

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Cathy Millison to Brian Alcorn at 10:54am. Subject: RE: Camp David Notes. (5 pages)	07/10/2000	b(7)(E)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System [Email]
NSC ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 1200000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/07/2000-08/22/2000]

2008-0729-F

vz1553

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: "Reside, Julie M" <ResideJM@state.gov> ("Reside, Julie M" <ResideJM@state.

CREATION DATE/TIME: 7-JUL-2000 12:57:03.00

SUBJECT: RE: Notice to the Press - Media Facilities During Camp David Even ts

TO: 'Tim Mulreany' <mulreanytj@state.gov> ('Tim Mulreany' <mulreanytj@state.gov> [READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Ogburn, Robert" <ROgburn@usia.gov> ("Ogburn, Robert" <ROgburn@usia.gov> [UNKN READ:UNKNOWN

TO: 'JEFF BROWN' <jbrown@pd.state.gov> ('JEFF BROWN' <jbrown@pd.state.gov> [UNKNOW READ:UNKNOWN

TO: 'Gary Clements' <clementsgd@state.gov> ('Gary Clements' <clementsgd@state.gov> READ:UNKNOWN

TO: 'Dave Staples' <staplesda@state.gov> ('Dave Staples' <staplesda@state.gov> [UN READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Boggs, Gladys D" <BoggsGD@state.gov> ("Boggs, Gladys D" <BoggsGD@state.gov> [READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Anne M. Edwards (CN=Anne M. Edwards/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO]) READ:UNKNOWN

TO: PA PRS Group <PAPRSGroup@state.gov> (PA PRS Group <PAPRSGroup@state.gov> [UNKN READ:UNKNOWN

TO: NSC Press Group <NSCPressGroup@state.gov> (NSC Press Group <NSCPressGroup@state READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Storck, Joan" <JStorck@usia.gov> ("Storck, Joan" <JStorck@usia.gov> [UNKNOWN READ:UNKNOWN

TO: 'kaky turpin' <turpin@usia.gov> ('kaky turpin' <turpin@usia.gov> [UNKNOWN]) READ:UNKNOWN

TO: 'Greg Franklin' <gfranklin@pd.state.gov> ('Greg Franklin' <gfranklin@pd.state.g READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Ereli, Adam J" <EreliAJ@state.gov> ("Ereli, Adam J" <EreliAJ@state.gov> [UNKN READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Couch, Thomas M Jr (PACE)" <CouchTMJR@state.gov> ("Couch, Thomas M Jr (PACE)" READ:UNKNOWN

TO: "Bartels, Kitty J" <BartelsKJ@state.gov> ("Bartels, Kitty J" <BartelsKJ@state.g READ:UNKNOWN

TO: DoD Press Group <DoDPressGroup@state.gov> (DoD Press Group <DoDPressGroup@state READ:UNKNOWN

TO: PA Releases - EXTERNAL Group <PaRel-Ext@state.gov> (PA Releases - EXTERNAL Grou READ:UNKNOWN

Natalie S. Wozniak (CN=Natalie S. Wozniak/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Text version:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

For Planning Purposes Only

July 7, 2000

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

2000/777

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

Media Facilities During Events at Camp David

In connection with the talks at Camp David, scheduled to begin Tuesday, July 11, a media working facility will be established by the United States State Department at the Thurmont Elementary School, 805 East Main Street, Thurmont, Maryland. Beginning 7:00 AM EDT, Monday, July 10, the Media Facility will be available to the press 24 hours a day for the duration of the talks.

Briefings

There will be daily media briefings with simultaneous interpretation available in English, Hebrew and Arabic at the media facility at the Thurmont Elementary School. Details on the briefing schedule are TBA.

Telephone Lines

All media organizations that want telephone service at the Media Facility at Thurmont Elementary School must place their own orders directly with the telephone company, whether for telephone, fax or computer line service. Please note that news organizations also must provide their own equipment for their lines, whether phone, fax or computer.

To order a telecommunications line, fax your request to: Bell Atlantic at (fax number:) (202) 331-0257. You must include the following information on all orders:

- 1) Name, address and phone number of the news organization and of the person there who will be responsible for all financial charges;
- 2) Quantity of lines needed;
- 3) You MUST indicate whether you want 'Restricted

Service'

or 'Unrestricted service'. 'Restricted' lines can only be used with credit cards, toll free dialing or operator assistance; 'Unrestricted' lines incur charges for calls made on that line billed directly to that phone number and the person who ordered the line will be liable for all those charges. If you order 'unrestricted', please specify a preferred long distance carrier.

Bell Atlantic will confirm receipt within 24 hours of every order by responding to the phone or fax number which you put on your order.

Any telecommunications order placed by 5:00 PM EDT, Friday, July 7, will be operational by 7:00 AM EDT, Monday, July 10. Any order placed by

mid-afternoon Saturday, will be operational by close of business on Monday. Any order after that, will be filled as possible.

Cell phone service note:

All journalists should be aware that cell service is spotty in the entire area, including the service of Bell Atlantic, and is not available at all for some carriers, including Sprint PCS.

Credentials

Special credentials will be required for access to the media facility. Correspondents with U.S. Government-issued photo media identification cards (White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Press Center, U.S. Congress) may pick up credentials upon arrival at Thurmont Elementary School by showing their permanent credential.

All others should fax credential requests to the Foreign Press Center, Attention: Liza Davis, at fax (202) 724-0073. The faxed request for credentials must include the following:

Name, affiliation, job title, permanent office address, permanent office phone number, and an area address and phone number if you are staying in the Thurmont area. Please include a cellular phone number if possible. Each request must be accompanied by a letter with signature of a manager in authority stating that you are assigned to cover the Summit for their news organization.

Writers' workspace requests

Writers - All correspondents, with either U.S. or foreign media organizations, who wish to reserve working space at tables should call Liza Davis of the Foreign Press Center at (202) 661-8941. Each space will have one electrical outlet (110v). Correspondents who need more than one outlet for small equipment (e.g., a computer) should bring their own power strip.

TV and radio workspace requests

All TV and radio organizations, with either U.S. or foreign media organizations, who wish to reserve a broadcast work space should call Joan Storck of the Foreign Press Center at (202) 661-8965, fax (202) 724-2679. TV and radio organizations will have access to the Thurmont Elementary School for set-up at their work space beginning Sunday, July 9, at 10:00 a.m. TV and radio organizations need to arrange for their own electrical service for their own work space and standups at the Thurmont Elem. School. To arrange electrical service, please directly contact Barnhart Electric Service Inc. Bob Barnhart can be paged at (301) 714-7484.

For other requirements: Please call Joan Storck at the Foreign Press Center:
(202) 661-8965.

Hotel

All media who wish to remain in the Thurmont area need to make all of their own arrangements. There are a number of hotels in Frederick, Maryland, and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, which are each within 30 minutes' drive of Thurmont.

Parking at Thurmont Elementary School

Please drive carefully: there will be children at the school. Thurmont Elementary School will be operating their summer school sessions and other summer activities while also hosting the Media Facility. The limited parking space in the school lot will be shared with school staff and parents. Park only in the areas clearly designated as available for use by the media. The specific area for microwave or satellite truck parking will

also be marked. Additional street parking is available nearby.

Directions to Thurmont Elementary School

From Washington, D.C.: Take 495 to Interstate 270 North. Follow 270 North toward Frederick, Maryland, to Route 15 North. From Baltimore: Take Interstate 70 West to Frederick, and then get onto Route 15 North. FOR THURMONT: Exit off Route 15 at Route 77 EAST. Route 77 east is Main Street in Thurmont. Follow Main Street through the town. As you leave town, Thurmont Elementary School is on the left side of Main Street.

> -----

> From: Reside, Julie M
> Sent: Friday, July 07, 2000 12:40 PM
> To: PA Releases - EXTERNAL Group; NSC Press Group; DoD Press Group; PA
> PRS Group; Anne Edwards; Bartels, Kitty; Boggs, Gladys; Couch, Thomas;
> Dave Staples; Ereli, Adam; Gary Clements; Greg Franklin; JEFF BROWN; kaky
> turpin; Ogburn, Robert; Storck, Joan; Tim Mulreany
> Subject: Notice to the Press - Media Facilities During Camp David
> Events
>
> <<File: Doc2____.doc>>
> For planning purposes only.
>

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Kenneth Brenton <kbrenton@whmo.mil> (Kenneth Brenton <kbrenton@whmo.mil> [

CREATION DATE/TIME: 8-JUL-2000 15:26:48.00

SUBJECT: Additional Equipment for Camp David Summit

TO: Jean-Francois Kalka (CN=Jean-Francois Kalka/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dwayne L. Locke (CN=Dwayne L. Locke/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

** High Priority **

SSD-EMB: Please provide the following additional equipment for the Camp David MEPT Summit. All items must be staged and ready NLT 0700 Sunday, 09 Jul.

- 5 - Dual Battery Chargers
- 3 - Saber Boxes (6 each Staff)
- 1 - AT&T 912 Telephone Package
- 4 - AT&T 925 Telephone Packages
- 2 - Merlin 820D (WHCA Ofc/NSC Ofc)
- 14 - Handsets w/ PTT for Merlin Phones
- 1 - Base Station, Sierra
- 1 - Y/Z Dial-up Site Modem
- 1 - COAX Box, Radio
- 1 - Site UPS, Radio

Please advise of the staging area and when all items are complete.

TSgt Miller: Please ensure all items are inventoried prior to departure for Camp David Sunday morning. Also, please bring Camp's Blue Minivan with you. It is parked on the official vehicle line at bldg 399 w/ a CDD placard in the window.

Regards,

TSgt Bucky Brenton

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Robert A. Bradtke (CN=Robert A. Bradtke/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

CREATION DATE/TIME:10-JUL-2000 08:40:07.00

SUBJECT: Information for the shuttle system into Camp David

TO: Cathy L. Millison (CN=Cathy L. Millison/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Colby J. Cooper (CN=Colby J. Cooper/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

fyi.

----- Forwarded by Robert A. Bradtke/NSC/EOP on
07/10/2000 08:40 AM -----

Cheri L. Stockham
07/09/2000 07:52:33 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Robert Rosen/WHO/EOP@EOP, Robert A. Bradtke/NSC/EOP@EOP, Brian
A. Alcorn/WHO/EOP@EOP, Nanda Chitre/WHO/EOP@EOP
cc:
Subject: Information for the shuttle system into Camp David

As of 12 noon on Monday, July 10, 2000, the access Road from the Visitors Center into Camp David will be closed. All visitors to Camp David will need to access Camp David as noted below:

77w to Foxfield/Deerfield Road
Make a right on Foxfield/Deerfield Road follow until you reach Manahan Road
Make a right on Manahan Road follow along until you see a Big Sign on the left that reads "Round Meadow" Make a left into Round Meadow and park your personal vehicle in the parking lot. Proceed to the Credential trailer and ask for the transportation van to Camp David. The van will either be directly onsite or called down (approx wait time 5 min). Once you arrive at Camp David, you will be dropped off at the Main Gate. You will have to walk on-foot once you get into camp and proceed directly to Hickory. Ask the Marines at the main gate for directions. Once you arrive at Hickory, proceed inside to the library for directions to the Summit sites. It is here where you can pick up a bicycle or continue on foot. At the end of the day or upon conclusion of your business, proceed back to the library in Hickory and ask for the transportation van. Once again, it will be dispatched (wait time 5-10 min) and return you to Round Meadow where you will pick up your personal vehicle.

Note: If you arrive and have a Summit Credential all you need to do is ask for the transportation van at the Credential trailer. If you do not have a credential, ask for yours at the Credential trailer. If one does not exist, ask them to Contact Pat Kennedy for approval.

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Kenneth Brenton <KBrenton@whmo.mil> (Kenneth Brenton <KBrenton@whmo.mil> [

CREATION DATE/TIME:10-JUL-2000 09:58:35.00

SUBJECT: Add'l Equipment for Camp David Summit

TO: Jean-Francois Kalka (CN=Jean-Francois Kalka/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dwayne L. Locke (CN=Dwayne L. Locke/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

** High Priority **

SSD-EMB: Please provide the following for the CDD. All items must be staged by 1015 Monday, 10 Jul.

14 - Handsets w/ PTT for Merlin Phones SECOND REQUEST!!!!!!
1 - Merlin 820D Package SECOND REQUEST!!!!
1 - Box of Motorola BMUS Handheld Cell Phones
1 - Staff Supply Box - OA
10 - Sleeping Bags
10 - Rolls of Gaffers Tape (Grey, Brown, or Black)
1 - Saber Box (6-Staff)

Please advise of the staging area.

Regards,

TSgt Bucky Brenton

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Cathy Millison to Brian Alcorn at 10:54am. Subject: RE: Camp David Notes. (5 pages)	07/10/2000	b(7)(E)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System [Email]
NSC ([Camp David])
OA/Box Number: 1200000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/07/2000-08/22/2000]

2008-0729-F
vz1553

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Maureen T. Shea (CN=Maureen T. Shea/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME:10-JUL-2000 17:21:13.00

SUBJECT: Tuesday

TO: Brooke D. Anderson (CN=Brooke D. Anderson/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

CC: Christine A. Stanek (CN=Christine A. Stanek/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

As promised, Jewish groups supporting the summit will be at Camp David - 70 strong - 40 kids from a camp and 30 DC types - along with a Washington Times photographer on the bus.

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Stephen N. Boyd (CN=Stephen N. Boyd/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME:11-JUL-2000 15:50:27.00

SUBJECT: question re: contractor providing maps for mideast negotiations

TO: David B. Stockwell (CN=David B. Stockwell/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

CC: Mark A. Kitchens (CN=Mark A. Kitchens/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

David -

What do you think of this request from Howard county times -- I expect we might not want to get into confirming what company provided maps....

----- Forwarded by Stephen N. Boyd/WHO/EOP on 07/11/2000
03:48 PM -----

Mark A. Kitchens

07/11/2000 03:40 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Stephen N. Boyd/WHO/EOP@EOP

cc:

Subject: mideast negotiations

this is a fellow Navy PAO who I know and has a question on the summit?

You want this one?

----- Forwarded by Mark A. Kitchens/WHO/EOP on 07/11/2000
03:39 PM -----

"Michael P. Cody" <mpcody@patuxent.com>

07/11/2000 03:08:24 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Mark A. Kitchens/WHO/EOP

cc:

Subject: mideast negotiations

Mark,

I just heard that a Columbia-based company, MBC Precision Imaging, supplied maps on which to plot disputed areas for the Mid-East peace talks at Camp David.

Could you ask someone if the White House has any objection to me reporting that, and if they'd like to make a comment?

Mike Cody

Columbia Flier/Howard County Times

10750 Little Patuxent Parkway
Columbia, MD 21044
(410) 730-3990 ext. 1233
FAX (410) 997-4564

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: ilustick@sas.upenn.edu (Ian Lustick) (ilustick@sas.upenn.edu (Ian Lustick

CREATION DATE/TIME:21-JUL-2000 09:54:18.00

SUBJECT: paper

TO: Mara E. Rudman (CN=Mara E. Rudman/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Sorry if you receive this twice Mara. And if you didn't, then I'll repeat that this is an updated version of what the Institute of Palestine Studies was supposed to send you two days ago. I'm off to pick up Hilary from Camp, but if you'd like a clean copy with maps it can be fedexed tomorrow.

Ian

Ian

Lustick wrote: > From ilustick@sas.upenn.edu Thu Jul 20 17:18:55 2000

> X-UIDL: d310f071762e746796473d2414ed27c7

> Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20000720171528.00883340@postoffice.sas.upenn.edu>

> X-Sender: ilustick@postoffice.sas.upenn.edu (Unverified)

> X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32)

> Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2000 17:15:28 -0400

> To: ilustick@sas.upenn.edu

> From: Ian Lustick <ilustick@sas.upenn.edu>

> Subject:

> Mime-Version: 1.0

> Content-Type: multipart/mixed;

boundary="===== _964142128== _"

>

> ----- _964142128== _

> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

>

>

> ----- _964142128== _

> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"

> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

> Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Jpsjerqd.mss"

>

>

=AEFM1MD=3DNM,PT=3D12,LS=3D1,OF=3D10,10,RM=3D65,IP=3D0,5,TS=3D5,10,FT=3D1,S

C=

> =3D1,BF=3D0,FL=AF=AENF1=AF

>

>

>

>

>

> =AEMDBO=AF=AEFC=AF

> El-Quds and Yerushalayim: Political Catechism and Political=

> Realities=AEMDNM=AF =AEMDBO=AF =AEMDNM=AF

>

> Professor Ian S. Lustick =20

> University of Pennsylvania=20

> =AEJU=AF=AEFL=AF =20

>

> =AELS2=AF=AEIP4,0=AF=AETS4=AFFor most observers the greatest shock about
the=
> historic summit at Camp David in July between President Clinton,
President=
> Arafat, and Prime Minister Barak was not that Jerusalem was the most=
> difficult off all issues, but that a compromise, based on redesigning
the=
> shape of the city and dividing sovereignty was even conceivable let
alone=
> the most likely agreed arrangement. This shock was due primarily to
the=
> strength and pervasiveness of misconceptions about Jerusalem.
>
> Overall, a common misconception about the Arab-Israeli conflict is that
it=
> was and is based on misconceptions. In fact the conflict has been as=
> sustained and difficult as it has been largely because each side, and
here=
> I mean the Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews, have known only too=
> precisely what their opponents wanted. Yet in the midst of a prolonged
but=
> fundamentally promising process of conflict transformation, such as we
are=
> witnessing, it is the case that misconceptions about certain aspects of
the=
> conflict can obscure opportunities for amelioration and by doing so
serve=
> the interests of those on either side who do not wish to see the
conflict=
> transformed into a long term political and cultural rivalry. This
dynamic=
> is more powerful, if hardly at all noticed, in the struggle over what=
> Israeli Jews call "Yerushalayim," what Arabs call "el-Quds," and what=
> non-Middle Easterners call "Jerusalem," than it is in regard to
virtually=
> any other dimension of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
>
> The purpose of this article is to address the unfortunate and hitherto=
> paralyzing consequences of four fundamental misconceptions about the
future=
> of the city with three names. Depending on whether the parties have=
> already adopted the formulas advanced here for solving the Jerusalem=
> problem or how near such an arrangement appears to be, the reader of
this=
> article should consider it as either a prediction, a timely piece of
advice=
> to policy-makers, an explanation as to why such a solution was able to
be=
> adopted, or background information to enrich efforts to move toward a=
> future compromise. The four misconceptions to be examined are:
>
> 1) that the boundaries of "Yerushalayim" are clear, unalterable, and=
> congruent with those of the current municipality;
>
> 2) that a unified Yerushalayim under Jewish sovereignty has always been
a=
> powerful and central element in Zionism;
>
> 3) that within Israel the legal and administrative status of "united=
> Yerushalayim" is simply that it has been annexed and constitutes a

portion=

> of the sovereign territory of the State of Israel;

>

> 4) that opinion among Israeli Jews at both the mass and elite level is so=

> firm and uniform that no movement, no possibility of compromise on the=

> principle of Israeli rule over all of that which is currently

designated as=

> Yerushalayim, is conceivable.

>

> I will argue that each of these beliefs is false. Moreover I will show that=

> by examining the gap between habitually recited beliefs and emotional and=

> political realities, and by understanding, on the Jewish/Zionist side, the=

> historical flexibility available for imagining Yerushalayim in symbolically=

> and practically sufficient ways, a much wider array of futures becomes=

> available for the overlapping communities that constitute today's=

> Jerusalem.=AEFN1Indeed the focus of this paper will be on

misconceptions=

> and political-mythic realities on the Jewish-Zionist-Israeli side. A=

> comparable paper could and should be written focusing on the=

> Arab-Muslim-Palestinian side.=AF

>

> =AEIP0,0=AF=AENJ=AF=AEFC=AF=AEUL1=AF=AEMDUL=AFWhere are Yerushalayim,=

> el-Quds, and Jerusalem?=AEMDNM=AF

>

> =AEJU=AF=AEFL=AF Most people, including Arabs, Jews, Americans, and=

> Europeans, imagine that by "Jerusalem" what is meant is that holy

shrine,=

> those neighborhoods, or that place which they, respectively, value so=

> highly. Whenever one side talks about its claim to or desire for=

> "Jerusalem" (Yerushalayim in Hebrew or el-Quds [The Holy] in Arabic),=

> others believe the claim is being made to just what they too aspire to=

> control. The reality is that "Jerusalem" has many boundaries and many=

> meanings. To reach a solution to the problem of the city's future will=

> require taking advantage of the fact of Jerusalem's multiple meanings=

> rather than suffering from them.

> =AEIP4,0=AF=20

> In other words, the idea that there is one specific and eternal meaning to=

> the term "Jerusalem"--one demarcation of the city's shape and size

which=

> has been, is, and always will be the object of contradictory claims--is=

> false. Nonetheless, it is an idea which is widely accepted. As such,

it=

> has become an important obstacle to expanding and improving public=

> discussion of Jerusalem's future and to inventing or even imagining a=

> regime for sharing the city which could satisfy the minimum

requirements of=

> Israelis and Palestinians.

=20

> =AEIP0,0=AF =20

> In its most dramatic form the idea that the Israeli

municipality of=

> Jerusalem, as it is currently configured, is the real city itself,=

> containing all of what Jerusalem has been and is and nothing which it

is=

> not, is expressed in the official Israeli designation of the city as

having=
> been made "whole" (shlema) or as having been "united" or "reunited"=
> (Yerushalayim hameuchedet) as a result of Israeli measures taken after
the=
> 1967 war. It is certainly true that some neighborhoods that were
divided=
> between Jordan and Israel in 1948 were "united" in 1967. It is also
true=
> that by joining Jordanian-governed neighborhoods to Israeli-governed=
> neighborhoods, Israel did "re-unite" these areas within a single=
> municipality (as had been the case during the British mandate).
However,=
> there is absolutely no sense in which the overall shape of the city as
it=
> was drawn by Israeli bureaucrats in June 1967 (including some
sixty-five=
> square kilometers of the West Bank, encompassing land from twenty eight
or=
> more villages and towns and dividing at least seventeen Arab villages
from=
> much of their lands) can be seen as some pre-existing historically,=
> religiously, or emotionally defined entity which was "united" or
"reunited"=
> in 1967. The fact is that only 8.5% of the 17,750 acres over which
Israel=
> extended its jurisdiction in 1967 were within the Jordanian ruled=
> "Municipality of el-Quds."
>
> Thus the line drawn in June 1967 to officially demarcate the
boundary=
> of the Israeli municipality had never appeared on any map in the five=
> thousand year history of the holy city. That is why no reference to an=
> historical entity called "Jerusalem" appears in the series of decrees
which=
> made that line the new border of the Israeli municipality. The shape
of=
> expanded Jerusalem that emerges from these points resembles a large
fist,=
> with knuckles to the west and uprisen thumb to the north. On the east
it=
> stretches thirteen miles, from Bethlehem in the south to el-Bireh in
the=
> north, keeping the Kalandia refugee camp outside "Jerusalem," while
keeping=
> the airport across the road within it.
>
> While influenced by desires to include as much land and exclude as
many=
> Arabs as possible, the precise location of the boundary was decided
upon as=
> a compromise between minimalist and maximalist positions advanced by=
> various bureaucrats, military officers, and politicians.=AEFN1
Shalom=
> Yerushalmi, =AEMDUL=AFKol Ha'ir=AEMDNM=AF, May 31, 1991. In June 1967=
> Rehavam Ze'evi, who subsequently founded the extreme right-wing Moledet=
> Party, was the senior military representative on the committee that=
> fashioned Jerusalem's new borders. For details of this committee's
work=
> see Shlomo Gazit, =AEMDUL=AFThe Carrot and the Stick: Israel's Policy
in=

> Judaea and Samaria, 1967-68=AEMDNM=AF (Washington, D.C.: B'nai B'rith=
 > Books, 1995) pp. 196-98. Recent efforts to greatly expand the size of
 the=
 > Maale Adumim settlement, located mid-way between Jerusalem and Jericho,
 and=
 > to bring its borders up the Yerushalayim municipal boundary are
 perfectly=
 > consistent with Yitzhak Rabin's preference in 1967 for a municipal
 boundary=
 > reaching half-way to Jericho. He was opposed by Moshe Dayan, who
 preferred=
 > a smaller municipality that would exclude the tomb of Rachel in
 Bethlehem=
 > and so encourage Israelis not to limit attachments to the Yerushalayim=
 > municipality. For details on the internal debates over where to draw=
 > Jerusalem's borders see various books and articles by Meron Benvenisti,=
 > including =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem: The Torn City=AEMDNM=AF (Minneapolis:
 The=
 > University of Minnesota Press, 1976) pp. 112-14; =AEMDUL=AFFatal=
 > Embrace=AEMDNM=AF (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1992) pp. 41-42; and=
 > "Building on the Slope of Evil," =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, January
 31,=
 > 1992. See also Uri Stendal, =AEMDUL=AFThe Arabs in Israel: Between
 Hammer=
 > and Anvil=AEMDNM=AF (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Academ, 1992) pp.
 330-332.=AF =
 > The absence of any historical, legal, or cultural definition of the
 city=
 > corresponding to the new boundary line is strikingly evident in the
 only=
 > description the government was able to give the new line, viz. a three
 page=
 > list of longitudinal and latitudinal points.=AEFN1 While most=
 > demarcations of the city limits, whether in ancient or modern times,
 have=
 > been much smaller than the 110 square kilometers included in the
 Israeli=
 > map of 1967, some have been larger. The United Nations Partition Plan
 in=
 > 1947 envisioned Jerusalem as a "=AEMDUL=AFCorpus Separatum=AEMDNM=AF"
 whose=
 > boundaries were to encompass Bethlehem and Beit Jalla in the South, Abu
 Dis=
 > and what is now Maale Adumim in the East, and Shuafat and Beit Hanina,
 but=
 > not Kalandia, in the North. The Peel Commission Partition Plan of 1937=
 > envisioned a "Jerusalem enclave" as even larger, including a wide
 corridor=
 > to the Mediterranean sea.=AF Despite enormous efforts to publicize the
 new=
 > enlarged shape of the municipality, as late as 1980=20the Israeli press
 was=
 > publishing maps of the city which showed ninety per cent of what had
 been=
 > added to the municipality as remaining outside of=
 > "Yerushalayim."=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFMaariv=AEMDNM=AF, March 14,
 1980, p. 21.=AF=
 > Official Israeli recognition that this line was arbitrary,
 temporary, and=
 > changeable, was reflected in the Knesset decision in 1980 to delete=

> language from the Basic Law--Jerusalem that would have specified that
 the=
 > "integrity and unity of greater Jerusalem in its boundaries after the
 Six=
 > Day War shall not be violated."=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem
 Post=AEMDNM=
 > =AF, July 24, 1980. This amendment to the bill was advanced by elements=
 > within the Labor Party who wished to reduce international opposition
 and=
 > maintain some flexibility in Israel's future negotiating position by=
 > mentioning neither borders nor territory in the Basic Law. Even so,
 Mapam=
 > and Yossi Sarid of the Labor Party voted against the adoption of the
 Basic=
 > Law. In 1984 a Jerusalem affairs committee of ministerial=
 > directors-general secretly, but comprehensively, evaluated various
 ideas=
 > for contracting or expanding the municipal boundary as it was
 established=
 > in 1967. Concerning the work of this committee see Nadav Shragai's=
 > extensive report in =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, June 24, 1994.=AF
 >
 > =AEMDNM=AF In the south, east, and north, the currently enforced
 Israeli=
 > boundary of the municipality of Yerushalayim remains just as it was=
 > demarcated on that three page list of longitudinal and latitudinal
 points=
 > in June 1967. There are at least three sources of evidence that this=
 > boundary, this vision in effect of what Jerusalem is and must be,
 should=
 > not be viewed as a foregone conclusion and does not reflect a powerful=
 > consensus, even in Israel, as to the future of the city. The evidence
 I=
 > will briefly present arises from consideration of the flexibility the=
 > Zionist movement and Israeli leaders have historically shown on the=
 > question of the political status and boundaries of "Jewish Jerusalem;"
 the=
 > ambiguous and non-determinative Israeli legal and administrative
 measures=
 > taken with respect to the portions of the municipality added in 1967,
 and=
 > the mixture of political views and mental images of the city as a
 source of=
 > practical importance and symbolic satisfaction among Israeli Jews.
 >
 > =AENJ=AF=AEFC=AF =AEMDUL=AFYerushalayim in the Political History of=
 > Zionism: Zionist Proposals for Dividing Jerusalem: 1936-1949=AEMDNM=AF
 >
 > =AEJU=AF=AEFL=AF In the final analysis the boundaries of cities, and
 the=
 > boundaries of states, are reflections of political realities and=
 > assessments of those realities. As political constraints and
 opportunities=
 > change, so do the conceptions of what boundaries are correct or
 necessary=
 > or "immutable." Therefore, to think realistically and yet creatively
 about=
 > the future of Jerusalem, and to break free of the conceptual shackles
 which=
 > catechism-like recitals of hardline positions produce, we should begin

by=
> thinking about the past. =20
> > Jewish liturgical and Biblical references to Jerusalem refer quite=
> specifically to areas in and immediately adjacent to the Jewish Quarter
of=
> the Old City and the Temple Mount, including the "City of David," Mt.
Zion,=
> and, across the Kidron Valley, the Mount of Olives. But we need not,
and=
> probably should not, cast our minds back over the millennia--to
Jebusites,=
> Canaanites, King David, the Crusades, or Saladin. Let us consider
instead=
> what formulas were advanced by the Zionist movement when it was faced,
in=
> the 1930's, with an opportunity for statehood in the Land of Israel,
but=
> when it was also confronted with political realities which encouraged a=
> minimalist approach to both symbolic and practical aspects of Jewish
life=
> in and control over "Yerushalayim." =20
>
> During the early twentieth century Jews built residential=
> neighborhoods and other institutions outside the walls of the Old City,
in=
> suburbs that came to be known as "the New City" or "West Jerusalem."
In=
> 1937 the Peel Commission recommended partition of Palestine into a
Jewish=
> state, an Arab state, and a small British-ruled enclave. In response,
and=
> in preparation for the Woodhead Commission investigation into how
Peel's=
> recommendations could be implemented, the Zionist Organization worked
hard=
> to develop proposals that would satisfy minimum Zionist objectives
while=
> also meeting what they saw as the crucial requirements of the other=
> parties--particularly the British.
>
> The "Jerusalem Committee" established to draw up the Jewish
Agency's=
> proposals for Jerusalem, confronted the mandatory power's plan for the=
> city. The British intended to separate the large Jewish population of=
> Jerusalem from the Jewish state by establishing permanent British
control=
> of the city of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a corridor leading from
Jerusalem=
> to Jaffa. The Jerusalem Committee worked in a Zionist context in which
a=
> majority on the Jewish Agency Executive Committee had, even before the=
> publication of the Peel Commission Report, decided on their readiness
to=
> forego Jewish rule of the Old City. The mainstream sentiment was that=
> Jewish sovereignty over, or at least access to, the Jewish
neighborhoods=
> comprising the "New City" of west Jerusalem would be the Jewish
Agency's=
> "red line." The primary Zionist leaders--Ben-Gurion, Weizmann,
Sharett,=

> and Katznelson--each made their views clear on the subject. The crucial=
> element, they argued, was to rule something that was inhabited by many Jews=
> and that the Jewish state could portray to world Jewry and to itself as=
> "Yerushalayim." The magic was in the name, not the exact place, not even=
> in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City or the precincts of the Temple=
> Mount.=AEFN1 For details concerning the Jewish Agency's proposals to=
> partition Jerusalem as its response to the Peel Commission Report see Yossi=
> Katz, =AEMDUL=AFPartner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan=
> in the Mandate Era=AEMDNM=AF (London: Frank Cass, 1998) especially Chapter=
> 3, "The Proposal for Partitioning Jerusalem," pp. 61-84.=AF From=
> Ben-Gurion's point of view, Jews could hardly tell one piece of Jerusalem=
> from another, so Jewish control of any part of the city might suffice to=
> inspire Jews with the idea that "Yerushalayim" was once again their=
> capital.=AEFN1 See Motti Golani, =AEMDUL=AFZion in Zionism: Zionist=
> Policy and the Question of Jerusalem=AEMDNM=AF, 1937-1949 (Hebrew)=
> (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishers, 1992) pp. 26, 124-25.=AF
>
> The Jerusalem Committee calculated that it would be impossible to=
> convince the British to relinquish the Old City. The committee decided,=
> however, that although Jewish sovereignty over something that could be=
> called "Yerushalayim" was crucial to the Zionist movement, the portions of=
> the Jerusalem area which were deemed necessary and sufficient for this=
> purpose were the modern Jewish neighborhoods of West Jerusalem and Mt.=
> Scopus (where the new Hebrew University was considered the symbol of=
> Zionism's contribution to a Jewish cultural renaissance). They therefore=
> proposed the division of Jerusalem into a Jewish section (in the West and=
> including Mt. Scopus) and the rest of the city which would be ruled by the=
> British. Suggestions by one member of the committee that the Old City=
> itself could be partitioned so that the Jews could rule the area of the=
> Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall were rejected out of calculations that=
> the British would never accede to such suggestions and that such=
> unrealistic demands would jeopardize attainment of the crucial goal--a=
> Jewish political presence in the city. For similar reasons, the Mt. of=
> Olives, with its emotionally and religiously important Jewish cemeteries,=
> was excluded from the list of neighborhoods which the Jewish Agency=
> proposed would constitute "Jewish Jerusalem."=AEFN1 Yossi Katz,=
> =AEMDUL=AFPartner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan in the=
> Mandate Era=AEMDNM=AF, =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF, 70. In the event the=
> Jewish Agency's proposals were rejected by the Woodhead Commission. Its=
> implementation plan for partition, published in December 1938, was=

> significantly less attractive to Jews than that of the Peel Commission,
and=
> the British government quickly scrapped the idea of partition
altogether.=
> =AF (See Figure 1 for the map of the division of Jerusalem as proposed
to=
> the Woodhead Commission by the Zionist executive.)
>
> The history of Zionist calculations about Jerusalem before,
during,=
> and after the 1948 war lend even more support to the view that no=
> particular version of Yerushalayim has been a sine qua non of Zionism. =
> When the United Nations approved its Palestine partition resolution in=
> November 1947, Jerusalem and a large area around it were designated as
a=
> "Corpus Separatum" that would be internationally ruled, existing
outside=
> the sovereignty of either the Palestinian Arab or Jewish states. The=
> Zionist movement enthusiastically accepted the UN decision, despite its=
> total exclusion from Jerusalem. During the fighting, however, great=
> efforts were invested to link West Jerusalem to the strongholds of the=
> nascent Jewish state in the coastal plain. In the end, despite
fighting=
> between their forces in the city, Transjordan and Israel came to an=
> agreement to divide the city between them rather than secure its unity=
> under international auspices. Uppermost in Ben-Gurion's mind was the=
> belief that consolidating Jewish statehood was the primary objective,
and=
> that pushing for more of Jerusalem than the world would be willing to=
> accept would not only jeopardize that goal but also encourage demands
that=
> Israel accept refugees and adjustments elsewhere along the emergent
borders=
> of the state.=AEFN1 Uri Bialer, "The Road to the Capital--The=
> Establishment of Jerusalem as the Official Seat of the Israeli
Government=
> in 1949," =AEMDUL=AFStudies in Zionism=AEMDNM=AF, Vol. 5, no. 2, p.
293.=AF=
> Especially in light of post-1967 Israeli adherence to the notion of
the=
> sanctity of the unity of Jerusalem, it is noteworthy that Israel and=
> Transjordan were the only countries in the world who opposed the city's=
> unification in preference for its division between them.=AEFN1 See=
> Motti Golani, "Zionism Without Zion: The Jerusalem Question, 1947-49,"=
> =AEMDUL=AFThe Journal of Israeli History=AEMDNM=AF, Vol. 16, no. 1
(1995)=
> pp. 39-52; and Avraham Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War:
Myth,=
> Historiography and Reality," =AEMDUL=AFMiddle Eastern
Studies=AEMDNM=AF,=
> Vol. 28, no. 4 (1992) pp. 662-63 and 679.=AF =20
>
> Although in 1948 some efforts were made by Jewish units to
re-establish=
> Jewish control of the Jewish Quarter within the Old City, Ben-Gurion
gave=
> such attempts a low priority and ultimately refused permission to his=
> commanders to conquer the Old City and even the rest of Arab Jerusalem
when=
> that opportunity did arise.=AEFN1 Avraham Sela, "Transjordan,

Israel=

> and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality, =AEMDUL=AFop.=
 > cit.,=AEMDNM=AF pp. 662 and 678-680.=AF Instead he and other Zionist=
 > leaders chose to emphasize the relative unimportance of the Old City
 for=
 > Jewish political aspirations and to refer instead to "Yerushalayim=
 > HaIvrit," "Hebrew Jerusalem," as that which would form the crowning
 glory=
 > and sign of success of the Zionist movement and the new Jewish state. =
 > Accordingly, in the 1948 war and during the negotiations which followed
 it,=
 > Ben-Gurion and the new government of Israel acted out of a clear
 preference=
 > for Israeli rule over "Jewish Jerusalem" (even without the Old City)=
 > instead of free Israeli access to the whole city without sovereignty
 over=
 > any part of it.=AEFN1 Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948
 War...",="
 > =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF, p. 666.=AF =20
 >
 > The districts which were established in 1949 as Israel's capital
 of=
 > Yerushalayim included Mt. Zion and the New City, but excluded other=
 > important parts of "Hebrew Jerusalem," viz. the Jewish Quarter of the
 Old=
 > City, the Temple Mount, and the cemeteries on the Mt. of Olives.
 Indeed=
 > the map dividing Jerusalem into "el-Quds," annexed by Jordan in 1950,
 and=
 > "Yerushalayim," declared Israel's capital in 1949, is strikingly
 similar to=
 > that prepared in 1937 by the Jewish Agency in its proposals to the
 Woodhead=
 > Commission (see Figure 2)--proposals which were in turn more or less
 what=
 > Chaim Weizmann had presented to the United Nations Special Committee on=
 > Palestine during its hearings on the issue in 1947. Again, according
 to=
 > these proposals, and according to Ben-Gurion's testimony before UNSCOP,=
 > only "Jewish Jerusalem" would be included in the Jewish
 state.=AEFN1 =
 > Golani, "Zionism Without Zion," =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF, p.
 41.=AF In=
 > this context one can understand why, when the Knesset moved Israel's=
 > capital from Tel-Aviv in 1949, it claimed to have thereby established=
 > Israeli rule, not over a portion of Jerusalem, but over "Jerusalem" (or=
 > "Jewish Jerusalem"). Again, it was not "West Jerusalem" that was, with=
 > high emotion and great satisfaction, declared in 1949 as Israel's
 sovereign=
 > capital. From 1949 until 1967 Israel and Israelis proudly and
 defiantly,=
 > easily and naturally, described the area under Israeli control, not as=
 > "West Jerusalem" but as "Jerusalem" (or "Hebrew [Jewish]
 Jerusalem")--the=
 > same "Yerushalayim" that Ben-Gurion described in January 1949 as "not
 only=
 > the heart of the land but the heart of the people" and as "no longer=
 > outside the state."=AEFN1 Shlomit Keren, "The Decision on the
 Status=
 > of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel," =AEMDUL=AFSekira

Chodshit=AEMDNM=AF=

> , No. 6 (September 1992) p. 6. Ben-Gurion's willingness, even
 enthusiasm,=
 > for substituting a part of Jerusalem (the Jewish part) for the whole,
 was=
 > characteristic of the discourse of the time among Israeli politicians.
 In=
 > the relevant Knesset debate, for example, only Menachem Begin and,=
 > ironically, Mapam, objected to the political division of the
 city--Begin=
 > because he did not want to acknowledge, by using the term "Hebrew=
 > Jerusalem," that there existed an "Arab Jerusalem," and Mapam because
 it=
 > did not want to undermine its demand for a binational state in all of=
 > Palestine/Eretz Yisrael. =AEMDUL=AFDivrei HaKnesset=AEMDNM=AF, December
 5,=
 > 1949, pp. 222-227.=AF In his formal declaration on behalf of the
 Israeli=
 > government, defending its move against international opposition,
 Ben-Gurion=
 > described "Jewish Jerusalem"
 >
 > =AELS1=AF=AEIP5,5=AF=AETS5=AF...as an integral part of the State of=
 > Israel...we cannot conceive of the possibility that the UN should
 attempt=
 > to tear out Jerusalem from the State of Israel, or to strike at the=
 > sovereignty of Israel in her Eternal Capital."=AEFN1 David
 Ben-Gurion,=
 > =AEMDUL=AFIsrael: A Personal History=AEMDNM=AF (Tel-Aviv: Sabra
 Books,=
 > 1972) p. 379.=AF
 > =AELS2=AF=AEIP0,0=AF =20
 > =AEIP5,0=AFIt was not true, of course, that all of Jewish Jerusalem was=
 > within the boundaries of Israel. What is important to note is that
 this=
 > version of Jerusalem, even without the Old City, could be made
 politically=
 > and emotionally satisfying as a symbolic evocation of Zionism's
 response to=
 > age-old Jewish yearnings for a return to "Zion and Jerusalem."=AEFN1 =
 > Ben-Gurion did refer to the Old City, but to no other portion of "Arab=
 > Jerusalem," as a part of "Jerusalem" which, "to my sorrow" was not part
 of=
 > the State of Israel. The full quotation is as follows: "Jerusalem is=
 > within the area of the Jewish government--at this time, to my sorrow,=
 > without the Old City--exactly as Tel-Aviv. Indeed there is no
 difference=
 > between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, Haifa, Hanita...They are all within the=
 > area of the Jewish government." Shlomit Keren, =AEMDUL=AFop.
 cit.=AEMDNM=AF=
 > , p. 5. Ben-Gurion was also quite clear in his depiction of many
 districts=
 > now included within the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem--such as the
 Arab=
 > village of Shuafat--as clearly outside the "area of the city itself."=
 > =AEMDUL=AFIsrael: A Personal History=AEMDNM=AF, =AEMDUL=AFop.
 cit.=AEMDNM=
 > =AF, p. 378.=AF As a specification of the city it was as inaccurate as
 the=
 > current Israeli definition of the city, including as it does villages,=

> empty areas, and refugee camps which have no more religious, emotional,
or=
> cultural meaning to Jews than any other small piece of the Land of
Israel=
> outside the city of Jerusalem. This suggests real potential to
contract=
> political boundaries in the city without sacrificing Israeli rule of=
> Yerushalayim as a symbol of Jewish return to Zion. For if a
politically=
> satisfying depiction of the city could be constructed for Israelis
without=
> the Jewish Quarter, the Western Wall, and the Temple Mount, how much
more=
> satisfying a depiction of the city could crystallize, minus Arab=
> neighborhoods and villages in East Jerusalem, but including Jewish
access=
> to or rule over these important Jewish sites?=20
> =AEIP0,0=AF=AENJ=AF=AEFC=AF=20
> =AEMDUL=AFIsrael's Ambiguous Legal and Administrative Position Regarding
the=
> Post-1967 Status of Expanded East Jerusalem=AEMDNM=AF =20
>
> =AEJU=AF=AEFL=AF=AETS4=AF One of the most egregious and yet
widespread=
> misconceptions about the post-1967 status of expanded East Jerusalem=
> pertains to its status in Israeli law. Many believe that in June 1967,
or=
> by means of the 1980 "Jerusalem Law," this whole area was annexed, and
made=> a part of the sovereign State of Israel. While promoting the
impression=
> that this has occurred has indeed been a guiding principle of Israeli=
> foreign policy, the fact is that no annexation has taken place. From
an=
> official Israeli government legal and administrative point of view, and
in=
> terms of the substance of relevant Israeli Supreme Court decisions, the=
> judgments of Israeli legal specialists, and international law, the=
> governance of expanded East Jerusalem is as temporary and contingent as=
> Israeli rule of the Golan Heights--an area that the current government
of=
> Israel has made clear it is ready to relinquish in the context of peace=
> negotiations.
> =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFElsewhere I have explained in some detail how the three legal
and=
> administrative measures promulgated in June 1967 were a careful and
clever=
> attempt to create an ambiguous legal situation that could slip
gradually=
> into the world's consciousness to create the impression that annexation
had=
> occurred.=AEFN1 Ian S. Lustick, "Has Israel Annexed East Jerusalem?"=
> =AEMDUL=AFMiddle East Policy=AEMDNM=AF, Vol. V, no. 1 (January 1997)
pp.=
> 34-45.=AF Here I shall just note that the measures implemented by the=
> Eshkol government, taken together, produced an administrative expansion
of=
> the municipal boundary of the Yerushalayim municipality. Indeed the=
> government offered a formal declaration at the United Nations that its=
> measures were purely administrative in nature, were designed to improve

the=
> extension of municipal services, and had nothing to do with annexation
of=
> the area to the State of Israel. Indeed Israel officials consciously=
> avoided using the legal capacities which were employed to annex the
Little=
> Triangle to the Jewish state in 1949 (in part to avoid granting
citizenship=
> to Arabs in expanded East Jerusalem).=AEFN1 The locutions used
by the=
> Israel government in 1967 to distinguish between Israeli administration
and=
> rule over expanded East Jerusalem from annexation or the imposition of=
> sovereignty were, instructively, virtually identical to those used in
1948=
> by Israel's first Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett. In July 1948
Sharett=
> explained the government's policy toward Jerusalem to the Mapai Party=
> Central Committee. The government would "announce that those sections
of=
> the city held by Israel constitute a conquered area, that is, that we
will=
> not proclaim their annexation...it should be clear that we are not=
> declaring Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, only Israeli authority
over=
> these parts of the city." Quoted in Gabriel Sheffer, =AEMDUL=AFMoshe=
> Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate=AEMDNM=AF (Oxford: Oxford=
> University Press, 1996) pp. 379-80.=AF
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFNor was annexation accomplished by the "Basic Law:
Jerusalem,=
> Capital of Israel," passed in June 1980 and commonly cited as the event
of=
> Israel's annexation of expanded East Jerusalem. The Law simply states
that=
> "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel." Because an=
> amendment to the original bill specifying the boundaries of the city as=
> those established in June 1967 was dropped, and because neither the
word=
> "annexation (sipuach)" nor "sovereignty (ribonut)" appears in the
document,=
> the law introduced absolutely no change in the legal claims Israel was=
> advancing with respect to the size, shape, and legal/sovereign status
of=
> expanded East Jerusalem.=AEFN1 According to Ruth Lapidot and Moshe=
> Hirsch, "the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, does not
actually=
> contain any innovation but merely repeats matters previously laid
down."=
> =AEMDUL=AFThe Jerusalem Question and Its Resolution: Selected=
> Documents=AEMDNM=AF, Ruth Lapidot and Moshe Hirsch, eds. (AD Dordrecht,
The=
> Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) p. xxvi.=AF
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFAlthough some have cited several Israeli Supreme Court
decisions=
> as having clearly determined that expanded East Jerusalem has been
annexed=
> to Israel, the decisions themselves, and the arguments made by the
judges=

> themselves when issuing those decisions, say something quite different.=
> What emerges from these judgments and the strained and awkward
reasoning=
> contained in some of them is that the approximately seventy-three
square=
> kilometers involved exist in a kind of Israeli legal limbo--a status=
> created to obviate the need for formal announcements of annexation or=
> sovereignty, but a status which is destabilized by legal principles
which=
> require such announcements, imposition of citizenship, and/or
international=
> recognition in order for questions of sovereignty to be definitively=
> answered. Although the Court had briefly observed in a 1968 case,
Hanzalis=
> vs. Tribunal of the Greek Orthodox Church, that the actions taken in
June=
> 1967 had established "United Jerusalem" as "an integral part of
Israel,"=
> what that meant legally was left unresolved. The best known and most=
> commonly cited opportunity the Israeli Supreme Court had to speak
clearly=
> on this matter came in 1969 when an unusual case (Ruidi vs. Hebron
Military=
> Tribunal) came before it on appeal. Although it has been incorrectly
cited=
> to prove the opposite of the conclusions it contains, the reasoning in
this=
> case and its outcome is strong evidence for my interpretation of the
legal=
> situation in the context of which the Israeli Government remains
extremely=
> reluctant to make or test any official claim to have annexed expanded
East=
> Jerusalem to the State of Israel. =20
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFRuidi was an Arab antiquities dealer who transferred
antiquities=
> from Hebron to his store in East Jerusalem. The Military Government=
> charged him with breaking the Jordanian law against exporting
antiquities=
> "out of the country" since, in view of the Military Government, East=
> Jerusalem was no longer in the same country as Hebron. Ruidi's lawyers=
> successfully demanded a restraining order against the Military
Government. =
> The Military then brought the matter to the Supreme Court, which ruled=
> against the dealer. It is not the ruling, however, but the basis of
the=
> ruling and the reasoning presented which is of interest.
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFJustice Vitkon noted that "large and important questions can=
> arise in this matter" but that the Court should and would avoid them in
its=
> decision. He rejected the deputy Attorney General's argument that the=
> imposition by Israel of its jurisdiction (shiput) on expanded East=
> Jerusalem was equivalent to annexation. He also criticized the
Military=
> Government for not asking the government for a formal determination
about=
> whether East Jerusalem had been made a part of the State of Israel or
not. =

> In any event Vitkon reasoned that since East Jerusalem was "de facto"=
> outside the same jurisdiction as that governing Hebron, the Jordanian
law=
> could be applied. Thus he was pleased to be able to decide the case=
> without deciding whether East Jerusalem had indeed been annexed to
Israel=
> or been made a part of the State of Israel.
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFJustice Haim Cohen, in his opinion, stressed that neither the=
> Supreme Court of Israel nor the Military Government could make a=
> determination as to whether East Jerusalem had been annexed or who was=
> sovereign there. That, he stressed, was a political problem and
asserted=
> that his judgment against the appellant "was not a judicial
determination=
> in the extraordinary political question we have delineated..." In his=
> comment in the case, Justice Y. Kahan notes that the measures taken by
the=
> Government of Israel in June 1967 were not annexation, although they
were=
> "not inconsistent with the conclusion that the legislative intent...was
to=
> authorize the government to annex..." Thus Kahan makes it clear that
in=
> order to annex enlarged East Jerusalem another legal action by the
State of=
> Israel would be required.
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFYoram Dinstein's authoritative analysis of this case noted
the=
> ironic fact that here, as in other fora, the Arabs have served Israeli=
> interests by exaggerating the meaning of Israel's actions and=
> declarations--interpreting them as representing the "annexation" of
East=
> Jerusalem, whereas Israel itself has always refrained from making this=
> claim.=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFHapraklit=AEMDNM=AF, 1971, Vol. 27, 5-11.=AF =
> Dinstein argued that it was a pity that the problem of East Jerusalem's=
> legal status had ever been allowed to arise since Israel was on very
weak=
> ground and had not in fact annexed the territory in question. He
concluded=
> by noting that legally and formally Israel could not successfully
assert=
> (and had not asserted) its sovereignty over East Jerusalem or its=
> annexation of it and sternly warned against making any kind of formal=
> declaration of annexation or sovereignty over East Jerusalem. On the
other=
> hand, he recommended that Israel proceed to settle the area massively,=
> consider its rule of the area "dayenu" (enough for us) and hope that=
> eventually the "statute of limitations" would run out, and Israeli=
> annexation could be established and recognized.
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFTwo 1988 cases also shed light on the actual legal status of=
> enlarged East Jerusalem, from the Israeli perspective, as well as on
the=
> role which some Justices see their interpretations as playing in the=
> movement of that status from de facto Israeli control to full and=
> recognized annexation and sovereignty. Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian=
> activist from East Jerusalem, had emigrated the United States and then=
> returned to East Jerusalem. He lived there on a tourist visa which the=

> government refused to extend. He appealed the deportation order issued=
> against him to the Supreme Court. The Court rejected Awad's argument
that=
> East Jerusalem's special status precluded the application to him of the
law=
> under which he was being deported. In its explanation of case the
Court=
> quoted from the amended law and Administration Ordinance of June 1967
to=
> the effect that the State's "law, jurisdiction and administration" had
been=
> extended to enlarged East Jerusalem. "East Jerusalem," continued the=
> Court, "was unified with the rest of the city. This is the
significance of=
> the annexation of East Jerusalem to the State and its becoming an
integral=
> part thereof (see Kazidi [sic] vs. Military Tribunal of
Hebron). "=AEFN1 =
> Mubarak Awad vs. Yitzchak Shamir, H.C. 282/88, translated in
=AEMDUL=AFThe=
> Jerusalem Question and its Resolution: Selected Documents=AEMDNM=AF,=
> Lapidoth and Hirsch, eds., =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF p. 532.
"Kazidi"=
> is an erroneously transliterated reference to the "Ruidi" case, a=
> mistransliteration which built upon an error the Court itself made by=
> referring, in its 1988 ruling, to "Kauidi" instead of "Ruidi" (see
above). =
> For another example of how this decision has been cited incorrectly by=
> scholars and lawyers to the effect that Ruidi did establish that
enlarged=
> East Jerusalem had been annexed to the State of Israel, see Devorah=
> Housen-Couriel and Moshe Hirsch, =AEMDUL=AFEast Jerusalem and the
Elections=
> to Be held in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, in Accordance with the Israeli=
> Peace Initiative of May 1989=AEMDNM=AF, Background Paper 8 (Jerusalem: =
> Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1992) p. 2 (Hebrew). A more=
> important error, as I have shown, is the citation of this case, here by
the=
> Court itself, as a basis for claiming that the actions taken in 1967
had=
> effected the annexation of enlarged East Jerusalem to the State of
Israel. =
> See below, note 21.=AF As I have explained, this is a blatantly
erroneous=
> use of the Ruidi judgment, but employment by the Justices of such a=
> citation is explained by a subsequent passage in the Awad judgment in
which=
> the Court observes that=20
>
> =AELS1=AF=AEIP5,5=AF=AERM55=AFthe trend of the legislation is to bring
about=
> synchronization between the law, etc., of the State on the one hand and=
> East Jerusalem and its inhabitants on the other hand. The purpose of=
> interpretation is to give effect to this trend as far as possible and
to=
> find a basis for it in the statutory language.=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFThe=
> Jerusalem Question and its Resolution: Selected Documents=AEMDNM=AF,=
> Lapidoth and Hirsch, eds., =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF, p. 533.=AF
> =AELS2=AF =AERM65=AF =20
> =AEIP5,0=AFIt is the obvious need for this judicial activism, to achieve

a=
 > legal status of annexation and sovereignty via layers of=
 > (mis)interpretation, which speaks most clearly about the fundamental=
 > absence of an act of annexation or of an act extending Israeli
 sovereignty=
 > over enlarged East Jerusalem. In a subsequent case, handled by the
 Jerusalem=
 > District Court, the High Court's reasoning was, in fact, abandoned, in=
 > favor of a position that reflects more honestly and consistently the
 Ruidi=
 > decision. Yoel Davis was a fugitive from American justice who was
 arrested=
 > in East Jerusalem's Old City and who sought to resist an extradition
 order=
 > by claiming that he was not arrested on sovereign Israeli territory and=
 > therefore could not be extradited under the terms of the Extradition=
 > Convention between the United States and Israel. In his judgment
 denying=
 > Davis's appeal, Judge Yaacov Zemach did not reject the claim that East=
 > Jerusalem had not been brought under Israeli sovereignty, but stressed=
 > instead that Israel did exert de facto control of the area, which was
 all=
 > that was required under the terms of the Convention. To be sure he
 went on=
 > to cite the Ruidi and Hanzalis cases as a basis for rejecting Davis's=
 > argument that "East Jerusalem was not part of the territory of the
 State of=
 > Israel," but he studiously avoided concluding that Israel had either=
 > "annexed" or extended its "sovereignty" to the area.=AEFN1 Attorney=
 > General vs. Davis, District Court of Jerusalem, October 10, 1988,
 =AEMDUL=
 > =AFThe Jerusalem Question and its Resolution: Selected
 Documents=AEMDNM=AF,=
 > =AEMDUL=AFop. cit.=AEMDNM=AF p. 537. In this judgment the Ruidi case
 is=
 > again referred to, inaccurately, as "Bravidi." The transliteration and=
 > citation errors I have noted, by producing mythical precedents such as=
 > "Bravidi" and "Kazidi," in addition to the flagrant misconstruction of
 the=
 > substance of the Ruidi decision in the Awad ruling, may have helped=
 > strengthen illusions that the High Court has ruled repeatedly and on=
 > separate occasions regarding the supposedly settled nature of Israel's=
 > legal regime in expanded East Jerusalem. =AF=20
 > > =AEIP0,0=AF=AENJ=AF=AEFC=AF=AETS4=AF=AEMDUL=AF Yerushalayim as a
 Live=
 > Political Question in Israeli Politics=AEMDNM=AF
 >
 > =AEIP4,0=AF=AEJU=AF=AEFL=AFI am arguing that the future of Jerusalem and
 its=
 > boundaries, meaning, in effect, the boundaries of Yerushalayim and
 el-Quds,=
 > are more likely to change in response to changing political
 circumstances=
 > than they are to remain exactly as they are today. Thus far I have=
 > presented evidence in support of political malleability based on the=
 > historical record of Zionist proposals regarding Jerusalem and on the=
 > actually ambiguous and calculatedly indeterminate legal and
 administrative=
 > status of Israeli rule over expanded East Jerusalem. This argument
 runs=

> directly counter to what has been an official Israeli facade of confidence=
> and certainty that all the territory incorporated by Israel in 1967 has=
> been permanently added to the State of Israel. In this section I shall=
> examine the political side of the equation--looking at the rhetoric of=
> political struggle inside of Israel and available survey data for evidence=
> that, at least for Israelis, permanent Israeli rule of expanded East=
> Jerusalem is not the consensual or taken-for-granted fact of life it is=
> commonly made out to be. Such evidence also encourages expectations that=
> the Israeli government could enjoy substantial public support as it moves=
> more clearly toward distinguishing Yerushalayim from el-Quds.
>
> It is of course very apparent that successive governments have gone to=
> enormous lengths to accentuate and dramatize the supposedly passionate=
> Israeli attachment to all of "united Jerusalem." These efforts include=
> establishment of the day of the conquest/liberation of East Jerusalem by=
> Israeli forces as a national holiday, the Jerusalem Law, establishment,=
> temporarily, of a "Jerusalem Ministry," promulgation of the "Jerusalem=
> Covenant," the "Jerusalem 3,000" extravaganza, etc. Indeed there is no=
> denying that the campaign to identify the greatly expanded municipality as=
> an icon of Jewish yearning for "Zion and Jerusalem" has had a substantial=
> effect. Although in the years immediately following the Six Day War,=
> public opinion polls did occasionally ask whether compromise on Jerusalem=
> was acceptable, the typical negative response rate was so high and so firm=
> that pollsters stopped asking the question. Mark Heller's 1983 description=
> of Israeli perceptions of Jerusalem is representative.
>
> =AELS1=AF=AEIP5,5=AF=AETS5=AF Jerusalem has...become a transcendental=
> value for Israelis, not an instrument to promote some larger end but an=
> intrinsic part of the collective purpose itself, and if there is any=
> outstanding issue about which it can truly be said that an Israeli national=
> consensus exists, it is that Jerusalem remain the capital of Israel,=
> undivided and wholly accessible.=AEFN1 Mark A.
Heller, A Palestinian=
> State: The Implications for Israel, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University=
> Press, 1983) p. 116.=AF
>
> In countless interviews and formal speeches the leaders of Israeli=
> governments have responded to the topic of Jerusalem with catechism-like=
> declarations of uncompromisability which rival in their predictability the=
> formulas used to avoid answering questions about Israel's nuclear weapons=
> capacity.
> =20
> =AEIP5,0=AFBut beneath this strictly choreographed official position,

and=

> the silence of most Israelis on the issue, lies much more uncertainty

and=

> contingency of view than has been appreciated. In October 1986 Yossi=

> Sarid, now head of the Meretz Party, declared on the floor of the

Knesset=

> that he favored "a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the partition of=

> Jerusalem." Two years later the Civil Rights Movement presented a new=

> political platform saying that Jerusalem "would remain Israel's unified=

> capital," but added that "its status is open for negotiation. The

national=

> and religious needs of Jerusalem residents would be taken into=

> consideration."=AEMDNM=AF=AEFN1 IDF Radio Broadcast, July 3, 1988,=

> transcribed by FBIS, July 8, 1988, p. 32.=AF =AEMDNM=AFMost famous of

all,=

> of course, is the widely reported "Beilin--Abu Mazen" plan, negotiated

in=

> 1994 and 1995 when Yossi Beilin was Deputy Foreign Minister in Prime=

> Minister Rabin's government. This plan outlined an approach based on=

> sharing the city politically, deferring the question of sovereignty

over=

> the Old City, and creating a Palestinian capital in Abu Dis and the=

> contiguous Arab inhabited portions of what was, historically, the Arab

city=

> of "el-Quds." Far from being ostracized, Beilin emerged as a major=

> contender for leadership of the Labor Party and serves as Justice

Minister=

> in the current government.

>

> =AEIP5,0=AFThe real political flexibility present in the Israeli body=

> politic on the issue of Jerusalem's future is also apparent in the

language=

> routinely used by journalists, leading politicians, and government=

> agencies. In other words, when Israelis are not mindfully trying to

recite=

> the official catechism of the inconceivability of any change in the

size,=

> shape, and meaning of Israeli rule of "united Jerusalem," they often

reveal=

> their "real" view of the problem as possessing a significant, if

perhaps=

> threatening, degree of fluidity.

>

> =AEIP0,0=AF It is=AEMDNM=AF instructive to note, for example, that=

> Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics has not treated the expansion of=

> Jerusalem's boundaries as a commonsensical fact of the state's "given"=

> shape. Thus in its annual Statistical Abstract of Israel the CBS still=

> considers it necessary to explain that its listing of the state's

surface=

> area represents the "Area of Israel according to 1949 Armistice Lines,=

> including East Jerusalem and the Golan."=AEFN1 For a detailed

analysis of=

> the difficulties the Central Bureau of Statistics has had trying to

depict=

> the map of Jerusalem accurately without contradicting official policies=

> regarding lines in and around Jerusalem that are or are not "the Green=

> Line," a municipal boundary, or an international boundary, see Ian S.=

> Lustick, "The Fetish of Jerusalem: A Hegemonic Analysis," in

=AEMDUL=AFIsr=

> ael in Comparative Perspective, Michael N. Barnett=AEMDNM=AF, ed.

(Albany: =

- > SUNY Press, 1996) pp. 152-53.=AF In an interview in April 1987, then=
- > Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin explicitly noted that East Jerusalem was=
- > "part of the State of Israel." Then, in the same sentence, while
- noting=
- > the heavier restrictions placed upon army action against Arab inciters
- in=
- > East Jerusalem, he compared "East Jerusalem" to "the rest of the=
- > territories."=AEFN1 Interview with the Defense Minister, IDF Radio,
- April=
- > 14, 1987, transcribed by FBIS, April 15, 1987, p. 12.=AF In Prime
- Minister=
- > Rabin's announcement, on March 30, 1993, of the closure of Israel to=
- > inhabitants of the occupied territories, he explicitly, and repeatedly,=
- > declared that Arabs in East Jerusalem would not be affected, thereby=
- > signalling his belief that Israelis would not naturally and inevitably=
- > infer this fact from a cognitive map which placed expanded East
- Jerusalem=
- > within "Israel" as opposed to "the West Bank." Indeed Rabin himself=
- > referred to East Jerusalem as if he considered the area to be "occupied=
- > territory" rather than, as he put it, "the sovereign territory of
- Israel." =
- > Israelis, Rabin said, needed to know that "There are no Palestinians
- from=
- > the territories inside the sovereign territory, with the exclusion of=
- > united Jerusalem." In other words, in the same sentence in which East=
- > Jerusalem (part of united Jerusalem) is declared to be within Israeli=
- > sovereign territory, its inhabitants are referred to as "Palestinians
- from=
- > the territories."=AEFN1 Israel Television broadcast, March 30, 1993,=
- > transcribed in FBIS, March 31, 1993, pp. 21-22.=AF =20
- > =AEMDNM=AF
- > Perhaps the most important evidence from Israeli political
- discourse that=
- > change in the status or shape of Jerusalem is not inconceivable has
- been=
- > the practice of Likud and other right-wing politicians who have
- continued=
- > to make partisan attacks on their rivals for harboring supposedly
- flexible=
- > views on the Jerusalem issue. Such attacks implicitly acknowledge the=
- > indeterminate status of the city. If the city's future were indeed=
- > unchangeable in the minds of Israelis, then the claim that prominent=
- > Israeli politicians with mass support would even contemplate "dividing=
- > Jerusalem" would be too outrageous and silly an accusation to be useful=
- > politically. Indeed, if the question was really believed to be so
- utterly=
- > closed in Israeli minds, there would be no need to worry about what
- some=
- > Israeli politicians might think about it and no profit to be made in=
- > launching attacks against one's rivals on this basis. =20
- > =AEIP0,0=AF =20
- > =AEIP5,0=AFThe entire effort by Geula Cohen and the Tehiya Party in
- 1980, to=
- > propose the Basic Law--Jerusalem, testifies to the willingness of the
- right=
- > to use Jerusalem as a political issue against the Labor Party. This
- tactic=
- > was associated with a failed Likud effort to use a reference by
- President=

> Bush to East Jerusalem as "occupied territory" in order to deter or prevent=
> the Labor Party, in the autumn of 1989, from unseating the government=
> within which it was only a junior partner. It again became prominent in=
> the debate begun in early 1990 over whether Palestinians residing in East=
> Jerusalem could participate in autonomy negotiations and what wording about=
> Jerusalem as an issue open to future negotiation can be part of an interim=
> accord with the Palestinians. Likud and other annexationist politicians=
> and commentators condemned the Labor Party and its supporters for agreeing=
> to negotiate with East Jerusalem residents, agreeing to permit them to vote=
> in proposed elections, or accepting wording about future negotiations which=
> imply the possibility of compromise on the status or shape of the city.=
> "Once we agree that East Jerusalemites can vote for elections in Judaea and=
> Samaria," said Yitzhak Shamir in February 1990, "it will not remain in the=
> territory of Israel."=AEFN1 Interview with Yitzhak Shamir,=
> =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem Post=AEMDNM=AF, February 23, 1990.=AF Likewise Ariel=
> Sharon objected to negotiations on modalities for elections that were to be=
> held in Cairo.
>
> =AELS1=AF=AEIP5,5=AF The very fact we will go to talks in Cairo with=
> deportees and East Jerusalem Palestinians already contains the basic=
> elements of the beginning of negotiations on Jerusalem, which=
> will--following the repartitioning of the city for security reasons, and=
> that division already exists--lead also to political partitioning.=AEFN1 =
> Israel Radio broadcast, March 6, 1990, transcribed in FBIS, March 7, 1990,=
> p. 14. See also Sharon's speech before the Likud Central Committee, where=
> he castigated his rivals in the Likud as well for their betrayal of the=
> "united Jerusalem." "In fact, the capital, the heart of the Jewish people,=
> has again been partitioned. The Israeli Government has reconciled itself=
> to this situation." IDF Radio Broadcast, February 12, 1990, transcribed by=
> FBIS, February 12, 1990, p. 14.=AF
>
> =AELS2=AF=AEIP0,0=AFAccording to one commentator, the Rabin government was=
> dooming its peace efforts by challenging the national consensus on=
> Jerusalem. By opposing "Judaization" efforts in Arab neighborhoods of East=
> Jerusalem, he argued, the Rabin government made public its "unthinkable"=
> position regarding Jerusalem," i.e. that after withdrawal from Nablus,=
> Gaza, and Hebron, a similar compromise on East Jerusalem would be=
> accepted.=AEFN1 A. Alon, "He Enters through the Lions Gate, Departs="

> through the Dunghill Gate," =AEMDUL=AFMaariv=AEMDNM=AF, August 17, 1992. =

> The reference is to Rabin. See also See also Shamir's speech before the=

> Likud Knesset faction indicating that the redivision of the city was only=

> too conceivable, IDF Radio Broadcast, March 14, 1990, transcribed by FBIS,=

> March 14, 1990, p. 16.=AF Of course by accusing the Rabin government and=

> its allies of harboring these thoughts the author undermines the very claim=

> he seeks to advance, namely, that among Israelis, the idea of compromise on=

> "Jerusalem" is "unthinkable." Each of these denunciations and warnings,=

> including Netanyahu's famous 1996 attack on Peres that he would "divide=

> Jerusalem," imply or actually demonstrate calculations that the Israeli=

> public and leading Israeli politicians not only can, but do believe in the=

> possibility of a redivision of the expanded city--a redivision that to many=

> seems just one election or one political decision away.

>

> Of course use of the issue of Jerusalem's future as a partisan weapon,=

> although it may have an immediately intimidating effect, also opens=

> opportunities for politicians who privately favor some change in the city's=

> status to develop formulations useful for encouraging future debate on the=

> issue. When Shimon Peres defended himself and his party against the=

> Likud's attacks in 1990 regarding Jerusalem, he acknowledged the consensus=

> shared by an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews that supports the idea=

> of a "united city" serving as Israel's capital. But while Peres wrapped=

> his position in the language of the consensus, he was careful to include=

> the principle that the geographical definition of the city, its boundaries,=

> were subject to change by government decision.

>

> =AELS1=AF=AEIP5,5=AF There are no differences of opinion on the issue of=

> Jerusalem...Jerusalem, Israel's capital, =AEMDUL=AFwithin borders decided=

> by the Government of Israel=AEMDNM=AF, will remain a united city where=

> Israeli law will prevail, where autonomy will not be imposed--an eternal=

> capital of Israel.=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFDivrei HaKnesset=AEMDNM=AF, March 15,=

> 1990, from FBIS March 15, 1990 p. 32. (emphasis added) The long-term trend=

> toward willingness of Labor Party leaders publicly to consider adjustments=

> in the status of expanded East Jerusalem and/or its residents is also=

> apparent from the contrast between Labor's agreement to the participation=

> of East Jerusalemites in the proposed negotiations and elections of 1990=
 > and its opposition to comparable proposals during the autonomy negotiations=
 > in 1980-82. See Abba Eban, "Autonomy--The Hour of Truth,"=
 > =AEMDUL=AFAl-Hamishmar=AEMDNM=AF, January 15, 1982. =AF
 >
 > =AELS2=AF=AEIP0,0=AFTwo weeks after Peres's comment the Knesset passed a=
 > resolution, introduced by a hawkish Labor parliamentarian and supported by=> all the parties to the right of Labor, reaffirming "that united Jerusalem=
 > is under Israeli sovereignty and there will be no negotiations on its unity=
 > and status." The purpose of the resolution was identical to that of the=
 > Jerusalem Law, to force Israeli politicians to go on record against any=
 > compromise regarding expanded East Jerusalem that might facilitate a more=
 > general territorial compromise. Tellingly, however, only 45 deputies voted=
 > for the resolution. Four voted against, but the rest (71) either absented=
 > themselves from the balloting or abstained.=AEFN1 Jerusalem Domestic=
 > Service Radio Broadcast, March 28, 1990, transcribed by FBIS, March 28,=
 > 1990, p. 18.=AF Consideration of this proposal, to say nothing of the=
 > weakness of support for it, is best seen as a self-contradicting=
 > assertion--proof that it was in fact already impossible to treat the future=
 > division of the municipality of Yerushalayim as inconceivable.
 >
 > This inferential analysis of Israeli political discourse may strike some as=
 > an insubstantial basis for my argument. However it was this kind of=
 > analysis that led me to make a prediction based on my 1993
 =AEMDUL=AFForeign Policy=
 > n Policy=AEMDNM=AF article, "Reinventing Jerusalem."=AEFN1 Ian S. Lustick,=
 > "Reinventing Jerusalem," =AEMDUL=AFForeign Policy=AEMDNM=AF, No. 93=
 > (Winter--1993/94) pp. 41-59.=AF I contended that if public opinion polls=
 > were conducted among Jewish Israelis on the question of whether they would=
 > support trading specified portions of Arab East Jerusalem to the=
 > Palestinians in the context of a peace agreement, much more flexibility=
 > would be observed than if, as had been the standard practice, the polls=> were conducted on the question of whether they would be willing to=
 > compromise on "Yerushalayim." Unbeknownst to me, State Department analysts=
 > took up my suggestion and conducted a poll asking Israelis whether "they=
 > would be willing to trade Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem outside the=
 > Old City" for peace with the Palestinians. The responses they received=
 > were surprising in the solid support they gave to my contention. Fully 35%=
 > of Israeli Jews responded affirmatively, and this in the absence of any=
 > leading politician even suggesting this as a practical policy option.
 > =AEIP0,0=AF =20
 > =AEIP4,0=AFThis outcome encouraged other researchers. In 1995 the Ford=
 > Foundation supported a study by researchers at the University of

Maryland=

> and the Guttman Institute for Applied Social Research in Jerusalem into=
> Jewish (and later Palestinian) attitudes toward Jerusalem. The result
was=

> a systematic and unprecedentedly detailed survey of Israeli Jewish=
> knowledge about, and attitudes toward, Jerusalem. With questionnaires=
> produced after intensive meetings with focus groups drawn from all
sectors=

> of Israeli Jewish society, their work tells us much more than we ever
have=

> known about Israeli Jewish beliefs regarding Jerusalem and their=
> sociological and attitudinal correlates.=AEFN1 The study of
Israeli Jewish=

> attitudes toward Jerusalem was complemented by a parallel study of=
> Palestinian views on the subject conducted in 1996 by Nader Izzat Sa'id
and=

> Jerome Segal. Both have now been published in one volume. See Jerome
M.=

> Segal, Shlomit Levy, Nader Issat Sa'id, and Elihu Katz,
=AEMDUL=AFNegotiat=

= ng Jerusalem=AEMDNM=AF (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2000).=

> =AF

> =AEIP0,0=AF =20

> Only some of the findings can be reported here, but they are
marvelously=

> illuminating. (The numbers in parentheses refer to pages numbers in
the=

> book =AEMDUL=AFNegotiating Jerusalem=AEMDNM=AF cited in footnote 21.)=

> Ninety-eight percent of respondents (all Israeli Jews) indicated that=

> Yerushalayim was either "important" or "very important" to them=

> personally.(240) Seventy-eight percent said that they opposed or
definitely=

> opposed negotiations on Yerushalayim within the peace process.(241)=

> However, the solidity of this opposition to even discussing the future
of=

> the city dissolved once the question shifted respondents' attention
from=

> whatever they were imagining as "Yerushalayim" to specific portions of
the=

> expanded municipality. Thus, although 95% considered the new Jewish=

> neighborhoods constructed after 1967 in expanded East Jerusalem as=

> important or very important to them, only 59% said that the non-Jewish=

> quarters of the Old City were important to them; only 45% said that

"Arab=

> neighborhoods in downtown East Jerusalem" were important or very
important=

> to them; and only 42% said that "Arab settlements now included within=

> Yerushalayim" were important or very important to them.(245) These=

> responses suggest even more flexibility regarding the shape of the city=

> than was uncovered by the State Department poll. Indeed, for those who=

> identified themselves as close to the Labor Party in political
orientation,=

> a full 73% said that "the Arab settlements which are now included
within=

> Yerushalayim" were either "not so important" or "not at all=

> important."(245) =20

>

> For the first time in thirty years it is no longer unusual for
Israeli=

> polling organizations to ask detailed questions about public views=
 > concerning the future of Yerushalayim In their January 2000 "Peace
 Index"=
 > report, Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann of the Tami Steinmetz Center
 for=
 > Peace Research reported that in a November 1999 survey twenty-eight per=
 > cent of Jewish Israeli respondents were in favor of East Jerusalem
 becoming=
 > the capital of a Palestinian state in order to achieve peace. Only=
 > minorities of Israeli Jew reported feeling that Arab neighborhoods in
 and=
 > around el-Quds "belonged to Yerushalayim:" Wadi Joz: 30%; Sheikh
 Jarrah:=
 > 32%; Shu'afat: 42%; Ras el-Amud: 41%; and Abu Dis/Al-Azareyeh:
 22%.=20
 >
 > Without discussing details of possible maps or jurisdictional=
 > arrangements, it is still important to notice that these Jewish/Israeli
 =
 > conceptual and emotional repertoires concerning Jerusalem, matched by=
 > comparably flexible repertoires of meanings on the Palestinian
 Arab/Muslim=
 > side, provide usually unnoticed room for sharing and compromise.
 Setting=
 > aside the obvious dispute over the Temple Mount/Harm el-Sharif, the
 partial=
 > overlap of the ancient City of David with Silwan, and the question of=
 > whether the Old City could be disaggregated into quarters, one can see
 that=
 > the relatively compact Arab residential and business neighborhoods of
 Bab=
 > el-Zahra, Wadi Joz, Sheikh Jarrah, a-Tur, and Silwan, proximate as they
 are=
 > to the Muslim and, thereby, the Christian Quarters of the Old City,
 provide=
 > a potential focus for "el-Quds." This is an area which could be linked
 to=
 > Shuafat and Beit Hanina in the north, Abu Dis and al-Azariah in the
 east,=
 > and the Arab villages of expanded East Jerusalem to the south, and
 which=
 > would not contradict Jewish/Israeli political and symbolic jurisdiction=
 > over a "Yerushalayim" comprised of the New City, Mt. Zion, and some or
 all=
 > of the new outlying neighborhoods to the north and south of the Old
 City.
 > =AEIP0,0=AF =20
 > =AEIP4,0=AFIn addition to generating optimism about the possibility of=
 > sharing the city by showing that there is not, in fact, an intractably=
 > perfect overlap between all of what each side means by "Jerusalem,"=
 > challenges to casual beliefs in the permanence or sanctity of current=
 > boundaries can open up a variety of possibilities for either
 contracting or=
 > expanding the municipality city. The much discussed Amirav plan to
 greatly=
 > enlarge the city's limits so as to include Ramallah and Bethlehem was=
 > designed to achieve a political and demographic balance which would 1)=
 > reduce the incentive for each side to create expensive and destructive=
 > "facts" so as to affect the demographic complexion of smaller areas; 2)=
 > expand the symbolic and material resources defined as "Jerusalem" so as

to=
> make sharing of it easier; 3) finesse demands that Jewish neighborhoods=
> created since 1967 be removed or allowed to stay as a condition for a=
> mutually acceptable arrangement; and 4) permit the division of
sovereignty=
> by allocating most of a North-South swath running from Ramallah to=
> Bethlehem to the Palestinian state while allocating most of a West-East=
> swath to Israel.=AEFN1 Under the Amirav-Siniara Plan, the Old City,
where=
> the two swaths crossed, would be placed under a joint regime. In this=
> sense, then, this plan constitutes expansion of the city along some=
> dimensions (geographical and demographic) but contraction in other
respects=
> (the extent of Arab Jerusalem under Israeli rule). Concerning their=
> "Blueprint for Jerusalem" see =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem Post=AEMDNM=AF,
February=
> 4, 1990; and =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, May 23, 1990.=AF By
portraying=
> the solution to the city's future as involving the "accommodation of=
> legitimate Palestinian interests within the boundaries of greater=
> Jerusalem" politicians such as Minister of Public Security, Shlomo
Ben-Ami=
> contribute to a discourse which imagines new boundaries within that
area of=
> "greater Jerusalem" that will divide Israeli and Palestinian
jurisdictions=
> and which will not correspond to the current municipal=
> boundary.=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem Report=AEMDNM=AF, March 13,
2000, p.=
> 21.=AF In December 1999, Prime Minister Ehud Barak's chief negotiator,=
> Oded Eran, launched a trial balloon by indicating that some Palestinian=
> neighborhoods in el-Quds could be designated as "Area B" and that=
> eventually they might be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty.=AEFN1Nadav=
> Shragai, "Palestinian Authority to Get Civilian Control in Jerusalem=
> Neighborhoods," =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, December 28, 1999; and=
> =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, December 31, 1999.=AF In January 2000,
Elisha=
> Efrat published an article in the National Religious Party newspaper,=
> =AEMDUL=AFHatzofeh=AEMDNM=AF, advocating division of the city in order
to=
> improve the demographic balance. He also argued for an end to
improvements=
> in services in Arab areas of the city since they were likely to be
turned=
> over to Palestinian sovereignty anyway.=AEFN1 Elisha Efrat, "Why
Should We=
> Provide for Them?" =AEMDUL=AFHatzofeh=AEMDNM=AF, January 28, 2000.=AF =
> Meanwhile Shlomo Gazit, former head of Military Intelligence and
leading=
> figure in a working group on the question of Jerusalem, proposed a
radical=
> and complete division of the municipality between Israel and Palestine
on=
> security grounds.=AEFN1 Shlomo Gazit, "Divide Jerusalem,"
=AEMDUL=AFJerusal=
> em Post=AEMDNM=AF, February 1, 2000.=AF Amidst speculation in June
2000,=
> concerning the imminent crystallization of a Palestinian State,=
> =AEMDUL=AFYediot Acharonot=AEMDNM=AF, Israel's largest circulation=

> newspaper, published an editorial suggesting that with respect to=
> Yerushalayim "a likely solution will include redefining the boundaries
of=
> Israel's capital so as to exclude most of the city's Arab neighborhoods
and=
> include several Jewish communities on the outskirts of the=
> city."=AEFN1 =AEMDUL=AFYediot Acharonot=AEMDNM=AF, June 25,
2000.=AF =20
>
> Aside from the spur these ideas give to public discussion of options=
> formerly considered "inconceivable," notions of "contracting" the city,=
> that are, of course, consistent with an historically accurate image of
its=
> fluid boundaries, can help the sides notice symmetries where they
otherwise=
> might not. A contraction of the Yerushalayim municipality that
included=
> relinquishing Arab neighborhoods, even some containing Jewish sites or
some=
> Jewish inhabitants, could be seen as equivalent to the contraction in=
> Palestinian Arab conceptions of el-Quds that have removed Katamon,
Musrara,=
> and Talbieh from their political image of the city. It is also worth=
> noting, in this connection, that adjustments in the municipal boundary
of=
> the city, as have been repeatedly implemented along the portion of the=
> boundary within the Green Line,~ can under Israeli law be implemented
as=
> administrative orders, with no necessary legal action by the full
Cabinet=
> or the Knesset.=AEFN1 In 1991 the Israeli press reported that Arab=
> villagers in Abu Dis, al-Azariyah, and other neighborhoods lying
outside=
> the current city limits, who were severely affected by the constant=
> closures of the city to Arabs entering from the rest of the West Bank,
were=
> encouraged by the Civil Administration to file requests that their
villages=
> be annexed to the Jerusalem municipality so that their West Bank
identity=
> cards could be exchanged for Israeli permanent resident documents.=
> =AEMDUL=AFHAdashot=AEMDNM=AF, April 28, 1991, FBIS, April 30, 1991, p.
29.=
> =AF
>
>
> =AEMDBO=AFConclusion=AEMDNM=AF
>
> Jewish religious law, the halacha, prohibits Jews from carrying anything=
> during the sabbath outside a private domain. In order to make it
possible=
> to carry religious articles to the synagogue, and in order to perform a=
> variety of other necessary tasks, the law allows a fence, an "eruv," to
be=
> erected around a large area, thereby transforming it into one enclosed
area=
> within which items can be carried. It is traditional to erect an eruv,=
> constituted largely by barely noticeable wires strung along streets and=
> around neighborhoods, along the boundaries of a Jewish community. It
is=
> quite instructive to note that the eruv in Jerusalem, constructed,=

> monitored, and maintained by the Chief Rabbinate, does not coincide with=
> the official municipal boundary to the city's south, north, and east. As=
> the map in Figure 3 shows, the eruv instead winds its way through the=
> "indivisible city" separating most of the densely populated Arab areas of=
> el-Quds (including Silwan, Shuafat, Beit Hanina, Issawiya, Jebel Mukaber,=
> etc.) from Jewish inhabited districts, including the new neighborhoods=
> erected since 1967 in expanded East Jerusalem. =20
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AF Again my point is that there are many images of the shape of the=
> city and ultimately much more flexibility available for solving the problem=
> of the future of Yerushalayim and el-Quds if the boundaries are remembered=
> to be political tools and not sacred lines. =
> Yerushalayim--el-Quds--Jerusalem is both a metropolitan area filled with=
> human beings who seek to live normal everyday lives, and a basket of=
> symbolic resources--many of which are attached to specific locations, and=
> some of which can be reattached to different locations within something=
> credibly seen as the part of the city. In this context it is likely, and=
> now increasingly seen to be likely, that a political solution to the=
> problem of the city's future will be based on the existence of two separate=
> or partially overlapping political entities--Yerushalayim and=
> el-Quds.=AEFN1See for example, David Landau's report distributed by the=
> Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Once 'Non-Negotiable,' Jerusalem Is on the=
> Table," =AEMDUL=AFJewish Exponent=AEMDNM=AF, June 8, 2000, p. 26. =
> Previously this kind of proposal had been formally advanced by Adnan Abu=
> Odeh, "Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem," =AEMDUL=AFForeign=
> Affairs=AEMDNM=AF, Vol. 71 (Spring 1992) pp. 183-88; and is similar to=
> ideas discussed by the Palestinian delegation to the Washington peace talks=
> in 1993. See =AEMDUL=AFHaaretz=AEMDNM=AF, June 25, 1993. See also Gershon=
> Baskin, =AEMDUL=AFJerusalem of Peace: Sovereignty and Territory in=
> Jerusalem's Future=AEMDNM=AF (Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for=
> Research and Information, 1994).=AF In any event, even if this outcome is=
> delayed by political developments, understanding and highlighting the=
> artificiality and mutability of the city's boundaries can help liberate=
> Jews and Palestinians from their catechisms and catalyze new thinking about=
> the city's future.
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AF According to Jewish legend, Yerushalayim is situated between the=
> gate to Paradise and the gate to Hell. Apart from suggesting the profound=
> importance of carefully demarcating its boundaries, the image promises the=
> rewards of peace if the city is managed well and the torments of war if it=

> is not. But it is also often said that to manage the complex demands
made=
> upon the city and its environs will require the wisdom displayed by
Solomon=> when confronted by two women claiming the same baby as their own--as=
> Jerusalem is one indivisible living organism. My point is that=
> Yerushalayim/Jerusalem/el-Quds is not one, clearly demarcated,
indivisible,=
> living organism, and that this circumstance is a boon to all. By
learning=
> to analyze the different kinds of disputes that exist in and over
Jerusalem=
> and the different meanings that the sides attach to different parts or=
> aspects of it, progress can be made toward demystifying "Jerusalem" as
an=
> unbreakable container of meaning which can, like the baby in the
Solomon=
> story, exist only if cared for entirely by one "mother" or the other.
=20
> =AEIP0,0=AF =20
> =AEIP4,0=AFWhat I suggest instead is that by uncovering just how
arbitrary=
> and malleable are the geographical boundaries of the city, we can=
> disaggregate emotional and religious attachments from economic,
security,=
> and other interests. The fact is that there are even more Jerusalems
than=
> there are names for the city and its parts, and there are plenty of
those: =
> the Old City, "The Jewish Quarter," "Arab Jerusalem," "Hebrew
Jerusalem,"=
> "Jewish Jerusalem," "Greater Jerusalem" (Yerushalayim rabati), el-Quds,=
> el-Quds e-Sharif, "the Jerusalem Metropolitan area" (merchav
Yerushalayim),=
> "the environs of Jerusalem" (svivot Yerushalayim), "West Jerusalem,"
"East=
> Jerusalem," "historical East Jerusalem," "Jerusalem proper," "Jordanian=
> Jerusalem," Jerusalem suburbs, "United Jerusalem," Jerusalem area
villages,=
> the Jerusalem district, etc. This list itself reveals the many
different=
> kinds of boundaries--geographical, emotional, cultural, religious,=
> psychological, and economic--which exist in and around the city. By=
> acknowledging these different boundaries both Palestinians and Israelis
can=
> be encouraged to think about trade-offs that exist among different
types of=
> attachments they may have to different Jerusalems and about how
potential=
> zones of differing jurisdictional or political meaning could help them=
> satisfy more of their values than static and monolithic pictures of the=
> city's present and future.=AEPG=AF
>
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ChrisUsher@aol.com @ inet (ChrisUsher@aol.com @ inet [UNKNOWN])

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adaley@newsweek.com @ inet (adaley@newsweek.com @ inet [UNKNOWN])
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TEXT:

Pool Report #11

The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Return to Camp David
July 23, 2000

President Clinton departed White House at 6:04 p.m., arriving aboard Marine One at Camp David at 6:36. Aides said he went immediately into meetings with senior advisors. He was expected to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders into the night. White House declared a coverage lid at 8 p.m.

Thomas Hargrove
Scripps Howard News Service

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: IIS Peace Process <peacetlk@israel-info.gov.il> (IIS Peace Process <peacet

CREATION DATE/TIME:26-JUL-2000 09:26:28.00

SUBJECT: peacetalks: Camp David Summit - Key Points, July 25, 2000

TO: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST <ISRAEL-MIDEAST@PANKOW.INTER.NET.IL>
READ:UNKNOWN

Steven J. Naplan (CN=Steven J. Naplan/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

=====
Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem
Mail all Queries to feedback@mfa.gov.il
URL: http://www.mfa.gov.il
=====

July 25, 2000

The Conclusion of the Camp David Summit
Key Points

In the wake of the Camp David Summit, the following points must be stressed:

1. The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David ended today, July 25, without an agreement being reached.
2. Israel came to Camp David with the intention of reaching a Framework Agreement on the Israeli-Palestinian Permanent Status (FAPS), in order to bring about an end to the conflict and to secure peace for future generations. To reach such an agreement, Israel is prepared to make painful compromises, yet is unwilling to pay any price demanded of it.
3. Israel's quest for a negotiated peace will continue. Israel welcomes the upcoming visit of a senior US envoy meant to promote a continuation of the negotiating process.
4. The positions presented by Israel at the Summit were well received and were accorded legitimacy by the US hosts. President Clinton, in his statement following the Summit, praised the flexibility shown by Prime Minister Barak and the Israel delegation during the talks.
5. Many ideas and proposals were presented by Israel during the course of the negotiations. However, the ground-rules of the Camp David talks established that, in the absence of an agreement, these negotiating positions are no longer valid and are rendered null and void. Consequently, the positions presented by Israel during the Summit cannot be used as the basis for Palestinian demands, claims and opening positions in future negotiations.

6. During the course of the Summit, the Palestinian leadership showed that it had not yet internalized the need to demonstrate flexibility and compromise on a number of key issues. In particular, the positions presented by Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat with regard to Jerusalem prevented the achievement of an agreement. The leadership of the Arab world did not provide Arafat with sufficient backing for a more flexible stance, and demonstrated a lack of willingness to exert the necessary influence on the Palestinian delegation to bring about an internalization of the need for real compromise.

7. Any possible unilateral actions by the Palestinians in the wake of the Summit are unjustified and counterproductive. The ongoing relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the conduct of negotiations between them, must be based upon mutual agreement and remain free of external pressure.

In this regard, the parties declared in their statement at the end of the Summit:

"The two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of negotiations, and their their differences will be resolved only by good faith negotiations"

8. Some Palestinian circles have intimated and even declared that they intend to resort to violence should the Camp David Summit fail. There is not justification for such a reaction, and Israel will do everything within its authority to maintain calm and prevent violence.

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: IIS Peace Process <peacetlk@israel-info.gov.il> (IIS Peace Process <peacet

CREATION DATE/TIME:26-JUL-2000 09:41:02.00

SUBJECT: peacetalks: Barak Statement after Camp David, July 25, 2000

TO: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST <ISRAEL-MIDEAST@PANKOW.INTER.NET.IL>
 READ:UNKNOWN

Steven J. Naplan (CN=Steven J. Naplan/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
 READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

=====

Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem
 Mail all Queries to feedback@mfa.gov.il
 URL: http://www.mfa.gov.il

=====

Statement by Prime Minister Barak
 at Press Conference upon the Conclusion of the Camp David Summit
 July 25, 2000

The Government of Israel, and I as Prime Minister, acted in the course of the Camp David Summit out of moral and personal commitment, and supreme national obligation to do everything possible to bring about an end to the conflict - but not any any price - while at the same time, strengthening the State of Israel, and Jerusalem its capital. In the course of the negotiations, we touched the most sensitive nerves, ours and the Palestinians, but regretfully - with no result.

We were not prepared to relinquish three things: the security of Israel, those things that are holy to Israel, and the unity of the our People. If we will be faced with the alternative between compromising one of these and a confrontation, the choice is clear to every Israeli.

We've known how to face such situations in the past, and we will in the future. Yet, if we will find ourselves in a confrontation, we will be able to look straight into the eyes of our children and to say that we have done everything to prevent it. In the face of the dangers and risks before us, we must put aside all our differences and unite, as we have known to do so many times in the past.

All my life I fought for Israeli security, and I reiterate: I will not agree to relinquish the vital interests of Israeli security; I will not agree to give up the strengthening of Israel and the bolstering of greater Jerusalem, with a solid Jewish majority, for future generations.

Israel was prepared to pay a painful price to bring about an end to the conflict, but not any price. We sought a stable balance, and peace for generations to come, not headlines in tomorrow's paper. The summit was a major - and for now the latest - milestone in the intensive and exhaustive negotiating process to achieve a framework agreement for the permanent status accord with the Palestinians,

which my government has been striving to achieve.

We can today look in the mirror and say: In the past year, we have exhausted every possibility to bring an end to the 100 year-old conflict between us and the Palestinians, but regrettably the conditions were not yet ripe.

I understand the disappointment of many in Israel, who believe in co-existence and extending a hand in peace to our Palestinian neighbors. I even join them in their disappointment. However, we will not cease our effort to achieve peace and will continue to work to bring it about - yet not at any price.

Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat's positions on Jerusalem are those which prevented the achievement of the agreement.

We in the delegation worked day and night in order to reach an agreement. But I, as Prime Minister, bear overall responsibility for the Israeli positions presented in the course of the summit, just as I would have stood behind any overall agreement, difficult as it may have been, had it been achieved.

The Israeli positions were accorded full legitimacy by the US government, and there is no dispute that Israel was prepared to go all the way to achieve that peace.

Ideas, views and even positions which were raised in the course of the summit are invalid as opening positions in the resumption of negotiations, when they resume. They are null and void.

We must not lose hope. The vision of peace is not dead, but it suffered a heavy blow because of the Palestinian stubbornness. The Palestinians must deal with their extremist elements, and both sides must work together to prevent a deterioration into violence.

I thank the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Peace Staff - both of the State Department and of the National Security Council, for their dedicated work during the course of the Summit, during the last months, and throughout the last year - I would even say throughout the decade.

We are at the end of an important stage in the peace process and the beginning of a new stage which contains considerable uncertainty. Strong and united, firmly convinced in the justice of our position, we will enter the period before us with confidence. We will insist on our security and continue to act with determination to bring peace to Israel and a secure future for all our families and children.

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Scott C. Heyer (CN=Scott C. Heyer/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

CREATION DATE/TIME:22-AUG-2000 05:48:44.00

SUBJECT: Did you work the Camp David Summit?

TO: David Reyes (CN=David Reyes/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Should we mention to him that the shift workers here in the Sit Room provided direct support to the mission from here? Did you see the note that SRB personnaly wrote thanking the Sit Room?

Scott

----- Forwarded by Scott C. Heyer/NSC/EOP on 08/22/2000
05:47 AM -----

Michael Wilson

08/21/2000 09:50:16 AM

Record Type: Record

To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

cc:

Subject: Did you work the Camp David Summit?

Note: Some recipients have been dropped due to syntax errors.
Please refer to the "\$AdditionalHeaders" item for the complete headers.

** High Priority **

** Reply Requested by 8/21/2000 (Monday) **

I need to confirm which CSD members supported the Mid East Peace Summit at Camp David.

Right now I am showing the following members:

Broadwick

Fuchs

Ewens

Blackburn

Need to know today if you supported or if you know of other CSD members not listed above, who supported the Camp David Summit. Negative replies ARE NOT required.

SMSGT Wilson

Message Sent

To: _____

Bonnie S. Broadwick/NSC/EOP

cjansen@nsc.eop.gov

Douglas M. Erdahl/NSC/EOP

Gregory J. Laskowski/NSC/EOP

John M. Blackburn/NSC/EOP

Joachim D. Fuchs/NSC/EOP

Kristine A. Jordan/NSC/EOP

Michael B. DePaepe/NSC/EOP

Michael R. Lowden/NSC/EOP

Patrick C. Porterfield/NSC/EOP

Stevan D. Crowder/NSC/EOP

Scott C. Heyer/NSC/EOP