

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Saunders, Richard; From: Bolan, Christopher; Re: Fw: Kosovo Key Developments Update (3 pages)	04/30/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	To: Bobbitt, Philip, et al; From: Gobush, Matthew; Re: Kosovo Comms Meeting Docs [partial] (1 page)	05/12/1999	P3/b(3), b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Havel, Meeting, NATO])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/15/1999 - 05/12/1999]

2017-0413-F

sb2288

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/15/99 7:51:13 PM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Kosovo Timeline [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schulte, Gregory L.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Greg - Here's the latest, reflecting Lindsey Huff's spadework and input from Dave as well. A few thoughts from Dave:
Need to infuse points with strategic thinking (e.g. February 1999 decisions on negotiating strategy prior to Rambouillet); perhaps flesh out October 1998 and January 1999 events a bit more. Does that help? Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Kosovo Timeline.doc
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOSOVO CRISIS

FEBRUARY 1998**Key Events**

- * MUP move into Drenica area; four MUP and 16 Albanians killed

Presidential Involvement

- *

MARCH 1998**Key Events**

- * More clashes in Drenica; Albanian protests
- * 3/9,25 CG Ministers demand withdrawal of forces
- * 3/31 UNSCR 1160 endorses CG demands and bans arms to FRY

Presidential Involvement

- * Directs freeze on FRY assets in US
- * With Secretary General Annan, condemns violence and blames

Serbian government

- * One PC meeting

APRIL 1998

Key Events

- * CG minus Russia agree new sanctions on FRY

Presidential Involvement

- * 4/14 Dispatches delegation led by Talbott to European capitals
- * One PC meeting

MAY 1998

Key Events

*

Presidential Involvement

- * Phones Prodi to discuss follow-up to CG meeting in Rome
- * Dispatches Holbrooke and Gelbard to Belgrade and Kosovo
- * 5/29 Meets with Rugova to support negotiations toward a political settlement
- * 5/13 In remarks to people of Germany, encourages greater engagement in the Balkans

JUNE 1998

Key Events

- * 6/16 Yeltsin-Milosevic meeting in Moscow

Presidential Involvement

- * 6/10 Issues Executive Order imposing additional sanctions on Serbia
- * 6/11 Announces the U.S., in concert with the EU, will impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and Serbia
- * 6/15 Phones Yeltsin to urge him to press full CG requirements on Milosevic
- * Four PC meetings

JULY 1998

Key Events

- * 7/8 CG Ministers agree principles for interim settlement
- * 7/16 MUP disperse Kosovar Albanian parliament

Presidential Involvement

- * 7/8 Phones Kohl to discuss two-track approach for Kosovo (diplomacy, NATO)

military planning)

- * One PC meeting

AUGUST 1998

Key Events

*

Presidential Involvement

- * 8/6 Phones Blair to press for NATO to plan air strikes
- * 8/7 Phones Kohl to press for NATO to plan air strikes
- * 8/8 Phones Chirac to press for NATO to plan air strikes
- * One PC meeting; two DC meetings

SEPTEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * 9/23 UNSCR 1199 demands ceasefire, withdrawal of forces
- * 9/24 NATO issues ultimatum

Presidential Involvement

- * 9/1-2 Discusses with Yeltsin at Moscow summit
- * 9/9 Directs drawdown of \$20 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
- * 9/13 Phones Chirac to press for NATO ultimatum
- * 9/16 Discusses Kosovo with President Vaclav Havel
- * 9/17 Submits report to Congress on Partnership for Peace
- * 9/18 Briefed on Kosovo in preparation for UNGA trip
- * 9/24 Final agreement to ultimatum
- * Two PC meetings; three DC meetings

OCTOBER 1998

Key Events

- * Holbrooke to Belgrade and Kosovo
- * FRY forces launch major attacks throughout Kosovo
- * 10/13 NATO issues activation order for air strikes
- * OSCE/NATO verification agreements; Serb forces withdraw
- * UNSCR 1203 endorsing agreements and demanding compliance

Presidential Involvement

- * Dispatches Holbrooke to Belgrade
- * 10/2 Phones Chirac to press for NATO ACTORD
- * 10/5 Phones Yeltsin to discuss results of Ivanov mission to Belgrade
- * 10/6 Phones Blair on NATO ACTORD
- * 10/7 Meets with FPT to discuss diplomatic strategy and NATO planning
- * 10/8 Decides the US will give NATO authority to carry out military strikes if Milosevic continues to defy

- * 10/9 Meets with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
- * 10/13 Outlines conditions for Milosevic to follow in address on South Lawn
- * 10/14 Meets with Holbrooke for report on Belgrade mission
- * 10/27 Emphasizes deployment of international force to Kosovo
- * Four PC meetings; 28 DC meetings

NOVEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * Additional MUP deploy into Kosovo

Presidential Involvement

- * Seven DC meetings

DECEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * NATO begins to deploy XFOR to Macedonia

Presidential Involvement

- * Dispatches Holbrooke to Belgrade to warn Milosevic on Macedonia, compliance
- * Four DC meetings

JANUARY 1999

Key Events

- * KVM reaches 1600 personnel
- * Violence escalates; KLA captures, releases VJ soldiers
- * 1/15 Racak massacre
- * 1/18 Belgrade orders KVM Director Walker to depart
- * NATO increases readiness of forces
- * 1/29 CG Ministers set deadline for political settlement

Presidential Involvement

- * 1/21 Phones Blair to discuss response to Racak
- * 1/25 Makes Presidential Determination that up to \$25 million will be made available to the US Emergency Refugee and Migration

Assistance Fund

- * 1/27 Meets FPT to decide response to Racak
- * Six PC meetings; eight DC meetings

FEBRUARY 1999

Key Events

- * 2/6 Rambouillet talks begin
- * 2/14 CG Ministers extend talks

Presidential Involvement

- * 2/1 Meets FPT to agree strategy for Rambouillet
- * 2/4 Phones Blair to discuss strategy, UK views on need for NATO-led ground force to help implement a settlement
- * 2/11 Meets with FPT
- * 2/13 Phones Congressional leadership on Rambouillet, possibility of U.S. contribution to NATO-led force
- * 2/19 Writes to Sen. Lott
- * 2/19 Discusses Kosovo with Chirac
- * 2/23 Meets with Congressional leaders to discuss Rambouillet and possible U.S. contribution
- * 2/25 Sends message to Yeltsin
- * 16 DC meetings

MARCH 1999

Key Events

- * 3/15 Talks resume in Paris
- * 3/18 Kosovar Albanians sign Rambouillet accord in Paris
- * 3/22 Holbrooke mission to Belgrade
- * 3/24 NATO air strikes commence

Presidential Involvement

- * 3/19 Meets with FPT
- * 3/19 Meets with Members of Congress
- * 3/20 Meets with FPT to discuss military options
- * 3/21 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder on Holbrooke mission
- * 3/23 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder to discuss next steps after Holbrooke mission
- * 3/23 Meets with Members of Congress
- * 3/24 Phones Congressional leadership
- * 3/25 Phones Solana and Clark to discuss first day of air strikes
- * 3/27 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema to urge moving to Phase II of air strikes
- * 3/29 Phones Blair, Schroeder to urge a further widening of air strikes
- * Seven PC meetings; 13 DC meetings

APRIL 1999

Key Events

- * 4/5 NAC Foreign Ministers set out NATO's conditions

Presidential Involvement

- * 4/3 Phones Gligorov to discuss refugee situation
- * 4/5 Announces commitment of additional \$50 million
- * 4/14 Meets FPT to discuss ongoing operations, humanitarian relief and diplomatic strategy
- * 4/14 Phones Blair to discuss intensification of air strikes
- * Three PC meetings; four DC meetings

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/15/99 11:27:53 PM

FROM Schulte, Gregory L.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOSOVO
CRISIS [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Moretz, Sheila K.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.

Tarver, J. Sean
Unrue, Michael

CARBON_COPY

Hurley, C. Michael
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Leavy, David C.
Gobush, Matthew N.

TEXT_BODY

WHSR - Pls send to SRB with driver in morning. Thanks

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

PRESIDENT CLINTON.doc
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE KOSOVO
CRISIS

FEBRUARY 1998

Key Events

- * MUP move into Drenica area; four MUP and 16 Albanians killed

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Key Events

- * More clashes in Drenica; Albanian protests
- * 3/9,25 CG Ministers demand withdrawal of forces
- * 3/31 UNSCR 1160 endorses CG demands and bans arms to FRY

Presidential Involvement

- * With Secretary General Annan, condemns violence and blames Serbian government
- * One PC meeting

APRIL 1998

Key Events

- * CG minus Russia agree new sanctions on FRY

Presidential Involvement

- * 4/14 Dispatches delegation led by Talbott to European capitals
- * One PC meeting

MAY 1998

Key Events

- * Increased diplomatic activity toward political settlement

Presidential Involvement

- * Phones Prodi to discuss follow-up to CG meeting in Rome
- * Dispatches Holbrooke and Gelbard to Belgrade and Kosovo
- * 5/29 Meets with Rugova to support negotiations toward a political settlement
- * 5/13 In remarks to people of Germany, encourages greater engagement in the Balkans

JUNE 1998

Key Events

- * 6/16 Yeltsin-Milosevic meeting in Moscow
- * Increased fighting

Presidential Involvement

- * 6/10 Issues Executive Order imposing additional sanctions on Serbia
- * 6/11 Announces the U.S., in concert with the EU, will impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and Serbia
- * 6/15 Phones Yeltsin to urge him to press full CG requirements on Milosevic
- * Four PC meetings

JULY 1998

Key Events

- * 7/8 CG Ministers agree principles for interim settlement
- * 7/16 MUP disperse Kosovar Albanian parliament
- * One PC meeting

Presidential Involvement

- * 7/8 Phones Kohl to discuss two-track approach for Kosovo (diplomacy, NATO military planning)

AUGUST 1998

Key Events

- * One PC meeting; two DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 8/6 Phones Blair to press for NATO to plan air strikes
- * 8/7 Phones Kohl to press for NATO to plan air strikes
- * 8/8 Phones Chirac to press for NATO to plan air strikes

SEPTEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * 9/23 UNSCR 1199 demands ceasefire, withdrawal of forces
- * 9/24 NATO issues ACTWARN to begin generating forces
- * Two PC meetings; three DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 9/1-2 Discusses with Yeltsin at Moscow summit
- * 9/9 Directs drawdown of \$20 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
- * 9/13 Phones Chirac to press for NATO ultimatum
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- * 9/24 Final agreement to ultimatum

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- * OSCE/NATO verification agreements; Serb forces withdraw
- * UNSCR 1203 endorsing agreements and demanding compliance
- * Four PC meetings; 28 DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * Dispatches Holbrooke to Belgrade
- * 10/2 Phones Blair, Chirac to press for NATO ACTORD
- * 10/5 Phones Yeltsin to discuss results of Ivanov mission to Belgrade
- * 10/6 Phones Blair on NATO ACTORD
- * 10/7 Meets with FPT to discuss diplomatic strategy and whether to request

NATO to issue ACTORD

- * 10/8 Decides the US will give NATO authority to carry out military strikes if Milosevic continues to defy
- * 10/8 Phones Chirac to discuss Holbrooke's meetings
- * 10/8 Phones Kohl to discuss Holbrooke's meetings and German decision-making during transition
- * 10/9 Meets with Schroeder
- * 10/13 Outlines conditions for Milosevic to follow in address on South Lawn
- * 10/14 Meets with Holbrooke for report on Belgrade mission
- * 10/26 Phones D'Alema to discuss pressure on Milosevic

- * 10/27 Emphasizes deployment of international force to Kosov

NOVEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * Additional MUP deploy into Kosovo
- * Seven DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 11/22 Discussed FRY compliance and NATO extraction force with Solana at White House

DECEMBER 1998

Key Events

- * NATO begins to deploy XFOR to Macedonia
- * Four DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * Dispatches Holbrooke to Belgrade to warn Milosevic on Macedonia, compliance

JANUARY 1999

Key Events

- * KVM reaches 1600 personnel
- * Violence escalates; KLA captures, releases VJ soldiers
- * 1/15 Racak massacre
- * 1/18 Belgrade orders KVM Director Walker to depart
- * NATO increases readiness of forces
- * 1/29 CG Ministers set deadline for political settlement
- * Six PC meetings; eight DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 1/21 Phones Blair to discuss response to Racak, i.e. NATO ultimatum designed to achieve "status quo plus"
- * 1/25 Makes Presidential Determination that up to \$25 million will be made available to the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
- * 1/27 Meets FPT to discuss post-Racak strategy and allied calls for a NATO-led implementation force

FEBRUARY 1999

Key Events

- * 2/6 Rambouillet talks begin
- * 2/14 CG Ministers extend talks
- * 16 DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 2/1 Meets FPT to discuss whether US should contribute to a NATO-led implementation force
- * 2/4 Phones Blair to discuss strategy, UK views on need for NATO-led ground force to help implement a settlement
- * 2/7 Meets FPT to discuss whether to agree to NATO ACTORD and to consider associated risks
- * 2/11 Meets with FPT to review NATO planning, U.S. costs and KFOR exit strategy
- * 2/13 Phones Congressional leadership on Rambouillet, possibility of U.S. contribution to NATO-led force
- * 2/19 Phones Blair to discuss planning for air strikes
- * 2/19 Discusses Kosovo with Chirac at White House
- * 2/23 Meets with Congressional leaders to discuss Rambouillet and possible U.S. contribution to KFOR
- * 2/25 Sends message to Yeltsin
- * Requests Senator Dole to travel to region to engage Kosovar Albanians

MARCH 1999

Key Events

- * 3/15 Talks resume in Paris
- * 3/18 Kosovar Albanians sign Rambouillet accord in Paris
- * 3/22 Holbrooke mission to Belgrade
- * 3/24 NATO air strikes commence
- * Seven PC meetings; 13 DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 3/4 Phones Blair to discuss message to Milosevic
- * 3/5 Discusses Kosovo with D'Alema at White House
- * 3/14 Phones Blair to discuss pressing Milosevic
- * 3/19 Meets with FPT to review strategy and NATO planning for air

operations

with Paris talks deadlocked and FRY massing forces

- * 3/19 Meets with Members of Congress

- * 3/20 Meets with FPT to review NATO planning for air operations

- * 3/21 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder on Holbrooke mission

- * 3/23 Receives military briefing on updated planning for air

operations

- * 3/23 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder to discuss next steps after

Holbrooke

mission

- * 3/23 Remarks on Kosovo at Omni Shoreham Hotel

- * 3/23 Meets with Members of Congress

- * 3/24 Oval Office speech to nation on air strikes

- * 3/24 Phones Congressional leadership to inform on air strikes

- * 3/25 Receives military briefing on air strikes

- * 3/25 Phones Solana and Clark to discuss first day of air strikes

- * 3/26 Receives military briefing on air strikes

- * 3/27 Phones Blair, Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema to urge moving to

Phase II of

air strikes

- * 3/29 Phones Blair, Schroeder to urge a further widening of air

strikes

- * 3/30 Phones Blair on intensifying air strikes

APRIL 1999

Key Events

- * 4/5 NAC Foreign Ministers set out NATO's conditions

- * Three PC meetings; four DC meetings

Presidential Involvement

- * 4/1 Phones Blair, Schroeder on streamlining NATO targeting process

- * 4/1 Remarks on Kosovo at Hampton Roads

- * 4/3 Phones Blair, Chirac, Aznar, Chretien to discuss air strikes and humanitarian relief

- * 4/3 Phones Gligorov to discuss refugee situation

- * 4/4 Radio address on Kosovo

- * 4/5 Announces commitment of additional \$50 million

- * 4/5 Phones Blair to discuss refugee relief and the need for NATO to improve

its public information

- * 4/7 Speaks on Kosovo at Mayflower Hotel

- * 4/10 Phones Blair to discuss increasing economic pressure on FRY

- * 4/13 Meets with Cabinet to discuss Kosovo

- * 4/13 Statement on Kosovo in Rose Garden

- * 4/14 Meets FPT to discuss ongoing operations, humanitarian relief and

diplomatic strategy

- * 4/14 Phones Blair twice to discuss intensifying air strikes
- * 4/15 Speech on Kosovo in San Francisco

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/99 6:07:22 PM
FROM Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: (NATO Summit) Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, The International Trade Center, Washington, DC [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kaufman, Stuart J.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

pls comb SRB stmts -- his riff on oil embargo and UNSCR are worth integrating into your guidance

-----Original Message-----

From: Gray,
Wendy E.
Sent: Friday, April 23, 1999 6:03 PM
To: @PRESS - Public
Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Cc: @NATO; @NSA - Natl Security
Advisor; @KOSOVO
Subject: (NATO Summit) Press Briefing by National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger, The International Trade Center, Washington,
DC [UNCLASSIFIED]

Press Briefing
(NATO Summit) Press Briefing
by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, The International Trade
Center, Washington, DC

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Berger Briefing 4-23-99.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 23, 1999

PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER

The International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.

4:40 P.M. EDT

MR. LOCKHART: -- Sandy Berger, who will give you a sense of the President's day and what we've gotten done today. And we'll take your questions. If there are other questions from the White House press corps on domestic questions, I'll be glad to take them afterwards. Thanks.

MR. BERGER: Thank you, Joey. Thank you very much.

Let me try to give you a sense of today's meeting on Kosovo, on particulars, seeing how the meeting was, I believe, televised and available to you. It was quite an extraordinary session, let me say. If there was one refrain that was heard again and again and again, it was this: This Alliance stands solidly behind the air campaign. It will intensify that campaign and it will prevail. And virtually every leader said that in one form or another.

I would note that we have seen evidence of the intensification this week as NATO

planes attacked a number of high-value national targets that go to the heart of Milosevic's command and control. As you heard earlier from General Clark, the effort was designed to strike at his ruling party headquarters, electrical sites, Serb propaganda elements, command and control locations, and more troops in the field. And what the leaders were saying today was, more, not less; stronger, not weaker.

Those attacks are and will be designed to underscore the determination to continue to extract a higher and higher price from Milosevic, from his intransigence, until he reaches the point where he decides to cut his losses.

Today's session also accomplished a number of other important goals, at least from our perspective, including total allied unity on reaffirming NATO's unconditional demands to Milosevic in order to end the air campaign. Several leaders indicated that we could not, should not, reduce those conditions, even as there were diplomatic efforts to try to get him to accept them.

Second, intensifying economic sanctions to continue to tighten the pressure on Milosevic and on his ability -- on his war machine. As you know, the EU has already placed an embargo on oil. At least several other states not members of EU spoke about individual steps that they intended to take, and the leaders directed the defense ministers to develop a program for -- get the exact language here -- the defense ministers to determine how NATO can halt the delivery of war material, including launching maritime operations.

And a number of leaders spoke about the importance of interdicting the oil that is going to Serbia, the resupply. Several spoke about the unacceptability of our pilots flying in and taking out oil refineries, flying in and taking out storage facilities, if that oil can be resupplied, and that we had to bring a stop to that -- through embargo, but also through interdiction efforts.

The defense ministers have been charged to operationalize that -- a word I hate -- to develop an operational plan for that, taking into account the consequences on Montenegro. Obviously, no one seeks to destabilize the situation in Montenegro any more than it is already in danger.

There is a very strong statement in the communique, I think the strongest we've

made at this point, on NATO's response to any attempt by Mr. Milosevic to widen the war by threatening the frontline states. Specifically, NATO will respond to such challenges by Belgrade to its neighbors, resulting from the presence of NATO forces or their activities on their territories during the crisis -- a strong statement of willingness to respond if Milosevic acts against the frontline states.

A commitment to continued cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal. A number of leaders spoke of the need and importance of continuing to work with Russia in its effort to find a diplomatic resolution of this which is consistent with the conditions that they have set forth. The effort of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin does not appear to meet that test, at least as of now. But we're encouraged that he is making that effort and that Russia apparently has indicated that it would participate in some kind of an implementation force. These are steps forward, but obviously, the ultimate criteria here is whether the objectives -- that is, getting the Serb troops out, getting the Kosovar people back, having an international security presence that can protect the Kosovars -- whether those criteria are met.

The day obviously was also noteworthy because of the inclusion into the Alliance of three former adversaries -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I'll try not to, obviously, quote other leaders, but I thought President Havel was particularly moving when he said -- I think maybe 10 years ago he had been the person who had declared the end of the Warsaw Pact on behalf of all of the nations in the Warsaw Pact. And for him personally to be participating now in this critical NATO meeting was a very moving and important experience for him.

We have much to do tomorrow in terms of continuing the work of adaptation of NATO that we've been working on for about five years. I suspect there will be more conversations about Kosovo at dinner, as well. But I was very pleased with and heartened by the tone of the meeting today. It was extraordinarily determined. As I say, the almost universal chorus was, we're going to continue the air campaign, we're going to intensify the air campaign, and we're going to win. And there was no dissenting opinion from that that was expressed.

Q -- the NATO diplomatic initiative. When will NATO take this planned resolution to the Security Council, and what do you think the chances are that

Russia will not veto it?

MR. BERGER: Well, notice what -- I think the key phrase here is, this could follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution. So this outlines one scenario, where once Belgrade has accepted the conditions, a force would be constituted -- NATO at its core, but perhaps, hopefully, including Russia, including other partnership countries; and as was the case in Bosnia, that that force would be then endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. But it was important to us in this paragraph that that not be a requirement.

Obviously, no one would have a veto on that, but it would be -- I think it would be the ideal scenario. And as I said, that is what happened in Bosnia -- where once Dayton took place, we took it to the U.N., endorsed the agreement and endorsed the force that would give it, obviously, its greatest strength.

Q Why was the naval blockade rejected to enforce an oil embargo? And do you believe that an oil embargo can be enforced without a naval blockage?

MR. BERGER: Well, first of all, the premise of your question is wrong. What this says is that defense ministers -- we have directed our defense ministers to determine ways that NATO can contribute to halting the delivery of war material, including by launching maritime operations, taking into account possible consequences on Montenegro. So the defense ministers basically have a mandate now to develop an interdiction system -- call it what you want -- that will stop oil. And what is the particular legal and military and architectural design of that is not something the leaders are going to try to entertain.

But there was -- your question is upside-down -- there was a specific endorsement of stopping the oil not only through an embargo, which means I'm not going to sell, myself, or the EEU is not going to sell, in stopping the oil on the seas -- again, there are a lot of legal and technical and military issues involved in putting together a regime, which the defense ministers have been asked to do.

Q The Russians, the Russian diplomatic initiative, have both included the fact that the NATO attacks must stop, and then other things. You are continuing to have your government contact with the Russian government. How come the Russian

government keeps putting that option up, knowing it's going to be shot down by NATO?

MR. BERGER: Well, it's obviously not acceptable to us. We would expect there to be a verifiable beginning of implementation before we would engage in any kind of pause or any kind of suspension. That is an area where we, at this point, may not see eye to eye with the Russians.

There are others. We believe that there has to be an international security presence, for all the reasons that you're all familiar with and I've talked to you about before.

Now, I think, again, we haven't seen much from -- Mr. Chernomyrdin has indicated that he's got activities in Moscow over the weekend and we may know more about this on Monday. But there's some indication that the Russians have said they are prepared to participate. Well, that would be a step forward -- even that would be a step forward. It would not be sufficient, obviously, but it would be, I think, useful. It would be an acknowledgement on their part that there needed to be an international military presence. But on the question of our stopping bombing, it could not be on the basis simply of a promise.

Q What kind of contact have the allies had with Chernomyrdin? Is there any chance he'll be coming here to the summit? And have you been able to clear up discrepancies over how he describes President Milosevic's willingness to accept international presence and what the Serbs are saying about that?

MR. BERGER: He's definitely not coming here, as far as I understand it from our embassy in Moscow. He has -- I think both -- Foreign Minister Ivanov is not back to Moscow. I think he wants to -- he's indicated he wants to -- Ivanov -- he wants to consult with him, and there are some party activities that he's engaged in in his own party over the weekend. So he indicated, or his people indicated to us that he had no intention of coming here.

I suspect that over the next few days, that we'll have more contact and we'll get more detail. I think that -- I'm not sure that the Russians are asserting that this is a sufficient basis on which this can end. It certainly doesn't look like that from our perspective, but we encourage them to continue.

Q Yesterday, the President was asked if he could envision sending an international security force into Kosovo without Milosevic's approval. And he said, of course, there are scenarios under which that could occur. Does that mean that the U.S. would consider sending ground troops into a semi-permissive environment?

MR. BERGER: No, it illustrates what happens when you answer hypothetical questions. The President also said that our policy hasn't changed, and he also said that there's a permissive environment and there's a non-permissive environment. There's a lot of other terminology that is being used; I've looked all those words up in the dictionary, I don't find them. And I think any two of you would define them differently.

Our position remains the same. Number one, we are committed to this air war. Number two, we believe it can and will succeed. Number three, I'm more convinced of this today, now, than I was four hours ago by virtue of the meeting that I just sat through, because I've seen 19 leaders who have made it very clear that they will succeed.

We will participate in a multinational force with NATO at its core if that is part of an agreement or if there is acceptance by Milosevic of such a force. But we do not favor participation under other circumstances.

Q You say if there's acceptance, then you are definitely saying that he has to agree, he has to come to some kind of agreement. You say if he accepts it.

MR. BERGER: Yes, accepts or acquiesces.

Q And does that have to be in writing? What form would that --

MR. BERGER: Oh, come on. We're not -- nor am I going to answer how he has to spell his name. These are hypothetical questions. Right now, what we've got to do is keep focused on the air war and on prosecuting it vigorously, and on intensifying it in a serious way over the coming days and weeks, as you have seen over the past week.

I think we've made quite clear what our position is in terms of ground forces. We don't favor them in a non-permissive situation. And that's as far as I'm going to go.

Q Sandy, on paragraph six you stressed the word "could," but the paragraph also says, "we will seek a U.N. resolution." Is NATO going to seek a U.N. resolution? Will the United States support that? If so, why, after months of refusing to go that course, would you do it? And why shouldn't Milosevic take heart that this is the beginning of UNPROFOR II?

MR. BERGER: Where do you see --

Q Mine says, "this could follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution" --

MR. BERGER: Which we will seek.

Q -- which we will seek.

MR. BERGER: Yes. That doesn't mean that if we don't get it, we won't go ahead.

Q Right.

MR. BERGER: Let me try to be clear about this. We're now talking about a situation in which we have vindicated what we're fighting for; that is, essentially, the right of a people to return to their homeland from which they've been driven by force, and the right of them to live there with security and protection. He's accepted perhaps not my formulation, but he's accepted that.

We would then -- NATO has said and we have said -- we've been prepared to participate in an implementation force. We would seek the U.N.'s approval and I think we would have a reasonably good chance of getting it under those circumstances. I mean, you can envision a situation in which Russia has been part of bringing this about, or Russia participating in this force, therefore, the prospect of a veto being eliminated.

But we're not going to be subordinated to a U.N. veto, or let the U.N. block us going forward because one country on the Security Council doesn't want to go forward -- one country with a veto. So, there was another part of your question.

Q Is this the beginning of UNPROFOR II -- a U.N. protection force?

MR. BERGER: No. I mean, we've had UNPROFOR I, and we weren't part of it, but it's quite enough. We would not -- the reason why we have said that if we were to participate in a force we believe NATO ought to be at its core, although there could be other elements of it, is because we believe, or the United States, that there has to be an effective force, and we have to have confidence if we're going to put American soldiers in that force, that there is a command and control competence and integrity that we have in NATO, and that we believe we could trust.

We would not go into a situation which, even permissive, would be not without risks unless our own people -- this is something we owe to our own people and to the American people -- our own forces were in a coherent, workable, effective force. And that is not my recollection of UNPROFOR.

Q If I could ask you a question about another matter. Two days ago, CIA Director Tenet briefed congressional leaders about alleged Chinese spying, and yesterday a couple of those congressional leaders talked with the President about their own investigation. I wonder if the administration is now prepared to concede that there are indications of Chinese spying during the Clinton administration and that there may be indications that it occurred at some of the national labs, and if you're willing to talk to us about what the administration is doing about it or has done about it.

MR. BERGER: Well, I'm not going to be able to answer your questions fully because of ongoing investigations and ongoing security matters. We do believe that there has been a problem at the national lab -- a security problem at the national labs. That is why in 1998 the President signed a presidential directive ordering a set of reforms in the way counterintelligence and security was handled at the labs.

Moreover, the President has asked his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,

chaired by Senator Roy Rudman to look at this matter generally with respect to the labs and to see whether or not everything is being done, everything was done in an appropriate way, and whether more could be done.

Two days ago, the President, when we were briefed from the agency, based upon their damage assessment coming out of the Cox Commission, the President asked his National Counter-Intelligence Advisory Board to look more broadly at vulnerabilities that may exist beyond the labs in the way in which nuclear weapons information is handled in the government, and to report back to him on any further steps they are taking.

And so this is something that we take very seriously. I think we've acted very responsibly, and we'll take further actions. We've adopted almost all of the recommendations, for example, of the Cox Commission.

Q -- define a permissive environment. And he specifically left out the idea that Milosevic would have to permit the forces in. What he said was that Serb forces would not be presenting any resistance, and that the implementation force would be able to do its job with the least hindrance. And he later said -- specifically left out the idea of permission. I know you're saying that this is a hypothetical situation --

MR. BERGER: I can only speak for American policy. And I don't believe that NATO has spoken formally on this, but in any case, we have indicated that we would participate in a force in a permissive environment. A permissive environment would be one in which the government in Belgrade either would accept its presence or acquiesce to its presence. And that's pretty straight forward.

Q Can you clarify on the oil shipments -- NATO has decided that it wants to prevent ships, tankers, boats from delivering petroleum products to ports that will make it into Yugoslavia. That now it's up to the defense ministers to figure out how that will be stopped? And, second, have Bulgaria and Romania signed on to stopping petroleum shipments over land -- that's the whole eastern side of Yugoslavia -- and if they don't agree, then how can you stop those shipments?

MR. BERGER: What NATO has decided is, NATO has asked its defense ministers to

determine how NATO can halt the delivery -- I'm paraphrasing a little bit -- of war material, so that suggests, through any means, including by launching maritime operations, taking into account possible consequences on Montenegro. I think the defense ministers here have a rather broad mandate to determine ways in which we can limit resupply of war material, and that clearly is intended to include oil, to Serbia. But as I say, there are a myriad of legal and military and political and logistical questions that have to be looked at to determine what is feasible.

Q -- weapons, will they be actually allowed to use a force of arms if they decide that's appropriate?

MR. BERGER: It's certainly not ruled out.

Q Secretary Albright spent some time Wednesday in front of Congress saying that President Clinton would be talking about the long-term future of the Balkan Peninsula. She mentioned the possibility of the common currency among the countries in that region, perhaps a customs union, stronger economic and political ties.

First of all, can you tell us, did this come up today? And, secondly, can you tell us more specifically what kind of an arrangement you foresee politically for those countries on the Balkan Peninsula, long-term?

MR. BERGER: I would imagine this will be discussed more specifically on Sunday, when first the NATO leaders meet with the frontline states and then later they meet at 42, with the partners, the APC.

The President has spoken in broad terms in San Francisco about the need for the kind of economic and political structures in Southeast Europe -- integrative structures, stabilizing structures, to be built over a long period of time -- that have brought stability and peace to the other parts of Europe.

I think this is a -- the EU has spoken to this in the last few weeks, and I think this will be a theme, increasingly, over the next two days. I don't know that any fully elaborated plan will evolve, but what I hope would evolve would be the impetus from the leaders to begin now to look at what this region can look

like two years from now, four years from now, after this conflict is over.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:06 P.M. EDT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/99 8:05:15 AM
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: statements for today [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Silva, Mary Ann T.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY please print

-----Original Message-----
From: Malinowski, Tomasz
P.
Sent: Friday, April 23, 1999 7:57 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security
Advisor
Cc: @KOSOVO; @NATO
Subject: statements for today [UNCLASSIFIED]

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Commemorative Speech1.doc
President William Jefferson Clinton
NATO Commemorative Speech
April 23, 1999

Secretary-General Solana, my fellow leaders of NATO. Welcome to the Washington Summit.
We meet to consider NATO's past, its present and its future.

In his acceptance speech for the 1949 Nobel Prize, the American novelist William Faulkner acknowledged the fear of nuclear holocaust that gripped the world at the time, but declared that humanity "will not merely endure, [it] will prevail."
That same year, twelve nations pledged here to unite the strength of their peoples so this faith could be vindicated in fact.

Among them were North Americans, victorious in war, yet haunted by

the memory
that they had not awakened in time to prevent the rise of evil across
the
Atlantic. Among them were Europeans, their future in doubt, yet each
determined
not merely to rebuild, but to build a new and better Europe on the
ruins of the
old.

They were idealists who believed the future could be made better than
the past.
They were also realists, who understood that only by being ready to
fight, if
necessary, for their security and freedom, could they preserve their
security
and freedom. In that enduring truth, NATO was born.

In this Auditorium, the French Foreign Minister Robert Shuman said
that NATO's
fundamental aim was not to help us win a war that would leave
Europe ravaged and
depopulated. He foresaw it would allow us to "avoid such a war by
becoming,
together, strong enough to safeguard the peace." He was right. No
member of
NATO has ever had to fire a shot in anger to defend an ally from
attack.

America's Secretary of State Dean Acheson said NATO would "free
the minds of men
in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them
to work and
plan with confidence in the future." He was right, too. NATO bought
time for
the Marshall Plan. It encouraged allies to pool their military and
economic
strength, instead of pitting it against their neighbors.

Canada's Lester Pearson predicted that the NATO pact's achievements
would "extend
beyond the time of emergency which gave it birth, or the geographical
area which
it now includes." He was also right. NATO gave hope to West
Germany and
confidence to Greece and Turkey. Ultimately, and remarkably, it
helped free the
entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War. The greatest military
alliance
in history won a victory not of arms but of values.

Yesterday, Europe was divided by an arbitrary line; on one side were free people living in fear of aggression; on the other were people who wanted to be free, living in a struggle with tyranny. Today, thanks in no small part to NATO, most of Europe is free and at peace. A battlefield of ideologies has been transformed into a marketplace of ideas. Three new democracies, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, whose descent into darkness helped spark NATO's creation, have joined us, pledged to defend what was long denied them. President Goncz, President Havel, President Kwasniewski, welcome to NATO. Welcome home to the community of freedom

It is a moment 50 years in coming. But it is more than that. For the first time in history, the great powers of Europe and North America do not view one another as adversaries. For the first time, the smaller powers are secure enough to shape their own destiny. For the first time in history, we have a chance to build a Europe truly undivided, peaceful and free.

But our vision far from assured. There is still a danger that new democracies will falter. There is the danger of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of terror. Human nature being what it is, there will always be a possibility of renewed threats to our existence. In fact, the surest way to guarantee such a threat will arise is to assume it will not.

And of course, there is not just the danger but the reality of ethnic conflict and brutality in southeastern Europe, the gaping hole in the edifice of an integrated Europe. Let us be clear about what we have been facing in the actions of Slobodan Milosevic, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia, now in Kosovo: It is the marriage of ancient hatred and modern totalitarianism. It is a leader who teaches people to love a piece of land while utterly dismissing the value of

those who live on it. The result has been violence without limits,
except the
limits we impose from outside.

Today, we remember what the creators of NATO knew, that evil
unopposed leads only
to greater evil. We remember that it takes but one nation to start a war.
But
it takes many to stop a war and build peace in its place. That is what
NATO is
for. That is what NATO is doing in Kosovo.

What we need in Europe in the final year of the 20th century is not the
triumph
of hatred, repression, and propaganda. What we need is the triumph of
tolerance.

What we need is not more children torn from their parents' arms and
people
driven from their land, more human beings singled out for destruction
because of
their ethnicity or religion. What we need is not more disintegration,
but more
integration. We need to see southeastern Europe travel the same road
as western
Europe half a century ago and central Europe a decade ago.

We need an alliance that will help the nations of this region do this, an

alliance that will stand up to the cynicism and violence of those who
are trying
to hold them back. We need an alliance that fulfills its enduring
mission of
collective defense, an alliance that continues to unite Europe and
North America,
while enabling us all to meet new challenges. We need an alliance that
remains
open to new members, so that every nation from the Baltic to the
Black Sea knows
it is welcome in our community as long as it makes the right choices.
We need an
alliance that works with partners across Europe, including Russia. For
our
vision of a Europe whole and free will not be realized unless it
embraces Russia.
And it will not be realized unless it is embraced by Russia.

This is the kind of alliance we are building at this Summit.

Near the turn of the last century, President Theodore Roosevelt said
something

that could well be applied to a united Europe and our united transatlantic community: "We have no choice as to whether we will play a great part in the world. That has been determined for us by fate, by the march of events. The only question is whether we shall play it well or ill."

Our nations played our part well after World War II, from the airlift over Berlin, to the founding of NATO, to the restoration of hope and confidence in western Europe. We played it well after the Cold War, from the reunification of Germany, to enlargement of NATO, to the support we have offered a democratic Russia. We played well when we eventually joined together to end the slaughter in Bosnia. Surely, having done all that, we rise to this new and fundamental challenge to the peace of Europe.

Let us send a clear message from this Summit: NATO will prevail in Kosovo. The refugees will return to their homes. They will have security. They will have self-government. We are not going to let the last European dictatorship of the 20th century trample with impunity on the most basic values the rest of the world has embraced. And we will build something better in place of the lifeless wasteland Mr. Milosevic is leaving in his wake: A Europe where borders unite rather than divide; a transatlantic community in which every nation is free, and every free nation is our partner; a principled peace in our community, protected by an alliance of free nations that deters aggression whenever that is possible, and marshals support against it whenever that is necessary.

That was the vision of NATO's founders. It is our vision of the future today.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

kosovo intervention.doc
President William Jefferson Clinton
Kosovo Meeting Intervention
April 23, 1999

Thank you Mr. Secretary-General, fellow leaders: As I suggested in my welcoming remarks, the goals that ought to guide us today are simple and clear: to end this conflict on terms that vindicate our values and our interests and to be ready to win the peace once the conflict is over.

I believe that our air campaign is on track and I believe if we persist and stay together, we will achieve our objectives. Let me say a few words about the specific steps we should take as we work towards those objectives.

First, we have to reaffirm our conditions for bringing this conflict to an end. Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces must leave Kosovo. All refugees and displaced people must be able to return, with security and self government. And an international security force must deploy to protect them. Before we suspend the bombing, Mr. Milosevic must unequivocally accept our conditions, stop his attacks on the Kosovars and begin to withdraw his forces from Kosovo.

Yesterday, Victor Chernomyrdin met for eight hours with Milosevic in an effort to find a diplomatic solution. While we would welcome a diplomatic resolution, and appreciate the efforts of Russia to find one, Milosevic still seems unwilling to meet our conditions. He must withdraw his forces, not just reduce them. There must be an effective international security presence, not just an international presence. NATO must form the core even if its not on the label. And we cannot make our agreement contingent on rebuilding Serbia or withdrawing our forces from neighboring Partner states. But while this agreement does not meet our conditions, we should encourage Mr. Chernomyrdin to stick with his efforts and to

continue to press Milosevic.

Our conditions represent the minimum necessary solution to this crisis. They are also reasonable and just. The international force we want, for example, will include many other nations. We want Russia to play an important role in it. We would welcome a UN Security Council endorsement. The force will enforce the demilitarization of Kosovo, including the KLA. It will protect the rights of all of Kosovo's people, including its Serbian minority. This is an offer that no Serbian leader with the interests of his people at heart would refuse.

Second, we must increase our military, political and economic pressure against Belgrade so that its capacity to hold out is diminished and so we can meet our goals sooner. This includes even more vigorous conduct of the air war. It should include countering Belgrade's propaganda by increasing broadcasting from transmitters in the front-line states.

It should also include denying Mr. Milosevic the resources he needs to maintain his control and keep his war machine moving. I strongly support the efforts underway in the EU to embargo oil exports to Serbia, to tighten existing sanctions, and to impose new ones. NATO also has a part to play, based on our naval presence in the Adriatic and past experience to interdict war supplies, including oil, before they reach port. NATO's military authorities have already examined the possibility of a "visit and search" regime. We should ask our Defense Ministers to review it at their meeting later today and direct immediate planning, looking at ways to minimize the impact on Montenegro. It makes absolutely no sense to ask our pilots to risk their lives to destroy Serbian oil supplies if we allow them to be replenished with impunity. We have the ability to stop this flow, the right to stop it, and most important, an obligation to

stop it.

Our third task today should be to send a tangible message of support to the front line states, who have risked so much to stand with us in this crisis, and are now threatened by Belgrade's actions. We should make clear today that if Serbia launches an attack any of its neighbors because of their support for our efforts, NATO will respond. How can we do less? It is unthinkable. In this way, we will be more likely to deter such a threat in the first place, and give our partners the confidence they need to persevere.

Finally, even as we fight this conflict, we need to look beyond it to what southeastern Europe should look like a decade and a generation from now. I want to work with all of you and the security, political and economic institutions that bring us together to support these nations' economic and democratic development and their integration into our transatlantic community. Let us start the process of de-Balkanizing the Balkans.

Let me just conclude by saying that from the very beginning we have wanted the Summit to make a clear statement of NATO's values and vision of Europe. I cannot imagine a more powerful statement of what we believe than our actions in Kosovo today, and our commitment that this confrontation should end with a new push toward integration. I cannot imagine a more powerful demonstration of NATO's unity and resolve in the face of new challenges. That does not make the situation in Kosovo any less tragic or difficult. But it does offer hope that NATO will continue to do what it has done so well for the last 50 years: to uphold our interests and our values by making it clear that America and Europe will do what it takes to defend them.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Kosovo Plenary.doc
President William Jefferson Clinton
Opening Statement at NATO Kosovo Meeting
April 23, 1999

Mr. Secretary-General, Mr. President d'Honneur, my fellow leaders, let me welcome you all to the United States. We meet at this Summit to honor NATO's past and to chart its future. But we begin this morning, appropriately, by addressing the most urgent challenge we face at present. It is good that circumstances have brought us all together at a moment when NATO is engaged in the defense of its values and working to secure Europe's future. I am certain of our unity, determination, and resolve.

Today, we will send a clear message: Our air campaign is on track. We will sustain it for as long as it takes. We will not waver in our conditions for ending it. We will pursue diplomatic initiatives that meet our conditions. We will increase our political and economic pressure against the regime in Belgrade, so that its capacity to continue its repression is diminished. We will stand by the front line nations threatened by Belgrade's actions. We will work with them for democracy, prosperity and stability in southeastern Europe, so that when Mr. Milosevic's vision is defeated, a better one can rise in its place. And we will seek to do this together with all our European partners, including Russia and Ukraine.

We will also remember what is at stake, what we stand for, and what we stand against. Mr. Milosevic's forces burn and loot homes and murder innocent people; our forces deliver food and shelter and hope to the displaced. Mr. Milosevic fans the flames of anger between nations and peoples; we are an

alliance of 19
democratic nations, uniting 780 million people of many faiths and
traditions in a
common cause. Mr. Milosevic knows only one way to achieve his
aims - through
force; we have done everything possible to resolve matters peacefully.
But when
we fight, we fight to prevail. We will prevail in this conflict. And we
will
build the undivided, democratic Europe that the founders of NATO
envisioned 50
years ago.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

NATOtoast_.doc
4/22/99 9 pm Widmer

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
TOAST AT NATO LEADERS DINNER
THE WHITE HOUSE
APRIL 23, 1999

[Secretary General Solana, Mrs. Solana, fellow leaders, spouses]

Welcome to Washington, and welcome to the White House. I'd like to
begin with a
little-known anecdote. When the original North Atlantic Treaty was
signed fifty
years ago, the United States Marine Band was in the auditorium
playing a medley
from Porgy and Bess that included the songs "I Got Plenty of
Nothing" and "It
Ain't Necessarily So." I'm happy to say that NATO has vastly
exceeded those
gloomy musical predictions.

In 1949, this alliance signaled a radical departure from American
history. Our
founding fathers wanted nothing to do with foreign entanglements -
that is, as
soon as we were done asking the French to help us win independence
from the
British. Many Americans didn't want the United States to sign the
treaty. The
Second World War was over. The staggering carnage of that war was

an argument
both for and against involvement with Europe. The tempting solution
was to
celebrate the end of the war, and wash our hands of further
responsibility. That
is what, unfortunately, we did after World War One. The hard solution
- the
right solution - was to do everything in our power to alter history,
including
our own. To win World War Three by making sure it never began. To
accept what
we now see as a basic lesson of our century: peace is not something
you hope
for, it's something you work for, and sometimes you fight for.

We owe a profound debt of gratitude to that generation for choosing
the right
course. They were thinking of their children - us - when they took on
that
responsibility. Tonight, we are thinking of them as we renew our
commitment to
each other ... and to our children.

I don't have to go into the history of NATO for you. All of you know
how much
this alliance has accomplished. That we have never been directly
challenged by
an adversary, that Europe's divisions are fading, that new democracies
want to
join us ... that says it all. But it does not mean we do not face constant
challenges. I think the situation in Kosovo has crystallized what it is
that
draws us together and keeps us together. NATO is an alliance not
merely of arms
but of values. We believe in the right to pursue happiness with
freedom and
dignity. We also believe that God-given rights must be actively and
continually
secured by human beings. They must be defined, and they must be
defended.

Over fifty years, a new Europe has emerged. Each decade has seen
progress - none
more than the 1990s. Today's map of the continent reveals what
NATO's founders
could only dream of - a Europe that is increasingly united - free - and
with one
exception, at peace. Amidst all the trappings of a state dinner, it is
difficult
to conjure up the suffering of the Kosovar people. But we must

remember them,
and find resolve in our reflection.

As we meet, hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Kosovo or refugees nearby are without a home. Many have seen unspeakable cruelty; many are facing hunger and cold, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they are.

Many - who knows how many - have been killed in cold blood. But those who have survived, for all they have been through, know this: they are not abandoned.

For they have the most powerful democratic alliance ever assembled on their side.

They are not forgotten. We will not let that happen again. Mr.

Milosevic will

not succeed in erasing their identity from the pages of history. They will

return and reclaim their lives.

Let's not forget that as we continue our working agenda this weekend.

Let's not

forget that the critical issues of adapting NATO are not abstractions, whether

it's the need to revise NATO's strategic concept, or to strengthen our defense

capability, or to build new ties with non-NATO states. All our discussions serve

the overarching purpose of NATO - giving people the chance to live the lives they

want to, free of fear.

Our situation remains ever new. But we draw strength from those who labored

before us so that nations might co-exist, and find lasting peace in common

purpose. I will close with a line from Aeschylus: "Great spirits meet calamity

greatly." I will add to that the principle that has animated NATO from the

moment of its creation: that from the calamity of war, a gentler world can be

built, and shielded from harm. Let us renew our commitment - to honor NATO's

founders, and pass on their legacy to our children in the new century.

Please

join me in a toast to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

###

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/99 4:43:22 PM
FROM Merletti, Roger D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT KOSOVO MEDIA HIGHLIGHTS -- 23 APRIL 1800 [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keirn C.
Busby, Scott W.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Crowley, Philip J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Guarnieri, Valerie N.
Halperin, David E.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurley, C. Michael
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Krass, Caroline D.
Lackey, Miles M.
Leavy, David C.
Malinowski, Tomasz P.
Merletti, Roger D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Rice, Edward A.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Segal, Jack D.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Smith, James A.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Tedstrom, John E.

Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
Unrue, Michael

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
KOSOVO MEDIA HIGHLIGHTS
1800 EDT UPDATE
23 APRIL 1999

FRY

Montenegrin Prime Minister Vujanovic
said that his country would accept any controls of its oil distribution
and supply if that would prevent the EU from including Montenegro
in its oil ban on the FRY next week. He also said he was "horrified"

by FRY Prime Minister Bulatovic's "direct invitation for a confrontation." During an anti-NATO rally in Podgorica yesterday, Bulatovic threatened the Montenegrin police with extinction unless they agreed to take orders from the VJ. Reuters a1946, a1618

INTERNATIONAL

An aide to Russian special envoy Chernomyrdin said that Chernomyrdin's account of his meeting yesterday with FRY President Milosevic had been misunderstood. The aide said the two had agreed on an international presence that should be comprised of UN civilian observers with unarmed men in military uniform and Russians participating. UPI u8935

Italian Foreign Minister Dini condemned NATO's bombing last night of a Serbian state television building in Belgrade. He claimed the attack was "not in the plans." Reuters a2615

Albanian Information Minister Ulqini described the talks between Milosevic and Chernomyrdin as "just another desperate attempt by Milosevic." Reuters a2299

Czech President Havel said his armed forces would participate in a possible NATO ground operation. Yesterday, the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania reiterated their readiness to send troops and auxiliary service personnel in support of NATO operations. FBIS F3236, F3251

At its annual meeting in Geneva, the UN Committee on Human Rights today overwhelmingly adopted a U.S. resolution condemning "horrendous and ongoing war crimes" against ethnic Albanians by Serb forces. Russia was the only country to vote against the resolution. Reuters a2521

German Interior Minister Schily said that Germany may take in more refugees but urged other EU members to fulfill their pledges of providing sanctuary to ethnic Kosovar Albanians. Meanwhile, Switzerland has agreed to accept up to 2,500 more refugees. Reuters a1873, a2268

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/26/99 10:24:57 AM
FROM Malinowski, Tomasz P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Steinberg speech on NATO/Kosovo--Input Needed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gordon, Philip H.

CARBON_COPY

Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
Bandler, Donald K.
Bell, Robert G.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Brody, Richard J.
Brown, Keirn C.
Busby, Scott W.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Crowley, Philip J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gordon, Philip H.
Gray, Wendy E.
Guarnieri, Valerie N.
Halperin, David E.
Hurley, C. Michael
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Krass, Caroline D.
Lackey, Miles M.
Leavy, David C.
Malinowski, Tomasz P.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)

vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)
Wippman, David

TEXT_BODY

Phil: Very good. Main difficulty is the front -- it needs to be hugely compressed, I think, to avoid repetition -- one tick on Kosovo objectives, one tick on how NATO agenda naturally related to Kosovo, and one tick on southeastern Europe to make the point that this is where our military campaign and NATO's post-Cold War strategy of reaching out to new democracies and extending the zone of stability in Europe come together. But I would leave out most of the policy detail, since you do it in the sections that follow.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Flanagan, Stephen J.

Sent: Monday, April 26,
1999 9:17 AM

To: Gordon, Philip H.

Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.; Flanagan,
Stephen J.; Malinowski, Tomasz P.; Hachigian, Nina L.; @BOSNIA -

Bosnian Affairs; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe; @SPEECH - NSC
Speechwriters;

@NATO

Subject: FW: Steinberg speech on NATO/Kosovo--Input Needed
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Here are some comments.

Greg
is slated to speak on this morning's Kosovo panel, and I'm on this
afternoon to talk about NATO initiatives for SEE
integration/cooperation,
coupled with your presentation on institutions, this slate should
elaborate Administration policy nicely.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon,

Philip H.

Sent: Sunday, April 25, 1999 5:37 PM

To: Schulte, Gregory

L.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Malinowski, Tomasz P.; Hachigian, Nina
L.

Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe;
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @NATO

Subject: Steinberg speech on

NATO/Kosovo--Input Needed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Here
is a first draft of Jim's Tuesday morning speech on Kosovo/NATO.
Includes input from Tom on first part. Pls. respond by Monday noon.

Greg:
Can you help with the Kosovo stuff (see notes to you in italics)?

Steve:
Same for you on the Frontline states stuff.

Tom: Anything else
to add?

Nina: I will be at first session of Kosovo conference
Monday am. Will come back mid-day to find brilliant contributions
of colleagues and put them together for final to Jim. In the meantime,
if he wants an early look at where this is headed please show him
this.

Thanks to all.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT NATO and Kosovo.doc
NATO and Kosovo

NATO-Kosovo Link

* Two themes - NATO summit and Kosovo - go hand in hand.

On Kosovo and Southeast Europe:

* Summit leaders made decisions to advance common goals in
Kosovo: immediate end
to violence and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal of all Serb forces;
stationing
of international security force; return of all refugees; establishment of
political framework based on self-government for Kosovars.

* The leaders also took steps to enhance the near-term security and
stability of
Serbia's democratic neighbors most affected by the Kosovo conflict
including:
enhanced consultations, security assistance coordination and PFP
activities, as
well as an assurance that NATO will respond to threats by Belgrade to

their
security as a result of cooperation with NATO military operations.

* Finally, they also agreed to make the stability of Southeast Europe an Alliance priority. They expressed their determination to work with other governments and international institutions, to help the countries of the region build a secure future based on democracy, justice, economic integration and cooperation.

In adapting NATO

* Leaders undertook a range of initiatives designed to adapt Alliance for new challenges. Indeed, believe that Kosovo demonstrates importance of adapting NATO for new challenges and validates approach we had been taking toward Alliance adaptation for more than a year.

* Each of key summit issues has direct relevance for Kosovo and Southeast Europe:

-new Strategic Concept emphasizing new missions like responding to regional conflict (and preserving NATO's flexibility to act when necessary);

-initiative to enhance European defense capabilities and Alliance interoperability so that Europeans can be more effective and take on more responsibility;

-credible commitment to further enlargement, including a detailed Membership Action Plan, which gives all nine aspirants -- five in Southeast Europe -- strong incentives to continue on the path of reform and good neighborly relations; and

-strengthening PFP to enhance practical military cooperation with NATO members and other Partners, which will enhance the ability of Southeast European partners to work with NATO in managing regional security problems, improve their defense capabilities, and advance their integration goals.

Kosovo

* Let me begin with facts. Leaders were determined to intensify air campaign toward objectives already mentioned. Every member of the Alliance believes Kosovo crisis is a fundamental challenge to values for which NATO has stood since the very beginning: democracy, human rights, rule of law. Summit made it clear we will not permit Milosevic's campaign of terror to succeed.

Several new decisions [Schulte to elaborate]:

- maritime interdiction regime that will further cut off war supplies...
- new flexibility on targeting...
- increase economic pressure...

* But real story of Summit is unity. Every ally absolutely determined to stop the barbarity of Milosevic's actions. Every ally supports air campaign and intensification of bombing. Every ally agrees that there will be no change in our objectives or compromise on our conditions. Every ally agrees words not enough from Milosevic: he must start pulling his forces out of Kosovo before bombing is suspended.

* NATO, as we have said before, will press ahead with air campaign and increase economic pressure, until Milosevic either accepts NATO's conditions or loses his ability to hold on to Kosovo. [Greg, can you say something about high value targets --SRT off the air now - long a key instrument of ethnic cleansing - latest on strikes in against forces in Kosovo - Clark point on Serbian forces hiding from strikes, which means they are harder to hit, but also useless against Kosovars. New forces/Apaches in Albania, etc. Allies confident that with patience over the long haul this will succeed. Refugees will return with security and self- government.

* Before this campaign started. Skepticism that NATO could hold together for

long haul. We heard about leftist governments in Europe, about worries of southeast European states, about unwillingness to use force.

* The doubters probably included Milosevic himself, who thought that NATO could never hold together long enough to go ahead with military force, or that if it did Alliance unity would crack once the going got tough. He was wrong. NATO has never been more united.

* Unity extends to three new members, who find themselves in a conflict just weeks after formally joining alliance. Understandable difficulties for Hungary, given Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. But Hungary has played a critical role in providing overflight rights, inspecting/interdicting supplies to Serbia and stationing support aircraft. Havel eloquent on need to defend values in the face of evil. Poles vindicating our hope that they would become among most vigorous members of alliance; will play important role when we deploy ground troops to enforce a peace. Polish Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz last weekend: "In Poland there were questions (about NATO). Will NATO really help us if we are under attack, or will there be a repeat of 1939? Now we have a clear demonstration that NATO can and will act, and that is very important to us."

* Unity has not been just among NATO's 19 members, but throughout the Partnership for Peace as well. From the Baltic states in the north to Uzbekistan and others in Central Asia, NATO's Partners have joined us in condemning Serb atrocities and in many cases providing material help to the Allies' common cause.
*

* Most courageously, the States neighboring on the conflict, despite the risks and costs - and in some cases close historical links to Serbia - are also firmly behind NATO's action. Despite Serb threats and a flood of nearly 350,000 refugees, Albania has been steadfast in its support for NATO offering

basing and
overflight rights. In the face of similar challenges and significant
domestic
political opposition, Macedonia has continued to offer overflight and
other
support for NATO actions. The governments of Romania and
Bulgaria have also
strongly backed NATO's efforts and have granted military overflight
rights,
despite strong public opposition to the military campaign. (final
Bulgarian
action on Tuesday CK back)

* As the President noted at Sunday's special meeting with Serbia's
immediate
neighbors, the U.S. and NATO are working to relieve their most
pressing burdens
and we will do more: intensifying relief operations, taking our share
of
refugees, and reassuring them that we will not tolerate threats by
Belgrade to
their security. NATO made clear, if Belgrade challenges its neighbors
as a
result of the presence of NATO forces or NATO activities on their
territories, we
will respond.

* These dozens of European and North Atlantic states together on this
first
because the cause is just: stopping the most shocking violations of
human rights
seen in Europe since WWII. Many have potential ethnic minority
problems of their
own, and they understand the imperative of not allowing ethnic
tensions to be
exploited in the service of aggression and power.

* But we are also united because the Partnership for Peace has forged
genuine
bonds between our militaries, our governments and our interests.
Because many of
these countries want to be part of NATO and all want to be part of
Europe -- and
because the strategy we have pursued for the last several years makes
that a real
possibility. We designed that strategy for moments such as this, and it
is
heartening to see that the strategy is working. That was certainly in
view at
our meeting with neighboring states on Sunday morning.

* Beyond current air campaign, humanitarian crisis, Allies and Partners also united on need for long-term vision for Southeastern Europe. President Clinton laid this vision in his speech in San Francisco last week, which was welcomed and seconded by Allies and partners over last weekend, that we must help the states of Southeast Europe advance their development and integration into the European and transatlantic mainstream. This must include a place for a democratic Serbia. We need to do for SEE what we did for north Central Europe after Cold War, Western Europe after WWII.

* First step in this is provision of support for most immediate emergency needs to frontline states. Also committed to sustained engagement, working with Allies, the OSCE, the EU and IFIs to coordinate practical plans to realize this vision. NATO Foreign Ministers welcomed the proposal advanced by Germany on behalf of the UE Presidency, to have a high-level meeting next month, under the sponsorship of the OSCE, to galvanize effort. Likely to be major focus of U.S.-EU Summit and President's trip to Slovenia in June.

* Finally let me say that we are not interested in redrawing maps in Bosnia, FRY or anywhere else - for every problem that solves, a new set of problems is created. As President said, real question is not whether Kosovo will be part of Serbia, but whether Kosovo, Serbia, and all the nation of the region will be part of Europe. Challenge is not to redraw borders, but to bring these countries into a Europe where borders are less and less important.

NATO Adaptation/Kosovo

* Few words on summit results on NATO adaptation and how relevant for Kosovo. Actually believe that if we had to design package of initiatives based on "lessons learned" from Kosovo it would look very much like the one we just

adopted - which in fact had been underway for nearly two years. Evolution from NATO adaptation begun early in the decade as adaptation to end of Cold War, but we took some real steps forward.

* New Strategic Concept. Reaffirms article 5 but new focus on growing challenges like regional conflict (as in Bosnia, Kosovo), WMD, terrorism. Strikes right balance. Also strikes right balance on issue of legitimacy of use of force. New Strat Con preserves NATO's flexibility to act when its 19 democratic members, by consensus, agree on it - as they all do in Kosovo.

* Defense Capabilities Initiative. Program to adapt NATO conventional forces for new missions. Particular emphasis on flexibility, mobility, interoperability. Engagement across full spectrum of missions from high-intensity combat to humanitarian missions. Will guide Alliance defense reform and ensure that diverse Allies can act together and with partners.

* WMD Initiative. Setting up new Center at NATO that will help Alliance prepare for growing threat of proliferation of WMD and missiles. Will involve information sharing, help foster common assessment of threat, better preparation in case of WMD event. Thankfully not directly relevant in Kosovo today, but not too difficult to imagine similar conflict in near future against adversary armed with WMD. Serbia has had CW programs and Allies need to be prepared.

* ESDI. Summit also made progress on ESDI, following Blair initiative last September. Completed Berlin arrangements for possible WEU led missions using NATO assets, adopted new command structure. Europeans pledged to enhance defense capabilities, NATO committed to working with EU if it develops defense and security policy role. We believe Kosovo reinforces our view of importance of NATO and Alliance unity, not need for separate European alliance.

Added European capabilities certainly relevant, however.

* Open Door. Noted progress of all nine aspirants in commune (as well as their contributions to Kosovo) and adopted Membership Action Plan to make their candidacies stronger. In other words, not only made clear that door is open, made an active commitment to help aspirants pass through. Announced that FMs will do ongoing review of enlargement and leaders will address at next summit-no later than 2002. Believe open door essential as incentive for aspirants to stay the course of reform, cooperate with other partners in Kosovo.

* Strengthening PFP. Increased partner involvement with planning and implementation of future NATO-led operations, detailed framework for NATO-Partner military cooperation. Partners already contributing enormously in Bosnia. This will make that even more effective. We expect full partner participation in Kosovo peace implementation force.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/26/99 11:45:27 AM
FROM Kaufman, Stuart J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Jim's speech for tomorrow [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Pascual, Carlos E.

CARBON_COPY Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.

TEXT_BODY Carlos--No mention of Russia in this speech, and I couldn't find a graceful place to insert one. Given topic, maybe that's OK, but wanted to alert you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon,
Philip H.
Sent: Monday, April 26, 1999 11:39 AM
To: @NSA - Natl
Security Advisor
Cc: @NATO; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe; @KOSOVO;
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: Jim's
speech for tomorrow [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Nina: Here's
a draft for Jim. Includes input from Schulte, Flanagan and
Malinowski.

Might
be a bit long -- they're expecting around 20-25 minutes with about
20-25 more for Q&A.

Conference is at Grand Hyatt, 1000 H Street,
talk begins at 8:45 tomorrow morning.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT NATO and Kosovo.doc
NATO and Kosovo

NATO-Kosovo Link

- * Two themes - NATO summit and Kosovo - go hand in hand.
- * Summit leaders made decisions to advance common goals in Kosovo: immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal of all Serb forces; stationing of international security force; return of all refugees; establishment of political framework based on self-government for Kosovars.
- * Also agreed range of initiatives designed to adapt Alliance for new challenges.
Indeed, believe that Kosovo demonstrates importance of adapting NATO for new challenges and validates approach we had been taking toward Alliance adaptation for more than a year - an approach that involves emphasizing new missions like responding to regional conflict; developing more mobile and flexible defense capabilities; maintaining credible Open Door policy; and enhancing practical military cooperation between NATO and its Partners. I will talk about these initiatives in a moment, but let me first turn to Kosovo.

Kosovo

- * Let me begin with facts. Leaders were determined to intensify air campaign toward objectives already mentioned. Every member of the Alliance believes Kosovo crisis is a fundamental challenge to values for which NATO has stood since the very beginning: democracy, human rights, rule of law. Summit made it clear we will not permit Milosevic's campaign of terror to succeed.

Several important decisions at the summit:

-allied leaders agreed to support SACEUR's requests for additional resources and

to give him increased flexibility in targeting - our objective is to sustain the air campaign and to intensify it;

-allies also agreed to supplement the air campaign with steps to increase economic pressure; they welcomed intention of EU to embargo oil deliveries to Serbia;

-leaders directed Defense Ministers to examine ways that NATO can help to halt delivery of war materiel to Serbia; Defense Ministers have since tasked NATO military authorities to initiate preparations for a maritime "visit and search" regime in the Adriatic.

* But real story of Summit is unity. Every ally absolutely determined to stop the barbarity of Milosevic's actions. Every ally supports air campaign and intensification of bombing. Every ally agrees that there will be no change in our objectives or compromise on our conditions. Every ally agrees words not enough from Milosevic: he must start pulling his forces out of Kosovo before bombing is suspended.

* NATO, as we have said before, will press ahead with air campaign and increase economic pressure, until Milosevic either accepts NATO's conditions or loses his ability to hold on to Kosovo.

* NATO forces are conducting simultaneous strikes on two air lines of operations:

-First, strategic attack against the integrated air defense systems, higher-level command and control, VJ and MUP forces, supporting infrastructure and resources and military supply routes.

-Second, an operational attack against forces in Kosovo to degrade, isolate and interdict them.

* Forces in theater committed to this operation include over 690 aircraft, more than 20 combatant ships (11 of which can launch cruise missiles) and three aircraft carriers. Over 10,000 sorties flown against Yugoslavia, of which over 4,000 have been strike missions.

* Allies confident that with patience over the long haul this will succeed.
Refugees will return with security and self- government.

* Before this campaign started. Skepticism that NATO could hold together for long haul. We heard about leftist governments in Europe, about worries of southeast European states, about unwillingness to use force.

* The doubters appear to have included Milosevic himself, who thought that NATO could never hold together long enough to go ahead with military force, or that if it did Alliance unity would crack once the going got tough. He was wrong. NATO has never been more united.

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for Peace as well. From the Baltic states in the north to Uzbekistan and others in Central Asia, NATO's Partners have joined us in condemning Serb atrocities and in many cases providing material help to the Allies' common cause.

* Most courageously, the States neighboring on the conflict, despite the risks and costs - and in some cases close historical links to Serbia - are also firmly behind NATO's action. Despite Serb threats and a flood of nearly 350,000 refugees, Albania has been steadfast in its support for NATO, offering basing and overflight rights. In the face of similar challenges and significant domestic political opposition, Macedonia has continued to offer overflight and other support for NATO actions. The governments of Romania and Bulgaria have also strongly backed NATO's efforts and have granted military overflight rights, despite strong public opposition to the military campaign.

* As the President noted at Sunday's special meeting with Serbia's immediate neighbors, the U.S. and NATO are working to relieve their most pressing burdens and we will do more: intensifying relief operations, taking our share of refugees, and reassuring them that we will not tolerate threats by Belgrade to their security. NATO made clear that it will respond if Belgrade challenges its neighbors as a result of the presence of NATO forces or NATO activities on their territories.

* These dozens of European and North Atlantic states united on this first because the cause is just: stopping the most shocking violations of human rights seen in Europe since WWII. Many have potential ethnic minority problems of their own, and they understand the imperative of not allowing ethnic tensions to be exploited in the service of aggression and power.

* But we are also united because the Partnership for Peace has forged genuine

bonds between our militaries, our governments and our interests. Because many of these countries want to be part of NATO and all want to be part of Europe -- and because the strategy we have pursued for the last several years makes that a real possibility. We designed that strategy for moments such as this, and it is heartening to see that the strategy is working. That was certainly in view at our meeting with neighboring states on Sunday morning.

* Beyond current air campaign, humanitarian crisis, Allies and Partners also united on need for long-term vision for Southeastern Europe. President Clinton laid out this vision in his speech in San Francisco last week, a vision that was seconded by Allies and partners over the past weekend, that we must help the states of Southeastern Europe advance their development and integration into the European and transatlantic mainstream. This must include a place for a democratic Serbia. We need to do for SEE what we did for CEE after Cold War, and for Western Europe after WWII.

* The first step in this is provision of support for the most immediate emergency needs to the frontline states. We are also committed to sustained engagement, working with Allies, the OSCE, the EU and the IFIs to coordinate practical plans to realize this vision. NATO foreign ministers welcomed the proposal advanced by Germany on behalf of the EU Presidency, to have a high-level meeting next month, under the sponsorship of the OSCE, to galvanize effort. Likely to be a major focus of U.S.-EU Summit and President's trip to Slovenia in June.

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of Europe. Challenge is not to redraw borders, but to bring these countries into a Europe where borders are less and less important.

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Evolution from

NATO adaptation begun early in the decade as adaptation to end of Cold War, but

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like regional conflict (as in Bosnia, Kosovo), WMD, terrorism. Strikes right

balance. Also strikes right balance on issue of legitimacy of use of force. New

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for growing threat of proliferation of WMD and missiles. Will involve

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/30/99 8:08:02 AM
FROM Bolan, Christopher J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: WHSR Kosovo Media Highlights--0600 30 April 1999 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Saunders, Richard M.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

-----Original Message-----

From: Bayley, Douglas C.

Sent: Friday,

April 30, 1999 4:57 AM

To: @ADHOC KOSOVO

Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation

Room

Subject: WHSR Kosovo Media Highlights--0600 30 April 1999
[UNCLASSIFIED]

WHITE

HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

KOSOVO MEDIA HIGHLIGHTS

0600 EDT UPDATE 30

APRIL 1999

FRY

FRY Prime Minister Bulatovic's Socialist

People's Party (SNP) walked out of talks with the Montenegrin government
aimed at preserving peace. Reuters a0357

NATO missiles and aircraft

struck VJ headquarters, the Defense Ministry and a police building
in Belgrade. NATO also hit a Belgrade TV transmitter, temporarily
knocking Serb state television off the air, according to official
FRY media. Serb state television and radio resumed broadcasting
early Friday. However, an eyewitness said the transmitter on Mount
Avala near Belgrade could no longer be seen. Reuters a4281, a4558,
a4561, a4654

INTERNATIONAL

Following his meeting with Italian Prime Minister D'Alema, Russian special envoy Chernomyrdin said, "our positions have moved closer on the ways and the directions in which we can pursue (a political solution to the conflict)." Reuters a3863

Czech President Havel yesterday said NATO's bombing of the FRY signaled a new "ethical" stance in which national sovereignty could be violated for the sake of protecting people. He said, "This war gives human rights precedence over the rights of states... This is probably the first war ever fought that is not being fought in the name of interests, but in the name of certain principles and values." Reuters a3483

In Moscow, UNSYG Annan yesterday said, "It is very important that the international community should highly appreciate the role Russia must and is playing in a Kosovo settlement. I hope that my special envoys will go along with the efforts of the Russian leadership soon." FBIS F9278

Russia sent four planes to Macedonia over the past few days with humanitarian aid for the refugees. An Emergency Ministry spokesman said the planes contained food, medicine, clothes and blankets, but he refuted reports by Russian news agencies that the planes had been sent to Macedonia after they were denied permission to fly to Belgrade. Reuters a0490

French Prime Minister Jospin arrived in Tirana to examine the refugee situation and relief needs. He will also visit Macedonia. Reuters a0638

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Saunders, Richard; From: Bolan, Christopher; Re: Fw: Kosovo Key Developments Update (3 pages)	04/30/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Havel, Meeting, NATO])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/15/1999 - 05/12/1999]

2017-0413-F
sb2288

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/12/99 1:10:50 PM

FROM Gobush, Matthew N.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Kosovo Comms Meeting Docs [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greenberg, Brenda L.
Hammer, Michael A.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY FYI: Phone list, taskings and agenda for the new Kosovo communications group.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Kosovo Comms IWG List.doc
KOSOVO COMMUNICATIONS INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP

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AGENCY
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SSN
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	To: Bobbitt, Philip, et al; From: Gobush, Matthew; Re: Kosovo Comms Meeting Docs [partial] (1 page)	05/12/1999	P3/b(3), b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Havel, Meeting, NATO])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/15/1999 - 05/12/1999]

2017-0413-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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202-456-2673

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Kosovo Meeting Taskings 5-12-99.doc
KOSOVO COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
May 12, 1999

TASKINGS**Surrogates**

- * Lackey to draft list of potential current and former Congressional validators
- * Foley to draft list of former Ambassadors, A/S, human rights envoys, etc.
- * Foley to gauge support from Eagleburger, Zimmerman, Tarnoff
- * Gobush to track Jock Covey as potential validator
- * Huff to research relevant former NSC staff and Carter Administration officials
- * Desler to compile list of former SecDefs, JCS, NATO Ambassadors, SACEURs and other military authorities who could serve as potential
- * Desler to explore conference call with military analysts
- * Gobush to compile think tanks validators list
- * Gobush to compile NGO validators list
- * Huff to consult with WH OPL on potential religious leaders
- * Foley to consider potential international validators, including Havel, Thatcher

Refugee Story

- * Foley/Desler to inventory State/DoD PAOS and press support resources in region and suggest names for Eller
- * Foley/Desler to consider refugee story packages, live interviews

- * Leavy to consult with Mike Siegel regarding press support in region
- * Palmieri to interface with network affiliates about regional amplification and local coverage of refugee story, as well as network, cable magazine shows
- * Desler to inquire about USAF pilots press availability and restrictions in region and in US
- * Palmieri to propose POTUS Ft. Dix stop during next Wednesday's planned trip to New York
- * Gobush to draft SP for POTUS call to Gen. Hilton prior to tomorrow Vets Speech re. Camp Hope
- * Desler to explore piping-in POTUS call to Camp Hope
- * Dach to contact Sosnik re. contributions for refugees

"Tid Bit" Strategy

- * Leavy to follow-up with Harlow on unclassified intel gathering
- * Leavy and all to suggest intel and specific story lines with specific reporters
- * Harlow to be invited to daily communications meetings

FLOTUS Balkans Trip

- * Dach to call Verveer re. FLOTUS trip press (daily diary, newspaper column)
- * Palmieri to propose joint POTUS-FLOTUS Saturday radio address
- * Palmieri to propose Shalala, Witt to FLOTUS delegation

Principals Activities

- * Leavy to call CNN re. Vets Speech coverage
- * Gobush to propose SRB Kosovo speech at CFR
- * Dach to contact OVP re. VPOTUS involvement
- * All to bring block calendars

KOSOVO COMMUNICATIONS MEETING

May 13, 1999

AGENDA

I. Review Taskings and Next Steps

II. Identification of Top Story Lines by Reporter

III. Review Major Dates and Principles Activities

IV. Activation of US Albanian Community