

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/19/97 1:48:01 PM
FROM Brooks, Jennifer M.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davies, Glyn T.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

-----Original Message-----

From: Mueller, William (Doug) D.

Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 1997 1:07 PM

To: Brooks, Jennifer M.

Cc: /N,

NonRecord

Subject: FW: NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
[UNCLASSIFIED]

From:

Dohoney, James P.

To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Subject: NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, August 19,
1997 11:02 AM

To WHSR :

Please send to Barry Toiv
on the trip. Thank you.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

AUG19GUI.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
August 19, 1997

Landmines

Iran

Gulf War Illnesses

Cuba

Middle East

Russian Mir Situation

Nuclear Arms

Rwanda

China/Taiwan

Northern Ireland

Angola

Cyprus

South Asia Trip

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Kenya

Fast Track

Trips and Visitors

Bosnia

Cambodia

Korea

LANDMINES

August 18, 1997

Decision to Join the Ottawa Process

* Since the end of the second CD session in June, the United States has been

taking stock of progress in negotiations to ban landmines.

* We have just concluded that review, and will join the Ottawa Process as a participant.

-- We recognized that there had been a lack of significant progress in the CD in the first half of the year, while at the same time, support for the Ottawa process had grown significantly.

-- We want to take advantage of the momentum behind the Ottawa Process and help build on the support it already has.

* We will be going to Oslo on September 1 to actively participate in the negotiations on treaty text. The objective of those negotiations is to conclude a text for signing in December.

* We will work to secure an agreement that achieves our humanitarian goals while protecting our national security interests.

* We will be bringing some new positions to the table in Oslo. For example:

-- We will propose that there be a geographic exception to allow stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines to defend the U.S. and its allies on the Korean peninsula. Given the security situation there, and the crucial role that landmines play in our defense plans, it is fundamental that any treaty make this exception.

-- We will be seeking to improve the draft treaty's verification provisions, particularly in the area of information exchange and fact finding missions.

[If asked about exemption for self-destructing or anti-tank systems:

-- We will propose language that will make clear that the treaty definitions would not apply to systems whose primary function is anti-tank or anti-vehicle, rather than anti-personnel.

[If asked about transition period or conditioning entry into force on

ratification by certain states:]

-- We will also be proposing that the treaty include a provision that would delay entry into force until a majority of producers and users have ratified. As an alternative, we would propose that there be an optional deferral period for certain provisions comparable to that in the CCW Amended Mines Protocol pending before the Senate.

* Our proposed changes will not dilute the humanitarian benefit of the treaty. To the contrary, they may increase the treaty's effectiveness because, if accepted, they will make the treaty more attractive to states that are not now participating in the Ottawa process.

-- It would be very positive if participation could be broadened and more states which are APL producers and users were to join. The greater the adherence, the more effective this treaty will be.

* We will be sending a senior-level team to Geneva this week to discuss our positions informally with a number of key Ottawa supporters, so that we can begin to develop support for these positions in advance of the formal negotiations in Oslo.

-- The team will be led by Eric Newsom, PDAS for Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department. Mr. Newsom will also lead our delegation in Oslo.

[If asked about Post report that Robert Bell is leading the team:]

-- Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the NSC, will be going as part of the delegation, but the State Department leads U.S. diplomatic efforts involving consultations with foreign governments.

[If asked about whether we still go to Oslo even if U.S. proposals receive a hostile reaction:]

* Yes. We will attend the Oslo conference and present our positions

there.

[If asked whether we will sign the treaty even if we fail to gain agreement to our positions in Oslo:]

* No. We are not prepared to sign a treaty that does not protect our national security interests.

* We remain committed to our other efforts to ban landmines, including the establishment of step-by-step negotiations toward a ban in the CD. That effort remains important as long as there are states that will not join the Ottawa process but who are CD members. The CD membership includes most of the major historical producers and exporters.

* We will also continue our efforts to work with the Senate to secure early advice and consent to ratification of the CCW Amended Mines Protocol. That Protocol, if adhered to, could make a significant contribution to the landmines problem.

[If asked: Its key provisions include, for example, a requirement for minimum APL detectability, for easy mine clearing; marking and monitoring of non-self-destructing APL; and 99.9% reliability rate for scatterable, self-destructing APL.]

* We would emphasize that the United States has been a leader on this issue. For example:

-- One year ago the President decided to end our use of non-self-destructing APL, with the exception only of Korea and training. We are in the process of destroying some 3 million NSD APL and that will be complete by 1999.

-- The rest of our systems are self-destructing within a matter of days or weeks. There have been no documented incidents of civilians being harmed by one of our self-destructing systems.

-- We do not export APL. In January, the President declared a

permanent ban on
all APL exports and transfers.

-- We have aggressively pursued development and fielding of new
demining
technologies, and are one of the world's leaders in our "train-the-
trainer"
demining programs.

IRAN
August 19, 1997

Background

- * The President signed an Executive Order to clarify the scope of
restrictions on

trade and investment activities by United States persons with Iran.

- * Issuance of the order is consistent with existing U.S. policy toward
Iran.

This is a reinforcement and confirmation of the scope of the 1995
embargo, and

does not represent a change in policy or the imposition of further
punitive
measures.

- * The new Executive order makes explicit that United States persons,
wherever

located, are prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in any
investment or

trade-related activity with Iran, wherever such activity occurs.

- * The new order has proven necessary to resolve questions that have
continued to

surface about the proper interpretation of the existing orders. Our goal
is to

remove any doubt and to render absolutely clear and explicit those
aspects which
have been questioned.

- * The 1995 embargo on Iran was imposed to deprive Iran of the
benefits of trade

with and investment from the United States. The new order reconfirms
this
objective.

Q: Why now?

A: The clarifying order has been under review for some time.

Q: Is this new order in any way connected to the Turkey pipeline
decision?

A: No. This is entirely separate from the State Department's
assessment that
Turkey's decision to purchase Turkmeni gas does not appear to

involve activity
that would be sanctionable under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.

This EO confirms and clarifies the restrictions on U.S. persons
engaging in
trade or investment-related activities involving Iran.

Q: Why are we not using this vehicle to toughen sanctions on Iran?

A: The United States has the world's most restrictive policy on
economic dealings
with Iran. The comprehensive trade and embargo was imposed in
1995. The Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act was signed into law August 5, 1996.

We have engaged intensively with allies to encourage them to impose
significant
economic measures to change Iran's objectionable behavior.

While we do not rule out further unilateral measures in the future, we
favor a
common multilateral approach, which will have a greater impact in
changing
Iranian behavior.

Q: Will this encounter resistance from U.S. allies as another
extraterritorial
extension of U.S. jurisdiction?

A: Our allies understand the depth of our resolve to cut off economic
activity
with Iran until it modifies its dangerous policies. The new Executive
order is
intended to clarify the application of the U.S. embargo to U.S. persons
appropriately subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

Q: Does the new order close a loophole?

A: No. It would be accurate to say the new order is intended to
eliminate debate
over different interpretations regarding the scope of the embargo.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES August 19, 1997

Q: What is the White House response to the news item that almost
half the
Presidential Advisory Committee now think nerve gas may be a
contributing factor
to veterans' illnesses?

A: POTUS has been committed to getting out all the facts that might explain the reasons for veterans' illnesses.

The PAC did not rule out the possibility of chemical warfare agents in its Final Report last January, but rather said while it was unlikely, more investigation into the possibility of such exposures needed to be completed.

Since spring 1996, in response to the President's determination to leave no stone unturned, the PAC's extensive efforts and its recommendation to fully explore the possibility of chemical warfare agent exposures, DoD and CIA significantly improved their efforts to investigate a wide variety of environmental exposures, including very low level exposure nerve agents, such as the demolitions at Khamisiyah. POTUS extended the PAC to ensure continued oversight of that effort.

In addition, DOD has committed tens of millions of dollars to research into the possible effects of such exposures.

This administration remains committed to determining the cause of the veterans' illnesses, continuously improving their health care, and ensuring all who qualify are afforded the compensation and benefits they deserve.

It would be imprudent to comment further on a hypothetical outcome of a pending PAC report.

Q: How could the U.S. bomb chemical weapons sites when the Pentagon knew that it could be harmful to U.S. troops?

A: From the beginning, POTUS committed to getting out all the facts that may have bearing on why troops are ill.

Our current understanding of the Livermore plume data is that it was a generic "template " for use in planning air campaign pre-attack assessments. Something I'm sure we are all pleased they thought to do.

The Livermore modeling results the White House is aware of do NOT

show exposure
of U.S. troops.

The CIA modeling done to date shows plumes longer than these.
None of these
reach troops.

DOD and CIA developed a new sophisticated suite of models which
were used to
determine possible low level exposures at Khamisiyah (Kam-i-See'-
Ya) (a site
destroyed post war by demolition, not in the air campaign). They will
apply
those models to the known chemical manufacturing sites and
determine whether
there were possible exposures.

Some of you may have been shown interpretive modeling done by
someone else
(NOTE: Jim Tuite, former Senate Banking Committee staffer who
believes there is a
DOD cover-up on CW exposures). We are not familiar with his work,
and therefore
cannot comment on it.

Q: Did the White House know about this report? Who is responsible
for not telling
Powell and Schwartzkopf?

A: I am not aware of anyone on the White House staff that had seen
the report
prior to yesterday.

As to who knew in DOD or who is responsible for notifying the
generals, I direct
your inquiry to DOD.

If asked:

At this point we are not aware of who in DOD was shown these
models.

DOD and CIA have devoted significant resources to the effort of
understanding
the extent of possible chemical exposures. Detailed questions on
models are best
addressed there.

CUBA
August 19, 1997

Q: Does the U.S. plan to ease travel restrictions during the Pope's visit to Cuba?

A: We have received requests from the Archdiocese of Miami, the Cuban Catholic Church and others to permit, consistent with U.S. law and policy, travel to Cuba and donations of humanitarian assistance to the Church, in connection with the Pope's visit.

We have begun to receive license applications and will consider their merit, on a case by case basis, in accordance with U.S. law and the humanitarian needs of the Cuban people. Travel and shipment of humanitarian assistance will require appropriate licensing by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce.

So far, no licenses have been granted. A request by the Archdiocese of Miami to conduct a pilgrimage via cruise ship, is being considered under OFAC regulations governing religious travel.

If pressed on allowing direct humanitarian flights:

* We have authorized direct humanitarian flights twice in the past year: last October after hurricane Lili and again in December as a follow-up for the victims of hurricane Lili and in time for the holidays. We have also authorized travel for religious purposes in the past.

* This is not new and consistent with the law and current regulations. Providing support directly to the Cuban people has been an important element of U.S. policy toward Cuba since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992. It is also consistent with the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton).

Q: Any comment on recent attacks in South Lebanon?

A: We are very concerned by the cycle of attacks and counter-attacks in South Lebanon.

We urge all parties to exercise maximum restraint.

We have conveyed our concern to the governments of Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

(IF ASKED) We are not going to get into assessing who is to blame. All parties need to exercise maximum restraint.

Q: Any read out on the security meetings that took place?

A: Palestinian and Israeli security officials met in Ramallah Sunday evening, with US Government participation, to discuss a variety of security issues.

As we have made clear, we believe that this channel will work best if we do not get into the details of the exchanges.

We do understand that the Palestinians turned over information related to the explosive devices used in the July 30 bombings in the Jerusalem Market.

This cooperation is a positive step, more needs to be done.

As we have said, the Palestinians need to do all they can both unilaterally and in cooperation with Israeli security to prevent terror.

Q: Any comment on the Palestinian arrest and prosecution of those suspected in the murder of an Israeli taxi driver?

A: We have no specific comment. We note that the Israeli government cited this action and cooperation on the July 30 bombing investigation in its release of a portion of the tax revenues it was withholding from the Palestinian Authority.

Q: Any reaction to Chairman Arafat's call for including Hamas and other militant groups in a "national unity dialogue?"

A: We have seen the press reports of this, but it is not clear what is actually intended.

That said, it is our view that there is no role for those who oppose the fundamentals of the Peace Process and the use of terror to pursue their aims.

Q: Any reaction to Israel's decision to release some 30% of the tax revenue that it was withholding from the Palestinian Authority?

A: We welcome the move.

As we have made clear we consider measures unrelated to security counterproductive, and would like to see them lifted.

Palestinian economic well-being is in Israel's interest, as well as those of the Peace Process generally.

Q: Are you concerned that economic measures such as these build support for groups like Hamas?

A: As I said, the economic well being of the Palestinian people is in the interests of the Peace Process, and thus in Israel's interest as well.

Improving the daily lives of the Palestinian people helps give them a stake in the peace process and is essential to the long term prospects for peace in the region.

Efforts to improve the Economic situation must continue.

This is the primary reason for US assistance to the Palestinian people.

IF PRESSED

Q: Are you implying that Hamas and other groups are justified in their use of terror because of economic deprivation?

A: Absolutely not. There can be no legitimate rationale for such action.

Q: What did Dennis Ross accomplish on his mission?

A: His primary focus was to begin the reestablishment of a cooperative bilateral

relationship to improve the security environment. The security meetings between Israelis and Palestinians are first steps in the right direction, but the meetings are only the beginning of a process.

They need to produce results - we will be monitoring the situation closely.

(IF PRESSED on specific Palestinian promises and Israeli demands): I will not go into the details of our exchanges. Sustained unilateral action by the Palestinians and sustained cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is essential to get the peace process back on track.

Q: Will the CIA represent the US in a trilateral security panel as reported in the Washington Times?

A: First, I would not agree with the Washington Times that trilateral security cooperation was "the main result" of Ross' trip. The main results were that the Palestinians understand more clearly that security is the essential underpinning of the peace process and that the two sides have resumed bilateral security cooperation.

Second, you know our position on intelligence-related questions. I could not confirm who would be our representative at those meetings where the bilateral security dialogue is expanded to a trilateral security dialogue. As I said yesterday, it is natural that we would send US officials who have the necessary expertise.

Q: The President and Netanyahu both insist that security issues must be addressed first, but Arafat wants the agenda broadened - isn't this causing an impasse?

A: No. Chairman Arafat has indicated that a high priority should be placed on security. We need to make sure this is translated into action.

Q: Is the US pressing Israel on the payments and closure issues?

A: We're concerned about security, but we are also concerned about

actions that
undermine the authority of the Palestinian Authority and make it
harder to
cooperate on security.

Israel has legitimate security needs that must be addressed. We expect
the
Palestinian Authority to intensify their efforts.

Israel has assured us that the closure and other measures are
temporary.

Q: Do you support the right of the Israelis to go into the "Zone A" of
the
territories?

A: We are not going to answer a hypothetical - but as we said, what
matters now
is that the focus is on security cooperation between the parties - it's in
their
mutual interest to work together.

Q: What about the situation in southern Lebanon - isn't this troubling?

A: The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group completed on Tuesday its
consideration of
eleven complaints of violations of the April 1996 understanding.
While all
violence in southern Lebanon and northern Israel is of concern to us,
the ILMG is
fulfilling its intended purpose of deterring escalation.

Q: When will Secretary Albright go?

A: We expect Secretary Albright to travel to the region assuming there
is
progress in the security area. No decision on timing has yet been
made.

Q: The Palestinian Authority has called for conscription - isn't this a
violation
of Oslo?

A: Clearly this is time for all parties to cool their rhetoric, and not take
actions that undermine confidence.

Q: Isn't Israel crippling Arafat and the PA?

A: First, let's be clear. Fighting terror is in the interest not only of the
Israelis but also the Palestinian people. Terrorists seek to destroy the

peace
process, which is the only vehicle for both parties to achieve their
goals.

Q: Do you believe that Israel's decision to construct a neighborhood at
Har Homa
triggered the current impasse?

A: The focus at the moment should not be on trying to blame one
party or another
for the current impasse. The focus must be on improving security
cooperation so
that we can refocus on returning to the negotiating table - the only
way to
peace.

Q: What if Israel persists in its unilateral actions like Har Homa?

A: The immediate issue is restoring an adequate level of security
cooperation.

That said, it's hard to have a credible environment when the parties are
taking
steps that are seen by the other to be prejudicing the outcome of
negotiations.

RUSSIAN MIR SITUATION

August 19, 1997

Early Monday (August 18) morning, the main computer onboard the
Mir shut down
during the docking procedure of a Russian Progress resupply
spacecraft. As a
result, the Mir briefly lost attitude control and its battery power was
depleted.
The crew used the Soyuz spacecraft attached to the Mir to reorient it
toward the
sun, and the batteries have now been recharged and computer put back
in
operation. Mir's other major systems are operating well at this time.

Talking Points

-- NASA reports that U.S. astronaut Michael Foale and Russian
cosmonauts Solovyev
and Vinogradov are in no danger, and all critical life support systems
onboard
the Mir remain fully functional. Yesterday's computer failure will
likely delay
the planned repair mission to reconnect power from the damaged

Spektr module
from August 20 to the 22nd or 23rd.

-- The Mir's primary oxygen system has been repaired and is now functional.

-- The current schedule for crew replacement and repair is as follows:

- o August 22-3 Internal spacewalk to reconnect power cables from damaged module.
(U.S. astronaut Mike Foale to remain in Soyuz capsule.)
- o Sept. 3 External spacewalk to inspect -- but not repair -- damaged module and solar arrays. (Foale may participate.)
- o Late Sept. (pending NASA review) Launch of Shuttle with U.S. astronaut David Wolf to replace Michael Foale. Shuttle could carry parts needed for repair of Mir.

-- The President is being kept fully informed of the situation by his Science Advisor, Dr. Jack Gibbons.

Q: Is NASA still planning to send David Wolf to replace Michael Foale?

A. At this time, Wolf is scheduled to replace Foale aboard Mir in September. The final decision on whether he will stay aboard will depend on restoration of power from the damaged module and on the results of NASA's internal and external reviews of Mir safety.

Q: Isn't it finally time to end our participation in the Shuttle-Mir program?

The Shuttle/Mir program is only one facet of our space cooperation with Russia. Our missions on the Mir are giving us a great deal of knowledge and experience on how to live and work aboard an operational space station, especially in unexpected situations - something we will want to fully understand before we send up our own international space station. We are taking the decision on whether to send the next U.S. astronaut (David Wolf) to the Mir one step at a time. We will be watching the results of the repair space walk on August 22 or 23 and will rely

on NASA to make a decision on how we should proceed based on their technical and safety analysis of the situation.

NUCLEAR ARMS

August 18, 1997

Q: Is it true that the United States is hard at work on new or modified designs for nuclear arms?

A: The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded by the Administration in September 1994 identified no new requirement for new-design nuclear warhead production.

Thus, the Department of Energy (DOE) has no requirement for new weapon types and is not designing advanced new weapons types.

Consistent with the NPR, the DOE will, however, maintain a capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads as part of its program to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrent.

Q: What about the descriptions of weapons design included in the Department of Energy's "Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan?"

A: The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes specifics about how the DOE will maintain its capability to design replacement warheads and replace parts of aging warheads.

(As stated above), the DOE needs to maintain a capability to design replacement parts and new warheads as parts of existing warheads age.

That said, there is currently no requirement for new weapon types, and no plans to design any advanced new weapon types.

Q: Doesn't this kind of work undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

A: No. The Administration is fully committed to securing the ratification and effective implementation of the CTBT.

The DOE's stockpile stewardship and management program is fully consistent with the CTBT.

The objective of this program is to ensure that our existing nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable in the absence of nuclear testing.

The program will enable the United States to enter into a CTBT and is designed to ensure that the U.S. would not have to return to nuclear testing.

Q: Is it true that the Clinton Administration has failed to exercise adequate policy and fiscal oversight over the nation's bomb making complex, including the DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP)?

A: The President has provided detailed direction for the stockpile stewardship and management program, and has made clear the importance of this program in his August 11, 1995 statement announcing his support for a zero yield CTBT.

In addition, the program has been developed in coordination with other federal agencies (NSC, OSD, JCS, OSTP, OMB) since its inception in 1993.

RWANDA
August 18, 1997

Q: Has the United States sold or transferred any military equipment to the Rwandan military?

A: Following the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, the United States joined the international community in a commitment to help rebuild Rwandan society. As part of that mission, the Department of Defense has provided a modest program of assistance to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) which has included humanitarian demining aid, refugee repatriation training and instruction in military justice.

DOD has also conducted two Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions in

Rwanda focusing on the rule of law, human rights, first aid, and decision making skills.

The United States is closely tracking allegation of human rights abuses which may have been committed by the RPA. The United States lends its full support to the pending UN investigation into such matters.

Q: Did/has the United States provided any training or equipment to military forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo or former Zaire?

A: No. DOD has not and did not provide any training or equipment to Alliance forces. There is absolutely no link, either formal or informal, between the U.S. military and Alliance forces, either prior to the outbreak of violence in eastern Zaire last year or afterwards.

Q: Did the DOD provide any other assistance to Rwanda?

A: As part of DOD's Humanitarian Assistance program, DOD has also provided excess military property to several civilian ministries of the Rwanda Government including the Ministries of Education, Health, Justice and Public Works as well as to the National Nursing School and Kigali Central Hospital. This equipment included office equipment and supplies, medical equipment and supplies, and education supplies (desks, chairs, etc.)

For further information, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.

CHINA/TAIWAN

August 4, 1997

Q: Can you confirm the C.H. Tung plans to visit the United States September 9-11, and that he will meet with President Clinton while in Washington?

A: We welcome Mr. Tung to travel to the United States during that time period, and look forward to meetings with him in Washington. Appointments

for him are
currently under consideration.

IF PRESSED: We expect Secretary Albright will meet with Mr. Tung.
His
appointments in the White House are currently being arranged.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the request for a transit visa for
Taiwan's
President Lee Teng-Hui?

A: The United States will consider this transit request (through Hawaii
on the
way to Central America, with return stop in Hawaii) as we do all
transit requests
by Taiwan leaders. We look to the issue of the safety, comfort and
convenience
of the traveler. We have not yet issued the visa, but we do not
anticipate any
difficulty in doing so.

Q: What did Sandy Berger accomplish on his trip to China?

A: Mr. Berger met with China's President, Jiang Zemin, Premier Li
Peng,, Vice
Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, and State Council Foreign
Affairs Director
Liu Huaqiu on August 11-12. Berger's talks with Liu were the fourth
round of
discussions of strategic issues conducted by National Security
Advisors with
Chinese counterparts, the first such round occurring in March 1996
when Tony Lake
met with Liu in Washington. Their strategic discussions focused on
Asian issues:
Korea, relations with Japan, Cambodia, and South Asia.. On Korea,
they stressed
our good cooperation in the recently concluded Preparatory Talks
which we hope
will lead to Four Party talks. On Japan, we explained the importance
of the
U.S.-Japan security relationship as an anchor of stability in East Asia.
On
Cambodia, there was agreement on supporting ASEAN's initiative to
work with the
Cambodian parties to bring about free and fair elections in 1998. On
South Asia,
both sides agreed on the importance of working to defuse tensions.

Mr. Berger also discussed preparations for President Jiang's visit to
the U.S.
this fall. This will be the first visit by a President of China to the U.S.

since 1985. We believe Presidential meetings and visits are an essential part of improving U.S.-China relations, and the Chinese agree with us that we should look for ways to use the visit to expand areas of cooperation and address areas where we differ. Berger raised U.S. concerns and objectives on issues including nonproliferation and other security issues, human rights, trade, and transnational issues such as the environment and law enforcement. The trip was not designed to negotiate issues, but rather to highlight specific areas of concern as we approach President Jiang's visit. The atmospherics were good, and Berger was warmly received.

NORTHERN IRELAND

August 12, 1997

Q: Has Adams visa been approved? What about fundraising?
(Background: Adams, Martin McGuinness and Richard McAuley applied for visas in Dublin August 11.)

A: Yes, Secretary of State has approved visa. (That means it can be stamped in his passport by Embassy Dublin, once they receive formal notification.) Adams and other officials not expected to travel to U.S. until early September.

If asked: Do not anticipate placing restrictions on fundraising on visas
Note
that FBI system for monitoring how funds are used remains in effect.
(Note:
System allows FBI access to Dublin bank account of Sinn Fein to monitor how funds deposited and spent.)

Q: Are there any plans for Adams to see the President? Whom will he see?

A: No, we do not anticipate such a meeting. We do expect to schedule a meeting with the National Security Advisor, but nothing has been requested or scheduled yet.

If pressed: Yes, Adams did meet with the President during the previous ceasefire
(at the 1995 St. Patrick's Day celebration at the White House and in

Belfast in November 1995); would not rule out meetings now that ceasefire restored, since we expect it to be permanent, but not going to happen during this visit.

Q: Did the Administration give Sin Fein assurances regarding visas for Sinn Fein leaders, access to the White House, fundraising in the United States, and suspension of IRA deportation cases, in the event of a renewed IRA ceasefire?

A: After Gerry Adams announced that he would recommend to the IRA that it reestablish the ceasefire, we informed Sinn Fein officials that in the event of a cease-fire, we would be prepared to take appropriate confidence-building measures to support the ceasefire and the peace process.

We are not going to go into detail about those confidence-building measures.

I will note that Sinn Fein official Joe Cahill was recently granted a waiver to visit here in early August. (NOTE: Actually Cahill got a visa BEFORE the August 1994 ceasefire...)

Q: Any readout from Jim Steinberg's meeting with Adam Ingram?

A: Jim Steinberg met yesterday with Adam Ingram, Northern Ireland Minister for Security and Economic Development.

They had a very positive meeting. Discussion focused on the Northern Ireland peace process and ways to build on the progress of the recent ceasefire in the multi-party negotiations slated for September.

They also agreed that greater attention needed to be given to questions of economic development, as the essential ingredient for long-term stability.

If pressed: The involvement of Sinn Fein in the multi-party talks was discussed and the two agreed that the August 6 meeting between Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams and UK Minister for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam was a positive step.

Q: What about the deportation cases?

A: Not going to go into specifics of possible confidence-building measures.

Q: What will happen to the peace process now that the UUP has voted against the decommissioning proposal at the Belfast talks today?

British and Irish governments have expressed commitment to process, to negotiated settlement. Do not see negative vote as in any way end of process but how they take it forward is up to them, to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues and the parties involved.

Q: What is Senator Mitchell's role?

Senator Mitchell is chairing the talks in Belfast.

ANGOLA
August 14, 1997

Background:
Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the peace agreement between the government and UNITA, has been stalled for several months. UNITA blocked the extension of state administration into areas it controls and has not cooperated with the UN mediation, to which the U.S. is an official observer, and has not demobilized its army. An Angolan government delegation visited Washington last week, and State posted a press statement on Friday that called for UNITA to comply with its Lusaka commitments and also stated we may support sanctions against UNITA if it does not comply. On Monday, U/S Pickering spoke with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and told him we would support sanctions if he did not comply. Savimbi replied that he would soon present a proposal to the mediation outlining how he will fulfill his Lusaka obligations. The documents allow for the extension of state administration but give no credible numbers for its remaining forces. The Government's response has been to suggest that UN Security Council

action be
delayed until September 2 while extension of state administration
begins next
week, as a way of "testing" UNITA's credibility.

Q: What are the prospects for Lusaka Protocol compliance in Angola?

A: The U.S., as one of the observers of the Lusaka Protocol, remains
concerned by
the lack of progress in completing implementation of the Lusaka
Protocol.

Although the Government's compliance has been imperfect, the
present impasse is
caused primarily by UNITA's non-compliance with three tasks
demanded by the
mediation: providing an acceptable plan for the extension of state
administration into UNITA-controlled areas; accounting for its
remaining armed
forces; and ending propaganda on its radio station and making it a
non-partisan
station.

The UN Secretary General's report on Angola to the Security Council
is due this
Friday, and based on its conclusions, we and the other members of the
Council
will decide what further steps may be necessary to expedite the
complete
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

Under Secretary of State Pickering spoke Monday with UNITA leader
Jonas Savimbi
and told him that he must comply immediately with his Lusaka
Protocol obligations
or the United States will support further UN Security Council
sanctions against
UNITA.

UNITA presented in Luanda later that day what appears to be a
credible proposal
to allow the extension of state administration to recommence, but its
documents
on troop numbers and normalizing its radio station do not comply with
UNITA's
Lusaka Protocol obligations.

The Government responded on Tuesday with a suggestion to the
mediation that
further UN Security Council action be deferred until September 2. In
the
intervening three weeks, extension of state administration would
begin at 73 of

the sites on the recently-submitted UNITA list.

CYPRUS

August 15, 1997

Q: Can you give us an update on the Cyprus talks in Switzerland? Is it true that they broke up in failure?

A: We understand that the UN-sponsored talks in Montreaux concluded today. Press statements by the two Cypriot parties, as well as by the UN, are just coming in now.

We understand that the talks were useful; extended over five full days and provided an opportunity to hear out both sides' positions.

Will be following up with the parties over coming weeks to build on this dialogue.

Hope progress will continue and lead to comprehensive settlement that will establish a bizonal, bicomunal federation for Cyprus.

If asked about the early conclusion (talked slated to end August 16):

We are less concerned about dates, more focused on substance. The parties had five full days of face to face discussion. Good step in right direction.

If asked about UN accession talks for Cyprus:

The U.S. position on EU membership has not changed. We are not members and don't have a vote, however we support EU membership for both Turkey and Cyprus.

Also believe that the EU accession process provides positive incentives for concerned parties to move ahead, achieve just and viable settlement to Cyprus dispute.

SOUTH ASIA TRIP

August 18, 1997

Q: Is the President going to India? Pakistan? Bangladesh?

A: The President would like to be able to visit South Asia soon, and we are examining the possibilities for such a trip.

Currently no decision on whether and when.

AFGHANISTAN

August 18, 1997

Q: Why have we suspended operations at the Afghan embassy?

A: There has been continuing contention between Afghan factions inside the Embassy over who represents Afghanistan.

We believe that there is no effective government in the country at this time.

We had not allowed for new accreditation, and there was effectively one diplomat left standing in the office. He was the Taliban representative, and to assure continued US neutrality towards the factions of the conflict, the US has decided to suspend operations instead of allowing one faction to represent the country here in Washington.

We believe that we must remain strictly neutral toward all the Afghan factions, and cannot be seen as favoring one over the other.

The suspension of operations will take effect on August 21st.

Q: What do we hope to accomplish?

A: We hope that this action will encourage the factions to end the fighting and form a broadly based and representative government.

Q: What about the consulate in New York?

A: The consulate in New York will remain open to continue providing useful services to the Afghan-American community. We are drawing distinctions between the service related functions of the consulate and the political functions of the Embassy.

PAKISTAN
August 18, 1997

Arrest in Murder of Consulate Employees

Q: What do you know about the reported arrest of a suspect in the 1995 murders of two American Consulate employees in Karachi?

A: A Karachi police official announced on August 15th the arrest of a suspect in the March 8, 1995 murder of two US Consulate employees, Jacqueline Van Landingham and Gary Durrell, and the wounding of a third, Mark McCloy. The suspect reportedly implicated others who took part in the killings.

The United States believes strongly that all of those involved in the brutal 1995 attack should be brought to justice. We are following this case closely and are in touch with appropriate officials in Pakistan about the arrest.

Q: Is a US "Investigating Team" involved, as Reuters reports?

A: No US "Team" was involved. However, we are following this case closely and are in touch with the appropriate officials in Pakistan.

KENYA
August 12, 1997

Q: Has violence continued in Kenya following Friday's incidents?

A: We are not aware of any clashes since then linked to Friday's violence. There were two days of violence in one Nairobi neighborhood which appears to be linked to ethnic tensions rather than national politics.

Q: Have there been any developments associated with Friday's deaths?

A: The Police Commissioner has promised swift action against those responsible for the deaths of two police officers. Most pro-democracy opposition leaders have agreed that such action is necessary. They have complained that the government has not shown similar energy in pursuing those responsible for killing demonstrators on July 7.

Q: What is the U.S. view of Friday's violence?

A: The U.S. Government condemns the violence that marred demonstrations in Kenya on August 8. Although security forces were allowing a Nairobi rally to proceed unopposed, one police officer was brutally beaten to death, a second officer was stoned to death, and looting was widespread. The credibility of advocates of democratic reform suffers when they allow freedom of assembly to end in violence. The U.S. continues to call on all Kenyans to eschew violence and begin the peaceful, inclusive dialogue which can lead to free and fair elections.

FAST TRACK August 8, 1997

Q: How important is Fast Track?

A: As the President has made clear, we will seek legislation from Congress to secure fast track trade negotiating authority. We believe such authority is important to help us continue the successful work of the President's first term.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods with bipartisan support. The reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. International trade is increasingly important to our future. Over the next

decade, the global economy is expected to grow at three times the rate of the U.S. economy. Over the past four years, one-quarter of our economic growth came from trade - and exports created 1.4 million new jobs. In a world where over 95% of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., we must export to sustain growth at home.

Fast track authority will permit us to continue the work of opening markets around the world through the WTO and other global institutions. For example, trade authority permitted us to secure the recent Information Technology Agreement, which will open a \$500 billion global information technology market. In 1995, 3.3 million U.S. jobs were supported by \$90 billion in exports of these products.

Without fast track authority, we risk sitting on the sidelines while other countries open markets to their products or set new trading rules contrary to U.S. interests. Since 1992, in Latin America and Asia alone, other countries have reached 20 preferential trade agreements without us. We must be active. We have nothing to fear. The U.S. is already the most competitive, the most open and most successful large economy in the world.

In the fall, we will offer a fast track proposal to Congress and seek passage in both the House and Senate.

Q: What is the purpose of the President's meeting with members of Congress?

A: The President expressed the need for fast track to ensure U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Fast Track is about expanding opportunities for U.S. exports and making sure the U.S. sets the rules and conditions for trade that are advantageous to U.S. workers and businesses. The Administration's trade agenda is focused on exactly those areas where the U.S. is most competitive -- telecommunications, technology, professional services, agriculture,

biotechnology, and critical manufacturing sectors.

Q: Why does the Administration keep meeting with Members without presenting a proposal?

A: The only way to succeed in securing fast track authority is to build the broadest consensus possible before we head into the fall. It is important for Congress to have a clear understanding of why we need fast track, and the President used last week's meeting as an opportunity to do that.

Q: Why did the President meet with these particular Members?

A: Amb. Barshefsky and other members of the Administration have met with over 170 members over the last few months. The President's meeting today is part of an effort to personally address questions from those Members about trade and the need for fast track. This meeting is one of a number of meetings the President will have with Members in the coming months.

Q: What are the chances of the Administration securing fast track authority?

A: We realize this will be a divisive battle, but the more Congress understands that fast track is necessary for U.S. competitiveness in the global economy, we believe they will support renewed fast track authority for the President. We can not afford to have the rest of the world march on by while we pass up opportunities for U.S. workers and companies.

There are three fast track related activities taking place this week at the White House:

1. President will officially nominate Jay Berman and Vicki Radd to head the Administration's fast track effort.

[Jay has had a long and distinguished career in Washington as the Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America and has been particularly active on ensuring that US intellectual property rights are protected around the

world. Vicki has been an Chief of Staff to Erskine Bowles most notably coordinating the Summit of the Eight in Denver. She will be working with Jay on coordinating this priority.]

2. Erskine briefed the Cabinet on the President's commitment to fast track on Wednesday afternoon and has asked that the Cabinet be available to speak out and work on this issue in the future.

3. On Thursday, the President will meet with congressional members to talk about why fast track authority is in the national interest.

General Points:

* The President is clearly committed to securing fast track authority this fall.

This will be one of the Administration's top priorities and the President and his Cabinet will work hard on articulating both to the American people and the Congress why fast track authority is vital to the nation's long term economic prosperity.

* Fast track is at the heart of the President's effort to prepare the American people for the challenges of the 21st century. A central pillar of the President's economic strategy has been aggressively creating opportunities to advance America's job growth, productivity and overseas trade.

* And it has worked: longest sustained period of growth of all our G-7 partners (25% of which was driven by exports), 12 million new jobs, unemployment under 5%--a 25 year low and sustained low inflation.

* Securing fast track authority is critical to continue this economic expansion and maintain America's leadership position in the world.

The Administration's international trade agenda is on track and moving forward at full speed. In APEC, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and in the WTO, the United States and the Clinton Administration are setting the agenda to open markets, expand trade, and increase domestic prosperity. More than

25% of our economic growth in the past four years has been driven by export growth.

* In the last six months, the U.S. led the world to conclude trade agreements in information technology and telecommunications which covered more than \$1 trillion in global trade. We just led the developed countries of the world to conclude an historic anti-corruption agreement among the 29 developed nations in the OECD. We are moving forward in financial services talks at the WTO.

* The President was personally involved in securing the ITA agreement, working with APEC leaders last Fall to build support for this agreement. APEC has already embarked on "ITA II" to expand the reach of this agreement and will consider other sectoral trade agreements this year.

The President and the Administration are actively engaged with the Congress on the trade agenda.

* We are now working in Congress to preserve MFN trade status with China -- normal trade relations -- a critical measure to protect the economic health of Hong Kong because half of U.S.-China trade goes through Hong Kong.

* We have secured commitments from the congressional leadership to address "fast track" on an expedited basis this Fall and conclude this year. This effort will involve the President, the Vice President, and the resources of the White House.

We would like to see Congress approve "fast track" in the Fall to ensure that we can gain the best possible trade terms on a reciprocal basis for U.S. companies and workers. The trade agenda has not been held back by the absence of "fast track" negotiating authority. We are moving forward in the FTAA, within APEC, and in the WTO on a wide range of negotiations including financial services.

* Fast track is important because trade barriers in the fastest growing

markets
in the world are much higher than ours, and fast track will increase
our leverage
to bring those barriers down and open markets.

* We will work with the Congress this summer to build consensus on
the scope of
fast track and how to address labor and environmental issues.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

July 28, 1997

* President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to
October
12-17.

* APEC Summit in Vancouver November 24-25.

Q: Press reports have mentioned October 28 as a possible arrival date
for PRC
President Jiang Zemin's State visit to the U.S. What can you tell us
about plans
for the visit?

A: President Clinton and President Jiang earlier agreed to an exchange
of state
visits. Our two governments are discussing plans for President Jiang
to visit
the U.S. before the end of this year.

BOSNIA

August 18, 1997

Q: Why is Gelbard going back to Bosnia?

A: Special Representative Gelbard is heading back to the region to
follow-up in
Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb on work from the Holbrooke-Gelbard
trip and
maintain the momentum of our re-energized implementation effort.

NSC Special Assistant to the President for Dayton Implementation
Jock Covey will
accompany Gelbard (as he did with Holbrooke-Gelbard)

Refer to State for other details.

SFOR Action in Banja Luka

Q: What can you tell us about SFOR action in Banja Luka to prevent violence between police forces? Did police supporting Plavsic violate NATO's guidelines for special police?

A: We understand that SFOR troops intervened to prevent violence between two groups of police during a confrontation that occurred when police loyal to the elected government took action to investigate reports that the Constitutional Court Justice had been beaten in the police station.

SFOR expects all RS police to comply fully with the decision to place all special police under Annex 1-A.

Acts of violence and intimidation will only keep the RS from gaining assistance and recognition of the international community. We applaud SFOR's efforts to control these special police forces.

Q: Have RS-backed police conducted illegal surveillance of Plavsic?

A: Dragan Lukac, commander of the Banja Luka anti-terrorist unit, claimed that evidence was found that President Plavsic's telephone communications were being tapped by forces loyal to Pale from the Banja Luka police station.

Once more we call on leaders in the RS to respect the rule of law and dispense with these illegal tactics.

Is SFOR is planning to detain Karadzic or other indictees?

* We continue to remain deeply concerned with the presence of war criminals in Bosnia, including Karadzic. We remain concerned about his potential influence -- in violation of agreements that he not be involved in political life -- and will

not be satisfied until he is brought to justice in the Hague.

* We are considering a full range of options to facilitate delivery of war criminals to the Hague. We continue to press the Parties to live up to their obligation to turn over war criminals.

* SFOR is authorized to detain war criminals encountered in the course of its regular duties and if the tactical situation permits. The recent SFOR operation to detain war criminals in Prijedor conformed to this mandate. Any indicted war criminal would be subject to detention in such circumstances. If asked about ABC report on U.S. forces training to apprehend war criminals

* Contrary to what has been reported, U.S. forces are not now in training for or participating in any unilateral or multinational commando operation to apprehend indicted war criminals in the former Yugoslavia.

* It is the policy of the Administration to help the International War Crimes Tribunal bring indicted war criminals to justice.

If asked about Plavsic statements that Secretary Albright offered Karadzic a deal
(WP)

* Secretary Albright made no such offer. Our position on war criminals, including Karadzic, remains unchanged -- no exile, no amnesty, only a fair trial in the Hague.

(if pressed, cannot comment on possible future operations)

Corruption in Bosnia (NYT)

* Corruption in Bosnia is a serious problem, particularly in Republika Srpska.

One of the reasons thousands of Bosnian Serbs are standing up to support Plavsic is that the Bosnian Serb people are fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale hardliners.

* We have tailored our assistance efforts specifically to counter corruption in Bosnia, by making assistance contingent on behavior of the parties and with substantial accounting requirements that prevent assistance funds from being

misused.

* One of our top priorities is the restructuring and retraining of police in Bosnia in accordance with democratic standards. Retraining and restructuring will help end the use of police as a tool for corruption and repression by hard-line leaders. We have already completed initial restructuring of police forces in two cantons of the Federation.

Meeting with Milosevic

* The Holbrooke-Gelbard team met with Milosevic on Friday and both Milosevic and Krajisnik on Saturday. They explained to Milosevic that support for Plavsic is evident that ordinary Serbs are fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale hardliners.

* The team warned Milosevic that his continued disengagement and non-cooperation by Pale could have disastrous results, including for the FRY.

Did Holbrooke Tell the Serbs of Plans to Capture Karadzic?

* The team made very clear that Karadzic must go and that that we will not be satisfied until he faces trial at the Hague. We told the Serbs that we are considering every option until Karadzic is brought to justice.

(If pressed, will not go into further details of private meeting)

Holbrooke-Gelbard Team with Izetbegovic/Tudjman

* Team made important progress on implementation, including signing of agreements by Croatian and Bosnian Presidents which demonstrated a positive spirit of cooperation. Agreements cover return of refugees (including bringing to justice those who attacked refugees earlier this month), cooperation on war criminals, and measures to strengthen Federation institutions.

* These commitments are a positive step. Now we will be looking for swift action by the parties to implement the agreements.
Holbrooke-Gelbard Team with Joint Presidency

* Team also made progress with the Joint Presidency and the Council of Ministers

* The Joint Presidency approved the allocation of Embassies among the three ethnic groups. Of note, the Serbs will choose the Ambassador to the United States. The three Presidents also approved remaining details on the Standing Committee on Military Matters, which will be critical to transparency and confidence building.

* We expect concrete action by each of the Parties to fully implement these and other commitments under the Dayton Accords.

* All assistance, every benefit will be conditioned on each party's performance; we will actively seek to penalize those who fail to honor their commitments.

New Policy towards police?

* On August 8, General Shinseki (COMSFOR) announced a new policy for the control and restructuring of Special Police in Bosnia in accordance with Dayton. Special police that have not been certified by the IPTF - and therefore have not been restructured - will be treated as military forces in accordance with Annex 1A.

* This policy will speed democratic police reform.

(if asked about details of new SFOR rules for police, refer to DoD; for details on IPTF police restructuring, refer to State)

SFOR's efforts on Helping Refugees

* Helping refugees is an essential element to the successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

* We are pleased to see that SFOR troops continue to make a difference on the ground, creating a secure environment for refugees to return home.

(If asked about June 98)

* As we've said before, the present operation will have run its course by then.

We should be discussing in the meantime what, if any, involvement the United States should have after than.

Recent Attacks on SFOR

* We take seriously the spate of incidents aimed at SFOR and other parts of the international community in Bosnia.

* Any effort to intimidate the international community is unacceptable.

* Together with our NATO partners, we are making it clear to appropriate authorities that this must cease.

* (if asked) We are not going to discuss hypothetical consequences.

RS Power Struggle/Plavsic Expulsion from SDS

* We continue to monitor the political developments in Republika Srpska and the situation involving Republika Srpska President Plavsic and the Pale hardliners.

The challenge to the authority of the elected president is clearly an attempt to avoid implementing Dayton.

* We are not surprised that the SDS and President Plavsic have parted ways. This does not in anyway change to powers or authorities of President Plavsic. We hope and expect this can help foster the start of a genuine democratic process in Republika Srpska and a viable opposition to the hard-line nationalist leadership of the SDS.

* We support the rights of the legitimate democratically elected authorities to exercise their appropriate powers. The OSCE and the High Representative, among other experts, have concluded that Mrs. Plavsic's actions are legitimate and authoritative. We fully accept that judgment.

* We note that thousands of Bosnian Serbs have taken to the streets of different

cities in Republika Srpska in support of President Plavsic. The Bosnian Serb people are clearly fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale leadership.

Has the policy changed on SFOR ending its mission in June 1998?

* The President has repeatedly said that the SFOR mission will end in June 1998.

* The critical question is what we do between now and then. We have to focus our energy on assisting the parties with full implementation: common institutions, refugees, economics, war criminals and police training.

* What role, if any, NATO plays, in or out of Bosnia, after June 1998 has not been decided -- let alone what role we would play.

If asked whether we absolutely ruling out United States troops in Bosnia after June 1998

* SFOR's mission should end on schedule in June 1998. US political and economic engagement will continue well beyond that.

* It is too soon to speculate as to what, if any, role there may be for NATO following the completion of SFOR's mission. Our focus is on intensifying civilian implementation across the board so that parties themselves can assume greater responsibility for their own future after SFOR's mission is completed.

Amendments for Date Certain Withdrawal from Bosnia

* President's senior advisors have recommended a veto if such a measure were to remain in the Authorization bill after the House-Senate Conference. Even though we have no plans to extend the SFOR mandate past June 1998, requiring a withdrawal from Bosnia by a date certain interferes with the President's foreign policy prerogatives and is counterproductive.

* A withdrawal by a date certain - with no regard for the situation on the ground

and progress to be made on civilian implementation - would call into question our commitment to implementation of the Dayton Accords, our reliability as a NATO ally, and our commitment to peace and stability in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation would question the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

* As the President has emphasized, our focus should be on the hard work that needs to be done in the next year on civilian implementation. U.S. political and economic engagement in Bosnia will remain essential after SFOR's mission is done, and we can only succeed if the parties and the international community remain assured of U.S. leadership and commitment.

CAMBODIA

August 13, 1997

Q: Any comment on the meeting between Hun Sen and King Sihanouk in Beijing?

A: Hun Sen, Ung Huot, acting head of state Chea Sim, and other Cambodian politicians have traveled to Beijing to meet with King Sihanouk. Our position remains that the process by which Ung Huot was selected as First Prime Minister was undemocratic. However, we welcome any dialogue between Cambodia's major players that will lead to free and fair elections in May 1998.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible abdication by King Sihanouk?

A: We would prefer not to comment on what would clearly be a significant personal and political decision for the King. However, I would note that the King is a popular figure among Cambodians, and he does have significant public influence. A decision to abdicate would obviously have major political implications for Cambodia.

Q: Any comment on ASEAN's decision in Singapore that it will no

longer recognize
Ranariddh as First Prime Minister? What is the U.S. position? Do we
still
follow ASEAN's lead?

A: Our understanding is that ASEAN members recognize states, not
governments.
The ASEAN foreign ministers indicated they would continue their
relationship with
Cambodia. Our understanding of the ASEAN foreign ministers'
statement is that
they did not discuss the issue of recognition of Ranariddh or Ung
Huot as First
Prime Minister.

We welcome the ASEAN foreign ministers' announcement that they
will continue
their mediating role to seek a peaceful and democratic resolution to
the
Cambodian political crisis. We understand that the ministers have
proposed
hosting a dialogue between the parties in the conflict. We fully
endorse ASEAN's
efforts in this regard.

We strongly support the efforts of ASEAN to mediate in an effort to
restore
implementation of the Paris Accords in Cambodia. We and ASEAN
share the
objectives of stopping the violence, maintaining the coalition
government and
ensuring the May 1998 elections are free and fair. We have been in
regular and
close contact with ASEAN regarding Cambodia's political crisis.

Q: Will the U.S. lift the suspension of aid to Cambodia?

A: On Friday, August 8, Secretary of State Albright decided to
continue the
suspension of all non-humanitarian aid indefinitely. We have
suspended all
assistance except some humanitarian and election-related projects
provided
through NGO's and USAID contractors. None of our aid will directly
benefit the
Cambodian government.

During the suspension period, we have continued the equivalent of
\$20 million in
activities. For the immediate future, we are continuing the same
programs. We
plan an in-depth program review at the end of August.

Q: Can you provide an update on Desaix Anderson's mission to the region?

A: Yesterday, Mr. Anderson was in Singapore to meet with the ASEAN foreign ministers. He met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the leader of the ASEAN foreign minister's group that is working toward a resolution of the Cambodian political crisis. Mr. Anderson briefed Foreign Minister Alatas on his meetings in Phnom Penh with Ung Huot and others (see below).

Mr. Anderson also met with other foreign ministers and senior officials. His discussions focused on ASEAN's efforts to restore political stability and ensure free and fair elections in Cambodia in May 1998.

Over the weekend, Mr. Anderson visited Phnom Penh, where he met with newly installed First Prime Minister Ung Huot. His purpose was to inform Ung Huot of the U.S. decision to extend indefinitely the suspension of aid. He also reaffirmed to Ung Huot the core principles that are guiding U.S. decisions on future assistance to Cambodia. Mr. Anderson also met with ASEAN ambassadors, donor country ambassadors, human rights representatives, and other government officials.

Q: Does this mean you recognize Ung Huot as First Prime Minister?

A: Ung Huot retains his position as Foreign Minister. As we have said, we consider the process by which he was named First Prime Minister to have been undemocratic. We have also said we are prepared to meet with him as necessary.

Q: Do you recognize Ranariddh as Prime Minister?

A: Ranariddh's status is a decision for FUNCINPEC to make. We believe that all exiled leaders, including Ranariddh should be allowed to return to participate freely in the political process.

Q: Can you comment on Secretary Albright's statements in Singapore about Pol Pot

and his recent show trial by the Khmer Rouge?

A: The United States continues to attach great importance to bringing Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders to justice for their atrocities against the Cambodian people.

We regard the recent show trial of Pol Pot and three of his Generals, and Pol Pot's sentence of life under house arrest, to be a legal farce.

We are continuing actively to explore with our friends and allies in the international community, including at the United Nations, various options for bringing Pol Pot to justice before some form of international tribunal should he be delivered into the custody of responsible authorities.

Given the current confused state of affairs in Cambodia, it would be premature and imprudent to speculate publicly on what might be the best type of forum for such procedures. But no one in Cambodia should be under the illusion that our determination to pursue those options is diminished because of the Khmer Rouge show trial of Pol Pot.

Q: Does the Khmer Rouge trial of Pol Pot raise a defense of double jeopardy for Pol Pot and the three generals?

A: No. In our view the show trial clearly does not invoke the principle of double jeopardy, both because of the show trial's obvious flaws and because it has no effect whatsoever on an international prosecution of Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge leaders.

Q: Does the United States support the establishment of an international criminal court?

A: Yes. The President has long expressed his support for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court that meets our requirements for effectiveness, due process, and broad participation by countries across the

globe. The United States is actively engaged in UN negotiations currently underway. We are working very hard to finalize the text of a statute for such a permanent court and moving on to a diplomatic conference.

Note to Briefer : A permanent court would not have retrospective jurisdiction, and thus could not prosecute Pol Pot for atrocities of the 1970's.

KOREA

August 19, 1997

Background

In accordance with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has maintained the freeze on its nuclear facilities and has cooperated in a join U.S.-DPRK project to store its spent nuclear fuel, now 85 percent complete. In return, KEDO is committed to provide two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea, and to deliver 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) annually until the first reactor is built.

The target date for completion of the first LWR is 2003, although we expect some delays. South Korea and Japan will finance the majority of the multi-billion dollar LWR project, while the U.S. is responsible to raise funds for HFO. Before KEDO could break ground on the LWR project, it first needed to negotiate a long list of agreements with the DPRK, many of which -- such as those covering telecommunications and transportation access -- established precedential links with South Korea and thus required significant DPRK concessions.

The U.S. has contributed over \$55 million to KEDO for HFO and KEDO admin expenses, plus an additional \$26 million for the spent fuel project. We have requested \$30 million for KEDO for FY 1998.

Q. Why has it taken so long for KEDO to break ground?

A. Before KEDO could begin construction, it had to reach agreement

with the DPRK
on a light-water reactor supply agreement, as well as six protocols and
a long
list of technical agreements governing the terms and conditions for the
project.

Many of these agreement -- such as those related to
telecommunications,
transportation, and use of DPRK labor -- established precedents in the
DPRK's
relations with South Korea and the rest of the world and thus took
considerable
time and effort to negotiate.

Q. What is the timetable for completion of the project?

A. KEDO's target date for completion of the first light-water reactor is
2003,
although the project may experience delays.

Q. Who is funding the light-water reactor project?

A. South Korea and Japan share primary responsibility for funding the
LWR
project.

Q. Has the United States contributed to the reactor project?

A. No. U.S. contributions to KEDO cover a portion of the
organization's
administrative expenses and heavy fuel oil costs.

Q. Has North Korea fulfilled its nuclear freeze commitments under the
Agreed
Framework?

A. We are satisfied with the DPRK's compliance with the nuclear
freeze provisions
of the agreed framework.

North Korea maintains the freeze on its nuclear program, under IAEA
monitoring,
and is also cooperating in a joint project with the United States to
safely store
its spent nuclear fuel, which would otherwise be available for
reprocessing.
Over 85 percent of the DPRK's spent fuel rods have already been
placed under IAEA
seals.

The agreed framework is structured in such a way that if the DPRK
fails to

fulfill its obligations under the accord, KEDO will not complete the LWR project.

Background for Four Party Preparatory Talks:

The Chinese, North Korean and South Korean delegations were led by a vice or deputy minister of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation was headed by Chuck Kartman, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The U.S. delegation had representatives from the NSC, JCS, OSD, and State Department. The U.S. delegation held bilateral consultations with South Korea and China on Monday, with the four party preparatory talks beginning Tuesday, August 5, at Columbia University. The purpose of the talks was to reach agreement on a venue, date and broad category agenda topics (1. discussion of a new, permanent peace mechanism to replace the Armistice, 2. Tension-reduction and confidence building measures).

Q: What is the status of talks in New York?

A: The Four Party preparatory meeting recessed August 7, with agreement to reconvene during the week of September 1st 5 in New York to address the final issue for decision - setting the agenda for the Four Party plenary. The four parties tentatively agreed on the timing (6 weeks after final agreement on the agenda), venue (Geneva - the Swiss have offered to provide substantial support for the talks), level of representation (Minister will meet as appropriate and available; heads of delegations will report to the Ministers and be of roughly equal rank - Deputy Minister/Assistant Secretary level) and procedural issues (U.S. will chair the first plenary; sequence of rotating chairmen will be determined by drawing lots).

Q: Did the North Koreans use the Nunn-Laney visit to send a message to the U.S. or South Korean governments? How would you characterized their discussions?

A. Following their trip to North Korea, Sen Nunn and Ambassador

Laney provided both the U.S. and South Korean governments a brief overview of their discussions and observations. As their press statement released in Seoul indicates, they had frank and useful discussions with both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korean Peoples Army officials about promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We note that Sen Nunn and Ambassador Laney emphasized the value of four party talks and the need for the North to undertake economic and agricultural reforms to solve its long-term difficulties..

Q: What is your reaction to recent statements by international groups that the famine in North Korea is worsening?

A: The food shortages in North Korea inflict a horrible cost on the North Korean people who already are suffering from impoverishment. The international community has responded generously to calls for emergency humanitarian assistance, and the United States has contributed some \$50 million to the UN World Food Program appeals.

We are participating in the current WFP food appeal through the contribution of 100,000 tons of food. But the long term answer is not short-term food aid; the North's prospects for agricultural production sufficient to feed itself will only improve through structural economic and agricultural reform. That reform can be greatly assisted through the four party peace talks.

MORE

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/20/97 10:23:03 AM
FROM McCormick, Shawn H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wilson, Joseph C.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY Revised as per your request.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT AUG19GUI____.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
August 19, 1997

Landmines

Iran

Gulf War Illnesses

Cuba

Middle East

Southern Lebanon

Russian Mir Situation

Poland

Nuclear Arms

Rwanda

China/Taiwan

Northern Ireland

Angola

Cyprus

South Asia Trip

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Kenya

Fast Track

Trips and Visitors

Bosnia

Cambodia

Korea

LANDMINES

August 18, 1997

Decision to Join the Ottawa Process

* Since the end of the second CD session in June, the United States has been taking stock of progress in negotiations to ban landmines.

* We have just concluded that review, and will join the Ottawa Process as a participant.

-- We recognized that there had been a lack of significant progress in the CD in the first half of the year, while at the same time, support for the Ottawa process had grown significantly.

-- We want to take advantage of the momentum behind the Ottawa Process and help build on the support it already has.

* We will be going to Oslo on September 1 to actively participate in the negotiations on treaty text. The objective of those negotiations is to conclude

a text for signing in December.

* We will work to secure an agreement that achieves our humanitarian goals while protecting our national security interests.

* We will be bringing some new positions to the table in Oslo. For example:

-- We will propose that there be a geographic exception to allow stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines to defend the U.S. and its allies on the Korean peninsula. Given the security situation there, and the crucial role that landmines play in our defense plans, it is fundamental that any treaty make this exception.

-- We will be seeking to improve the draft treaty's verification provisions, particularly in the area of information exchange and fact finding missions.

[If asked about exemption for self-destructing or anti-tank systems:

-- We will propose language that will make clear that the treaty definitions would not apply to systems whose primary function is anti-tank or anti-vehicle, rather than anti-personnel.

[If asked about transition period or conditioning entry into force on ratification by certain states:]

-- We will also be proposing that the treaty include a provision that would delay entry into force until a majority of producers and users have ratified. As an alternative, we would propose that there be an optional deferral period for certain provisions comparable to that in the CCW Amended Mines Protocol pending before the Senate.

* Our proposed changes will not dilute the humanitarian benefit of the treaty.

To the contrary, they may increase the treaty's effectiveness because, if accepted, they will make the treaty more attractive to states that are not now participating in the Ottawa process.

-- It would be very positive if participation could be broadened and more states which are APL producers and users were to join. The greater the adherence, the more effective this treaty will be.

* We will be sending a senior-level team to Geneva this week to discuss our positions informally with a number of key Ottawa supporters, so that we can begin to develop support for these positions in advance of the formal negotiations in Oslo.

-- The team will be led by Eric Newsom, PDAS for Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department. Mr. Newsom will also lead our delegation in Oslo.

[If asked about Post report that Robert Bell is leading the team:]

-- Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the NSC, will be going as part of the delegation, but the State Department leads U.S. diplomatic efforts involving consultations with foreign governments.

[If asked about whether we still go to Oslo even if U.S. proposals receive a hostile reaction:]

* Yes. We will attend the Oslo conference and present our positions there.

[If asked whether we will sign the treaty even if we fail to gain agreement to our positions in Oslo:]

* No. We are not prepared to sign a treaty that does not protect our national security interests.

* We remain committed to our other efforts to ban landmines, including the establishment of step-by-step negotiations toward a ban in the CD. That effort remains important as long as there are states that will not join the Ottawa process but who are CD members. The CD membership includes most of the major historical producers and exporters.

* We will also continue our efforts to work with the Senate to secure early advice and consent to ratification of the CCW Amended Mines Protocol. That Protocol, if adhered to, could make a significant contribution to the landmines problem.

[If asked: Its key provisions include, for example, a requirement for minimum APL detectability, for easy mine clearing; marking and monitoring of non-self-destructing APL; and 99.9% reliability rate for scatterable, self-destructing APL.]

* We would emphasize that the United States has been a leader on this issue. For example:

-- One year ago the President decided to end our use of non-self-destructing APL, with the exception only of Korea and training. We are in the process of destroying some 3 million NSD APL and that will be complete by 1999.

-- The rest of our systems are self-destructing within a matter of days or weeks. There have been no documented incidents of civilians being harmed by one of our self-destructing systems.

-- We do not export APL: In January, the President declared a permanent ban on all APL exports and transfers.

-- We have aggressively pursued development and fielding of new demining technologies, and are one of the world's leaders in our "train-the-trainer" demining programs.

IRAN
August 19, 1997

Background

* The President signed an Executive Order to clarify the scope of restrictions on trade and investment activities by United States persons with Iran.
* Issuance of the order is consistent with existing U.S. policy toward Iran.
This is a reinforcement and confirmation of the scope of the 1995

embargo, and
does not represent a change in policy or the imposition of further
punitive
measures.

* The new Executive order makes explicit that United States persons,
wherever
located, are prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in any
investment or
trade-related activity with Iran, wherever such activity occurs.

* The new order has proven necessary to resolve questions that have
continued to
surface about the proper interpretation of the existing orders. Our goal
is to
remove any doubt and to render absolutely clear and explicit those
aspects which
have been questioned.

* The 1995 embargo on Iran was imposed to deprive Iran of the
benefits of trade
with and investment from the United States. The new order reconfirms
this
objective.

Q: Why now?

A: The clarifying order has been under review for some time.

Q: Is this new order in any way connected to the Turkey pipeline
decision?

A: No. This is entirely separate from the State Department's
assessment that
Turkey's decision to purchase Turkmeni gas does not appear to
involve activity
that would be sanctionable under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.

This EO confirms and clarifies the restrictions on U.S. persons
engaging in
trade or investment-related activities involving Iran.

Q: Why are we not using this vehicle to toughen sanctions on Iran?

A: The United States has the world's most restrictive policy on
economic dealings
with Iran. The comprehensive trade and embargo was imposed in
1995. The Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act was signed into law August 5, 1996.

We have engaged intensively with allies to encourage them to impose
significant
economic measures to change Iran's objectionable behavior.

While we do not rule out further unilateral measures in the future, we

favor a
common multilateral approach, which will have a greater impact in
changing
Iranian behavior.

Q: Will this encounter resistance from U.S. allies as another
extraterritorial
extension of U.S. jurisdiction?

A: Our allies understand the depth of our resolve to cut off economic
activity
with Iran until it modifies its dangerous policies. The new Executive
order is
intended to clarify the application of the U.S. embargo to U.S. persons
appropriately subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

Q: Does the new order close a loophole?

A: No. It would be accurate to say the new order is intended to
eliminate debate
over different interpretations regarding the scope of the embargo.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

August 19, 1997

Q: What is the White House response to the news item that almost
half the
Presidential Advisory Committee now think nerve gas may be a
contributing factor
to veterans' illnesses?

A: PAC recommendations are based on a consensus building process
that reaches
conclusions based on scientific and medical evidence. Those efforts
remain
ongoing. Last January, following receipt of the PAC report, POTUS
extended the
PAC to ensure continued oversight of DOD's intensifying
investigation into
possible low level exposures in the Gulf War. The final PAC report
has yet to be
written and is not due to POTUS until late this fall.

Other points:

POTUS is committed to getting out all the facts that might help
explain the
reasons for veterans' illnesses and ensuring all who served their nation
are
afforded the treatment and benefits they deserve.

The PAC, in its January report said it is unlikely there were any health effects related to short term exposure to low levels of nerve agent based on available scientific literature. They went on to say that more investigation into the possibility of such exposures and research into the possibility of adverse health effects would be productive.

In response to that recommendation and POTUS direction, DoD and CIA significantly increased their efforts to look into low level exposure to nerve agents. This included a significant effort to model the demolition at Khamisiyah. That effort resulted in the notification of almost 100,000 troops that they were probably exposed to very low levels of nerve agent. In addition, DOD committed tens of millions of dollars for research into the possible adverse health effects of such exposures.

Q: How could the U.S. bomb chemical weapons sites when the Pentagon knew that it could be harmful to U.S. troops?

A: From the beginning, POTUS committed to getting out all the facts that may have bearing on why troops are ill.

Our current understanding of the Livermore plume data is that it was a generic "template " for use in planning air campaign pre-attack assessments. Something I'm sure we are all pleased they thought to do.

The Livermore modeling results the White House is aware of do NOT show exposure of U.S. troops.

The CIA modeling done to date shows plumes longer than these. None of these reach troops.

DOD and CIA developed a new sophisticated suite of models which were used to determine possible low level exposures at Khamisiyah (Kam-i-See'-Ya) (a site destroyed post war by demolition, not in the air campaign). They will apply those models to the known chemical manufacturing sites and

determine whether
there were possible exposures.

Some of you may have been shown interpretive modeling done by
someone else
(NOTE: Jim Tuite, former Senate Banking Committee staffer who
believes there is a
DOD cover-up on CW exposures). We are not familiar with his work,
and therefore
cannot comment on it.

Q: Did the White House know about this report? Who is responsible
for not telling
Powell and Schwartzkopf?

A: I am not aware of anyone on the White House staff that had seen
the report
prior to yesterday.

As to who knew in DOD or who is responsible for notifying the
generals, I direct
your inquiry to DOD.

If asked:

At this point we are not aware of who in DOD was shown these
models.

DOD and CIA have devoted significant resources to the effort of
understanding
the extent of possible chemical exposures. Detailed questions on
models are best
addressed there.

CUBA
August 19, 1997

Q: Does the U.S. plan to ease travel restrictions during the Pope's visit
to
Cuba?

A: We have received requests from the Archdiocese of Miami, the
Cuban Catholic
Church and others to permit, consistent with U.S. law and policy,
travel to Cuba
and donations of humanitarian assistance to the Church, in connection
with the
Pope's visit.

We have begun to receive license applications and will consider their

merit, on
a case by case basis, in accordance with U.S. law and the
humanitarian needs of
the Cuban people. Travel and shipment of humanitarian assistance
will require
appropriate licensing by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets
Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce.

So far, no licenses have been granted. A request by the Archdiocese of
Miami to
conduct a pilgrimage via cruise ship, is being considered under OFAC
regulations
governing religious travel.

If pressed on allowing direct humanitarian flights:

* We have authorized direct humanitarian flights twice in the past
year: last
October after hurricane Lili and again in December as a follow-up for
the victims
of hurricane Lili and in time for the holidays. We have also authorized
travel
for religious purposes in the past.

* This is not new and consistent with the law and current regulations.
Providing
support directly to the Cuban people has been an important element of
U.S. policy
toward Cuba since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992. It
is also
consistent with the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
(Helms-Burton).

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

August 19, 1997

Q: Any update on Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation?

A: Palestinian and Israeli security officials met in Ramallah Sunday
evening,
with US Government participation, to discuss a variety of security
issues.

As we have made clear, we believe that this channel will work best if
we do not
get into the details of the exchanges.

We do understand that the Palestinians turned over information
related to the
explosive devices used in the July 30 bombings in the Jerusalem

Market.

This cooperation is a positive step, more needs to be done.

As we have said, the Palestinians need to do all they can both unilaterally and in cooperation with Israeli security to prevent terror.

Q: Any reaction to Israel's decision to release some 30% of the tax revenue that it was withholding from the Palestinian Authority?

A: We welcome the move.

As we have made clear we consider measures unrelated to security counterproductive, and would like to see them lifted.

Palestinian economic well-being is in Israel's interest, as well as those of the Peace Process generally.

Q: Any reaction to Chairman Arafat's call for including Hamas and other militant groups in a "national unity dialogue?"

A: We have seen the press reports of this, but it is not clear what is actually intended.

That said, it is our view that there is no role for those who oppose the fundamentals of the Peace Process and the use of terror to pursue their aims.

Q: What did Dennis Ross accomplish on his mission?

A: His primary focus was to begin the reestablishment of a cooperative bilateral relationship to improve the security environment. The security meetings between Israelis and Palestinians are first steps in the right direction, but the meetings are only the beginning of a process.

They need to produce results - we will be monitoring the situation closely.

SOUTHERN LEBANON
August 19, 1997

Q: What is the situation in Southern Lebanon/ Northern Israel?

A: As of now, the situation appears to have quieted down. Hizballah claimed

responsibility for a barrage of Katyusha rockets into Northern Israel, which slightly injured one Israeli.

As of this morning, the Israeli government has permitted its citizens to leave bomb shelters in Northern Israel.

The South Lebanon Army apparently carried out yesterday's shelling of the Southern Lebanese city of Sidon, which killed seven Lebanese and wounded over 30 others. Earlier Yesterday, a roadside bomb killed two children of a former SLA Commander, according to Press Reports.

Q: What are you doing to end this latest cycle of fighting?

A: We have been directly in touch with all the Parties to urge maximum restraint.

(NOTE FOR BRIEFER ONLY: we consider the Lebanese and Syrian governments responsible for passing message to Hizballah)

We also encouraged them to look to the Israeli-Lebanon Monitoring Group to play its role in defusing tensions in the region.

We understand that an ILMG meeting will be convened as soon as possible to deal with the latest incidents.

Q: There has been a sharp upsurge in fighting and particularly civilian casualties. Is the April 1996 Understanding unraveling?

A: We regret the violence that has taken place, and particularly the civilian casualties.

But these incidents do not indicate that the understanding is unraveling.

We believe the understanding and the Monitoring Group have contributed over the past year to stabilizing a difficult situation. Without it, the situation in Southern Lebanon and along the Israel-Lebanon border would have deteriorated further.

The parties remain committed to upholding the understanding and have made clear

they will work toward that end.

Q: Isn't Israel ultimately responsible for the SLA attack on civilians in Sidon?

A: I am not going to get into the blame game here.

The ILMG will- as it has done on every occasion in the past- investigate and reach conclusions on the recent attacks. We will let the ILGM do its work.

Again, we urge all the parties to exercise maximum restraint and do their utmost to stabilize the situation and prevent civilian casualties.

IF ASKED ONLY

Q: Has the Lebanese Army responded militarily to the attack on Sidon?

A: We understand that the Lebanese Armed Forces responded to the attack.

RUSSIAN MIR SITUATION

August 19, 1997

Early Monday (August 18) morning, the main computer onboard the Mir shut down during the docking procedure of a Russian Progress resupply spacecraft. As a result, the Mir briefly lost attitude control and its battery power was depleted. The crew used the Soyuz spacecraft attached to the Mir to reorient it toward the sun, and the batteries have now been recharged and computer put back in operation. Mir's other major systems are operating well at this time.

Talking Points

-- NASA reports that U.S. astronaut Michael Foale and Russian cosmonauts Solovyev and Vinogradov are in no danger, and all critical life support systems onboard the Mir remain fully functional. Yesterday's computer failure will likely delay the planned repair mission to reconnect power from the damaged Spektr module from August 20 to the 22nd or 23rd.

-- The Mir's primary oxygen system has been repaired and is now

functional.

-- The current schedule for crew replacement and repair is as follows:

- o August 22-3 Internal spacewalk to reconnect power cables from damaged module.

(U.S. astronaut Mike Foale to remain in Soyuz capsule.)

- o Sept. 3 External spacewalk to inspect -- but not repair -- damaged module and

solar arrays. (Foale may participate.)

- o Late Sept. (pending NASA review) Launch of Shuttle with U.S. astronaut David

Wolf to replace Michael Foale. Shuttle could carry parts needed for repair of Mir.

-- The President is being kept fully informed of the situation by his Science

Advisor, Dr. Jack Gibbons.

Q: Is NASA still planning to send David Wolf to replace Michael Foale?

A. At this time, Wolf is scheduled to replace Foale aboard Mir in September. The

final decision on whether he will stay aboard will depend on restoration of power

from the damaged module and on the results of NASA's internal and external

reviews of Mir safety.

Q: Isn't it finally time to end our participation in the Shuttle-Mir program?

The Shuttle/Mir program is only one facet of our space cooperation with Russia.

Our missions on the Mir are giving us a great deal of knowledge and experience on

how to live and work aboard an operational space station, especially in

unexpected situations - something we will want to fully understand before we send

up our own international space station. We are taking the decision on whether to

send the next U.S. astronaut (David Wolf) to the Mir one step at a time. We will

be watching the results of the repair space walk on August 22 or 23 and will rely

on NASA to make a decision on how we should proceed based on their technical and

safety analysis of the situation.

POLAND

August 19 1997

Q: Can you comment on the WP article about a Polish family's claim that the USG built its Embassy on their land and should compensate them for the lost property?

A: The USG takes the position that we acquired the property legally from the government of Poland and that the claimants should work out any problems it has on this issue with the Polish government.

Although we have done some record searches on the history of the acquisition of the property, we have not been able to find substantial documentation to either confirm or deny most of the allegations made -- particularly the key allegation that the US obtained the property with the full knowledge of how the host country had acquired them.

NUCLEAR ARMS

August 18, 1997

Q: Is it true that the United States is hard at work on new or modified designs for nuclear arms?

A: The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded by the Administration in September 1994 identified no new requirement for new-design nuclear warhead production.

Thus, the Department of Energy (DOE) has no requirement for new weapon types and is not designing advanced new weapons types.

Consistent with the NPR, the DOE will, however, maintain a capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads as part of its program to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrent.

Q: What about the descriptions of weapons design included in the Department of

Energy's "Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan?"

A: The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes specifics about how the DOE will maintain its capability to design replacement warheads and replace parts of aging warheads.

(As stated above), the DOE needs to maintain a capability to design replacement parts and new warheads as parts of existing warheads age.

That said, there is currently no requirement for new weapon types, and no plans to design any advanced new weapon types.

Q: Doesn't this kind of work undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

A: No. The Administration is fully committed to securing the ratification and effective implementation of the CTBT.

The DOE's stockpile stewardship and management program is fully consistent with the CTBT.

The objective of this program is to ensure that our existing nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable in the absence of nuclear testing.

The program will enable the United States to enter into a CTBT and is designed to ensure that the U.S. would not have to return to nuclear testing.

Q: Is it true that the Clinton Administration has failed to exercise adequate policy and fiscal oversight over the nation's bomb making complex, including the DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP)?

A: The President has provided detailed direction for the stockpile stewardship and management program, and has made clear the importance of this program in his August 11, 1995 statement announcing his support for a zero yield CTBT.

In addition, the program has been developed in coordination with other federal agencies (NSC, OSD, JCS, OSTP, OMB) since its inception in 1993.

RWANDA

August 18, 1997

Q: Has the United States sold or transferred any military equipment to the Rwandan military?

A: Following the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, the United States joined the international community in a commitment to help rebuild Rwandan society. As part of that mission, the Department of Defense has provided a modest program of assistance to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) which has included humanitarian demining aid, refugee repatriation training and instruction in military justice.

DOD has also conducted two Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions in Rwanda focusing on the rule of law, human rights, first aid, and decision making skills.

The United States is closely tracking allegation of human rights abuses which may have been committed by the RPA. The United States lends its full support to the pending UN investigation into such matters.

Q: Did/has the United States provided any training or equipment to military forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo or former Zaire?

A: No. DOD has not and did not provide any training or equipment to Alliance forces. There is absolutely no link, either formal or informal, between the U.S. military and Alliance forces, either prior to the outbreak of violence in eastern Zaire last year or afterwards.

Q: Did the DOD provide any other assistance to Rwanda?

A: As part of DOD's Humanitarian Assistance program, DOD has also provided excess military property to several civilian ministries of the Rwanda Government

including the Ministries of Education, Health, Justice and Public Works as well as to the National Nursing School and Kigali Central Hospital. This equipment included office equipment and supplies, medical equipment and supplies, and education supplies (desks, chairs, etc.)

For further information, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.

CHINA/TAIWAN

August 4, 1997

Q: Can you confirm the C.H. Tung plans to visit the United States September 9-11, and that he will meet with President Clinton while in Washington?

A: We welcome Mr. Tung to travel to the United States during that time period, and look forward to meetings with him in Washington. Appointments for him are currently under consideration.

IF PRESSED: We expect Secretary Albright will meet with Mr. Tung. His appointments in the White House are currently being arranged.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the request for a transit visa for Taiwan's President Lee Teng-Hui?

A: The United States will consider this transit request (through Hawaii on the way to Central America, with return stop in Hawaii) as we do all transit requests by Taiwan leaders. We look to the issue of the safety, comfort and convenience of the traveler. We have not yet issued the visa, but we do not anticipate any difficulty in doing so.

Q: What did Sandy Berger accomplish on his trip to China?

A: Mr. Berger met with China's President, Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng,, Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, and State Council Foreign Affairs Director Liu Huaqiu on August 11-12. Berger's talks with Liu were the fourth

round of
discussions of strategic issues conducted by National Security
Advisors with
Chinese counterparts, the first such round occurring in March 1996
when Tony Lake
met with Liu in Washington. Their strategic discussions focused on
Asian issues:
Korea, relations with Japan, Cambodia, and South Asia.. On Korea,
they stressed
our good cooperation in the recently concluded Preparatory Talks
which we hope
will lead to Four Party talks. On Japan, we explained the importance
of the
U.S.-Japan security relationship as an anchor of stability in East Asia.
On
Cambodia, there was agreement on supporting ASEAN's initiative to
work with the
Cambodian parties to bring about free and fair elections in 1998. On
South Asia,
both sides agreed on the importance of working to defuse tensions.

Mr. Berger also discussed preparations for President Jiang's visit to
the U.S.
this fall. This will be the first visit by a President of China to the U.S.
since 1985. We believe Presidential meetings and visits are an
essential part of
improving U.S.-China relations, and the Chinese agree with us that we
should look
for ways to use the visit to expand areas of cooperation and address
areas where
we differ. Berger raised U.S. concerns and objectives on issues
including
nonproliferation and other security issues, human rights, trade, and
transnational issues such as the environment and law enforcement.
The trip was
not designed to negotiate issues, but rather to highlight specific areas
of
concern as we approach President Jiang's visit. The atmospherics were
good, and
Berger was warmly received.

NORTHERN IRELAND

August 12, 1997

Q: Has Adams visa been approved? What about fundraising?
(Background: Adams, Martin McGuinness and Richard McAuley
applied for visas in
Dublin August 11.)

A: Yes, Secretary of State has approved visa. (That means it can be
stamped in
his passport by Embassy Dublin, once they receive formal

notification.) Adams
and other officials not expected to travel to U.S. until early
September.

If asked: Do not anticipate placing restrictions on fundraising on visas
Note
that FBI system for monitoring how funds are used remains in effect.
(Note:
System allows FBI access to Dublin bank account of Sinn Fein to
monitor how funds
deposited and spent.)

Q: Are there any plans for Adams to see the President? Whom will he
see?

A: No, we do not anticipate such a meeting. We do expect to schedule
a meeting
with the National Security Advisor, but nothing has been requested or
scheduled
yet.

If pressed: Yes, Adams did meet with the President during the
previous ceasefire
(at the 1995 St. Patrick's Day celebration at the White House and in
Belfast in
November 1995); would not rule out meetings now that ceasefire
restored, since we
expect it to be permanent, but not going to happen during this visit.

Q: Did the Administration give Sin Fein assurances regarding visas
for
Sinn Fein leaders, access to the White House, fundraising in the
United States,
and suspension of IRA deportation cases, in the event of a renewed
IRA ceasefire?

A: After Gerry Adams announced that he would recommend to the
IRA that it
reestablish the ceasefire, we informed Sinn Fein officials that in the
event of a
cease-fire, we would be prepared to take appropriate confidence-
building measures
to support the ceasefire and the peace process.

We are not going to go into detail about those confidence-building
measures.

I will note that Sinn Fein official Joe Cahill was recently granted a
waiver to
visit here in early August. (NOTE: Actually Cahill got a visa
BEFORE the
August 1994 ceasefire...)

Q: Any readout from Jim Steinberg's meeting with Adam Ingram?

A: Jim Steinberg met yesterday with Adam Ingram, Northern Ireland Minister for Security and Economic Development.

They had a very positive meeting. Discussion focused on the Northern Ireland peace process and ways to build on the progress of the recent ceasefire in the multi-party negotiations slated for September.

They also agreed that greater attention needed to be given to questions of economic development, as the essential ingredient for long-term stability.

If pressed: The involvement of Sinn Fein in the multi-party talks was discussed and the two agreed that the August 6 meeting between Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams and UK Minister for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam was a positive step.

Q: What about the deportation cases?

A: Not going to go into specifics of possible confidence-building measures.

Q: What will happen to the peace process now that the UUP has voted against the decommissioning proposal at the Belfast talks today?

British and Irish governments have expressed commitment to process, to negotiated settlement. Do not see negative vote as in any way end of process but how they take it forward is up to them, to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues and the parties involved.

Q: What is Senator Mitchell's role?

Senator Mitchell is chairing the talks in Belfast.

ANGOLA
August 14, 1997

Background:
Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the peace agreement between

the government and UNITA, has been stalled for several months. UNITA blocked the extension of state administration into areas it controls and has not cooperated with the UN mediation, to which the U.S. is an official observer, and has not demobilized its army. An Angolan government delegation visited Washington last week, and State posted a press statement on Friday that called for UNITA to comply with its Lusaka commitments and also stated we may support sanctions against UNITA if it does not comply. On Monday, U/S Pickering spoke with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and told him we would support sanctions if he did not comply. Savimbi replied that he would soon present a proposal to the mediation outlining how he will fulfill his Lusaka obligations. The documents allow for the extension of state administration but give no credible numbers for its remaining forces. The Government's response has been to suggest that UN Security Council action be delayed until September 2 while extension of state administration begins next week, as a way of "testing" UNITA's credibility.

Q: What are the prospects for Lusaka Protocol compliance in Angola?

A: The U.S., as one of the observers of the Lusaka Protocol, remains concerned by the lack of progress in completing implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Although the Government's compliance has been imperfect, the present impasse is caused primarily by UNITA's non-compliance with three tasks demanded by the mediation: providing an acceptable plan for the extension of state administration into UNITA-controlled areas; accounting for its remaining armed forces; and ending propaganda on its radio station and making it a non-partisan station.

The UN Secretary General reported to the Security Council on Angola last Friday, and based on its conclusions, we and the other members of the Council are deciding what further steps may be necessary to expedite the complete

implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. This includes the possible imposition of sanctions against UNITA.

Under Secretary of State Pickering spoke last Monday with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and told him that he must comply immediately with his Lusaka Protocol obligations or the United States will support further UN Security Council sanctions against UNITA.

The Angolan parties have agreed to a plan for extension of state administration to recommence. However, UNITA has failed to present credible information on troop numbers as called for in the Lusaka Protocol and a plan for normalizing its radio station.

CYPRUS

August 15, 1997

Q: Can you give us an update on the Cyprus talks in Switzerland? Is it true that they broke up in failure?

A: We understand that the UN-sponsored talks in Montreaux concluded today. Press statements by the two Cypriot parties, as well as by the UN, are just coming in now.

We understand that the talks were useful; extended over five full days and provided an opportunity to hear out both sides' positions.

Will be following up with the parties over coming weeks to build on this dialogue.

Hope progress will continue and lead to comprehensive settlement that will establish a bizonal, bicomunal federation for Cyprus.

If asked about the early conclusion (talked slated to end August 16):

We are less concerned about dates, more focused on substance. The parties had five full days of face to face discussion. Good step in right direction.

If asked about UN accession talks for Cyprus:

The U.S. position on EU membership has not changed. We are not members and don't have a vote, however we support EU membership for both Turkey and Cyprus.

Also believe that the EU accession process provides positive incentives for concerned parties to move ahead, achieve just and viable settlement to Cyprus dispute.

SOUTH ASIA TRIP

August 18, 1997

Q: Is the President going to India? Pakistan? Bangladesh?

A: The President would like to be able to visit South Asia soon, and we are examining the possibilities for such a trip.

Currently no decision on whether and when.

AFGHANISTAN

August 18, 1997

Q: Why have we suspended operations at the Afghan embassy?

A: There has been continuing contention between Afghan factions inside the Embassy over who represents Afghanistan.

We believe that there is no effective government in the country at this time.

We had not allowed for new accreditation, and there was effectively one diplomat left standing in the office. He was the Taliban representative, and to assure

continued US neutrality towards the factions of the conflict, the US has decided to suspend operations instead of allowing one faction to represent the country here in Washington.

We believe that we must remain strictly neutral toward all the Afghan factions, and cannot be seen as favoring one over the other.

The suspension of operations will take effect on August 21st.

Q: What do we hope to accomplish?

A: We hope that this action will encourage the factions to end the fighting and form a broadly based and representative government.

Q: What about the consulate in New York?

A: The consulate in New York will remain open to continue providing useful services to the Afghan-American community. We are drawing distinctions between the service related functions of the consulate and the political functions of the Embassy.

PAKISTAN
August 18, 1997

Arrest in Murder of Consulate Employees

Q: What do you know about the reported arrest of a suspect in the 1995 murders of two American Consulate employees in Karachi?

A: A Karachi police official announced on August 15th the arrest of a suspect in the March 8, 1995 murder of two US Consulate employees, Jacqueline Van Landingham and Gary Durrell, and the wounding of a third, Mark McCloy. The suspect reportedly implicated others who took part in the killings.

The United States believes strongly that all of those involved in the brutal 1995 attack should be brought to justice. We are following this case closely and are in touch with appropriate officials in Pakistan about the arrest.

Q: Is a US "Investigating Team" involved, as Reuters reports?

A: No US "Team" was involved. However, we are following this case closely and are in touch with the appropriate officials in Pakistan.

KENYA

August 12, 1997

Q: Has violence continued in Kenya following Friday's incidents?

A: We are not aware of any clashes since then linked to Friday's violence.

There were two days of violence in one Nairobi neighborhood which appears to be linked to ethnic tensions rather than national politics.

Q: Have there been any developments associated with Friday's deaths?

A: The Police Commissioner has promised swift action against those responsible for the deaths of two police officers. Most pro-democracy opposition leaders have agreed that such action is necessary. They have complained that the government has not shown similar energy in pursuing those responsible for killing demonstrators on July 7.

Q: What is the U.S. view of Friday's violence?

A: The U.S. Government condemns the violence that marred demonstrations in Kenya on August 8. Although security forces were allowing a Nairobi rally to proceed unopposed, one police officer was brutally beaten to death, a second officer was stoned to death, and looting was widespread. The credibility of advocates of democratic reform suffers when they allow freedom of assembly to end in violence. The U.S. continues to call on all Kenyans to eschew violence and begin the peaceful, inclusive dialogue which can lead to free and fair elections.

FAST TRACK

August 8, 1997

Q: How important is Fast Track?

A: As the President has made clear, we will seek legislation from Congress to secure fast track trade negotiating authority. We believe such authority is important to help us continue the successful work of the President's first term.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods with bipartisan support. The reasons for it now are more compelling than ever.

International trade is increasingly important to our future. Over the next decade, the global economy is expected to grow at three times the rate of the U.S. economy. Over the past four years, one-quarter of our economic growth came from trade - and exports created 1.4 million new jobs. In a world where over 95% of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., we must export to sustain growth at home.

Fast track authority will permit us to continue the work of opening markets around the world through the WTO and other global institutions. For example, trade authority permitted us to secure the recent Information Technology Agreement, which will open a \$500 billion global information technology market. In 1995, 3.3 million U.S. jobs were supported by \$90 billion in exports of these products.

Without fast track authority, we risk sitting on the sidelines while other countries open markets to their products or set new trading rules contrary to U.S. interests. Since 1992, in Latin America and Asia alone, other countries have reached 20 preferential trade agreements without us. We must be active. We have nothing to fear. The U.S. is already the most competitive, the most open and most successful large economy in the world.

In the fall, we will offer a fast track proposal to Congress and seek passage in both the House and Senate.

Q: What is the purpose of the President's meeting with members of Congress?

A: The President expressed the need for fast track to ensure U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Fast Track is about expanding opportunities for U.S. exports and making sure the U.S. sets the rules and conditions for trade that are advantageous to U.S. workers and businesses. The Administration's trade agenda is focused on exactly those areas where the U.S. is most competitive -- telecommunications, technology, professional services, agriculture, biotechnology, and critical manufacturing sectors.

Q: Why does the Administration keep meeting with Members without presenting a proposal?

A: The only way to succeed in securing fast track authority is to build the broadest consensus possible before we head into the fall. It is important for Congress to have a clear understanding of why we need fast track, and the President used last week's meeting as an opportunity to do that.

Q: Why did the President meet with these particular Members?

A: Amb. Barshefsky and other members of the Administration have met with over 170 members over the last few months. The President's meeting today is part of an effort to personally address questions from those Members about trade and the need for fast track. This meeting is one of a number of meetings the President will have with Members in the coming months.

Q: What are the chances of the Administration securing fast track authority?

A: We realize this will be a divisive battle, but the more Congress understands that fast track is necessary for U.S. competitiveness in the global economy, we

believe they will support renewed fast track authority for the President. We can not afford to have the rest of the world march on by while we pass up opportunities for U.S. workers and companies.

There are three fast track related activities taking place this week at the White House:

1. President will officially nominate Jay Berman and Vicki Radd to head the Administration's fast track effort.

[Jay has had a long and distinguished career in Washington as the Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America and has been particularly active on ensuring that US intellectual property rights are protected around the world. Vicki has been an Chief of Staff to Erskine Bowles most notably coordinating the Summit of the Eight in Denver. She will be working with Jay on coordinating this priority.]

2. Erskine briefed the Cabinet on the President's commitment to fast track on Wednesday afternoon and has asked that the Cabinet be available to speak out and work on this issue in the future.

3. On Thursday, the President will meet with congressional members to talk about why fast track authority is in the national interest.

General Points:

* The President is clearly committed to securing fast track authority this fall. This will be one of the Administration's top priorities and the President and his Cabinet will work hard on articulating both to the American people and the Congress why fast track authority is vital to the nation's long term economic prosperity.

* Fast track is at the heart of the President's effort to prepare the American people for the challenges of the 21st century. A central pillar of the President's economic strategy has been aggressively creating opportunities to

advance America's job growth, productivity and overseas trade.

* And it has worked: longest sustained period of growth of all our G-7 partners (25% of which was driven by exports), 12 million new jobs, unemployment under 5%--a 25 year low and sustained low inflation.

* Securing fast track authority is critical to continue this economic expansion and maintain America's leadership position in the world.

The Administration's international trade agenda is on track and moving forward at full speed. In APEC, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and in the WTO, the United States and the Clinton Administration are setting the agenda to open markets, expand trade, and increase domestic prosperity. More than 25% of our economic growth in the past four years has been driven by export growth.

* In the last six months, the U.S. led the world to conclude trade agreements in information technology and telecommunications which covered more than \$1 trillion in global trade. We just led the developed countries of the world to conclude an historic anti-corruption agreement among the 29 developed nations in the OECD. We are moving forward in financial services talks at the WTO.

* The President was personally involved in securing the ITA agreement, working with APEC leaders last Fall to build support for this agreement. APEC has already embarked on "ITA II" to expand the reach of this agreement and will consider other sectoral trade agreements this year.

The President and the Administration are actively engaged with the Congress on the trade agenda.

* We are now working in Congress to preserve MFN trade status with China -- normal trade relations -- a critical measure to protect the economic health of Hong Kong because half of U.S.-China trade goes through Hong Kong.

* We have secured commitments from the congressional leadership to address "fast track" on an expedited basis this Fall and conclude this year. This effort will involve the President, the Vice President, and the resources of the White House.

We would like to see Congress approve "fast track" in the Fall to ensure that we can gain the best possible trade terms on a reciprocal basis for U.S. companies and workers. The trade agenda has not been held back by the absence of "fast track" negotiating authority. We are moving forward in the FTAA, within APEC, and in the WTO on a wide range of negotiations including financial services.

* Fast track is important because trade barriers in the fastest growing markets in the world are much higher than ours, and fast track will increase our leverage to bring those barriers down and open markets.

* We will work with the Congress this summer to build consensus on the scope of fast track and how to address labor and environmental issues.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

July 28, 1997

* President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

* APEC Summit in Vancouver November 24-25.

Q: Press reports have mentioned October 28 as a possible arrival date for PRC President Jiang Zemin's State visit to the U.S. What can you tell us about plans for the visit?

A: President Clinton and President Jiang earlier agreed to an exchange of state visits. Our two governments are discussing plans for President Jiang to visit the U.S. before the end of this year.

BOSNIA

August 18, 1997

Gelbard Trip

* Special Representative Gelbard is in Sarajevo today. He will attend and speak on behalf of the President at a memorial service for American diplomats Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel and Nelson Drew who perished in the cause of peace on the Mt. Igman Road.

* He also has meetings with U.S. and local officials on Dayton implementation issues. Wednesday he will travel to Vienna for a Contact Group meeting on the political situation in Republika Srpska.

Refer to State for other details.

SFOR Action in Banja Luka

* SFOR troops intervened to prevent violence between two groups of Serb police during a confrontation that occurred this weekend when police loyal to the elected government took action to investigate reports that the Constitutional Court Justice had been beaten in the police station. The IPTF is investigating the incident.

* Illegal weapons, documents and equipment was confiscated with records turned over to the IPTF and Office of the High Representative for investigation. Dragan Lukac, commander of the Banja Luka anti-terrorist unit, claimed that evidence was found that President Plavsic's telephone communications were being tapped by forces loyal to Pale from the Banja Luka police station.

* Acts of violence and intimidation will only keep the RS from

gaining assistance
and recognition of the international community. We applaud SFOR's
efforts to
control these special police forces. SFOR expects all RS police to
comply fully
with the decision to place special police under Annex 1-A control.

If asked about arrest of New Banja Luka Police Chief

* We have heard reports that the newly appointed police chief was
detained
overnight by the Pale-backed police.

* We condemn this act of intimidation directed against President
Plavsic and her
supporters.

RS Power Struggle/Constitutional Court Ruling

* The continuing attempts by the Pale radical hard-liners to challenge
the
authority of the elected president is clearly an attempt to avoid
implementing
Dayton. The reported attacks on Constitutional Court judges and the
pressure
campaign by the Pale radical hard-liners clearly invalidates the court
decision
on the RS assembly.

* We support the rights of the legitimate democratically elected
authorities to
exercise their appropriate powers. The OSCE and the High
Representative, among
other experts, have concluded that Mrs. Plavsic's dissolution of the
assembly was
legitimate and authoritative. We fully accept that judgment and the
election of
a new RS assembly.

* We note that thousands of Bosnian Serbs have taken to the streets of
different
cities in Republika Srpska in support of President Plavsic. The
Bosnian Serb
people are clearly fed up with the corruption and repression of the
Pale
leadership.

Demining (USA Today)

* The presence of over 1.8 million land mines in Bosnia remains a
serious
concern. It is a tragedy that even after the war has ended, the men,

women and
children of the region remain at risk as result of landmines

* The US has been a leading contributor to the demining effort. Our goal is and
continues to be creating an indigenous capability and organizational structure
that will survive after our direct involvement ends.

* To date the USG program has spent approximately \$12M in
developing three
regional Mine Action Centers and training several hundred deminers for
humanitarian demining.

War Criminal Pero Skopljak

* Croatian Ministry of Justice issued a statement that indicted war
criminal Pero
Skopljak has been arrested and is in custody.

* We expect the Government of Croatia to transfer Skopljak
expeditiously to the
Hague. President Tudjman recently promised to do his utmost to
ensure the
transfer of indicted war criminals to the ICTY. Cooperation on war
crimes is one
of our top issues with Croatia.

Is SFOR is planning to detain Karadzic or other indictees?

* We continue to remain deeply concerned with the presence of war
criminals in
Bosnia, including Karadzic. We remain concerned about his potential
influence --
in violation of agreements that he not be involved in political life --
and will
not be satisfied until he is brought to justice in the Hague.

* We are considering a full range of options to facilitate delivery of
war
criminals to the Hague. We continue to press the Parties to live up to
their
obligation to turn over war criminals.

* SFOR is authorized to detain war criminals encountered in the
course of its
regular duties and if the tactical situation permits. The recent SFOR
operation
to detain war criminals in Prijedor conformed to this mandate. Any
indicted war
criminal would be subject to detention in such circumstances.

(if pressed, cannot comment on possible future operations)

Corruption in Bosnia

* Corruption in Bosnia is a serious problem, particularly in Republika Srpska.

One of the reasons thousands of Bosnian Serbs are standing up to support Plavsic is that the Bosnian Serb people are fed up with the corruption and repression of the Pale hardliners.

* We have tailored our assistance efforts specifically to counter corruption in Bosnia, by making assistance contingent on behavior of the parties and with substantial accounting requirements that prevent assistance funds from being misused.

* One of our top priorities is the restructuring and retraining of police in Bosnia in accordance with democratic standards. Retraining and restructuring will help end the use of police as a tool for corruption and repression by hard-line leaders. We have already completed initial restructuring of police forces in two cantons of the Federation.

Has the policy changed on SFOR ending its mission in June 1998?

* The President has repeatedly said that the SFOR mission will end in June 1998.

* The critical question is what we do between now and then. We have to focus our energy on assisting the parties with full implementation: common institutions, refugees, economics, war criminals and police training.

* What role, if any, NATO plays, in or out of Bosnia, after June 1998 has not been decided -- let alone what role we would play.

If asked whether we absolutely ruling out United States troops in Bosnia after June 1998

* SFOR's mission should end on schedule in June 1998. US political and economic engagement will continue well beyond that.

* It is too soon to speculate as to what, if any, role there may be for NATO following the completion of SFOR's mission. Our focus is on intensifying civilian implementation across the board so that parties themselves can assume greater responsibility for their own future after SFOR's mission is completed.

Amendments for Date Certain Withdrawal from Bosnia

* President's senior advisors have recommended a veto if such a measure were to remain in the Authorization bill after the House-Senate Conference. Even though we have no plans to extend the SFOR mandate past June 1998, requiring a withdrawal from Bosnia by a date certain interferes with the President's foreign policy prerogatives and is counterproductive.

* A withdrawal by a date certain - with no regard for the situation on the ground and progress to be made on civilian implementation - would call into question our commitment to implementation of the Dayton Accords, our reliability as a NATO ally, and our commitment to peace and stability in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation would question the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

* As the President has emphasized, our focus should be on the hard work that needs to be done in the next year on civilian implementation. U.S. political and economic engagement in Bosnia will remain essential after SFOR's mission is done, and we can only succeed if the parties and the international community remain assured of U.S. leadership and commitment.

CAMBODIA

August 13, 1997

Q: Any comment on the meeting between Hun Sen and King Sihanouk in Beijing?

A: Hun Sen, Ung Huot, acting head of state Chea Sim, and other Cambodian

politicians have traveled to Beijing to meet with King Sihanouk. Our position remains that the process by which Ung Huot was selected as First Prime Minister was undemocratic. However, we welcome any dialogue between Cambodia's major players that will lead to free and fair elections in May 1998.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible abdication by King Sihanouk?

A: We would prefer not to comment on what would clearly be a significant personal and political decision for the King. However, I would note that the King is a popular figure among Cambodians, and he does have significant public influence. A decision to abdicate would obviously have major political implications for Cambodia.

Q: Any comment on ASEAN's decision in Singapore that it will no longer recognize Ranariddh as First Prime Minister? What is the U.S. position? Do we still follow ASEAN's lead?

A: Our understanding is that ASEAN members recognize states, not governments. The ASEAN foreign ministers indicated they would continue their relationship with Cambodia. Our understanding of the ASEAN foreign ministers' statement is that they did not discuss the issue of recognition of Ranariddh or Ung Huot as First Prime Minister.

We welcome the ASEAN foreign ministers' announcement that they will continue their mediating role to seek a peaceful and democratic resolution to the Cambodian political crisis. We understand that the ministers have proposed hosting a dialogue between the parties in the conflict. We fully endorse ASEAN's efforts in this regard.

We strongly support the efforts of ASEAN to mediate in an effort to restore implementation of the Paris Accords in Cambodia. We and ASEAN share the objectives of stopping the violence, maintaining the coalition

government and
ensuring the May 1998 elections are free and fair. We have been in
regular and
close contact with ASEAN regarding Cambodia's political crisis.

Q: Will the U.S. lift the suspension of aid to Cambodia?

A: On Friday, August 8, Secretary of State Albright decided to
continue the
suspension of all non-humanitarian aid indefinitely. We have
suspended all
assistance except some humanitarian and election-related projects
provided
through NGO's and USAID contractors. None of our aid will directly
benefit the
Cambodian government.

During the suspension period, we have continued the equivalent of
\$20 million in
activities. For the immediate future, we are continuing the same
programs. We
plan an in-depth program review at the end of August.

Q: Can you provide an update on Desaix Anderson's mission to the
region?

A: Yesterday, Mr. Anderson was in Singapore to meet with the
ASEAN foreign
ministers. He met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the
leader of the
ASEAN foreign minister's group that is working toward a resolution
of the
Cambodian political crisis. Mr. Anderson briefed Foreign Minister
Alatas on his
meetings in Phnom Penh with Ung Huot and others (see below).

Mr. Anderson also met with other foreign ministers and senior
officials. His
discussions focused on ASEAN's efforts to restore political stability
and ensure
free and fair elections in Cambodia in May 1998.

Over the weekend, Mr. Anderson visited Phnom Penh, where he met
with newly
installed First Prime Minister Ung Huot. His purpose was to inform
Ung Huot of
the U.S. decision to extend indefinitely the suspension of aid. He also
reaffirmed to Ung Huot the core principles that are guiding U.S.
decisions on
future assistance to Cambodia. Mr. Anderson also met with ASEAN
ambassadors,
donor country ambassadors, human rights representatives, and other

government
officials.

Q: Does this mean you recognize Ung Huot as First Prime Minister?

A: Ung Huot retains his position as Foreign Minister. As we have said, we consider the process by which he was named First Prime Minister to have been undemocratic. We have also said we are prepared to meet with him as necessary.

Q: Do you recognize Ranariddh as Prime Minister?

A: Ranariddh's status is a decision for FUNCINPEC to make. We believe that all exiled leaders, including Ranariddh should be allowed to return to participate freely in the political process.

Q: Can you comment on Secretary Albright's statements in Singapore about Pol Pot and his recent show trial by the Khmer Rouge?

A: The United States continues to attach great importance to bringing Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders to justice for their atrocities against the Cambodian people.

We regard the recent show trial of Pol Pot and three of his Generals, and Pol Pot's sentence of life under house arrest, to be a legal farce.

We are continuing actively to explore with our friends and allies in the international community, including at the United Nations, various options for bringing Pol Pot to justice before some form of international tribunal should he be delivered into the custody of responsible authorities.

Given the current confused state of affairs in Cambodia, it would be premature and imprudent to speculate publicly on what might be the best type of forum for such procedures. But no one in Cambodia should be under the illusion that our determination to pursue those options is diminished because of the Khmer Rouge show trial of Pol Pot.

Q: Does the Khmer Rouge trial of Pol Pot raise a defense of double jeopardy for Pol Pot and the three generals?

A: No. In our view the show trial clearly does not invoke the principle of double jeopardy, both because of the show trial's obvious flaws and because it has no effect whatsoever on an international prosecution of Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge leaders.

Q: Does the United States support the establishment of an international criminal court?

A: Yes. The President has long expressed his support for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court that meets our requirements for effectiveness, due process, and broad participation by countries across the globe. The United States is actively engaged in UN negotiations currently underway. We are working very hard to finalize the text of a statute for such a permanent court and moving on to a diplomatic conference.

Note to Briefer : A permanent court would not have retrospective jurisdiction, and thus could not prosecute Pol Pot for atrocities of the 1970's.

KOREA
August 19, 1997

Background

In accordance with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has maintained the freeze on its nuclear facilities and has cooperated in a join U.S.-DPRK project to store its spent nuclear fuel, now 85 percent complete. In return, KEDO is committed to provide two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea, and to deliver 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) annually until the first reactor is built.

The target date for completion of the first LWR is 2003, although we

expect some delays. South Korea and Japan will finance the majority of the multi-billion dollar LWR project, while the U.S. is responsible to raise funds for HFO. Before KEDO could break ground on the LWR project, it first needed to negotiate a long list of agreements with the DPRK, many of which -- such as those covering telecommunications and transportation access -- established precedential links with South Korea and thus required significant DPRK concessions.

The U.S. has contributed over \$55 million to KEDO for HFO and KEDO admin expenses, plus an additional \$26 million for the spent fuel project. We have requested \$30 million for KEDO for FY 1998.

Q. Why has it taken so long for KEDO to break ground?

A. Before KEDO could begin construction, it had to reach agreement with the DPRK on a light-water reactor supply agreement, as well as six protocols and a long list of technical agreements governing the terms and conditions for the project.

Many of these agreement -- such as those related to telecommunications, transportation, and use of DPRK labor -- established precedents in the DPRK's relations with South Korea and the rest of the world and thus took considerable time and effort to negotiate.

Q. What is the timetable for completion of the project?

A. KEDO's target date for completion of the first light-water reactor is 2003, although the project may experience delays.

Q. Who is funding the light-water reactor project?

A. South Korea and Japan share primary responsibility for funding the LWR project.

Q. Has the United States contributed to the reactor project?

A. No. U.S. contributions to KEDO cover a portion of the organization's

administrative expenses and heavy fuel oil costs.

Q. Has North Korea fulfilled its nuclear freeze commitments under the Agreed Framework?

A. We are satisfied with the DPRK's compliance with the nuclear freeze provisions of the agreed framework.

North Korea maintains the freeze on its nuclear program, under IAEA monitoring, and is also cooperating in a joint project with the United States to safely store its spent nuclear fuel, which would otherwise be available for reprocessing. Over 85 percent of the DPRK's spent fuel rods have already been placed under IAEA seals.

The agreed framework is structured in such a way that if the DPRK fails to fulfill its obligations under the accord, KEDO will not complete the LWR project.

Background for Four Party Preparatory Talks:

The Chinese, North Korean and South Korean delegations were led by a vice or deputy minister of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation was headed by Chuck Kartman, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The U.S. delegation had representatives from the NSC, JCS, OSD, and State Department. The U.S. delegation held bilateral consultations with South Korea and China on Monday, with the four party preparatory talks beginning Tuesday, August 5, at Columbia University. The purpose of the talks was to reach agreement on a venue, date and broad category agenda topics (1. discussion of a new, permanent peace mechanism to replace the Armistice, 2. Tension-reduction and confidence building measures).

Q: What is the status of talks in New York?

A: The Four Party preparatory meeting recessed August 7, with agreement to reconvene during the week of September 1`5 in New York to address the final issue

for decision - setting the agenda for the Four Party plenary. The four parties tentatively agreed on the timing (6 weeks after final agreement on the agenda), venue (Geneva - the Swiss have offered to provide substantial support for the talks), level of representation (Minister will meet as appropriate and available; heads of delegations will report to the Ministers and be of roughly equal rank - Deputy Minister/Assistant Secretary level) and procedural issues (U.S. will chair the first plenary; sequence of rotating chairmen will be determined by drawing lots).

Q: Did the North Koreans use the Nunn-Laney visit to send a message to the U.S. or South Korean governments? How would you characterized their discussions?

A. Following their trip to North Korea, Sen Nunn and Ambassador Laney provided both the U.S. and South Korean governments a brief overview of their discussions and observations. As their press statement released in Seoul indicates, they had frank and useful discussions with both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korean Peoples Army officials about promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We note that Sen Nunn and Ambassador Laney emphasized the value of four party talks and the need for the North to undertake economic and agricultural reforms to solve its long-term difficulties..

Q: What is your reaction to recent statements by international groups that the famine in North Korea is worsening?

A: The food shortages in North Korea inflict a horrible cost on the North Korean people who already are suffering from impoverishment. The international community has responded generously to calls for emergency humanitarian assistance, and the United States has contributed some \$50 million to the UN World Food Program appeals.

We are participating in the current WFP food appeal through the contribution of

100,000 tons of food. But the long term answer is not short-term food aid; the North's prospects for agricultural production sufficient to feed itself will only improve through structural economic and agricultural reform. That reform can be greatly assisted through the four party peace talks.

52

MORE