

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2059				
Document ID: 9806397				
Stack: V	Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806397
RECEIVED: 17 SEP 98 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: GOBUSH
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KOSOVO COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 23 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOBUSH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
GOBUSH
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9806397

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98092514 FOR DECISION
X 98100216 BERGER APPROVED RECOM W/ COMMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

9/23
1540

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6377
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TRC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>6</u> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓟ 9/23</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>Copy</u> <u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>Note</u>
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

1998 SEP 23 PM 2:05

COMMENTS:

Kosovo Communications
Strategy

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

9/23
1540

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6397
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 772 A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 9/23</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>Copy</u> ✓		
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>note</u>
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Kosovo Communications
Strategy

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

30 SEP 23 00 20

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 23, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN ^{AB}
FROM: MATTHEW N. GOBUSH ^{ang}
SUBJECT: Kosovo Communications Strategy

→ Matt -
Excellent plan
Let's go. Conclude
w/ ang -
MARA

Purpose

To build a foundation of public understanding and support for the range of diplomatic and military initiatives we are considering in Kosovo, including the possible use of force.

Background

As our diplomacy intensifies and the possibility of military intervention in Kosovo grows, our communications strategy should focus on laying the groundwork of domestic and international public support essential to any action we undertake. Should the decision be made to use force, additional steps would need to be taken to solidify this support, including a speech by the President to the nation and a more prominent role for DoD and the JCS in our public outreach efforts.

In developing this strategy, we face a number of challenges. First, many Americans are simply not familiar with the national security issues in Kosovo or the potential ramifications for wider European security. We must define for the American people what is at stake in the crisis: stopping a wider war in the Balkans that could involve potential NATO allies; preventing the worsening of a humanitarian and refugee crisis in the heart of Europe; demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and NATO to deal effectively with ethnic tensions; and continuing to build towards a peaceful and undivided Europe. This task is made difficult by the fact that the outcome we seek - increased autonomy for the Kosovars, short of independence - requires a sophisticated understanding of the crisis and complicates the case for taking military action. Finally, our efforts in the Balkans cannot be viewed in isolation. Developments in other

theaters, including Iraq and North Korea, will affect our efforts to project a credible threat of force and build public and Congressional support for our approach to the Kosovo crisis.

Internationally, we must emphasize the multilateral nature of NATO action to forestall criticism that we are acting without the mandate of the international community. Additionally, we must stress that we are exhausting all diplomatic options and will only resort to forceful action if the parties themselves fail to reach a solution. Because cooperation from our allies will be critical to any initiative we undertake, we must enlist the support not only of friendly governments, but their populations as well.

Over the past six months, senior Administration officials have spoken out forcefully on Kosovo, asserting that we will not permit it to become "another Bosnia." Critics have charged that our actions have not matched our rhetoric, creating a credibility gap. Restoring our credibility is essential to the success of our policy, both at home and abroad.

The objectives of our public outreach campaign in advance of any new diplomatic or military initiative is fivefold:

- Raise public awareness of the crisis;
- Define U.S. interests and policy objectives in Kosovo;
- Demonstrate our preference for a political solution;
- Secure international support; and
- Project a credible threat of force and clarify the aims of military intervention.

public and congressional audiences

Strategy

To achieve these objectives, we propose the Administration take the following actions:

The President

- **SBTP on NATO/UN Mandate** - If we succeed in convincing our NATO allies that military intervention does not require a UN resolution, we should release a public statement by the President affirming NATO's mandate to intervene militarily if necessary. Conversely, if the UN passes a resolution implicitly or explicitly authorizing the use of force, a public statement by the President highlighting the resolution would add credibility to our threat.

agree

Cabinet Secretaries and Senior Administration Officials

- **High Visibility Speech** - As the likelihood of military intervention grows, MKA or SRB should deliver a major address aimed at a broad audience to define our national security interests in Kosovo, highlight the humanitarian emergency, enunciate the objectives of any potential use of force, and frame the crisis in the larger context of our overall European security strategy. *Spelling 'K' fast?*

- **Validation Strategy** - Well-respected military leaders past and present (Powell, Shalikashvili), Congressional leaders from both parties (Dole, Nunn), and recognizable foreign statesmen (Blair, Kohl) should be encouraged to vocalize their support for our policies early and often through both spoken and written word. *unlikely* *Bush (Xmas warning)*

- **Shattuck Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis** - A press briefing by A/S Shattuck on his recent mission to Kosovo will underscore human rights violations committed by Serb authorities to date and warn of the worsening humanitarian crisis. We should also seek every opportunity to televise images of the suffering Serb authorities have inflicted upon Kosovars to build public appreciation for the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis. *good*

- **"Diplomatic Dispatches" by Ambassador Chris Hill** - Periodic public reports from our chief mediator in Kosovo on the status of talks will demonstrate our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the crisis while affirming that our diplomacy is backed by force. Diplomatic reporting will also provide the public with insight on the complicated task we face, including the security impediments to delivering humanitarian aid to internally displaced people. NSC Planning will work in conjunction with Amb. Hill's public affairs officers to coordinate and disseminate regular dispatches. *4*

- **Outreach to Editorial Boards and Key Columnists** - In conjunction with the MKA/SRB speech, we should arrange for a briefing for key columnists and pundits at the White House. Senior Administration officials should also brief editorial boards and key reporters in both the domestic and foreign media. We will engage Public Affairs Officers at our overseas posts to carry our message internationally. *4*

- **Foreign Press Center Briefing and USIA Global Exchanges** - Senior Administration officials and NSC staff should also

brief foreign correspondents at the FPC and appear on USIA Global Exchange programs to build international support for U.S. policy in the region.

- **Outreach to Albanian-Americans** - A/S Gelbard should periodically brief Albanian-American leaders on developments in Kosovo. Regular outreach will strengthen the Administration's relationship with this vocal community, which will be important to demonstrate our diplomatic efforts as well as for validation of any future action. Supportive members of this community should also be enlisted for appearances as surrogates on USIA and other international media. *go*

NSC Staff

- **Background Briefings with Schulte** - We will aggressively promote briefings by Greg to reporters covering Kosovo to begin building the case for intervention, encourage more nuanced reporting, and develop open lines of communication. ✓
- **"Scholar's Briefing" for White House Press Corps** - Although normally reserved for Presidential trips, this highly-successful device could be utilized to provide interested reporters with basic information on the nature of the conflict, the historic animosities involved, and the broader implications of the crisis. ✓
- **International Public Information IWG** - The IPI group will take the lead in developing international strategies for building public support abroad for our position. Liaison with NATO's office of Public Affairs will be crucial to this effort. ✓

Concurrence by: Bob Bell, Mara Rudman, P.J. Crowley,
 Len Hawley, Jamie Metzl *(All via e-mail)*
Greg Schulte

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve strategy and authorize proposed actions.

Approve *A* Disapprove _____

Sutphen, Mona K.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 1998 4:20 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
Subject: Kosovo Update: Results of Today's CG Pol Dir Meeting [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Sandy -
cc: Jim

- At their meeting in NY today, CG Political Directors agreed to instruct their ambassadors in Belgrade to deliver a message from CG Foreign Ministers to Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanian leadership.
- The message would underscore the CG's unity and determination in support of UNSCR 1199 requirements, as well as the expectation that Belgrade would take concrete steps toward compliance within a "couple days."
- Political Directors also agreed that CG experts should meet with Chris Hill soon to discuss the elements in his draft settlement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By AE NARA, Date 12/14/23
2008-0094-F-3

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT STEINBERG
SUTPHEN

SIT: BANDLER DAVIDSON DOWLING FLANAGAN HURLEY PASCUAL SCHULTE SUM2 WEISS

SIT: NODIS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 241146Z SEP 98

N
O
D
I
S

FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6623

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
US MISSION USUN FOR AMB SODERBERG
PASS ALSO TO JCS (CASEY) AND OSD (MCCONNELL)

N
O
D
I
S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D) .

1. (C) THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NATO
ACTUALLY HAVE DRAMATICALLY QUICKENED THE PACE OF WHAT
COULD WELL BE THE BEGINNING OF THE ENDGAME IN KOSOVO.
AS WE ENTER THIS CRUCIAL PHASE, I WANTED TO PROVIDE
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND,
INCLUDING VIOLENCE AND DISPLACED PEOPLE, THE STATE OF
THE KLA, AND THE NEGOTIATING TRACK -- ESPECIALLY
WHERE WE CAN ANTICIPATE ENCOUNTERING SOME DIFFICULT
DECISION POINTS IN THE COMING WEEKS.

N
O
D
I
S

2. (C) IN MY LAST MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC ON MONDAY
(SEPTEMBER 21) HE HAD CLEARLY BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND THE
MESSAGE COMING FROM NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE THAT OUR
COLLECTIVE ANGER WITH HIS BEHAVIOR HAD REACHED THE
POINT WHERE THE USE OF FORCE WAS BECOMING A PUNITIVE
MATTER AGAINST HIM, NOT TO BE ASSUAGED BY HALF
MEASURES ON THE GROUND. BECAUSE OF THE CREDIBILITY
OF THE THREAT AGAINST HIM, I EXPECT IN THE COMING
DAYS TO SEE THE LAST OFFENSIVE IN THE DRENICA AREA T
BE COMPLETED AND -xAS MILOSEVIC (SIGNIFICANTLY)
INDICATED IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT AFTER MY MEETING
WITH HIM - "VICTORY" DECLARED OVER THE KLA.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By KDE NARA, Date 12/14/23
2008-0994-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

3. (C) WE HAVE LONG WANTED MILOSEVIC TO DECLARE AN END TO HIS OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KLA, BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOW AND THE SPRING IS THAT THIS TIME HE WILL BE ABLE TO DECLARE THE END THROUGH A VICTORY ACHIEVED BY BRUTE FORCE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE KLA IS FOREVER DEFEATED. MILITARILY IT COULD WELL BE BACK IN SOME FORM IN THE SPRING. BUT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THE KLA, AND ESPECIALLY ITS SWISS-BASED CORE ORGANIZATION, HAS BEEN DEALT A HUGE BLOW. IT HAS BEEN HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE ALBANIAN PUBLIC AS BEING RECKLESS AND LACKING ANY CONCEPT OF WHAT IT WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE APART FROM "LIBERATING KOSOVO." TO BE SURE, THE PRISTINA PRESS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE KLA. KOHA DITORE, FOR EXAMPLE, REGULARLY ISSUES STATEMENTS AND APPEALS ON THE PART OF THE KLA CALLING FOR RECRUITS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BLASTING RUGOVA AND ANY EFFORTS (INCLUDING OUR OWN) TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MANY ALBANIANS, HOWEVER, INCLUDING ONES I RECENTLY ENCOUNTERED LIVING UNDER PLASTIC TENTS IN A MUDDY CLEARING EAST OF MALISEVO (I DIDN'T SEE ANYONE THERE FROM KOHA DITORE) HAVE NO PATIENCE FOR THESE COFFEE HOUSE HEROES AND JUST WANT TO GET BACK TO WHAT IS LEFT OF THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY.

4. (C) AS FOR THE KLA ITSELF, IN MANY CASES (MALISEVO, DECANI, ISTINIC) IT DEPARTED THE BATTLEFIELD EVEN AHEAD OF THE POPULATION IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DEFEND. IN JUNIK, THE KLA DROPPED WEAPONS ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING 82 MM MORTARS, AND LEFT BEHIND 75 MM RECOILESS RIFLES WHICH HAD BEEN DRAGGED OVER CRAGGY PEAKS FROM ALBANIA AT GREAT COST AND DIRE RISK. THE RESULT OF THIS HUMILIATION IS A KLA THAT IS ITSELF FRACTURED (THERE HAS NEVER BEEN MUCH EVIDENCE THAT THE "DRENICA COMMAND" EVER HAD MUCH CONNECTION TO THE "DECANI COMMAND," ETC., ETC.) AND TEMPERS ARE CONSEQUENTLY RISING. THE RECENT KIDNAPPING OF 13 LDK LEADERS IN DRENICA (WHO WERE THERE ASSESSING THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION), THE MURDER OF THE "SHADOW GOVERNMENT" DEFENSE MINISTER IN TIRANA (A MURDER WHICH, BY THE WAY, WILL PROBABLY BE AVENGED), AND THE BIZARRE "RESIGNATION" OF KLA "POLITICAL LEADER" ADEM DEMACI ALL POINT TO AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS SOME SERIOUS RESTRUCTURING AHEAD.

5. (C) MEANWHILE, THE SERBS WILL ALSO SEEK TO ASSUAGE WORLD OPINION WITH A MASSIVE EFFORT TO FORCE PEOPLE BACK TO THEIR VILLAGES, WHETHER RETURNEES FEEL SECURE IN THOSE VILLAGES OR NOT. THIS PROCESS, ACCORDING TO MOST RECENT KDOM OBSERVATIONS, IS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

ALRDY WELL UNDERWAY IN THE DECANI, DJAKOVICA, AND JUNIK AREAS, AND I SUSPECT THAT WHEN THE ORDER IS GIVEN, THE NOW EMPTY CORRIDAR BETWEEN KOMORANE AND MALISEVO WILL SOON FILL UP WITH FRIGHTENED VILLAGERS STRETCHING THEIR UNHCR PLASTIC WRAP BETWEEN THE REMAINING STANDING WALLS OF THEIR BURNED-OUT HOUSES. IT WILL NOT BE A PRETTY SIGHT - THE SERBS HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY COULD CARE LESS ABOUT THESE ALLEGED VICTIMS OF KLA "TERRORISM" - BUT THE SERBS WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT PEOPLE ARE BACK IN THEIR "HOMES" AND "WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS?"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
US MISSION USUN FOR AMB SODERBERG
PASS ALSO TO JCS (CASEY) AND OSD (MCCONNELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

6. (C) THOUGH THE SERBS' MOTIVATION WILL CONTINUE TO FALL BELOW THE LEVEL OF INSPIRATION, I ALSO EXPECT WE WILL SHORTLY BEGIN TO SEE SOME KIND OF "WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES." I TOOK SEVERAL RUNS AT MILOSEVIC OVER THIS ISSUE LAST MONDAY AND IT WAS CLEAR THEN THAT HE WAS NOT YET READY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. BUT A COMBINATION OF THE TIME GAINED DURING THE INTERVENING DAYS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS FROM NEW YORK AND PORTUGAL SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO GET HIM MOVING. AND SO, ASSUMING THAT THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION -- HOWEVER UGLY -- WILL SHOW IMPROVEMENT AND THAT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE WILL ALSO DIE DOWN SOON, WE WILL NEED TO CONSIDER SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATION TRACK.

7. (C) WE ARE CURRENTLY WAITING FOR SERB COMMENTS ON OUR DRAFT. WHEN WE GET THESE - AND WE EXPECT THEM TO BE NEGATIVE AS THOSE OF THE ALBANIANS - WE WILL INCORPORATE BOTH SETS INTO THE DOCUMENT AND SEE HOW FAR APART THEY PARTAIN. DEPENDING ON THE SERB COMMENTS, WE MAY WANT TO TAKE THE DOCUMENT TO THE CONTACT GROUP IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, OR WE MAY TAKE ANOTHER STAB AT REDUCING THE DIFFERENCES. OUR GOAL IS TO HAVE THE CONTACT GROUP ENDORSE THE PLAN AS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

ITS OWN AND PRESENT IT TO BOTH SIDES AS A FINAL COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE COVER TO BOTH SETS OF NEGOTIATORS.

8. ~~(C)~~ ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE THE PARTS, THE MOST IMPORTANT WILL BE THE QUESTION OF KOSOVO'S RELATIONSHIP TO SERBIA. KNOWING THAT THE SERBS WILL NOT ACCEPT LOSING KOSOVO, AND KNOWING THAT THE ALBANIANS CANNOT ACCEPT TO BE FOREVER IN SERBIA, WE CAME UP WITH THE IDEA OF A SO-CALLED "INTERIM ACCORD" WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO ALLOW THE ALBANIAN NEGOTIATORS TO NEGOTIATE THE RECLAIMING OF KOSOVO'S SE< GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS, WHILE NOT SUBJECTING THEM TO ACCUSATIONS THAT THEY SIGNED AWAY THE AGE-OLD DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT WHILE SERBIA IS OBVIOUSLY NOT A DEMOCRACY (RAISING THE MORAL QUESTION OF FORCING THE ALBANIANS TO LIVE UNDER THE SERBIAN REGIME, A QUESTION THE NGO COMMUNITY AND ALBANIAN AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS), THE KOSOVARS THEMSELVES COULD DO WITH A LITTLE REMEDIAL EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. "MOREOVER, IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE FEW SIGNS INDEED THAT KOSOVARS HAVE THE WHEREWITHALL TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS OR TO BECOME A SECOND ALBANIAN STATE IN THE BALKANS, WITH ALL THE FRIGHTENING PROSPECTS THIS CONJURES UP FOR THE BROADER NEIGHBORHOOD GIVEN THE CONTINUED MELTDOWN OF STATE AUTHORITY IN ALBANIA.

9. ~~(C)~~ ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF KOSOVO'S STATUS HAS BEEN THE SUGGESTION THAT KOSOVO LEAVE SERBIA BUT STAY A PART OF YUGOSLAVIA. THIS SEEMS PERSUASIVE IN THEORY, BUT EVERYONE - SERBS AND ALBANIANS ALIKE - AGREES THAT THE FRY IS A CARTOON STATE WITH A VERY UNCERTAIN FUTURE. THEREFORE, THE ALBANIANS' WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A FEDERAL STATUS OUTSIDE SERBIA, OR A "THIRD REPUBLIC" STATUS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD CANNOT BE CONSIDERED MUCH OF AN EFFORT TO MEET THE SERBS HALF WAY. IN ESSENCE, THE ALBANIANS SEE FEDERAL STATUS WITH NO RESIDUAL CONNECTIONS TO SERBIA AS AKIN TO INDEPENDENCE AND DEMAND THAT -- EVEN DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD -- THEY BE FREE FROM ANY CONNECTION WITH SERBIA. THE SERBS REJECT THIS TOTALLY. THEY UNDERSTAND VERY WELL THAT FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDE NO REAL LEVERS OF POWER -- WITNESS THEIR TROUBLES WITH THE MONTENEGRINS -- AND THE REMAINING SERBS IN KOSOVO WOULD GET THE MESSAGE AND PROMPTLY LEAVE. THE SERBS WILL NOT --AT LEAST FOR NOW -- SIGN ON TO A STATUS FOR KOSOVO OUTSIDE SERBIA PEACEFULLY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

10. ~~(C)~~ SO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION REMAINS KOSOVO'S RELATIONSHIP TO SERBIA. OUR NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO PUT THE STATUS QUESTION OFF FOR AT LEAST THREE YEARS, IN EFFECT NOT TAKING KOSOVO OUT OF SERBIA BUT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TAKING SERBIA OUT OF KOSOVO. BOTH THE ALBANIANS AND THE SERBS -- BUT PARTICULARLY THE ALBANIANS - INSIST THAT WE ADDRESS THE STATUS ISSUE NOW, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, WE CONFIRM THEIR PARTISAN VIEW. IN MY JUDGMENT, THIS MEANS THAT THE CONTACT GROUP, IN ENDORSING OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT, WILL HAVE TO STAND FIRM IN DENYING BOTH SIDES THEIR MOST CHERISHED ASPIRATIONS OF CONFIRMING ONCE AND FOR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
US MISSION USUN FOR AMB SODERBERG
PASS ALSO TO JCS (CASEY) AND OSD (MCCONNELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

ALL THAT KOSOVO IS (FOR THE SERBS), OR IS NOT (FOR THE ALBANIANS) A PART OF SERBIA.

11. ~~(C)~~ IF WE CAN HOLD FIRM ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE OF PUTTING ASIDE THE STATUS QUESTION (IN EFFECT, MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO WITH REGARD TO KOSOVO'S POSITION IN SERBIA) AND WORKING ON A THREE YEAR PROGRAM OF DEVELOPING BROAD SELF-GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, I BELIEVE THE SERBS AND THE ALBANIANS WILL ACCEPT OUR PLAN, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY. (IN POINT OF FACT, BY "IMPOSING" THE PLAN WE WOULD BE PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED POLITICAL COVER TO BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO SELL THE AGREEMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PUBLICS.) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONTACT GROUP SIDES WITH THE ALBANIANS AND ATTEMPTS TO TAKE KOSOVO OUT OF SERBIA UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, THE SERBS WILL REJECT THE PLAN AND DARE US TO ENTER A SCENARIO OF USING FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR COMPLIANCE.

12. ~~(C)~~ WE ALSO NEED TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE OF THE "INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" THAT THE ALBANIANS REQUIRE AND THE SERBS REJECT. NATO IS IDEALLY SUITED FOR SOME OF THE TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH POST-SETTLEMENT, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

BE TOUGH WITH THE SERBS (AND PROBABLY THE RUSSIANS) TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF NATO ROLE. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES, SUCH AS WITH THE OSCE, WILL PROBABLY BE AN EASIER SELL.

13. ~~(S)~~ AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST, WE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO WORK WITH THE EU TO PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC SWEETENERS. ECONOMICALLY, KOSOVO IS NOT A LOT WORSE OFF THAN OTHER PARTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT ONE CAN IMAGINE WITH ITS THIRD WORLD POPULATION GROWTHRATE AND ITS CRUMBLING INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, IT WILL NEED CONSIDERABLE HELP EVEN APART FROM WAR DAMAGE.

14. ~~(S)~~ FINALLY, AS WE ALL ARE AWARE, ALBANIA'S CHAOS IS LIKELY TO POSE THEREATEST CHALLENGE TO STABILITY IN KOSOVO AND THAT SITUATION WILL HAVE TO BE MANAGED IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS IN KOSOVO.

HILL

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SSN>2543

<^TOR>980924103144 M3479892

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SSN>2543

<^TOR>980924103145 M3479893

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

<^SSN>2543

<MSGID> M3479892

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~