

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Bruce Riedel to Bruce Riedel and Mara Rudman at 2:21 PM. Subject: Document 1 of 1430. (2 pages)	07/13/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Donald Gentile to nsa.ic.gov at 2:52 PM. Subject: White House Situation Room. (9 pages)	08/11/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/2000-08/23/2000]

2008-0729-F

vz1598

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/12/2000 2:57:32 PM
FROM Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: PHALCON GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cooper, Colby J. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Please print the guidance for Bruce and Rob as FYI -- unless they wrote it! Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowley,
Philip J. (PRESS)
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2000 2:56 PM
To: @PRESS
- Public Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Subject: PHALCON GUIDANCE
[UNCLASSIFIED]

@PRESS, can you get this to State and Defense.

@NESA,
can you get a copy to Alina Romanowski at Defense.

Thanks.

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

PHALCON.doc
PHALCON
July 12, 2000

Context for Briefer Only: On Wednesday, July 12, 2000, the Israeli spokesman in
Thurmont, near Camp David, confirmed that the Israeli government
had informed
President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton that the Israelis would
not deliver

the Phalcon to China. The formulation that the spokesman used was that Israel would not continue with implementation of the Phalcon program, reflecting their understanding of our concerns about the sale. The spokesman added that the Israeli government would evaluate implementation in the future, taking into account the views of the U.S. government, if circumstances change. Joe Lockhart indicated today at his press briefing that we don't expect our views on this sale to change.

Can you confirm that the Israelis told the President that they are canceling the Phalcon deal?

* We welcome the decision by the Israeli government.

* This matter has been an important issue for us and has been the subject of continuing discussion between the U.S. and the Israeli government at various levels, including between the President and Prime Minister.

* We're pleased that the Israeli government understood our security concerns and took them into account.

When was the President informed?

* I'm not going to discuss the substance of specific meetings at Camp David, other than to say that the Prime Minister and President held two bilateral meetings on the first day of the Summit and Phalcon was discussed.

Is it a cancellation?

* I'll defer to the Israeli government to explain their decision.

* Our view remains firm that this technology should not be introduced into the Asia-Pacific region.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/13/2000 8:48:53 AM

FROM Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT log [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Middle East Peace Process (significant reaction to Camp David talks, particularly by Israeli Knesset; in addition, intelligence on any planned terrorist activity by extremist groups) and G8 Summit (any significant intelligence that could impact President's participation in upcoming summit in Okinawa).

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/12/2000 2:55:49 PM
FROM Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT PHALCON GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY @PRESS, can you get this to State and Defense.

@NESA, can you
get a copy to Alina Romanowski at Defense.

Thanks.

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

PHALCON.doc
PHALCON
July 12, 2000

Context for Briefer Only: On Wednesday, July 12, 2000, the Israeli spokesman in
Thurmont, near Camp David, confirmed that the Israeli government
had informed

President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton that the Israelis would not deliver the Phalcon to China. The formulation that the spokesman used was that Israel would not continue with implementation of the Phalcon program, reflecting their understanding of our concerns about the sale. The spokesman added that the Israeli government would evaluate implementation in the future, taking into account the views of the U.S. government, if circumstances change. Joe Lockhart indicated today at his press briefing that we don't expect our views on this sale to change.

Can you confirm that the Israelis told the President that they are canceling the Phalcon deal?

* We welcome the decision by the Israeli government.

* This matter has been an important issue for us and has been the subject of continuing discussion between the U.S. and the Israeli government at various levels, including between the President and Prime Minister.

* We're pleased that the Israeli government understood our security concerns and took them into account.

When was the President informed?

* I'm not going to discuss the substance of specific meetings at Camp David, other than to say that the Prime Minister and President held two bilateral meetings on the first day of the Summit and Phalcon was discussed.

Is it a cancellation?

* I'll defer to the Israeli government to explain their decision.

* Our view remains firm that this technology should not be introduced into the Asia-Pacific region.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Bruce Riedel to Bruce Riedel and Mara Rudman at 2:21 PM. Subject: Document 1 of 1430. (2 pages)	07/13/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/2000-08/23/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1598

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/20/2000 1:18:19 AM
FROM Cooper, Colby J. (ADMIN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Go for Speech [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cooper, Colby J. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Closing Statement Speech_.doc
President William Jefferson Clinton
Closing Statement
Camp David Peace Talks
July 19, 2000

For the past nine days, we have been engaged in the most comprehensive and thorough negotiations ever between Israelis and Palestinians. As I explained on the eve of the Summit, we have a genuine opportunity to put an end to their conflict, reach a just and lasting peace, and create a better future for the Middle East.

I believe the two parties have been making an intensive effort to resolve their differences over the most difficult issues in their conflict. The gaps between the parties remain significant, but there continues to be progress and I believe we must be prepared to go the extra mile.

The parties want to stay at Camp David while I travel to Okinawa for the G-8 Summit. During that time they will be working with Secretary Albright to

continue to try to close the gap. Upon my return I will assess the status of the talks.

There should be no illusion about the difficult task that lies ahead. But there also should be no limit to the effort we are prepared to make to help the parties reach an agreement.

4

1

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/21/2000 4:47:09 PM
FROM Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Guidance for Podesta [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)

CARBON_COPY Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)

TEXT_BODY As you know, John Podesta is appearing on ABC's This Week (with Sam and Cokie). I know he's been kept fully aware of events at Camp. However, we have a requirement to furnish him the public line. Prior to the news blackout, we had for guidance several general information questions that remain pertinent: why are you doing this, why here, etc.

In the interest of fulfilling this requirement, I am attaching

that guidance having removed extraneous matter. See if this works.

Need

to add one question/answer to this package: Have you discussed with Congress how much a settlement with the parties will cost U.S. taxpayers?

* We are in regular contact with members of Congress about the Summit

* Have not discussed dollar figures

* Working hard to help the parties reach an agreement

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT MEPP July 22.doc

MEPP/CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
July 22, 2000

Has the collapse of Prime Minister Barak's coalition prevented him from making the kind of concessions the President said he needs to make for the Summit to be successful?

* Prime Minister Barak came to Camp David in good faith, determined to pursue peace. He has a direct mandate from the Israeli people with a large majority and we believe he has a strong mandate to make peace. He also made clear that he would submit any agreement to a referendum.

* We have every reason to believe he and Chairman Arafat are determined to pursue an agreement that deals with the core final status issues. As the President's said before, no one said this would be easy. There are difficult decisions that need to be made. The president believes both the Prime Minister and Chairman can succeed and he will do everything he can to help them.

Why did you decide to go forward with the Summit now?

* Believe there is potential but reached point where we thought

potential
couldn't be realized without bringing leaders together.

* Negotiators have worked hard but can't take it any further. They made considerable progress over last several months, but now needed to get leaders together with the negotiators in order to move forward.

* In the absence of a Summit, there will be no agreement, and in absence of agreement, situation will slide back into turmoil. President felt it would be irresponsible not to go forward with Summit under the circumstances.

Was there unanimity on the Middle East team that the Summit should be held now?
Is it a problem that Barak wanted to have the Summit now but Araft didn't?

* Yes, there was unanimity on our Middle East team that now is the right time to hold the Summit.

* Both leaders have made clear to us that the only way to reach agreement is with a Summit.

* Important that in the final analysis, both leaders agreed to come to the Summit now without any hesitation and without any preconditions.

What is the potential? Parties seem far apart on the issues.

* Not going to discuss details of parties' positions, but only chance to realize the potential is by leaders coming together.

* We see potential in part because there have been serious discussions over the past several days of the summit, for the first time, on permanent status issues.
Very existence of permanent status negotiations is remarkable.

* No guarantees of success, and the President understands this. But he decided that the risks of not calling the leaders together at this point outweighed the risks of calling them together and not realizing the potential of

reaching
agreement.

Would failure mean an end to the Peace Process? Is this a reckless act?

* We are trying to change the dynamic to make it possible to succeed. If nothing else comes of Summit other than that things are moving forward in a positive direction, that is a good result.

* We have been intimately involved in the parties' efforts to negotiate the difficult issues, and it was our assessment that the negotiations had hit a wall. Of course there is a risk of failure, but it's a risk that is absolutely necessary to take in order to have any shot of success.

Isn't this all about POTUS legacy? Would failure be a setback for the President in his last six months?

* No. Both parties have felt for sometime that a summit was needed if there were to be any chance of resolving the difficult issues.

* The President is not doing this for himself. He's doing what he thinks is right for the region and for the American people.

* Our judgment, and the President's judgment, was that now is the right time to hold a summit, and he didn't feel that he could responsibly do anything else.

Are you expecting to resolve all the key issues? And if you don't, can you imagine an agreement that kicks some of the issues down the road?

* Not useful to speculate about different potential agreements. We intend to deal with all the issues, and this is also the intent of the parties.

What about September 13? Did Arafat's reminder that the Palestinians would unilaterally declare statehood on the 13th contribute to your decision to call a summit now?

* September 13 date has been out there for a long time. It's of course part of the entire landscape that factored into our decisionmaking.

What will you do on September 13? The Europeans have said they would recognize a state of Palestine; why not the U.S.?

* As we have always said, we favor negotiation. We believe there will be no enduring progress on the basis of unilateral steps.

* We will continue to work with both sides toward agreement.

What has been the role of the U.S. at the summit? The President's role?
Secretary of State's role?

* The President is determined to continue to be as helpful as we can. We are there to help the parties reach an agreement, and we will do whatever we can toward that end.

* President and Secretary have met and will continue to meet with the leaders and the delegations, in different configurations. Nature of the negotiations will obviously shape the nature of the meetings.

* President will continue to give as much time as needed to this but will also come back to Washington regularly to focus on other issues.

* The President has asked the Secretary of State to be at Camp David full time throughout the Summit.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/25/2000 9:16:03 AM
FROM Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR VP ON CAMP DAVID
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Matt has seen, but PG is not yet cleared by NSC-NESA or PRESS.
However, wanted to give you a preview.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc1.doc

Background: After 15 days of intensive negotiations, talks at Camp David are set to break up without an agreement. While progress was made by the negotiating teams on the issues of borders, security, and refugees, the leaders themselves were unable to find a compromise solution on Jerusalem.

CORE POINTS:

First of all, I want to commend Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat for their courage to come to Camp David and for their efforts to work toward a comprehensive peace agreement that serves the interests of their peoples.

Convening this summit was the right thing to do. The parties had intense and serious discussions about the most sensitive and complex issues.

It's obviously disappointing that the parties did not come to a formal agreement during their stay at Camp David. However, I believe both sides emerged with a better understanding of the other's position and concerns.

I would urge both sides to build on this improved understanding and to move forward with their historic efforts to bring peace and security to their people.

If asked why the Summit's collapse

All sides came to Camp David with the intention of coming to an agreement.

Everyone worked hard toward that goal, but unfortunately a compromise solution acceptable to both sides could not be found this time around.

If pressed on USG position on Jerusalem

Jerusalem is clearly one of the most sensitive and emotional of the permanent status issues.

Given those sensitivities, I believe Jerusalem is an issue best resolved by the parties themselves.

The fact that the parties themselves were willing to seriously discuss this issue is testimony to how far the peace process has come and I am urging both sides to continue that process.

If pressed on USG reaction should Arafat declare a Palestinian State this year

I don't want to speculate on hypotheticals.

However, I would strongly counsel both sides against taking any unilateral action that would damage the peace process.

The window for achieving a just and lasting peace is not closed.

I hope both sides will continue to demonstrate the moral courage and conviction needed to take positive steps toward achieving that goal.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/25/2000 2:06:30 PM

FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT MKA Briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY FYI - MKA briefing at 2:45 at State on Camp David Summit, on-camera and on-the-record. Followed by senior administration official on background, off-camera.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/26/2000 11:12:16 AM
FROM Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT letter to giorgione [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY cathy: please do the attached as a letter from me to mike giorgione at camp david. thanks.

Dear Mike:

On behalf of the "Camp David team" from the NSC, I wanted to thank you and your staff for your extraordinary efforts during the Middle East Peace Summit.

In our first conversations, I had tried to warn you about the burden the Summit would place upon you and all of those working at Camp David, but even I did not realize just how much we would ask. Throughout the long days and nights at Camp David, the support you and staff provided the negotiators from all three sides enabled them to concentrate totally on the difficult diplomatic and political challenges they faced. While we were not able to reach the agreement we had hoped for, the negotiations were unprecedented in addressing the most sensitive issues in the Middle East Peace Process. The unique setting of Camp David was an essential element in making such discussions possible.

I know that all of this was not achieved without a great deal of hard work and sacrifice by all those serving at Camp David and their families. Please extend the NSC's profound thanks to them for a job well done.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/27/2000 3:32:05 PM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Camp David Summit Collapse Guidance 7-25-2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT COLLAPSE OF CAMP DAVID SUMMIT GUIDANCE.doc
COLLAPSE OF CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
July 25, 2000

Why did the Summit fail?

* As the President said, there were extraordinary discussions over the last fourteen days. Intensive, unprecedented discussions on the most sensitive and

emotional issues in this conflict.

* Issues that were only touched on before were explored in great detail here. In that sense, there was a lot accomplished here. But in the end, couldn't find enough common ground to reach an agreement.

Who is responsible for the failure? Who did what and who didn't do enough?

* Not going to get into this kind of scorecard analysis.

* The issue in a conflict as complicated as this one is not who's right and who's wrong.

* Fact is the parties could not find enough common group on these issues to get an agreement.

* That said, Prime Minister Barak made an extraordinarily bold effort to reach agreement here.

So you're saying Arafat didn't do enough?

* As the President said, the Chairman is committed to peace.

* He led his delegation and his delegation definitely made an effort.

You're saying Barak was bold and that Arafat only made an effort? Did you think Arafat should have done more?

* The President's statement speaks for itself.

You say they made progress. Is anything locked in? What kind of progress is there?

* They had extraordinary discussions on the whole range of issues. And they made progress on each of them.

* The operating principle we had adopted from the outset was that nothing was

agreed until everything was agreed. And that continued to guide the discussions right up to the end of the summit.

* But it's fair to say that on each of the issues, there was progress in the discussions and that progress will undoubtedly be reflected in the future efforts that the parties will make.

Why did you call for a Summit if the gaps were so large?

* Fact is we were at an impasse. No way to move the process forward without bringing the leaders together. Involving them directly in the discussions and the decisionmaking.

* We were concerned that the process would slip back into a cycle of violence. Would have been irresponsible for us to sit back and do nothing to try and move the process ahead.

* Knew that the issues were extremely difficult and that there was a chance that we would not succeed, but felt it was important to make the effort with the leaders at this time.

Won't this failure make it worse? Aren't you afraid of violence now?

* Underlying reality is that the parties have to live together. And they have to find a way to overcome their differences.

* The important thing is that both leaders are committed to peace. And we are committed to helping them in any way we can.

What about plans for another summit? What are your next steps?

* Have asked us after a period of reflection of a few weeks to work with them to resume the negotiations.

* We will be considering what next steps are appropriate.

But what about another summit?

* Fact is this was an exhausting effort. For all sides, including us.

* Need a bit of time and space to reflect and determine what makes sense for next steps.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 25, 2000

TRILATERAL STATEMENT

Between July 11 and 24, under the auspices of President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met at Camp David in an effort to reach an agreement on permanent status. While they were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail. Building on the progress achieved at Camp David, the two leaders agreed on the following principles to guide their negotiations:

- 1) The two sides agreed that the aim of their negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
- 2) The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.
- 3) Both sides agree that negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement and they undertake to create an environment for negotiations free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.
- 4) The two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome of negotiations and that their differences will be resolved

only by good faith negotiations.

5) Both sides agree that the United States remains a vital partner in the search for peace and will continue to consult closely with President Clinton and Secretary Albright in the period ahead.

30-30-30

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/28/2000 10:16:32 AM
FROM Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS Interview last night with Israeli TV [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Dennett, Todd H. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Can you get this to mil-aide with the VP for inclusion into
'normal' reading materiel, i.e., doesn't need special attention?

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT INTERNAL TRANSCRIPT - RBTP in 7-27-2000 Israeli TV Interview___.doc

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Internal Transcript
July 27, 2000

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY ISRAELI TELEVISION

The Roosevelt Room

5:42 P.M. EDT

Q Mr. President, time is of the essence. How do you consider right now the relationship between Israel and the United States after the summit?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it's very strong. But I think in view of the courageous actions that the Prime Minister and the Israeli team took at the summit, and in view of the withdrawal from Lebanon, I think some review and strengthening is in order.

I plan to have a comprehensive review to improve our strategic relationship. We're going to have talks that will start right away, with a view toward what we can do to ensure that Israeli maintains its qualitative edge, modernizes the IDF and meets the new threats that Israel and the other countries will face in the 21st century.

Secondly, I want to have a memorandum of understanding done as soon as possible with regard to our bilateral assistance, with a goal of making a long-term commitment to the necessary support to modernize the IDF. I think that's important.

The third thing that I think is significant is that we provide assistance, which we will do, to Israel, to upgrade its security, in light of the withdrawal from Lebanon. And in that context, we also want to try to help the government of Lebanon to strengthen its ability to control South Lebanon and to make progress toward a more normal existence. There are some other things that we're reviewing.

You know, I have always wanted to move our embassy to West Jerusalem. We have a designated site there. I have not done so because I didn't want to do anything to undermine our ability to help to broker a secure and fair and lasting peace for Israelis and for Palestinians. But in light of what has happened, I've taken that decision under review and I'll make a decision sometime between now and the end of the year on that.

And there are other things I think we have to be open to. But the main thing that I want the people of Israel to know is that the United States remains a friend and a partner, completely committed to the security and future of Israel; continuing to believe that a just and lasting peace is the best alternative, and the only alternative for absolute security. But in the meanwhile, we have to do what we can to strengthen the capacity of Israel to defend itself and to deepen our bilateral relationship. So I intend to do that.

Q You mentioned the relocation of the Israeli -- of the American Embassy and put it in Jerusalem. Would you consider it in any circumstances, even if there is no agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think I should stand on the words I said. I have always wanted to do it. I've always thought it was the right thing to do. But I didn't want to do anything to undermine the peace process our ability to be an honest broker, which requires that we be accepted by both sides.

But it's something that I have taken under review now because of the recent events. And I think that's all I should say about it now.

Q So what is the next move right now? As I understand, Prime Minister Barak is saying that he's willing to go to another summit. What do you think is the next move?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think, first of all, we need to have their people start talking directly again, and I think they will at a certain level. And then the Prime Minister needs to have a little time, I think, in Israel to deal with governmental issues. And I would hope that Chairman Arafat and the other leaders in the Arab world will work to prepare their public for the proposition that there can be no agreement without courage and conscience, but also honorable compromise -- that's what agreements are.

The Palestinians did make some moves at these talks that have never been made before. And while I made it clear in my statement, I thought that the Prime Minister was more creative and more courageous. They did make some moves, and the teams -- the negotiating teams, for the first time in a formal setting where it counted, actually discussed these issues.

Now, you know, there had been side papers and discussions and all that over the last seven years, since Oslo, but nothing like this, not ever. And there's a reason when the Oslo agreements were signed that these final status issues were put off until the end -- they're hard, they're difficult, they're contentious. But the fact that they were actually there talking and the fact that I saw changes emerge on both sides, including within the Palestinian camp, I think is hopeful.

But what I want to do -- first of all, I'll do anything I can. I'll be glad to convene another meeting. I'll go anywhere, do anything, anything I can. But --

Q Will you consider a visit to Israel --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just want to defer making any statements until I make a decision about what is the best thing for the peace process. I will act as soon as I can be helpful. We're doing things all the time, including now, today, as we speak. But I don't want to do something that's not helpful. And if we're going to make a difference, then the next time we meet, both sides have to be prepared to make the decisions necessary to conclude an agreement. And as soon as I'm convinced that's a good possibility, I'll do what I can to make it happen.

Q You know, the discussion about Jerusalem during the summit opened Pandora's Box in Israel. Can you assure the Israeli people that Barak isn't going to divide Jerusalem?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say this. First of all, all the discussions that were held were private and I have to honor that. What the Israelis and Palestinians decide to say about it is their affair. But I can't be in the position of violating the trust of either side.

What I believe is that Prime Minister Barak in no way ever compromised the vital interests of the security of the State of Israel. One thing I think that I can say without violating either side is that the most progress in the talks was made in the area of security, where there was a surprising amount of consensus and an understanding that neither side would be secure after a peace agreement unless

both were secure and unless both worked together -- and there was no interest, fundamentally, in the Palestinians in having a weak Israel, a vulnerable Israel, an Israel unable to defend itself; and that the Palestinians would be stronger if they were working together.

I think if there is one thing that should be encouraging to the people of Israel, of all political parties and persuasions, it would be that. There was a clear willingness to try to come to grips with what were very different positions on this issue when they met, and come together. And I was quite encouraged by that.

You know, Jerusalem is a difficult issue. But I believe that the Prime Minister did everything he could to reach an agreement while preserving the vital interests of Israel.

Q Israel is afraid that if Barak already made some concessions right now, and that the Palestinians didn't make any concession -- in Jerusalem -- so many people are afraid that if the negotiations will resume, Israel will be asked to do, to make some more concessions. Can you tell the Israeli people that you wouldn't ask Barak to give much more than what he already was ready to give?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I don't think that he will ever do anything that he believes undermines the vital interest of the people of Israel and Jerusalem. And it is true that while the Palestinians, themselves, didn't make some moves on Jerusalem, that Israel did more. But nothing that I think undermined the vital interests of the people of Israel.

And I think that is an issue where -- and, frankly, most of the discussion involved ideas embraced not formally by either side. And they are not bound by it. So I believe that -- everybody pretty well knows right now that there won't necessarily be a lot more movement of the same kind. And we may have to have a resolution in some ways that no one has quite thought of yet.

But I kept telling the Palestinians, and I will say again to the world, that you cannot make an agreement over something as important as a city that is the holiest place in the world -- to the Jews, to the Christians and to the -- one of the holiest places in the world to the Muslims -- if it is required of one side

to say I completely defeated the interest of the other side. If either side gets to say that at the end, there won't be an agreement. There can't be.

There has to be a way to identify the legitimate interests -- and there are legitimate interests in both sides, in Jerusalem, in such a way that they are met and honored and that the sanctity of the Holy City is uplifted. There has to be a way to do that. But, you know, it's not for me to design a plan, they have to come to it. And I think they will come to it if the people of Israel, and if the Palestinians will give their leaders a clear message that they trust them not to compromise their vital interest or their security; but beyond that, to be as flexible as possible, to try to honorably accommodate each other's true interests.

Q During the talks, did you consider the possibility that maybe Barak's concession will not pass a referendum?

THE PRESIDENT: I did. Of course, he has to be the final judge of that.

Q -- help him with that.

THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me?

Q You can always advise him and help him with that, too.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they reach an agreement that they both believe is right and honorable, and protects their vital interests and their security, obviously I would do whatever I could to persuade the people to support it. I don't know that I would have much influence, but I would do whatever I could. I would certainly never countenance an agreement that I thought undermined Israel's security, but you don't have to worry about that. I don't think there was ever anything that was clearer to me in these negotiations.

The people of Israel may differ with their Prime Minister on some of the details, but they should never question whether he had the long-term security and vital interests of Israel uppermost in his mind. That was clear. And as I said, to me something that should be very encouraging is that they really did make a lot of progress on the security issue. And Israel was, I think, the big winner

there. But only because the Palestinians recognize that their security will be tied to Israel's security if they make an agreement.

Q I'm sure that you know that the majority of Israeli, the people admire your devotion to the peace process. And they ask themselves today if President Clinton can't bring peace, which President of the United States will do it?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would hope that any President would honor America's historic commitment to Israel, and our decades of involvement in the Middle East, and our attempt to be fair to the legitimate interests of all the people of the region, including the Palestinians. I don't know if anybody else will ever put the time in on this that I have, or have the kind of personal, almost religious conviction I have about it.

But, keep in mind, this is an evolutionary process. If we don't finish -- and I believe we can, and I still believe we will -- but if we don't finish this year, the negotiating teams for the two sides, and the attitudes of the people will be in a different place than they were because of all that has happened over the last seven years, and especially because of what happened at Camp David, as long as there is a constructive attitude taken about it, and a deepened resolve to be frank with the public, and that this is especially important for the Palestinians.

Q You are known as the tireless master of negotiating. What happened there? How can both leaders resist the Clinton charm?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm afraid my charm and my reasoning abilities, at least for just 15 days, cannot compare with the thousands of years of history that go to the core of the identity of Israelis and Palestinians, as regards Jerusalem. But that's okay; we made a lot of progress -- we got people to talk about it, to deal with it, to think about it.

And I hope I prompted a lot of thinking about all the various options available to them. There is more than one way to resolve this in a way that's honorable for everyone.

But I must tell you, when we started these negotiations, I didn't think we had a one in ten chance to succeed. And we actually got more done than I thought we

would.

I called this summit because I was afraid that the lack of progress was spinning out of control. The parties, after all, promised each other they would reach an agreement by the middle of September. And they'd never even met to formally, frankly, openly discuss these issues -- ever.

So I think when you look at it in that context, it's -- you know, if I were just sitting on the outside, and I didn't know any more about it, I would be profoundly disappointed. I'd say, they've had seven years, what have they been doing all this time? Well, you know what they've -- we've had a lot of progress in the last seven years, an enormous amount. But these final status issues were put off until the end because both sides knew they were potentially explosive and agonizingly difficult.

So it wasn't really a matter of charm. Believe me, if I could have prevailed by charming, cajoling, arguing, or just depriving them of sleep, we would have a deal. The last two nights I went to bed at 5:00 a.m., in the morning both nights. I did my best so I would be the last person standing on both sides, you know. Of all the sides there.

But we just couldn't get there. And we won't get there until each side decides. And this is the decision I think Prime Minister Barak made. That he would go as far as he could without making any specific commitments, because we had it organized so that neither side would be exposed.

So for people to say that he's bound by all these commitments, I don't think that's an accurate reflection of the way I conducted the negotiations. I went out of my way, especially as regards Jerusalem, to set it up so that if either side were willing to float some ideas or entertain some ideas, they wouldn't be exposed, and they could always take them back if there was no agreement.

But both sides -- and this applies to the Palestinians, they're going to have to think about this -- they have to decide that there is a solution which meets their vital interests, that does not permit them, after it is over, to say, I won and they lost. You have to be able to be able to say, when this is over, We won; peace won; our children won; the future won. We may -- yes, if we can get 100

percent of everything we wanted, no. Is it an honorable compromise that preserves our vital interests and enhances our security -- not just maintains it -- enhances it, yes. That has to be the test. The test has to be that our vital interests are preserved, our security is enhanced, our future is brighter, and neither side suffered a cataclysmic defeat. That's not what a negotiation is.

Q Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to be that Egypt and Saudi Arabia didn't help to persuade Arafat to make the necessary concessions to have an agreement. It seems to be that this both allies of the United States in this crucial moment couldn't deliver the goods.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that the truth is that because this had never been discussed before between the two parties -- and because when we went into the negotiations, they were usually secret or sacrosanct -- that I'm not sure, number one, that they thought they knew enough to know what to ask for. Although I did my best to try to get them to help, in general terms, before the process started.

But I'm not sure they knew enough to know explicitly what to ask for. Which won't be the case if we meet again. Because we're down the road enough now.

And, number two, I do believe that the public opinion among the Palestinians, and throughout the Middle East, had not even sufficiently discussed all these issues. You can see it was still operating at the high level of rhetoric, you know. And at some point, there has to be a way of saying, we have won by making sure the Israelis didn't lose. And the Israelis have to be able to say, we have won by making sure the Palestinians didn't lose. And that's -- it's harder to sell.

When you're dealing with something as involved as Jerusalem in these peace talks, the only person who's going to get cheered is the person that says, no, no, no. And that's an easy sell. You go out and say, no, and you can get up the crowd, and they'll cheer you. But if that is the attitude which prevails, then we won't get peace.

Q There is a right now in the Congress some proposal to eliminate or prevent the use, aid to the Palestinians if they decide unilaterally to declare about statehood. Hillary Clinton, your wife, is for this proposal. What is your

approach?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the bill has just been introduced. We don't give a great deal of aid there, as you know. And a lot of it is --

Q But it's very symbolic.

THE PRESIDENT: Very symbolic. Well, let me just say this. I think there should not be a unilateral declaration. And if there is, our entire relationship will be reviewed, not confined to that. So I don't -- I make it a practice normally when the bills are first introduced -- and I haven't even reviewed them, not to comment -- but I think it would be a big mistake to take a unilateral action and walk away from the peace process. And if it happens, there will inevitably be consequences -- not just here, but throughout the world, and things will happen. I would review our entire relationship, including, but not limited to that.

Q If there will be agreement, what kind of support the Israeli people can expect from the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: I will do my best to get the maximum amount of support. One of the reasons I wanted very much to get the agreement this time is that it would give us more time to pass an aid package through Congress. But if there is an agreement, Israel will have further security needs, there will be human costs involved. There will have to be some sort of international fund set up for the refugees.

There is, I think, some interest, interestingly enough, on both sides, in also having a fund which compensates the Israelis who were made refugees by the war, which occurred after the birth of the State of Israel. Israel is full of people, Jewish people, who lived in predominantly Arab countries who came to Israel because they were made refugees in their own land.

That's another piece of good news I think I can reveal out of the summit. The Palestinians said they thought those people should be eligible for compensation, as well. So we'll have to set up a fund and we will contribute. I went to the G-8 in Okinawa in part to give them a report, and I asked the Europeans and the

Japanese to contribute, as well. And there will be other costs associated with this. So it will not be inexpensive.

Also, if there is an agreement and if the Palestinians set up a state pursuant to an agreement, Israel has a strong interest in seeing it be economically stronger and more self-sufficient, a better trading partner; not just a supply of labor but also a country capable of buying Israeli products in greater detail and growing together in the future. So there will be economic issues that have to be dealt with.

I will try to get as much support as I possibly can for the United States, but also as much support as I possibly can from Europe, from Japan and from other people in the world.

Q With your permission, Mr. President, can you take us inside Camp David and describe us one of the crucial moments, one of the crucial crises?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the only thing I can talk about without revealing the substance of the talks, which I have promised not to do, is the first time the talks almost broke up. Right before I went to Okinawa, I thought the talks were over. I even went by and said goodbye to Chairman Arafat. And I went by and said goodbye to Prime Minister Barak. And I was walking around talking to the Palestinian and Israeli peace teams. And it was obvious to me that they did not want to go, and that they feared that if they left in the position the talks were then in, that there would be an enormous harshness and recrimination, and it could wind up being a net setback, if you will, for the peace process.

And then, all of a sudden, it became obvious to me that they didn't want to go, that they wanted to keep trying, that they thought it was still possible. So I went back around, I made two more visits. By then, it's very late at night and I'm leaving at dawn the next day. It was like 1:30 a.m. or 1:45 a.m. I made two more visits to both Prime Minister Barak and his team and to Chairman Arafat and his team.

And I finally concluded that they really didn't want to quit. And so I invited them to stay. And I said that I had to go to the G-8 because the United States had some strong interest in Okinawa -- it's a main base for a lot of our forces

in the Pacific -- and because I owed it to my partners to go there to my last meeting, and because I wanted to ask them for money to help the peace process. But that if they would stay, I would leave Secretary Albright behind in charge and they could keep talking, and they wanted to do it.

That was, I think, the pivotal moment which turned this from a negative result to a positive result, even though we didn't get an agreement. Because in the next few days, they relaxed, they began to talk, the Palestinians began to open up a little bit, and we began to get a sense that -- at least how we might get an agreement, even if the parties couldn't reach it this time. In my mind, looking back on it, I think that was a pivotal moment.

Q Finally, I wanted to ask you, many critics of yours are saying that you are looking desperately for the missing chapter of your legacy, and maybe you tried to overcome the impeachment process. Is the Middle East issue is the missing chapter of this legacy?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Look, you know, I'm not proud of the personal mistake I made, but I'm proud of what happened in the impeachment process. As far as I'm concerned, we saved the United States Constitution. And I think history will record it favorably to me and unfavorably to those who did it. And I think I have a pretty good legacy here with our economy, with our social progress on crime, on welfare, on education; on health care, for the elderly, for children. And I am proud of what I have done in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Latin America.

This has nothing to do with my legacy. All my life, I have wanted to see peace in the Middle East, and I promised myself when I got elected President, I would work until the last day to achieve it. This is not about me; it's about the children who live in the Middle East. It's about whether those children will be living together or living apart, whether there will be fighting or learning together.

Q And you're convinced it can be done?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely. And if it doesn't happen while I'm here, I just want to know that I have done everything I possibly could to make sure it will

happen as soon as possible. But I am absolutely convinced that we can do it and that we should do it before the end of the year, because the parties have committed themselves to this September deadline. The parties came to Camp David; nobody had to come. Prime Minister Barak thought it was a good time and I knew if we didn't do it, we would never get around to dealing with this.

We have a saying in America, this is like going to the dentist without having your gums deadened, you know? It's like having somebody pull your teeth with no painkiller. This is not easy. This was hard for these people. But if we hadn't started -- you know, you never get to the end of the road unless you get out on the road and take the first step. And this was a huge, important thing.

Q Mr. President, thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: You're welcome.

END

6:12 P.M. EDT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 08/02/2000 9:08:49 AM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS Foreign Policy Priorities [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Thought folks might be interested in the attached guidance prepared by the NSC for a POTUS interview with the Washington Post today. Summarizes President's foreign policy goals for the balance of his term. Note that this is in draft form and still be being revised. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUSHarris.doc
POTUS GUIDANCE
YEAR 2000
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

Highest Priority

1. Middle East Peace Process

* Recent Camp David Summit didn't end with an agreement, but it has created a debate and a dynamic within the region that forces both parties to

really
confront the core final status issues for the first time.

* They are close enough that an agreement is possible. I'm prepared to do anything I can to help them reach an agreement.

2. Russia/Arms Control/National Missile defense

* I've had two meetings with President Putin this year. I expect to see him twice more before the end of the year. We have a wide ranging agenda with Russia, including non-proliferation, arms control, missile defense, economic and democratic reforms, Chechnya, rule of law and freedom of the press.

* I expect to make a decision on NMD within the next few weeks, based on the four criteria (threat, cost, technical feasibility and overall impact on national security, including arms control) I've outlined before. I will continue to push for parallel discussions on START III to continue.

3. China PNTR

* We are working very hard on this because it is a priority for the American people. Pleased the House passed PNTR. Disappointed the Senate failed to act before its August recess.

* It clearly advances our interests, both our global economic interests and our national security interests. Believe at the end of the day Congress will do the right thing for the American people. China's accession to WTO and our provision of PNTR will increase China's participation in a predictable, transparent, and rules-based international system and increase its stake in regional peace and stability.

4. Global Engagement

* U.S. is the world's indispensable nation. But we can't lead the world

on the
cheap. Remain concerned and engaged with the Hill that we have the
resources
necessary to support this engagement. Must ensure that military
remains best
equipped, best trained and best prepared force in the world. Must have
resources
to support diplomacy around the world, whether in the Balkans,
Middle East,
Colombia or anywhere we have significant national interests. Must
pay our dues
to the UN and our fair share of the cost of peacekeeping operations.

5. Northern Ireland

* Making steady progress on full implementation of the Good Friday
Accords.
Institutions are up and running. Decommissioning has been enhanced
by the
confidence building measures that have put IRA weapons "beyond
use." Prisoners
are being released. Working through police issue.

Second Tier

1. Colombia

* Very pleased by the strong bipartisan support we received on the
Hill for our
aid package to Colombia. I plan to travel to Colombia at the end of the
month to
demonstrate my support for Plan Colombia, President Pastrana and
the Colombian
people.

* Our assistance will help Colombia reinvigorate its economy,
enhance its
governing capability, discourage human rights abuses, and reduce the
money
available to guerrillas and paramilitaries from involvement in drug
trafficking.
As such, the plan represents the best chance to promote real progress
in the
peace process.

2. Terrorism/WMD Preparedness

* Have strengthened law enforcement and intelligence efforts. In cooperation with other governments, we have targeted terrorist finances, broken up support cells, disrupted training and brought suspects to justice. The Administration undertook the largest counter-terrorism operation in U.S. history to ensure a peaceful Millennium celebration.

* Concerned that Congress is not providing the necessary funding for cyber security or counterterrorism efforts that enable us to detect and deter terrorist threats, or train people to effectively respond in the event we are attacked.

3. Balkans

* Just marked the one-year anniversary of the Stability Pact by creating a new \$150 million Trust Fund to promote small and medium businesses across Southeast Europe. In addition, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation launched a new \$150 million equity fund to invest in telecommunications, consumer goods and other sectors across the region. The United States has pledged support for more than 50 of the "Quick Start" projects.

* The impact of these and other international efforts already is being felt in the region. In Bosnia, disputes are settled at the ballot box; refugee returns are rising; and people are more focused on building roads and bridges to the rest of Europe than on building walls between neighbors. In Kosovo, while the goal of co-existence remains a difficult task, people are preparing for the first democratic local elections in their history. Croatia is moving forward to democracy. Across the region, from Romania to Bulgaria to Macedonia to Albania, economies are expected to recover from negative growth in 1999 to more than three percent positive growth this year, with inflation down.

* Milosevic remains a concern. In Okinawa, the G-8 leaders,

including Russian President Putin, expressed our grave concern about these actions and warned against any steps that would contribute to the further tensions or undermine Montenegro. Continue to work with the democratic opposition in Serbia, to help it unite around a common platform, to support non-governmental organizations and the independent media.

4. Africa Trade Bill/Caribbean Basin Initiative

* Major legislative accomplishment. Implemented a new, comprehensive trade policy aimed at developing a partnership with Africa economic growth and development and facilitate Africa's integration into the global economy. The legislative cornerstone of this policy is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into law on May 18, 2000. The Act will expand the generalized system of preferences (GSP) program to provide duty-free treatment to virtually all products exported to the U.S. from sub-Saharan Africa.

5. India-Pakistan

* Trip to South Asia has enabled us to strengthen our relationship with the nations of that part of the world. My visit promoted the range of interests we have with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh -- including non-proliferation, trade, energy and the environment, and promotion of democracy.

* We want to have a better relationship with India, the world's largest democracy. I look forward to seeing Prime Minister Vajpayee next month.

6. Cyprus

* Continue to support UN process for dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

7. Iran

* Lifted restrictions on the import of carpets and pistachios. Continue to build on people-to-people programs. Have made clear to Iran our desire for government-to-government dialogue.

* Hear interesting comments from Iran's leadership from time to time, tempered by prosecution of Iranian Jews on trumped up charges. Real struggle continues within Iran regarding its relationship with the rest of the world.

8. Health/Debt Relief

* Major topics of discussion at U.S.-EU Summit in June and at G8 meeting last month in Okinawa. Forgave \$500 million in African debt, announced initiative to link debt relief to health and education investments, and forged agreement among G-8 industrialized countries to provide additional debt relief.

9. North Korea

* North-South summit is historic. Believe dialogue between the North and South is key to reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. We've been working hard to promote this dialogue for quite some time.

* Encouraged that North and South Korea are following up on specific actions the two Presidents agreed on in Pyongyang. Secretary Albright just met with her North Korean counterpart in Bangkok. Expect to engage North Korea in further missile talks later in the year, find out more about what Chairman Kim told President Putin about their missile program.

10. Nigeria

* Look forward to going to Nigeria later this month. Nigeria's transition from a military dictatorship to a democracy will be the most influential development in

Africa for the next ten years.

* President Obasanjo has demonstrate a willingness to tackle the tough issues that confront Nigeria and the region - AIDS and other infectious diseases, crime and drug trafficking, ending regional conflicts and economic reform.

11. Climate Change

* Environmental issues now part of our every day engagement with countries around the world. Recent follow up on historic Kyoto Protocol at G8 meeting, also part of dialogue earlier this year with India.

* Ensuring that U.S. efforts to expand trade reflect a strong commitment to promoting environmental protection worldwide. Fostered strong environmental standards at U.S. export agencies, the World Bank and other international financial institutions, including targets for clean energy lending. Led the fight for the recent G8 commitment to common environmental guidelines for export credit agencies by 2001.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Donald Gentile to nsa.ic.gov at 2:52 PM. Subject: White House Situation Room. (9 pages)	08/11/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/2000-08/23/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1598

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 08/23/2000 6:43:09 PM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT REVISED Foreign Policy Accomplishments [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Leah - with track changes didn't check for redundant points though. will bring down to explain anything. thanks - KB

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

REVISED Foreign Policy Accomplishments.doc

Foreign Policy: World's Strongest Force for Peace, Freedom and Prosperity

Promoting Peace and Strengthening Democracy

- * Advancing peace in the Middle East by hosting Camp David Summit between

Israelis and Palestinians, which constituted first high-level discussions of all

permanent status issues; brokering peace agreements between Israel and its other

neighbors, including the Palestinians and Jordan; negotiating the Wye River

Accords; supporting the launch of final settlement negotiations between the

Israelis and Palestinians; and revitalizing peace talks between the Syrians and

Israelis.

- * Stabilizing Southeast Europe by ending a decade of repression and ethnic

cleansing in Kosovo through leading NATO alliance to victory in air campaign and

ushering in international peacekeepers, and by launching the Stability Pact to

strengthen democracy, economic development and security throughout the region

and accelerating its integration with the rest of Europe

- * Helped broker the Good Friday Peace Accord in Northern Ireland,

ending decades

of bloodshed and empowering the people of Northern Ireland to determine their future.

* Led diplomatic efforts to end the civil war and foster multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia.

* Restored democratic government in Haiti, ending military dictatorship and stopping refugee flows.

* Supporting transitions to democracy in South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia,

Central Europe and the Baltics and supporting mediation peace efforts in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone,

Burundi, and Ethiopia-Eritrea.

* Helped end violence and protected democracy in East Timor by leading diplomatic efforts and supporting international peacekeeping mission.

* Helped settle the Peru-Ecuador border dispute and end civil war in Guatemala.

* Pressing for human rights and religious freedom worldwide, including in China, Burma and Sudan.

* Re-started talks toward a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus

Combating Threats

* Protecting Americans from weapons of mass destruction by working to reduce

Russian nuclear arsenal [s] through implementation of strategic arms control

agreements (START) and cooperative threat reduction programs, permanently

eliminating nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, easing nuclear

tensions between India and Pakistan, signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty, and achieving the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

* Enhancing military stability in Europe by successfully concluding the adapted

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

* Combating terrorism by developing a national counter-terrorism strategy,

appointing a national coordinator and striking terrorist targets in Afghanistan

and Sudan.

* Waging war on drugs by intensifying interdiction efforts,

strengthening

cooperation with allies, cracking down on drug lords and

providing \$1.3 billion

in assistance for Colombia.

* Reducing North Korean threat through deterrence, including the forward

deployment of 37,000 U.S. troops; diplomacy, including bilateral talks leading to

a moratorium on long-range missile testing; and non-proliferation, including the

eventual dismantling of North Korea's dangerous nuclear facilities.

* Containing Iraq while working toward regime change through deterrence, economic

sanctions, humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi people from the oil-for-food

program, and support for popular opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime.

* Addressing new threats by protecting America's critical infrastructure from

cyber-terrorism and biological and chemical weapons.

* Discussed development of a limited national missile defense to protect against

attacks from states that threaten international peace and security while

preserving strategic stability with Russia.

* Strengthening military readiness and modernizing our armed forces.

* Combating trafficking in persons, especially women and children, through the

development of an integrated strategy that focuses on prevention, prosecution of

traffickers, and protection of and assistance to victims.

* Fighting proliferation by improving controls over Russian nuclear weapon

materials, and by funding legitimate employment opportunities for former Russian

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons researchers and institutes as an

alternative to peddling their skills abroad.

* Negotiating a protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, banning

antipersonal landmines that do not self-destruct and self-deactivate, signed by

all the major mine-producing nations.

* Waging war on international crime by strengthening U.S. law enforcement

programs and bilateral, regional and global cooperation related to drug

trafficking, money laundering and other international organized crime and by

providing \$1.3 billion in additional funding for critical counter-drug

and
related initiatives throughout the Andean Region.
* Mobilizing leadership and resources - including development of
new vaccines -
to fight AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which threaten development,
economic
growth, stability and security.

Strengthening Alliances and Building Partnerships

* Fulfilling vision of an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe
by enlarging
NATO, integrating Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic and
Southeast Europe,
and strengthening NATO's partnerships with Russia, Ukraine and the
other New
Independent States.
* Building a more constructive relationship with China through
engagement and
frank dialogue, leading to cooperation on non-proliferation and
regional
security, environmental protection.
* Deepening security alliance with Japan through adoption of Defense
Guidelines
and Joint Security Declaration.
* Strengthening cooperation with South Korea through jointly offered
Four Party
Peace Talks with North Korea and the establishment of Trilateral
Consultation and
Oversight Group to coordinate North Korea policy.
* Supporting democracy, human rights, and market economies in
Russia, Ukraine,
and the countries of the former Soviet Union and promoting their
international
integration
* Secured landmark agreements to develop oil and gas pipelines from
the Caspian
Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, strengthening ties in the region and
ensuring
Americans have continued access to vital natural resources.
* Expanding trade and strengthening democracy in Asia and Latin
America through
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Summit of the
Americas, and the
Organization of American States.
* Strengthening ties with Africa by launching the new Partnership for
Economic
Growth and Opportunity, achieving passage of the African Growth
and Opportunity
Act, and supporting the Africa Crisis Response Initiative and other
regional

peacekeeping efforts.

- * Preserved U.S. leadership role at the United Nations by reaching agreement with

Congress that would enable us to pay \$1 billion in back dues. *

Deepened security

ties with the Philippines through adoption of the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Expanding Prosperity

- * Opening markets for U.S. exports abroad and creating American jobs through

NAFTA, GATT and nearly 300 other free and fair trade agreements.

- * Integrating China into the world economy through landmark agreement for China's

entry into the World Trade Organization that opens markets to U.S. exports,

slashes Chinese tariffs, and protects American workers from dumping.

- * Established World Trade Organization to reduce tariffs, settle trade disputes, and enforce rules.

- * Reduced the possibility that a future Asian financial crisis would undermine

America's prosperity by promoting structural reform -- including sound monetary

policies, urging banking reforms and fighting corruption abroad.

- * Stimulating worldwide growth through support for the IMF and G-8 global economic strategy.

- * Assisted Mexico's economic recovery with \$20 billion in emergency support loans.

- * Forgave \$500 million in African debt, announced initiative to link debt relief

to health and education investments, and forged agreement among G-8

industrialized countries to provide additional debt relief.

- * Helped to overcome the Asian financial crisis through support for multilateral

and bilateral efforts and through keeping America's markets open at a critical juncture.

- * Helped facilitate disaster relief and reconstruction in Central American

countries affected by Hurricane Mitch, committing \$940 million to economic

reactivation, education, public health, and future mitigation.

- * Helped Brazil avert financial crisis by backing \$41.5 billion international

support package.

[National Security Council]

