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RECORD ID: 0004084
RECEIVED: 20 JUN 00 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
SUMMIT

MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: MALLEY

SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID - LOOKING BACK

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MALLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR INFO
MALLEY
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DOC 3 OF 3

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0004084

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 00062017 FOR INFORMATION
001 MALLEY	Z 00062214 FOR REDO
002 BERGER	Z 00062214 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 00062321 FOR INFORMATION
003	X 00062614 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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003 000623	VICE PRESIDENT
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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RUDMAN	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

*Looking Back: The First
Camp David*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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Execsec/Nea:
 Per my email,
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 a memo to POTUS
 Thab. Justin

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CC:

COMMENTS:

*Middle East - The Trust
 Camp David*

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Log # 4084

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

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MARA,

I recommend you approve AS SRB
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE**

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CC:

COMMENTS: *Looking Back: The First
Camp David*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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950
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Execsec/Nea:

Per my email,

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Repackaged as

*a memo to POTUS
Thab. Justi*

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COMMENTS:

*Middle East - The Trust
Camp David*

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

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has already seen and asked for a new
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm BB To RMB Date 6/20

Bob,
I recommend you forward to
SRB.

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

6-26-00

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 2000

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT:

Looking Back -- The First Camp David

In the course of one of my conversations with Barak in which he was pushing for an immediate Summit, he drew an analogy with what was done in the first Camp David. Although the situations are very different, and the effort to reach a final agreement with the Palestinians of a far different magnitude than what Sadat and Begin set out to do, I thought it would be useful to look back. I have attached the relevant section of Bill Quandt's book. Following are some of the highlights of Quandt's account:

- The idea for a Camp David Summit was Carter's and went against the advice of most of his advisors. Carter's calculation, much like Barak's today, was that a Summit would force decisions to a head despite the existence of large gaps at the outset.
- The Summit itself lasted 12 days.
- After only two sessions with Begin and Sadat in the same room, Carter decided to keep them apart; they only met again when the agreement was reached. For the bulk of the meetings, the U.S. delegation met separately with the two leaders.
- After an initial round when both Egyptians and Israelis put their own, hard-line, drafts on the table, Sadat asked Carter to table U.S. proposals. From then on, the parties worked from non-binding drafts written by the United States. The U.S. side would get both sides' reactions and then produce a new draft.
- Begin withheld his cards until the very end. He took negotiations to the brink of collapse over secondary issues to

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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avoid being pressed on key issues. Of the three participants, he was least worried about a failed Summit, and therefore could afford some brinkmanship.

- On the Israeli side, Begin's aides were more flexible than he was. The situation was the reverse in the Egyptian case. Ultimately, this proved to be a smart negotiating posture for Begin.
- As compared to this potential Summit, the issues faced by Carter were far less daunting. In fact, the core of the agreement basically existed from the outset: Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. The only real problems in this respect were the disposition of Israeli settlements and the return of the airfields. (Begin withheld his final concessions on these issues until the very end.) Carter correctly gambled that the other issue being negotiated -- namely, Sadat's insistence on linking a Sinai resolution to an agreement on a formula for interim self-government for the Palestinians -- was one on which the Egyptians ultimately would cave (they did).
- Carter made no real attempt to prepare other Arab leaders for this outcome, thus it came to them cold. As a result all the Arabs, especially the Saudis and King Hussein, rejected it. Saddam Hussein led the opposition camp. We can't afford this mistake.

Attachment

Tab A Excerpt from Quandt's Book

manipulative aspects of the strategy discussed with Sadat could be made to work, although both remained wedded to the idea that a U.S. proposal should be developed. But no one seemed to relish the idea of a showdown with Begin, except perhaps for Brzezinski, who felt Begin was manipulating the United States and needed to be reminded that Washington was capable of pursuing its national interests in a vigorous way and would not always succumb to domestic pressures.

While the American side was edging away from a joint U.S.-Egyptian strategy by mid-1978, Sadat seemed to be operating on the assumption that the general outline of what had been discussed at Camp David was still valid. Thus he periodically adopted extreme positions in public, threatened to call off talks with Israel, talked ominously of October 1978 as the expiration date of the Sinai II agreement (not true), and generally seemed to be trying to engineer an Egyptian-Israeli crisis into which Carter could step with a compromise proposal. Though prepared to go along with the stage setting insisted upon by the Americans, such as the Leeds Castle talks at the level of foreign minister in July, Sadat was clearly getting impatient for the showdown with Begin.

Through the spring and summer of 1978 little substantive progress was made in an endless series of contacts with Egyptian and Israeli leaders. Carter was impatient with the slow pace of diplomacy and seemed to feel a desire to get more directly into the act. During much of July a highly secret planning group began to develop a U.S. proposal under Vance's supervision, and the president followed the progress with interest. On July 20 he discussed with his advisers an idea he had been toying with for some time—a summit meeting at Camp David with both Begin and Sadat.³³ Carter seemed to view a summit as the only way to force decisions to a head, and he doubtless counted on his own role as mediator to bridge the still very large gaps. His view of a summit was psychological and political: once the leaders were committed, they could not afford to fail, and he counted on the special atmosphere of Camp David, away from the press and the burdens of everyday governing, to help produce a positive result. The rest of the foreign-policy team was somewhat more wary of the summit idea, tending to focus on the need for very careful substantive preparations. In early August Vance went to the Middle East to invite Begin and Sadat to Camp David in early September. Both accepted readily, and no doubt Sadat saw this event as the much-awaited moment of truth when he and Carter would corner Begin.

THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

Carter, Sadat, and Begin, along with their top advisers, isolated themselves at the president's mountaintop retreat, Camp David, from September 5 to September 17. Little information reached the outside world of these deliberations at the time, so many were surprised at the news on the last day that agreement had been reached on two frameworks for negotiations. The first dealt with the principles of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement; the second, more complex and less precise, consisted of a formula for an interim period of self-government for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The outcome was not quite what anyone had expected at the beginning of the historic summit.

Carter prepared himself meticulously for the talks. His briefing book contained an analytical paper entitled "The Pivotal Issue," which focused on the question of "linkage" between agreements on Sinai and on the West Bank.³⁴ The point was made that Begin would seek to ensure that any agreement he might reach with Sadat concerning Egyptian-Israeli relations should in no way be dependent on resolving the Palestinian question. Sadat, by contrast, would want some relationship between the two so as to protect himself from the charge that he had abandoned the Palestinians and had accepted a separate peace with Israel. The problem for Carter would be to see if an agreement could be reached at the summit that would make it possible to use the incentive of reaching peace with Egypt to moderate Begin's position on the Palestinian question, without at the same time making Egyptian-Israeli relations entirely subject to whether a solution could be found to the most difficult part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The American delegation had identified several specific issues that were likely to be obstacles to a successful agreement at Camp David. First was Begin's unwillingness to accept that the principle of withdrawal from occupied territory, as called for in Resolution 242, should apply to the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a transitional period. Second was the problem of Israeli settlements in Sinai and in the West Bank. Third was the question of how to associate Jordan and the Palestinians with subsequent rounds of negotiations.

The American team felt it was pointless at Camp David to try to resolve the questions of the border between Israel and a Palestinian-Jordanian entity.³⁵ Not only would Begin be at his most intransigent,

but also the Arab parties most directly concerned would not be present. Similarly the Americans felt the question of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the status of Jerusalem, should be deferred. Instead they thought that Egypt and Israel could make some headway on outlining a transitional regime for the West Bank, building on Dayan's idea of dismantling the military occupation and replacing it with an elected Palestinian body with broad responsibility for day-to-day affairs, perhaps including control over state lands (which would have effectively foreclosed the possibility of extensive new Israeli settlement activity during the transitional period).

No one on the American side anticipated insurmountable problems in reaching a general agreement on principles regarding Sinai. Israel was expected to leave the settlements and the airfields, provided firm security arrangements could be worked out. Sadat was taken seriously when he said that he could not bargain over land or sovereignty, but that everything else could be negotiated.

These assessments led the American team to think in terms of seeking agreement between Begin and Sadat on general principles regarding both Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza. Begin would have to cede on the applicability of 242 to the West Bank and Gaza in any final settlement, and to a freeze on settlement activity, in return for which he could expect Sadat to be forthcoming on Israeli security requirements in Sinai and the West Bank, and to accept a very loose linkage between negotiations on the two fronts. In Vance's view an agreement of this sort would serve to guide the efforts of the foreign ministers as they sought to translate the principles agreed upon by the political leaders into a concrete document leading to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and to a formula for Palestinian self-government for a transitional period.

President Carter's initial reaction to the advice of his team was that it should have aimed higher.³⁶ Rather than just seek agreement on principles concerning an overall settlement, he wanted to work out the details of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, including specific security arrangements. At Camp David this became his special project, and the first draft of the Egyptian-Israeli accord was done in his hand.³⁷ Carter, it is fair to say, was less concerned with the so-called linkage problem than were other members of the American team, and he was also more optimistic about the chances of reaching a satisfactory agreement through direct talks with Begin and Sadat.

Those who were somewhat more pessimistic about the prospects of

bridging the very large gaps between the two parties were also more inclined to see the Camp David talks as part of an ongoing process. From this perspective, even if the talks fell short of full agreement, negotiations would continue, with the issues, it was hoped, more narrowly focused than before. This somewhat apolitical view stood in sharp contrast to the position taken by the president's domestic affairs advisers, who felt Carter needed to leave Camp David with an apparent success.

Carter's views proved to be partly correct and partly wrong. He was right in sensing that the best avenue for real progress lay in getting a detailed understanding between Begin and Sadat on Sinai and on the basic elements of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Begin skillfully withheld his final concessions on removal from Sinai of Israeli settlements and return of three airfields to Egypt until the very end, but from the outset it was clear that an agreement was possible. Carter was wrong, however, in believing that the talks could be concluded quickly and that the three leaders could work well together to solve problems. After only two sessions with both Begin and Sadat in the same room, the president realized it would be better to keep them apart.³⁸

Sadat arrived at Camp David ready for a fight with Begin. To ensure that it would happen, he presented to Carter and Begin an Egyptian draft of a fairly tough agreement. Begin reacted sharply, and the Israelis began to write a counterdraft. At the same time, however, Sadat privately told Carter that he was prepared to be flexible on most points, except for land and sovereignty, but that Carter should put forward proposals for both delegations to react to.³⁹ On the Israeli side, Attorney General Aharon Barak had also reached the conclusion that the time had come for the United States to put forward proposals of its own, and that Begin and Sadat should be kept apart. Thus, by the first weekend, the American team began to polish the first of many negotiating drafts.

Over the next ten days a pattern developed whereby the U.S. delegation, and often just the president and Secretary Vance, would meet separately with the Israeli and Egyptian leaders. They would work from nonbinding written drafts, each time trying to elicit concrete reactions to proposals. These would then be discussed within the American team, and a new draft would be produced, often only marginally different than the previous one. By this means the main issues of disagreement surfaced quickly.

On Sinai there were essentially two problems: settlements and airfields. Both were resolved satisfactorily toward the end of the talks, with Begin

reserving his position on settlements by saying the issue would have to be put to a vote of the Knesset. Predictably, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and the question of linkage were the main stumbling blocks. In addition, the Egyptians insisted on including language from Resolution 242 on the nonacquisition of territory by war. The Israelis refused, even though the language was found in 242, which Begin professed to accept. The not-very-elegant solution was to append the full text of 242 to the Camp David Accords, but not to single out that phrase in the text. For Begin this was a minor victory, typical of his tenacious concern for words and principles, and also indicative of Sadat's comparative indifference to precise language.

Two central issues seemed likely to prevent agreement as the days wore on. First was the bedeviling question of what would happen on the West Bank and Gaza after a five-year transitional period. The Egyptians, supported by the Americans, wanted to make it clear that a final agreement would be negotiated during the transitional period which would resolve the questions of borders, sovereignty, security, and recognition according to the same principles of 242 that would govern agreements on other fronts, such as Sinai. In other words, the "peace for withdrawal" formula would remain intact even if the details might be worked out somewhat differently and over a longer period. Begin would have none of it, but instead of fighting the issue head on, he preferred to focus on other matters until the very last days of the negotiations.

Begin, more than any of the other negotiators, seemed to have a feel for the strategic use of time, taking the negotiations to the brink of collapse over secondary issues to avoid being pressed on key problems. Sadat, by contrast, simply refused to negotiate at all over those matters of deepest concern to him—Egyptian land and sovereignty—while leaving to his aides the unhappy task of trying to stand up to Begin on the Palestinian issue. Carter, who often grew impatient with Sadat's subordinates, frequently went directly to Sadat to get them overruled, something that did not recommend itself on the Israeli side, since there it was Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and Barak who showed flexibility, while Begin was the hard-liner (a much stronger negotiating position to be in, as the results showed).⁴⁰ Begin's position was also strengthened by his willingness to accept a failure in the talks. Both Sadat and Carter were more committed to a positive outcome, and Begin could therefore credibly use the threat of walking out, as he did, to extract some concessions.

The second difficult issue was the question of settlements: the American and Egyptian teams wanted to get a freeze on them during the negotiations over Palestinian self-government. Again, Begin deferred the discussion of this issue until near the end of the talks.

September 16, a Saturday, proved to be the crucial day for addressing the hard issues involving the West Bank and Gaza.⁴¹ Up until that time all of the American drafts contained language on the applicability of 242, including the principle of withdrawal, to the final negotiation on the West Bank and Gaza. And a paragraph calling for a freeze on settlements had always been included. That morning Dayan and Barak met with Vance. The Israelis explained why Begin would never accept the language on 242 and withdrawal. Barak added that he felt a solution could be found, but only if they were all prepared to continue negotiating for another week or so. Prophetically, he said that if agreement had to be reached that day, all they could hope to do was to paper over some very major problems that would come back to haunt them.

Apart from Barak and a few others, however, no one had the stomach for another week in the claustrophobic environment of Camp David. As a result, in the course of the day on Saturday, the American draft was fundamentally changed. The elements of 242, including withdrawal, which had previously been spelled out, were deleted. The language was changed to make it clear that the negotiations, but not necessarily the results of the negotiations, would be based on the principles of 242. And the negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza were artfully obfuscated by creating two tracks, one involving peace-treaty negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and the other involving talks between Israel and representatives of the Palestinians about the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel had no objection to saying that 242 should be the basis for negotiations with Jordan. In Begin's view Jordan had no right to the West Bank, and saying that did not imply a commitment to the "peace for withdrawal" formula. In the Israeli view, 242 did not apply to the talks on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. A careful reader of paragraph 1(c) of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" signed on September 17, 1978, will see language about "two separate but related committees," and "the negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242." It may take a lawyer to explain how, but Begin successfully protected his position of principle that 242 did not apply to the negotiations over the West Bank's future; the Americans accepted the ambiguity; and Sadat may well have

wondered what all the verbal gymnastics were about. In any case, Begin won this round as well.

Later on Saturday evening Carter and Vance thought they had finally won a round with Begin. At a late-night session Carter insisted that Begin agree to a freeze on settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza for the duration of the negotiations over autonomy. Carter agreed to delete the paragraph in the draft text and to substitute a letter from Begin to him, and he dropped his insistence that existing settlements should not be thickened. But he clearly thought a commitment had been made not to construct new settlements during the autonomy talks. Vance also understood Begin to have made such a promise, although he was concerned about Begin's hesitation to accept an open-ended commitment to a freeze.⁴²

In any event, the issue should have been settled on Sunday morning, when Begin sent a draft letter on the topic to Carter. By this time Sadat had already been informed that Begin had agreed to a freeze on settlements. But the actual letter did not conform to Carter's understanding, and, without speaking directly to Begin, Carter sent it back. Begin had promised to freeze settlements for three months, a time period he had mentioned the previous evening. Now, however, Begin was linking the freeze to the duration of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, not to the autonomy talks, which was an entirely inappropriate and unprecedented step. Alarm bells should have gone off, but so many other issues were on the agenda that day, especially a diversionary argument over Jerusalem which erupted in the afternoon, that both Carter and Vance continued to act as if there had merely been a misunderstanding that would be cleared up as soon as Begin sent back a new draft.

The final version of the letter did not arrive until after the Camp David Accords had been signed, and in it Begin held stubbornly to his position that the freeze would last only through the three-month period of the Egyptian-Israeli talks. Another round went to Begin, and on a position of considerable importance to the skeptical Arab audience that was waiting to see what, if anything, would be offered to the Palestinians as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli separate peace apparently in the making. Carter never got over the feeling that Begin had misled him, and this episode caused deep mutual distrust between the two leaders.

Late in the afternoon of September 17 Sadat and Carter met for the last time to discuss the agreement that was nearing completion. Sadat was reserved, and his mood was not one of pleasure at a job well done. The American team also realized that many problems lay ahead, but in

the end it had made the political decision to get the best agreement then available, while hoping that the next stage of talks would fill in some of the gaps and clarify areas of ambiguity. And it is also true that the key players on the American side tended to think the Camp David Accords would eventually win Saudi and Jordanian support. To a large extent this was wishful thinking, and in part it reflected a tendency to take the Saudis too literally when they mumbled positive generalities to visiting Americans.

CONCLUSIONS

During the lengthy talks that preceded Camp David and at Camp David itself, U.S. policy constantly had to adjust to two realities: events in the Middle East cannot be easily controlled or influenced, so developments there frequently caught the Americans by surprise and obliged them to revise their strategies; and domestic American political realities intrude with particular force on the decisionmaking process regarding the Middle East. A president must simultaneously adjust his plans to the unpredictable twists and turns of Middle East politics and keep an eye on his domestic political base. What seems possible and desirable in the first year of a president's term is likely to be seen as hopelessly ambitious by the third year.

The result of these Middle East and domestic pressures is to move American policy away from grand designs with strong ideological content toward a less controversial, and less ambitious, middle ground that can win bipartisan public support as well as acceptance by Arabs and Israelis. To do so, of course, is not always possible, as much as it might be politically desirable, so American policy toward the Middle East rarely manages to satisfy everyone that has an interest in shaping it. Presidents seem to tire of all the controversy generated by Middle East problems, and the intractability of the issues is a source of much frustration.

The Camp David Accords amply demonstrate the limits of what in fact can be achieved, even with a massive commitment of effort. But they are also a reminder that diplomacy can produce results, if the will, the energy, and the creativity are there. The historical verdict on Camp David cannot be fully rendered, although with each passing year it seems to be more widely accepted as part of the new reality of the Middle East. By any standard, however, this remarkable adventure in summit diplomacy achieved more than most of its detractors have been willing to acknowledge, and less than its most ardent proponents have claimed.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

REDO 4084

June 22, 2000

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*

FROM: ROB MALLEY *RM*

SUBJECT: Looking Back: The First Camp David

Attached per your request is a memorandum for the President on the first Camp David experience.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Excerpt from Quandt's Book

Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)

From: Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2000 8:47 AM
To: Malley, Robert (NESA); @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUDMAN
Subject: Package 4084 - Redo for POTUS ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

@NESA: SRB sent back package 4084 last night (a memo from Bruce to SRB, subject line: "Looking Back: The First Camp David"). He wants it redone as a memo from SRB to the President. Only edits are to change the word "your" in the first sentence to "my" and to remove the paranthetical sentence beginning "Assuming we go to a Summit..." also in the first paragraph.

Please redo today as indicated above and re-route through Execsec.

Thanks, Justin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/29/2012
2008-0729-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 20, 2000

INFORMATIONMEMORANDUM FOR ~~SAMUEL BERGER~~ *President*THROUGH: ~~BRUCE RIEDEL~~ *RR*FROM: ~~ROB MALLEY~~ *RM* *SRB*

SUBJECT: Looking Back: The First Camp David

In the course of one of ~~my~~ *my* conversations with Barak in which he was pushing for an immediate Summit, he drew an analogy with what was done in the first Camp David. Although the situations are very different, and the effort to reach a final agreement with the Palestinians of a far different magnitude than what Sadat and Begin set out to do, I thought it would be useful to look back. I have attached the relevant section of Bill Quandt's book. ~~(Assuming we go to a Summit, it would be useful to convene a small group of people who were involved in Camp David I, including perhaps Carter himself.)~~ Following are some of the highlights of Quandt's account:

- The idea for a Camp David Summit was Carter's and went against the advice of most of his advisors. Carter's calculation, much like Barak's today, was that a Summit would force decisions to a head despite the existence of large gaps at the outset.
- The Summit itself lasted 12 days.
- After only two sessions with Begin and Sadat in the same room, Carter decided to keep them apart; they only met again when the agreement was reached. For the bulk of the meetings, the U.S. delegation met separately with the two leaders.
- After an initial round when both Egyptians and Israelis put their own, hard-line, drafts on the table, Sadat asked Carter to table U.S. proposals. From then on, the parties worked from non-binding drafts written by the United States. The U.S. side would get both sides' reactions and then produce a new draft.

- Begin withheld his cards until the very end. He took negotiations to the brink of collapse over secondary issues to avoid being pressed on key issues. Of the three participants, he was least worried about a failed Summit, and therefore could afford some brinkmanship.
- On the Israeli side, Begin's aides were more flexible than he was. The situation was the reverse in the Egyptian case. Ultimately, this proved to be a smart negotiating posture for Begin.
- As compared to this potential Summit, the issues faced by Carter were far less daunting. In fact, the core of the agreement basically existed from the outset: Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. The only real problems in this respect were the disposition of Israeli settlements and the return of the airfields. (Begin withheld his final concessions on these issues until the very end.) Carter correctly gambled that the other issue being negotiated -- namely, Sadat's insistence on linking a Sinai resolution to an agreement on a formula for interim self-government for the Palestinians -- was one on which the Egyptians ultimately would cave (they did).
- Carter made no real attempt to prepare other Arab leaders for this outcome, thus it came to them cold. As a result all the Arabs, especially the Saudis and King Hussein, rejected it. Saddam Hussein led the opposition camp. We can't afford this mistake.

Attachment

Tab A Excerpt from Quandt's Book