

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mary Williams to Mary Williams at 12:30 PM. Subject: 8845srb.doc. (31 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Richard Saunders to Christopher Bolan at 5:55 PM. Subject: November 13, 1997. (4 pages)	06/09/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/01/2000-07/07/2000]

2008-0729-F

vz1597

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/05/2000 2:41:21 PM
FROM Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY PEACE PROCESS: Haim Ramon, minister in Prime Minister Barak's office, told Israeli radio Palestinian talks have been exhausted...suggested Camp David summit "even if it might fail"...added, "what is left can only be done at a concluding summit meeting of the two leaders with the U.S President...we need President Clinton." (U) UPI s1234

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/21/2000 10:25:30 AM
FROM Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT MEPP Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6-21 MEPP.doc
PRESS GUIDANCE
June 21, 2000
MEPP: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRACK

There are Israeli press reports that Barak and Arafat have agreed to a summit meeting at Camp David, starting July 6 and lasting ten days. Barak advisor Danny Yatom said Israel wants a "working summit" within a few weeks. Any response?

* The President has clearly stated that he is prepared to host a summit with Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat once the necessary basis is achieved.
The purpose of such a summit would be to reach a permanent status agreement.

But can you confirm the specific Israeli reports?

* No.

What is your view on Palestinian reports saying they do not want a summit unless it is "properly prepared"?

* The President has made it clear that he is prepared to host a summit when the appropriate basis exists.

Will the Shas Party decision to withdraw from Barak's coalition hinder the peace process?

* I'm not going to comment on internal Israeli politics.

* The Israeli government and the Israeli people have committed themselves to striving for peace through negotiations. We are confident that this will remain Israel's policy and we will do everything that we can to support the peace process.

[Context: The Shas Party's four cabinet ministers and three deputy ministers submitted resignation letters today. They do not take effect for 48 hours, providing additional time for negotiations between Shas and Prime Minister Barak. Shas officials have said the next two days could be used to salvage the coalition.]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/05/2000 12:31:37 PM
FROM Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: SBTP on Announcement of Camp David Summit with Prime Minister Barak of Israel
and Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
Merletti, Roger D. (INTERAM)
Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
Wallace, Joanna B. (INTERAM)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)

Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Brown, Katherine A.
(PRESS/INTERN)

Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2000 12:00 PM

To: @PRESS

- Public Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @RUDMAN; @NSCComm;
@NESASIA - NE/South Asia; @INTERAM - Inter-American; @EXECSEC -
Executive

Secretary

Subject: SBTP on Announcement of Camp David Summit with
Prime Minister Barak of Israel and Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian
Authority [UNCLASSIFIED]

<< File: SBTP on Announcement of Camp
David Summit with Prime Minister Barak of Israel and Chairman Arafat
of the Palestinian Authority.doc >> Statement by the President on
Announcement of Camp David Summit with Prime Minister Barak of Israel
and Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority

@INTERAM: The

President took a question on Mexico after the statement.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/05/2000 3:33:59 PM
FROM Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Leon Interview with Ed Chen [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)

CARBON_COPY Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)

TEXT_BODY Sounds good to me.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bresnahan,
Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2000 3:14 PM
To: Powell,
Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Cc: Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Subject: Camp
David [UNCLASSIFIED]

I have been asked/tasked for nothing at this time. My opinion is that we should have an NSC office sized to support the amount of NSC members going to Camp David. With that said I think we should have NSC Secure LAN, Secure Video, MLPs, STU-IIIs and an office space for SRB to work out of other than Laurel. I also think this should be located in Willow (the WHCA building) which can accommodate this requirement. Manning should be a systems person and a sitroom communicator. If berthing becomes a problem up there then we might have to shuttle people back in forth...MAYBE two teams of two working shift work (0600-1500 and 1500-closing) ??? If there is a small NSC presence then maybe we only need a sitroom communicator. I would probably recommend sending the equipment up on Friday (me or Steve Crowder with the sitroom person) test it out and then just go up when ever the summit begins. These are just my thoughts and I have not shared these with anybody higher in the chain.

gary

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/07/2000 10:21:34 AM

FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Conference Call w/ JBS-Boucher-PJ-Reidel [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
NSA Email
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

TEXT_BODY Just to confirm that there will be a 10:45 a.m. conference call in preparation for JBS Magazine Session.

Included will be Boucher,
Steinberg, PJ (as soon as he gets back from briefing), Reidel and possibly Miller and Malley.

The number will be 6-6777 or 6-6799.
The code 628.

Marilyn: Please see the updated memo attached. note
that Donatella Lorch will be filling in for Michael Hirsch from
Newsweek.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Weekly Magazine Session 7-7-2000_.doc

July 7, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM STEINBERG

FROM: P.J. Crowley

SUBJECT: WEEKLY MAGAZINE SESSION

You will be meeting with the following magazine correspondents on
Friday, July 7
at 11:30 a.m. in your office:

Massimo Calabresi -Time
Donatella Lorch -Newseek
Warren Stroebel -U.S. News and World Report
Rick Dunham -Businessweek

Areas of interest include upcoming MEPP Summit at Camp David,
Shanghai 5 Summit,
G-8 Summit, and NMD.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/07/2000 2:17:43 PM

FROM Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT newswk essay [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Malley, Robert (NESA)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
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Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
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Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
NSA Email
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)

TEXT_BODY

Tom: As it turns out, SRB had reviewed your 11:14 a.m. version before I was able to pull it in favor of the 2:07 p.m. version, per your request. He made minimal edits, as shown in the attached. Please advise whether you need to go back to him with a new version that incorporates more of your later version.

Thanks, Justin

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

camp david_.doc

Draft POTUS Newsweek Op-Ed

This week, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat will come to Camp David at my invitation to seek agreement on the core issues that have fueled a half-century of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Underlying this challenge are the most profound questions -- about beliefs, political identity, and collective fate. Etched in each side's mind are intense fears and emotions and a deep-seated commitment to defend their people's interests. There clearly is no guarantee of success.

So, why this summit and why now? The answer is simple: While Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have made real progress, the most complex and sensitive issues are still unresolved. Success now depends on decisions only the two leaders can make.

For Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat, the challenge is to draw the contours of a long-awaited peace - a peace that can fulfill the Israeli people's quest for security and recognition, genuine reconciliation with Palestinians, and true acceptance in the region -- a peace that can fulfill the Palestinian people's legitimate aspirations to determine their destiny on their own land, and to build a better future.

Neither side can achieve 100 percent of its goals. The optimal solution of each party is, by definition, one the other party cannot and will not accept.

Negotiations must create an outcome that is realistic, balanced, and fair; that meets the fundamental objectives of both sides; that reconciles their competing grievances; that strengthens the two parties rather than weakens one of them.

Delay is no longer an option, for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict knows no status quo. It can move forward toward peace, or can slide back into turmoil.

It will not stand still. If the parties do not seize this moment to make more progress, there will be more hostility and more bitterness -- perhaps even more violence.

And to what end? Eventually, after more bloodshed and tears, they will have to come back to the negotiating table, where they will face the same history, the same geography, the same passions, the same hatreds and the same tough choices that confront them today.

In coming here and accepting this challenge, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have shown they are ready to take risks to pursue peace. The Israeli and Palestinian people have leaders now who are visionary enough, courageous enough, and capable of building a fair, just, and lasting peace. I will be there with them, and I intend to do all I can to help. America has a profound interest in a Middle East whose people are prosperous, at peace, and willing to confront common challenges as partners. For the same reasons, the rest of the world - and especially the rest of the region - cannot afford to be bystanders. For all those who are truly committed to the cause of peace and to the well-being of the Israeli and Palestinian people, now is the time to lend support to the peacemakers.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/07/2000 7:14:35 PM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT MEPP/NMD Weekend Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT MEPP-NMD-jul07gui2000.doc
NSC GUIDANCE
July 7, 2000

Camp David Summit

NMD/Core Points

NMD/Flight Tests (draft)

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
July 7, 2000

Why did the President decide to convene this Summit?

* As President said, he believes the parties have a real opportunity to reach an agreement on the core issues that have fueled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

* But the negotiators have taken this as far as they can. Issues that remain are sensitive and complex, and require leaders' direct involvement.

* Without a Summit, there will be no agreement, decisions will not get any easier, and situation is likely to deteriorate. The alternative to a Summit is to keep the negotiations in current impasse and risk escalation over time.

* All three leaders reached consensus that now is the time to try to move this forward.

What do you hope to get out of the Summit?

* The ultimate objective has always been the same: to reach a framework agreement on permanent status issues.

* There is of course no guarantee that it can be achieved, for the issues the parties face are existential and gaps remain significant. But the President believes there is both a real danger of backsliding and a real opportunity for progress, and that we have a responsibility to seize it.

* The key is to move the process forward, and the only way to do that at this point is with the direct involvement of the leaders because the negotiators have taken this as far as they could.

How long do you expect the Summit will last?

* We will not set a deadline. The President will assess progress periodically.

* Right now, the President is focused on doing everything he can to help the parties reach an agreement as quickly as possible. He is well aware of the challenge, but he believes there is no time to waste. There is a real opportunity and this is the best way to make progress.

* He has spoken to PM Barak and Chairman Arafat, and both share his view that we need to try to do this now.

Does the President intend to attend the G8 Summit?

* Yes. The President needs to leave for the Summit of the G* on the 18th and both leaders understand that.

Do you really believe you can reach an agreement in a week?

* The issue is no longer one of time. The issue is whether the two leaders are prepared to take the tough decisions required to reach an agreement.

* The fact is that the two sides have been dealing with these issues for a long period now, and each one is familiar with the other side's position. Without courage and creativity, these talks could drag on for another ten years without an agreement.

What will the U.S. role be at the Summit?

* Ultimately, only the Israelis and Palestinians can make the historic decisions for peace. US cannot and will not try to impose its views on either side.

* At the same time, the parties traditionally have asked us to play a role in the negotiations, and we have done so in a variety of ways. Expect that will be case here too.

Will the U.S. table its proposal?

* Will not get into the details of what we will or will not do. Suffice it to say that we will do what best helps the parties.

Will the President be at Camp David every day?

* There is no greater priority for the President at this time.

* He is prepared to participate in the talks as much as is needed to help the parties reach an agreement.

* Expect the President to go back and forth as appropriate.

What will happen if the parties fail to reach an agreement?

* As I said, there is certainly is no guarantee of success. Clearly the

gaps
remain significant.

* But the consequences of continued stalemate are dangerous.

* President believes this is the only way to try to move forward, and he is convinced that there is a real opportunity to succeed. Right now, we are focused on trying to do just that.

If the negotiators have exhausted their usefulness, what will they be doing for two days?

* Any Summit like this requires intensive preparatory work, and both sides agreed that it would make sense to send their senior negotiators to the U.S. ahead of the Summit.

* They will be working with Secretary Albright in that spirit.

NMD: CORE POINTS
June 22, 2000

Core Points:

* Emerging threat. Prudent to explore appropriate response

* Can and if possible should be done consistent with adapted ABM treaty. Treaty provides for adjustments

* Working with Russians who acknowledge threat but disagree over response.

* Decision later this year whether to move forward next spring

* Four criteria (threat, cost, technology, overall security including arms control)

* Prepared to share appropriate technology with Allies and Russia

* Welch Report

- * Valuable contribution which provides independent assessment
- * Key findings
- * Important progress in the last year
- * The program is technically feasible to meet the Phase I requirement (up to a dozen or two warheads with simple decoys), but further attention is needed to the problem of discriminating decoys from real warheads for Phase II.
- * Meeting the schedule remains high risk, but Welch does not recommend changing the schedule at this point

* Perry, Shali, etc/Boost phase:

- * Open-minded about boost phase approach-but technically not available by 2005 when threat projected to emerge
- * Could be valuable supplement to our architecture; prepared to discuss with Russians and others; our negotiations with Russians to permit our Phase 1 would not preclude further agreed amendments to accommodate this approach.

* Reinterpretation of ABM Breach

- * No decision yet on deployment
- * Treaty does not define what constitutes breach/range of interpretations possible
- * Only prudent that lawyers review possible interpretations
- * Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that President will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security including arms control)

* Hill arguments in favor of postponing decision and deferring negotiations with Russians

- * Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years
- * President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security
- * Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what

is appropriate

* No decision yet

* Korean Summit/undercuts need/urgency for NMD

* Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of tensions on Korean Peninsula

* Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions

* Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely

* Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue

* Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports)

* Postol/Decoys

* Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program

* Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I)

* Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

DRAFT

NMD: FLIGHT TEST

July 7, 2000

CONTEXT. On July 7, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization announced it performed a flight test involving a planned intercept of a target reentry vehicle over the central Pacific Ocean. [An intercept was achieved][An intercept was not achieved]. This was the fifth National Missile Defense (NMD) integrated flight test (IFT). The first two (IFT-1A and IFT-2) tested the ability of

sensors
deployed on kill vehicles to discriminate between warheads and decoys, and did not involve actual intercepts. The third (IFT-3) conducted on October 2, 1999, was the first NMD flight test designed to conduct an actual intercept; in this test, the kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. The fourth (IFT-4) conducted on January 18, 2000, failed to achieve an intercept. Yesterday's test (IFT-5) was the third NMD flight test designed to conduct an actual intercept. BMDO is now conducting a review of the test; a more complete review could take several weeks to compile.

POLICY

- * Committed to the development of a limited NMD system - designed to counter emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security.
- * President will decide later this year whether to proceed with deployment; decision based on four criteria: threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security, including arms control.
- * Want to work with Russia on changes to the ABM Treaty required to deploy a limited NMD.

Core Points

- * Committed to the development of a limited NMD system - designed to counter emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security.
- * Will make a decision later this year on whether to proceed with deployment of a limited NMD. That decision will take into account four criteria: the threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security including arms control.
- * The July 7 test in which the kill vehicle [sucessfully intercepted]

[missed]

the target was one of a series of tests; results of this test -- along with other flight tests, ground tests and simulations -- will be used to assess the technical feasibility of our NMD.

[If asked points if the test is a success]

Doesn't this test prove that our NMD system is "technically feasible?"

* Test shows we are making progress in our NMD program; the question of technical feasibility will be addressed in the upcoming Administration review of our NMD program.

* As DOD said Thursday, it is premature to make any declarations regarding "technical feasibility" based on the results of this one test. We are going to have to take the time in the next couple of weeks to take a real hard look at the data from this test, and be cautious of being overly optimistic.

Does this mean the President will now decide to proceed with deployment?

* No decision has been made regarding deployment.

* Will make a decision on deployment later this year, based on four criteria: threat, cost, technical feasibility, and national security including arms control.

[If asked points if the test is not successful]

Was the July 7 test a failure?

* The kill vehicle did not intercept the target. I would refer you to DOD for details.

Doesn't this prove that our NMD system is not "technically feasible?"

* The question of technical feasibility will be addressed in the

Administration's
deployment readiness review; results of this test -- along with other
flight
tests, ground tests and simulations -- will be used to assess the
technical
feasibility of our NMD.

Doesn't this suggest that the Administration's approach to NMD is
flawed?

* Believe we have the right program for developing a limited NMD.
The July 7
test is one in a series of flight tests that will take place over the next
few
years. We will continue with our program to develop a limited NMD.

[Other questions]

When will the President make his decision on deployment?

* Later this year.

What is the next step in this process?

* Administration will proceed with its review, taking into account
four criteria.

Has the Administration determined when its NMD program would
violate ABM?

* We have not made a determination as to when work on our NMD
would violate the
ABM Treaty.

* Treaty does not define what constitutes breach; only prudent that
lawyers
review possible interpretations.

* There are a range of interpretations available; but no decision has
been made.

* Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that
President
will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security
including
arms control).

Why not postpone a decision on deployment and defer negotiations with Russians?

- * Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years.

- * President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security.

- * Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what is appropriate.

- * No decision yet.

Hasn't the Korean summit changed your thinking on the North Korean threat?

- * Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of tensions on Korean Peninsula.

- * Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions.

- * Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely.

- * Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue.

- * Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports).

What about criticisms from Ted Postol and others that our NMD program cannot effectively deal with decoys? that the program has been manipulated?

- * Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program.

- * Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I).

* Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

Both in Moscow and since, President Putin has outlined an alternate path of cooperation on NMD, including cooperation on theater missile defense and boost phase intercept. Why not embrace what President Putin is proposing?

* U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also recently made proposals. Intend to continue our discussion of how we can work together on this issue. U.S. experts were in Moscow last week to continue our discussions.

* The point we have made about Russia's proposal is that we do not see it as a substitute for our national missile defense program. That doesn't mean we don't want to talk about it, or that there isn't something there for us to work with. We hope that there is, and we plan to discuss this further with the Russians.

What is the status of the Intelligence Community assessments of (a) foreign reactions to a possible NMD deployment, and (b) the ballistic missile threat to the United States? What will it say about these issues?

* Assessment itself is still in preparation; not going to speculate as to when it might be done or what the key judgments might be.