

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Joshi M. Kay to Various at 9:30 AM. Subject: Six-Months Memo. (9 pages)	06/05/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Bruce Riedel to Kathleen Cooper and Robert Malley at 6:09 PM. Subject: Abdallah. (9 pages)	06/07/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/01/2000-076/07/2000]

2008-0729-F

vz1567

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/01/2000 8:54:00 AM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT (Portugal) Press Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on President's Meeting with Prime Minister Barak, Sheraton Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal, June 1, 2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Background Briefing
(Portugal) Press Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on President's Meeting with Prime Minister Barak, Sheraton Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal, June 1, 2000

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

(Portugal) Background Press Briefing on Barak Meeting.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Lisbon, Portugal)

For Immediate Release June 1, 2000

PRESS BRIEFING BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BARAK

Sheraton Lisboa
Lisbon, Portugal

12:25 P.M. (L)

MR. HAMMER: Good afternoon. We're going to have a briefing, on
BACKGROUND, by
a senior administration official, who will provide you a few more
details on this
morning's meeting between the President and Prime Minister Barak.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you heard the
President describe in
general terms the meeting, let me just amplify a couple of points.
Number one,
the Secretary will go out for a short meeting after the Moscow
summit. The main
purpose of the meeting will be to follow up on today's discussion,
have a chance
to meet with Chairman Arafat, as well, see if there are differences that
can be
narrowed.

I do not expect this to be her only trip. All along we have said that the
President would be prepared to have a summit with the leaders if the
basis was
laid. And we've always felt that the Secretary would make a trip at a
certain
point to make a judgment as to whether or not we were at that
juncture, where the
basis had been laid. This particular trip is geared much more to follow
up.
We're not at a point, we don't see, we don't believe, where the basis is
sufficiently laid to be able to go to that kind of a summit.

That said, I think the President feels, again, that in the aftermath of this meeting what he sees is a very determined effort on Prime Minister Barak's part to seize the moment and to see if, in fact, from his standpoint it's possible to reach an agreement. He feels, based on his conversation on the phone yesterday with Chairman Arafat, that he, too, has a commitment also to try to seize the moment and end this conflict.

I do want to say one thing and then I'll take your questions. We are dealing with the most fateful issues there are between Israelis and Palestinians. The issues of permanent status, borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, security arrangements -- all of these issues go to the heart of identity, existence and security, and these are very tough negotiations, to be sure, given how profound the issues are. But there is no question that what we have seen is, at least in the negotiations, there is a chance to overcome the differences. But there's still an awful lot of hard work that will have to be done.

I'll take questions.

Q The President in his remarks called on both sides to do the things that they have not done in the past. Can you specifically lay out what these things are that they have not done in the past?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, I think what he was getting at was specifically, you're trying now to deal with the permanent status issues. The fact is, when the Oslo process was laid out, it was envisioned that there would be a three-year period to negotiate permanent status issues.

In fact, the discussions on permanent status have really been going on for about the last six months, and really only for about the last three to four weeks have we seen the kind of -- what I would describe as serious business going on. So

what you're really dealing with at this point is being able to go to the heart of the matter. Oslo was built on taking a series of interim steps. Now we're dealing with the issues that go to the heart of the matter, and they're -- as I said, they're issues that deal with identity, with existence, and with security.

Q Do you expect a new level of involvement by Albright? Will she be making repeated trips or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I just wanted to make it clear that there might have been -- some might have assumed that this trip would be the trip that's designed to lay the basis, or determine whether the basis would be there. It's not that. I would expect that she will make at least another trip.

Q How has the pullout from Lebanon, in your view, affected the state of these negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, it's created a new reality. No matter how you slice it, in the Middle East there is a new reality. Israel is out of Lebanon. The U.N. is working right now to put itself in a position to be able to confirm that withdrawal. It will mean that one of the Security Council resolutions, as often cited, will have, in fact, been implemented. So it creates a new reality.

For many, it shows that something like this, which many thought couldn't happen, can happen. And I think it is also a reminder that when, maybe, different parties on different sides say that there's a historic moment, this tends to crystallize the reality that there is a moment here -- that things can change, they can change in a very profound way on the ground.

When we say there's a moment, one of the concerns we have is that there is a moment because both sides seem committed to wanting to overcome

these very
profound issues. But you know, moments don't last forever. And if
they're not
seized upon, the consequences of not seizing upon them are usually
pretty
significant. So I would just say that what Lebanon does is highlight
that the
realities can change in a very significant way. Israel had been in
Lebanon since
1982. And for many, that was simply a fact of life. Well, it's clear
that's no
longer a fact of life.

Q Does the President still believe that a September 13th target date is realistic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that he does. I
believe that he
thinks it is possible to reach an agreement.

I think he has no illusions. I think on the one hand, the President is
quite
hopeful, because he sees the level of intent on each side. On the other
hand,
he's quite mindful of how difficult these issues are for both sides, how
difficult the decisions are for both leaders. I think it's why he -- he
often
times speaks about the importance of both sides having the vision and
the courage
to take these steps -- and it will take both, because these are
enormously
difficult. But there is a pathway that's there, and there is an intent that
is
there; now we'll have to see whether it's possible to translate that
intent into
a reality.

Q Prior to today's meeting, Mr. Barak accused the Palestinian's of
some
foot-dragging in negotiations. Did Arafat give the President an
indication that
there is a hang-up here, or will negotiations proceed apace?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The negotiations will
proceed apace. Again,
when you're dealing with what are very difficult issues, and you also
have an
environment that has been difficult the last few weeks, as well, it's not
surprising that one side or the other will have a sense of grievances.

And, in
fact, the reality is, both sides have a sense of grievance.

We're focused much more on, again, dealing with what we have seen
in the
negotiations that indicate that both sides are quite serious about trying
to find
ways not only to overcome the differences, but I will say, one thing
that clearly
characterizes this track, and has, is that both sides make much more of
an effort
to try to take account of the other side's needs, not only their own
needs.

Q When do you expect the meeting between the President and
Chairman Arafat in
Washington to occur?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President said,
"soon." We'll obviously
have to find a date that's mutually convenient, soon. It will take, I
would
expect, fairly soon after the Secretary has seen him and after the
President gets
back.

Q It's not scheduled yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not scheduled yet
because we'll have to
work it out with Chairman Arafat.

Q Would you expect in June, sometime within June?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When the President says
"soon," I think he
means soon.

Q More and more reports are emerging that rather than 60 percent of
the West
Bank or the Jordan Valley, up to 90 percent is being put into play by
Barak. Is
that something that was discussed today? Is he offering that through
President
Clinton or signaling that he's prepared to offer much more land than
anyone had
anticipated from the Jordan Valley of the West Bank?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to go
into the specifics,

and I think what either the Israelis or the Palestinians offer at the negotiating table is something for them to talk about, not for us to talk about. But I would say that both sides have signaled to each other and to us that they're prepared to try to take account of the needs of the other, as well as meeting their own needs.

I think it's fair to say that in Prime Minister Barak's case, he is very much governed by what Israel needs for security, but he's also mindful that if you're going to reach a deal you're going to have to make some painful decisions. And that he signaled to us and he certainly has signaled that to his own public.

Q You said that Secretary Albright will go to the Middle East next week and that she'll have to make another trip before there will be a Camp David summit. Is that your thinking on the timing -- I mean, do you know, you're able to project that it's only going to take two Albright trips to the Middle East and then you're ready for a three-way summit?-

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not projecting yet. We know where we are right now. We know, on the one hand, that, in fact, they have made some headway, they have narrowed some differences. But we also know that the differences that remain are very significant. And more has to be done to create a kind of basis before you would go to the kind of summit that the President has in mind.

How long that's going to take, I can't predict right now. What the exact nature of the process will be, I can't predict right now. What I can tell you is that this trip doesn't have that as its purpose. This trip will be geared towards following up on the discussion that was here, which the President found to be quite useful; following up both with Prime Minister Barak and with Chairman

Arafat. And then Chairman Arafat will come see the President -- I use the word "soon" and it will be soon -- and then I would expect that in the aftermath of that, we will make a judgment.

There are different ways we may proceed. It may involve the Secretary going back out; it may involve bringing the negotiators to a spot; it may involve me working with the negotiators. We'll see, based on the aftermath of these discussions where we think we are. But we basically feel there is a pathway here that offers promise, but there is still an awful lot of work that has to be done.

Q Is she going to Syria, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Does the President plan a follow-up phone call with Mr. Arafat today? And in the meeting with Mr. Barak, was there talk about the Israeli-Syria track?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first question, I don't believe so, because I think what the President envisions is that in terms of fully briefing the Chairman, the Secretary will be in a position to fully brief the Chairman on the meeting.

Most of this meeting was devoted to the Israeli-Palestinian track, but there was at least a brief discussion about Syria, as well.

Q To follow up to that, is there any reason to think that this latest turn of events might get the Syria track moving some, that it might -- President Assad might feel motivated to start talking more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think when you look at the Middle East and you see something that changes the landscape fundamentally, traditionally, there is a tendency for people to read into it the potential for danger. But the

reality is there is also a potential for opportunity. So I think in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, you have a new situation. If you have a new situation, that may also create new possibilities.

We have never closed the door on the Syrian track. We've made that very clear.

We have stayed in communication with the Syrians. They haven't closed the door and we haven't closed the door. So we continue to believe that there is a possibility there.

Q What was the length of the meeting? How long was the meeting?

Q -- confirmation of the report by the U.N. negotiator in Syria that the Syrians have accepted the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as per the U.N. report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only thing that -- no. Right now, Terje Roed-Larsen is out there; what he is reporting and said publicly is that the Syrians have accepted the U.N. reports. That's what he said. We have not heard anything differently, but he is a very reliable reporter and we have no reason to question it.

An hour-and-a-half.

Q And is the Secretary going directly from Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think she'll be going from Ukraine. She'll get in the night of the 5th.

Q The night of the 5th. And will she go only to meet with Arafat, or will she also be going to Jerusalem to meet with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: She'll meet with Prime Minister Barak, as well as with Chairman Arafat.

Q Can you tell us anything more about the meeting, itself; that is to say, were there certain of these fundamental issues that were discussed more than others,

or are some showing more promise than others, other than just that Barak showed determination?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's fair to say that there was a discussion on permanent status and on the issues of permanent status. There was a discussion on sort of the status of where the negotiations are. And I think the Prime Minister gave the President his views.

When the President meets with either the Prime Minister or Chairman Arafat at this stage, the effort is very much geared towards trying to understand not only exactly where things stand in the eyes of the respective leader, but also to probe and see what possibilities might exist in terms of narrowing gaps.

Q There have been so many positive moments, and then hopes have been dashed. And you've seen just about all of them. Putting this into context --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's right.

Q Yes -- putting this into context for those of us who haven't seen them that way, how would you characterize this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad you asked that question, because oftentimes people say I like to use the word "context," and I didn't mention it, but you did.

If you look at where we are in the sweep of things, historically, you'd have to say we've made a lot of headway, at least between Israelis and Palestinians. And I think the fact that we are dealing with permanent status issues now, and that we can look at these issues and think that, as the President said yesterday, that an agreement is possible, is itself an indication that things have moved.

It's hard to sort of, on the one hand, state that things have moved, and then

still relate to the reality that the gaps you still have to overcome are difficult. But the reason they're difficult is because of the nature of these issues. It's not an accident that the issues in Oslo were put off until the end -- although, as I said before, it was supposed to be three years to cover them.

The hope was that you would create a kind of environment, a kind of climate, where when you came to deal with the permanent status issues, given the nature and the difficulty of them, that there would be such a stake in cooperation that it would be easier to resolve them than might have been the case otherwise.

The fact is, we're in the seventh year of this process. And we don't necessarily have the kind of climate one would have envisioned, but we do have the kind of negotiations now that at least show that there may be a way to overcome the differences.

I think what the President conveys is a sense of hopefulness based upon the sense that, in fact, we have come a long ways -- again, measured against a historical context. But there's also no illusions that the kind of decisions that the two leaders are going to have to make are very, very difficult, because nobody can be satisfied completely on any of these issues, because to satisfy one side completely is to leave the other side dissatisfied.

So you have a reality where both sides are going to have to find ways not only to make difficult decisions, but to be prepared to build bridges that presently don't exist, to overcome the differences. And if we didn't think there was a chance, we wouldn't be making the effort right now. We obviously think there is a chance, because the two sides themselves are making it very clear that they're prepared to do what they think is necessary to reach an agreement. Now, reconciling what they need and what the other side needs is what the challenge is

all about right now.

Q Did the President and Barak agree on the earmarking of \$50 million to shore up the border with Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israelis made a request to us a couple of weeks ago, and I think actually the President made the decision before this meeting that we would respond favorably to that request. The essence of that request is to use \$50 million of existing FMF, but to allow the Israelis to spend it -- in a sense, use Israeli contractors for that. So they're allowed to use offshore procurement, and that represents, in a sense, lifting the threshold of what they're normally permitted to do in that regard.

Q Did the President convey that message to the Prime Minister today or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It had been conveyed previously, in the last -- in the past week, it was conveyed.

Q What's your sense of the current domestic Israeli political situation and its impact on the peace process? Does Prime Minister Barak have the necessary maneuvering room, given that situation, to do what he has to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you're dealing with a Prime Minister who won a very large mandate personally in the last election. He clearly has made it unmistakable that his objective is to reach peace. He believes that he has sufficient support to do it. He is prepared to press ahead to do it. He is the best judge of what his politics make possible, and there is no question that what the President again heard today was a great deal of determination on his part to press ahead.

And I believe that in many respects, his own views, if anything, have been bolstered by the withdrawal from Lebanon, because this is something

-- he made a decision during the campaign that he would get out of Lebanon. He felt that it was in Israel's strategic interest to get out of Lebanon. He preferred to try to do it through negotiation, but when that wasn't possible by the time period that he had set, he went ahead and he did it.

A major part of his rationale was that inertia was keeping Israel in a position that didn't serve its strategic interests. And he has also made a strategic judgment that there is an opportunity to make peace, and to end a 100-year conflict. And his attitude, if anything, is as determined, if not more so, than what we've heard before.

You asked the question about context before. I would say what the President saw with the Prime Minister is someone who is more convinced than ever that there is a moment that should be seized -- at least, the effort has to be made to seize it. And I think the President's conversations, and his meetings with Chairman Arafat recently, have also convinced him that Chairman Arafat is coming from the same standpoint.

As I said, what you see, in a sense, is the intent. What you see is also a choice. Now, the real question is, can we translate that intent and that choice into a reality?

MR. HAMMER: All right, thank you very much.

END

12:45 P.M. (L)

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/01/2000 1:25:27 PM
FROM Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Lockhart, state briefings for 5/31 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

I'm not sure if you caught the Lockhart briefing, so here are the questions...

Will there be a chance for the President to talk to the press pool after Barak meeting?
Will there be a readout of the meeting given afterwards?
Wouldn't the Pres like to say something re the Barak meeting before meeting the embassy personnel?
Is the embassy meeting closed to the press? (and repeat)
What did Pres mean when he said we may make more headway in Russia than people expect?
He's not hinting at anything in terms of...(cut off by Lockhart)?
Why was venue for the meeting w/Barak changed from Berlin to London (typo - Lisbon?)
Does Pres mean by sharing NMD technology
1) to extend the umbrella of NMD over Europe or 2) to show them how we did it and leave them to build their own? (and repeat)
Does the "sharing" include Russia?
Can you cite other examples of what Clinton means by "share technology"? (and repeat)
How would President address Euro concerns that they can't afford the kind of technology we might be willing to share?
Do you get the sense that our Euro allies have been reassured by the "share technoogy" idea, that they no longer harbor misgivings about the NMD system?
Is the US

really trying to force a settlement in Mid-East? Is this now or never time?

Do you have any confirmation that the Syrians have accepted Israeli pullout?

Has the President tried to reach President Assad, or any senior US official tried to reach Syrian For. Min. Shaara?

If you share missile defense technology, aren't you giving away private enterprise innovation/secrets?

You're not willing to say US would share NMD with Russians?

Has the idea arisen for a Camp-David style three leader meeting to finalize a Mid East deal? Is

US seriously weighing any idea of sanctions or unilateral action re Peru elections?

Has the admin backed off from its sense of outrage at the beginning?

Is the Pres disappointed at lack of progress on US-EU trade disagreements?

Will AIDS and infectious diseases have more prominence in EU and G-8 meetings?

Is this the first time the President has declared the threat from rogue nations to be real? (and repeat)

How receptive will Germans be tomorrow re custody cases/German courts issue?

Is this issue causing awkwardness in talks on other issues?

Will President raise the core of the problem, which is the underlying assumption (by Germany?) that kids are better off in

Germany than with a biological parent?

Does the Barak meeting mean no meeting with young leaders in Berlin?

Can you tell us any more re Clinton's discussion with Arafat?

What is the breakdown on President's time on trade issues, security issues, etc. in these meetings?

(exactly which meetings is unclear)

Is a three-way summit at Camp David re Middle East still on the table? (unintelligible)

Questions faced by Reeker at State:

Can you fill us in on details of US proposal at OAS re Peru?

Did Guatemala's proposal upstage the US/did
US table proposal because of lack of support among other members?
Do
you expect steps re Peru at OAS to be decided upon today or tomorrow?
Who
is going to represent US in Windsor?
What would invoking Resolution
1080 mean?
Isn't Resolution 1080 basically worthless/toothless?
(and repeat twice) (Implication: So basically OAS and US are doing
nothing
re Fujimori)
Secretary Albright will not attend the OAS meeting
in Windsor? (and repeat twice)
What is US point of view re Fujimori
attending meeting in Windsor?
Is the US considering any other action
except for Resolution 1080?
Will State Department be meeting with
Toledo's people?
How many people is Toledo sending?
Isn't there
a convenient subjectivity in the US' definition of "free and fair"
elections? (and repeat)
Does the word "flawed" mean "invalid"?
(referring to Peru elections)
Has there been any contact between
Peruvian and US governments re US position?
Comment re Peruvian
delegate's comments that elecs are an internal matter and that the
decision to delay or not delay was
the purview of the electoral
commission, not the government?
On what basis do you say that the
election was flawed, since even Stein's report says there is not
enough evidence to claim
this?
Do you perceive a sort of trend
of backsliding away from democracy in Latin America? (Interesting
question...)
Any info re North Korean visit to Beijing?
Is this
the DPRK leader's first foreign trip?
Any comment re President's
comments re sharing NMD technology?
Inaudible... something about
MND.
Any readout on missile talks in Rome?
Does the US have a
position on who owns Shebaa farms or how to resolve the issue?

Would
you care to urge the Lebanese to drop their claims to this territory?
Should
we infer then that US position is that Shebaa farms are part of Syria?
Any
update on Fiji?
Is US considering/ has US decided to impose sanctions
against Fiji?
Inaudible...something about sanctions.
Any numbers
re Americans who have left Fiji to date?
Who does US think is in
charge in Fiji? Why is there a reluctance on part of US to say that
a government has been toppled?
Does US want the military commander
of Fiji to step down as leader of Fiji?
Who is running the country,
and are you getting updates from the US ambassador there?
Incoherent...
Inaudible...
Incoherent...
Would
US support Australian sanctions against Fiji?
Is US making clear
to the Fijians the consequences of their actions?
How can US hope
to preserve democracy when US take such weak stances in face of democracy
being trampled? (Fiji and
Peru)
When Pres to meet with Barak?
Did
Ambassador Ross leave already?
Why was meeting time changed?
Does
she (Secretary Albright?) sit in on these meetings? (which meetings
is unclear - presumably Barak talks)
What is State Department expecting
from the Russia meetings?
Has Strobe Talbott gone to Russia to
finalize the agenda or to wrap up the easier issues ahead of the
summit?
Narco-traffickers...cut off by Reeker.
Does US have reason
to believe that Iran has stepped up its support to Hizbollah?
Iran
has denied their increased support; does US accept this denial?
Is
there a UN plan to decommission Hizbollah?
Why is verification
taking so long?

Incoherent...something about decommissioning of
Hizbollah.

Has the US government urged Ethiopia to limit its war
aims to recovery of territory taken by Eritrea?

How does US confirm

Eritrea's pullout...(repeat x2 plus fencing over National Technical
Means.)

Is Asst Sec Rice in Algiers?

Please explain how the new

independent postal system in Kosovo should not be taken by Kosovars
and Serbs as one more

step toward an independent Kosovo? (and
repeat)

Any comments re rumored bin Laden changing of bodyguards?

Any

readout re Pickering's meeting with Taliban?

Any word on Libya

travel ban report?

It's being held up by Lockerbie?

What is taking

so long?

If Taliban offered bin Laden for recognition would the

US agree?

So you only want to fulfill UN resolution re bin Laden?

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Joshi M. Kay to Various at 9:30 AM. Subject: Six-Months Memo. (9 pages)	06/05/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/01/2000-076/07/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1567

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/05/2000 7:53:03 PM
FROM Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT WHSR Evening Summary for 5 June 2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Almon, Timothy C. (INTEL)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Avery, Dale R. (INTERAM)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Banbury, Anthony N. (MULTI)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Bernard, Kenneth W. (HEALTH)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Epstein, Gerald L. (OSTP)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Gentile, Donald J. (WHSR)

Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)
Halperin, David E.
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hane, Gerald J. (OSTP)
Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE)
Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)
Huso, Ravic R. (ASIA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Lee, Malcolm R. (NEC)
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
Mclean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Merchant, Brian T. (RECORDS/INTEL)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Donald A. (INTEL)
Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)
Muir, Morgan C. (SEE)
Munter, Cameron P. (EUR)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Pittman, Howard D. (SEE)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)

Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Rinaldi, Steven M. (OSTP)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Samans, Richard (NEC)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sapiro, Miriam E. (SEE)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)
Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Shannon, Thomas A. (INTERAM)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)
Smith, James A. (INTEL)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)
Soubers, Richard R. (RECORDS)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
Yarmchuk, Christina H. (WHSR)
Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

SITUATION ROOM EVENING SUMMARY June 5, 2000

UNCLASSIFIED

EUROPE/EURASIA

UK-IRELAND:

Northern Ireland parliament held first session in four months.

Separately, Sinn Fein candidate Crumley elected mayor of Londonderry...marks first Sinn Fein mayoral position in major city since 1920. (U) Reuters a9614, a2410

GEORGIA: Kidnappers released four remaining UN hostages...Georgian official said release was without any conditions. (U) Reuters a9735

CROATIA:

Croatian economy ministry announced agreement was reached for admittance to WTO in accordance with "Baltic formula"...formula grants same rights in protecting national cultural tradition and identity as other European countries...also requested WTO approve admission before parliament breaks for summer. (U) Reuters a9946

ASIA

INDONESIA:

President Wahid rejected yesterday's West Papuan independence declaration and warned security forces will take action to maintain order "if it means doing something to people without violating human rights." (U) AP a0456, a0480

AFRICA

ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: Eritrea accused

Ethiopia of renewed attacks today on Bure front, 26 miles southwest of Assab. (U) AP a0499

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

PEACE PROCESS:

Haim Ramon, minister in Prime Minister Barak's office, told Israeli radio Palestinian talks have been exhausted...suggested Camp David summit "even if it might fail"...added, "What is left can only be done at a concluding summit meeting of the two leaders with the U.S. President." (U) UPI s1234

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CHILE: Santiago Appeals

Court stripped former President Pinochet of immunity he holds as senator, paving way for trial for alleged human rights violations. (U) Reuters a1902

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Bruce Riedel to Kathleen Cooper and Robert Malley at 6:09 PM. Subject: Abdallah. (9 pages)	06/07/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/01/2000-076/07/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1567

RESTRICTION CODES

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