

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2710				
Document ID: 9900825				
Stack: V	Row: 46	Section: 3	Shelf: 10	Position: 2

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900825
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 99 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE
HURLEY

DOC DATE: 03 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

SERBIA
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO SEN BIDEN RE SITUATION IN KOSOVO RE MILITARY OPTION

ACTION: OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED

DUE DATE: 17 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900825

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY
002 BERGER
002 HURLEY
002

Z 99020516 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99030319 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99030520 FOR REDO
X 99041315 OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900825
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 99 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BIDEN, JOSEPH R

DOC DATE: 28 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

SERBIA
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN KOSOVO RE MILITARY OPTION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 17 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MARA RUDMAN'S SIGNATURE.



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OPENED BY: NSTSM

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
DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

3/3

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0825
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Dave A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
 Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>1/23</u>	<u>Done</u>
Rice	<u>2</u>		
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		<u>edit</u>
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>3/5 Dave</u>	<u>Done</u>
Records Mgt.			
<u>Hurley/Schulte</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>Redo</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

99 MAR 31 7:29

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Needs to go back
to Hurley / Schulte
for redo.
(R)

National Security Council
The White House

3/3

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0825

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG Dave A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Rice	<u>2</u>		
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Records Mgt.			
<u>Hurley/Schulte</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>Redo</u>

A = Action I = Information D =

Needs to go back
to Hurley / Schulte
for redo.

cc:

COMMENTS:

199 MAR 3 PM 7:29

(R)

Exec Sec Office has diskette

ye

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter from Senator
Biden on the Situation in Kosovo

Attached at Tab A is a Presidential response to a letter from
Senator Biden on the situation in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: Miles Lackey, Rod vonLipsey

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft response at Tab A and sign the
memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Biden

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Biden Letter

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Biden on the situation in Kosovo and his support for military options.

Background

Senator Biden has written a letter about Kosovo that advocates we use a credible threat of NATO air strikes to compel the parties to negotiate a political settlement. He also calls for NATO air strikes against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) -- to the extent technically possible -- if KLA provocations derail the peace process. He notes his initial view against the use of U.S. ground forces to assist in implementation of a peace agreement but suggests that he would nonetheless support such a decision after consultation with the Congress.

Your draft response at Tab A outlines our policy on Kosovo, noting that NATO stands ready to act if Belgrade's intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 peace talks. You point out that air strikes would not be well suited to dealing with KLA responsibility but that we are exploring other appropriate measures if the KLA is at fault. Your response also advises that NATO is preparing an implementation force to deploy to Kosovo to help implement such a settlement, while noting you have not yet made a final decision on U.S. participation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Biden
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your recent letter on events in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo. Ambassador Chris Hill has been meeting with members of the Kosovar delegation and sees positive indications that they may be prepared to sign when the talks resume on March 15. To advance the process, I asked Bob Dole to travel to the region on March 5 to encourage Kosovar Albanian leadership to agree to the settlement. It appears his meetings were fruitful: he reports that the Kosovar Albanians could sign within days.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed, establish self-government in Kosovo and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the vast majority of Serb military forces, except for a limited number of troops associated with border patrol, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

It is clear that President Milosevic is primarily responsible for the current crisis. I agree with your assessment that Milosevic only understands the language of force. The step you recommended -- using NATO air strikes against Serb security force targets to force compliance -- is consistent with the approach we are implementing. We are making clear to Milosevic

that if his intransigence is responsible for failure to reach agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

Even though it now appears that the Kosovar Albanians will sign the agreement, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provocations could derail the peace process. NATO air strikes would not be well suited to punish the KLA under those circumstances. We are exploring other appropriate means of response if the KLA is at fault.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement and has a realistic exit strategy.

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and I hope both sides will grasp its importance and begin to build a brighter future.

I will consult closely with you in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
PAUL COVERDELL, GEORGIA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
ROD GRAMS, MINNESOTA
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
CRAIG THOMAS, WYOMING
JOHN ASHCROFT, MISSOURI
BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE
PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, MINNESOTA
BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY

JAMES W. NANCE, STAFF DIRECTOR
EDWIN K. HALL, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 28, 1999

Personal and Confidential

FEB 2 PM 12:20

Dear Mr. President:

I have long held, and publicly asserted, first that Yugoslav President Milosevic is the principal obstacle to peace in the southern Balkans, and second that he will only modify his murderous policies when confronted with the imminent prospect of overwhelmingly superior military force ready to be used against him.


Thus, while I welcome the political-military initiative on Kosovo that Secretary Albright unveiled today, I believe the plan is doomed to failure unless the threat of force is truly credible. To achieve this credibility with Milosevic, I would submit, we must immediately persuade the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reaffirm last October's activation order and concurrently make demonstrative movements of U.S. military assets toward action in Kosovo. If we cannot get NATO to go along, we should act without them.

Moreover, so that our military actions do not undermine our political goals, I urge you to make clear our willingness to utilize air power to the extent technically possible against the Kosovo Liberation Army, as well as against Serbian military and special police, if they refuse to accept the interim political settlement that we present for the province.

Mr. President, my initial view is against the use of American ground forces in Kosovo. Nonetheless, should you determine that U.S. ground troops are necessary as part of an international force to implement the interim political settlement in Kosovo, I urge you consult promptly with Congress.

Finally, I want to emphasize my conviction that the resolute military and political action in Kosovo that I have outlined can, and must, reinforce our commitment to the Dayton peace settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conversely, failure to achieve autonomy for Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation would seriously undermine Dayton.

Sincerely,


Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member

The President
The White House

**DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING Per E.O. 13526**

Sec. 3.2(C) Initials: KDE **Date:** 2/1/94

2008-0994-F-3

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
PAUL COVERDELL, GEORGIA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
ROD GRAMS, MINNESOTA
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
CRAIG THOMAS, WYOMING
JOHN ASHCROFT, MISSOURI
BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE
PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
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BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 28, 1999

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
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Sincerely,


Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member

The President
The White House

**DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING Per E.O. 13526**

Sec. 3.2(C) Initials: KDE Date: 2/1/24

2108-09944-3

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

U.S.S.

The President
The White House

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

BY SENATE RIDING PAGE
POSTMASTER'S OFFICE
SENATE DIRKSEN, B-23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE), concerning the use of American military force in Kosovo;
- 2) Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-IN), concerning the Nunn-Lugar Act;
- 3) Rep. David E. Bonior (D-MI) and twenty-five other Members of Congress, concerning the President's upcoming visit with Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo;
- 4) Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), concerning the implementation of the Wye River Accord;
- 5) Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) and twenty-six other Members of Congress, concerning the intelligence budget for FY 1999 and FY 2000;
- 6) Rep. Philip M. Crane (R-IL), concerning the transfer of export licensing jurisdiction from the Department of Commerce to the Department of State;
- 7) Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL) and six other Members of Congress, concerning the recent turn of events in the Republic of Sierra Leone, West Africa;

FEB 514:35

- 8) Rep. John Joseph Moakley (D-MA) and Rep. James P. McGovern (D-MA), concerning the President's decision to visit countries devastated by Hurricane Mitch;
- 9) Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), concerning former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim;
- 10) Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), concerning the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *unt*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter from Senator
Biden on the Situation in Kosovo

Attached at Tab A is a Presidential response to a letter from
Senator Biden on the situation in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: Miles Lackey, *cmH* Rod vonLipsey *cmH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft response at Tab A and sign the
memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Biden

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Biden Letter on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Biden on the situation in Kosovo and his support for military options.

Background

Senator Biden has written a letter about Kosovo that advocates we use a credible threat of NATO air strikes to compel the parties to negotiate a political settlement. He notes his initial view against the use of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo but suggests that he would nonetheless support such a decision after consultation with the Congress.

Your response outlines our policy on Kosovo, noting that NATO stands ready to act if Belgrade's intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 peace talks. You also advise that NATO is preparing an implementation force to deploy to Kosovo to help such a settlement, while noting you have not yet made a final decision on U.S. participation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Biden
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter on events in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering, and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo.

Ambassador Chris Hill has been meeting with members of the Kosovar delegation and sees positive indications that they are prepared to sign when the talks resume on March 15. To advance the process, I have asked Bob Dole to travel to Kosovo on March 5 to encourage Kosovar Albanian leadership to agree to the settlement.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed; establish self-government in Kosovo; and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the majority of Serb army forces, except for a limited number of troops serving exclusively as border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign but they have agreed to substantial parts of the political agreement on Kosovo self-government. With Kosovar Albanian agreement in hand, we and our allies can focus pressure on President Milosevic, who bears

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It is clear that the President Milosevic is

primary responsibility for the current crisis. I agree with your assessment that Milosevic only understands the language of force and the step you recommended -- using NATO air strikes against Serb security force targets to force compliance -- is consistent with our approach. We are making clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

is responsible for failure to reach agreement

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

is responsible for failure to reach agreement

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement, and has a realistic exit strategy.

I will consult closely with you in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Biden Letter on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Biden on the situation in Kosovo and his support for military options.

Background

Senator Biden has written a letter about Kosovo that advocates we use a credible threat of NATO air strikes to compel the parties to negotiate a political settlement. He notes his initial view against the use of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo but suggests that he would nonetheless support such a decision after consultation with the Congress.

Your ~~draft response at Tab A~~ outlines our policy on Kosovo, noting that NATO stands ready to act if Belgrade's intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 peace talks. ~~Your response~~ also advised that NATO is preparing an implementation force to deploy to Kosovo to help ~~implement~~ such a settlement, while noting you have not yet made a final decision on U.S. participation. *Upu*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Biden
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your recent letter on events in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering, and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo. Ambassador Chris Hill has been meeting with members of the Kosovar delegation and sees positive indications that they are prepared to sign when the talks resume on March 15. To advance the process, I have asked Bob Dole to travel to Kosovo on March 5 to encourage Kosovar Albanian leadership to agree to the settlement.

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When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed; establish self-government in Kosovo; and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development. ~~there~~. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the majority of Serb army forces, except for a limited number of troops serving exclusively as border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

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Change margin to one inch and

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against Serb security force targets to force compliance -- is consistent with ~~the approach we are implementing~~. We are making clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. ~~N~~Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement, and has a realistic exit strategy. ✓

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and it is up to both sides to grasp its importance and begin to build a better future.

I will consult closely with you in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: HURLEY

LOG NUMBER: 0825

DUE DATE: 17 FEB

DATE STAFFED: 5 FEB

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: SEN. BIDEN

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.