

## Exchange Mail

---

**DATE-TIME** 8/25/97 5:16:26 PM

**FROM** Crowley, Philip J.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** GUIDANCE UPDATE BY TUESDAY AT 10 A.M.  
[UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Riedel, Bruce O.  
Pedersen, Amy F.  
Countryman, Thomas M.  
Marty, Joseph H.  
Cooper, Kathleen H.  
Gorsuch, Robert P.  
Albert, Ronda A.  
Kristoff, Sandra J.  
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.  
Suettinger, Robert L.  
Bader, Jeffrey A.  
Gagnon, James M.  
Covey, James P.  
McEldowney, Nancy E.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
Sapiro, Miriam E.  
Dowling, John N. (Nick)  
Feeley, John F.  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Peters, Mary A.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Bandler, Donald K.  
Butler, Lawrence E.  
Todd, Gwennyth E.  
Covey, James P.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
Dowling, John N. (Nick)  
Feeley, John F.  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Bandler, Donald K.  
Hofmann, Karl W.  
DeSouza, Patrick J.  
Dobbins, James F.  
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.  
Piccone, Theodore J.  
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.  
Misol, Elizabeth J.  
Busby, Scott W.  
Malley, Robert  
Letts, Kelly J.

Ragan, Richard F.  
 Schwartz, Eric P.  
 Hill, Roseanne M.  
 Rossi, Christopher R.  
 Abdulmalik, April B.  
 Antholis, William J.  
 Kyle, Robert D.  
 Lee, Malcolm R.  
 Mitsler, Elaine M.  
 Panerali, Kristen E.  
 Bendick, Gordon L.  
 Burrell, Christina L.  
 Danvers, William C.  
 Davis, William K.  
 Kiernan, Gerald P.  
 Rinaldi, Steven M.  
 Behring, Deanna M.  
 Epstein, Gerald L.  
 Jones, Kerri-Ann D.  
 MacDonald, Bruce W.  
 Ward, JoAnn  
 Andreasen, Steven P.  
 Bell, Robert G.  
 Bouchard, Joseph F.  
 Kelly, Sandra L.  
 Langley, Janice M.  
 Mulligan, George D.  
 Seaton, James B.  
 Witkowsky, Anne A.

**CARBON\_COPY**

Dohoney, James P.  
 Crowley, Philip J.  
 Johnson, David T.  
 Luzzatto, Anne R.  
 Wozniak, Natalie S.

**TEXT\_BODY**

Even though it's a relatively slow news week, the guidance marches  
 on. Would appreciate guidance updates on the following by tomorrow  
 morning:

NESA: Anything new on MEPP? Albright Trip? Where is Congressman Hilliard?

ASIA: DPRK defection? Cambodia update?

Fallout from Wolf trip to Tibet?

EUR: Has Adams meeting with APNSA been scheduled?

BOSNIA: Update on IPTF/SFOR inspections on RS police? Where did the guns come from? What if Pale group tries to retake Banja Luka transmitter by force?

INTERAM/DEMOCRACY: Montserrat

update?

AFRICA: What in UN investigation team in Congo-K doing?

INTECON/LEGISLAT:

WSJ says we'll present Fast Track to the Hill on Sep 8. Firm schedule?

OSTP:

Life on Mir?

DEFENSE: What don't we agree with from NYT landmine editorial?

Thanks.

PJ

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT**

Aug25gui.doc

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

August 25, 1997

Korea

Middle East Peace Process

Bosnia

Montserrat

Zambia

Iran

Russian Mir Situation

Germany

NATO

Landmines

Cuba

China/Taiwan

Cambodia

Northern Ireland

Fast Track

## Trips and Visitors

KOREA

August 25, 1997

## NORTH KOREAN DEFECTIONS

Q: Are North Korea's ambassador to Egypt, as well as his diplomat brother based in Paris, now in the United States?

We have seen the press accounts out of Cairo and Seoul, but I don't have anything for you on it at this time.

Q: Have they requested political asylum?

We have seen the press accounts out of Cairo and Seoul, but I don't have anything for you on it at this time.

Q: What role did the United States play in this?

Again, we have seen the press reports, but I don't have anything further.

Q: Did the United States have an intelligence relationship with either of them?

We never comment on intelligence matters.

## FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT/KEDO

Background: In accordance with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has maintained the freeze on its nuclear facilities and has cooperated in a joint U.S.-DPRK project to store its spent nuclear fuel, now 85 percent complete. In return, KEDO is committed to provide two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea, and to deliver 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) annually until the first reactor is built.

The target date for completion of the first LWR is 2003, although we expect some delays. South Korea and Japan will finance the majority of the multi-billion

dollar LWR project, while the U.S. is responsible to raise funds for HFO. Before KEDO could break ground on the LWR project, it first needed to negotiate a long list of agreements with the DPRK, many of which -- such as those covering telecommunications and transportation access -- established precedential links with South Korea and thus required significant DPRK concessions.

The U.S. has contributed over \$55 million to KEDO for HFO and KEDO administrative expenses, plus an additional \$26 million for the spent fuel project. We have requested \$30 million for KEDO for FY 1998.

Q: Why has it taken so long for KEDO to break ground?

A: Before KEDO could begin construction, it had to reach agreement with the DPRK on light-water reactor supply agreement, as well as six protocols and a long list of technical agreements governing the terms and conditions for the project.

Many of these agreement -- such as those related to telecommunications, transportation, and use of DPRK labor -- established precedents in the DPRK's relations with South Korea and the rest of the world and thus took considerable time and effort to negotiate.

Q: What is the timetable for completion of the project?

A: KEDO's target date for completion of the first light-water reactor is 2003, although the project may experience delays.

Q: Who is funding the light-water reactor project?

A: South Korea and Japan share primary responsibility for funding the LWR project.

Q: Has the United States contributed to the reactor project?

A: No. U.S. contributions to KEDO cover a portion of the organization's administrative expenses and heavy fuel oil costs.

Q: Has North Korea fulfilled its nuclear freeze commitments under

the Agreed  
Framework?

A: We are satisfied with the DPRK's compliance with the nuclear freeze provisions of the agreed framework.

North Korea maintains the freeze on its nuclear program, under IAEA monitoring, and is also cooperating in a joint project with the United States to safely store its spent nuclear fuel, which would otherwise be available for reprocessing. Over 85 percent of the DPRK's spent fuel rods have already been placed under IAEA seals.

The agreed framework is structured in such a way that if the DPRK fails to fulfill its obligations under the accord, KEDO will not complete the LWR project.

#### FOUR PARTY PREPARATORY TALKS

Background for Four Party Preparatory Talks: The Chinese, North Korean and South Korean delegations were led by a vice or deputy minister of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation was headed by Chuck Kartman, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The U.S. delegation had representatives from the NSC, JCS, OSD, and State Department. The U.S. delegation held bilateral consultations with South Korea and China on Monday, with the four party preparatory talks beginning Tuesday, August 5, at Columbia University. The purpose of the talks was to reach agreement on a venue, date and broad category agenda topics (1. discussion of a new, permanent peace mechanism to replace the Armistice, 2. Tension-reduction and confidence building measures).

Q: What is the status of talks in New York?

A: The Four Party preparatory meeting recessed August 7, with agreement to reconvene during the week of September 1-5 in New York to address the final issue for decision -- setting the agenda for the Four Party plenary. The four

parties  
tentatively agreed on the timing (6 weeks after final agreement on the agenda),  
venue (Geneva - the Swiss have offered to provide substantial support for the talks), level of representation (Minister will meet as appropriate and available;  
heads of delegations will report to the Ministers and be of roughly equal rank - Deputy Minister/Assistant Secretary level) and procedural issues (U.S. will chair the first plenary; sequence of rotating chairmen will be determined by drawing lots).

Q: Did the North Koreans use the Nunn-Laney visit to send a message to the U.S.  
or South Korean governments? How would you characterize their discussions?

A. Following their trip to North Korea, Sen. Nunn and Ambassador Laney provided both the U.S. and South Korean governments a brief overview of their discussions and observations. As their press statement released in Seoul indicates, they had frank and useful discussions with both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korean Peoples Army officials about promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We note that Sen. Nunn and Ambassador Laney emphasized the value of four party talks and the need for the North to undertake economic and agricultural reforms to solve its long-term difficulties.

Q: What is your reaction to a recent statement by the DPRK's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN indicating U.S. forces in Japan should be withdrawn?

A: We totally reject any notion that U.S. forces in Japan are a cause of tension on the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, U.S. forces in Japan have been a principle force for peace and stability in Asia. We remain hopeful that North Korea will engage in the four party peace process in a serious manner when preparatory talks resume in September.

FAMINE

Q: What is your reaction to recent statements by international groups that the famine in North Korea is worsening?

A: The food shortages in North Korea inflict a horrible cost on the North Korean people who already are suffering from impoverishment. The international community has responded generously to calls for emergency humanitarian assistance, and the United States has contributed some \$50 million to the UN World Food Program appeals.

We are participating in the current WFP food appeal through the contribution of 100,000 tons of food. But the long term answer is not short-term food aid; the North's prospects for agricultural production sufficient to feed itself will only improve through structural economic and agricultural reform. That reform can be greatly assisted through the four party peace talks.

## MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

August 25, 1997

## ARAFAT STATEMENTS

Q: What is your judgment today of Palestinian performance with regard to security cooperation with Israel?

A: We have received a series of assurances from Chairman Arafat in the course of Ambassador Ross and others' discussions in recent days and weeks that he will assist in the fight against terrorism; that he will assist in the renewal of security cooperation.

We will not to into the details of the trilateral meetings held to discuss security cooperation. As we have said before, security cooperation is not a one-time event, but a continuing requirement to say the right words and take the right actions.

In short, we will judge Chairman Arafat by his actions on security. In recent days, security cooperation has improved but there's still a long way to go.

We don't see any role for Hamas or Islamic Jihad in the peace process. They are the enemies of peace, and they don't belong in any serious discussion of the peace.

(IF ASKED): Secretary Albright still intends to visit the region soon provided there is an improvement in Palestinian security cooperation.

## LEBANON

Q: What is going on in Lebanon?

A: The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group concluded Saturday its meeting on the border concerning last week's exchanges of fire. We have urged all the parties to exercise restraint and we will continue to do so.

## BOSNIA August 22, 1997

### Force Protection/Bosnian Serb Threats

\* Situation in Republika Srpska is calm but we are concerned about the increase in negative and provocative rhetoric being put out by the radical hard-liners in Pale and their state-media. That type of propaganda is dangerous and must be stopped. We will continue to press the Pale leadership on this issue.

\* All the parties must understand that they should not challenge SFOR. We will hold the Parties' leadership responsible for keeping their people under control.

\* They should know we would deal very effectively, very swiftly with a forceful

response. We'll do what we have to do to protect our troops.

#### SFOR Action in Banja Luka

\* Situation in Banja Luka remains calm but tense. The five Banja Luka police stations are now under the control of police loyal to the elected President of Republika Srpska. IPTF is continuing its investigation and monitoring in Banja Luka. SFOR remains in the area providing general security.

\* This week's IPTF-SFOR operation in Banja Luka has uncovered substantial amounts of illegal weapons and equipment and clearly revealed that the Pale radical hard-liners are planning the use of violence and intimidation in order to obstruct implementation of the Dayton peace and maintain their hold on power. This action follows a meeting yesterday with Bob Gelbard, Plavsic, General Shinseki and others in which Plavsic apparently expressed concern about a Pale attempt to arrest her.

\* We strongly support this IPTF-SFOR operation taken in response to IPTF information that there was evidence of illegal police activity inside these stations.

\* This action follows up incidents this past weekend when Pale police briefly detained the new police chief appointed by Plavsic and when SFOR troops intervened to prevent violence between two groups of Serb police during a confrontation that occurred this weekend when police loyal to the elected government took action to investigate reports that the Constitutional Court Justice had been beaten in the police station.

\* Acts of violence and intimidation will only keep the RS from gaining assistance and recognition of the international community. We applaud IPTF and SFOR's efforts to enforce compliance of the police provisions of Dayton. SFOR expects all RS police to comply fully with the decision to place special police under

Annex 1-A control.

#### RS Assembly Elections/OSCE

\* The OSCE and the High Representative, among other experts, have concluded that President Plavsic's dissolution of the assembly was legitimate and authoritative. President Plavsic is clearly correct to call for new RS assembly elections. The OSCE Council yesterday expressed support for those elections. We also believe the OSCE should supervise the elections.

\* Thousands of Bosnian Serbs have taken to the streets of different cities in Republika Srpska in support of President Plavsic, including nightly rallies in Banja Luka. The Bosnian Serb people are clearly fed up with the corruption and repression of the Karadzic wing in Pale.

If asked about Constitutional Court Ruling:

\* We condemn Pale's attempted manipulation of the Constitutional Court. The campaign of pressure tactics, including the beating of one justice, clearly invalidates the Court ruling on this matter.

#### Demining (USA Today)

\* The presence of over 1.8 million land mines in Bosnia remains a serious concern. It is a tragedy that even after the war has ended, the men, women and children of the region remain at risk as result of landmines

\* The US has been a leading contributor to the demining effort. Our goal is and continues to be creating an indigenous capability and organizational structure that will survive after our direct involvement ends.

\* To date the USG program has spent approximately \$12M in developing three regional Mine Action Centers and training over 500 hundred civilian and military deminers for humanitarian demining.

War Criminal Pero Skopljak

\* Croatian Ministry of Justice issued a statement that indicted war criminal Pero Skopljak has been arrested and is in custody.

\* We expect the Government of Croatia to transfer Skopljak expeditiously to the Hague. President Tudjman recently promised to do his utmost to ensure the transfer of indicted war criminals to the ICTY. Cooperation on war crimes is one of our top issues with Croatia.

Is SFOR is planning to detain Karadzic or other indictees?

\* We continue to remain deeply concerned with the presence of war criminals in Bosnia, including Karadzic. We remain concerned about his potential influence -- in violation of agreements that he not be involved in political life -- and will not be satisfied until he is brought to justice in the Hague.

\* We are considering a full range of options to facilitate delivery of war criminals to the Hague. We continue to press the Parties to live up to their obligation to turn over war criminals.

\* SFOR is authorized to detain war criminals encountered in the course of its regular duties and if the tactical situation permits. The recent SFOR operation to detain war criminals in Prijedor conformed to this mandate. Any indicted war criminal would be subject to detention in such circumstances.

(if pressed, cannot comment on possible future operations)

Corruption in Bosnia

\* Corruption in Bosnia is a serious problem, particularly in Republika Srpska.

One of the reasons thousands of Bosnian Serbs are standing up to support Plavsic is that the Bosnian Serb people are fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale hardliners.

\* We have tailored our assistance efforts specifically to counter corruption in Bosnia, by making assistance contingent on behavior of the parties and with substantial accounting requirements that prevent assistance funds from being

misused.

\* One of our top priorities is the restructuring and retraining of police in Bosnia in accordance with democratic standards. Retraining and restructuring will help end the use of police as a tool for corruption and repression by hard-line leaders. We have already completed initial restructuring of police forces in two cantons of the Federation.

Has the policy changed on SFOR ending its mission in June 1998?

\* The President has repeatedly said that the SFOR mission will end in June 1998.

\* The critical question is what we do between now and then. We have to focus our energy on assisting the parties with full implementation: common institutions, refugees, economics, war criminals and police training.

\* What role, if any, NATO plays, in or out of Bosnia, after June 1998 has not been decided -- let alone what role we would play.

If asked whether we absolutely ruling out United States troops in Bosnia after June 1998

\* SFOR's mission should end on schedule in June 1998. US political and economic engagement will continue well beyond that.

\* It is too soon to speculate as to what, if any, role there may be for NATO following the completion of SFOR's mission. Our focus is on intensifying civilian implementation across the board so that parties themselves can assume greater responsibility for their own future after SFOR's mission is completed.

## EVACUATION

Q: Has the United States been asked to help in any way?

A: At present, the British are facilitating the voluntary departure of Montserratians from the island. At this point, the USG has not received an official request from the UK government to support their ongoing evacuation efforts.

## REFUGEE SUPPORT

Q: Will any of the people from Montserrat be granted entry into the U.S.?

A: As indicated the press, because Montserrat is a British dependent territory, the UK has the lead on this as well and has offered admission to the UK and relocation assistance. At the request of the UK, the US is considering the following support:

A. Temporary Protected Status. The Attorney General is actively considering granting temporary protected status to Montserratians currently in the United States. We expect a decision by the Attorney General on this in the next 24-48 hours. Temporary protected status (TPS) would permit Montserratians in the United States to remain here temporarily with employment authorization.

B. Parole. For those Montserratians still on the island, we are considering other options to permit them to enter United States territory, including the United States Virgin Islands, on a humanitarian basis.

(If asked, the options we're considering are humanitarian parole and public interest parole.)

ZAMBIA  
August 25, 1997

Background

President Chiluba is out of the country on an official trip. The Vice President, Brigadier General Godfrey Miyanda, is acting.

IF ASKED:

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the violence in Zambia on August 23, involving the shooting of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Dr. Rodger Chongwe?

A: The United States Government regrets the violence in Kabwe on August 23, and in particular the wounding of Dr. Kaunda and Dr. Chongwe.

We urge the Zambian authorities to thoroughly investigate this matter.

We call on all sides to exercise restraint and to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric and violence. It is imperative that all political parties return to the table of dialogue to resolve their differences peacefully.

IRAN  
August 22, 1997

Russian Missile Sales to Iran

Q: Has Russia transferred missiles to Iran?

A: No. We remain concerned, however, that the technical assistance provided by some Russian enterprises could benefit Iran's acquisition of a long-range ballistic missile capability.

Q: What can you tell me about U.S.-Russia consultations on missile sales to Iran?

A. As you know, we have been concerned for some time about Iranian efforts worldwide to acquire missile technology. The President and President Yeltsin talked about this at the Helsinki Summit, then at Denver they agreed to raise the level and accelerate the pace of our contacts.

Background: In early August, former Ambassador to India Frank Wisner led a small interagency team to Moscow to discuss ways we can work to prevent missile

technology from reaching Iran. We expect these talks to continue in the coming weeks.

The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also have an ongoing dialogue about weapons and missile sales o Iran, as do Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov. We expect these exchanges to continue when the Vice President is in Moscow in late September and when Secretary Albright and FM Primakov meet in New York in the margins of UNGA.

The Russians continue to assure us that they are committed to the highest non-proliferation standards. [NOTE: Wisner says it is important to the Russians to get this out as part of the press line.]

Q: What, precisely was the substance of the Wisner discussions in Moscow? With whom did he meet?

A: I'm not going to comment further on the talks at this time, except to say that they are off to a serious start.

Q: Has Wisner gone anywhere else? What about Israel?

A: Separately, he traveled to Israel and Egypt to discuss our concerns about Iran, and he returned to the US via the UK.

## Executive Order

### Background

- \* The President signed an Executive Order to clarify the scope of restrictions on trade and investment activities by United States persons with Iran.
- \* Issuance of the order is consistent with existing U.S. policy toward Iran.

This is a reinforcement and confirmation of the scope of the 1995 embargo, and does not represent a change in policy or the imposition of further punitive measures.

- \* The new Executive order makes explicit that United States persons, wherever located, are prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in any investment or

trade-related activity with Iran, wherever such activity occurs.

\* The new order has proven necessary to resolve questions that have continued to surface about the proper interpretation of the existing orders. Our goal is to remove any doubt and to render absolutely clear and explicit those aspects which have been questioned.

\* The 1995 embargo on Iran was imposed to deprive Iran of the benefits of trade with and investment from the United States. The new order reconfirms this objective.

Q: Why now?

A: The clarifying order has been under review for some time.

Q: Is this new order in any way connected to the Turkey pipeline decision?

A: No. This is entirely separate from the State Department's assessment that Turkey's decision to purchase Turkmeni gas does not appear to involve activity that would be sanctionable under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.

This EO confirms and clarifies the restrictions on U.S. persons engaging in trade or investment-related activities involving Iran.

Q: Why are we not using this vehicle to toughen sanctions on Iran?

A: The United States has the world's most restrictive policy on economic dealings with Iran. The comprehensive trade and embargo was imposed in 1995. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was signed into law August 5, 1996.

We have engaged intensively with allies to encourage them to impose significant economic measures to change Iran's objectionable behavior.

While we do not rule out further unilateral measures in the future, we favor a common multilateral approach, which will have a greater impact in changing Iranian behavior.

Q: Will this encounter resistance from U.S. allies as another extraterritorial

extension of U.S. jurisdiction?

A: Our allies understand the depth of our resolve to cut off economic activity with Iran until it modifies its dangerous policies. The new Executive order is intended to clarify the application of the U.S. embargo to U.S. persons appropriately subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

Q: Does the new order close a loophole?

A: No. It would be accurate to say the new order is intended to eliminate debate over different interpretations regarding the scope of the embargo.

## RUSSIAN MIR SITUATION

August 22, 1997

The crew on board Mir began the repair mission to reconnect power from the damaged Spektr module at approximately 5:00 am EDT. The repair mission was delayed by approximately 2 hours due to a pressure leak in one of the cosmonaut's gloves. The glove was replaced and the mission proceeded. NASA reports that all of the power cables have been successfully reconnected. The repair mission is expected to be completed around 12 noon EDT. The crew will run a test on all the connections prior to turning on the power from the module. NASA expects that within 72 hours they will know whether the mission has succeeded in regaining power. NASA is hopeful that at least 30% of Spektr's power can be regained. Mir's other major systems are operational at this time, although some are currently powered down to preserve energy.

### Talking Points

-- Obviously, we are pleased with the progress of the repair mission to this point. We are hopeful that, as planned, some power can be restored from the damaged module in the next few days.

-- The current schedule for crew replacement and repair is as follows:

o Sept. 3 External spacewalk to inspect -- but not repair -- damaged module and solar arrays. (Foale may participate.)  
o Late Sept. (pending NASA review) Launch of Shuttle with U.S. astronaut David Wolf to replace Michael Foale. Shuttle could carry parts needed for repair of Mir.

-- The President is being kept informed of the situation by his Science Advisor,  
Dr. Jack Gibbons.

Q: If the power is restored, will NASA send another astronaut to Mir?

A: David Wolf is the next astronaut scheduled to go to the Mir on September 25.  
NASA will follow its regular flight readiness review prior to the launch to determine that all safety criteria are met prior to the launch. The decision to send Wolf will be a decision NASA makes in coordination with the Russians as part of the Shuttle-Mir program.

Q: Are you saying that if power isn't restored, he won't go?

A: NASA has always viewed reconnecting the power as one of the key criteria in determining whether it makes sense to send another astronaut. If it is not restored, they will assess whether it still makes sense, both from a scientific and operational perspective.

Q: President Yeltsin issued statements supporting the cosmonauts. Has President Clinton talked to him about this situation?

A: The President is being kept up to date on this issue. He has not spoken to President Yeltsin about it.

Q: (if asked) We understand that Russia's deputy finance minister Vladimir Petrov has said that Russia will end financing for the aging Mir space station and retire it in 1998. How will this affect U.S. plans for space cooperation with Russia and for sending U.S. astronauts to the Mir?

A: We note that Deputy Minister Petrov's remarks were immediately repudiated by the Russian government spokesman, who reaffirmed continuing Russian government support for the Mir. We have received no indications from the Russian government that there is any change in their strong support for the Mir. Accordingly, there have been no changes in U.S. plans for space cooperation with Russia.

Q: The Russians themselves seem to suggest that the aging Mir is not receiving enough government support for needed upgrades and maintenance? Aren't you worried about this?

A: As part of each Shuttle-Mir mission, NASA conducts a thorough flight readiness review with their Russian counterparts before each launch, including the readiness status of each of the main systems and subsystems on board the Mir. We are confident, based on firm assurances from the highest levels, that the Russian government remains committed to supporting their part of the Shuttle-Mir program as part of our joint efforts to prepare for the International Space Station.

FYI: The recently-returned Russian cosmonauts have complained about a lack of Russian government support, and Wednesday's NYTimes carried a report of Russian ground crew grumbling over spare parts, etc.

Q: Isn't it finally time to end our participation in the Shuttle-Mir program?

A: The Shuttle/Mir program is only one facet of our space cooperation with Russia. Our missions on the Mir are giving us a great deal of knowledge and experience on how to live and work aboard an operational space station, especially in unexpected situations - something we will want to fully understand before we send up our own international space station. We are taking the decision on whether to send the next U.S. astronaut (David Wolf) to the Mir one step at a time. Obviously, we are pleased with the progress of the repair mission

to this point. We will rely on NASA to make a decision on how we should proceed based on their technical and safety analysis of the situation.

GERMANY  
August 22, 1997

#### U.S.-Germany on Holocaust Compensation

\* We support compensation for CEE holocaust survivors, the so-called "double victims" who suffered under both Hitler and Stalin.

\* We have made our support known to the German government and all other European governments.

\* We applaud the recent agreement between the German government and Jewish community representatives to set up a special commission to examine reparations claims from East European holocaust victims.

NATO  
August 22, 1997

Q: Can you comment on the Washington Times story that says the GAO thinks the Administration low-balled its estimate of NATO enlargement costs?

A: The GAO actually concluded that the Defense Department's key assumptions, including about the scope of potential military threats, were reasonable. It also found that the higher cost estimates in studies by the RAND Corp. and the Congressional Budget Office reflect much greater and less likely military threats assessments.

GAO did not conclude that the cost of enlargement would be higher than the Administration's estimate. Rather, it focused on a number of uncertainties (how many countries would join, what are the specific military

requirements, how will costs be allocated among NATO Allies) which could make our actual cost burden higher or lower than the Administration's February estimate. In fact, GAO concluded that the Administration estimate included some categories of spending that are not necessarily related to enlargement and that would reduce our overall cost estimate by \$18-23 B.

GAO did question the precision of the Pentagon's pricing methodology for the costs of some specific defense improvements.

Our future cost estimates can be more precise now that NATO has identified which countries will be included and once Allies agree later this fall to the specific military requirements of enlargement.

LANDMINES  
August 21, 1997

## DECISION TO JOIN THE OTTAWA PROCESS

Q: Why Has the Clinton Administration Switched Course?

A: In May 1996 the President decided that the United States would pursue a global ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

We want a ban that is worldwide and will pursue the most promising opportunities available.

In January we began to pursue the establishment of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That is where a number of other global treaties have been negotiated, for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Since January, however, progress has been slower than we would have liked while at the same time momentum behind the Ottawa Process has grown.

We think there is an opportunity here now to achieve an early ban that both serves our humanitarian goals and protects our national security interests. We want to take advantage of it and help build on the momentum behind the Ottawa Process.

When the formal negotiations open on September 1, we will be there as an active participant.

The objective of those negotiations is to conclude a text for signing in December.

We will work to secure an agreement that achieves our humanitarian goals while protecting our national security interests.

Q: What are the positions that the U.S. will be bringing to the table?

A: We will be bringing a number of positions to the table in Oslo. For example:

\* We will propose that there be a geographic exception to allow stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines to defend the U.S. and its allies on the Korean peninsula. Given the security situation there, and the crucial role that landmines play in our defense plans, it is fundamental that any treaty make this exception.

\* We will be seeking to improve the draft treaty's verification provisions, particularly in the area of information exchange and fact finding missions.

Q: Are you seeking an exemption for self-destructing APL?

A: The United States is not seeking a special exemption for pure anti-personnel landmines. We expect they would be banned under the treaty just like non-self-destructing systems.

However, we will propose language that will make clear that the treaty definitions would not apply to systems whose primary function is anti-tank or anti-vehicle, rather than anti-personnel.

These munitions are designed to block or channel tanks and armored vehicles, not people, and are only deployed in areas where a threat is imminent.

Submunitions that are anti-personnel and protect the anti-tank mines would be permitted as part of these systems.

\* [If needed:] These systems must self-destruct within a very short period. (U.S. systems self-destruct within 15 days or less.)

The intent of the Ottawa Process is to prohibit anti-personnel landmines, not anti-tank mine systems.

Q: Are You Seeking a Transition Period?

A: We will also be proposing that the treaty include a provision that would delay entry into force until a majority of producers and users have ratified. As an alternative, we would propose that there be an optional deferral period for certain provisions comparable to that in the CCW Amended Mines Protocol pending before the Senate.

Q: Don't these proposals undercut your commitment to a ban?

A: Our proposed changes will not dilute the humanitarian benefit of the treaty. To the contrary, they may increase the treaty's effectiveness because, if accepted, they will make the treaty more attractive to states that are not now participating in the Ottawa process.

\* It would be very positive if participation could be broadened and more states which are APL producers and users were to join. The greater the adherence, the more effective this treaty will be.

Q: What reactions have there been to your proposals from other governments?

A: We have sent a senior-level team to Geneva this week to discuss our positions informally with a number of key Ottawa supporters, so that we can begin to

develop support for these positions in advance of the formal negotiations in Oslo.

\* The team is led by Eric Newsom, PDAS for Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department. Mr. Newsom will also lead our delegation in Oslo.

\* Their discussions thus far have been useful. They will continue.

(If asked about whether we still go to Oslo even if U.S. proposals receive a hostile reaction):

\* Yes. We will attend the Oslo conference and present our positions there.

\* But we would urge patience before predicting an outcome. We have only begun to discuss our positions with other nations and the negotiations do not open until next week.

(If asked whether we will sign the treaty even if we fail to gain agreement to our positions in Oslo):

\* No. We are not prepared to sign a treaty that does not protect our national security interests.

Q: Have you abandoned your effort in the CD?

A: We remain committed to our other efforts to ban landmines, including the establishment of step-by-step negotiations toward a ban in the CD. That effort remains important as long as there are states that will not join the Ottawa process but who are CD members. The CD membership includes most of the major historical producers and exporters.

We will also continue our efforts to work with the Senate to secure early advice and consent to ratification of the CCW Amended Mines Protocol. That Protocol, if adhered to, could make a significant contribution to the landmines problem.

(If asked: Its key provisions include, for example, a requirement for minimum

APL detectability, for easy mine clearing; marking and monitoring of non-self-destructing APL; and 99.9% reliability rate for scatterable, self-destructing APL.)

U.S. leadership on this issue

- \* We would emphasize that the United States has been a leader on this issue.

- \* The President called for the elimination of landmines in September, 1994.

- \* In 1995, the United States resolution calling for a comprehensive, global ban on landmines was adopted at the UN by a vote of 156-0.

- \* We have been working since then to establish negotiations in the CD.

- \* We have also taken important unilateral steps. One year ago the President ended our use of non-self-destructing APL, with the exception only of Korea and training. We will destroy some 3 million NSD APL by 1999.

- \* The rest of our systems are self-destructing within a matter of days or weeks. There are no documented incidents of civilians being harmed by our self-destructing systems.

- \* In January, the President permanently banned all United States APL exports and transfers.

- \* We have aggressively pursued development and fielding of new demining technologies, and are one of the world's leaders in our "train-the-trainer" demining programs.

CUBA

August 22, 1997

1998 Papal Visit to Cuba - Issuance of License to Archdiocese of Miami

- \* The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today

approved a license request submitted by the Archdiocese of Miami to conduct a pilgrimage by cruise ship from Miami to Havana during the time that Pope John Paul II will be visiting Cuba. This license was issued in accordance with OFAC regulations permitting religious travel to Cuba. Travelers will be subject to all the normal spending and other restrictions affecting travel to Cuba.

\* This is the only license approved to date for travel related to the Papal visit to Cuba. All requests related to the Pope's visit, whether for travel or for shipment of donations, will be considered on a case by case basis in accordance with U.S. law and policy and the humanitarian needs of the Cuban people.

\* The United States Government views the Pope's visit as a potentially important event in bringing to the Cuban people a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights.

Q: Does the U.S. plan to ease travel restrictions during the Pope's visit to Cuba?

A: We have received requests from the Archdiocese of Miami, the Cuban Catholic Church and others to permit, consistent with U.S. law and policy, travel to Cuba and donations of humanitarian assistance to the Church, in connection with the Pope's visit.

We have begun to receive license applications and will consider their merit, on a case by case basis, in accordance with U.S. law and the humanitarian needs of the Cuban people. Travel and shipment of humanitarian assistance will require appropriate licensing by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce.

So far, no licenses have been granted. A request by the Archdiocese of Miami to conduct a pilgrimage via cruise ship, is being considered under OFAC regulations

governing religious travel.

(If pressed on allowing direct humanitarian flights):

\* We have authorized direct humanitarian flights twice in the past year: last October after hurricane Lili and again in December as a follow-up for the victims of hurricane Lili and in time for the holidays. We have also authorized travel for religious purposes in the past.

\* This is not new and consistent with the law and current regulations. Providing support directly to the Cuban people has been an important element of U.S. policy toward Cuba since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992. It is also consistent with the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton).

#### CHINA/TAIWAN

August 4, 1997

Q: Can you confirm the C.H. Tung plans to visit the United States September 9-11, and that he will meet with President Clinton while in Washington?

A: We welcome Mr. Tung's travel to the United States during that time period, and look forward to meetings with him in Washington. Appointments for him are currently under consideration.

IF PRESSED: We expect Secretary Albright will meet Mr. Tung. His appointments in the White House are currently being arranged.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the request for a transit visa for Taiwan's President Lee Teng-Hui?

A: The United States will consider this transit request (through Hawaii

on the way to Central America, with return stop in Hawaii) as we do all transit requests by Taiwan leaders. We look to the issue of the safety, comfort and convenience of the traveler. We have not yet issued the visa, but we do not anticipate any difficulty in doing so.

Q: What did Sandy Berger accomplish on his trip to China?

A: Mr. Berger met with China's President, Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, and State Council Foreign Affairs Director Liu Huaqiu on August 11-12. Berger's talks with Liu were the fourth round of discussions of strategic issues conducted by National Security Advisors with Chinese counterparts, the first such round occurring in March 1996 when Tony Lake met with Liu in Washington. Their strategic discussions focused on Asian issues: Korea, relations with Japan, Cambodia, and South Asia. On Korea, they stressed our good cooperation in the recently concluded Preparatory Talks which we hope will lead to Four Party talks. On Japan, we explained the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship as an anchor of stability in East Asia. On Cambodia, there was agreement on supporting ASEAN's initiative to work with the Cambodian parties to bring about free and fair elections in 1998. On South Asia, both sides agreed on the importance of working to defuse tensions.

Mr. Berger also discussed preparations for President Jiang's visit to the U.S. this fall. This will be the first visit by a President of China to the U.S. since 1985. We believe Presidential meetings and visits are an essential part of improving U.S.-China relations, and the Chinese agree with us that we should look for ways to use the visit to expand areas of cooperation and address areas where we differ. Berger raised U.S. concerns and objectives on issues including nonproliferation and other security issues, human rights, trade, and transnational issues such as the environment and law enforcement. The trip was not designed to negotiate issues, but rather to highlight specific areas

of  
concern as we approach President Jiang's visit. The atmospherics were  
good, and  
Berger was warmly received.

#### CAMBODIA

August 22, 1997

Q: What is your reaction to charges by Cambodian Ambassador Var  
Houth and  
"Special Envoy" Chhang Song that they have documents showing that  
Prince  
Ranariddh was plotting with Khmer Rouge hardliners, violating  
Cambodian law, and  
that Ranariddh is determined to return the country to civil war?

A: We have called for an end to violence in Cambodia since the  
events of July 5-6  
and we repeat that now. Cambodia has seen enough violence.  
Violence cannot  
solve Cambodia's political problems.

A lasting resolution of Cambodia's current situation can only come  
from a  
negotiated political settlement. We strongly support the ASEAN  
initiative to try  
to restore political stability to Cambodia through a negotiated political  
settlement.

We are not in a position to confirm the authenticity of any purported  
Cambodian  
documents. We are aware that FUNCINPEC officials were holding  
talks with the  
Khmer Rouge.

We have stated on many occasions our view that senior Khmer Rouge  
leaders who  
are responsible for the genocide of the 1970's should be prosecuted  
and punished  
for their crimes against humanity from 1975-1979. The Khmer Rouge  
senior  
leaders, who oversaw the deaths of at least one million Cambodians  
should not be  
allowed to assume any kind of political role in that country.

Our core principles as regards Cambodia are:

An end to the fighting that overturned the results of the 1993  
elections.

FUNCINPEC and other parties must be allowed to operate freely .

There must be free and fair elections in 1998.

The framework of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords must be reinstated.

We remain opposed to any political role for leaders of the Khmer Rouge.

Q: Any comment on the meeting between Hun Sen and King Sihanouk in Beijing?

A: Hun Sen, Ung Huot, acting head of state Chea Sim, and other Cambodian politicians have traveled to Beijing to meet with King Sihanouk. Our position remains that the process by which Ung Huot was selected as First Prime Minister was undemocratic. However, we welcome any dialogue between Cambodia's major players that will lead to free and fair elections in May 1998.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible abdication by King Sihanouk?

A: We would prefer not to comment on what would clearly be a significant personal and political decision for the King. However, I would note that the King is a popular figure among Cambodians, and he does have significant public influence. A decision to abdicate would obviously have major political implications for Cambodia.

Q: Any comment on ASEAN's decision in Singapore that it will no longer recognize Ranariddh as First Prime Minister? What is the U.S. position? Do we still follow ASEAN's lead?

A: Our understanding is that ASEAN members recognize states, not governments. The ASEAN foreign ministers indicated they would continue their relationship with Cambodia. Our understanding of the ASEAN foreign ministers' statement is that they did not discuss the issue of recognition of Ranariddh or Ung Huot as First Prime Minister.

We welcome the ASEAN foreign ministers' announcement that they

will continue  
their mediating role to seek a peaceful and democratic resolution to  
the  
Cambodian political crisis. We understand that the ministers have  
proposed  
hosting a dialogue between the parties in the conflict. We fully  
endorse ASEAN's  
efforts in this regard.

We strongly support the efforts of ASEAN to mediate in an effort to  
restore  
implementation of the Paris Accords in Cambodia. We and ASEAN  
share the  
objectives of stopping the violence, maintaining the coalition  
government and  
ensuring the May 1998 elections are free and fair. We have been in  
regular and  
close contact with ASEAN regarding Cambodia's political crisis.

Q: Will the U.S. lift the suspension of aid to Cambodia?

A: On Friday, August 8, Secretary of State Albright decided to  
continue the  
suspension of all non-humanitarian aid indefinitely. We have  
suspended all  
assistance except some humanitarian and election-related projects  
provided  
through NGO's and USAID contractors. None of our aid will directly  
benefit the  
Cambodian government.

During the suspension period, we have continued the equivalent of  
\$20 million in  
activities. For the immediate future, we are continuing the same  
programs. We  
plan an in-depth program review at the end of August.

Q: Can you provide an update on Desaix Anderson's mission to the  
region?

A: Yesterday, Mr. Anderson was in Singapore to meet with the  
ASEAN foreign  
ministers. He met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the  
leader of the  
ASEAN foreign minister's group that is working toward a resolution  
of the  
Cambodian political crisis. Mr. Anderson briefed Foreign Minister  
Alatas on his  
meetings in Phnom Penh with Ung Huot and others (see below).

Mr. Anderson also met with other foreign ministers and senior  
officials. His

discussions focused on ASEAN's efforts to restore political stability and ensure free and fair elections in Cambodia in May 1998.

Over the weekend, Mr. Anderson visited Phnom Penh, where he met with newly installed First Prime Minister Ung Huot. His purpose was to inform Ung Huot of the U.S. decision to extend indefinitely the suspension of aid. He also reaffirmed to Ung Huot the core principles that are guiding U.S. decisions on future assistance to Cambodia. Mr. Anderson also met with ASEAN ambassadors, donor country ambassadors, human rights representatives, and other government officials.

Q: Does this mean you recognize Ung Huot as First Prime Minister?

A: Ung Huot retains his position as Foreign Minister. As we have said, we consider the process by which he was named First Prime Minister to have been undemocratic. We have also said we are prepared to meet with him as necessary.

Q: Do you recognize Ranariddh as Prime Minister?

A: Ranariddh's status is a decision for FUNCINPEC to make. We believe that all exiled leaders, including Ranariddh should be allowed to return to participate freely in the political process.

Q: Can you comment on Secretary Albright's statements in Singapore about Pol Pot and his recent show trial by the Khmer Rouge?

A: The United States continues to attach great importance to bringing Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders to justice for their atrocities against the Cambodian people.

We regard the recent show trial of Pol Pot and three of his Generals, and Pol Pot's sentence of life under house arrest, to be a legal farce.

We are continuing actively to explore with our friends and allies in the international community, including at the United Nations, various options for

bringing Pol Pot to justice before some form of international tribunal should he be delivered into the custody of responsible authorities.

Given the current confused state of affairs in Cambodia, it would be premature and imprudent to speculate publicly on what might be the best type of forum for such procedures. But no one in Cambodia should be under the illusion that our determination to pursue those options is diminished because of the Khmer Rouge show trial of Pol Pot.

Q: Does the Khmer Rouge trial of Pol Pot raise a defense of double jeopardy for Pol Pot and the three generals?

A: No. In our view the show trial clearly does not invoke the principle of double jeopardy, both because of the show trial's obvious flaws and because it has no effect whatsoever on an international prosecution of Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge leaders.

Q: Does the United States support the establishment of an international criminal court?

A: Yes. The President has long expressed his support for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court that meets our requirements for effectiveness, due process, and broad participation by countries across the globe. The United States is actively engaged in UN negotiations currently underway. We are working very hard to finalize the text of a statute for such a permanent court and moving on to a diplomatic conference.

Note to Briefer : A permanent court would not have retrospective jurisdiction, and thus could not prosecute Pol Pot for atrocities of the 1970's.

Q: What can you tell me about Adams' itinerary?

A: He will be coming to the U.S. in early September; believe he will be in Washington September 2-4, then go to New York until 7th.

Will have meeting with Berger here; understand he will also see Secretary Daley and has meetings on Hill as well. For details, refer you to Sinn Fein office here.

Q: Has Adams visa been approved? What about fundraising? (Background: Adams, Martin McGuinness and Richard McAuley applied for visas in Dublin August 11.)

A: Yes, Secretary of State has approved visa. (That means it can be stamped in his passport by Embassy Dublin, once they receive formal notification.) Adams and other officials not expected to travel to U.S. until early September.

If asked: Do not anticipate placing restrictions on fundraising on visas. Note that FBI system for monitoring how funds are used remains in effect. (Note: System allows FBI access to Dublin bank account of Sinn Fein to monitor how funds deposited and spent.)

Q: Are there any plans for Adams to see the President? Whom will he see?

A: No, we do not anticipate such a meeting. We do expect to schedule a meeting with the National Security Advisor, but nothing has been requested or scheduled yet.

If pressed: Yes, Adams did meet with the President during the previous ceasefire (at the 1995 St. Patrick's Day celebration at the White House and in Belfast in November 1995); would not rule out meetings now that ceasefire restored, since we expect it to be permanent, but not going to happen during this visit.

Q: Did the Administration give Sin Fein assurances regarding visas

for Sinn Fein  
leaders, access to the White House, fundraising in the United States,  
and  
suspension of IRA deportation cases, in the event of a renewed IRA  
ceasefire?

A: After Gerry Adams announced that he would recommend to the  
IRA that it  
reestablish the ceasefire, we informed Sinn Fein officials that in the  
event of a  
cease-fire, we would be prepared to take appropriate confidence-  
building measures  
to support the ceasefire and the peace process.

We are not going to go into detail about those confidence-building  
measures.

I will note that Sinn Fein official Joe Cahill was recently granted a  
waiver to  
visit here in early August. (NOTE: Actually Cahill got a visa  
BEFORE the August  
1994 ceasefire...)

Q: Any readout from Jim Steinberg's meeting with Adam Ingram?

A: Jim Steinberg met yesterday with Adam Ingram, Northern Ireland  
Minister for  
Security and Economic Development.

They had a very positive meeting. Discussion focused on the Northern  
Ireland  
peace process and ways to build on the progress of the recent ceasefire  
in the  
multi-party negotiations slated for September.

They also agreed that greater attention needed to be given to questions  
of  
economic development, as the essential ingredient for long-term  
stability.

If pressed: The involvement of Sinn Fein in the multi-party talks was  
discussed  
and the two agreed that the August 6 meeting between Sinn Fein  
leader Gerry Adams  
and UK Minister for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam was a positive  
step.

Q: What about the deportation cases?

A: Not going to go into specifics of possible confidence-building  
measures.

Q: What will happen to the peace process now that the UUP has voted against the decommissioning proposal at the Belfast talks today?

British and Irish governments have expressed commitment to process, to negotiated settlement. Do not see negative vote as in any way end of process but how they take it forward is up to them, to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues and the parties involved.

Q: What is Senator Mitchell's role?

Senator Mitchell is chairing the talks in Belfast.

#### FAST TRACK August 8, 1997

Q: How important is Fast Track?

A: As the President has made clear, we will seek legislation from Congress to secure fast track trade negotiating authority. We believe such authority is important to help us continue the successful work of the President's first term.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods with bipartisan support. The reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. International trade is increasingly important to our future. Over the next decade, the global economy is expected to grow at three times the rate of the U.S. economy. Over the past four years, one-quarter of our economic growth came from trade - and exports created 1.4 million new jobs. In a world where over 95% of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., we must export to sustain growth at home.

Fast track authority will permit us to continue the work of opening markets around the world through the WTO and other global institutions. For example, trade authority permitted us to secure the recent Information Technology

Agreement, which will open a \$500 billion global information technology market.

In 1995, 3.3 million U.S. jobs were supported by \$90 billion in exports of these products.

Without fast track authority, we risk sitting on the sidelines while other countries open markets to their products or set new trading rules contrary to U.S. interests. Since 1992, in Latin America and Asia alone, other countries have reached 20 preferential trade agreements without us. We must be active. We have nothing to fear. The U.S. is already the most competitive, the most open and most successful large economy in the world.

In the fall, we will offer a fast track proposal to Congress and seek passage in both the House and Senate.

Q: What is the purpose of the President's meeting with members of Congress?

A: The President expressed the need for fast track to ensure U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Fast Track is about expanding opportunities for U.S. exports and making sure the U.S. sets the rules and conditions for trade that are advantageous to U.S. workers and businesses. The Administration's trade agenda is focused on exactly those areas where the U.S. is most competitive -- telecommunications, technology, professional services, agriculture, biotechnology, and critical manufacturing sectors.

Q: Why does the Administration keep meeting with Members without presenting a proposal?

A: The only way to succeed in securing fast track authority is to build the broadest consensus possible before we head into the fall. It is important for Congress to have a clear understanding of why we need fast track, and the President used last week's meeting as an opportunity to do that.

Q: Why did the President meet with these particular Members?

A: Amb. Barshefsky and other members of the Administration have met with over 170 members over the last few months. The President's meeting today is part of an effort to personally address questions from those Members about trade and the need for fast track. This meeting is one of a number of meetings the President will have with Members in the coming months.

Q: What are the chances of the Administration securing fast track authority?

A: We realize this will be a divisive battle, but the more Congress understands that fast track is necessary for U.S. competitiveness in the global economy, we believe they will support renewed fast track authority for the President. We can not afford to have the rest of the world march on by while we pass up opportunities for U.S. workers and companies.

There are three fast track related activities taking place this week at the White House:

1. President will officially nominate Jay Berman and Vicki Radd to head the Administration's fast track effort.

[Jay has had a long and distinguished career in Washington as the Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America and has been particularly active on ensuring that US intellectual property rights are protected around the world. Vicki has been an Chief of Staff to Erskine Bowles most notably coordinating the Summit of the Eight in Denver. She will be working with Jay on coordinating this priority.]

2. Erskine briefed the Cabinet on the President's commitment to fast track on Wednesday afternoon and has asked that the Cabinet be available to speak out and work on this issue in the future.

3. On Thursday, the President will meet with congressional members to talk about why fast track authority is in the national interest.

#### General Points:

\* The President is clearly committed to securing fast track authority this fall.

This will be one of the Administration's top priorities and the President and his

Cabinet will work hard on articulating both to the American people and the

Congress why fast track authority is vital to the nation's long term economic prosperity.

\* Fast track is at the heart of the President's effort to prepare the American

people for the challenges of the 21st century. A central pillar of the President's economic strategy has been aggressively creating opportunities to

advance America's job growth, productivity and overseas trade.

\* And it has worked: longest sustained period of growth of all our G-7 partners

(25% of which was driven by exports), 12 million new jobs, unemployment under

5%--a 25 year low and sustained low inflation.

\* Securing fast track authority is critical to continue this economic expansion

and maintain America's leadership position in the world.

The Administration's international trade agenda is on track and moving forward at

full speed. In APEC, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and in the WTO, the

United states and the Clinton Administration are setting the agenda to open

markets, expand trade, and increase domestic prosperity. More than 25% of our

economic growth in the past four years has been driven by export growth.

\* In the last six months, the U.S. led the world to conclude trade agreements in

information technology and telecommunications which covered more than \$1 trillion

in global trade. We just led the developed countries of the world to conclude an

historic anti-corruption agreement among the 29 developed nations in the OECD.

We are moving forward in financial services talks at the WTO.

\* The President was personally involved in securing the ITA

agreement, working  
with APEC leaders last Fall to build support for this agreement. APEC  
has  
already embarked on "ITA II" to expand the reach of this agreement  
and will  
consider other sectoral trade agreements this year.

The President and the Administration are actively engaged with the  
Congress on  
the trade agenda.

\* We are now working in Congress to preserve MFN trade status with  
China --  
normal trade relations -- a critical measure to protect the economic  
health of  
Hong Kong because half of U.S.-China trade goes through Hong  
Kong.

\* We have secured commitments from the congressional leadership to  
address "fast  
track" on an expedited basis this Fall and conclude this year. This  
effort will  
involve the President, the Vice President, and the resources of the  
White House.

We would like to see Congress approve "fast track" in the Fall to  
ensure that we  
can gain the best possible trade terms on a reciprocal basis for U.S.  
companies  
and workers. The trade agenda has not been held back by the absence  
of "fast  
track" negotiating authority. We are moving forward in the FTAA,  
within APEC,  
and in the WTO on a wide range of negotiations including financial  
services.

\* Fast track is important because trade barriers in the fastest growing  
markets  
in the world are much higher than ours, and fast track will increase  
our leverage  
to bring those barriers down and open markets.

\* We will work with the Congress this summer to build consensus on  
the scope of  
fast track and how to address labor and environmental issues.

\* President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

\* APEC Summit in Vancouver November 24-25.

Q: Press reports have mentioned October 28 as a possible arrival date for PRC

President Jiang Zemin's State visit to the U.S. What can you tell us about plans for the visit?

A: President Clinton and President Jiang earlier agreed to an exchange of state visits. Our two governments are discussing plans for President Jiang to visit the U.S. before the end of this year.

Exchange Mail

---

**DATE-TIME** 8/29/97 8:47:32 AM  
**FROM** Butler, Lawrence E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: URGENT REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Crowley, Philip J.

**CARBON\_COPY****TEXT\_BODY**

PJ -- I've sent this to JS on off-chance that he is in for a quick vet. Otherwise, it's cleared in the European directorate.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Crowley, Philip J.

Sent: Friday, August 29,  
1997 8:43 AM

To: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy;

@BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs;

@NESASIA - NE/South

Asia; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs

Cc: @PRESS

- Public Affairs; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: URGENT REQUEST

FOR GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

For Martha's Vineyard  
this morning, need the following by 10 a.m.:

DEFENSE: Update

Russian seismic guidance

DEFENSE: Are Shali comments on landmines

consistent with Ottawa negotiating position? Germany committed to  
Ottawa without exceptions?

BOSNIA: Update situation, implications

for Bosnia policy

GLOBAL: Do we support Shali call for interagency  
czar?

NESA: Albright trip announcement

EUROPE: Update NI guidance

to reflect Brit announcement

ASIA: GOJ says we will announce Foley  
today

Thanks

PJ

AFRICA: Government halts UN investigation

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT**

pressguidance829.doc

Draft press guidance for August 29 -- checked against the substance of Mowlam's statement delivered today.

NORTHERN IRELAND

August 29, 1997

Q: What is your reaction to Mowlam's announcement on the Ceasefire?

A: Mo Mowlam, the Secretary for Northern Ireland, said in Belfast earlier today that she had determined that the IRA ceasefire announced six weeks ago met conditions in word and deed to permit the entry of Sinn Fein to the substantive talks which begin in Belfast on September 15.

We welcome this decision which gives an opportunity for all parties in Northern Ireland to be part of inclusive talks leading to a negotiated settlement.

Q: How does this affect Adams' visit to the United States next week?

A: He picked up his visa in Dublin last week and arrives early next week; believe he will be in Washington September 2-4, then go to New York until 7th.

Will have meeting with Berger here September 3; understand he will also see Secretary Daley and has meetings on Hill as well. For details, refer you to Sinn Fein office here.

If asked: he has no restrictions on fundraising attached to his visa.

Q: Are there any plans for Adams to see the President?

A: No, we do not anticipate such a meeting.

If pressed: Yes, Adams did meet with the President during the previous ceasefire (at the 1995 St. Patrick's Day celebration at the White House and in

Belfast in November 1995); would not rule out meetings with ceasefire restored, since we expect it to be permanent, but not going to happen during this visit.

Q: Did the Administration give Sin Fein assurances regarding visas for Sinn Fein leaders, access to the White House, fundraising in the United States, and suspension of IRA deportation cases, in the event of a renewed IRA ceasefire?

A: After Gerry Adams announced that he would recommend to the IRA that it reestablish the ceasefire, we informed Sinn Fein officials that in the event of a cease-fire we would be prepared to take appropriate confidence-building measures to support the ceasefire and the peace process.

We are not going to go into detail about those confidence-building measures.

I note that Sinn Fein official Joe Cahill was granted a waiver to visit here in early August.

Q: What about the deportation cases?

A: Not going to go into specifics of possible confidence-building measures.

Q: What will happen to the peace process now; will the UUP participate in the Belfast talks that start next month?

That is a decision for the UUP to make. British and Irish governments have provided mechanisms to move the talks process and decommissioning forward towards a negotiated settlement. We encourage the UUP to be at the table in September in order that all parties are represented and heard there.

Q: What is Senator Mitchell's role?

Senator Mitchell will continue to chair the talks in Belfast.

Q: Have we been asked to supply a person for the Decommissioning Commission?

The Irish and UK governments have jointly asked us to provide an official to be one of the members of the Independent Commission on Decommissioning. The State Department is presently working to identify a suitable candidate.

# Exchange Mail

---

**DATE-TIME** 9/3/97 9:11:27 AM  
**FROM** Crowley, Philip J.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Dowling, John N. (Nick)

**CARBON\_COPY**

**TEXT\_BODY**

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT**

Aug29guide.doc

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE  
August 29, 1997

Bosnia

Russia

Middle East Peace Process

Northern Ireland

Korea

Landmines

Interagency Czar

Russian

BOSNIA

August 29, 1997

Events in Brcko?

\* The situation is now calm.

\* SFOR operation began because of a potential confrontation between police forces in support of the government of President Plavsic and factions in Pale. Troops are there to help contain violence and prevent loss of life, restore safe and secure environment under Dayton Agreement.

(refer to Defense, State and SFOR for more information)

Force Protection/Bosnian Serb Threats

\* We hold the hard-liners in Pale responsible for yesterday's violence. In particular, we are concerned at the use of provocative media broadcasts and air raid sirens that appeared to incite the crowd. This type of provocation is dangerous and unacceptable. We will continue to press this issue with the Pale leadership.

\* All the parties must understand that they should not challenge SFOR. We will hold the Parties' leadership responsible for keeping their people under control.

\* They should know we would deal very effectively, very swiftly with a forceful response. We'll do what we have to do to protect our troops.

Is U.S. or SFOR taking sides in the conflict between Karadzic and Plavsic?

\* We support implementation of the Dayton accords and those leaders who cooperate with Dayton. President Plavsic is the elected President of Republika Srpska with legal authority for governing the Serb entity in Bosnia.

\* The current crisis results from the interference by indicted war criminal Karadzic and other radicals in Pale with President Plavsic's attempts to clean up corruption in the RS and to cooperate with international efforts to

the  
implement Dayton peace.

Are Plavsic forces gaining control?

\* President Plavsic has been gaining strength. With the support of IPTF and SFOR acting under Dayton authorities, police and media authorities in Western Srpska have broken away from Pale and are now performing their duties under the authority of the elected President.

\* Thousands of Bosnian Serbs have taken to the streets of different cities in Republika Srpska in support of President Plavsic, including nightly rallies in Banja Luka. The Bosnian Serb people are clearly fed up with the corruption and repression of the Karadzic wing in Pale.

Milosevic

\* Bob Gelbard is in Belgrade today to meet with President Milosevic.

\* It is time for President Milosevic to get off the fence on this issue and support RS leaders who support the Dayton agreement that he signed.

Media in Republika Srpska

\* State television facilities in Banja Luka have stopped taking editorial direction from the radical hard-liners in Pale. We believe this is a positive step that will help ensure that the Bosnian Serb people have access to alternate media sources, including fair coverage of President Plavsic.

\* We also understand that SFOR is providing area security near the broadcast facilities.

RS Assembly Elections/OSCE

\* We fully support President Plavsic's call for OSCE-supervised RS assembly elections in October. The OSCE council has also expressed support for these elections. Free and fair elections of a new assembly will give the Bosnian Serb

people the opportunity to make the choice between the obstructionist message of the Pale hard-liners and the anti-corruption message of President Plavsic.

\* Special Representative Bob Gelbard was in Moscow yesterday for discussions on this issue. Russian support for these elections is clearly important.

If asked about Constitutional Court Ruling:

\* The OSCE and the High Representative, among other experts, have concluded that President Plavsic's dissolution of the assembly was legitimate and authoritative. We condemn Pale's attempted manipulation and intimidation of the Constitutional Court. The campaign of pressure tactics, including the beating of one justice, clearly invalidates the Court ruling on this matter.

Is SFOR is planning to detain Karadzic or other indictees?

\* We continue to remain deeply concerned with the presence of war criminals in Bosnia, including Karadzic. We remain concerned about his potential influence -- in violation of agreements that he not be involved in political life -- and will not be satisfied until he is brought to justice in the Hague.

\* We are considering a full range of options to facilitate delivery of war criminals to the Hague. We continue to press the Parties to live up to their obligation to turn over war criminals.

\* SFOR is authorized to detain war criminals encountered in the course of its regular duties and if the tactical situation permits. The recent SFOR operation to detain war criminals in Prijedor conformed to this mandate. Any indicted war criminal would be subject to detention in such circumstances.

(if pressed, cannot comment on possible future operations)

Corruption in Bosnia

\* Corruption in Bosnia is a serious problem, particularly in Republika Srpska. One of the reasons thousands of Bosnian Serbs are standing up to support Plavsic

is that the Bosnian Serb people are fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale hardliners.

\* We have tailored our assistance efforts specifically to counter corruption in Bosnia, by making assistance contingent on behavior of the parties and with substantial accounting requirements that prevent assistance funds from being misused.

\* One of our top priorities is the restructuring and retraining of police in Bosnia in accordance with democratic standards. Retraining and restructuring will help end the use of police as a tool for corruption and repression by hard-line leaders. We have already completed initial restructuring of police forces in two cantons of the Federation.

Has the policy changed on SFOR ending its mission in June 1998?

\* The President has repeatedly said that the SFOR mission will end in June 1998.

\* The critical question is what we do between now and then. We have to focus our energy on assisting the parties with full implementation: common institutions, refugees, economics, war criminals and police training.

\* What role, if any, NATO plays, in or out of Bosnia, after June 1998 has not been decided -- let alone what role we would play.

If asked whether we absolutely ruling out United States troops in Bosnia after June 1998

\* SFOR's mission should end on schedule in June 1998. US political and economic engagement will continue well beyond that.

\* It is too soon to speculate as to what, if any, role there may be for NATO following the completion of SFOR's mission. Our focus is on intensifying civilian implementation across the board so that parties themselves

can assume  
greater responsibility for their own future after SFOR's mission is  
completed.

#### RUSSIA/NOVAYA ZEMLYA EVENT

August 29, 1997

Q: Is it true that Russia conducted an underground nuclear explosion  
at Novaya  
Zemlya on August 16?

\* We have information that a seismic event with explosive  
characteristics  
occurred in the vicinity of the Russian nuclear test range at Novaya  
Zemlya on  
August 16.

\* The information we have is still under review.

\* We are currently engaged in a dialogue with Russia and with other  
countries  
regarding this event.

[If asked: Does the CTBT ban all nuclear explosions?]

\* The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other  
nuclear  
explosion.

[If asked: Does the information suggest that a nuclear explosion has  
taken  
place?]

\* The information is not conclusive. We are not able to confirm that a  
nuclear  
test has taken place.

[If asked: Can we rule out an earthquake or other natural  
explanation?]

\* The information we have is not conclusive. We are not able to  
confirm that a  
nuclear test has taken place. Thus, we cannot rule out an earthquake or  
other  
natural explanation.

[If asked: Does our inability to make a determination as to the nature  
of this  
event indicate the CTBT is not effectively verifiable?]

\* We believe our National Intelligence Means, together with the  
Treaty's

verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable.

\* The CTBT would provide opportunities for clarification and on-site inspections in cases such as these.

[If asked: If a state did conduct a nuclear explosion, would that violate international law? Would it be a violation of the obligation of a treaty signatory under the Vienna Convention not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty?

\* As a matter of principle, the United States does not believe it useful to make hypothetical legal determinations.

\* However, the United States is not at all reluctant to emphasize the importance of all states refraining from carrying out any nuclear explosion.

\* The United States remains confident that in due course all states will be convinced of the wisdom of becoming parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

\* In the view of the United States, the maintenance of the situation as it existed at the time of the conclusion of the negotiations of the CTBT is extremely important.

\* A nuclear explosion could seriously threaten the Treaty. Thus, the United States would consider the carrying out of any nuclear explosion by a signatory as raising a serious question concerning compliance with international legal obligations.

[If asked: Isn't the United States conducting underground experiments at the Nevada Test Site that would be similar to those reported at Novaya Zemlya?]

\* No.

\* U.S. subcritical experiments do not involve a nuclear yield, are not nuclear

explosions, and therefore are consistent with our domestic law, which currently bans nuclear testing, and with the CTBT.

#### MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

August 29, 1997

#### PEACE PROCESS: THE SECRETARY'S TRIP

Q: The Secretary made her trip conditional on the security situation between Palestinians and Israelis. Does your announcement mean the serious security problems have been solved?

A: The Secretary said in her August 6 speech that she would travel to the region when the time was appropriate and her trip would be useful.

She also said she would go if there were some progress in the security situation.

There has been some progress.

Clearly, we need to see more efforts from the Palestinians, and we will be raising that with the Palestinians and will watch the situation closely.

Security will be on the agenda for her discussions with the Palestinians and Israelis.

But, as important as security is, the political aspects of the peace process have to be addressed if the process is to move forward.

Security is a permanent necessity in this process, but the political issues must also be addressed.

There can be no progress towards peace if political issues cannot be addressed in an atmosphere of security. Hence, security and progress on political negotiations are inextricably linked.

Q: But I thought that the Secretary did not want to spend her time cleaning up security problems. I thought Dennis did security and the Secretary did the political issues? Are you backtracking?

A: No. Security is an ever-present part of the peace process. No process can succeed without security, and it is impossible to discuss getting this process back on track without discussing security.

What we have said is that addressing security issues is not enough to put the process back on track. Political issues must be addressed, and the Secretary will address them.

Q: What is the purpose of the Secretary's trip?

A: The peace process is at a low ebb. As the Secretary stressed in her speech, there is a crisis of confidence.

The Secretary's trip is designed to begin to address that lack of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians.

The problems between these two parties are complex and deeply entrenched. They will not be solved by one trip. Both we and the regional parties need to be realistic.

She will work on this issue, but this is a regional trip and she will also address other important issues.

The first is the need for a truly comprehensive peace between Israel and the

Arabs: This will obviously be a focus of her stop in Syria.

Second, the Secretary needs to speak directly with our key Arab allies about

regional issues and our bilateral relationships. That's why she will travel to

Egypt and Jordan, and will go to the Gulf to meet with the Saudi leadership and

representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

In the Gulf, she will be discussing regional security, Iraq and Iran.

Q: You omitted Lebanon? Is the Secretary going to go to the region and discuss the peace process without traveling to Lebanon?

A: As the Secretary made clear in her speech and will reiterate in the region,

the U.S. is committed to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East. That obviously includes Lebanon.

There has been no decision regarding any possible stops beyond those mentioned in the announcement.

Q: Southern Lebanon is in crisis. Today, there's no need for the Secretary to travel to Lebanon?

A: We are very concerned about the situation in Southern Lebanon and along the Israel-Lebanon border. That's why the Secretary and others spent so much time trying to stabilize the recent situation.

And that's why we and the parties look to the Israel-Lebanon monitoring group to help defuse these tensions. It succeeded in doing so.

The Secretary will certainly be discussing this issue during her trip.

Q: Isn't Syria really the key here? How can you stop Hizballah without pressing the Syrians?

A: We have long raised the issue of violence in Southern Lebanon and along the Israel-Lebanon border with the Syrians, and the Secretary will certainly raise the subject with President Asad.

Q: What does the Secretary expect to accomplish during her trip?

A: It should be evident to all in the region that there is a serious crisis of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians.

This crisis affects relations between Israel and the entire Arab world.

One trip is not going to turn this around. The Secretary will provide a reality check of what is required to make the process succeed. And she will explore ways to reestablish engagement on the various negotiating tracks. Ultimately, she wants to begin restoring some confidence and some hope.

Q: How do you propose to bridge the kinds of huge gaps to which you have

referred?

A: As I said, one trip won't fix the problem.

But much is at stake and both we and especially the parties themselves must give it our best shot to put this process back on track.

Let me be clear. There are real dangers to American interests and especially to the interests of our friends and allies in the region if we do not move forward.

It is for these reasons that the United States has, for many decades, considered waging peace in the Middle East to be of the highest priority. To do so, however, the parties must make key decisions. We cannot make them for them. They have responsibilities they must be prepared to fulfill.

And, we stand ready to act as a full partner in this process.

Q: Will you raise the issue of a settlement freeze with the Israelis? Har Homa?

A: I am not going to discuss the details of what we will get into. But we will undoubtedly discuss all issues of concern to our partners.

Q: The Israeli press has been speculating that the real intent of the Secretary's trip is to pressure Netanyahu, whom you view as the real problem now. Any comment?

A: I disagree with your assessment. The task of ending the current crisis of confidence is the responsibility of both parties.

Q: You have long highlighted the need for security cooperation. You also said the Palestinians are not going enough on security. Aren't you rewarding Arafat with this visit while he continues to dodge the security commitments he made to Israel in their agreements?

A: We have begun to see greater security cooperation as follow-up to the Trilateral mechanism established during SMEC Ross' last trip to the region, and

we are seeing some progress.

That cooperation needs to be extended and sustained. There can be no durable, successful peace process without security, plain and simple.

Our involvement in this peace process is not reward to either side.

The important point is that progress in the peace process can be a reward to both sides.

Q: There were reports that Dennis Ross would go out to the region next week. Is he going?

A: No, but the Israelis and Palestinians will be sending a few people here for separate discussions with Dennis.

Q: What will they be discussing?

A: This will be a follow-up to his discussion in the region and provide an opportunity to hear from Israelis and Palestinians prior to the Secretary's trip.

#### TRIP ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of State Albright will travel to the Middle East next week. She will depart on September 9. The Secretary's trip will have several dimensions:

- first, to continue to help Israel and the Palestinians address the crisis of confidence blocking the resumption of their negotiations;
- second, to explore with the parties how we can again find ways to move forward toward a comprehensive peace;
- and third, to consult with our friends in the region about a variety of other important issues, including Persian Gulf security, Iran, and Iraq.

Toward this end, the Secretary will visit Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The United States continues to believe in the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement of the

Arab-Israeli conflict. President Clinton and Secretary Albright will do everything they can to assist in that effort.  
Albright will do everything they can to assist in that effort.

#### NORTHERN IRELAND

August 29, 1997

Q: What is your reaction to Mowlam's announcement on the Ceasefire?

A: Mo Mowlam, the Secretary for Northern Ireland, said in Belfast earlier today that she had determined that the IRA ceasefire announced six weeks ago met conditions in word and deed to permit the entry of Sinn Fein to the substantive talks which begin in Belfast on September 15.

We welcome this decision which gives an opportunity for all parties in Northern Ireland to be part of inclusive talks leading to a negotiated settlement.

Q: How does this affect Adams' visit to the United States next week?

A: He picked up his visa in Dublin last week and arrives early next week; believe he will be in Washington September 2-4, then go to New York until 7th.

Will have meeting with Berger here September 3; understand he will also see Secretary Daley and has meetings on Hill as well. For details, refer you to Sinn Fein office here.

If asked: he has no restrictions on fundraising attached to his visa.

Q: Are there any plans for Adams to see the President?

A: No, we do not anticipate such a meeting.

If pressed: Yes, Adams did meet with the President during the previous ceasefire (at the 1995 St. Patrick's Day celebration at the White House and in Belfast in November 1995); would not rule out meetings with ceasefire restored, since we expect it to be permanent, but not going to happen during this visit.

Q: Did the Administration give Sin Fein assurances regarding visas

for Sinn Fein  
leaders, access to the White House, fundraising in the United States,  
and  
suspension of IRA deportation cases, in the event of a renewed IRA  
ceasefire?

A: After Gerry Adams announced that he would recommend to the  
IRA that it  
reestablish the ceasefire, we informed Sinn Fein officials that in the  
event of a  
cease-fire we would be prepared to take appropriate confidence-  
building measures  
to support the ceasefire and the peace process.

We are not going to go into detail about those confidence-building  
measures.

I note that Sinn Fein official Joe Cahill was granted a waiver to visit  
here in  
early August.

Q: What about the deportation cases?

A: Not going to go into specifics of possible confidence-building  
measures.

Q: What will happen to the peace process now; will the UUP  
participate in the  
Belfast talks that start next month?

That is a decision for the UUP to make. British and Irish governments  
have  
provided mechanisms to move the talks process and decommissioning  
forward towards  
a negotiated settlement. We encourage the UUP to be at the table in  
September  
in order that all parties are represented and heard there.

Q: What is Senator Mitchell's role?

Senator Mitchell will continue to chair the talks in Belfast.

Q: Have we been asked to supply a person for the Decommissioning  
Commission?

The Irish and UK governments have jointly asked us to provide an  
official to be  
one of the members of the Independent Commission on  
Decommissioning. The State  
Department is presently working to identify a suitable candidate.

## KOREA

August 28, 1997

Q: Do you anticipate North Korea will attend the next session of four party preparatory talks currently scheduled for the week of September 15?

A: As we have said before, the four party talks are important for all parties (U.S., China, North and South Korea) and we believe the North also recognizes the value of the talks.

Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Barry Toiv in Martha's Vineyard, August 27, 1997

North Korean officials early this morning (August 27) informed us that the North Korean delegation will not participate in missile talks scheduled to begin today in New York City. North Korea has cited the U.S. decision to allow the North Korean Ambassador to Egypt Chang and his family to come to the United States as the reason for not participating. While this decision by the North was not unexpected, it is nonetheless disappointing. We see no linkage between the defection and missile talks, and believe it is in North Korea's interest to remain engaged in the talks.

## LANDMINES

August 29, 1997

Q: What is Germany's position on a treaty to ban landmines?

A:

\* Germany will be an active participant in the Ottawa process in which a treaty will be negotiated this September.

\* Germany has also publicly stated its support for an ongoing role for the

Conference on Disarmament in the area of anti-personnel landmines.

\* These positions are fully consistent with those of the United States.

Q: But will Germany support the U.S. position in Oslo?

A:

\* We have held useful consultations with the Germans and other Ottawa participants.

\* The negotiations begin on September 1.

\* We look forward to a successful outcome of those talks.

[If pressed on whether the U.S. position will prevail:]

\* The negotiations are not set to open until September 1. Many nations, like the United States, will be coming to the table with new proposals. I do not want to speculate on the outcome of these talks.

Self-Destructing APLs

Q: Are we or aren't we willing to ban all self-destructing APLs?

A:

\* The U.S. position is that the treaty to be negotiated in Oslo should not apply to munitions primarily designed as anti-tank or anti-vehicle. Submunitions of these systems that are anti-personnel must be integral to the system and self-destructing.

\* The U.S. is prepared in the Oslo talks, to give up the use of all pure anti-personnel landmines, including the self-destructing type, except for use in Korea.

Q: Is this the position the Chairman was talking about in today's Washington Post?

A:

\* Yes.

## INTERAGENCY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR

August 29, 1997

Q: Does the Administration support Shali's call for an interagency czar?

\* We completely agree with Shali's call for improved interagency coordination, planning, and implementation of the civilian aspects of peace operations.

\* In May President Clinton signed PDD-56, a document on this very subject. It builds on the lessons learned from such operations as Haiti and Bosnia. It mandates that we stand up an NSC-chaired executive committee when we engage in a complex contingency operation. That executive committee will include representatives (usually at the Assistant Secretary level) from all agencies that have responsibilities for programs in the operation, including all appropriate civilian agencies.

\* PDD-56 also mandates that the executive committee will draft political-military plans before we begin a complex contingency operation. The pol-mil plan lays out the specific responsibilities of all the departments, including expected programs, timetables, and milestones. It ensures that the various parts of the pol-mil plan are integrated together, so the military and civilian tasks are accomplished in tandem.

## RUSSIAN MIR SITUATION

August 29, 1997

The repair spacewalk undertaken on August 22 was successful in reconnecting cables from the damaged module to the core module. Efforts to restore power from the module will continue this week. Mir's major systems are functioning at this time, including the oxygen systems.

Talking Points

-- At the request of the Mir crew, NASA and the Russian Space Agency have delayed the external spacewalk to assess Mir's exterior damage from September 3 to September 6.

-- The Russian space agency has completed its analysis of the recycled water sample returned from Mir earlier this month and announced that the Mir's water supply system is not contaminated. NASA's analysis confirms this.

-- The Kristall module is now almost fully powered up, and the crew will be working today to prepare the Kvant-2 module and its own oxygen system for full reactivation.

-- The President is being kept informed of the situation by his Science Advisor, Dr. John Gibbons.

Q: Doesn't the handling of news about Mir's oxygen situation indicate a continuing lack of coordination between NASA and the Russian Space Agency?

A: It would be more appropriate to view this as a difference between Russian and U.S. views about the operation of a space station. NASA issued a report on the situation as soon as it learned of it from Russia. The Russians did not view the adjustments made by the Mir crew to restart the oxygen systems as particularly unusual, and the crew did not consider the situation to be extraordinary.

Q: Who will decide whether the United States will send another astronaut to Mir?

A: The decision to send U.S. astronaut David Wolf to stay aboard Mir will be made by NASA in coordination with the Russian Space Agency. The President is being kept informed of the decision-making process, but he will rely on the NASA Administrator to make the final decision. NASA will base that decision on reviews of Mir safety by NASA, Russian Space Agency, and outside

experts, as well  
as on NASA's assessment of the benefits to be gained by sending  
another U.S.  
astronaut to Mir.

Q: Isn't it finally time to end our participation in the Shuttle-Mir  
program?

A: The Shuttle/Mir program is only one facet of our space cooperation  
with  
Russia. Our missions on the Mir are giving us a great deal of  
knowledge and  
experience on how to live and work aboard an operational space  
station,  
especially in unexpected situations - something we will want to fully  
understand  
before we send up our own international space station. We are taking  
the  
decision on whether to send the next U.S. astronaut (David Wolf) to  
the Mir one  
step at a time. Obviously, we are pleased with the progress of the  
repair mission  
to this point. We will rely on NASA to make a decision on how we  
should proceed  
based on their technical and safety analysis of the situation.