks and ineffectual responses, a predominantly American force conducted a sustained attack on military targets throughout Bosnian Serb-held territory. This concerted attack made a deep impression on the Bosnian Serb leadership, especially because it coincided with a Croat-Muslim offensive that recouped most of the original Serb gains. It offered a glimpse of what air power might have accomplished, had it not been fettered by a nearly helpless land force.

Lack of American Leadership

The United States exercises a prominent role within the Security Council and NATO due to its military power and role as a superpower. When the United States hung back in Bosnia, no other power or combination of powers proved capable of sustained effective action.

The Bosnia conflict plunged successive U.S. Administrations into a protracted policy debate. The United States failed clearly to decide whether it had little interest in former Yugoslavia or a strong

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interest, whether it wanted European allies to lead or wanted to exert its own leadership, whether it wanted to keep its land forces out or deploy them, whether it should favor Muslims or be impartial among the parties, and finally whether it preferred peace or a more intense war. After its European allies declined to support "lift and strike," the Administration resorted to confused half-measures. In 1995, it followed a complex, even slightly contradictory policy, supporting an impartial peace operation while simultaneously encouraging Croatia to attack Serbs and incidentally also United Nations forces.

It became clear that neither the Security Council nor NATO would be effective without American leadership and that American attempts to push others forward would lead to humiliating failures. Moreover, the U.S. was forced to recognize that it could not expect its allies to fight on the ground while the U.S. provided only air support. If the U.S. wanted to lead, then it had to put troops on the ground and share the same risks with its allies. It could not lead an alliance from 20,000 feet.

WHY NATO-LED PEACE OPERATIONS SUCCEEDED IN BOSNIA

In dramatic contrast to UNPROFOR's failures, the United States and its NATO allies were immediately successful in compelling compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton agreement. These included a cease-fire, withdrawal from a zone of separation, and cantonment of heavy weapons. This success was due to several factors:

Military Superiority of the Croat-Muslim Federation

By the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats, who were backed by Croatia, and the Muslims, who were at least receiving arms smuggled through Croatia, were militarily superior to the Bosnian Serbs, who received ever less support from Belgrade. Croats and Muslims were held in an uneasy alliance under pressure from the United States, which helped engineer the federation and insisted on its continuance despite obvious strains. Subsequent to Dayton, this superiority increased as a result of American aid to the Muslims, who had long enjoyed superior manpower.

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Belgrade's Refusal to support the Pale Regime

The Belgrade regime showed astonishingly little interest in the fates of either the Krajina Serbs or the Bosnian Serbs at Dayton and subsequently. Indeed, Belgrade seemed to regard Pale less as the champion of its countrymen's rights than as a potential political rival. It did little to encourage Pale's intransigence and easily accepted emergence of a rival power in Banja Luka.

General War Weariness

All sides in the conflict exhibited considerable war weariness after almost four years of continuous, if often desultory fighting. The economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina was shattered, much of its infrastructure damaged, and many of its people either scattered abroad or internally displaced. No side, with the possible exception of the victorious Croats, had the means or will to accomplish its aims by force.

Fewer Populations in Minority Status

Although some populations, especially Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia, remained intermingled, postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina had far fewer people in minority status than before the war. "Ethnic cleansing" and simple flight had largely disentangled populations that prior to the war had been mingled. Indeed, the process of ethnic partition continued after the conclusion of hostilities, most notably in March 1996 when Serbs abandoned Grbavica rather than live under Muslim-dominated government.

NATO's Show of Overwhelming Force

From the outset, IFOR exhibited overwhelming combat power to the former belligerents. While not overwhelming in numbers, IFOR was so much better equipped and trained than the ragged, still amateurish local forces as to be overwhelming. In particular, the display of American armor and attack helicopters made any resistance appear suicidal. During the first months of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the United States had to show such force on several occasion to recalcitrant Bosnian Serbs, who then became far more cooperative.

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NATO's Impartiality

NATO's overwhelming force was neatly complemented by its impartiality. The former belligerents had little motive to oppose a manifestly superior force so long as it was clearly impartial and not allied with any one side. Had, for example, the Bosnian Serbs believed that NATO was really bent on their destruction, then they might have tried to retaliate even in an apparently hopeless situation.

NATO's Initial Avoidance of Difficult Tasks

With strong encouragement from the Americans, NATO confined its military operations to assuring compliance with Annex 1A of the Dayton agreement, while avoiding more difficult tasks that might have caused trouble. Initially, NATO refused to arrest persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, unless they inadvertently fell into its hands. Only as NATO's position became more firmly assured, did it undertake selected arrests and it has recently begun an overt campaign to bring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to justice.

Initially, NATO also avoided the very difficult task of securing the return of refugees to areas where they would be in the minority. It remains to be seen how far NATO will ultimately venture into this area under prodding from the High Representative. Almost three years after the war, very few refugees have returned to areas where their own ethnic group is in the minority. NATO currently faces a dilemma: if it refuses to protect minorities, full implementation of Dayton may become impossible, but if it protects them, it will have acquired an arduous, onerous, interminable obligation.

CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has improved somewhat since the conclusion of the Dayton accord, but a number of important problems remain.²

²For a detailed discussion of these problems, see chapter _____.

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Indefinite Duration of the Mandate

In the first few months of JOINT ENDEAVOR, NATO implemented the military provisions of the Dayton agreement without having to fight or even being seriously challenged. But NATO and even more the High Representative are frustrated by the former belligerents' stubborn refusal to cooperate in implementing civilian provisions of the agreement, except under duress or in hope of reward. Even the Bosniacs, once the most inclusive of the belligerents, are rallying under an Islamic party that displays little concern for non-Muslims. Among the Bosnian Serbs, even the moderate leadership in Banja Luka shows little interest in recreating a multi-ethnic society. The Croats have virtually obliterated the distinction between Croatia and Herzegovina, in effect achieving Greater Croatia as the reward for their victories during the war. This intractable nationalism has indefinitely prolonged a NATO operation that was originally supposed to take only one year.

Tensions in the Dayton agreement

Strong tensions are inherent in the Dayton agreement. This agreement points toward both separation of the former belligerents and toward their union. It envisions a complex, possibly unworkable construct that includes one state, two entities, and three constitutionally protected nationalities (or ethnic groups), each with its own armed forces. So far as implementation of Dayton defines the Clinton Administration's strategy, that strategy is deeply ambivalent. Officially, the Administration maintains that reconciliation of the former belligerents in a single state is the road to peace, yet many within the Administration fear that the new Bosnian state might be as unstable as its predecessor. If a mixed state is indeed the goal, who will assure the safety of its citizens, especially refugees who return to areas dominated by another nationality?

Although NATO's military mission expanded during the second year, it still falls short of policing and the unarmed International Police Task Force (IPTF) has no coercive powers. The newly created multinational reaction force will help fill this gap, but it cannot substitute for effective indigenous police. The U.S. and its NATO

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allies currently see no alternative but to pursue implementation of the Dayton agreement, even though they recognize that implementation ultimately depends on the parties. Dayton cannot succeed unless the parties sincerely want to live together, still an unlikely prospect due to the fears and hatreds engendered by war and attendant atrocities.

Ambivalent U.S. Commitment

The United States became involved in Bosnia because the conflict there threatened to weaken and discredit NATO, not because it has any overwhelming national interest in the fate of Bosnia *per se*. Despite relative success to date, many American leaders view the current U.S. involvement in Bosnia with misgivings. They realize that the Dayton accords are not being fully implemented and that Bosnia-Herzegovina is far from any end state that would make renewed conflict improbable. They are also well aware that conflict could break out again when NATO forces depart. Ironically, the Clinton Administration is now as reluctant to disengage as it once was to engage, fearing that hostilities might erupt again and discredit its policy.

The American Congress, especially its Republican majority, would prefer to disengage from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but has stopped short of repudiating the Administration's policy. The Administration lives in constant fear that American troops might suffer even very small casualties that would incite strong Congressional criticism and increase pressure on the Administration to revise its policy. The specter of Somalia, where small casualties led to withdrawal, casts an ever-present pall over its Bosnian policy.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO

The outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo has presented the Western Alliance with a new and daunting challenge. There are a number of similarities between Kosovo and Bosnia:

Deep-Seated Ethnic Hatreds

As in Bosnia, deep-seated ethnic differences lie at the root of the Kosovo problem. Serbs and Kosovar Albanians are divided by deeply held national myths and strong antipathies.

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Milosevic's Central Role

Milosevic was key to the Dayton agreement and he is central to any solution of the Kosovo problem. The United States in particular has grown accustomed to dealing with Milosevic. At the same time, there is a growing recognition that he is part of the problem--perhaps the problem.

Localized Conflict

Like Bosnia, conflict in Kosovo has had a localized character, with regular forces, police, militias and paramilitary forces engaged in numerous small struggles for villages and hamlets. Such conflict is intensely personal and nasty, often pitting neighbor against neighbor.

Serb Reliance on Heavy Weapons

As in Bosnia, the Serbs have relied heavily on heavy weapons, especially armored vehicles and artillery. They have tended to employ these weapons in slow moving siege operations. They have showed marginal competence in light infantry tactics and little capability at the operational level of war.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO

At the same time, there are a number of important differences between the two conflicts:

Legal Status of Kosovo Province

Bosnia-Herzegovina was an internationally recognized state. By contrast, Kosovo is merely a province of Yugoslavia without any legal claim to independence. As a result, several powers, especially China and Russia, maintain that foreign states have no right to intervene in Kosovo without a resolution of the Security Council that either of these countries might veto. In this view, the Kosovo crisis is an internal affair of Yugoslavia that may not be construed as affecting international peace and security unless the Security Council were to make such a determination.

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Greater Potential for Spillover

The danger that the conflict in Kosovo could spill over is much greater than was the case in Bosnia. The Bosnia conflict was relatively self-contained. However, in Kosovo there is a real danger that the conflict could spill over into Macedonia, where the Albanian population makes up about a quarter of the population, or into Albania itself. If the conflict did spread to Macedonia, the country could be destabilized and disintegrate. This could spark a rivalry among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and probably Turkey to inherit its remnants or block others from doing so.

Lack of Countervailing Power

In Bosnia wars, Serb power was checked by the Croats and Muslims, then finally rolled back. Moreover, Bosnia received outside assistance from Muslim countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. By contrast, there is no comparable champion for Albanians. Albania is too politically divided and impoverished to provide such help, nor can the Albanians in Macedonia offer much real assistance. Indeed, the bulk of the assistance seems to come primarily from the Albanians in the Diaspora. As a result, Belgrade is checked militarily only by the continuing threat of NATO air strikes.

Lack of Serb Settlement

Serbs are a small minority of the Kosovo population (less than 10 percent) and their numbers are declining. Despite official inducements, those Serbs who fled Croatian offensives have been unwilling to settle in Kosovo. As a result, Belgrade has almost no hope of changing the national composition of Kosovo. This situation is fundamentally different from Bosnia (and Krajina) where Serbs were thickly settled before the war. Much thinner settlement in Kosovo implies that Belgrade could cede control without severe consequences apart from the shock to Serb self-esteem and national feeling.

LESSONS THAT APPLY TO KOSOVO

Military peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina taught some broad lessons that would be applicable to peace operations in Kosovo. As

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Western policy-makers contemplate further involvement in Kosovo, they would do well to keep these lessons in mind.

Feasible Mission

Military forces should not deploy without some mission that is within their capabilities and will contribute to overall goals. Mere presence is not a mission. It accomplishes little and may cause several sorts of difficulty. It may raise false expectations about the actual level of allied commitment. It may also engender timidity in governments that begin to fear for the safety of their troops.

Don't Try to Keep Peace during War

No peace-keeping operation, employing lightly armed or unarmed monitors, should commence until the belligerents show they are willing to stop fighting. It makes no sense to send monitors into an on-going conflict.

No Mingling of Non-coercive and Coercive Operations

Non-coercive (Chapter VI) operations are incompatible with coercive (Chapter VII) operations and should not be mingled. The same force cannot expect to be treated as both a non-combatant and a combatant simultaneously.

United Nations Should Not Attempt Coercive Operations

The United Nations is not competent to control forces in combat and therefore should not attempt to conduct coercive operations. At most, United Nations-controlled units should be expected to defend themselves if attacked.

Dual Key Arrangements Are Self-Defeating

The United Nations and NATO are very different in character and make poor partners, especially in any sort of "dual key" arrangement that gives each organization veto power.

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Strong Political Consensus Is a Necessity

Strong consensus among the major participating powers is essential, especially regarding long-term political goals. Absent such consensus, military operations may bog down in endless disagreement.

American Leadership Is Important

If the United States refuses to lead, the chances of success of any major military operations are significantly diminished. Absent U.S. leadership, fewer countries are likely to participate and those who do may be distracted by divisions and disagreements.

The United States Should Share the Risks

If the United States offers to lead and some military operation is contemplated, it should be prepared to share the risks, including contributing land forces to any operation on the ground. If the United States does not share the risks, it is likely to have a different perspective from its allies. This can seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of military operations, as happened in Bosnia during the UNPROFOR period. The best rule is "in together, out together."

Air power Has Severe Limitations

Air power alone will not, in most cases, force a belligerent to abandon any interest he considers vital, especially in view of the constraints that Western morality sets on the use of air power. In addition, air power is limited by the suitability of target sets. It is most effective against easily observed, high-value targets and least effective against targets of lesser value that are harder to acquire. For example, air power is highly effective against heavy forces massed for combat, less effective against such forces when they are dispersed, and often ineffective against light and irregular forces.

Show Overwhelming Force

A peace force should appear overwhelming to former and potential belligerents so that opposition appears futile. Among other advantages, overwhelming force precludes combat that might excite domestic opposition in the participating countries.

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OPTIONS IN KOSOVO

In October 1998, the United States and NATO mediated a cease-fire and started to mediate far-reaching agreement between the parties. In Kosovo, an OSCE-led Verification Mission (KVM) is monitoring the fragile cease-fire while an Extraction Force is assigned to assure its safety.

It remains uncertain whether these efforts will help resolve the conflict or merely punctuate it. At this juncture, the United States and its allies have three broad options regarding Kosovo:

- **A Cease-Fire.** If the parties at least agree to stop fighting, the United States and its allies might be called upon to support or enforce cease-fire agreements.
- **Autonomy.** If the parties reach an agreement giving Kosovo autonomy, the United States and its allies might be called upon to support or enforce its implementation.
- **Independence.** If Kosovo breaks away from Serbia, the United States and its allies might be called upon to enforce Kosovo's independence while dealing with the consequences for neighboring states.

Possible Peace-Support Operations

The United States and its NATO allies might conduct a variety of operations to support the broad options discussed above. These might be peace-keeping operations (implying that a resolution of the Security Council would invoke Chapter VI of the Charter) or enforcement operations (Chapter VII). They might be conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), by NATO, or by a coalition of willing nations. If conducted by NATO, they might involve the alliance as a whole or a coalition of willing members supporting a combined task force. In some cases, air forces alone might suffice, while in others land forces would be required for success.

Table 9.1**Possible Operations Regarding Kosovo**

Option	Type of Operation	Tasks	Agent	Forces
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Cease-fire between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians	Peace-keeping	Observe cease-fire; mediate violations.	OSCE, NATO	Observers, 2-3 battalion equivalents to extract observers.
	Enforcement	Observe cease-fire; mediate violations; punish parties that violate the cease-fire.	OSCE, NATO	Observers; 1-2 brigade equivalents and 1-3 wing equivalents to secure observers and to punish violators of cease-fire.
Interim agreement creating an autonomous province of Kosovo within Serbia	Transition	Observe implementation of agreement; mediate disputes; help rebuild security and government.	OSCE, NATO	Observers, 2-3 battalion equivalents to extract observers; assistance teams.
	Enforcement	Observe implementation of agreement; help rebuild security and government; enforce provisions of the agreement.	OSCE, NATO	Observers, 2-5 brigade equivalents and 1-3 wing equivalents to secure observers and to punish violators.
Kosovo independence	Enforcement	Observe status of Yugoslav forces; prevent entry of Yugoslav forces into Kosovo.	NATO	Intelligence collectors; 1-3 wing equivalents to halt Yugoslav forces.

Table 9.1 illustrates types of military operations that might be conducted to support each of the three options.

The first column reflects the basic option, whether cease-fire, autonomy, or independence. Of course, this option might change, requiring the United States and its NATO allies to make commensurate adjustments in the types of military operations needed to support the option. For example, the Kosovar Albanians might use autonomy as a means to achieve eventual independence. In such a case, the Western allies might be called upon to support independence, implying a different type of military operation.

The second column characterizes operations according to the typology offered earlier in this Chapter. This typology is keyed to the most demanding task that the force is expected to accomplish and less demanding tasks may be subsumed. For example, an operation to enforce autonomy would include tasks associated with a transition operation, such as assistance to the indigenous security forces.

The third column identifies the broad tasks implied by the force's overall mission.

The fourth column identifies the agent that would perform the operation. It intentionally contains no entries for the United Nations

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because, as the experience in Bosnia demonstrates, the United Nations is ill suited to manage military operations that might involve combat.

The final column outlines in extremely broad terms the air and land forces that might be required to carry out the military mission for each option.

Cease-Fire Agreement

Current efforts to reach agreement among the parties might fail, leading to renewed conflict. In this event, the United States and its allies would probably try to mediate a new cease-fire arrangement. Cease-fires, usually broken within days or weeks, were a permanent fixture of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Western allies might simply monitor cease-fires or they might attempt to enforce them. But impartial enforcement would be very difficult due to the disparate character of the parties.

Neither party wants autonomy and ultimately neither party may be willing to accept an agreement that offers autonomy or to implement such an agreement in good faith. Belgrade finds autonomy distasteful because it fears that autonomy would strengthen pressure for independence, while Kosovar Albanians overwhelmingly prefer independence, though under certain conditions some might be willing to accept autonomy as an interim transition stage toward full independence. Even if the parties can reach formal agreement, renewed conflict would still be possible, even likely. The Serbs try to reassert control or merely defend their own countrymen against a police now dominated by Kosovar Albanians. The Kosovar Albanians might act provocatively, either on a governmental level or through organizations like the KLA that were impatient to achieve independence from Serbia.

The Western allies might just monitor a cease-fire, as currently is the case, through the OSCE-led KVM. But if the conflict became virulent, as during the summer of 1998, observers would be reduced to recording endless cease-fire violations by both sides and might themselves be endangered. Moreover, Serb forces would continue to enjoy an overwhelming advantage in heavy weapons over the Kosovar Albanians, even greater than Bosnian Serbs enjoyed over Muslims. In this case, the

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Western allies would either have to enforce the cease-fire or else look on while Serbs used brutal methods to repress Albanians. Refugees would flow to Albania and to Montenegro and Macedonia. NATO might be required to secure the safety of observers either from Macedonia, as the French-led Extraction Force is charged to do, or from within Kosovo.

Enforcement would raise the same dilemma that confronted the allies during the summer of 1998. They would want to restrain the Serbs without encouraging the KLA. However, any use of force against the Serbs would inevitably encourage the KLA. In such a vicious ethnic conflict, it is illusionary to imagine that NATO could strike the Serbs without giving the KLA opportunities to reassert its control. Moreover, it would be practically impossible to enforce a cease-fire impartially using air power alone. Air power would be effective against Serb heavy forces (tanks, personnel carriers, artillery) both within and outside Kosovo. But it would be ineffective against lightly armed and elusive guerrillas such as constitute the bulk of the KLA. Indeed, it might be useless against guerrillas unless their identity could be confirmed through some asset on the ground. In addition, it is questionable whether Western public opinion, especially in the U.S. Congress, would support air strikes against Kosovar Albanians, who are widely perceived as being the aggrieved party. For these reasons, NATO air strikes would tend to promote independence, not the ostensible goal of maintaining autonomy within Yugoslavia.

There are also some serious obstacles to mounting air strikes. Western allies would anticipate problems of collateral damage and risk to pilots, especially if a protracted campaign were necessary. Moreover, air strikes would inevitably weaken Serb rule and encourage the KLA to reassert control, as it did in late 1998. Some European countries might insist that air strikes require a new resolution of the Security Council to provide legitimacy and assure great power support. But China and Russia might oppose such a resolution.

Enforcement would almost inevitably require both land and air forces controlled through an appropriate joint command with a deployed headquarters. The land component would not necessarily be very large. For example, 1-2 brigade equivalents coupled with on-call air forces

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might be adequate to enforce a cease-fire. Land forces that knew the situation on the ground would greatly increase the utility of air power. When backed by air forces, even modest land forces would enjoy immense superiority over possible Serb opponents. In peace operations, effective land forces are trump, but precisely their effectiveness conspires to make their commitment very difficult to terminate at acceptable political cost. Most governments, especially the current American Administration, are acutely aware of this dynamic and are therefore hesitant to commit land forces even when success appears relatively assured.

Employment of land forces, however, would be more difficult than employment of air forces. The United States has expressed a strong disinclination to commit its own land forces fearing that Congress would not approve such action. European states may be reluctant to send their own troops if the United States remains aloof. And if they did send troops, there is a danger that this would lead to the type of policy disagreement that crippled effective action in the early phases of the Bosnia conflict--a situation which no one wants to see repeated.

Autonomy for Kosovo

If efforts at mediating a restoration of autonomy were successful, the United States and its allies would be strongly interested in the successful implementation of any agreement. The Western allies would have two basic options related to implementing any accord on autonomy. They might simply monitor and otherwise support implementation of an agreement without trying to enforce it. Alternatively, they might decide to enforce implementation through a military operation that would have to include land forces.

Autonomy would restore an earlier legal status that was abrogated in 1988-1989. Ideally, autonomy would satisfy the demands of both sides, keeping Kosovo within FRY but give Kosovar Albanians greater control over their everyday lives. Moreover, autonomy would have the advantage of at least postponing the larger question of Albanian self-determination that could disrupt the Balkans.

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For autonomy to have a reasonable chance of success, the Western allies should at least monitor and support implementation. If problems developed, the allies might also have to enforce the agreement or else see it overturned, but it is not clear how they would conduct enforcement. Land forces would almost certainly be required, but the United States is reluctant to commit land forces, and its allies, recalling dissension during the Bosnian conflict, are likely to insist that all members of the alliance should bear the same risks. The Europeans might develop a coalition of willing nations or conduct a military operation using NATO assets without American participation as foreseen by the 1996 Berlin Ministerial. But, the history of the Balkan conflicts to date, including the recent conflict in Kosovo, indicates that the Europeans have difficulty reaching and maintaining consensus without American leadership.³

An operation to enforce autonomy would risk becoming interminable for much the same reason that the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues without end. Autonomy demands willingness of parties to resolve their differences and to work together toward a common future, but there is little reason to expect such willingness to emerge soon in Kosovo. Indeed, it might never emerge considering the deep-seated animosity that exists between the two ethnic groups. The danger is that under these conditions the operation could not be terminated without risking resurgence of old animosities. Indeed, both parties could become dependent upon foreign powers to mediate and supervise arrangements that would otherwise be unworkable. Such an open-ended commitment could pose problems for some governments, especially the U.S. The U.S. Congress is unenthusiastic about the Bosnia operation, in large part because there is no end in sight. It would have similar, possibly even stronger reservations about an open-ended operation in Kosovo.

³The Italian-led operation Alba may be considered a partial exception. But the nature of the operation was quite different and did not require large-scale combat operations. But even in this case, there was considerable hesitancy and disagreement among the European allies in the initial stages.

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Independence

Kosovo might soon start down the road to independence. Events in the summer of 1998 indicated that Serbia could not control Kosovo without resorting to methods that Kosovar Albanians could not endure and the Western allies could not tolerate. Autonomy is no longer acceptable to Kosovar Albanians, except as a bridge to independence. Serb opposition to independence seems adamant, but might break down under the press of events. In the past, Milosevic has not hesitated to abandon the Serb cause for reasons of political expediency. NATO has already brought Kosovo much closer to independence, especially in the view of Kosovar Albanians, by compelling the Serbs to reduce their military forces and accept mediation. If Kosovo did become independent, the Western allies would have to manage the consequences. Ironically, safeguarding this independence would be much easier in military terms than attempting to enforce autonomy.

Independence would end Serb outrages in Kosovo, allow Kosovar Albanian refugees to return home safely, and remove an excuse for the Belgrade regime to oppress its own people. But it would also cause serious difficulties. It would probably cause a mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, such as occurred when Croatia regained control over Krajina, and a severe political crisis in Belgrade. In the worst case, the Belgrade regime might become even more nationalist than it already is, possibly including an overture to the Serb Republic in Bosnia. Kosovo might not be viable as an independent state and even if it were viable, independence would raise the broader problem of Albanian self-determination, a problem with no easy solution. Broadly speaking, Kosovar independence might lead to a union of Kosovo with Albania or to a union of Kosovo, Albania, and some portion of Albanian-inhabited Macedonia.

Very likely, NATO could enforce the independence of Kosovo without having to deploy large land forces. In the past, Serbia has relied on heavy weapons such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery to repress the Kosovar Albanians. NATO could negate and ultimately destroy heavy weapons through air power alone at minimal risk to itself. But independence might cause other problems that air power alone could

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not handle. In particular, the Serb minority in Kosovo would be at risk to reprisals and to terrorist attacks from extremists among the Kosovar Albanians. If reprisals and attacks became widespread, the Serb minority might flee or attempt to defend itself through irregular forces and militia. At the same time, Serb nationalist groups might infiltrate paramilitary and light infantry forces into Kosovo. Such forces were a constant feature of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and might reappear in Kosovo. Although they have compiled a poor record in the past, they might be more effective against Kosovar Albanian forces that would be lightly armed and scarcely trained.

To protect the Serb minority in Kosovo, NATO might require large land forces, but this task, even if it entailed few casualties, could become protracted and onerous. Serbs and Kosovar Albanians would probably use NATO forces as an excuse to minimize contacts with each other and to avoid steps toward reconciliation. Moreover, NATO troops could be drawn into murky situations where both sides were about equally at fault. In view of these difficulties, the Western allies would probably prefer to monitor the situation in an independent Kosovo while maintaining political pressure on the Kosovo government to respect the rights of its Serb minority.

CONCLUSION

The Western allies face a dilemma in Kosovo. The goal of autonomy is not supported by either party, not attainable through a peace operation at any acceptable cost, and not a stable outcome. The Kosovar Albanians want independence and the Serbs might eventually accept it, but the Western allies are little inclined to advocate a solution that is currently unacceptable to Serbs and threatens the integrity of Macedonia.

An interim arrangement, that will probably lead to independence, might be the most practical solution, but if the Western allies mediate such an arrangement, they will also have to enforce it or else run a very high risk of renewed conflict. If they elect to enforce, they should use overwhelming force, including land forces that would make resistance appear futile. These forces should have a mission

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commensurate with the political will of the participants, implying that it be clearly limited and attainable within a reasonable period of time. U.S. participation would also be essential. The history of Western intervention in the Balkans over the past several years strongly suggests that U.S. leadership is a prerequisite for effective implementation of peace operations in the region and that the U.S. must share the risks with its allies, including putting ground troops in harm's way.

Participation

U.S. participation is critical because the U.S. has unique capabilities to project power and has a strong stake in maintaining NATO's credibility and effectiveness. In addition, the U.S. has no deep-seated historical interests in the region or association with any particular ethnic group that might contort its policy. But exactly this lack of strong historical interest in the region makes the U.S. reluctant to become more deeply involved in Kosovo, just as it once shied away from involvement in Bosnia. The U.S. Congress is highly skeptical of the indefinite commitment to implement the Dayton accord, and deeply reluctant to approve a new operation that might be similarly open-ended. Yet the U.S. is already quite extensively involved in Kosovo, both diplomatically through its mediation efforts and more directly through its leadership of an observer mission. The U.S. may soon have to choose, as it eventually did in Bosnia, between endless discrediting failures and involvement at a decisive level of effort.

If the U.S. tries to lead without sharing the risks, it risks a repetition of the fractious disputes that arose during the UNPROFOR period in Bosnia. This could seriously weaken NATO. If the other Western allies mount an operation without the U.S., the risks of failure are great unless there is an extraordinarily strong consensus for action among the participants. Moreover, by encouraging the U.S. to remain aloof, they would be setting a bad precedent for Europe in the post-Cold War era. If NATO is to maintain an effective military alliance, the U.S. must stay engaged and exercise its role as an alliance leader. This means sharing risks--including the use of ground troops--with its

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European allies. An alliance based on a division of labor in which the U.S. supplies air power only will not work and could seriously undermine the political cohesion and military effectiveness of the alliance over the long run. For a demanding mission, the only practical alternative to U.S. leadership would be European leadership build upon a solid consensus among Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, but such a consensus might be very difficult to build and maintain.

Mission

In selecting a military mission, the Western allies have a fairly wide choice but one fundamental decision: will they merely facilitate whatever agreement is reached or will they enforce it? This choice also has implications for the appropriate agent.

If they choose not to enforce--for example by monitoring compliance (as is currently being done through the OSCE) or keeping peace through mutual consent,--then they probably should not involve NATO. NATO commands respect as a military alliance capable of decisive action. It would impair NATO's prestige and ultimately its effectiveness if it deployed token forces that parties could openly defy, as UNPROFOR did in Bosnia. Moreover, such missions make sense only when parties are really willing to abide by their agreements and in such cases NATO's military strength would be superfluous.

If the allies choose to enforce, then NATO would normally be the preferred agent because it has the shared doctrine, procedures, and infrastructure to mount effective combat operations. In any case of enforcement, the need to use overwhelming force would be important. Despite their ostensible agreement, the parties will likely have reservations, possibly an ill-concealed recalcitrance, that will tempt them to violate the agreement and even resort again to force. The Western allies can minimize this temptation and also the risks to their own troops by displaying, as IFOR did in Bosnia, a level and quality of force that makes resistance appear futile.

Goal

The goal of a military operation, including a peace operation, should be clear and attainable by force. Autonomy as a permanent goal

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for Kosovo fulfills neither criterion. Neither party wants autonomy and both parties are likely to subvert whatever agreements are reached in the hope of attaining their ultimate objectives. Autonomy requires Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to live together, causing endless friction. It probably would not work without strong Western involvement that would be open-ended like the current operation in Bosnia. Ironically, the operation might become protracted in proportion to its success because the parties would depend upon outside powers to make autonomy work.

Independence for Kosovo is a clear goal and one attainable by military force. Indeed, the recent threat of NATO air strikes caused a rapid and strong resurgence of KLA influence. But the Western allies would hesitate to openly advocate independence because it could destabilize Macedonia and have a disturbing impact elsewhere in the Balkans, stimulating other ethnic groups to strive for independence. It could also destabilize Dayton, stimulating the Bosnian Serbs to renew their effort to achieve independence, possibly by force.

One possible solution might be an interim agreement that led in a relatively short period of time to independence. Such an agreement could ease Serb surrender of a position that has become increasingly untenable due to diminution of the Serb population in Kosovo. But this solution would also harbor dangers. The resulting state might not be viable and would inspire a drive for independence by the Albanians in Macedonia. Moreover, the plight of Serbs in Kosovo might cause a nationalist backlash in Serbia, precipitating even worse behavior than Serbia has exhibited in the past. To prevent against such backlash, the Western allies might help ameliorate the lot of Serbs in Kosovo, but they could not indefinitely protect these Serbs, any more than they could indefinitely protect minority returnees in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Deciding When To Go

By MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
and STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

How should the world's only global military power decide when and where to use its armed forces to save innocent lives? There is little doubt that the United States is prepared to employ military force to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf or Korea. But there is no national consensus about whether to intervene militarily in places of limited economic and strategic significance—such as Sierra Leone, where full-scale civil war has broken out once again.

Some conservatives fundamentally oppose the use of any U.S. troops in military actions they see as peripheral to American interests. Likewise, some liberals reject the idea that military power can be a sound means of resolving conflict under any circumstances. But many Americans are torn. On the one hand, we want to "do something" about the horrifying images

from Sierra Leone's civil war that began showing up on television screens and newspaper pages in recent weeks. Yet what grounds do we have for intervening there—and not in Angola, or the Sudan, or any of the dozen or so countries where major

conflicts are now raging?

The United States cannot intervene everywhere—even as part of a larger U.N. or NATO force. Nor is our presence always helpful or wanted. International law gives us some guidelines, but in today's modern world of ethnic conflict, U.S. policymakers need some framework for deciding when, for humanitarian reasons alone, they think intervention is desirable.

Here is an initial yardstick that might seem crude, but contains a moral and ethical premise worth considering: Has the death rate of the war exceeded the murder rate in the United States?

The vast majority of conflicts abroad have

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See INTERVENTION, B2, Col. 1

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death tolls comparable to the annual U.S. murder rate—roughly 1,000 deaths per 10 million citizens. One could argue that we are under no moral or political obligation to make the world safer than our own country, and therefore we should—except in cases where U.S. national interests are at stake—confine our efforts to diplomacy and nonmilitary aid.

But once the death toll reaches a certain level—let's say five times our murder rate—staying on the sidelines becomes more questionable. Eight conflicts reached that level of bloodshed at some point in the past seven years: the wars in Chechnya, Burundi and Liberia exceeded that threshold in the mid-1990s, and those in Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Angola and Bosnia passed it earlier in the decade. (More because of their location more than their death tolls, Kosovo and Haiti must be included as candidates for U.S. involvement, bringing the number of possible interventions in the past seven years to 10.)

Of course, the U.S. government cannot base its foreign policy on such a measurement. No arbitrary yardstick can possibly be perfect. Nor should it prevent the United States from intervening for other reasons. No one would seriously propose that the United States wait for the death toll to reach a certain plateau if, for example, the conflict involved the genocidal targeting of a specific ethnic group.

But such a yardstick does provide a *moral* basis for compiling a very short list of candidates for humanitarian interventions. The next, and more complicated step, is to devise a strategy for ending a specific conflict—or at least alleviating the associated suffering. The third and final step is for the president to seek the support of the American people and the Congress, as well as the political support and military participation of other like-minded countries. Such support—preferably including U.N. Security Council approval—is essential for an operation that will probably involve American casualties, and that will radically affect the internal affairs of at least one other country.

In deciding how to intervene, our choices generally are three in number. We can take sides and help one party win a war. We can impose a partition line between hostile groups and attempt to enforce it. Or we can simply try to mitigate the worst effects of a conflict without trying to stop it—creating safe havens or ensuring secure food supplies for civilian populations, for example.

In at least two cases on our short list, none of these approaches would have worked. Intervening in Chechnya would have risked war with Russia, jeopardizing far more lives than a humanitarian intervention could have saved. In ethnically torn Burundi, it would have been very difficult to develop an exit strategy. For example, partitioning the country into Tutsis and Hutu cantons would have required massive relocations of local populations. It is doubtful that we could have convinced the international community—or most Burundians themselves—to support such a drastic idea.

So an ambitious approach to using U.S. military force to save lives might have produced no more than eight interventions since 1992. As it is, we engaged in four—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and the central Africa conflict that consumed Rwanda and the former Zaire. The missions had varying degrees of effectiveness; in the case of central Africa, the intervention came far too late to stop half a million Tutsi and moderate Hutus from being slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. But in all cases, the humanitarian operation

made a difference for the better—naysayers' critiques notwithstanding. Admittedly, four more similar missions would have been a burden on U.S. military forces and foreign policy officials, and it would have added 1 to 2 percent to the annual defense budget. But that would not have been too high a price to give greater moral clarity and direction to our global leadership role.

How would this framework for selective intervention apply to today's world? Based on the intensity of violence and bloodshed, two immediate candidates for scrutiny are Sierra Leone and Angola. (Because of Kosovo's proximity to NATO allies in Europe and the potential for that conflict to trigger a broader Balkans war, the alliance is right to consider intervention there. But given the scrutiny that conflict is receiving elsewhere, we do not focus on it in this essay.)

In Sierra Leone, the case for immediate intervention is compelling. In January alone, about 3,000 people died out of a population of 5 million—a degree of violence comparable to the death toll in the Bosnian civil war (and 70 times higher than the annual U.S. murder rate, if the bloodshed were to continue at that level for the rest of the year). In addition, many civilians have had limbs amputated by the barbarous rebels of the Revolutionary United Front. There is little reason to think that the death rate will decline this year; in fact, now that a Nigerian peacekeeping force is planning to leave by late spring, the war could intensify and jeopardize the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

Further strengthening the case for intervention is that rebel forces number only a few thousand and are poorly equipped. A U.S. brigade of several thousand troops, along with comparable numbers from our allies and regional states, could defeat them. If U.S. military aid was then used to build up a reformed army in Sierra Leone, American forces could probably be withdrawn within a year. Unlike the situation in Bosnia, they would not be in the nation-building business; their primary purpose would be to achieve a battlefield victory.

Although the death toll in Angola is just as heartbreaking, it is far harder to conceive of a militarily and politically sound strategy for intervention. The civil war in Angola has been underway for a quarter-century and has left nearly a million dead, according to the best estimates. More than 300,000 have died since 1992, but the intensity of combat declined considerably in the mid-1990s only to increase in the last few months. After two U.N. planes were shot down over rebel territory in recent weeks, sentiment at the United Nations has begun to lean toward pulling out U.N. peacekeepers, effectively abandoning the country to a renewal of full-scale warfare.

The primary culprit in this war is former U.S. proxy Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA rebel movement. It is Savimbi who, after losing elections in 1992, renounced the peace process and returned to the battlefield. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos may be the lesser of two evils, but his government has had strong ties with communist states such as the former Soviet Union and Cuba and it retains a reputation for severe corruption today. It would be morally and politically difficult to justify taking his side in battle.

Moreover, intervention in Angola would be difficult in military terms. Rebel forces in Angola are larger than in Sierra Leone, numbering tens of thousands of troops, and the country's territory is larger as well. At least several U.S. brigades, and the forces of other countries, would be needed. Due to the number of land mines there and the rebels' possession of advanced weapons such as surface-to-air missiles, operations would be dangerous. Under these circumstances, U.S.-led military intervention in Angola is not advisable.

How could the pared-down American military possibly cope with any of these added demands? Attempting simultaneous interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Angola, all the while maintaining vigilance in the Persian Gulf and Korea and continuing peacekeeping in Bosnia, would admittedly be too much—a further argument against the use of force in Angola at present. But today's 1.4 million-strong U.S. armed forces can handle additional deployments of a few thousand troops to both West Africa and the Balkans.

One part of the solution is to ask for more help from our allies, as the Clinton administration is doing right now as it considers the deployment of a NATO force to Kosovo. Another part of the solution is to make greater use of U.S. military units in other parts of the world that have not been frequently deployed in recent years.

Policymakers may find themselves surprised at the willingness of many U.S. military personnel to carry out well-conceived missions that make a meaningful difference in peoples' lives overseas. While it is true that many U.S. military officers would prefer not to participate in humanitarian operations, it is also true that the Army's highest reenlistment rates come from units that have recently been deployed to Bosnia.

For those frustrated by the seeming intractability of violent conflict abroad and our powerlessness to do much about it, it is important to remember that only a very few of the world's current conflicts are extremely lethal. By being somewhat more ready to use force, and using it wisely and firmly when necessary, the United States and the international community may be able to significantly reduce the level of bloodshed around the world.

BY CHRISTOPHE VORLET FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

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"The Yugoslav wars of secession, which were anticipated 25 years ago with the death of Tito, but were a bit delayed because of the system that Tito had installed in Yugoslavia actually lasted longer than most people thought -- those wars are continuing, and they all have been from the beginning bedeviled by dilemmas and complexities.

"In the case of Kosovo, as has already been pointed out, the problem is long-standing, but Tito had a workable solution for it, which Milosevic ended or sabotaged or torpedoed in 1989. So the outlines of the seriousness of the problem in Kosovo have been around for a long time, so much so that President Bush before leaving office issued his famous Christmas warning in December of 1992 -- that Ivo has alluded to -- and which President Clinton repeated after he took office. That -- those warnings looked on the surface as though they were going to keep Kosovo quiet while Bosnia and other issues were bubbling and getting worse and worse. In fact the situation in Kosovo became gradually more dangerous and more troubling as the -- in the Albanian population in particular -- frustration, grievances and so on produced a gradual radicalization of attitudes.

"Well, the problem has always -- or at least since 1989 -- been one that sooner or later would find outside powers, the so-called "international community," or at least the European community, would sooner or later have to deal with. And I think the delay that Ivo talked about at the outset of this discussion in fact goes back many years. There's been a lot of talk about preventive diplomacy, there's been a lot of talk about crisis warning and so on, and Kosovo is a classical case of one that one could see come down the road for many years before it erupted into the kind of brutal militarization earlier this year. Now, without going further into those details which have already been discussed, I think the importance of Kosovo now at this point in time is its meaning for the ability of NATO in the first instance, but NATO members individually, to deal with crises of this kind -- they all differ in specifics. Crises of this kind on its periphery outside the NATO treaty area, which however could threaten and do threaten and recognized as threatening the peace and security interests of members of the alliance.

"This is an issue that has been around in various forums since the end of the Cold War: How do you deal with problems, with dangers that emanate from within a sovereign country? And everybody still recognizes Serbia or Yugoslavia as a sovereign country, and Kosovo as part of it. How do you deal with those issues when the treaty commitment and NATO, the firm commitment under article five, has to do with armed attacks across borders, and the U.N. Charter is ambiguous about this matter? The fact is that since early this year the U.N. Security Council has twice taken the position that the trouble in Kosovo must be dealt with under Chapter 7 of the United Nations, which is the chapter that deals with threats to international peace and security. That in my view in fact provides a legal basis to cope with this issue that it is an essentially domestic issue but with ramifications in the surrounding area and even beyond the surrounding area because of refugee flows and so on.

"But we haven't done very well in coping with it, and the NATO strategic concept, which is supposed to be the new strategic concept, revised strategic concept which is supposed to be finalized by the time of the NATO summit, anniversary summit here in Washington in April, is trying to cope with it.

What can trigger a NATO action? How do you get the necessary consensus for doing this in -- using military forces, for combining diplomacy and military threat? These all turn out to be open issues in this -- Susan has suggested, and I think correctly, that the assumptions that have been made about the role of force in bringing someone like Milosevic and probably Saddam Hussein around to a reasonable, acceptable, rational set of answers to these very difficult problems, is an unresolved issue. In the case of Bosnia it was at least as much, if not more the Croatian ground action against the Serbs as the bombing, although both together eventually produced Dayton with all its problems, but nevertheless at least an agreement.0

"The problem in my view in regard to NATO action is that NATO has now, and individual members including the U.S., gotten into a position where its credibility as a security guarantor for the members of the alliance is in serious question. Again and again for weeks, for months, rhetoric has been used, planning has been advertised, ostentatious fly-bys and maneuvers have been undertaken and so on, and here we are still trying to grope for a political answer of some sort that would make it unnecessary to use military force. Ironically, as in Bosnia we have also maneuvered ourselves into a position where the use of ground forces has become almost inevitable -- whether to impose a cease-fire or to police a cease-fire or to protect humanitarian assistance, or to eventually implement some sort of an agreement -- detailed agreement concerning autonomy, substantial autonomy for the Kosovars.

I believe that these wider ramifications concerning the capacity -- the ability of NATO to reach consensus, concerning the willingness of countries thereafter to actually commit forces, combining it with diplomatic effort -- that in my view is a set of issues, complex, that need to be resolved by the allies before they celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance, or else they will really be

launching, in my view, the gradual decline of the alliance as a peace-keeper, as a peace preserver in the region, of the alliance and of areas that are of crucial security importance to the alliance.”