

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to Various at 6:55 PM. Subject: Phone Calls. (6 pages)	07/01/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mathew Sibley to Robert Malley and Bruce Riedel at 11:40 PM. Subject: Barak and Arafat Phone Calls. (5 pages)	07/02/2000	P1/b(1)
003. email	Robert Malley to Various at 10:08 AM. Subject: Arafat Phone Call. (4 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)
004. email	Robin Rickard to Various at 1:12 PM. Subject: RE: MEPP. (4 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)
005. email	Robin Rickard to Various at 1:14 PM. Subject: RE: MEPP (Time Sensitive). (3 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)
006. email	Frank Jaronski to Robert Malley and Bruce Riedel at 7:28 PM. Subject: Draft MEMCON: POTUS-Israeli Prime Minister Barak. (7 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F

vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/26/2000 1:22:04 PM
FROM Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Minus DOE and NMD.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUS QA June 27.doc
POTUS Q&A
June 27, 2000

- * MEPP
- * National Missile Defense
- * DOE Security
- * Colombia
- * Cuba Sanctions
- * Elian
- * Korea
- * Zimbabwe Elections
- * Ethiopia-Eritrea
- * Japan Elections
- * Northern Ireland
- * President Putin
- * Chechnya
- * Vieques
- * Kosovo
- * Iranian Jews
- * Mexico Elections
- * Peru Elections

MEPP

Secretary Albright arrived in the Middle East today. There have been charges, counter-charges and threats by both sides in recent days about prisoners, redeployments and Palestinian statehood. I know you will wait to hear her report. If you decide to go ahead with a Summit, would it be your goal to keep the parties convened until there is at least a framework agreement on final status issues? Would you consider convening such a meeting at Camp David? And would such a meeting happen after July 4 as some sources in the Middle East have suggested?

* Secretary Albright arrives in Israel later today (Tuesday) and will see Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. I look forward to hearing her report on her discussions when she returns to Washington later in the week. It would be premature to discuss steps until then. I am ready to do whatever I can to help advance the process forward but I want to hear from Secretary Albright before talking specifics.

What about the Syrian track? I know that Bashar Asad is observing the period of mourning regarding the death of his father. Once that period ends, do you plan to reach out to him, as you did to his father in Geneva, to see if you can break the current logjam?

* The door remains open to finding a way forward. I have spoken with Bashar Asad

since his father's death and I am watching closely the Syrian process for selecting a new president.

National Missile Defense

How will the recent North-South Korea summit affect your decision, given the importance of the North Korean threat in past NMD rationalization? Is Kim Chong-il still an irrational leader of a rogue state, in your view?

* My decision on NMD will, as you know, take into account four basic criteria: feasibility, cost, implications for arms control, and the evolving nature of the threat. North Korean missiles are not the only threat that is of grave concern to us. In addition, we are still not in a position to say that the North Korean missile threat will not materialize as we have previously thought. I would be pleased to see that threat reduced, but as of now the evidence is simply not there for me to reach that determination.

* Kim Chong-il surprised everyone by his handling of the North-South summit. I hope that his behavior in the coming months supports the impression he created that he is prepared to establish more effective ties not only with the ROK but also with others in the international arena.

DOE Security

Colombia

The Congress is about to pass your request for funding for Colombia? Isn't it inevitable that we are going to get sucked into deeper military involvement?

* First, I want to say that I was very pleased by the strong bipartisan support we received in the Senate for our aid package to Colombia and I do hope this will move quickly out of conference. We need this money to help Colombia fight a drug trafficking problem that threatens Colombia as well as the United States. Over 80% of the cocaine supplied to the US now originates or passes through Colombia, as does two-thirds of the heroin seized in this country. It is important to support President Pastrana and the Colombian people in this effort.

* Second, no I do not intend for us to get dragged into the long-standing conflict with the insurgents. We will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts. Our support to Colombia is aimed specifically at reducing the supply of illicit drugs. This is a goal shared by the international community.

* US assistance will be provided only to those police and military units that have been or are being carefully vetted, according to each agency's procedures with respect to human rights abuses.

* We do not believe that a purely military solution is workable for Colombia.

Plan Colombia is President Pastrana's comprehensive and balanced response to Colombia's interrelated challenges of lawlessness, corruption and long internal conflict which have been exacerbated by the immense profits generated from the growing drug trade.

* We believe Colombia's multiple problems can only be solved by the Colombians themselves, and we, along with the international community, support President Pastrana's efforts in meeting Colombia's challenges.

Is there any hope for a negotiated peace in Colombia?

* Yes, there is. In fact, President Pastrana was elected on a peace plank in 1998. Of course, as with any peace process, success is not guaranteed.

* Our policy is to support President Pastrana's efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the country's longstanding civil conflict. We fully recognize that progress in resolving Colombia's civil conflict would make sustained progress much easier on all other fronts -- reducing drug supply, protecting human rights, and promoting democracy and economic development.

* We believe strongly that our assistance will help Colombia reinvigorate its economy, enhance its governing capability, discourage human rights abuses, and reduce the money available to guerrillas and paramilitaries from involvement in drug trafficking. As such, the plan represents the best chance to promote real progress in the peace process.

* Our package will also provide support to help train government negotiators and advisors on managing conflict and negotiations. Training will draw on the lessons learned in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Central America. The training will include the techniques for reintegrating ex-combatants into civil society.

* Of course, we expect the peace process to continue to be marked by breakthroughs and setbacks. It may take many years.

Do you truly think we can make a dent with this counter-drug effort?

* Certainly. The impressive successes of regional counter-drug efforts in Peru and Bolivia show what can be done with an integrated strategy.

* The problem is that to make further gains against cocaine and Colombian heroin -- and to avoid future setbacks -- we need to help Colombia beef up its counter-drug capabilities.

Cuba Sanctions

The Hill is moving to lift food and medicine sanctions against Cuba. Isn't it time for the Administration to end the embargo against Cuba, especially since you are working to open trade with China and North Korea?

* Our Cuba policy, including the embargo, is based on a bipartisan consensus spanning more than three decades. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, or Helms-Burton Act, became law in the wake of Cuba's shootdown of two U.S. civilian aircraft in international airspace in February 1996. To change this would require an act of Congress.

* Helms-Burton was intended to increase pressure on the Castro government to undertake reforms and to better protect the rights of U.S. citizens whose

property in Cuba was illegally confiscated and later used by foreign investors.

* While the embargo receives the most media and international attention, support for the Cuban people is the central theme of our policy. The embargo does not prohibit the sale of food and medicines to private entities but to government organizations.

* We are prepared to consider alterations in our policy in response to clear and unequivocal steps toward democracy in Cuba. So far we have seen little indication that the Cuban government is prepared to make such moves.

* The Administration does object to legislative proposals that would seriously limit the President's ability to implement foreign policy and would have grave implications for our non proliferation, counter terrorism and counter narcotics initiatives.

* There is a big difference between Cuba and China. China has reformed its economy allowing for the development of a private sector. Cuba has not. China has an open labor market, it permits foreign firms to directly contract and hire individuals. Cuba does not. In China, one can do business without directly empowering and enriching the government. In Cuba, one cannot.

Elian

How do you think the Elian case has affected U.S. relations with Cuba? Is there a real chance to engage Cuba now that American public feelings have turned against the Cuban-American community in Florida?

* Our handling of Elian Gonzalez matter has been in no way shaped by a desire to reconstruct our policy toward Cuba. We have long said that if the Government of Cuba makes fundamental, systemic changes, our relations with Cuba will improve;

if it does not make fundamental changes, relations will not improve.

* It appears to me that there is a growing consensus among the American people that we should change our current approach in dealing with Cuba. But that change in attitude does not change the basis of our policy. I have often said that if Cuba makes fundamental changes then I would be willing to consider changes in our policy toward Cuba. Until those changes are made, our policy will not change.

Korea

Are you satisfied with the results of the North-South summit? How do they affect US policy toward the Korean peninsula?

* I believe the North-South summit marked a very hopeful step on the path reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula. I have supported Kim Dae-Jung from the start as he has pursued the strategy that led to the summit. I think it is the right way to go, and I again want to congratulate him on the remarkable progress he has made.

* We have worked in close coordination with the ROK, and our basic policy remains very much in place. To remind you, this lays out a path to normalization of US-North Korea relations based on a number of concrete steps. Just last week, we completed the process necessary to implement sanctions easing measures I first announced last September. North Korea last week reiterated its moratorium on missile testing. We have bilateral missile talks coming up very soon.

* As long as North Korea takes the concrete steps necessary, I look forward to our moving down the path toward normalization, and I think this fits very well with the strategy that the ROK is pursuing, and also that Japan is pursuing. Should North Korea move in the wrong direction, of course, that would have consequences for our own approach.

Do you expect very rapid progress toward Korean reunification?

* The North-South summit produced specific initiatives that both sides will now seek to implement. I expect these to encourage further reduction of tensions and to significantly increase North-South contacts. We hope those steps go smoothly and that they start a process that can produce real peace on the peninsula. That is in all of our interests. This process will, inevitably, take some time.

Will the North-South summit affect US troop deployments to the ROK?

* Kim Dae-Jong gave a speech this past weekend to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Korean war. In it, he made absolutely clear that US forces will remain critical to peace and stability in the region, even when his hopes for reunification are realized. I believe Kim's view reflects the objective realities and long-term interests not only of the ROK but of the entire region.

What do we think of Putin going to North Korea?

* We welcome reports that Russian President Putin will visit North Korea. We all share the desire for a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula. I believe President Putin's trip should contribute to that goal.

Zimbabwe Elections

Background: Parliamentary elections were held over the weekend, June 24-25.

Zimbabwe was wracked by government-inspired violence in the weeks and months leading up to the elections, both as a result of forceful land

occupations by
ruling ZANU-PF party cadre and in direct response to the growing
popularity of
the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The
government originally
told us they would allow professional international election monitors,
then later
declined, but ultimately permitted diplomats and other USG officials
to be
accredited. The National Democratic Institute and International
Republican
Institute sharply condemned the electoral process even before the
elections were
held over the weekend. Preliminary reports indicate a surprisingly
high voter
turnout, with the votes being counted early this week. Final results are
not yet
ready.

How concerned are you that the elections were flawed and what do
you intend to do
about it?

* Clearly, the electoral process was compromised by violence and
intimidation.

We and other governments have made our concerns clear to the
government of Robert
Mugabe, and repeatedly called for adherence to the rule of law in
matters
pertaining to both the elections and the land issue.

* It is too early to determine the outcome of the elections, as votes are
just
being counted now. We are encouraged that millions of Zimbabweans
chose to vote
despite the violence.

* I really don't want to comment on our response until we've seen the
final
results of the elections and heard from the observers. Once the
outcome of the
elections has been determined, and observers have commented on its
conduct, we
will respond accordingly.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Background: The foreign ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Algiers on June 18. Negotiated by the Organization of African Unity with the strong support of the United States (Tony Lake attended and participated in the negotiations on behalf of the U.S.), the Agreement includes provisions for Ethiopia's withdrawal from Eritrean territory and the creation of a security zone and deployment of UN peacekeepers. The parties will now engage in negotiations aimed at achieving a final, comprehensive peace.

Are you optimistic about the agreement signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia in Algiers?

* Yes, I consider this a real breakthrough. This is the first time in two years that the two parties have agreed to silence their weapons and negotiate peacefully.

* There is a great deal of work to be done, however, as the two parties must now negotiate a final, comprehensive end to this war. We will continue to do all we can to support a final peace agreement.

Japan Elections

What is the Administration response to the results of the Japanese Lower House elections?

* I want to congratulate those who were elected, and I look forward to continuing our very close cooperation with the government of Japan. This is, for us, an extremely important relationship and one in which I have been personally deeply involved. I am looking forward to my trip to Japan for the G-8 summit in late July.

Q: The election seems to have weakened the LDP and potentially increased policy paralysis. How will this affect US interests.

* The Diet will meet on July 4, and I understand there may be changes in the Cabinet. I look forward to working with the new Cabinet to address the issues we both recognize are very important.

Northern Ireland

Yesterday, special representatives Martti Ahtissari and Cyril Ramaphosa provided an initial report saying that IRA weapons and explosives are adequately stored and cannot be used without detection. While you hailed this as a positive step, can you outline what the IRA has to do next? What specific steps do you expect the IRA to do, when and what are you planning to do to push the IRA towards actual decommissioning?

* In the context of Irish history, what the IRA has done is nothing short of monumental. That has to be recognized.

* At the same time, even the IRA acknowledges that the peace process still requires putting all arms beyond use.

* The IRA has pledged to initiate a process that will achieve this goal in the context of full implementation of the Good Friday Accord. It announced yesterday, as part of this process, that it would resume contact with the international commission headed by General de Chastelain that oversees the arms decommissioning issue.

* It is clear to me that the best way to move toward putting all paramilitary arms beyond use in Northern Ireland is for the paramilitaries to engage with de Chastelain, and for all political parties to work together in good faith to implement the Good Friday Accord. I want to see that happen, and I am using all the means at my disposal to support this.

Russia/Chechnya

Since your summit with President Putin, we have seen Gusinsky arrested and the Duma vote to rein in regional leaders. How concerned are you that he is not the reformist you had hoped and is, in fact, seeming to go in the opposite direction?

* During my visit to Moscow, I made clear to President Putin that Russia's embrace of democracy, individual and human rights is fundamental to the success of reform and Russia's continued international integration.

* I also emphasized that we're concerned by the very real problems that Russia is having in some of these areas. I hope that by talking honestly and directly my visit made a difference.

* President Putin has said that Russia has a lot of work to do to put its own house in order. I agree and want to work with him and other Russians who want to build a more democratic, prosperous country.

* At the same time, it would be huge mistake simply to turn our backs on Russia or throw up our hands. I have long said that the process of building a new Russia is going to be measured in decades and generations.

Doesn't the arrest of Gusinsky and the raid on Media MOST make

clear that freedom
of press is in jeopardy?

* Am very concerned about state of free media in Russia. Key issue
for Russian
democracy. During my stay in Moscow, talked to President Putin
about issue at
length.

* I think it's important that President Putin has said "Russia will have
no
future if we suppress civic freedoms and the press."

* In any free society, we can't expect to like or enjoy everything the
press says
or does. But the development of independent media in Russia is a
singular
achievement, it's something that never existed there before. It's a
source of
strength and vitality, should be cherished - and protected.

* Russian people have made great strides in overcoming the
totalitarian past.
Important to safeguard these gains and not permit any return to the
tactics of
intimidation.

Any comment on Putin's plan to strengthen central authority at the
expense of
Russia's governors? Does this look like a prelude to the return of
authoritarianism?

* It's responsibility of Russian people and their leaders to decide how
to
structure government. Know that Russian parliament is examining
these proposed
laws now. That's right way to handle such things.

* Believe that regional autonomy and development of strong, stable
relations
between federal government and Russia's regions are important to
success of
Russia's transformation.

Any comment on the Russian announcement of suspension of air and
artillery
attacks in Chechnya?

* I would welcome this report, if accurate.

* I have maintained that this conflict cannot be resolved through military action. Call on Russians to pursue a political solution to the conflict, as the only path to a durable peace.

What do you say about Russian atrocities in Chechnya, which have been documented in such detail by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International?

* I've been very disturbed by reports of killings at Aldi (all-DEE). The war in Chechnya was a very prominent issue in my discussions with President Putin while I was in Moscow. I think that reflects the importance this issue holds for both the U.S.-Russian relationship and Russia's own future and international standing.

* I made clear once again that a military solution is not viable. Sadly, the stepped up level of violence in the region in recent weeks suggests that Russia is becoming trapped in a quagmire that will only get worse before it gets better. I can only hope that claims of the Russian military yesterday that the bombing has stopped are true.

* The only way to find a lasting solution is to take meaningful steps on political track, begin dialogue with responsible Chechen leaders.

* I'm obviously very concerned about humanitarian impact, refugee situation and rights abuses. I pressed President Putin to conduct transparent, impartial investigations of reported human rights violations and to cooperate fully with international organizations (e.g., OSCE). Disappointed by Russian footdragging on this.

if pressed -- Why hasn't the U.S. accused Russia of war crimes?

* Deeply concerned by allegations of human rights violations by Russian forces in

Chechnya. That's why we co-sponsored resolution on Chechnya at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in April. That resolution outlined steps Russia should take to investigate these reports and cooperate with international human rights organizations.

* Russian actions in Chechnya raise fundamental questions under international humanitarian law that merit immediate and impartial investigation by Russian authorities.

* Thorough investigation necessary to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any individual for specific criminal acts. Will continue to urge the Russian Government to conduct open and transparent investigations, prosecute those responsible.

Chairmen Gilman and Helms have placed a hold on our Paris Club bilateral debt rescheduling because of Russia's actions in Chechnya and because the Russian economy seems to be bouncing back. The Russians say they really need debt forgiveness, and that they're being punished because they're economy is doing better than expected. Will you support debt relief for Russia?

* The bilateral rescheduling agreement in question is not a new initiative. It implements our commitment with other Paris Club creditors in August 1999 to reschedule Soviet-era payments falling due in 1999 and 2000.

* In this connection, the U.S. has agreed to reschedule -- not forgive -- certain Russian debt payments in order to maximize prospects for repayment of the debts Russia owes us.

* Think it is most important that Russia focus on consolidating its economic recovery and putting in place sustainable macroeconomic policies and structural reforms that will help spur economic growth and attract private investment.

Do you support resuming IMF and World Bank assistance to Russia as it continues its campaign in Chechnya?

* We support Russia's reengagement with the IMF.

* Believe World Bank can play a crucial role supporting key structural reforms on Russia's agenda, including in banking, social sector and pension reform.

* Make decisions on whether to support financing for Russia based on our national interest, including our interest in a democratic, stable Russia that is making real progress on economic reform. IMF funding should be provided only when program conditions have been met.

The Senate on Friday voted to amend the Foreign Ops bill to include an amendment by Helms regarding Russian loans to Serbia, which would restrict on a dollar for dollar basis our bilateral assistance to Russia. Indeed, the Russians in May hosted an indicted war criminal, FRY Defense Minister Ojdanic, and announced new loans to Serbia. Will you support IMF loans to a country that behaves this way?

* I was dismayed by reports that an indicted war criminal was received by the Russian Government last month. We expressed our concerns immediately to the Russians about the serious problems this visit created. I think it's appropriate that they've apologized for the incident and pledged this won't happen again.

* We've been talking extensively with the Russians about the exact nature of the loans that may have been extended or are under consideration. This is very serious matter. I think it's important that Russia avoid steps that would reduce international isolation of Milosevic regime.

* Make decisions on IMF assistance to Russia based on our national interest,

including our interest in a Russia that is making progress toward economic reform.

A German newspaper suggests that President Putin may be attached to a money laundering scandal. Do you have any concrete evidence of high-level Russian corruption, siphoning off of U.S. aid?

* Urge Russians to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with investigations, no matter where evidence leads.

* Have uncovered no evidence of systemic or large-scale diversions of U.S. bilateral assistance.

* Appropriate safeguards in place with respect to any IMF and World Bank programs going forward.

What do you think of Putin's economic policies?

* Encouraged by early emphasis on tax reform, WTO accession, strengthening property rights and overall plans to improve investment environment, all of which are signals in the right direction. But Putin's economic policy will be judged by results.

* Key to seize the great opportunity Russia is currently enjoying thanks to favorable energy prices and push ahead.

* Encourage Russia to build on its current economic upswing and undertake reforms necessary to achieve sustainable growth that will result in improved living standards for all Russian citizens.

Any response to the claims by the wife of Edmond Pope, Cheryl Pope, that the State Department isn't doing enough on her husband's behalf?

* Concerned about Mr. Pope's situation and understand the frustration

of his
family that their loved one is incarcerated in a faraway place.

* Familiar with Mr. Pope's case and know that our Ambassador in Moscow and other senior officials are raising the issue appropriately with Russian authorities.

* Refer any further questions to State Department.

Expecting a breakthrough any time soon on Nagorno-Karabakh?

* NK peace agreement central to promoting stability and prosperity in region.

* The pace of progress is something that only Armenia and Azerbaijan can determine. The United States and the international community are ready to support a peace settlement as soon as the parties reach an agreement. Very encouraged by seriousness of Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev in discussing various approaches.

* As one of the three Minsk group co-chairs, u.s. remains actively engaged in peace process. All three co-chairs are planning to visit the region from July 2-6 for further meetings with regional leadership.

Vieques

Protesters in Vieques -- including Robert Kennedy, Jr. -- are adamant that the US

Navy not resume bombing there. Isn't it about time to admit that continued

military training on Vieques is a bad idea?

* The limited military training being conducted on Vieques is being carried out

in accordance with agreements worked out with the Governor of Puerto Rico and

Navy and Defense officials, and detailed in my directives.

* These agreements address the concerns of the people of Vieques to the fullest

extent possible, while also attempting to meet important military training needs.

* My directives are supported by the Mayor of Vieques, Congressman

Romero-Barcelo, in addition to the Governor of Puerto Rico, and the legislature

of Puerto Rico.

Kosovo

Background: The Gračanica-based Serb National Council (SNV) voted overwhelmingly on June 25 to resume participation, as observers, in Kosovo joint institutions for another three months. The move comes following assurances by UNMIK and others that additional efforts would be made to improve the security for Kosovo Serbs.

Now that Kosovo Serbs are back in the transitional council, how much closer are you to deciding that US troops are no longer necessary to station there?

* We welcome the decision of the Serb National Council to resume participation in Kosovo's joint institutions and hope steps announced to improve the Kosovo Serbs' security will be effective. Extremists must end the ethnic violence that is undermining efforts to bring stability to Kosovo

* Though the resumption of Serb participation in the joint institutions is an important step, there is still much to be done in Kosovo. Elections must be held and interim institutions of autonomy that protect the rights of all Kosovars must be developed. Without a secure environment these objectives cannot be accomplished.

* While we have made real progress, the job in Kosovo is not finished. The US - and the US military - working with our European allies must continue to play a strong leadership role to ensure that the job is done right.

Iranian Jews

Background: The proceedings of the trial have concluded and the Iranians have

announced that a verdict (and sentencing, we expect) will be announced on July 1.

There are conflicting pronouncements regarding whether any of the accused have been charged with crimes punishable by execution.

What would you consider a positive verdict in the trial of the 13 Jews?

- * Want them to receive justice.
- * Expect a verdict very soon.
- * Don't want to say anything that could prejudice the outcome.

Mexico Elections

What is your reaction to possible fraud in next Sunday's Mexican elections and how will you respond?

- * We have confidence in the Mexican electoral system.
- * Political leaders of all parties in Mexico have worked hard to develop an electoral process that is independent of governmental authorities and provides safeguards against electoral abuse.
- * The elections will be monitored by some 800,000 polling station officials who will be joined by party monitors and approximately 800 foreign observers.

What will the U.S. position be if the election outcome is challenged following a close race?

- * If the vote is challenged by any one of the parties, it will undergo a close examination by the country's electoral review processes.
- * We have confidence in those mechanisms to carry out an independent and thorough review.

But aren't you saying this because the United States favors the election of ruling party candidate Labastida?

- * I want to be make very clear that we don't favor any candidate or party. We look forward to working with whomever the Mexican people select to lead them over the next six years.

Peru Elections

When Peru went ahead with its recent elections, U.S. government response was quite opposed. Have you now accepted the flawed election there?

* We remain deeply concerned by the flawed election in Peru, which clearly did not meet internationally recognized standards.

* Peru should not be mistaken about how the international community has viewed its election. The Organization of American States (OAS) passed a strong unanimous resolution expressing concern about the process and outcome and reiterated its commitment to preserving and strengthening democracy in the hemisphere.

* It is in this vein that the OAS Secretary General Gavia and FM Axworthy are on their way to Peru to discuss with all segments of political life, including the opposition, steps that should be taken to rebuild Peru's democratic institutions.

* It is significant that Peru has accepted this OAS mission and its mandate.

But what are you doing to pressure Fujimori, will you impose sanctions?

* We continue to work with the OAS action and our hemispheric partners to press Peru to enact strong and verifiable measures to establish democratic credibility.

* Continue to make clear to the Peruvian government that we expect results We certainly will continue to consider bilateral measures as appropriate.

* We look forward to hearing from SYG Gaviria and Axworthy before deciding on next steps.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/29/2000 11:56:20 AM
FROM Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: mepp/state invite [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)

TEXT_BODY

i talked with pat kennedy who had a somewhat more benign interpretation of this invite. his assumption is that this summit, if it happens, will see the president drop in and out, meaning that state in fact will have to have the lead, since the white house will only engage when the president is there. (the exception, of course, is if this is at camp david.) so maybe i was overreacting.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)

Sent: Thursday,

June 29, 2000 11:10 AM

To: @RUDMAN

Cc: @NESASIA - NE/South Asia;

Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)

Subject: mepp/state invite [UNCLASSIFIED]

elaine

shocas has asked rob and me to attend a somewhat undefined meeting tomorrow to organize ourselves to do whatever it is that we will need to do on the logistical side of the middle east peace process. i suspect wendy and elaine think that they will be running this process. there will certainly be plenty of work to do, and we and state will need to work together, when decisions get made, but i am not comfortable with state leading since the most difficult questions will relate to the president's involvement and will have to involve

wh advance, scheduling, wh press, etc. nor do i think sandy will want it to be done this way.

i would like to talk with rob when he returns, and ideally we would have some guidance from sandy, but i wonder whether we should be counter-proposing an alternative process involving you as chair (and wendy or elaine as co-chair), with me and pat kennedy identified to work together to coordinate on the details, reporting back to and getting guidance from the two of you (and sandy of course). perhaps we should turn elaine's meeting into a video conference that you would chair?

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/26/2000 4:40:22 PM

FROM Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT MEPP guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6-26 MEPP.doc
PRESS GUIDANCE
June 26, 2000
MEPP: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRACK

There continue to be Israeli press reports that Barak and Arafat have agreed to a summit meeting at Camp David starting July 6 and lasting ten days. Arafat said statehood could be proclaimed in a matter of weeks. Does this mean we're closer to a summit?

* The President has clearly stated that he is prepared to host a summit with Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat once the necessary basis is achieved. The purpose of such a summit would be to reach a permanent status

agreement.

* As I said earlier, the Secretary arrives in the region tomorrow to determine if we have a basis to go to a summit or if more work is necessary.

What is your view on Palestinian reports saying they do not want a summit unless it is "properly prepared"?

* The President has made it clear that he is prepared to host a summit when the appropriate basis exists.

What happens if there is no summit? Does it have to be done before the election campaign heats up?

* I'm not going to get into "what if" speculation. All parties are committed to establishing the appropriate basis so that a summit can be held that will achieve a permanent status agreement.

Do you have any comment on the "American Non-Paper" obtained by Israeli news sources regarding the basis for a tripartite summit? Is this an official USG document? Can you verify that the negotiating positions in that document are accurate?

* We have seen these reports and the document.

* This document is not a U.S. government documents, does not reflect USG views and is factually incorrect.

* We're not going to speculate about where it came from but as I said, it is not a U.S. document.

* As we've said before, we are not going to comment on the specific details of the negotiations.

What are your views on a possible Israeli handover of villages near Jerusalem to the Palestinians?

* The Israeli government has taken a decision on this and we would expect these further redeployments will occur at some point.

Can you confirm that the United States asked the Palestinians to accept a postponement of the scheduled Israeli handover of more land? Or that the Palestinians have agreed to this request?

* Further redeployment (FRD) is an issue the two parties are continuing to discuss.

* Our focus right now is to concentrate on permanent status issues. We believe there is a historic opportunity that should not be missed.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to Various at 6:55 PM. Subject: Phone Calls. (6 pages)	07/01/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Mathew Sibley to Robert Malley and Bruce Riedel at 11:40 PM. Subject: Barak and Arafat Phone Calls. (5 pages)	07/02/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

003. email	Robert Malley to Various at 10:08 AM. Subject: Arafat Phone Call. (4 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)
------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/03/2000 1:00:34 PM
FROM Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: ARAFAT [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Malley, Robert (NESA)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Gentile, Donald J. (WHSR)
Grissom, Dianne L. (WHSR)
Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
Mynatt, Lee (Brad) B. (WHSR)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Yarmchuk, Christina H. (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

TEXT_BODY Printed and placed in readbook for Berger before his departure for Camp David.

-----Original Message-----

From: Malley, Robert

(NESA)

Sent: Monday, July 03, 2000 10:16 AM

To: @WHSR - WH Situation

Room

Cc: Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

Subject: ARAFAT [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please

pass to SRB before phone call

Sandy,

You should

be aware of this, which we have heard is what Arafat told Yossi Ginosar on Saturday. Unclear whether this represents a genuine Palestinian expectation based on what MKA and Arafat discussed (a two-week preparatory period) or a tactical move by Arafat to engineer a delay. In any event, it should give you a sense of the Pals' state of mind.

a6376

^BC-MIDEAST-SUMMIT

^Clinton said to offer Middle East summit dates

GAZA, July

3 (Reuters) - The United States has proposed one

or two tripartite

summits with Israel and the Palestinians in July and

August to

hammer out an accord before a September target for a final peace,

a Palestinian official said on Monday.

``The Americans have

proposed July 17 or July 24 for a summit

that will follow talks

between the two sides," the official, who declined to be identified,

told Reuters.

``The summit could possibly only be for consultation and

in that case will be followed by another summit sometime in August,

before the September deadline," he said.

A U.S.

diplomat declined comment, saying any decision to convene a summit

would come from the White House.

The Palestinian official said

lower-level negotiators would

begin meeting in the Washington area
sometime following Tuesday's U.S.
Independence Day holiday.

U.S. President Bill Clinton would ask Israel and the PLO
which
date they prefer for a summit.
Israel and the Palestinians,
negotiating parties in seven
years of U.S.-brokered peace talks,
have set a September 13 target for
resolving the toughest issues
of their conflict -- borders, the status
of Jerusalem, Jewish settlers
and Palestinian refugees.
Israel has pushed for an immediate
summit. The Palestinians
are opposed to holding one as yet, calling
instead for further negotiations
to try to narrow differences.
RB--
07/03/00 10:04:56

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Robin Rickard to Various at 1:12 PM. Subject: RE: MEPP. (4 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

005. email	Robin Rickard to Various at 1:14 PM. Subject: RE: MEPP (Time Sensitive). (3 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)
------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/03/2000 6:34:45 PM

FROM Malley, Robert (NESA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT POTUS ANNOUNCEMENT [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Gentile, Donald J. (WHSR)
Grissom, Dianne L. (WHSR)
Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
Mynatt, Lee (Brad) B. (WHSR)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Yarmchuk, Christina H. (WHSR)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

TEXT_BODY SANDY:

AS WE DISCUSSED, THIS IS A DRAFT STATEMENT THAT
THE POTUS
COULD MAKE (IF THIS CANNOT HOLD UNTIL WEDNESDAY,
THE PRESIDENT STILL
COULD MAKE THESE REMARKS TO EXPLAIN THE
GATHERING AND PUT IT IN CONTEXT)

I
WILL GO OVER IT WITH DENNIS TOMORROW, BUT
WANTED YOU TO HAVE AN IDEA
OF WHAT I WAS THINKING AND GET YOUR REACTIONS.

(OF COURSE, WE
WILL HAVE TO ADJUST IT TO WHATEVER IS DECIDED IN
TERMS OF TIMING/SEQUENCE)

FYI:
OUR CONGEN IS SEEING ARAFAT TOMORROW MORNING
TO MAKE THE POINT ABOUT
THE TIMING. I WILL CALL YOU WHEN WE HEAR BACK

I LEFT A MESSAGE
FOR COHEN. NO WORD BACK YET.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CAMP DAVID -- POTUS RMKS II.doc
X days from now, at my invitation, Prime Minister Barak and
Chairman Arafat will
be coming to Camp David accompanied by their negotiators. There,
they will seek
to end a century-old conflict and to establish a genuine peace for
generations to
come.

To describe the task is to state the magnitude of the challenge that lies
ahead.

To solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to address the most
profound
existential questions -- about beliefs, about collective identity, about
collective fate. It is to come to terms with the most wrenching fears
and
emotions. There are no easy answers, and certainly no painless ones.
There is,
in other words, no guarantee of success.

Why then this Summit, and why now? To put it simply: Israelis and
Palestinians
have taken their negotiations far, but they can take them no further.

Only
leaders can now change the dynamic and make the historic decisions
that need to
be made. Nor will the choices become any easier with time. If both
sides agree
that this is the moment of truth -- and I believe both do -- then the
time to
face it is now.

Action has its perils. But so too does inaction. Never have the Israeli
or
Palestinian people had leaders more visionary, more courageous and
more capable
of building a fair and lasting peace. History will not forgive us for
turning
back at a time when circumstances beg us to move forward.

To those who would argue that the risks of failure outweigh the
benefits of
success, that it would be better to wait than to take a chance on such a
high-stakes gathering, I would say this: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
knows
no status quo. One can step forward, or one can step back. But one
cannot stand
still. If the parties do not seize this moment, if they cannot reach an
agreement now, sooner or later they will return to the negotiating
table. In the
meantime, however, there will have been more hostility and
bitterness; perhaps
more violence, more bloodshed and more tears.

And to what end? They will return to face the same history. The same
geography.
The same demography. The same passions and hatreds. And, I am
sure, the exact
same solutions that, today, only fear and apprehension prevent them
from
embracing. Neither party should expect the other to wither under the
effect of
time or of pressure. We are down to each sides' core interests and core
requirements; the way out is not for one party to impose its will at the
expense
of the other's but to devise a solution that takes both into account.
Negotiations must create a win-win situation for both sides, or no
agreement can
endure. That, in a word, is the essence of peacemaking.

To the Israeli and Palestinian people, I would like to say this: Peace
never is

cost-free. It requires giving up vast aspirations. But such aspirations rarely succeed for they fail to take account of the other side. The optimal solution of either party is one that the other cannot and will not accept.

Yes, you will be asked to part with some of your dreams. But peace can be a larger dream still. For it is a concrete and durable one that will allow both of you to focus on the issues that really matter: the safety, health care, education and well-being of your children and of your children's children.

I say this because, in many ways, the ultimate prize of peace has been overshadowed by the dreariness of its pursuit. The ups and downs of the peace process, the daily hassles and fears, the open-ended nature of the negotiations: all these, over time, have blurred the lofty vision born at Oslo. The logic of Oslo -- that each step forward would build mutual confidence -- has been turned on its head. To the supporters of peace, each step is seen less as another move forward than as another infuriating delay; to its detractors, each is another reason to fight back. To both, these steps are seen as endless concessions without reciprocal reward.

In my judgment, the time has come to rise above the step-by-step and the piece-meal. The time has come to carry out the real vision of Oslo and bring to life the ultimate objective of its creators. An end to the conflict. A just, lasting and comprehensive peace that deals with all claims, from both sides. The long-delayed fulfillment of the Israeli people's quest for security, for recognition, and for a genuine reconciliation in words as well as in deeds. The equally long-delayed fulfillment of the Palestinian people's legitimate aspiration to determine their own future on their own land.

In coming here and in accepting this daunting challenge, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have shown that they are ready to take risks in the pursuit of peace. The rest of the world, and particularly the rest of the region,

cannot
afford to be by-standers. For all those truly committed to the cause of
peace
and to the well-being of the Israeli and Palestinian people, this is a
moment of
truth as well.

The Arab-Israeli conflict -- which grew out of the struggle between
Israelis and
Palestinians -- can only be resolved once that struggle is fairly, and
permanently, put to rest. The time to do that is now.

Sim Shalom. (Arabic translation). Let there be peace.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Frank Jaronski to Robert Malley and Bruce Riedel at 7:28 PM. Subject: Draft MEMCON: POTUS-Israeli Prime Minister Barak. (7 pages)	07/03/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/26/2000-07/04/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1571

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/04/2000 5:13:36 PM
FROM Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: FOR SANDY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)

TEXT_BODY Miles -- are you going to do, in coordination with Barbara [?] a list of who makes what calls on the Hill? Assuming Sandy will call leadership, but shouldn't chairs/rankings of auth and approps get calls too?

-----Original Message-----

From: Malley, Robert
(NESA)
Sent: Tuesday, July 04, 2000 4:43 PM
To: @WHSR - WH Situation
Room; Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Cc: Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA); Rudman,
Mara E. (NSA); Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Subject: FOR SANDY [UNCLASSIFIED]

PLEASE
PASS TO SRB

Sandy,

Attached is a revised
version of the President's statement and draft congressional talking
points. I will be sending you draft qs and as shortly.

Miles
has cleared on the Congressional points.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CAMP DAVID -- POTUS RMKS II.doc
Six days from now, at my invitation, Prime Minister Barak and

Chairman Arafat

will be coming to Camp David, preceded by their negotiators. There, they will seek to reach an agreement on the core issues that have fueled the century-old conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. After close consultation with the two leaders, and after listening to Secretary Albright's report, I have concluded that this is the best way -- indeed, the only way -- to move forward.

To describe the task is to state the magnitude of the challenge. Behind the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lie the most profound existential questions. Etched in each side's mind are intense fears and emotions, and a deep-seated commitment to defend their people's interests. There are no easy answers, and certainly no painless ones. There is, in other words, no guarantee of success.

Why then this Summit, and why now? To put it simply: Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have made real progress and taken their talks far. But, left to their own devices, they can take them no further. Significant gaps remain, and they involve the most complex and the most sensitive of issues. The negotiations have reached an impasse, and any movement now depends on historic decisions only the two leaders can make.

To those who would argue that to prolong the current situation is safer than to run the risk of failure, I would say this: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict knows no status quo. It can move forward, or it can revert back. But it cannot stand still. If the parties do not seize this moment, if they cannot make progress now, there will be more hostility and bitterness; perhaps more violence, more bloodshed and more tears.

And to what end? Eventually, they will have to come back to the negotiating table. They will return to face the same history. The same geography. The same demography. The same passions and hatreds. And, I am sure, the

exact same
solutions that, today, only fear and apprehension prevent them from
embracing.

Of course, action has its perils. But so too does inaction. And the
choices
will not become any easier with time. Never have the Israeli or
Palestinian
people had leaders more visionary, more courageous and more
capable of building a
fair and lasting peace. History will not forgive us for turning back at a
time
when circumstances beg us to move forward.

In coming here and in accepting this challenge, Prime Minister Barak
and Chairman
Arafat have shown that they are ready to take risks in the pursuit of
peace. The
rest of the world, and particularly the rest of the region, cannot afford
to be
by-standers. For all those truly committed to the cause of peace and to
the
well-being of the Israeli and Palestinian people, this is an important
test as
well.

To the Israeli and Palestinian people, I would like to say this: Peace is
never
cost-free. For the optimal solution of either party is one that the other
cannot
and will not accept. The way out is not for one side to achieve its
goals at the
expense of the other, but to devise a solution that takes both sides'
vital needs
into account. Negotiations must create an outcome that is realistic,
balanced,
and fair, or no agreement can endure. That, in a word, is the essence
of
peacemaking.

And that, in a sense, is the real prize of peace. For by reconciling
competing
grievances, by creating a win-win situation, both of you can focus on
the issues
that will make a real difference in the lives of your children: safety,
health
care, education, and so much more.

At times, I fear that this ultimate objective has been overshadowed by
the

dreariness of its pursuit. The ups and downs of the peace process, the daily hassles and fears, the open-ended nature of the negotiations: all these, over time, have blurred the vision born at Oslo. The logic of Oslo -- that each step forward would build mutual confidence -- has been turned on its head. To the supporters of peace, each step is seen less as another move forward than as another infuriating delay; to its detractors, each is another reason to fight back. To both, these steps are seen as endless concessions without reciprocal reward.

In my judgment, the time has come to rise above the step-by-step and the incremental. Beginning next week, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat will try to move their common endeavor forward, and start drawing the contours of the long-awaited peace. A peace that can fulfill the Israeli people's quest for security, for recognition, and for a genuine reconciliation in words as well as in deeds. A peace that can fulfill the Palestinian people's legitimate aspiration to determine their destiny on their own land, and to build a better future.

Almost seven years ago, I stood here as I watched the historic handshake between late Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat. It began a process that offered the Israeli and Palestinian people the chance to achieve what I then described as the quiet miracle of a normal life. That is still the vision that inspires me today. With commitment, courage and creativity, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat can bring us yet another step closer to its fulfillment.

* Want to brief you on important development in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

* Later today, the President will announce that he has invited Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat to a Summit meeting at Camp David. They have agreed, and discussions will begin on July 11. Their goal will be to try to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues.

* Their senior negotiators will be coming a few days earlier for preparatory discussions under Secretary Albright's supervision.

* The President reached this decision after careful deliberation and close consultation with the two leaders. He decided on this course of action for two principal reasons:

* Without a Summit, there will be no agreement. The negotiators have worked hard and have made real progress. But significant gaps remain, and they cannot be resolved at the negotiators' level. They involve complex, sensitive issues for which the leaders direct involvement is required.

* Passage of time does not make it easier. Both leaders already are under intense political pressure from their own sides, and this will only get worse. Also facing deadlines they have set for themselves that will create their own dangerous dynamic, like September 13th (deadline for reaching final agreement; date for unilateral declaration of Palestinian state). It is the shared view of all three leaders that the time to move is now.

* Issues that remain are existential for both sides. No guarantee of success. But no alternative.

* If no Summit, there will be no agreement. If no agreement, will run into deadlines and potential cycle of unilateral steps that will harm Israelis

and
Palestinians, could lead to dangerous escalation in region.

* President knows that only Israelis and Palestinians can make the decisions. We
can help, but we cannot impose solutions and we will not try to.

* As you know, for every prior Arab-Israeli agreement, we have
provided help to
support the parties. If a historic agreement is reached now, believe we
should
be prepared to lend our hand. Of course, we will not make any
decision without
consulting thoroughly with you.

* This does not mean that others in the region or in the international
community
will be free of responsibility. Europeans and Arabs in particular will
have to
contribute significant amounts, and we will press them.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/04/2000 6:06:45 PM
FROM Malley, Robert (NESA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY FYI --

Currently with SRB for his clearance

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CAMP DAVID Qs and As.doc
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Why did the President decide to convene this Summit?

* As President said, he believes the parties have a real opportunity to reach an agreement on all the core issues that have fueled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

* But the negotiators have taken this as far as they could. Issues that remain are sensitive and complex, and require leaders' direct involvement.

* Without a Summit, there will be no agreement, decisions will not get any easier, and situation could deteriorate. The alternative to a Summit is to keep the negotiations in current impasse and risk escalation over time.

* All three leaders reached consensus that now is the time to try to move this forward.

What do you hope to get out of the Summit?

* The ultimate objective has always been the same: to reach an

agreement on
permanent status issues.

* There is of course no guarantee that it can be achieved now, for the issues the parties face are existential and gaps remain significant. But the President believes there is a real opportunity now and that we have a responsibility to seize it.

* The key is to move the process forward, and the only way to do that at this point is with the direct involvement of the leaders because the negotiators have taken this as far as they could.

How long do you expect the Summit will last?

* President needs to leave for Summit of the G-8 on July 18th, and the two leaders are aware of that.

* Right now, the President is focused on doing everything he can to help the parties reach an agreement as quickly as possible. He is well aware of the challenge, but he believes there is no time to waste. There is a real opportunity and this is the best way to make progress.

* He has spoken to PM Barak and Chairman Arafat, and both share his view that we need to try to do this now.

Does that mean the Summit will automatically end on the 18th?

* As I said, the President needs to leave for the Summit of the G* on the 18th and both leaders understand that.

Do you really believe you can reach an agreement in a week?

* The issue is no longer one of time. The issue is whether the two leaders are prepared to take the tough decisions required to reach an agreement.

* The fact is that the two sides have been dealing with these issues for a long period now, and each one is well aware of the other side's position. Without

courage and creativity, these talks could drag on for another ten years without an agreement.

What will the U.S. role be at the Summit?

* Ultimately, only the Israelis and Palestinians can make the historic decisions for peace. US cannot and will not try to impose its views on either side.

* At the same time, the parties traditionally have asked us to play a role in the negotiations, and we have done so in a variety of ways. Expect that will be case here too.

Will the U.S. table its proposal?

* Will not get into the details of what we will or will not do. Suffice it to say that the parties are looking to us for help, and we are prepared to do so.

Will the President be at Camp David every day?

* There is no greater priority for the President at this time.

* He is prepared to participate in the talks as much as is needed to help the parties reach an agreement.

What will happen if the parties fail to reach an agreement?

* As I said, there is no guarantee of success. The parties are facing existential issues, and clearly the gaps remain significant.

* But President believes this is the only way to try to move forward, and he is convinced that there is a real opportunity to succeed. Right now, we are focused on trying to do just that.

If the negotiators have exhausted their usefulness, what will they be doing for two days?

* Any Summit like this requires intensive preparatory work, and both sides agreed that it would make sense to send their senior negotiators to the U.S.

ahead of
the Summit.

* They will be working with Secretary Albright in that spirit.