

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/07/2000 7:37:11 PM
FROM Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT SRB GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
NSA Email
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY

Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bolton, Edward L. Jr. (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
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Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)

Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY

FOR SRB

This is the standing guidance we have on the Summit and NMD. I hope to get an additional MEPP package from State in the morning. We will update the guidance after the noon conference call tomorrow as we have in the past, summarizing the best questions and answers per your dialogue with the Secretary and Dennis.

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

MEPP-NMD-jul07gui2000_.doc
NSC GUIDANCE
July 7, 2000

Camp David Summit

NMD/Core Points

NMD/Flight Tests (draft)

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
July 7, 2000

Why did the President decide to convene this Summit?

* As President said, he believes the parties have a real opportunity to reach an agreement on the core issues that have fueled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

* But the negotiators have taken this as far as they can. Issues that remain are sensitive and complex, and require leaders' direct involvement.

* Without a Summit, there will be no agreement, decisions will not get any easier, and situation is likely to deteriorate. The alternative to a Summit is to keep the negotiations in current impasse and risk escalation over time.

* All three leaders reached consensus that now is the time to try to move this forward.

What do you hope to get out of the Summit?

* The ultimate objective has always been the same: to reach an agreement on the core permanent status issues.

* There is of course no guarantee that it can be achieved, for the issues the parties face are existential and gaps remain significant. But the President believes there is both a real danger of backsliding and a real opportunity for progress, and that we have a responsibility to seize it.

* The key is to move the process forward, and the only way to do that at this point is with the direct involvement of the leaders because the negotiators have taken this as far as they could.

How long do you expect the Summit will last?

* We will not set a deadline. The President will assess progress periodically.

* Right now, the President is focused on doing everything he can to help the parties reach an agreement as quickly as possible. He is well aware of the challenge, but he believes there is no time to waste. There is a real opportunity and this is the best way to make progress.

* He has spoken to PM Barak and Chairman Arafat, and both share his view that we need to try to do this now.

Does the President intend to attend the G8 Summit?

* Yes. The President needs to leave for the Summit of the G8 on the 19th and

both leaders understand that.

Do you really believe you can reach an agreement in a week?

* The issue is no longer one of time. The issue is whether the two leaders are prepared to take the tough decisions required to reach an agreement.

* The fact is that the two sides have been dealing with these issues for a long period now, and each one is familiar with the other side's position. Without courage and creativity, these talks could drag on for another ten years without an agreement.

What will the U.S. role be at the Summit?

* Ultimately, only the Israelis and Palestinians can make the historic decisions for peace. US cannot and will not try to impose its views on either side.

* At the same time, the parties traditionally have asked us to play a role in the negotiations, and we have done so in a variety of ways. Expect that will be case here too.

Will the U.S. table its proposal?

* Will not get into the details of what we will or will not do. Suffice it to say that we will do what best helps the parties.

Will the President be at Camp David every day?

* There is no greater priority for the President at this time.

* He is prepared to participate in the talks as much as is needed to help the parties reach an agreement.

* Expect the President to go back and forth as appropriate.

What will happen if the parties fail to reach an agreement?

* As I said, there is certainly is no guarantee of success. Clearly the gaps remain significant.

* But the consequences of continued stalemate are dangerous.

* President believes this is the only way to try to move forward, and he is convinced that there is a real opportunity to succeed. Right now, we are focused on trying to do just that.

If the negotiators have exhausted their usefulness, what will they be doing for two days?

* Any Summit like this requires intensive preparatory work, and both sides agreed that it would make sense to send their senior negotiators to the U.S. ahead of the Summit.

* They will be working with Secretary Albright in that spirit.

NMD: CORE POINTS
June 22, 2000

Core Points:

* Emerging threat. Prudent to explore appropriate response

* Can and if possible should be done consistent with adapted ABM treaty. Treaty provides for adjustments

* Working with Russians who acknowledge threat but disagree over response.

* Decision later this year whether to move forward next spring

* Four criteria (threat, cost, technology, overall security including arms

control)

- * Prepared to share appropriate technology with Allies and Russia

Welch Report

- * Valuable contribution which provides independent assessment
- * Key findings
- * Important progress in the last year
- * The program is technically feasible to meet the Phase I requirement (up to a dozen or two warheads with simple decoys), but further attention is needed to the problem of discriminating decoys from real warheads for Phase II.
- * Meeting the schedule remains high risk, but Welch does not recommend changing the schedule at this point

Perry, Shali, etc/Boost phase:

- * Open-minded about boost phase approach-but technically not available by 2005 when threat projected to emerge
- * Could be valuable supplement to our architecture; prepared to discuss with Russians and others; our negotiations with Russians to permit our Phase 1 would not preclude further agreed amendments to accommodate this approach.

Reinterpretation of ABM Breach

- * No decision yet on deployment
- * Treaty does not define what constitutes breach/range of interpretations possible
- * Only prudent that lawyers review possible interpretations
- * Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that President

will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security including arms control

Hill arguments in favor of postponing decision and deferring negotiations with Russians

- * Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years

- * President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security

- * Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what is appropriate

- * No decision yet

Korean Summit/undercuts need/urgency for NMD

- * Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of tensions on Korean Peninsula

- * Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions

- * Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely

- * Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue

- * Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports)

Postol/Decoys

- * Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program

- * Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I)

- * Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

NMD: FLIGHT TEST July 7, 2000

CONTEXT. On July 7, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization announced it performed a flight test involving a planned intercept of a target reentry vehicle over the central Pacific Ocean. [An intercept was achieved][An intercept was not achieved]. This was the fifth National Missile Defense (NMD) integrated flight test (IFT). The first two (IFT-1A and IFT-2) tested the ability of sensors deployed on kill vehicles to discriminate between warheads and decoys, and did not involve actual intercepts. The third (IFT-3) conducted on October 2, 1999, was the first NMD flight test designed to conduct an actual intercept; in this test, the kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. The fourth (IFT-4) conducted on January 18, 2000, failed to achieve an intercept. Yesterday's test (IFT-5) was the third NMD flight test designed to conduct an actual intercept. BMDO is now conducting a review of the test; a more complete review could take several weeks to compile.

POLICY

- * Committed to the development of a limited NMD system - designed to counter emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security.

* President will decide later this year whether to proceed with deployment;
decision based on four criteria: threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security, including arms control.

* Want to work with Russia on changes to the ABM Treaty required to deploy a limited NMD.

Core Points

* Committed to the development of a limited NMD system - designed to counter emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security.

* Will make a decision later this year on whether to proceed with deployment of a limited NMD. That decision will take into account four criteria: the threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security including arms control.

* The July 7 test in which the kill vehicle [sucessfully intercepted] [missed] the target was one of a series of tests; results of this test -- along with other flight tests, ground tests and simulations -- will be used to assess the technical feasibilty of our NMD.

[If asked points if the test is a success]

Doesn't this test prove that our NMD system is "technically feasible?"

* Test shows we are making progress in our NMD program; the question of technical feasibility will be addressed in the upcoming Administration review of our NMD program.

* As DOD said Thursday, it is premature to make any declarations regarding

"technical feasibility" based on the results of this one test. We are going to have to take the time in the next couple of weeks to take a real hard look at the data from this test, and be cautious of being overly optimistic.

Does this mean the President will now decide to proceed with deployment?

* No decision has been made regarding deployment.

* Will make a decision on deployment later this year, based on four criteria: threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security including arms control.

[If asked points if the test is not successful]

Was the July 7 test a failure?

* The kill vehicle did not intercept the target. I would refer you to DOD for details.

Doesn't this prove that our NMD system is not "technically feasible?"

* The question of technical feasibility will be addressed in the Administration's deployment readiness review; results of this test -- along with other flight tests, ground tests and simulations -- will be used to assess the technical feasibility of our NMD.

Doesn't this suggest that the Administration's approach to NMD is flawed?

* Believe we have the right program for developing a limited NMD. The July 7 test is one in a series of flight tests that will take place over the next few years. We will continue with our program to develop a limited NMD.

[Other questions]

When will the President make his decision on deployment?

* Later this year.

What is the next step in this process?

* Administration will proceed with its review, taking into account four criteria.

Has the Administration determined when its NMD program would violate ABM?

* We have not made a determination as to when work on our NMD would violate the ABM Treaty.

* Treaty does not define what constitutes breach; only prudent that lawyers review possible interpretations.

* There are a range of interpretations available; but no decision has been made.

* Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that President will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security including arms control).

Why not postpone a decision on deployment and defer negotiations with Russians?

* Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years.

* President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security.

* Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what

is appropriate.

* No decision yet.

Hasn't the Korean summit changed your thinking on the North Korean threat?

* Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of tensions on Korean Peninsula.

* Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions.

* Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely.

* Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue.

* Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports).

What about criticisms from Ted Postol and others that our NMD program cannot effectively deal with decoys? that the program has been manipulated?

* Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program.

* Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I).

* Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

Both in Moscow and since, President Putin has outlined an alternate path of

cooperation on NMD, including cooperation on theater missile defense and boost phase intercept. Why not embrace what President Putin is proposing?

* U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also recently made proposals. Intend to continue our discussion of how we can work together on this issue. U.S. experts were in Moscow last week to continue our discussions.

* The point we have made about Russia's proposal is that we do not see it as a substitute for our national missile defense program. That doesn't mean we don't want to talk about it, or that there isn't something there for us to work with. We hope that there is, and we plan to discuss this further with the Russians.

What is the status of the Intelligence Community assessments of (a) foreign reactions to a possible NMD deployment, and (b) the ballistic missile threat to the United States? What will it say about these issues?

* Assessment itself is still in preparation; not going to speculate as to when it might be done or what the key judgments might be.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/10/2000 8:47:05 AM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
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Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Incorporate this into Joe's package?

-----Original Message-----

From: McGee,
Jenny A. (WHSR)
Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2000 5:20 PM
To: Crocker,
Bathsheba N. (NSA); Siberell, Justin H. (NSA); @PRESS - Public
Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @WHSR
- WH Situation Room
Subject: FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Edited
version, per your request -- attachment is updated.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Sent: Saturday,
July 08, 2000 4:46 PM
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Cc: Crocker,
Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Subject: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jenny

-- as discussed, this is most recent version of guidance. I'm expecting Jim to call in with comments to the NMD section. Once his changes (if any) are made, please print clear version and fax at home to SRB and Jim (and call Sandy to let him know it's coming). Please also email updated version back to me, Justin, @press, @nesa, and @defense Thanks, Sheba

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRB press avail.doc
Middle East Summit

WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE SUMMIT NOW?

- * Believe there is potential but reached point where we thought potential couldn't be realized without bringing leaders together.
- * Negotiators have worked hard but can't take it any further. They made considerable progress over last several months, but now needed to get leaders together with the negotiators in order to move forward.
- * In the absence of a Summit, there will be no agreement, and in absence of agreement, situation will slide back into turmoil. President felt it would be irresponsible not to go forward with Summit under the circumstances.

WAS THERE UNANIMITY ON THE MIDDLE EAST TEAM THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE HELD NOW? IS IT A PROBLEM THAT BARAK WANTED TO HAVE THE SUMMIT NOW BUT ARAFAT DIDN'T?

- * Yes, there was unanimity on our Middle East team that now is the right time to hold the Summit.
- * Both leaders have made clear to us that the only way to reach agreement is with a Summit.
- * Important that in the final analysis, both leaders agreed to come to the Summit now without any hesitation and without any preconditions.

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL? PARTIES SEEM VERY FAR APART ON THE ISSUES.

- * Not going to discuss details of parties' positions, but only chance to realize the potential is by leaders coming together.
- * We see potential in part because there have been serious discussions

over the
past several months, for the first time, on permanent status issues.
Very
existence of permanent status negotiations is remarkable.
* No guarantees of success, and the President understands this. But he
decided
that the risks of not calling the leaders together at this point
outweighed the
risks of calling them together and not realizing the potential of
reaching
agreement.

HAVE YOU BEEN TRYING TO DRIVE DOWN EXPECTATIONS
OF A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT?

* We are trying to be honest with the American people about the risks
of not
doing this and the uncertainty inherent in this process.

WOULD FAILURE MEAN AN END TO THE PEACE PROCESS?
IS THIS A RECKLESS ACT?

* We are trying to change the dynamic to make it possible to succeed.
If nothing
else comes of Summit other than that things are moving forward in a
positive
direction, that is a good result.

* We have been intimately involved in the parties' efforts to negotiate
the
difficult issues, and it was our assessment that the negotiations had hit
a wall.
Of course there is a risk of failure, but it's a risk that is absolutely
necessary to take in order to have any shot of success.

ISN'T THIS ALL ABOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LEGACY?
WOULD FAILURE BE A SETBACK FOR
THE PRESIDENT IN HIS LAST SIX MONTHS?

* No. Both parties have felt for sometime that a summit was needed if
there were
to be any chance of resolving the difficult issues.

* The President is not doing this for himself. He's doing what he
thinks is
right for the region and for the American people.

* Our judgment, and the President's judgment, was that now is the
right time to
hold a summit, and he didn't feel that he could responsibly do
anything else.

WHAT WOULD BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THIS

SUMMIT?

- * An agreement that deals with the core issues of permanent status.

ARE YOU EXPECTING TO RESOLVE ALL THE KEY ISSUES?
AND IF YOU DON'T, CAN YOU
IMAGINE AN AGREEMENT THAT KICKS SOME OF THE
ISSUES DOWN THE ROAD?

- * Not useful to speculate about different potential agreements. We intend to deal with all the issues, and this is also the intent of the parties.

WHAT ABOUT SEPTEMBER 13? DID ARAFAT'S REMINDER
THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD
UNILATERALLY DECLARE STATEHOOD ON THE 13TH
CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR DECISION TO CALL A
SUMMIT NOW?

- * September 13 date has been out there for a long time. It's of course part of the entire landscape that factored into our decisionmaking.

WHAT WILL YOU DO ON SEPTEMBER 13? THE EUROPEANS
HAVE SAID THEY WOULD RECOGNIZE A
STATE OF PALESTINE; WHY NOT THE U.S.?

- * As we have always said, we favor negotiation. We believe there will be no enduring progress on the basis of unilateral steps.
- * We will continue to work with both sides toward agreement.

WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AT THE SUMMIT?
WHAT WILL BE THE PRESIDENT'S
ROLE? SECRETARY OF STATE'S ROLE?

- * The President is determined to be as helpful as we can. We are there to help the parties reach an agreement, and we will do whatever we can toward that end.
- * President and Secretary will meet with the leaders and the delegations, in different configurations. Nature of the negotiations will obviously shape the nature of the meetings.
- * President will give as much time as needed to this but will also come back to Washington regularly to focus on other issues.
- * The President has asked the Secretary of State to be at Camp David full time

throughout the Summit.

WHEN WILL THIS SUMMIT BE OVER? WILL THE PRESIDENT DEFINITELY GO TO OKINAWA?

- * The President is definitely going to Okinawa.
- * If the parties are prepared to make the tough choices, we believe we will be able to do what needs to be done by the time the President leaves for Okinawa.

WHY CAMP DAVID? WHAT ABOUT THE SYMBOLISM?

- * Chose Camp David because it's remote/isolated, comfortable, but close enough to D.C.

HOW MUCH WILL THIS AGREEMENT COST? WILL THE U.S. PAY?

- * Middle East peace agreements have always involved American assistance. We have not yet received any specific requests for assistance for this potential agreement. We are sure the issue will be raised, and we will obviously consult closely with the Hill, as we always have in these matters.
- * Important to note that we have already been in touch with members of Congress who are supportive of this process, and also with leaders of other countries, who are also supportive.
- * We would expect other countries to lend support to these efforts.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

DOES THE FAILURE OF FRIDAY'S TEST GIVE YOU THE POLITICAL COVER YOU NEED TO DEFER DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE NMD SYSTEM?

- * As we have consistently said, the President's decision on whether to deploy will be based on four factors - threat, cost, technical feasibility, and overall impact on security.
- * Friday's test will be an important factor in assessing the technical feasibility of the system. The President will receive a full assessment of the test from Secretary Cohen, Secretary Albright, and other national security advisors. Premature to draw any conclusions before receiving full

assessment.

DOESN'T FAILURE OF THE TEST PROVE THAT YOUR
APPROACH TO NMD IS WRONG AND THAT
YOUR CRITICS WERE RIGHT?

* No. There is an emerging ballistic missile threat, and the question is
what is

the best way to deal with that threat.

* We have focused on this particular architecture (1) because it is
designed to

be potentially available in a timely way to meet that threat and (2)
because, as

a limited system, it could be deployed and still allow us to preserve
the core of

the ABM Treaty.

* Questions remain about whether we should deploy at all. President
will make

that decision based on the four factors and his overall assessment of
what is in

the national interest.

DID NORTH/SOUTH SUMMIT ON KOREAN PENINSULA
CHANGE YOUR THINKING ON URGENCY OF
NORTH KOREA THREAT?

* Very hopeful about Korean Summit but unclear how it will unfold.
It is

something we will look at as part of our decision.

* Appreciate North Korea's recommitment to its missile moratorium,
but it has

demonstrated missile capability, and some aspects of its missile
program still

continue. We will have to continue to watch and monitor their actions
closely.

* Hope that ongoing missile talks will lead to a real end to the DPRK's
missile

program.

NOW THAT TEST HAS FAILED, DO YOU SEE ANY WAY TO
TURN THE RUSSIANS AROUND ON
CHANGES TO THE ABM TREATY?

* We made important progress at the Moscow summit with the
Statement of

Principles, where we agreed with the Russians that there are emerging
new threats

to security.

* Hope to convince them that moderate adjustments to the ABM
Treaty are needed

both to deal with those new threats and to preserve the core of the Treaty.

* The President will decide whether this NMD system is ready for deployment, but we have in common with the Russians an interest in dealing with the broader issues posed by increasing proliferation of missile technologies in the best ways possible.

* We are open to discussing all the issues with the Russians. Secretary Cohen was just in Russia and told the Russians that we would welcome exploring alternative technologies with them.

WHEN WILL THE PRESIDENT MAKE A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT?

* This summer.

ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED BY THE RESULTS?

* Whenever a test of any system doesn't go well, it's a disappointment, but it's part of the process.

IS THIS A SETBACK?

* The test is important to the question of technical feasibility, but it's premature to reach any judgment before the President receives the full assessment from Secretary Cohen and other members of his national security team.

WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF RUSSIAN OFFICIALS' REMARKS THAT FAILURE OF THE TEST PROVES THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO NMD WILL NOT WORK?

* Our decision will be based on our analysis, not on Russian commentary.

THOMPSON BILL

SENATOR THOMPSON HAS INTRODUCED A BILL TO STOP CHINESE PROLIFERATION, WHICH IS TIED TO PNTR. WILL YOU SUPPORT THOMPSON'S BILL?

* Nonproliferation has been central element of our engagement with

the Chinese

over the past 7 1/2 years. We have made considerable progress - the

Chinese have

signed the CWC, BWC, Test Ban Treaty.

* Although we share with Congress concerns about ongoing Chinese activity, we

have in place all the laws we need to sanction the Chinese if appropriate.

* The Thompson bill is a far reaching bill that would require automatic

imposition of sanctions on U.S. and foreign persons and companies based on a

suspicion of selling computers, missile technology to the Chinese. We believe it

is unnecessary and counterproductive.

* Chinese have traditionally had military relationship with Pakistan.

We're

concerned by some elements of that relationship, and we are talking to the

Chinese about our concerns, seeking to persuade them to limit those activities.

ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT VOTE ON PNTR IS GETTING
BOGGED DOWN BECAUSE OF CONCERNS
ABOUT CHINESE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY?

* We hope the Senate will act quickly, in the next week or so. Very important to

the U.S. economy and national security. House has acted, and Senate needs to do

its part.

* President and Administration working actively toward that end.

RWANDA REPORT

WHAT ABOUT THE RECENT REPORT ASSESSING U.S.
RESPONSE TO RWANDA AND CALLING FOR
U.S. TO PAY REPARATIONS?

* There is a war crimes process in place to assign blame for the atrocities. Not

useful to identify vague, collective guilt.

* Also working more broadly to have in place a system to deal with war crimes on

an international basis with a view to averting/deterring such atrocities in the

future.

* Also have provided assistance to help rebuild Rwanda and help the

Rwandan
people.

* The President has said he wished we'd moved more quickly to deal with the atrocities in Rwanda. We recognize that we should have moved more quickly.

* There are other serious problems in Africa right now. We have asked Congress for money to help address those problems. Important that Congress release holds on that money.

MILOSEVIC/MONTENEGRO

MILOSEVIC IS STILL IN POWER? WHAT ARE YOU DOING TO GET RID OF HIM?

* Draconian step Milosevic just took in changing the FRY Constitution shows his increasing desperation and isolation.

* We believe the situation in Serbia is deteriorating. Economy is weakening, Serbian people are getting increasingly distressed about their situation. World doesn't look good from where Milosevic is sitting.

MONTENEGRO LOOKING FOR INDEPENDENCE. WOULD YOU SUPPORT MONTENGRIN INDEPENDENCE?

* Admire Djukonovic, concerned about security of the region.

* Don't support Montenegrin independence.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/10/2000 9:14:25 AM

FROM Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT URGENT POTUS Q&A FOR IMMEDIATE REVIEW
[UNCLASSIFIED]

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Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)

Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

TEXT_BODY

POTUS is out at 1145 this morning. We need to provide Q&A to SRB

ASAP. Thanks.

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUS QA July 10_.doc
POTUS Q&A
July 10, 2000

MEPP

Will the collapse of Prime Minister Barak's coalition prevent him from making the kind of concessions you've said he needs to make for the Summit to be successful?

* Prime Minister Barak is coming to Camp David in good faith, determined to pursue peace. I have every reason to believe he and Chairman Arafat are determined to pursue an agreement that deals with the core final status issues. As I've said before, no one said this would be easy. There are difficult decisions that need to be made. I believe both the Prime Minister and Chairman can succeed and I will do everything I can to help them.

* The Prime Minister is the best judge of what he is able to accomplish. He spoke to the Israeli people last night about the mandate he feels he has to pursue an agreement that advances the security of Israel. I believe this is what the Israeli people want him to do.

NMD

What is your reaction to Saturday's NMD test failure? Many members of Congress

are recommending that you defer a deployment decision to the next Administration?

Doesn't the failure give you the political cover to punt this to the next President? When will you decide?

* I was disappointed with the result, obviously. Whenever you conduct a test, particularly with such a complex system, you want success, because you want to learn everything you can about the technology.

* The Pentagon will have to analyze what went wrong. I expect to receive

Secretary Cohen's recommendation in the next few weeks regarding deployment.

I'll look at that, along with the judgement of other members of my national

security team, and then I'll make a decision before the summer is over.

* As I've said before, there are four criteria I'll look at - threat, cost, technical feasibility and overall national security impact. Clearly I'll have to

take this test failure into account, but first I'll wait to get the full analysis

from the Pentagon.

HIV/AIDS

Hundreds of delegates walked out on president Mbeki's opening speech yesterday at the international AIDS conference in Durban, South Africa. What hope does that give you that the international community is united enough to solve the AIDS problem in Africa?

* The human toll of AIDS continues to be staggering. Fifty million people worldwide have been infected with the HIV virus; 33.6 million are now living with HIV/AIDS, and annual AIDS-related fatalities hit a record 2.6 million last year.

* Ninety-five percent of all cases are in the developing world. AIDS is now the leading cause of death in Africa and fourth in the world. In at least five African countries, over 20 percent of adults are HIV-positive. Other parts of the world are going down the same road as Africa.

* Defeating AIDS requires several things. First is leadership in the international arena. This is why we put AIDS on the agenda of the UN Security Council in January, why it will be a key topic during the upcoming U.S.-EU Summit, and why we're pleased that Japan has identified AIDS as a priority issue for the G-8 meeting in Okinawa in July. Second is resources. For FY 2000, Congress appropriated funding for our global AIDS prevention and care programs of \$225 million - four times as much as the next largest donor. The FY2001 budget request includes an additional \$100 million increase. Third is prevention, through education at the ground level and also through a more rigorous effort to find a cure for this and other devastating diseases like malaria. That's

why I
proposed a tax credit as an incentive to the pharmaceutical industry to
do more,
and quickly, to develop vaccines.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/10/2000 10:19:42 AM
FROM Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY My edits to Ken's stuff.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUS QA July 10.doc
POTUS Q&A
July 10, 2000

MEPP

Will the collapse of Prime Minister Barak's coalition prevent him from making the kind of concessions you've said he needs to make for the Summit to be successful?

* Prime Minister Barak is coming to Camp David in good faith, determined to pursue peace. He has a direct mandate from the Israeli people with a large majority and I believe he has a strong mandate to make peace.. He also made clear that he would submit any agreement to a referendum.

* I have every reason to believe he and Chairman Arafat are determined to pursue an agreement that deals with the core final status issues. As I've said before, no one said this would be easy. There are difficult decisions that need to be made. I believe both the Prime Minister and Chairman can succeed and I will do everything I can to help them.

NMD

What is your reaction to Saturday's NMD test failure? Many members of Congress are recommending that you defer a deployment decision to the next Administration?

Doesn't the failure give you the political cover to punt this to the next President? When will you decide?

* I was disappointed with the result. Whenever you conduct a test, you want success.

* Expect to receive a full report regarding this test and the technology in the next few weeks.

* I'll consult with my national security team and make a decision on how to proceed before the summer is over, taking into account the four criteria I've

spelled out - threat, cost, technical feasibility, and overall national security impact, including arms control.

HIV/AIDS

Hundreds of delegates walked out on president Mbeki's opening speech yesterday at the international AIDS conference in Durban, South Africa. What hope does that give you that the international community is united enough to solve the AIDS problem in Africa?

* We are committed to working with leaders around the world - especially in Africa - to fight this terrible disease.

* The human toll of AIDS continues to be staggering. The UNAIDS program has just reported that a 15 year old in some African countries will have a 50-50 chance of getting AIDS. And life expectancy in 6 African countries has now fallen to 38 or 39 years. We cannot allow this epidemic to claim more children and their parents.

* Defeating AIDS requires several things. First is leadership in the international arena. This is why we put AIDS on the agenda of the UN Security Council in January, why it was a key topic during the U.S.-EU Summit, and why we're Japan has identified AIDS as a priority issue for the G-8 meeting in Okinawa next week.

* Second, is resources for prevention and care . In the last two years, we have more than doubled our investment in international prevention and care programs. This year I am asking Congress for \$325 million for international

AIDS programs,
more than 4 times more than the next largest donor. And plans for
further
increases for prevention and care are under discussion. The U.S. and
all
concerned countries should be doing more - much more.

* Third is prevention, through education and behavior change at the
ground level
and also through a more rigorous effort to find a vaccine for AIDS and
other
devastating diseases like TB and malaria. That's why I have asked
Congress for a
tax credit as an incentive to the pharmaceutical industry to do more,
and
quickly, to develop vaccines - the best solution for these diseases.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/10/2000 11:06:16 AM
FROM Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT MEPP PIECE FOR SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY KNOCK YOURSELF OUT....

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Draft MEPP piece for Joel's Summary.doc

PEACE PROCESS: During his meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak, Prime Minister Barak reiterated his five points of non-concession for Tomorrow's Camp David Summit. Barak's five rejection "red lines" include: any return to pre-war 1967 borders; any foreign army occupation in West Bank; any assumption of responsibility by Tel Aviv for Palestinian refugee problem; any change in Jerusalem's status as untied city under Israeli sovereignty; and any deal that would prevent most Jewish settlers from remaining in blocs in West Bank. Additionally, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara said Damascus could not accept anything less than full Israeli withdrawal from Golan to 1967 pre-war borders. Separately, Israeli soldiers killed one and wounded five Palestinian civilians in Gaza when they inadvertently drove into cross-fire...sparked Palestinian protests and Cabinet threat to Tel Aviv to, "evacuate settlers before they are evacuated by other means." (U) Reuters a3763, a3554, a3613

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 8:57:18 AM

FROM Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT log [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY 0845 Convened NatSec...discussed Peace Process (any developments impacting Camp David summit), Japan (any further government reaction to recent incidents in Okinawa), and OPEC (intentions on increasing production levels).

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 10:16:36 AM
FROM Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY no -- postponed due to Camp David summit.

-----Original Message-----

From: Anderson,
Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2000 9:55 AM
To: Norland,
Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED]

is trimble/mallon
visit still on?

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 10:22:24 AM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT MEPP-Camp David Summit Guidance, 7-10-2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

MEPP-Camp David Guidance 7-10-2000.doc
MEPP/CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
July 10, 2000

Will the collapse of Prime Minister Barak's coalition prevent him from making the kind of concessions the President said he needs to make for the Summit to be successful?

* Prime Minister Barak is coming to Camp David in good faith, determined to pursue peace. He has a direct mandate from the Israeli people with a large majority and we believe he has a strong mandate to make peace. He also made clear that he would submit any agreement to a referendum.

* We have every reason to believe he and Chairman Arafat are determined to pursue an agreement that deals with the core final status issues. As the President's said before, no one said this would be easy. There are difficult decisions that need to be made. The president believes both the Prime Minister and Chairman can

succeed and he will do everything he can to help them.

Why did you decide to go forward with the Summit now?

* Believe there is potential but reached point where we thought potential

couldn't be realized without bringing leaders together.

* Negotiators have worked hard but can't take it any further. They made

considerable progress over last several months, but now needed to get leaders

together with the negotiators in order to move forward.

* In the absence of a Summit, there will be no agreement, and in absence of

agreement, situation will slide back into turmoil. President felt it would be

irresponsible not to go forward with Summit under the circumstances.

Was there unanimity on the Middle East team that the Summit should be held now?

Is it a problem that Barak wanted to have the Summit now but Araft didn't?

* Yes, there was unanimity on our Middle East team that now is the right time to

hold the Summit.

* Both leaders have made clear to us that the only way to reach agreement is with

a Summit.

* Important that in the final analysis, both leaders agreed to come to the Summit

now without any hesitation and without any preconditions.

What is the potential? Parties seem far apart on the issues.

* Not going to discuss details of parties' positions, but only chance to realize

the potential is by leaders coming together.

* We see potential in part because there have been serious discussions over the

past several months, for the first time, on permanent status issues.

Very

existence of permanent status negotiations is remarkable.

* No guarantees of success, and the President understands this. But he decided

that the risks of not calling the leaders together at this point outweighed the

risks of calling them together and not realizing the potential of reaching

agreement.

Have you been trying to drive down expectation of a successful summit?

* We are trying to be honest with the American people about the risks of not doing this and the uncertainty inherent in this process.

Would failure mean an end to the Peace Process? Is this a reckless act?

* We are trying to change the dynamic to make it possible to succeed. If nothing else comes of Summit other than that things are moving forward in a positive direction, that is a good result.

* We have been intimately involved in the parties' efforts to negotiate the difficult issues, and it was our assessment that the negotiations had hit a wall.

Of course there is a risk of failure, but it's a risk that is absolutely necessary to take in order to have any shot of success.

Isn't this all about POTUS legacy? Would failure be a setback for the President in his last six months?

* No. Both parties have felt for sometime that a summit was needed if there were to be any chance of resolving the difficult issues.

* The President is not doing this for himself. He's doing what he thinks is right for the region and for the American people.

* Our judgment, and the President's judgment, was that now is the right time to hold a summit, and he didn't feel that he could responsibly do anything else.

What would be a successful outcome for this summit?

* An agreement that deals with the core issues of permanent status.

Are you expecting to resolve all the key issues? And if you don't, can you imagine an agreement that kicks some of the issues down the road?

* Not useful to speculate about different potential agreements. We

intend to
deal with all the issues, and this is also the intent of the parties.

What about September 13? Did Arafat's reminder that the Palestinians would
unilaterally declare statehood on the 13th contribute to your decision
to call a
summit now?

* September 13 date has been out there for a long time. It's of course
part of
the entire landscape that factored into our decisionmaking.

What will you do on september 13? The europeans have said they
would recognize a
state of palestine; why not the u.s.?

* As we have always said, we favor negotiation. We believe there will
be no
enduring progress on the basis of unilateral steps.

* We will continue to work with both sides toward agreement.

What will be the role of the u.s. at the summit? What will be the
President's
role? Secretary of State's role?

* The President is determined to be as helpful as we can. We are there
to help
the parties reach an agreement, and we will do whatever we can
toward that end.

* President and Secretary will meet with the leaders and the
delegations, in
different configurations. Nature of the negotiations will obviously
shape the
nature of the meetings.

* President will give as much time as needed to this but will also
come back to
Washington regularly to focus on other issues.

* The President has asked the Secretary of State to be at Camp David
full time
throughout the Summit.

When will this Summit be over? Will the President definitely go to

Okinawa?

* The President is definitely going to Okinawa.

* If the parties are prepared to make the tough choices, we believe we will be able to do what needs to be done by the time the President leaves for Okinawa.

Why Camp David? What about the symbolism?

* Chose Camp David because it's remote/isolated, comfortable, but close enough to D.C.

How much will this agreement cost? Will the U.S. pay?

* Middle East peace agreements have always involved American assistance. We have not yet received any specific requests for assistance for this potential agreement. We are sure the issue will be raised, and we will obviously consult closely with the Hill, as we always have in these matters.

* Important to note that we have already been in touch with members of Congress who are supportive of this process, and also with leaders of other countries, who are also supportive.

* We would expect other countries to lend support to these efforts.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 11:31:01 AM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Press Schedule -- Camp David, July 11, 2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY FYI - Everyone.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Press Schedule -- Camp David.doc
Press Schedule #1

TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT
to
Camp David, Maryland

July 11, 2000

NOT FOR RELEASE OR PUBLICATION-For news planning only

Weather/Thurmont: Partly cloudy with a chance of showers and
thunderstorms,
Hi 82, low 67

6:45 am EST WH Intown Travel Pool Gathers at the James Brady
Briefing Room.

7:00 am EST WH Intown Travel Pool boards press vans and departs
the White House
en route Pool Hold at Camp David.

9:00 am EST WH Intown Travel Pool press vans arrive Round
Meadows Pool Hold.

Notes about Camp David: It is expected that the events of the summit will be private. All details of the schedule of the PRESIDENT, other than those in this schedule, are TBA.

Press Schedules from the White House will pertain only to the schedule of the PRESIDENT. For information about schedules of other summit participants, please contact their press officers.

NOTES FOR THE WHITE HOUSE POOL:

The pool for the White House during the Summit will be the White House Intown Travel Pool, following the assignments prescribed on its daily rotation. The WH Intown Travel Pool will be transported

BRIEFINGS:

There will be daily briefings during the Summit and the briefing schedule is TBA.

AUDIO of the daily briefing will be available at the Summit Media Center at the

Thurmont Elementary School in Thurmont, Maryland, and on the PA of press rooms at the White House, State Department and Foreign Press Center in Washington, D.C.

At the Summit Media Center in Thurmont, audio will be available in English, Hebrew and Arabic. At the other locations listed above, audio on the PA will be in English only.

PRESS FACILITIES IN THURMONT:

The Summit Media Center is located at the Thurmont Elementary School, 805 East Main Street (Route 77 East), in Thurmont, Maryland. For information and details on getting press credentials, workspaces or telephones at this Center, and whom

to contact for those and other requests, please obtain the Media Advisory on the Summit issued by the U.S. State Department on July 7, 2000.

THE WHITE HOUSE PROTECTIVE POOL:

On Tuesday, July 11, the White House Intown Travel Pool will depart from the

White House in press vans to the Round Meadows Pool Hold area.

For each

additional calendar day the WH Intown Travel Pool will assemble in the Camp David

area and go on protective standby in the Round Meadows Pool Hold in the Camp

David area. All poolers are advised:

1) The White House Intown Travel Pool will form every day at the Round Meadows

Pool Hold near Camp David. Directions to the Round Meadows Pool Hold are on page

5 in this schedule.

2) All poolers are advised to have an overnight bag with them in case the

decision to made to remain overnight at Camp David.

3) Hotel rooms for Pool: Poolers have all been contacted by the White House and

hotel rooms have been arranged by the White House only for the pool members who

made financial arrangements with the White House Travel Office. All other press

are responsible for making their own hotel arrangements in the Thurmont area.

4) "Pool switches" during the day between the Summit Media Center in Thurmont and

the Pool Hold at Round Meadows will occur as frequently as needed.

Daily

gathering points in Thurmont for the White House Pool other than Round Meadows

Pool Hold, will be worked out directly with poolers once they are in Thurmont.

White House Intown Travel Pool

POOL FILING AND POOL HOLDS - CAMP DAVID

"Round Meadows Pool Hold" in the gymnasium at the day camp site in the Catoctin Mountain Park. Pool facilities: Seven shared charge-a-call phones, workspace with electric, cable TV, fax, and speakerphone if needed to hear audio of briefings.

"Summit Media Center" in Thurmont Elementary School: In the "Wires" work room four shared charge-a-calls and workspace with electric for the WH Pool when the pool holds in the Summit Media Center.

FOR OTHER PRESS:

SUMMIT MEDIA CENTER: Media Center is operating 24 hours a day. Please acquire the Media Advisory of the U.S. State Department (issued 07-07-00) for information on the Center and to arrange yourself your own working space there.

Press Offices located at the Summit Media Center at the Thurmont Elementary

School:

White House Press Office

U.S. State Department Press Office

U.S. State Dept. Foreign Press Center

Liaisons to the delegations of Israel and the Palestinian Authority

DRIVING DIRECTIONS

Directions to the Summit Media Center at the Thurmont Elementary School:

Thurmont, Maryland, is alongside MD Route 15 about 15 miles north of Frederick,

Maryland, and about 10 miles south of Gettysburg. There are several exits off

Route 15 for Thurmont. Use the Exit for Route 77. To get to the school, take

Route 77 EAST, for about a mile, through Thurmont. The brick one-story grammar

school will be on your left, on Route 77, slightly set back. Please follow the signs telling you where you can park, and watch out for the children at the school for summer school.

Directions to the "Round Meadows Pool Hold": Take MD Route 15 to the Exit for Route 77 (at Thurmont). When you come down the exit ramp, take 77 WEST (away from the town of Thurmont) and toward the hills. Stay on Route 77 West for nearly five miles as it winds up the hills and through the woods. During the five miles you will go past Cunningham Falls Park, past the Catoctin National Park Visitors Center, and past Catoctin Hollow Road. When you come out of sheer forest into an area with private homes, start watching for your turn. Turn RIGHT off Route 77 onto Foxville-Deerfield Road (at this intersection, the street to the left is called "Stottlemeyer", but the sign to the right says: Foxville-Deerfield Road). After a quarter mile, this joins another road (Herman Hauver Road) and bears to the right - stay with it and bear to the right with it. There's another immediate bearing right onto "MANAHAN ROAD". After a half-mile, watch for a driveway on the left into the parking lot of "Round Meadows". The big white unmarked stucco building at the edge of the parking lot is the gym (Pool Hold)

Tuesday, July 11, 2000

10:30 am EDT THE PRESIDENT boards MARINE ONE and departs the White House en route

Camp David, Maryland.
OPEN PRESS of departure.

11:00 am EDT MARINE ONE arrives Camp David.
CLOSED PRESS of arrival.

NOTE: The Schedule of the PRESIDENT for the remainder of July 11, 2000, is TBA.

The White House Intown Travel Pool will remain on protective standby.

IMPORTANT NOTE: THE PRESIDENT will reside overnight at Camp David on Tuesday, July 11, 2000. After that, overnight for THE PRESIDENT is TBD. The following overnight information will apply to any and all of the nights that THE PRESIDENT remains at Camp David.

Overnight for THE PRESIDENT:
Camp David, Maryland

Overnight for the Pool:
Super 8
300 Tipin Drive
Thurmont, Maryland
Ph: 301-271-7888
Fx:301-271-7888

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2000

The Schedule of the PRESIDENT for Wednesday is TBD.

Press Schedule #1 as of 7-10-00 PAGE 2
TRIP TO MD
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR RELEASE

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 12:48:17 PM
FROM Hay, Julie (INTECON)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Here's a chilling thought ... [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Lockhart has already denied this story but do you think the President would look at the trip book anyway???

Washington, July
10 Kyodo -- (ED: STORY TO BE LED)

U.S. President Bill Clinton
hinted Monday he might delay or even cancel his planned trip to Japan
for the Group of Eight summit later this month to cope with the Middle
East peace summit opening Tuesday.

"I don't want to set an artificial
deadline," Clinton said at a media event in the White House, referring
to the summit with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestine
President Yasser Arafat at the presidential retreat Camp David.

The
three-day G-8[0] summit opens July 21 in Okinawa.
[Description of
Source: Tokyo Kyodo News Service in English--Japan's largest domestic
and international news agency, owned by nonprofit cooperative of
63

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/11/2000 1:59:04 PM
FROM Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS departure statement before departing for Camp David
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

I've highlighted key sentences that you might find useful.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

RBTP Upon Leaving for Camp David to Open the Middle East Peace Summit_.doc

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 11, 2000

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
UPON LEAVING FOR CAMP DAVID
TO OPEN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE SUMMIT

South Portico

10:38 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. As all of you know, I am now leaving Camp David to join Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat in their effort to reach an agreement on the core issues that have divided Israelis and Palestinians for a century now.

The two leaders face profound and wrenching questions, and there can be no success without principled compromise. The road to peace, as always, is

two-way street. Both leaders feel the weight of history, but both, I believe, recognize this is a moment in history which they can seize. We have an opportunity to bring about a just and enduring end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is the key to lasting peace in the entire Middle East. Of course, there is no guarantee of success, but not to try is to guarantee failure.

The path ahead builds on the journey already taken from the first Camp David Summit to Madrid to Oslo; to the first handshake on the lawn between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat; to the peace between Israel and Jordan;

the agreement at Wye River. The parties have proven that peace is possible.

They are determined to make it.

In the process, they have passed the point of no return. The only way forward now is forward. Both sides must find a way to resolve competing claims and give their children the gift of peace. It will take patience and creativity and courage. But Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have shown that they would not have come this far.

They will also have the unstinting and unequivocal support of the United States. I'll do everything I can over the coming days to see that this moment of history is fulfilled. And I hope that those leaders will have the thoughts and prayers and support of all Americans.

Thank you very much.

Q Mr. President, having barely survived the no confidence vote, does Prime Minister Barak come here with a handicap? Can he negotiate with the full weight of the Knesset and the Israeli people behind him?

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I'll say what I said yesterday -- the polls in Israel, that well over half the people support his coming here and believe he ought to work for peace. Secondly, he has promised to put whatever agreement is reached here, if an agreement is reached, to a vote of the people.

So they have nothing to lose. They'll have final say anyway. There ought to be 100 percent support for his coming here, because the people will be the deciders on the question. So I think that that is fine. And, yes, he had an eight-vote margin yesterday; I would remind you that on most of the days Yitzhak Rabin came here, he had a one-vote margin in the Knesset.

So I think we're in as good a shape as we're ever going to get, and we must just go to work. Thank you very much.

END

10:43 A.M. EDT

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/12/2000 12:03:56 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)

TEXT_BODY These are the NMD points that resulted from Talk Show Conference Call last Saturday ... I'll also forward you latest points we prepared for Sandy to use with Gephardt ... these were prior to the test.

-----Original Message-----

From: McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)

Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2000 17:20 PM

To: Crocker, Bathsheba

N. (NSA); Siberell, Justin H. (NSA); @PRESS - Public Affairs;
@NESASIA

- NE/South Asia; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation

Room

Subject: FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Edited version,
per your request -- attachment is updated.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crocker,

Bathsheba N. (NSA)

Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2000 4:46 PM

To: @WHSR

- WH Situation Room

Cc: Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)

Subject: SRB

guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jenny -- as discussed, this is most recent

version of guidance. I'm expecting Jim to call in with comments to the NMD section. Once his changes (if any) are made, please print clear version and fax at home to SRB and Jim (and call Sandy to let him know it's coming). Please also email updated version back to me, Justin, @press, @nesa, and @defense Thanks, Sheba

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRB press avail.doc
Middle East Summit

WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE SUMMIT NOW?

- * Believe there is potential but reached point where we thought potential couldn't be realized without bringing leaders together.
- * Negotiators have worked hard but can't take it any further. They made considerable progress over last several months, but now needed to get leaders together with the negotiators in order to move forward.
- * In the absence of a Summit, there will be no agreement, and in absence of agreement, situation will slide back into turmoil. President felt it would be irresponsible not to go forward with Summit under the circumstances.

WAS THERE UNANIMITY ON THE MIDDLE EAST TEAM THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE HELD NOW? IS IT A PROBLEM THAT BARAK WANTED TO HAVE THE SUMMIT NOW BUT ARAFAT DIDN'T?

- * Yes, there was unanimity on our Middle East team that now is the right time to hold the Summit.
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- * Important that in the final analysis, both leaders agreed to come to the Summit now without any hesitation and without any preconditions.

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- * We see potential in part because there have been serious discussions over the

past several months, for the first time, on permanent status issues.

Very

existence of permanent status negotiations is remarkable.

* No guarantees of success, and the President understands this. But he decided

that the risks of not calling the leaders together at this point

outweighed the

risks of calling them together and not realizing the potential of reaching

agreement.

HAVE YOU BEEN TRYING TO DRIVE DOWN EXPECTATIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT?

* We are trying to be honest with the American people about the risks of not

doing this and the uncertainty inherent in this process.

WOULD FAILURE MEAN AN END TO THE PEACE PROCESS? IS THIS A RECKLESS ACT?

* We are trying to change the dynamic to make it possible to succeed.

If nothing

else comes of Summit other than that things are moving forward in a positive

direction, that is a good result.

* We have been intimately involved in the parties' efforts to negotiate the

difficult issues, and it was our assessment that the negotiations had hit a wall.

Of course there is a risk of failure, but it's a risk that is absolutely necessary to take in order to have any shot of success.

ISN'T THIS ALL ABOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LEGACY? WOULD FAILURE BE A SETBACK FOR THE PRESIDENT IN HIS LAST SIX MONTHS?

* No. Both parties have felt for sometime that a summit was needed if there were

to be any chance of resolving the difficult issues.

* The President is not doing this for himself. He's doing what he thinks is

right for the region and for the American people.

* Our judgment, and the President's judgment, was that now is the right time to

hold a summit, and he didn't feel that he could responsibly do anything else.

WHAT WOULD BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THIS SUMMIT?

* An agreement that deals with the core issues of permanent status.

ARE YOU EXPECTING TO RESOLVE ALL THE KEY ISSUES?
AND IF YOU DON'T, CAN YOU
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WHAT ABOUT SEPTEMBER 13? DID ARAFAT'S REMINDER
THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD
UNILATERALLY DECLARE STATEHOOD ON THE 13TH
CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR DECISION TO CALL A
SUMMIT NOW?

* September 13 date has been out there for a long time. It's of course
part of
the entire landscape that factored into our decisionmaking.

WHAT WILL YOU DO ON SEPTEMBER 13? THE EUROPEANS
HAVE SAID THEY WOULD RECOGNIZE A
STATE OF PALESTINE; WHY NOT THE U.S.?

* As we have always said, we favor negotiation. We believe there will
be no
enduring progress on the basis of unilateral steps.

* We will continue to work with both sides toward agreement.

WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AT THE SUMMIT?
WHAT WILL BE THE PRESIDENT'S
ROLE? SECRETARY OF STATE'S ROLE?

* The President is determined to be as helpful as we can. We are there
to help
the parties reach an agreement, and we will do whatever we can
toward that end.

* President and Secretary will meet with the leaders and the
delegations, in
different configurations. Nature of the negotiations will obviously
shape the
nature of the meetings.

* President will give as much time as needed to this but will also
come back to
Washington regularly to focus on other issues.

* The President has asked the Secretary of State to be at Camp David
full time
throughout the Summit.

WHEN WILL THIS SUMMIT BE OVER? WILL THE PRESIDENT
DEFINITELY GO TO OKINAWA?

- * The President is definitely going to Okinawa.
- * If the parties are prepared to make the tough choices, we believe we will be able to do what needs to be done by the time the President leaves for Okinawa.

WHY CAMP DAVID? WHAT ABOUT THE SYMBOLISM?

- * Chose Camp David because it's remote/isolated, comfortable, but close enough to D.C.

HOW MUCH WILL THIS AGREEMENT COST? WILL THE U.S.
PAY?

- * Middle East peace agreements have always involved American assistance. We have not yet received any specific requests for assistance for this potential agreement. We are sure the issue will be raised, and we will obviously consult closely with the Hill, as we always have in these matters.
- * Important to note that we have already been in touch with members of Congress who are supportive of this process, and also with leaders of other countries, who are also supportive.
- * We would expect other countries to lend support to these efforts.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

DOES THE FAILURE OF FRIDAY'S TEST GIVE YOU THE
POLITICAL COVER YOU NEED TO DEFER
DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE NMD SYSTEM?

- * As we have consistently said, the President's decision on whether to deploy will be based on four factors - threat, cost, technical feasibility, and overall impact on security.
- * Friday's test will be an important factor in assessing the technical feasibility of the system. The President will receive a full assessment of the test from Secretary Cohen, Secretary Albright, and other national security advisors. Premature to draw any conclusions before receiving full assessment.

DOESN'T FAILURE OF THE TEST PROVE THAT YOUR
APPROACH TO NMD IS WRONG AND THAT
YOUR CRITICS WERE RIGHT?

* No. There is an emerging ballistic missile threat, and the question is
what is
the best way to deal with that threat.

* We have focused on this particular architecture (1) because it is
designed to
be potentially available in a timely way to meet that threat and (2)
because, as
a limited system, it could be deployed and still allow us to preserve
the core of
the ABM Treaty.

* Questions remain about whether we should deploy at all. President
will make
that decision based on the four factors and his overall assessment of
what is in
the national interest.

DID NORTH/SOUTH SUMMIT ON KOREAN PENINSULA
CHANGE YOUR THINKING ON URGENCY OF
NORTH KOREA THREAT?

* Very hopeful about Korean Summit but unclear how it will unfold.
It is
something we will look at as part of our decision.

* Appreciate North Korea's recommitment to its missile moratorium,
but it has
demonstrated missile capability, and some aspects of its missile
program still
continue. We will have to continue to watch and monitor their actions
closely.

* Hope that ongoing missile talks will lead to a real end to the DPRK's
missile
program.

NOW THAT TEST HAS FAILED, DO YOU SEE ANY WAY TO
TURN THE RUSSIANS AROUND ON
CHANGES TO THE ABM TREATY?

* We made important progress at the Moscow summit with the
Statement of
Principles, where we agreed with the Russians that there are emerging
new threats
to security.

* Hope to convince them that moderate adjustments to the ABM
Treaty are needed
both to deal with those new threats and to preserve the core of the

Treaty.

* The President will decide whether this NMD system is ready for deployment, but we have in common with the Russians an interest in dealing with the broader issues posed by increasing proliferation of missile technologies in the best ways possible.

* We are open to discussing all the issues with the Russians. Secretary Cohen was just in Russia and told the Russians that we would welcome exploring alternative technologies with them.

WHEN WILL THE PRESIDENT MAKE A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT?

* This summer.

ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED BY THE RESULTS?

* Whenever a test of any system doesn't go well, it's a disappointment, but it's part of the process.

IS THIS A SETBACK?

* The test is important to the question of technical feasibility, but it's premature to reach any judgment before the President receives the full assessment from Secretary Cohen and other members of his national security team.

WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF RUSSIAN OFFICIALS' REMARKS THAT FAILURE OF THE TEST PROVES THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO NMD WILL NOT WORK?

* Our decision will be based on our analysis, not on Russian commentary.

THOMPSON BILL

SENATOR THOMPSON HAS INTRODUCED A BILL TO STOP CHINESE PROLIFERATION, WHICH IS TIED TO PNTR. WILL YOU SUPPORT THOMPSON'S BILL?

* Nonproliferation has been central element of our engagement with the Chinese

over the past 7 1/2 years. We have made considerable progress - the Chinese have signed the CWC, BWC, Test Ban Treaty.

* Although we share with Congress concerns about ongoing Chinese activity, we have in place all the laws we need to sanction the Chinese if appropriate.

* The Thompson bill is a far reaching bill that would require automatic imposition of sanctions on U.S. and foreign persons and companies based on a suspicion of selling computers, missile technology to the Chinese. We believe it is unnecessary and counterproductive.

* Chinese have traditionally had military relationship with Pakistan. We're concerned by some elements of that relationship, and we are talking to the Chinese about our concerns, seeking to persuade them to limit those activities.

ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT VOTE ON PNTR IS GETTING BOGGED DOWN BECAUSE OF CONCERNS ABOUT CHINESE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY?

* We hope the Senate will act quickly, in the next week or so. Very important to the U.S. economy and national security. House has acted, and Senate needs to do its part.

* President and Administration working actively toward that end.

RWANDA REPORT

WHAT ABOUT THE RECENT REPORT ASSESSING U.S. RESPONSE TO RWANDA AND CALLING FOR U.S. TO PAY REPARATIONS?

* There is a war crimes process in place to assign blame for the atrocities. Not

useful to identify vague, collective guilt.

* Also working more broadly to have in place a system to deal with war crimes on an international basis with a view to averting/deterring such atrocities in the future.

* Also have provided assistance to help rebuild Rwanda and help the Rwandan

people.

* The President has said he wished we'd moved more quickly to deal with the atrocities in Rwanda. We recognize that we should have moved more quickly.

* There are other serious problems in Africa right now. We have asked Congress for money to help address those problems. Important that Congress release holds on that money.

MILOSEVIC/MONTENEGRO

MILOSEVIC IS STILL IN POWER? WHAT ARE YOU DOING TO GET RID OF HIM?

* Draconian step Milosevic just took in changing the FRY Constitution shows his increasing desperation and isolation.

* We believe the situation in Serbia is deteriorating. Economy is weakening, Serbian people are getting increasingly distressed about their situation. World doesn't look good from where Milosevic is sitting.

MONTENEGRO LOOKING FOR INDEPENDENCE. WOULD YOU SUPPORT MONTENGRIN INDEPENDENCE?

* Admire Djukonovic, concerned about security of the region.

* Don't support Montengrin independence.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/12/2000 12:12:21 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2000 12:04 PM

To: Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

Cc: Tavlarides,

Mark J. (LEGIS); Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS); Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE); Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)

Subject: FW:

SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

These are the NMD points that resulted from Talk Show Conference Call last Saturday ... I'll also forward you latest points we prepared for Sandy to use with Gephardt ... these were prior to the test.

-----Original Message-----

From: McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)

Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2000 17:20 PM

To: Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA); Siberell, Justin H. (NSA); @PRESS - Public Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia; @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy

Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Subject: FW: SRB guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Edited version, per your request -- attachment is updated.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crocker, Bathsheba
N. (NSA)

Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2000 4:46 PM

To: @WHSR - WH

Situation Room

Cc: Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)

Subject: SRB guidance

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Jenny -- as discussed, this is most recent version of guidance. I'm expecting Jim to call in with comments to the NMD section. Once his changes (if any) are made, please print clear version and fax at home to SRB and Jim (and call Sandy to let him know it's coming). Please also email updated version back to me, Justin, @press, @nesa, and @defense Thanks, Sheba

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRB press avail.doc
Middle East Summit

WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE
SUMMIT NOW?

* Believe there is potential but reached point where we thought potential couldn't be realized without bringing leaders together.
* Negotiators have worked hard but can't take it any further. They made considerable progress over last several months, but now needed to get leaders together with the negotiators in order to move forward.
* In the absence of a Summit, there will be no agreement, and in absence of agreement, situation will slide back into turmoil. President felt it would be irresponsible not to go forward with Summit under the circumstances.

WAS THERE UNANIMITY ON THE MIDDLE EAST TEAM
THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE HELD NOW?
IS IT A PROBLEM THAT BARAK WANTED TO HAVE THE
SUMMIT NOW BUT ARAFAT DIDN'T?

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