

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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001. email	From George Tenet to Melanie Darby and Ardenia Hawkins. Subject: [None] (1 page)	09/28/1994	P1/b(1)
002. email	Alan Kreczko to Kathleen Stephens. Subject: RE: Joe Cahill Visa. (2 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Cahill, Joseph, Joe])
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 September 94 20:04
FROM Ross, Thomas B.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT September 22 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Reed, George
Ross, Thomas B.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Spalter, Jonathan H.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY ICON below represents Tom Ross-edited press guidance for September 22.
[[SEP22GUI.DOC : 5135 in SEP22GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 22 September 94 19:53

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SEP22GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points
September 22, 1994

Foreign Policy Accomplishments

Haiti

Cuba

Ireland

North Korea

Bosnia

Rwanda/Burundi

Nigeria

Angola

Middle East

FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In the end, what matters is what we are getting done. This is the measure of leader ship. And in recent weeks, we have helped Israel and Jordan achieve a historic breakthrough; helped Russia and Estonia reach agreement allowing the withdrawal of Russian troops; led in the implementation of a tough resolution on Haiti at the Security Council; and carried out a humanitarian operation in Rwanda that should make all Americans proud. In just the last month, we have contributed to achievement of a historic cease-fire by the IRA and we have reached an agreement with Cuba to stop the outflow of migrants by sea. And all Americans are proud of our successes in Haiti helping to restore democracy.

But let me take a moment to put this in the context of my three, fundamental strategic goals:

Our first goal in the post-Cold War world has been meeting security challenges:

- Prepared a strategy for our armed forces to fight two major regional conflicts.
- Eliminating nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
- As of August 31, all Russian troops are out of Central and Eastern Europe for the first time since World War II.
- Partnership for Peace.
- Progress in efforts to ensure that the Korean peninsula is nonnuclear.
- Historic progress in the Middle East.
- Pursued and convicted terrorists; will not let them stop peace.

Our second goal has been to promote free markets and bring our international economic policies in line with our domestic goals:

- Vast new credibility by lowering our deficit at home.
- NAFTA, which will create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S.
- GATT, which we are working with Congress to pass this year.
- First summit meeting of APEC, to launch new economic initiatives on Pacific rim.

-- Lifting of export controls and promotion of expanded American trade, investments.

Our third goal has been to promote democracy, from Russia to South Africa to Chile.

-- Assisted states, such as Russia and Ukraine, in return for progress toward market reforms.

-- Leading the international community in efforts to restore democracy to Haiti.

-- Will be hosting the Summit of the Americas, first gathering in 30 years of the democratic nations of our hemisphere.

HAITI

Key Points

-- The deployment of our forces is going well.

-- The situation in Haiti will not change immediately. But things continue to improve. We will make steady progress. We will restore democracy.

-- We have strongly condemned police violence. Such conduct cannot and will not be tolerated.

-- General Shelton, our commander on the ground, has met with Haitian military and police officials and made clear our policy to them. Such contacts will continue regularly.

-- As we move toward the 15th of October, we will work to moderate the conduct of the Haitian security forces without assuming their responsibilities.

-- After the democratic government returns to power, we will help them to implement a long-term plan of police and military reform. That will include retraining people so that they can perform to their fullest capabilities in an appropriate manner for a democratic society.

-- The habits of violence will not be shed overnight. But during the coming weeks, we will work

to help stop the violence and to begin the process of reconciliation.

Points

U.S. Forces

-- The U.S. forces will establish a secure and peaceful environment. They are to work cooperatively with the Haitian army.

-- Through police monitors and trainers, they will lay the ground work for the transition of the Haitian army to a professional security and police force.

-- And they will guarantee the agreement negotiated by President Carter, Senator Nunn and General Powell.

Cedras, Biamby, Francois

-- The presence of our troops will make it far more difficult for Cedras and his associates to inflict systematic violence on the Haitian people.

-- We will not tolerate any threat to our forces -- or the peaceful transition of government -- either before or after October 15th.

-- Although we expect Cedras and the other de facto leaders to live up to their side of the agreement, trust is not a factor.

-- The presence of our troops is a guarantee of cooperation.

-- The agreement refers to UN Security Council Resolutions 917 and 940 which names Francois as well as Cedras and Biamby. So even though Francois was not a party to the negotiation the agreement applies to him.

-- The military leaders will step down by October 15 at the latest. We believe they should leave Haiti and we will work toward that end.

-- The important facts are that President Aristide is going back to Haiti and Cedras, Biamby and Francois will no longer be in control of the military or the police.

Cost

-- We estimate the cost from now until the departure of the last U.S. forces in early 1996 to be about \$500 million.

-- A firmer estimate will depend on many variables, including how fast civil order is restored and how soon the Multinational Force is replaced by a UN peacekeeping operation.

-- The estimate does not include the cost of economic reconstruction which we are sharing with other countries.

-- Because of the previous violence and turmoil, we have been spending millions to feed the Haitian people. Over the long run, the cost of the intervention will be far outweighed by savings in foreign aid.

Sanctions

-- We will deal with sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 940 and in a manner that will promote the peaceful transition of power in Haiti.

-- Specifics of the sanctions are under review. We should have a more detailed announcement soon (possibly Friday).

-- There are two categories of sanctions: U.S. unilateral and UN imposed. We are reviewing both.

-- We will not seek to lift any of the UN sanctions until the military leaders leave power. That is what the UN Resolution provides.

-- On the other hand, we will do what is necessary to support our military forces and to facilitate a

peaceful transition.

-- If that requires humanitarian or other waivers or exemptions, we will consider those possibilities.

-- We are also examining each of the U.S. unilateral sanctions to see which are appropriate to lift at this stage.

-- The people of Haiti should be better not worse off as a result of the entry of U.S. forces. We want to effect some change as quickly as possible.

Jonassaint

-- The agreement was negotiated directly with Cedras and Biamby and we hold them directly accountable for its implementation.

-- It was signed by Jonassaint because that's the format the negotiators chose.

-- By accepting Jonassaint's signature on the agreement, it does not mean we recognize his government or consider Cedras and Biamby in any way exempt from the agreement's obligations.

-- There are no differences in substance between the Carter-Jonassaint agreement and the Governor's Island Accord.

-- The presence of U.S. troops makes a big difference. Before we were not in a position to enforce the Accord. Now we are.

Aristide

-- President Aristide will return when the military leaders step down.

-- We have had extensive discussions with President Aristide on the agreement and its implementation, including deployment of the Multinational Force.

-- He has shared his concerns over some dimensions of the agreement which we

underst
and. But
he has underscored his commitment to working with us to achieve our common
goal of i
ts full
implementation.

-- And he has expressed appreciation for the presence of U.S. forces and for my
comm
itment.

-- We will continue to work closely with him throughout the transition to
democracy
and his
return to Haiti.

-- President Aristide plans to open a transition office in Haiti. We will work clos
ely with that team
and provide protection to the office as needed.

(If asked about the purported promise that the Haitian army would be disarmed
immedi
ately)

-- We discussed with the Aristide government a plan that would have been
employed ha
d there
been a non-permissive entry of the coalition force.

-- In that environment where we would not have been cooperating with the
Haitian arm
y, there
would have been a need to collect weapons from some elements.

-- There was, however, an explicit acknowledgment in that plan that we could not
and
would not
be disarming all of Haiti.

-- Because there was a permissive entry and the Haitian army is cooperating, the
ori
ginal plan has
been changed. The reasons for contemplating disarming the Haitian military --
the
threat to U.S. forces --
does not now pertain.

-- We do intend to do two things over the weeks and months ahead:

-- Disarm other elements of the society in part through a weapons buy back
program.

-- Work on a program of military and police reform and retraining, including new employment opportunities for some.

-- The makeup and constitution of the Haitian military and police will be determined under Haitian law following the return of President Aristide and the restoration of the constitutional government.

-- The Government of Haiti will retain responsibility for paying the Haitian armed forces.

CUBA

Background

U.S. and Cuban negotiators reached agreement on September 9 to end the massive outflow of Cubans. The agreement requires the Government of Cuba to take effective measures to prevent unauthorized departure of Cuban citizens. Cuba agreed that arrangements for those Cubans who have recently left and wish to return can be made through diplomatic channels. We agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cubans from Cuba under existing authorities per year, plus approximately 6,000 Cubans from the current visa waiting list.

The agreement has resulted in a halt in the outflow from Cuba and on Thursday the Coast Guard called off its special operation to pick up the rafters.

Following your announcement of a new policy on August 19, close to 30,000 Cubans were picked up at sea, and are now at Guantanamo together with approximately 14,000 Haitians.

The refugee outflow followed a demonstration on the docks in Havana, the hijacking of several ferries and a statement by Castro on August 5 that he would instruct his border guards not to

inte
rcept rafters unless the
United States stopped "the encouragement of illegal departures."

Panama has announced it will take 10,000 Cubans and we have moved 1,161 to
Panama.

Key Points

-- We will closely monitor the migration agreement with Cuba. The Cuban
government
has
implemented measures that have ended the flow.

-- The Attorney General will be using her parole authority to bring 20,000
Cubans to
the United
States each year. Specific details will be announced soon.

-- We recognize that this is an extraordinary use of the authority granted by
Congre
ss. This needs
to be seen in light of the 30-year abnormal migration relation between Cuba and
the
United States.

-- From the beginning, I was determined that the United States and not Castro
would
determine
how many and which Cubans came to the United States and that the migration be
safe a
nd orderly. We
have accomplished that objective.

Points

-- The Cubans at Guantanamo will not -- I emphasize NOT -- be allowed to enter
the U
nited
States.

-- As with Haitians, we will not screen at Guantanamo. Bona fide refugees may
apply
in Havana
for entry to the U.S. Others may apply for the new legalization program.

-- For the Cubans being detained in the U.S., we are complying with the
Immigration
and
Nationality Act and on humanitarian grounds we are beginning to parole people.

Cuban Democracy Act

-- U.S. policy towards Cuba is based the Cuban Democracy Act which was passed with bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress and with the support of President Bush and of me when I was a candidate.

-- The Act stipulates that the economic embargo will remain in place until the Cuban government takes irreversible steps toward democracy and free markets. We will soon spell out what steps toward democracy we would like to see the Cuban government take.

-- At the same time, we will be moving on the second track of the Cuban Democracy Act to increase humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people and increase the flow of information and ideas to Cuba.

President Carter

-- (If asked about reports that President Carter was involved in the Cuban negotiations) President Carter did relay a conversation he had with Castro, but I did not ask him to communicate anything back.

IRELAND

Background

The IRA released a statement on August 31 promising "the complete cessation of military operations."

Prime Ministers Reynolds of Ireland and Major of Britain both welcomed the announcement, and commended the IRA action, but Major has indicated the IRA must make clear the cease-fire is permanent.

On September 16 Major announced the lifting of the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein/IRA officials and the reopening of several border crossing points between North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

At the same time, he announced a British commitment to hold a referendum in Northern Ireland on the outcome of the political talks which may soon include Sinn Fein.

Sinn Fein officials Joe Cahill and Patrick Treanor entered the United States on temporary single entry visas on August 30 to visit several Eastern cities in order to garner support for an end to violence in Northern Ireland. Vice President Gore met with Reynolds in Shannon en route from the population conference in Cairo.

Several moderate Nationalist and Unionist leaders have been in Washington this week meeting with senior administration officials. Gerry Adams has applied for a U.S. visa waiver and hopes to travel here in the next few days.

Key Points

-- The IRA statement of a cease-fire is a watershed, offering the prospect of a permanent peace in Ireland.

-- Even in the best of circumstances, the really hard work still lies ahead.

-- But the fact that the Irish question will now be the subject of political negotiations rather than an armed struggle is an important and historic turning point.

-- I know I speak for the millions of Americans who feel special bonds of affection and kinship to Ireland and Great Britain when I say that we want to do all we can to support further progress toward peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

Points

-- Albert Reynolds and John Major have worked hard to bring the peace process

this f
ar. There
must be no turning back, by any side, from the path of dialogue and negotiation.

-- I am pleased that the United States has been able to contribute to this process,
both through our
encouragement of the Anglo-Irish process, our expanded dialogue with leaders of
Nort
hern Ireland's
constitutional parties, and our efforts to support a permanent end to violence by al
l those who had used it
for political goals.

-- As I told Irish Deputy Prime Minister Spring, we want to look at ways to help
adv
ance the
process, and to demonstrate to both communities that there is a "peace dividend,"
wi
thin the limits of our
budget.

-- We will do what we can. But the hard work, the real progress, remains to be
comp
leted by the
two governments, and in the hearts and minds of the people of Northern Ireland. I
a
m hopeful that they,
and their leaders, will follow-through on this extraordinary opportunity for peace
t
hat now exists.

-- I welcome the steps Prime Major has taken to lift the broadcasting ban on Sinn
Fe
in, to reopen
some cross-border roads, and to make clear that Unionist participation remains
cruci
al to the achievement
of a peaceful democratic settlement.

(If asked if you agree with British insistence that the IRA say explicitly the cease
-fire is permanent, or other details
about next steps in the peace process.)

-- As my statement emphasized, the end to violence must be permanent. The Irish
and
British
governments agree completely on that and as time passes, the permanency of the
cease
-fire will hopefully
become clear.

-- Regarding peace negotiations, we are all hopeful they will begin soon. The Irish and British and other parties need to work out the timing among themselves.

(If asked about reported Unionist sense of betrayal)

-- Obviously, their concerns are important to this process. There can be no progress without Unionist participation and agreement. I salute the demonstrated willingness of moderate Unionist leaders to work for peace, and want to underscore its centrality to further progress. The Vice President and Anthony Lake have been in touch with Unionist leaders, and will continue to deepen his dialogue in coming days.

-- Senior Unionist officials will be in Washington September 22-23, and will meet with Senior Administration officials.

(If asked whether Molyneaux will visit the United States)

-- In recent conversations, the Vice President and National Security Adviser Lake have underscored to Mr. Molyneaux that the Administration would welcome a visit to Washington at his convenience.

-- As Mr. Molyneaux is traveling abroad over the next few weeks, no details have been discussed.

-- We expect to stay in close touch in the weeks ahead on how best to advance the cause of peace in Northern Ireland.

(If asked about reports that the U.S. promised \$200 million in aid for Northern Ireland, and, or visas for Sinn Fein/IRA officials, in exchange for the cease-fire.)

-- We now provide some \$20 million annually to the International Fund for Ireland.

No decisions have been made on additional assistance. I have asked my staff to look at some ways in which we might assist Northern Ireland's economic and political revitalization.

(If asked about a Gerry Adams visa)

-- Gerry Adams recently applied for a U.S. visa waiver. A decision on its status will be announced imminently.

NORTH KOREA

Background

The United States and North Korea will resume talks in Geneva on Friday. Earlier this month there were talks in two locations. In Pyongyang, a working-level U.S. delegation discussed a variety of technical matters related to the possible exchange and establishment of liaison offices in conjunction with satisfactory progress on the nuclear issue. In Berlin, U.S. officials discussed technical issues related to Light Water Reactors, alternative power supplies, and disposition of the spent fuel from the recently unloaded North Korean reactor. The Pyongyang talks were businesslike; the North Koreans in Berlin argued against a South Korean role in the light water reactor project.

At the end of previous talks last month, the U.S. and DPRK issued an agreed statement identifying elements that would be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue. North Korea reaffirmed its interest in replacing its graphite-moderated reactor program with light water reactor technology. The U.S. is willing to assist in that conversion by making arrangements for financing and construction of an LWR project.

The DPRK agreed that upon receipt of U.S. assurances regarding provision of an LWR project.

project it will forego reprocessing of spent fuel, seal and allow IAEA monitoring of its reprocessing facility (the Radiochemical Laboratory), and cease construction of the two large graphite-moderated nuclear reactors it is currently building (50 MW and 200 MW). The North also agreed that as part of an overall settlement it would remain a full member of the NPT, accept implementation of IAEA safeguards, and implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

The U.S. indicated that in the context of a resolution of the nuclear issue it is prepared to establish diplomatic representation in North Korea and to reduce barriers to trade and investment.

In a speech last month ROK President Kim Young Sam offered to supply capital and technology to support North Korea's construction of light water reactors if North Korea ensures transparency of its nuclear activities. Kim has now followed up with a letter of assurance to you.

North Korean radio indicated North Korea may reject South Korea's offer and insist upon resolution of the issue with the United States alone. The North-South negotiations

have ground to a halt amid mutual recriminations across the DMZ. According to recent reports, President Kim has invited former President Carter to mediate a North-South summit.

Key Points

-- The recent talks between the U.S. and North Korea opened the door to a verifiable freeze on the most dangerous points of North Korea's nuclear program. But we have a lot of work ahead of us before resolving this issue.

-- We are working with our allies and friends to help shift the focus of North Korea's nuclear program from producing plutonium to producing electricity.

-- We believe an overall settlement requires full implementation of North Korea's NPT obligations, including full international inspections, as well as the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

-- In the long term, we would like to see a North Korea that no longer poses a regional threat and is fully integrated into the international community.

Points

Pyongyang Talks

-- We have long said that in the context of an overall settlement we would be willing to move toward normal relations with North Korea. Liaison offices would be a first step in that direction.

-- We have not decided to set up liaison offices. Rather the meetings in Pyongyang will cover only technical questions that would have to be addressed if a decision were taken in the future to open liaison offices as part of an overall settlement of the nuclear issue.

-- The timetable depends upon progress on the nuclear issue.

Kim Young Sam Speech

-- I welcome and support President Kim's initiative. Our policy has been carefully coordinated all along.

-- President Kim's offer to assist with financing and technology for a light water reactor project in North Korea strongly supports our own approach.

-- (If asked about a possible North Korean rejection of Kim's offer) We are prepared to address this question when the talks resume.

On North-South Talks

-- We continue to support the Republic of Korea's initiatives on North-South relations, and we hope there will be an early resumption of their talks

(If asked about spent fuel)

-- Under the terms of the freeze, North Korea is committed not to reprocess its spent fuel. The disposition of this fuel is an issue that must be resolved.

-- We will continue discussing this issue with the DPRK. We are prepared to take steps to reduce the environmental and safety risk posed by the continued presence of the fuel in the spent fuel pond.

President Carter

-- (If asked) President Carter has played a helpful role in the past, and if President Kim thinks he would be helpful in the future that is obviously something I would consider.

Five MW Reactor

-- The agreed statement makes clear that the five MW reactor will remain frozen between now and the resumption of talks on September 23.

-- The statement is equally clear that, while the North Koreans are prepared to freeze construction of the 50 and 200 MW reactors permanently, they have not offered to freeze operation of the existing five MW reactor permanently. As we have noted, progress was made in the recessed talks but difficult issues remain to be resolved. We will take up this issue when these talks resume this month in Geneva.

-- (If asked what if they restart) That would undermine the basis of our talks.

BOSNIA

Background

NATO warplanes responded to a Bosnian Serb attack on French UNPROFOR troops on Thursday in Sarajevo by firing on a Bosnian Serb tank located within the exclusion zone.

Milosevic has agreed to international monitoring of the border with the Bosnian Serbs. Monitors are now being deployed, after which we have agreed to provide limited sanctions relief. The Bosnian Serbs voted against the peace plan in a referendum, have stepped up attacks in Bihac, and have tightened their squeeze on Sarajevo.

Key Points

-- We continue to make progress, although prospects for early Bosnian Serb acceptance of the peace plan are not bright.

-- The Contact Group's agreement to tighten sanctions against Serbia convinced Milosevic to endorse the plan and to cut off his support for the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Once again, I call upon the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. If they continue to reject the peace, we and our partners will continue to pursue measures to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.

-- In particular, we will seek NATO action in response to renewed Bosnian heavy weapons attacks on Sarajevo and other violations of the exclusion zone.

-- If the Bosnian Serbs persist in rejecting the proposal, a decision by the UN to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable.

Points

-- Milosevic's agreement to accept international monitors to verify that the border is closed is evidence that our strategy is working. We made clear that a limited easing of some sanctions would occur only if he agreed to monitors.

-- It will take some months before Belgrade's cut off has a visible effect on the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Therefore, we will work with our partners to exert other pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.

This will include a U.N. Security Council resolution to tighten economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and, we hope, stricter enforcement of exclusion zones.

-- Bosnian Serb cut-off of vital food and utilities supplies to Sarajevo is unacceptable, and is the cause of the renewed fighting there. Continued heavy weapons attacks will provide a justification for NATO air strikes.

-- Congressional action on the arms embargo reinforces our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict and to set the stage for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject peace.

-- And as I have said before, if there is no action within a reasonable period of time, I intend to consult with the Congress on a termination of the arms embargo.

-- This process cannot be strung out indefinitely. If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the peace plan by October 15, I intend to introduce a UN Security Council resolution to end the arms embargo on Bosnia by the beginning of November.

-- Planning is underway for the redeployment of U.N. troops that would have to precede a lifting of the arms embargo.

-- (If asked about the Sarajevo airstrike) Airstrikes should come as no surprise to the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S., NATO, and the UN have long-standing rules and procedures regarding attacks on UNPROFOR and violations of exclusion zones.

-- The Bosnian Serbs' flagrant attacks on UNPROFOR and violations of the exclusion zones

nes are a
test of our common resolve and require a decisive response.

-- Let me be clear, we are prepared to respond in this manner again should
circumsta
nce require
us to do so.

-- We believe it is essential that the UN continue to cooperate with NATO in
respond
ing promptly
and decisively to further Bosnian Serb attacks and violations of the exclusion
zones

-- (If asked about a unilateral lifting of the embargo) I have repeatedly said I fav
or lifting the arms
embargo, which has unfairly penalized the victim in the conflict, but I have
serious
reservations about
lifting it unilaterally.

-- (If asked whether Russia will join in supporting an embargo lift) It is no secret
that our allies
and the Russians have strong reservations about lifting the arms embargo. They
have
, however, agreed
that it could become unavoidable as a last resort.

RWANDA/BURUNDI

Background

More than 4,000 UNAMIR troops are now deployed in Rwanda. The largest
contingents a
re from Ethiopia and
Ghana, with other African nations also providing troops. The U.S. currently has
onl
y a handful of soldiers in
Rwanda and roughly 1,000 others in Uganda and Kenya providing regional air
support.
Our relief role in Goma,
Zaire has been turned over to the U.N., non-government organizations and
commercial
contractors.

Soldiers representing Rwanda's new government moved this week into U.N.-
controlled a
reas in the southwest,

where an estimated 500,000 people are still displaced.

Negotiations in Burundi among the Hutu led interim civilian government, the Tutsi-dominated military, and other factions remain fragile. There are reports of scattered violence and terrorism, though not directed against foreign nationals.

Key Points

-- I'm proud of what we've done to address the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Working with the U.N. and private groups, our efforts have saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives.

-- I sent a Presidential Mission of 20 distinguished Americans to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire to review our relief efforts and recommend new measures to get the region back on its feet. This group, led by Congressman Donald Payne and Africare President C. Payne Lucas, also conveyed my strong desire that the local parties work toward national reconciliation.

-- We have not yet received their formal report, but I understand the group expressed appreciation for the effective relief efforts we've mounted.

Points

-- There is still much to be done. Working with the World Bank and other donors, we will help the new government in Kigali restore Rwanda's basic needs -- including water, electricity and telephones -- and establish conditions needed to draw the refugees back.

-- We also need to work with the U.N. to create a tribunal to bring to justice those who perpetrated the horrendous genocide.

-- We will insist that the governments of Zaire and others provide security in the border camps. And we will continue our efforts to ensure that neighboring Burundi resolves its

political crisis and avoids the same tragedy that has befallen Rwanda.

NIGERIA

Background

The political situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. Last week General Abacha banned newspapers and decreed that people could be detained without charges. A two-month strike in support of restoring democracy ended without success. Chief Abiola remains in prison awaiting trial on charges of treason for declaring himself the elected head of state, and his health is deteriorating.

Abacha's ability to hold power over the long term remains uncertain. The end of the strike has strengthened his hand considerably. However, in recent weeks there have been numerous reports of coups being planned by other military officers -- not necessarily democrats -- dissatisfied with General Abacha.

In addition, long-standing regional and ethnic tensions, especially with Yoruba leaders opposed to Abacha are mounting.

Key Points

-- I condemn the actions of the military leaders. The banning of newspapers and authorizing detention without trial have set back the prospect for a constructive national dialogue on the restoration of democracy.

-- The military must reverse these actions and release those who have been arrested or detained for advocating democracy, including Chief Abiola.

-- The two-month strike by oil workers in support of democratic rule appears to have ended for

now. But it is clear to us that the Nigerian people do not countenance this regime, which must resort to increasingly repressive means to keep power.

-- A stable and democratic Nigeria is important to our national interests. Instability in Nigeria could provoke large movements of refugees requiring humanitarian assistance. We also have strong commercial interests in Nigeria, including \$3.7 billion in investments, mostly in the petroleum sector.

-- We are consulting with other countries, including Britain, to see how we can work together to bring about a peaceful transition toward democracy in Nigeria.

-- (If asked): At this time, we have no plans to impose an oil embargo on Nigeria.

We are considering the potential impact of other measures. I do not want to get into specifics at this time.

ANGOLA

Background

On August 30, UNITA accepted the proposal of the U.N., the U.S., Russia and Portugal. UNITA's compromise seemed to overcome a major hurdle by allowing the Government to nominate a governor-- subject to UNITA's approval-- for the contested Huambo province where UNITA won more than 75 percent of the vote in the 1992 presidential election. UNITA's decision was in large part intended to avoid international sanctions had it rejected the mediation package outright.

It is possible that the talks in Lusaka will wrap up by the end of September. The U.N. would be asked to provide about 7,000 peacekeepers to monitor the agreement. Meanwhile, both sides continue military offensives on the ground, including government air attacks on Savimbi's headquarters in Huambo.

Key Points

-- I welcome UNITA's decision to accept the proposal of the U.N. Special Representative and the observers from the U.S., Russia, and Portugal. UNITA's willingness to compromise over government posts resolves the last critical political issue in the negotiations. I urge the parties to resolve the remaining issues in talks in Lusaka.

-- We urge both sides to suspend military attacks and preparations for military offensives. The Angolan people have suffered enormously in this civil war from famine, disease and one of the world's highest amputee rates from the scourge of landmines.

-- We will continue to work with the U.N., Russia, Portugal, regional leaders, and the international community to facilitate a settlement of this long, tragic conflict.

-- Both sides must recognize that the patience and tolerance of the international community has been worn thin. Both sides must take advantage of the opportunity for peace presented by these developments.

MIDDLE EAST

SYRIA

-- I am encouraged by the recent remarks of Syrian and Israeli leaders. They show both President Asad and Prime Minister Rabin are prepared for the hard work of achieving peace.

-- Both President Asad and Prime Minister Rabin have previously stated that 1994 should

uld be the
year of peace. And we will do our best to help them.

-- But negotiations will be challenging because we are dealing with critical issues

for both
countries. So we need to be realistic.

-- We have stated our willingness to participate in security arrangements on the Gol
an Heights as
agreed to by the parties in the context of a peace treaty. But they have not requested such participation.
We will consult fully with Congress before any such commitment of U.S. forces is made.
e.

-- In my meeting in Geneva with President Asad, I made clear that progress in our relations depended on Syrian action in key areas, including terrorism and narcotics.

JORDAN

-- Both Israel and Jordan have made clear that their conflict is ended and their mutual goal is a peace treaty. The July 25 Washington Declaration is an important milestone on the road to achieving this goal.

-- Jordan and Israel agreed in the Washington Declaration to prepare for abolition of all economic boycotts. The King has also called for lifting the boycott.

-- We believe the Government of Jordan is making a serious effort to enforce the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. We have a continuing dialogue with Jordan on this.

-- We are committed to working with Congress to help relieve Jordan's debt burden (\$700 million) through debt forgiveness. This is something the IMF and the World Bank recommend. Jordan faces real difficulties, 28% of its budget goes to debt service.

SETTLEMENTS

[Background: During the campaign you referred to settlements as "a problem" to distinguish your position from George Bush's description of them as "an obstacle to peace." No good purpose is served by making this an issue at this time when real progress is being made in the peace process and the settlers are very much on the defensive. You should duck the question.]

-- U.S. views on settlements are well-known and have not changed. The PLO and Israel have agreed that this should be left to the final status negotiations.

JERUSALEM

-- My position on Jerusalem has not changed.

-- Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that the question of Jerusalem is an issue which they will discuss directly in the context of final status negotiations. Their agreement should be respected by all parties.

-- U.S. officials do not meet with representatives of the Palestinian authority in Jerusalem.

-- The Washington Declaration acknowledges the status quo -- i.e., Jordan has an historic interest in Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites. It also suggests that Jordan's concerns will be considered in the final status negotiations. We support what the parties agree to.

PALESTINIAN STATE

-- Our position has not changed. We do not support creation of a Palestinian state. But this is an

issue to be worked out in final status negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.

ISRAEL: STRATEGIC COOPERATION

-- I am committed to Israel's security and to maintaining and enhancing its qualitative edge. I told Prime Minister Rabin when we first met that as Israel took risks for peace, the United States

ted States
would ensure that those risks were minimized. Prime Minister Rabin has moved
forwa
rd boldly.
And we have kept our promise through concrete actions.

IRAQ SANCTIONS

-- We will work hard to maintain sanctions on Iraq. Just last week the sanction
wer
e extended
for another sixty days with no change. The sanctions have been effective in
prevent
ing Saddam Hussein
from posing a direct threat to his neighbors and the stability of the Gulf region.
We see Baghdad as still
defiant and unrepentant.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 September 94 17:22
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT September 23 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Ross, Thomas B.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

The latest...

[[SEP23GUI.DOC : 4383 in SEP23GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 September 94 13:49

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SEP23GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points
September 23, 1994

Foreign Policy Accomplishments

Haiti

Cuba

Russia/Yeltsin

Ireland

North Korea

Bosnia

Rwanda/Burundi

Nigeria

Angola

Middle East

FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In the end, what matters is what we are getting done. This is the measure of leader ship. And in recent weeks, we have helped Israel and Jordan achieve a historic breakthrough; helped Russia and Estonia reach agreement allowing the withdrawal of Russian troops; led in the implementation of a tough resolution on Haiti at the Security Council; and carried out a humanitarian operation in Rwanda that should make all Americans proud. In just the last month, we have contributed to achievement of a historic cease-fire by the IRA and we have reached an agreement with Cuba to stop the outflow of migrants by sea. And all Americans are proud of our successes in Haiti helping to restore democracy.

But let me take a moment to put this in the context of my three, fundamental strategic goals:

Our first goal in the post-Cold War world has been meeting security challenges:

- Prepared a strategy for our armed forces to fight two major regional conflicts.
- Eliminating nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
- As of August 31, all Russian troops are out of Central and Eastern Europe for the first time since World War II.
- Partnership for Peace.
- Progress in efforts to ensure that the Korean peninsula is nonnuclear.
- Historic progress in the Middle East.
- Pursued and convicted terrorists; will not let them stop peace.

Our second goal has been to promote free markets and bring our international economic policies in line with our domestic goals:

- Vast new credibility by lowering our deficit at home.
- NAFTA, which will create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S.
- GATT, which we are working with Congress to pass this year.
- First summit meeting of APEC, to launch new economic initiatives on Pacific rim.
- Lifting of export controls and promotion of expanded American trade, investments.

Our third goal has been to promote democracy, from Russia to South Africa to Chile.

- Assisted states, such as Russia and Ukraine, in return for progress toward market reforms.
- Leading the international community in efforts to restore democracy to Haiti.
- Will be hosting the Summit of the Americas, first gathering in 30 years of the democratic nations of our hemisphere.

HAITI

Key Points

- The deployment of our forces is going well.
- The situation in Haiti will not change immediately. But things continue to improve. We will make steady progress. We will restore democracy.
- We have strongly condemned police violence. Such conduct cannot and will not be tolerated.
- General Shelton, our commander on the ground, has met with Haitian military and police officials and made clear our policy to them. Such contacts will continue regularly.
- As we move toward the 15th of October, we will work to moderate the conduct of the Haitian security forces without assuming their responsibilities.
- After the democratic government returns to power, we will help them to implement a long-term plan of police and military reform. That will include retraining people so that they can perform to their fullest capabilities in an appropriate manner for a democratic society.
- The habits of violence will not be shed overnight. But during the coming weeks, we will work to help stop the violence and to begin the process of reconciliation.

Points

U.S. Forces

-- The U.S. forces will establish a secure and peaceful environment. They are to work cooperatively with the Haitian army.

-- Through police monitors and trainers, they will lay the ground work for the transition of the Haitian army to a professional security and police force.

-- And they will guarantee the agreement negotiated by President Carter, Senator Nunn and General Powell.

Cedras, Biamby, Francois

-- The presence of our troops will make it far more difficult for Cedras and his associates to inflict systematic violence on the Haitian people.

-- We will not tolerate any threat to our forces -- or the peaceful transition of government -- either before or after October 15th.

-- Although we expect Cedras and the other de facto leaders to live up to their side of the agreement, trust is not a factor.

-- The presence of our troops is a guarantee of cooperation.

-- The agreement refers to UN Security Council Resolutions 917 and 940 which names Francois as well as Cedras and Biamby. So even though Francois was not a party to the negotiation the agreement applies to him.

-- The military leaders will step down by October 15 at the latest. We believe they should leave Haiti and we will work toward that end.

-- The important facts are that President Aristide is going back to Haiti and Cedras, Biamby and

Francois will no longer be in control of the military or the police.

Cost

-- We estimate the cost from now until the departure of the last U.S. forces in early 1996 to be about \$500 million.

-- A firmer estimate will depend on many variables, including how fast civic order is restored and how soon the Multinational Force is replaced by a UN peacekeeping operation.

-- The estimate does not include the cost of economic reconstruction which we are sharing with other countries.

-- Because of the previous violence and turmoil, we have been spending millions to feed the Haitian people. Over the long run, the cost of the intervention will be far outweighed by savings in foreign aid.

Sanctions

-- We will deal with sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 940 and in a manner that will promote the peaceful transition of power in Haiti.

-- Specifics of the sanctions are under review. We should have a more detailed announcement soon (possibly Friday).

-- There are two categories of sanctions: U.S. unilateral and UN imposed. We are reviewing both.

-- We will not seek to lift any of the UN sanctions until the military leaders leave power. That is what the UN Resolution provides.

-- On the other hand, we will do what is necessary to support our military forces and to facilitate a peaceful transition.

-- If that requires humanitarian or other waivers or exemptions, we will consider

th
ose
possibilities.

-- We are also examining each of the U.S. unilateral sanctions to see which are appropriate to lift at this stage.

-- The people of Haiti should be better not worse off as a result of the entry of U.S. forces. We want to effect some change as quickly as possible.

Jonassaint

-- The agreement was negotiated directly with Cedras and Biamby and we hold them directly accountable for its implementation.

-- It was signed by Jonassaint because that's the format the negotiators chose.

-- By accepting Jonassaint's signature on the agreement, it does not mean we recognize his government or consider Cedras and Biamby in any way exempt from the agreement's obligations.

-- There are no differences in substance between the Carter-Jonassaint agreement and the Governor's Island Accord.

-- The presence of U.S. troops makes a big difference. Before we were not in a position to enforce the Accord. Now we are.

Aristide

-- President Aristide will return when the military leaders step down.

-- We have had extensive discussions with President Aristide on the agreement and its implementation, including deployment of the Multinational Force.

-- He has shared his concerns over some dimensions of the agreement which we understand. But he has underscored his commitment to working with us to achieve our common

goal of i
ts full
implementation.

-- And he has expressed appreciation for the presence of U.S. forces and for my
comm
itment.

-- We will continue to work closely with him throughout the transition to
democracy
and his
return to Haiti.

-- President Aristide plans to open a transition office in Haiti. We will work clos
ely with that team
and provide protection to the office as needed.

(If asked about the purported promise that the Haitian army would be disarmed
immedi
ately)

-- We discussed with the Aristide government a plan that would have been
employed ha
d there
been a non-permissive entry of the coalition force.

-- In that environment where we would not have been cooperating with the
Haitian arm
y, there
would have been a need to collect weapons from some elements.

-- There was, however, an explicit acknowledgment in that plan that we could not
and
would not
be disarming all of Haiti.

-- Because there was a permissive entry and the Haitian army is cooperating, the
ori
ginal plan has
been changed. The reasons for contemplating disarming the Haitian military --
the
threat to U.S. forces --
does not now pertain.

-- We do intend to do two things over the weeks and months ahead:

-- Disarm other elements of the society in part through a weapons buy back
program.

-- Work on a program of military and police reform and retraining, including new

employment opportunities for some.

-- The makeup and constitution of the Haitian military and police will be determined under Haitian law following the return of President Aristide and the restoration of the constitutional government.

-- The Government of Haiti will retain responsibility for paying the Haitian armed forces.

CUBA

Background

U.S. and Cuban negotiators reached agreement on September 9 to end the massive outflow of Cubans. The agreement requires the Government of Cuba to take effective measures to prevent unauthorized departure of Cuban citizens. Cuba agreed that arrangements for those Cubans who have recently left and wish to return can be made through diplomatic channels. We agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cubans from Cuba under existing authorities per year, plus approximately 6,000 Cubans from the current visa waiting list.

The agreement has resulted in a halt in the outflow from Cuba and on Thursday the Coast Guard called off its special operation to pick up the rafters.

Following your announcement of a new policy on August 19, close to 30,000 Cubans were picked up at sea, and are now at Guantanamo together with approximately 14,000 Haitians.

The refugee outflow followed a demonstration on the docks in Havana, the hijacking of several ferries and a statement by Castro on August 5 that he would instruct his border guards not to intercept rafters unless the

United States stopped "the encouragement of illegal departures."

Panama has announced it will take 10,000 Cubans and we have moved 1,161 to Panama.

Key Points

-- We will closely monitor the migration agreement with Cuba. The Cuban government has implemented measures that have ended the flow.

-- The Attorney General will be using her parole authority to bring 20,000 Cubans to the United States each year. Specific details will be announced soon.

-- We recognize that this is an extraordinary use of the authority granted by Congress. This needs to be seen in light of the 30-year abnormal migration relation between Cuba and the United States.

-- From the beginning, I was determined that the United States and not Castro would determine how many and which Cubans came to the United States and that the migration be safe and orderly. We have accomplished that objective.

Points

-- The Cubans at Guantanamo will not -- I emphasize NOT -- be allowed to enter the United States.

-- As with Haitians, we will not screen at Guantanamo. Bona fide refugees may apply in Havana for entry to the U.S. Others may apply for the new legalization program.

-- For the Cubans being detained in the U.S., we are complying with the Immigration and Nationality Act and on humanitarian grounds we are beginning to parole people.

Cuban Democracy Act

-- U.S. policy towards Cuba is based the Cuban Democracy Act which was passed with bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress and with the support of President Bush and of me when I was a candidate.

-- The Act stipulates that the economic embargo will remain in place until the Cuban government takes irreversible steps toward democracy and free markets. We will soon spell out what steps toward democracy we would like to see the Cuban government take.

-- At the same time, we will be moving on the second track of the Cuban Democracy Act to increase humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people and increase the flow of information and ideas to Cuba.

President Carter

-- (If asked about reports that President Carter was involved in the Cuban negotiations) President Carter did relay a conversation he had with Castro, but I did not ask him to communicate anything back.

RUSSIA/YELTSIN

Key Points

-- I am looking forward to hosting President Yeltsin in Washington -- his first visit here while I've been President and our fifth meeting.

-- U.S.-Russian relations are vitally important for both countries and the world. It is my top foreign policy priority.

-- I have several objectives for our summit.

-- First, want to continue build a new partnership with Russia:

-- I strongly support Russia's economic reforms and will continue to work for international assistance. There was remarkable economic progress in Russia in 1994.

-- I will talk to President Yeltsin about how we can use our combined influence to help resolve international conflicts -- in Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East peace process.

-- We must work together to produce a safer world by reducing the number of nuclear

weapons we possess and controlling more effectively fissile materials.

-- I have some ideas to discuss with President Yeltsin to help achieve this goal.

-- Second, this summit is about the future of our relationship.

-- I want to integrate Russia and the West for peace in next century.

-- Economic integration through GATT membership and lower barriers to trade.

-- Security integration through Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace and close military relations with U.S.

-- Political integration through Russia's new role in the G-7 on global problems from Bosnia to terrorism to the environment.

-- I'm optimistic about Russia's future and our partnership.

Points

Friends and Partners

-- President Yeltsin and I agree U.S. and Russia should be partners.

-- Russia is a great and powerful country with a great future.

-- Our partnership is expressed by the remarkable accomplishments of the past 20 months:

-- The U.S. is the leading supporter of Russian reform;

-- The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission is accomplishing great things -- the international space station and new business deals in oil/gas/telecommunications.

-- The U.S. and Russia worked with Ukraine on the Trilateral Statement to rid Ukraine of nuclear weapons. We are ahead of schedule--360 warheads have been transferred from Ukraine to Russia.

-- Our new partnership is producing benefits for people of both countries and for the world.

-- I feel good about our partnership and want to strengthen it.

-- It allows us to be more hopeful about the future: for continued peace between the world's greatest powers; for peace in a united Europe; and for lower force levels on both sides.

Jackson-Vanik

-- One of the things President Yeltsin and I are determined to do is remove all aspects of the Cold War from our relationship.

-- He feels very deeply that Russia, as a democratic country, should be treated with respect in the world and relieved from restrictions put on the Soviet Union.

-- I agree with him.

-- Last year, I convinced Congress to pass a bill that removed over 60 Cold War laws from the books.

-- Just a few days ago, I advised Congress that Russia is in compliance with the Jackson-Vanik provisions by virtue of a fine record on emigration of Jewish and Christian groups.

-- Russia will no longer be subject to the annual requirement that I waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment in order to grant Most Favored Nation treatment to Russia.

-- Because of my action, we just have to advise the Congress two times per year that

Russia is still in compliance.

-- This is a very good thing and I hope in the future it will be possible for Congress to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik completely.

Haiti/Near Abroad

-- There is no link in my mind to the situation in Haiti and that in the countries bordering Russia.

-- It is a mistake to draw analogies between different regional crises around the world. Each situation is different as is our response.

-- As for Russia's neighbors, we have good relations with nearly all of them. We respect their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

-- We supported very strongly the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia.

-- We are forming a new, close relationship with Ukraine.

-- We don't accept anyone's sphere of influence in any region.

-- I am anxious to discuss with President Yeltsin how we can work together with the

CSCE to resolve the tragic war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

-- And we'll continue to cooperate to end the civil war in Georgia.

Nuclear Proliferation/Crime and Corruption

-- We are already working very effectively with the Russian government on the international problem of the proliferation of nuclear materials.

-- And FBI Director Freeh is working with Russia to promote better coordination on our mutual

fight against international crime.

-- These two problems are among the most serious we will face in the next century.

-- We are not interfering in Russia's internal affairs and certainly have no intention of doing so.

-- The great advantage of our partnership is that we can now work together to resolve these problems as equals and partners.

Arms Reductions

-- The U.S. and Russia are both committed to drawing down the levels of our nuclear forces.

-- We both want to bring START I into force and to ratify START II so that we can reduce our nuclear warheads to 3000-3500 by the turn of the century.

-- The U.S. has terminated nearly all of our nuclear modernization programs.

-- I have just made significant decisions about our nuclear forces as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review.

-- Arms reductions must occur on both sides. This is a process between equals.

-- We will meet our commitments. I am confident Russia will meet its own.

Bosnia

-- The U.S. and Russia are working much more effectively together on Bosnia than was the case when I was in Moscow last January.

-- We created the Contact Group. We now have a forum to discuss this issue together

on a daily basis.

-- We both want to achieve peace in Bosnia.

-- President Yeltsin and I agree that we must keep working together within the Contact

Group.

IRELAND

Background

The IRA released a statement on August 31 promising "the complete cessation of military operations."

Prime Ministers Reynolds of Ireland and Major of Britain both welcomed the announcement, and commended the IRA action, but Major has indicated the IRA must make clear the cease-fire is permanent.

On September 16 Major announced the lifting of the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein/IRA officials and the reopening of several border crossing points between North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

At the same time, he announced a British commitment to hold a referendum in Northern Ireland on the outcome of the political talks which may soon include Sinn Fein.

Sinn Fein officials Joe Cahill and Patrick Treanor entered the United States on temporary single entry visas on August 30 to visit several Eastern cities in order to garner support for an end to violence in Northern Ireland. Vice President Gore met with Reynolds in Shannon en route from the population conference in Cairo.

Several moderate Nationalist and Unionist leaders have been in Washington this week meeting with senior administration officials. Gerry Adams has applied for a U.S. visa waiver and hopes to travel here in the next few days.

Key Points

-- The IRA statement of a cease-fire is a watershed, offering the prospect of a

perm
anent peace in
Ireland.

-- Even in the best of circumstances, the really hard work still lies ahead.

-- But the fact that the Irish question will now be the subject of political negotiations rather than an armed struggle is an important and historic turning point.

-- I know I speak for the millions of Americans who feel special bonds of affection and kinship to Ireland and Great Britain when I say that we want to do all we can to support further progress toward peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

Points

-- Albert Reynolds and John Major have worked hard to bring the peace process this far. There must be no turning back, by any side, from the path of dialogue and negotiation.

-- I am pleased that the United States has been able to contribute to this process, both through our encouragement of the Anglo-Irish process, our expanded dialogue with leaders of Northern Ireland's constitutional parties, and our efforts to support a permanent end to violence by all those who had used it for political goals.

-- As I told Irish Deputy Prime Minister Spring, we want to look at ways to help advance the process, and to demonstrate to both communities that there is a "peace dividend," within the limits of our budget.

-- We will do what we can. But the hard work, the real progress, remains to be completed by the two governments, and in the hearts and minds of the people of Northern Ireland. I am hopeful that they, and their leaders, will follow-through on this extraordinary opportunity for peace that now exists.

-- I welcome the steps Prime Major has taken to lift the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein, to reopen some cross-border roads, and to make clear that Unionist participation remains crucial to the achievement of a peaceful democratic settlement.

(If asked if you agree with British insistence that the IRA say explicitly the cease-fire is permanent, or other details about next steps in the peace process.)

-- As my statement emphasized, the end to violence must be permanent. The Irish and British governments agree completely on that and as time passes, the permanency of the cease-fire will hopefully become clear.

-- Regarding peace negotiations, we are all hopeful they will begin soon. The Irish and British and other parties need to work out the timing among themselves.

(If asked about reported Unionist sense of betrayal)

-- Obviously, their concerns are important to this process. There can be no progress without Unionist participation and agreement. I salute the demonstrated willingness of moderate Unionist leaders to work for peace, and want to underscore its centrality to further progress. The Vice President and Anthony Lake have been in touch with Unionist leaders, and will continue to deepen his dialogue in coming days.

-- Senior Unionist officials will be in Washington September 22-23, and will meet with Senior Administration officials.

(If asked whether Molyneaux will visit the United States)

-- In recent conversations, the Vice President and National Security Adviser Lake have

underscored to Mr. Molyneaux that the Administration would welcome a visit to Washington at his convenience.

-- As Mr. Molyneaux is traveling abroad over the next few weeks, no details have been discussed.

-- We expect to stay in close touch in the weeks ahead on how best to advance the cause of peace in Northern Ireland.

(If asked about reports that the U.S. promised \$200 million in aid for Northern Ireland and, or visas for Sinn Fein/IRA officials, in exchange for the cease-fire.)

-- We now provide some \$20 million annually to the International Fund for Ireland. No decisions have been made on additional assistance. I have asked my staff to look at some ways in which we might assist Northern Ireland's economic and political revitalization.

(If asked about a Gerry Adams visa)

-- Gerry Adams recently applied for a U.S. visa waiver. A decision on its status will be announced imminently.

NORTH KOREA

Background

The United States and North Korea will resume talks in Geneva on Friday. Earlier this month there were talks in two locations. In Pyongyang, a working-level U.S. delegation discussed a variety of technical matters related to the possible exchange and establishment of liaison offices in conjunction with satellite factory progress on the nuclear issue. In Berlin, U.S. officials discussed technical issues related to Light Water Reactors, alternative power

supplies, and disposition of the spent fuel from the recently unloaded North Korean reactor. The Pyongyang talks were businesslike; the North Koreans in Berlin argued against a South Korean role in the light water reactor project.

At the end of previous talks last month, the U.S. and DPRK issued an agreed statement identifying elements that would be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue. North Korea reaffirmed its interest in replacing its graphite-moderated reactor program with light water reactor technology. The U.S. is willing to assist in that conversion by making arrangements for financing and construction of an LWR project.

The DPRK agreed that upon receipt of U.S. assurances regarding provision of an LWR project it will forego reprocessing of spent fuel, seal and allow IAEA monitoring of its reprocessing facility (the Radiochemical Laboratory), and cease construction of the two large graphite-moderated nuclear reactors it is currently building (50 MW and 200 MW). The North also agreed that as part of an overall settlement it would remain a full member of the NPT, accept implementation of IAEA safeguards, and implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

The U.S. indicated that in the context of a resolution of the nuclear issue it is prepared to establish diplomatic representation in North Korea and to reduce barriers to trade and investment.

In a speech last month ROK President Kim Young Sam offered to supply capital and technology to support North Korea's construction of light water reactors if North Korea ensures transparency of its nuclear activities. Kim has now followed up with a letter of assurance to you.

North Korean radio indicated North Korea may reject South Korea's offer and insist upon resolution of the issue with the United States alone. The North-South negotiations

have ground to a
halt amid mutual recriminations across the DMZ. According to recent reports,
Presid
ent Kim has
invited former President Carter to mediate a North-South summit.

Key Points

-- The recent talks between the U.S. and North Korea opened the door to a
verifiable
freeze on the
most dangerous points of North Korea's nuclear program. But we have a lot of
work a
head of us before
resolving this issue.

-- We are working with our allies and friends to help shift the focus of North
Korea
's nuclear
program from producing plutonium to producing electricity.

-- We believe an overall settlement requires full implementation of North Korea's
N
PT obligations,
including full international inspections, as well as the North-South
Denuclearizatio
n Declaration.

-- In the long term, we would like to see a North Korea that no longer poses a
regio
nal threat and
is fully integrated into the international community.

Points

Pyongyang Talks

-- We have long said that in the context of an overall settlement we would be
willin
g to
move toward normal relations with North Korea. Liaison offices would be a first
st
ep in
that direction.

-- We have not decided to set up liaison offices. Rather the meetings in
Pyongyang
will
cover only technical questions that would have to be addressed if a decision were
t
aken

in the future to open liaison offices as part of an overall settlement of the nuclear issue.

-- The timetable depends upon progress on the nuclear issue.

Kim Young Sam Speech

-- I welcome and support President Kim's initiative. Our policy has been carefully coordinated all along.

-- President Kim's offer to assist with financing and technology for a light water reactor project in North Korea strongly supports our own approach.

-- (If asked about a possible North Korean rejection of Kim's offer) We are prepared to address this question when the talks resume.

On North-South Talks

-- We continue to support the Republic of Korea's initiatives on North-South relations, and we hope there will be an early resumption of their talks

(If asked about spent fuel)

-- Under the terms of the freeze, North Korea is committed not to reprocess its spent fuel. The disposition of this fuel is an issue that must be resolved.

-- We will continue discussing this issue with the DPRK. We are prepared to take steps to reduce the environmental and safety risk posed by the continued presence of the fuel in the spent fuel pond.

President Carter

-- (If asked) President Carter has played a helpful role in the past, and if President Kim thinks he would be helpful in the future that is obviously something I would consider.

Five MW Reactor

-- The agreed statement makes clear that the five MW reactor will remain frozen between

een now
and the resumption of talks on September 23.

-- The statement is equally clear that, while the North Koreans are prepared to free
ze construction
of the 50 and 200 MW reactors permanently, they have not offered to freeze
operation
s of the existing
five MW reactor permanently. As we have noted, progress was made in the
recessed ta
lks but difficult
issues remain to be resolved. We will take up this issue when these talks resume
th
is month in Geneva.

-- (If asked what if they restart) That would undermine the basis of our talks.

BOSNIA

Background

NATO warplanes responded to a Bosnian Serb attack on French UNPROFOR
troops on Thurs
day in Sarajevo by
firing on a Bosnian Serb tank located within the exclusion zone.

Milosevic has agreed to international monitoring of the border with the Bosnian
Serb
s. Monitors are now being
deployed, after which we have agreed to provide limited sanctions relief. The
Bosni
an Serbs voted against the
peace plan in a referendum, have stepped up attacks in Bihac, and have tightened
the
ir squeeze on Sarajevo.

Key Points

-- We continue to make progress, although prospects for early Bosnian Serb
acceptanc
e of the
peace plan are not bright.

-- The Contact Group's agreement to tighten sanctions against Serbia convinced
Milos
evic to
endorse the plan and to cut off his support for the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Once again, I call upon the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. If they cont

inue to reject
the peace, we and our partners will continue to pursue measures to increase the
pres
sure on the Bosnian
Serbs.

-- In particular, we will seek NATO action in response to renewed Bosnian heavy
weap
ons
attacks on Sarajevo and other violations of the exclusion zone.

-- If the Bosnian Serbs persist in rejecting the proposal, a decision by the UN to l
ift the arms
embargo could become unavoidable.

Points

-- Milosevic's agreement to accept international monitors to verify that the border
is closed is evidence that our strategy is working. We made clear that a limited e
asing of some sanctions would occur only if he agreed to monitors.

-- It will take some months before Belgrade's cut off has a visible effect on the Bo
snian Serbs.

-- Therefore, we will work with our partners to exert other pressure on the
Bosnian
Serbs.
This will include a U.N. Security Council resolution to tighten economic
sanctions
on the
Bosnian Serbs and, we hope, stricter enforcement of exclusion zones.

-- Bosnian Serb cut-off of vital food and utilities supplies to Sarajevo is unaccept
able, and is
the cause of the renewed fighting there. Continued heavy weapons attacks will
prov
ide a
justification for NATO air strikes.

-- Congressional action on the arms embargo reinforces our efforts to achieve a
nego
tiated
settlement to the conflict and to set the stage for a multilateral lifting of the ar
ms embargo if the Bosnia
Serbs continue to reject peace.

-- And as I have said before, if there is no action within a reasonable period of ti
me, I intend to
consult with the Congress on a termination of the arms embargo.

-- This process cannot be strung out indefinitely. If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the peace plan by October 15, I intend to introduce a UN Security Council resolution to end the arms embargo on Bosnia by the beginning of November.

-- Planning is underway for the redeployment of U.N. troops that would have to precede a lifting of the arms embargo.

-- (If asked about the Sarajevo airstrike) Airstrikes should come as no surprise to the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S., NATO, and the UN have long-standing rules and procedures regarding attacks on UNPROFOR and violations of exclusion zones.

-- The Bosnian Serbs' flagrant attacks on UNPROFOR and violations of the exclusion zones are a test of our common resolve and require a decisive response.

-- Let me be clear, we are prepared to respond in this manner again should circumstances require us to do so.

-- We believe it is essential that the UN continue to cooperate with NATO in responding promptly and decisively to further Bosnian Serb attacks and violations of the exclusion zones.

-- (If asked about a unilateral lifting of the embargo) I have repeatedly said I favor lifting the arms embargo, which has unfairly penalized the victim in the conflict, but I have serious reservations about lifting it unilaterally.

-- (If asked whether Russia will join in supporting an embargo lift) It is no secret that our allies and the Russians have strong reservations about lifting the arms embargo. They have, however, agreed that it could become unavoidable as a last resort.

RWANDA/BURUNDI

Background

More than 4,000 UNAMIR troops are now deployed in Rwanda. The largest contingents are from Ethiopia and Ghana, with other African nations also providing troops. The U.S. currently has only a handful of soldiers in Rwanda and roughly 1,000 others in Uganda and Kenya providing regional air support. Our relief role in Goma, Zaire has been turned over to the U.N., non-government organizations and commercial contractors.

Soldiers representing Rwanda's new government moved this week into U.N.-controlled areas in the southwest, where an estimated 500,000 people are still displaced.

Negotiations in Burundi among the Hutu led interim civilian government, the Tutsi-dominated military, and other factions remain fragile. There are reports of scattered violence and terrorism, though not directed against foreign nationals.

Key Points

-- I'm proud of what we've done to address the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Working with the U.N. and private groups, our efforts have saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives.

-- I sent a Presidential Mission of 20 distinguished Americans to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire to review our relief efforts and recommend new measures to get the region back on its feet. This group, led by Congressman Donald Payne and Africare President C. Payne Lucas, also conveyed my strong desire that the local parties work toward national reconciliation.

-- We have not yet received their formal report, but I understand the group expressed

d appreciation
for the effective relief efforts we've mounted.

Points

-- There is still much to be done. Working with the World Bank and other donors, we will help the new government in Kigali restore Rwanda's basic needs -- including water, electricity and telephones -- and establish conditions needed to draw the refugees back.

-- We also need to work with the U.N. to create a tribunal to bring to justice those who perpetrated the horrendous genocide.

-- We will insist that the governments of Zaire and others provide security in the border camps. And we will continue our efforts to ensure that neighboring Burundi resolves its political crisis and avoids the same tragedy that has befallen Rwanda.

NIGERIA

Background

The political situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. Last week General Abacha banned newspapers and decreed that people could be detained without charges. A two-month strike in support of restoring democracy ended without success. Chief Abiola remains in prison awaiting trial on charges of treason for declaring himself the elected head of state, and his health is deteriorating.

Abacha's ability to hold power over the long term remains uncertain. The end of the strike has strengthened his hand considerably. However, in recent weeks there have been numerous reports of coups being planned by other military officers -- not necessarily democrats -- dissatisfied with General Abacha.

In addition, long-standing regional and ethnic tensions, especially with Yoruba leaders opposed to Abacha

are m
ounting.

Key Points

-- I condemn the actions of the military leaders. The banning of newspapers and
dec
rees
authorizing detention without trial have set back the prospect for a constructive
na
tional dialogue on
the restoration of democracy.

-- The military must reverse these actions and release those who have been
arrested
or detained
for advocating democracy, including Chief Abiola.

-- The two-month strike by oil workers in support of democratic rule appears to
have
ended for
now. But it is clear to us that the Nigerian people do not countenance this regime,
which must resort to
increasingly repressive means to keep power.

-- A stable and democratic Nigeria is important to our national interests. Instabil
ity in Nigeria
could provoke large movements of refugees requiring humanitarian assistance.
We als
o have strong
commercial interests in Nigeria, including \$3.7 billion in investments, mostly in
th
e petroleum sector.

-- We are consulting with other countries, including Britain, to see how we can
work
together to
bring about a peaceful transition toward democracy in Nigeria.

-- (If asked): At this time, we have no plans to impose an oil embargo on Nigeria.

We are
considering the potential impact of other measures. I do not want to get into speci
fics at this time.

ANGOLA

Background

On August 30, UNITA accepted the proposal of the U.N., the U.S., Russia and Portugal. UNITA's compromise seemed to overcome a major hurdle by allowing the Government to nominate a governor-- subject to UNITA's approval-- for the contested Huambo province where UNITA won more than 75 percent of the vote in the 1992 presidential election. UNITA's decision was in large part intended to avoid international sanctions had it rejected the mediation package outright.

It is possible that the talks in Lusaka will wrap up by the end of September. The U.N. would be asked to provide about 7,000 peacekeepers to monitor the agreement. Meanwhile, both sides continue military offensives on the ground, including government air attacks on Savimbi's headquarters in Huambo.

Key Points

-- I welcome UNITA's decision to accept the proposal of the U.N. Special Representative and the observers from the U.S., Russia, and Portugal. UNITA's willingness to compromise over government posts resolves the last critical political issue in the negotiations. I urge the parties to resolve the remaining issues in talks in Lusaka.

-- We urge both sides to suspend military attacks and preparations for military offensives. The Angolan people have suffered enormously in this civil war from famine, disease and one of the world's highest amputee rates from the scourge of landmines.

-- We will continue to work with the U.N., Russia, Portugal, regional leaders, and the international community to facilitate a settlement of this long, tragic conflict.

-- Both sides must recognize that the patience and tolerance of the international community has been worn thin. Both sides must take advantage of the opportunity for peace present

ed by these
developments.

MIDDLE EAST

SYRIA

-- I am encouraged by the recent remarks of Syrian and Israeli leaders. They show both President Asad and Prime Minister Rabin are prepared for the hard work of achieving peace.

-- Both President Asad and Prime Minister Rabin have previously stated that 1994 should be the year of peace. And we will do our best to help them.

-- But negotiations will be challenging because we are dealing with critical issues for both countries. So we need to be realistic.

-- We have stated our willingness to participate in security arrangements on the Golan Heights as agreed to by the parties in the context of a peace treaty. But they have not requested such participation. We will consult fully with Congress before any such commitment of U.S. forces is made.

-- In my meeting in Geneva with President Asad, I made clear that progress in our relations depended on Syrian action in key areas, including terrorism and narcotics.

JORDAN

-- Both Israel and Jordan have made clear that their conflict is ended and their mutual goal is a peace treaty. The July 25 Washington Declaration is an important milestone on the road to achieving this goal.

-- Jordan and Israel agreed in the Washington Declaration to prepare for abolition of all economic boycotts. The King has also called for lifting the boycott.

-- We believe the Government of Jordan is making a serious effort to enforce the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. We have a continuing dialogue with Jordan on this.

-- We are committed to working with Congress to help relieve Jordan's debt burden (\$700 million) through debt forgiveness. This is something the IMF and the World Bank recommend. Jordan faces real difficulties, 28% of its budget goes to debt service.

SETTLEMENTS

[Background: During the campaign you referred to settlements as "a problem" to distinguish your position from George Bush's description of them as "an obstacle to peace." No good purpose is served by making this an issue at this time when real progress is being made in the peace process and the settlers are very much on the defensive. You should duck the question.]

-- U.S. views on settlements are well-known and have not changed. The PLO and Israel have agreed that this should be left to the final status negotiations.

JERUSALEM

-- My position on Jerusalem has not changed.

-- Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that the question of Jerusalem is an issue which they will discuss directly in the context of final status negotiations. Their agreement should be respected by all parties.

-- U.S. officials do not meet with representatives of the Palestinian authority in Jerusalem.

-- The Washington Declaration acknowledges the status quo -- i.e., Jordan has an

toric interest
in Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites. It also suggests that Jordan's concerns will be considered in the final
status negotiations. We support what the parties agree to.

PALESTINIAN STATE

-- Our position has not changed. We do not support creation of a Palestinian state. But this is an

issue to be worked out in final status negotiations between Palestinians and Israeli
s.

ISRAEL: STRATEGIC COOPERATION

-- I am committed to Israel's security and to maintaining and enhancing its
qualitat
ive edge. I told
Prime Minister Rabin when we first met that as Israel took risks for peace, the Uni
ted States
would ensure that those risks were minimized. Prime Minister Rabin has moved
forwa
rd boldly.
And we have kept our promise through concrete actions.

IRAQ SANCTIONS

-- We will work hard to maintain sanctions on Iraq. Just last week the sanction
wer
e extended
for another sixty days with no change. The sanctions have been effective in
prevent
ing Saddam Hussein
from posing a direct threat to his neighbors and the stability of the Gulf region.
We see Baghdad as still
defiant and unrepentant.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From George Tenet to Melanie Darby and Ardenia Hawkins. Subject: [None] (1 page)	09/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Cahill, Joseph, Joe])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/22/1994-12/05/1994]

2024-0172-F
vz6385

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Alan Kreczko to Kathleen Stephens. Subject: RE: Joe Cahill Visa. (2 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Cahill, Joseph, Joe])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/22/1994-12/05/1994]

2024-0172-F
vz6385

RESTRICTION CODES

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 05 December 94 14:22

FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT Request for concurrence [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]TO Kreczko, Alan J.
Spalter, Jonathan H.CARBON_COPY Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

Kathy would appreciate your comments/concurrence on the attached package ASP. It is for Mr. Lake's meeting with Gerry Adams tomorrow afternoon.

[[9630AL.DOC : 3649 in 9630AL.DOC]][[9630PR.DOC : 3650 in 9630PR.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

5 December 94 14:5

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

9630AL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
9630
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 5, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry
Adams, December 6, 1994, 4:00pm

Your meeting with Adams is the centerpiece of his third trip to the
U.S. this year. The meeting will attract considerable press

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2024
7024-0172-F

attention in the UK and Ireland. Adams will push hard on fundraising, and will be looking to get maximum press spin and leverage from the meeting as Sinn Fein enters talks with the British December 9.

Adams will probably make a formal presentation and leave a written statement. He will present the issue of fundraising in the context of the need for Sinn Fein to be accorded "equality of esteem" with other political parties. He has already asked to be allowed to fundraise at the end of January.

Adams will also complain about Sinn Fein's treatment at John Major's December 13-14 Investment Forum in Belfast. Although elected city councilors from Belfast and Derry (including several Sinn Fein members) have been invited to a portion of the conference, they are not included in the dinner Major is hosting. Adams might suggest that Ron Brown not go to the conference, but is more likely to push for a meeting here with him, if it has not been arranged already.

You should urge Adams to approach talks with the British in a positive way and not to take opening positions which shut down opportunities for gradual progress. On the key issue of disarming, you should encourage Adams to consider taking some confidence-building measures, such as the IRA turning in a portion of its explosives and missiles, which could have a dramatic effect on both sides of the Atlantic in demonstrating Sinn Fein's commitment to democratic processes.

Talking Points

Peace Process:

- Recognize and appreciate the decisive role you have played in bringing about the IRA cease-fire. Encouraged by the progress made since it was declared August 31.

- Hope cease-fire will lead to an irreversible end to violence by all parties, not only across the sectarian divide, but also within the communities themselves.

- We support the Downing Street Declaration and the principles it includes and the process it sets forward.

- President Clinton has welcomed the British decision to open talks with Sinn Fein this week.

- Details of negotiations are for Irish and British

governments, you and the other parties to work out. Issue of weapons, particularly of offensive explosives, will need to be addressed in order for Sinn Fein and its loyalist counterparts to be credible partners in the political dialogue.

-- Hope Sinn Fein will approach these talks in a positive way. Important that neither side take opening positions which foreclose options down the road.

-- Recognize your need to be mindful of the need to keep the republican movement united, and that some hardliners are suspicious that Sinn Fein/IRA may give up too much for too little in return. For this precise reason, as well as to maintain the credibility and momentum of the whole effort for peace, important to keep moving forward.

-- Important to build confidence on all sides. Turning in the most dangerous and offensive of the IRA's arsenal -- its explosives and its missiles -- would go far in building confidence and creating the conditions Sinn Fein needs to move forward politically. Would also serve Sinn Fein well here among those who still fear a return to terrorist acts is possible.

-- How do you see the talks process playing out?

-- What effect do the political changes in Dublin have on this process?

Future Visas/Fundraising Issues:

-- On visas our flexibility is limited by U.S. law. Anyone who has been placed on the list of persons we have reason to believe have engaged in terrorist activities will always need a visa, which will always require a waiver from the Attorney General.

-- Lifting the restriction on your fundraising in the U.S. is difficult for us because there is credible evidence that IRA weapons procurement activities in the United States have not stopped.

- Realize you may be unaware of or unable to stop all that goes on in the U.S. in the name of the IRA or Sinn Fein. But feel you can take the step of making clear through all the lines of communication available to you that this activity must stop. We will take note of such steps.

-- Some concerns about fundraising events Joe Cahill (senior IRA figure who has made two trips since August) was

involved in. Understand he or other Sinn Fein and IRA figures may be considering participating in fundraising events to commemorate NORAIID's 25th anniversary.

-- On purely political grounds, this sort of activity would send the wrong message. Whatever NORAIID stands for now, it is associated in the U.S. with raising money for the IRA. Important for you and Sinn Fein to be firmly distanced from that now.

Belfast Investment Forum

-- Important to get new investment and new jobs into Northern Ireland to help solidify cease-fire and wean Northern Ireland from its dependence on the public sector.

-- This is area where all sides would appear to share common view and common goal.

-- Pleased that Sinn Fein elected local councilors to be included in Forum. Important gesture on part of British.

Concurrences by: Jonathan Spalter and Alan Kreczko

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft press announcement at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Draft press announcement

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

5 December 94 14:10

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

9630PR.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

NORTHERN IRELAND: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MEETS WITH SINN FEIN LEADER

National Security Advisor Anthony Lake met with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams December 6 at the White House. Mr. Lake underscored the

strong interest of the American people and of the Administration in supporting peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. He expressed appreciation for the role Mr. Adams has played in working for an end to violence there. Mr. Lake urged Mr. Adams to continue to look for ways to build confidence and to move the political process forward.

Mr. Lake and Mr. Adams discussed ways in which the U.S. can continue to support the peace process, including through implementing and expanding the set of U.S. economic initiatives announced November 1. Mr. Lake affirmed U.S. support for the Downing Street Declaration of December 15, 1993, and indicated that he hoped to keep in touch with Mr. Adams and other political leaders from Northern Ireland as the talks process between and among the parties continues and deepens.

#

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 05 December 94 17:50
FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Gerry ADams memo [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Darby, Melanie B.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2024
2024-0172-F

Here is the memo you requested. Jonathan Spalter has cleared on the press release. Alan has a few questions on the Lake memo. Kathy will call him as soon as she gets back.

[[9630AL.DOC : 4403 in 9630AL.DOC]][[9630PR.DOC : 4404 in 9630PR.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 5 December 94 14:5

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 9630AL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
9630
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 5, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry
Adams, December 6, 1994, 4:00pm

Your meeting with Adams is the centerpiece of his third trip to the U.S. this year. The meeting will attract considerable press

attention in the UK and Ireland. Adams will push hard on fundraising, and will be looking to get maximum press spin and leverage from the meeting as Sinn Fein enters talks with the British December 9.

Adams will probably make a formal presentation and leave a written statement. He will present the issue of fundraising in the context of the need for Sinn Fein to be accorded "equality of esteem" with other political parties. He has already asked to be allowed to fundraise at the end of January.

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- President Clinton has welcomed the British decision to open talks with Sinn Fein this week.
- Details of negotiations are for Irish and British

governments, you and the other parties to work out. Issue of weapons, particularly of offensive explosives, will need to be addressed in order for Sinn Fein and its loyalist counterparts to be credible partners in the political dialogue.

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-- Pleased that Sinn Fein elected local councilors to be included in Forum. Important gesture on part of British.

Concurrences by: Jonathan Spalter and Alan Kreczko

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft press announcement at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Draft press announcement

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

5 December 94 16:57

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

9630PR.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

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strong interest of the American people and of the Administration in supporting peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. He expressed appreciation for the role Mr. Adams has played in working for an end to violence there. Mr. Lake urged Mr. Adams to continue to look for ways to build confidence in the political process and to move it forward.

Mr. Lake and Mr. Adams also discussed ways in which the U.S. can continue to support the peace process, including through the implementation and expansion of the U.S. economic initiatives announced November 1. Mr. Lake affirmed U.S. support for the Downing Street Declaration of December 15, 1993, and indicated that he hoped to keep in touch with Mr. Adams and other political leaders from Northern Ireland as the dialogue between and among the parties develops and deepens.

###