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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
(Jerusalem)

For immediate release
June 5, 2000

PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

Jerusalem
June 5, 2000

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: Good evening. We are pleased to have here Secretary Albright and her team. We have just ended, in a way, had to cut a very intensive meeting dealing with the details of the Palestinian track and the peace process. We are looking forward to the Secretary's visit to contribute to the moving forward of the peace process on the Palestinian track in order to seize the great opportunity which lies in front of us at this juncture, and I hope that the efforts will be successful. Thank you.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It has been nearly six months since my last visit to Israel and I am very pleased to be back again. Prime Minister Barak and I are kind of in the midst of a good meeting in which we are reviewing a variety of issues, obviously to do with the Arab-Israeli peace, but also we will be talking about Lebanon and the courageous act that Prime Minister Barak took on this. As I return to Israel I am struck by the strong sense of challenge and opportunity that exists here. The landscape of the Arab-Israeli conflict has undergone profound changes in recent years and, I believe, that there truly is a potential now to end the conflict. Barely two weeks ago, Prime Minister Barak fulfilled a bold commitment to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon and, in doing so, he began to create a new reality that holds real opportunities for the people of Israel, for Lebanon and for the pursuit of peace.

Our challenge, the challenge of all of us who seek peace, is to ensure that the UN Security Council Resolution 425 is implemented by all sides, and, indeed, there can be no

justification for any party to oppose this process or to sit on the sidelines. At the same time, the moment of truth is fast approaching in the pursuit of the Israeli- Palestinian peace. We are concentrating now on trying to realize this historic opportunity to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on permanent status and, in so doing, to address the core of the Arab- Israeli conflict. This can only be achieved through negotiations. There is no other way.

The challenge is equally clear, resolving issues that are extraordinarily complex and confronting tough decisions on both sides and, clearly, that is not going to be easy, but, if Israelis and Palestinians are willing to accept that neither side can get a hundred per cent of what it wants, that each side must address the needs of the other in a spirit of partnership and, the tough decisions that must be made won't become any easier with time, then they can succeed. And, I can just assure you that President Clinton and I are prepared to continue to do everything we can to help them to do so. We are there, ready to roll up our sleeves. Thank you very much.

QUESTION (in Hebrew): Shas behaves in the coalition as though it were theirs. What else should happen that such a party should remain in the government?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK (in Hebrew): I do not think that it is appropriate to solve the problems that require resolution in the coalition in the way you are suggesting. I always recommend dialogue, patience, on adhering to procedures that conform to public norms, on good government, but taking into account that we are ultimately talking about Israeli children, even if they are children who are learning in Shas schools. We have to diligently strive to get to a solution to the problem. Today I stopped the dialogue because there was a sense of an implied threat in the air, and neither I nor this government will operate under a threat of any kind from any source on any subject.

QUESTION (in Hebrew): Has the position that you iterated in Lisbon remained constant which was that the differences which currently exist are too great to convene a Camp David-type summit at end of this month?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK (in Hebrew): I believe that a summit must be appropriately prepared, and principally the Americans, if they initiate a summit, it would be appropriate for them to feel themselves that they have a chance to mediate between the sides. It's not without risk, but if the conditions for a summit ripen, it should be done. I, by the way, did not say -- not on the way to Lisbon, and not in any other place -- that the conditions will not ripen. On the contrary, we are within a narrow window of opportunity; there is a strategic need; there is an unusual opportunity; and it will be tested within the next few weeks, whether there is the desire, the determination on the part of the two sides, to try to solve and to put an end to the conflict -- from our point of view, while preserving Israel's vital interests.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I have a translation?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: I tried to say positive things.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I imagine.

(Translation by interpreter)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I have to say, as I said in my remarks, and the Prime Minister has just said, there really is a historic opportunity here and we all have to work very hard to pursue this opportunity at full speed, but, we have to make sure that there is a basis laid for what we are doing and, as I have said, President Clinton has said, he is prepared to have such a summit, but we have to make sure that the conditions are right and, as the Prime Minister indicated, he feels that way, too. But, we are all prepared to work as hard as we possibly can to have this happen, because this is an historic time and decisions must be made.

QUESTION: There have been reports that you have concluded that Israel no longer needs the Jordan Valley for its security and is considering putting it in the mix. Is that correct, please? Do you have in your own mind, even if you are not making it public, a red line, a line beyond which Israel cannot relinquish land?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: The more ground we have the better for professional reasons, but here we are dealing with a very complicated situation where all the elements of security should be put together and all the political elements in order to achieve a point of equilibrium that will provide us with a stable peace for generations to come.

I'm in no position right now -- it's too early -- to make any statements about what areas will be included in the agreement on negotiation and what areas will not be agreed. Basically, we need security and settlement presence along the Jordan Valley, but the details could be decided only through negotiations.

QUESTION: Well, it sounds like the report is incorrect.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: It can happen sometimes for reports....

QUESTION: Are you saying positively that Israel ...?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: I say only what I want to say.

QUESTION (in Hebrew): Regarding the third FRD, in the absence of a framework agreement, would you maintain the American letter which says that the withdrawal will not go beyond one percent? (Inaudible question to the Secretary about Syria.)

PRIME MINISTER BARAK (in Hebrew): The American letter does not state what you described. It says that that subject is Israel's responsibility and is not part of the negotiation, and that the United States does not intend -- that it has heard the Israeli position -- and does not intend to take a

stand on the size of the withdrawal. I am aware of that letter, and of course the United States is aware of it. We are committed to the discussion on the third withdrawal, and we intend to conclude it by the last week of June, but I don't see that as the principal channel by way of which we will achieve a breakthrough but rather a framework agreement, which is much more promising from the point of view of the ability of the two sides to put into it productive and useful content, if in fact there is real desire on both sides.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: You asked me about Syria. I think that in order to have a comprehensive peace, we want to see the Israeli-Syrian track also active. The door is open. I am going to be going to Cairo where there happens to be a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers and so, at that stage, I will have an opportunity to talk to the Foreign Minister of Oman as well as the Foreign Minister of Syria. We are concentrating on the Palestinian track as the Prime Minister and I have said, and as the President has said. But the door is open.

QUESTION: Mr. Prime Minister, would the final status agreement set in motion hundreds of thousands of refugees now living in Lebanon and elsewhere, and, if so, who would host these refugees until a Palestinian state could absorb them, if ever?

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: I think that the refugee issue should be approached and could be solved in a permanent status in a way that will solve, of course, the human suffering aspect of it in regard to all of them who would like to move, including those from Lebanon. But, it is too early, too premature to try to predict what shape the solution will take. We made it clear, many times, that we don't think, bearing in mind the history of this conflict, that Israel can accept either moral or judicial, legal, responsibility for the creation of the problem of the refugees, but, at the same time, as human beings, we are not blind to the human suffering that is there and that, some way to be approached when we come to permanently solve the problem and put an end to the conflict.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, you said that there was no justification for any party to either oppose or stand on the sidelines -- I'm talking about Lebanon -- by refusing to or declining to deploy the Lebanese army in the south, or by their position on Sheba Farms. Would you say that either Syria or Lebanon is standing on the sidelines or opposing the process?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that we are just in the beginning of this process. The United Nations has been working on certifying the withdrawal and the line and we do believe that it is important for Lebanon to have sovereignty over its territory and that they should, in fact, work towards that end. I think that that is an essential part. We have been, all along, for Lebanon's sovereignty and the ability to withdraw foreign forces and have them take control over their own territory. And, I am not prepared to

make a judgement at this stage, because the process has just begun, but I think it is a very important aspect of what has to happen.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK: Thank you all. Think positive.

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CREATION DATE/TIME:20-JUN-2000 19:44:40.00

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Tuesday June 20, 2000

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #62

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 2000, 12:05 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any statements. I would like, if I can express a hope, to get out of here at 12:30 so we can do the Moroccan events, but I'll leave that in your hands. Be glad to take your questions.

Where do we start? Jonathan, do you want to take the --

QUESTION: Oh, does this set a precedent?

MR. BOUCHER: No, it doesn't.

QUESTION: Go ahead, then.

QUESTION: Finishing up on a subject yesterday, the International Republican Institute has canceled its plans to send a delegation to Zimbabwe. Do you have a statement on that?

MR. BOUCHER: We've seen that report. I don't think - I don't know that we've been in touch with them since we've heard the announcement. But I do think it's important to say that we continue to believe that election monitoring is important in Zimbabwe. According to the Government of Zimbabwe, the word we got was that foreign nongovernmental organizations are not going to receive accreditation to be election monitors and that only foreign government employees will receive accreditation. The reason for this distinction has not been made clear to us, and we're disappointed with that decision.

The deadline for observers to be accredited is June 22nd. We have urged - and we will continue to urge - the Government of Zimbabwe to accredit all foreign election observers, governmental and nongovernmental, before this June 22nd deadline.

QUESTION: That's all you're going to say: "We're disappointed"?

MR. BOUCHER: We're pushing. We continue to push.

QUESTION: I mean, if they're not allowed, what does that mean?

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, they've still got a couple more days when they can do this, and we continue to urge them to do it.

QUESTION: And if they don't?

MR. BOUCHER: Then we'll talk about it then.

QUESTION: Well, it doesn't seem very likely that they will. You still have some - do you have reason to believe that they're going to change their minds?

MR. BOUCHER: We are urging them to change their minds and to accredit these observers.

QUESTION: Do you have any reason to believe -- (inaudible)
-- ?

MR. BOUCHER: We continue to push for it. I'll tell you when it happens, or if it doesn't happen.

QUESTION: The Taiwanese President Chen proposed a summit with President Jiang. I assume you would endorse a summit? Could you say that this is a good thing and a good idea?

MR. BOUCHER: Our view, as we've said before - and I'll say it again now - is that we strongly support a resumption of the cross-Straits dialogue. We are committed to promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the region. It is up to Beijing and Taipei to determine the basis for the dialogue and the modalities for the dialogue. Our abiding interest is in the peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides.

QUESTION: Were you warned, advised in advance, that he was going to make this proposal? And did you encourage him to go ahead?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything that would indicate that. I'd just say that we have consistently encouraged the idea of resumption of a cross-Straits dialogue. But, once again, it's up to the sides to specify the modalities and the timing and things like that.

QUESTION: Will the Secretary encourage such a summit when she goes to Beijing?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, she'll discuss cross-Straits developments, certainly, when she goes to Beijing, and reiterate our view that sides should resume their direct dialogue.

QUESTION: On the Middle East, the Israeli Government thinks it's time to have a working summit, sort of a Camp David sort of gathering, I gather. Does the State Department see any advantage in that now?

MR. BOUCHER: I'd say that on the summit issue, where we have been for the last few days, the Secretary, as you know, will go out to the region next week to determine if there is a sufficient - if the necessary basis exists for a summit, or whether we need to continue the work.

The President, I believe, two or three days ago said that at

this juncture we would say that a basis does not exist, but the point is to see next week when the Secretary goes out if there is such a basis or if we need to continue.

We have made quite clear - the President has made quite clear - that we're prepared to go forward with a summit at the appropriate time when we think the necessary basis exists.

QUESTION: Have you talked to the Palestinians about this? Are they also in favor of such a - another level of discussion?

MR. BOUCHER: The issue has been certainly discussed with both sides as we've been discussing with both sides how to reach agreement on the permanent status issues - the real tough issues, the fundamental issues - that are under discussion at this point.

QUESTION: When you make a determination of whether they're ready, is that based mainly on whether they say they're ready, or would you make an independent judgment independently of whether they say they're ready?

MR. BOUCHER: I think it's a combination of all our discussions on these things.

QUESTION: Would you expand on proposals that the US - that the President apparently made last week to Mr. Arafat about delaying Israeli handover? That comes from the Palestinian side, Saeb Erakat.

MR. BOUCHER: No, I think what I would say is that further redeployment - this is the issue there I think you're asking about - this is an issue that the two sides are continuing to discuss. I would also say that we have a window of opportunity right now to concentrate also on the permanent status issues and to try to resolve some of those fundamental issues.

QUESTION: But it was a US initiative to delay the --

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't mention that.

QUESTION: You didn't?

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't say that, no.

QUESTION: Do you deny it?

MR. BOUCHER: All I'm saying is this is an issue the two parties are continuing to discuss.

QUESTION: Richard, my colleagues in the Middle East say that the Israelis are reporting the summit as if almost it's a done deal, and they're even giving a specific date now. We had heard that Barak had suggested to the President after July 4th, but now apparently Israeli newspapers are reporting a July 6th summit.

Do you have any comment on the fact that they're already reporting it as if it's almost a done deal? And is that a deliberate effort to try and pressure you guys into going ahead with that proposal?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any comment.

QUESTION: Is that time frame a feasible time frame? I mean, it seems like the Secretary is going to be around, the President is going to be around, it's after the holiday weekend. Would there be, if there was to be a summit proposal, is that a reasonable -

MR. BOUCHER: If there is a necessary basis for a summit, then any time is a suitable time. I think the Secretary and the President have made clear they are prepared to do what it takes to reach an agreement. If they thought the basis existed to reach an agreement, they would be prepared to do what it takes. So I don't want to speculate on any particular date but just tell you that their commitment as they, both the Secretary and the President have stated it personally and recently, is strong to doing whatever they can to make this work, if we think a deal can be reached.

QUESTION: Can we go to Haiti?

QUESTION: When does Ambassador Ross go?

MR. BOUCHER: Midweek, this week.

QUESTION: This Wednesday?

MR. BOUCHER: Midweek.

QUESTION: Wednesday is midweek. Is it Wednesday?

QUESTION: Has it not been decided or - I mean, this is really ridiculous. I mean, it's not that big a deal to say when he's going. Has it not --

QUESTION: The Israelis said he's going to be there today.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, he's not.

QUESTION: Is there a date planned for when he leaves?

MR. BOUCHER: All I can tell you at this point is he is planning on being in the region middle of this week.

QUESTION: Any comment on the EU decision to accept Greece into the European monetary system?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry, we've got one more on the Middle East.

QUESTION: What effect, if any, does the political crisis inside the Israeli Government have on this? I know it's something you don't like to address very much but it seems rather - in the (inaudible) - it's rather vital that. It would be hard to arrange a summit with -

MR. BOUCHER: Well, you're right. The specifics of what's going on between the parties is internal politics in Israel, and I don't want to try to get into those questions. I think it's clear to us that the Israeli Government and the Israeli people have committed themselves to striving for peace through negotiations. We're confident that this will remain Israel's policy and we will do everything we can to support the peace process.

QUESTION: About Haiti?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we were going to go to Greece back there, I think.

QUESTION: Any comment on the EU decision to accept Greece into the European monetary system?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we - first of all, we congratulate the Greek Government and the Greek people on this decision that occurred in Portugal. It demonstrates Greece's remarkable economic progress in recent years and it complements Greece's increasingly active political role within the European Union. I'll leave it at that for my comments, but I think there might be something from the White House today.

QUESTION: Any response to my pending questions on Mr. Lesperoglou's case, on Mr. Konstantin Mitsotakis, and on the Olympic Games in Athens?

MR. BOUCHER: Have we gotten anything back on that? I think the Press Office will make sure to get you something.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay, Haiti. Go ahead.

QUESTION: What is the situation in Haiti? Have any Americans been attacked? What is the situation? Is the Embassy opened up today? What is the Embassy's - what is the US view of who is behind the violence, and what is the fate of the head of the electoral commission who fled the country?

MR. BOUCHER: Let's do some of this either way. The head of the electoral commission, Mr. Manus - I think I reported on yesterday or the day before - he's in the United States with his wife. They traveled on previously issued visas, and naturally we're concerned about the fact that they felt it necessary to leave the country.

As far as the situation in Haiti, there was a small demonstration yesterday near the embassy in Port au Prince. There were about a hundred demonstrators; they set a small fire in the street outside of the Embassy, then they moved to an adjacent park where it's reported that they hauled down and attempted to burn an American flag that had been flying in the park.

Significant demonstrations occurred throughout Port au Prince yesterday by small groups of protesters calling for

the announcement of the official results of the May 21 elections. Several main roads in and leading out of the capital were blocked by barricades of burning tires and other vehicular parts.

Now, today - I would also mention yesterday, because of the demonstrations around the Embassy, our Embassy had to close for the day. Today, the situation we understand in Port au Prince is calm and our Embassy is open.

I would also point out that Special Haiti Coordinator Donald Steinberg and National Security Council Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela are currently in Port au Prince for meetings related to the election results.

QUESTION: What is the US position right now in terms of those results?

MR. BOUCHER: That they need to be carefully and accurately reported, is the way I'd put it.

QUESTION: Does anybody in the Department plan to meet with Mr. Manus and get a debriefing from him?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure people are in touch with him. I'll have to check to see if there are any meetings planned.

QUESTION: But you don't know where he is? He was in New England yesterday -

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, I'm not exactly sure where he is. I'll have to check if there are any meetings scheduled with him.

Do you have one, or did we take care of it?

QUESTION: No, I have a question on Zimbabwe - oh, Sierra Leone, excuse me.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. Finished with Haiti?

QUESTION: How long will Steinberg and Valenzuela be there, and how long do you think it will take for the US to decide whether or not the votes have been accurately counted?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know how long they'll be there and I don't really have time frames for these things. They're down there having discussions, and we'll see where we get to and when we think the process has been completed in a fair manner.

QUESTION: Do you have any overall comment in terms of how you viewed the election process in Haiti?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think we said at the time of the elections that we were pleased that it was peaceful and there was a very large turnout. But the entire election process continues, and it's too early because some of the results haven't been made, haven't been finalized. And the manner in which they're counted and finalized is very important to us so it's too early to make some grand

declaration on it. We're certainly quite aware of the process and believe it needs to be handled very carefully to make sure it's fair.

QUESTION: Can I just ask one last question? This process that they used, apparently, where they didn't include everyone running, in terms of determining the majority that excluded some of the more minor candidates, is that acceptable to the US?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to talk about the particular process at this point. I know reports down there about final results, one way or the other, that turned out not to be final. We do think it's very important how the process is handled, and we're paying close attention to that.

QUESTION: So far, Mr. Aristide, the former president, and President Preval have said virtually nothing about the violence in the city. Do you have any comment on that? Do you - would urge them to speak out? Or are you disappointed that they seem to be quiet?

MR. BOUCHER: You know, without having any particular comment on them, because I just hadn't really focused on that, obviously, we think everybody should be exercising restraint and urging calm and trying to make this process continue in a manner that does turn out to be free and fair.

QUESTION: My understanding that the demonstration in the alleged flag burning was a reaction to the fact that Mr. Manus has come to the United States. And has he requested any kind of special attention while he's here? Has he requested asylum?

MR. BOUCHER: You mean, security or asylum? Well, he had a visa to come into the United States, so I think that's how he got here and how he stays here. If he had requested some special status, then I don't think we would be able to comment on it anyway because of privacy reasons. But our understanding of the --

QUESTION: He hasn't, but if he had you couldn't say?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I didn't really try to say whether he had or hadn't, because I don't know. But if he had or he hadn't, we wouldn't be able to say. As far as the demonstrations, our understanding they were calling for the announcement for official results of the May 21 election. So that involves a whole lot of issues, including some of the ones you raised.

QUESTION: Richard, did the American Embassy assist Mr. Manus in fleeing the country?

MR. BOUCHER: He had a visa already and he came here on an existing visa.

QUESTION: No, he went through the Dominican Republic and he hid out in an embassy in Port au Prince for a couple of days and then fled. I'm wondering if the Americans were involved in helping him flee.

MR. BOUCHER: I'll check and see if there is anything we can say, if we have anything for you on that.

QUESTION: After yesterday's briefing, I called the Metropolitan Police Department to see if they had finished their investigation of the assault on April 14th of demonstrators across 16th Street from the Cuban Interest Section. And the officer I reached said that the department had pretty much completed its investigation and that the case is being reviewed by a US Attorney and the State Department. I called the US attorney and they - they're going to get back to me.

But maybe you would prefer to take this question. But I would like to know if - what the status of this report is and what, if anything, the Justice Department, the US Attorneys Office and the State Department are doing in its evaluation of the police report.

MR. BOUCHER: Our understanding is that the Metropolitan Police and the US Attorney for the District of Columbia are still actively investigating the incident, so I'm not aware that we have gotten any report from them at this point. The decision regarding prosecution has to be made when the investigation is completed so there is no - no basis for that yet. And that's a decision made by the attorney.

QUESTION: I'm sure you've seen the piece by Mr. Panic in The Washington Post today outlining a proposal which you touched on yesterday. Do you see any merits in the proposal as he formulated it?

MR. BOUCHER: A proposal that I touched on yesterday? I thought we touched on it quite firmly yesterday and, if I didn't, let me touch on it quite firmly again. We think the only proposal for Mr. Milosevic's future is that he be out of power, out of the country, and in The Hague. And that's the only one that we - we have not seen any other proposals from governments and we're not interested.

QUESTION: But it's certainly two out of three.

MR. BOUCHER: We were asked that yesterday, and I said we want three for three. He belongs in The Hague; it's a one-way ticket policy and that's what we're looking for.

QUESTION: On Russia. I understand that Mrs. Pope was allowed in to see her husband today in Lefortovo. And, also, if you have any readout on Strobe's talks with the Russians. They seemed to be quite upbeat after the meetings.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, what I saw on the wires was that they had concluded their meetings and announced that they had nothing to say about them. So, at this point, I don't have --

QUESTION: Well, I think Mamedov said there's always progress when we talk with Strobe, or something like that.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay, well, that goes without saying.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Actually --

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't have anything on Strobe's talks yet. I think he's on his way back. I was not able to find anything this morning.

Mrs. Pope did visit her husband this morning at Lefortovo Prison for approximately two hours. A consular officer from the Embassy accompanied her on the visit, but we defer to Mrs. Pope for any comments to make about the visit.

QUESTION: On Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone said today that it has asked the United Nations to set up an international tribunal for war crimes against humanity to try Foday Sankoh. Is it a decision that you would back within the UN?

MR. BOUCHER: We have said there needs to be accountability and justice for Mr. Sankoh. We have said quite clearly we don't think he has any continuing role in the process. We've also said that we look to the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN Security Council to determine what's the best way to bring him to justice and to have accountability. So while I'm not aware of that specific proposal having been made, it has been discussed before, and certainly we would look forward to discussing it with others in the Security Council as well as the government.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:25 P.M.)

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Margaret M. Suntum (CN=Margaret M. Suntum/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

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READ:UNKNOWN

TO: tkinser@freedom forum.org (tkinser@freedom forum.org [UNKNOWN])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Kristina Wolfe (CN=Kristina Wolfe/OU=OVP/O=EOP@EOP [OVP])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Matthew L. Bennett (CN=Matthew L. Bennett/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Scott Beale (CN=Scott Beale/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Adam L. Rosman (CN=Adam L. Rosman/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Mary L. Smith (CN=Mary L. Smith/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: mkukis@upi.com (mkukis@upi.com [UNKNOWN])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Christine M. Glunz (CN=Christine M. Glunz/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Raj Adlakha (CN=Raj Adlakha/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Leah F. Pisar (CN=Leah F. Pisar/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Ann Marie Wallace (CN=Ann Marie Wallace/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Lisa Zweig Molyneux (CN=Lisa Zweig Molyneux/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Elizabeth E. Baylor (CN=Elizabeth E. Baylor/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: David Halperin (CN=David Halperin/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Elliott H. Baer (CN=Elliott H. Baer/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Philip J. Crowley (CN=Philip J. Crowley/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: Stephanie Adler (CN=Stephanie Adler/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: IIP-PRESS@lists.state.gov (IIP-PRESS@lists.state.gov [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Heather H. Howard (CN=Heather H. Howard/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
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TO: kmoran@exchange.usia.gov (kmoran@exchange.usia.gov [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Jennifer L. Dewitt (CN=Jennifer L. Dewitt/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: BARRY_TOIV@was.bm.com (BARRY_TOIV@was.bm.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Linda Sinoway (CN=Linda Sinoway/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Angela Blake (CN=Angela Blake/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Lissa Muscatine (CN=Lissa Muscatine/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Erica R. Morris (CN=Erica R. Morris/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: William T. Glunz (CN=William T. Glunz/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Jennifer I. Hoelzer (CN=Jennifer I. Hoelzer/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: kamena@washpost.com (kamena@washpost.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Eileen P. McCaughey (CN=Eileen P. McCaughey/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: James E. Kennedy (CN=James E. Kennedy/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

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TO: Pamela P. Carpenter (CN=Pamela P. Carpenter/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Heather F. Hurlburt (CN=Heather F. Hurlburt/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Justin G. Cooper (CN=Justin G. Cooper/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Lauren M. Supina (CN=Lauren M. Supina/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Brian A. Barreto (CN=Brian A. Barreto/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Christine L. Anderson (CN=Christine L. Anderson/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Emily Karcher (CN=Emily Karcher/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sonya N. Hebert (CN=Sonya N. Hebert/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Jenni R. Engebretsen (CN=Jenni R. Engebretsen/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Jordanindc@aol.com (Jordanindc@aol.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Rebecca J. Salay (CN=Rebecca J. Salay/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Lisel Loy (CN=Lisel Loy/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Debra D. Alexander (CN=Debra D. Alexander/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: sean.carr@cnn.com (sean.carr@cnn.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Kymberly M. Escobar (CN=Kymberly M. Escobar/OU=CEQ/O=EOP@EOP [CEQ])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Samir Afridi (CN=Samir Afridi/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Beth Nolan (CN=Beth Nolan/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Matthew T. Schneider (CN=Matthew T. Schneider/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Anne W. Bovaird (CN=Anne W. Bovaird/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Francisco J. Sanchez (CN=Francisco J. Sanchez/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Melissa G. Green (CN=Melissa G. Green/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Fern Mechlowitz (CN=Fern Mechlowitz/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Irma L. Martinez (CN=Irma L. Martinez/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: MichaelT@ag.state.ar.us (MichaelT@ag.state.ar.us [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: John H. Corcoran III (CN=John H. Corcoran III/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Sally Katzen (CN=Sally Katzen/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Alberto O. Feraren (CN=Alberto O. Feraren/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
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TO: Jason H. Schechter (CN=Jason H. Schechter/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: newsdesk@usnewswire.com (newsdesk@usnewswire.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: usia01@access.digex.com (usia01@access.digex.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: skgmd@umich.edu (skgmd@umich.edu [UNKNOWN])
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TO: dmilbank@tnr.com (dmilbank@tnr.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Natalie S. Wozniak (CN=Natalie S. Wozniak/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: Lowell A. Weiss (CN=Lowell A. Weiss/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Janice H. Vranich (CN=Janice H. Vranich/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Loretta M. Ucelli (CN=Loretta M. Ucelli/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: June G. Turner (CN=June G. Turner/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Serena C. Torrey (CN=Serena C. Torrey/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sarah E. Gegenheimer (CN=Sarah E. Gegenheimer/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dana C. Strand (CN=Dana C. Strand/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Richard L. Siewert (CN=Richard L. Siewert/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jeffrey A. Shesol (CN=Jeffrey A. Shesol/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Christopher K. Scully (CN=Christopher K. Scully/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Steven J. Naplan (CN=Steven J. Naplan/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: G. Timothy Saunders (CN=G. Timothy Saunders/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Peter Rundlet (CN=Peter Rundlet/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Heather M. Riley (CN=Heather M. Riley/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: TDIXON@smtpgate.mac.whca.mil (TDIXON@smtpgate.mac.whca.mil [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Julia M. Payne (CN=Julia M. Payne/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Ellen E. Olcott (CN=Ellen E. Olcott/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Minyon Moore (CN=Minyon Moore/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Megan C. Moloney (CN=Megan C. Moloney/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Laura S. Marcus (CN=Laura S. Marcus/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Joseph P. Lockhart (CN=Joseph P. Lockhart/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sarah S. Knight (CN=Sarah S. Knight/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Mark A. Kitchens (CN=Mark A. Kitchens/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: John_See@ed.gov (John_See@ed.gov [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Wayne C. Johnson (CN=Wayne C. Johnson/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Maureen A. Hudson (CN=Maureen A. Hudson/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: William C. Haymes (CN=William C. Haymes/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: William Hadley (CN=William Hadley/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Joshua S. Gottheimer (CN=Joshua S. Gottheimer/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Paul D. Glastris (CN=Paul D. Glastris/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Martha Foley (CN=Martha Foley/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sharon Farmer (CN=Sharon Farmer/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dorinda A. Salcido (CN=Dorinda A. Salcido/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dawn M. Chirwa (CN=Dawn M. Chirwa/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jackson T. Dunn (CN=Jackson T. Dunn/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Lana Dickey (CN=Lana Dickey/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Justin L. Coleman (CN=Justin L. Coleman/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Nanda Chitre (CN=Nanda Chitre/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Barbara D. Woolley (CN=Barbara D. Woolley/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Karen L. Barbuschak (CN=Karen L. Barbuschak/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
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TO: Jeannetta P. Allen (CN=Jeannetta P. Allen/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
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TO: wh-outbox-distr@pub.pub.whitehouse.gov (wh-outbox-distr@pub.pub.whitehouse.gov)
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TO: Margaret M. Suntum (CN=Margaret M. Suntum/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Edward L. Widmer (CN=Edward L. Widmer/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Kimberlin L. Love (CN=Kimberlin L. Love/OU=OVP/O=EOP@EOP [OVP])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Alexian T. Wines (CN=Alexian T. Wines/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Katherine A. Brown (CN=Katherine A. Brown/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Brian A. Reich (CN=Brian A. Reich/OU=OVP/O=EOP@EOP [OVP])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Elizabeth J. O'Connell (CN=Elizabeth J. O'Connell/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Rachael F. Goldfarb (CN=Rachael F. Goldfarb/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Brooke D. Anderson (CN=Brooke D. Anderson/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: Marc I. Hurwitz (CN=Marc I. Hurwitz/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jeffrey K. Nussbaum@OVP (Jeffrey K. Nussbaum@OVP [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Zina C. Pierre (CN=Zina C. Pierre/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Joseph B. Trahern (CN=Joseph B. Trahern/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Daniel R. Wilson (CN=Daniel R. Wilson/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
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TO: David B. Stockwell (CN=David B. Stockwell/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: Seth J. Applebaum (CN=Seth J. Applebaum/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: George E. Lewis (CN=George E. Lewis/OU=OA/O=EOP@EOP [OA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Carolyn E. Cleveland (CN=Carolyn E. Cleveland/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Brooke B. Livingston (CN=Brooke B. Livingston/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Helen L. Langan (CN=Helen L. Langan/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Alon J. Kupferman (CN=Alon J. Kupferman/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Paul K. Orzulak (CN=Paul K. Orzulak/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
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TO: Mara A. Silver (CN=Mara A. Silver/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: RSocarides@rlmnet.com (RSocarides@rlmnet.com [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Elizabeth J. Potter (CN=Elizabeth J. Potter/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Sean R. Dobson (CN=Sean R. Dobson/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Renee Sagiv (CN=Renee Sagiv/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Adrian E. Miller (CN=Adrian E. Miller/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Victoria L. Valentine (CN=Victoria L. Valentine/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Mark D. Magana (CN=Mark D. Magana/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Stephen N. Boyd (CN=Stephen N. Boyd/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Gilbert S. Gonzalez (CN=Gilbert S. Gonzalez/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Deanne E. Benos (CN=Deanne E. Benos/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
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TO: Terry Edmonds (CN=Terry Edmonds/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Bridget T. Leininger (CN=Bridget T. Leininger/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Lisa Ferdinando (CN=Lisa Ferdinando/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Anna Richter (CN=Anna Richter/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Stephanie A. Cutter (CN=Stephanie A. Cutter/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michele Ballantyne (CN=Michele Ballantyne/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Charles J. Payson (CN=Charles J. Payson/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sharon H. Yuan (CN=Sharon H. Yuan/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Rachel A. Redington (CN=Rachel A. Redington/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Patrick M. Dorton (CN=Patrick M. Dorton/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
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TO: Carolyn T. Wu (CN=Carolyn T. Wu/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michael K. Gehrke (CN=Michael K. Gehrke/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Hildy Kuryk (CN=Hildy Kuryk/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Aprill N. Springfield (CN=Aprill N. Springfield/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Jennifer M. Palmieri (CN=Jennifer M. Palmieri/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: tingen-terri@dol.gov (tingen-terri@dol.gov [UNKNOWN])
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TO: john_see@ed.gov (john_see@ed.gov [UNKNOWN])
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TO: Robert S. Weiner (CN=Robert S. Weiner/OU=ONDCP/O=EOP@EOP [ONDCP])
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TO: Thurgood Marshall Jr (CN=Thurgood Marshall Jr/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Karen Tramontano (CN=Karen Tramontano/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sylvia M. Mathews (CN=Sylvia M. Mathews/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michael J. Sullivan (CN=Michael J. Sullivan/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jennifer H. Smith (CN=Jennifer H. Smith/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Leanne A. Shimabukuro (CN=Leanne A. Shimabukuro/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Ruby Shamir (CN=Ruby Shamir/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Brooks E. Scoville (CN=Brooks E. Scoville/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Robert B. Johnson (CN=Robert B. Johnson/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Robin M. Roland (CN=Robin M. Roland/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Linda Ricci (CN=Linda Ricci/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Denver R. Peacock (CN=Denver R. Peacock/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sean P. O'Shea (CN=Sean P. O'Shea/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Melissa M. Murray (CN=Melissa M. Murray/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Laura D. Schwartz (CN=Laura D. Schwartz/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Kris M Balderston (CN=Kris M Balderston/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Catherine T. Kitchen (CN=Catherine T. Kitchen/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: David E. Kalbaugh (CN=David E. Kalbaugh/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Joel Johnson (CN=Joel Johnson/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Thomas D. Janenda (CN=Thomas D. Janenda/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Marty J. Hoffmann (CN=Marty J. Hoffmann/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michael A. Hammer (CN=Michael A. Hammer/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Wendy E. Gray (CN=Wendy E. Gray/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dario J. Gomez (CN=Dario J. Gomez/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Rachel E. Forde (CN=Rachel E. Forde/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jennifer Ferguson (CN=Jennifer Ferguson/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Anne M. Edwards (CN=Anne M. Edwards/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Debra D. Bird (CN=Debra D. Bird/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Daniel W. Burkhardt (CN=Daniel W. Burkhardt/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Elliot J. Diringer (CN=Elliot J. Diringer/OU=CEQ/O=EOP@EOP [CEQ])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Lynn G. Cutler (CN=Lynn G. Cutler/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Delia A. Cohen (CN=Delia A. Cohen/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: George G. Caudill (CN=George G. Caudill/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Mary E. Cahill (CN=Mary E. Cahill/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Karen C. Burchard (CN=Karen C. Burchard/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Antony J. Blinken (CN=Antony J. Blinken/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Ralph Alswang (CN=Ralph Alswang/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: Deborah Akel (CN=Deborah Akel/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
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TO: backup@wilson.ai.mit.edu (backup@wilson.ai.mit.edu [UNKNOWN])
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TEXT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 5, 2000

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

The James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

11:35 A.M. EDT

MR. CROWLEY: Just to repeat, this is a BACKGROUND BRIEFING, attributable to a senior administration official. As you will note, he has been integral to this process all along, and will kind of give his assessment of where they are and what we hope to accomplish at Camp David.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, actually, the President did a pretty good job, so rather than offering a larger statement on context to begin with, I'll just take questions.

Q If this summit does not succeed, is that, in fact, the end of this peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we're obviously operating on the premise of trying to make things work, not trying to focus on how they won't work.

I think the important thing here is we have reached a juncture where the negotiators, I think, worked very hard for a long time, but they've hit a wall. We have tried lots of different processes involving myself, the Secretary; we've tried lots of different kinds of techniques. And one of the things that became very clear was it wasn't going to go further unless you brought the leaders together with the negotiators. So that's really the logic of this at this point. And our focus, as I said, is how we try to make it work, not how we worry about it if it doesn't work.

Q You said you hit a wall. I mean, at what point in this ages-old process did you finally decide you'd hit a wall?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've got to put this in a certain perspective, which is the following. Permanent status negotiations were originally to have begun two years after -- in 1996, two years after the original agreement -- Gaza- Jericho. And, in fact, they didn't begin. And they really only began, I would say, going back to the beginning of this year, and they got, I think, quite serious during the course of the spring.

From the late spring, I would say, into the early part of this

month, they were working in a very serious way. They were beginning, I think, to distill more clearly the differences between them, and also trying to build some bases of convergence. What became pretty clear about a month ago is that the negotiators couldn't really take it farther than they could, working the way they were.

And that's when they went off to some different places; we went with them; we brought them here; we had the Secretary also make trips there. So, over the course of the last -- I would say, the last four to six weeks, we have been wrestling with what was a process in which they had made some headway, but in which it was becoming increasingly difficult to get them to cross the next threshold to see if you could really forge a breakthrough on the permanent status issues.

And I think over the last couple of weeks, after the Secretary's trip, when she came back and reported to the President she laid out very clearly where things stood and that we had not been able to move things beyond, or working with them, beyond where the stage at which they were at. So that's the context in which the President was asked to make a decision, and the President also did talk to both leaders before he made the decision.

Q What is going to be the mechanics of how this is going to work? You soften them up, to begin with; you do prenegotiation when they arrive, and then the President is there the whole time? Separate buildings --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, some of the details of how we'll actually work, even in a structural way, we still have to work out ourselves, because the decision has only recently been made. But I think what will happen at least is the following. We will have the negotiators -- not all the negotiators, but a small group of negotiators arrive on the weekend before this convenes. It will convene on the morning of the 11th.

Q The formal summit will at that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it will convene on the morning of the 11th. And so we will have a couple of days with the negotiators in advance. Once it convenes, I expect, as the President said, that he will be spending a lot of time up there. I don't believe it means he will be spending all of his time up there, but I do believe he will spend as much time up there as he feels is necessary. And I do think, once the leaders have arrived, the President will work, I think from the beginning, pretty intensely with them.

Now, there's a -- these kinds of negotiations obviously have an acquiring kind of rhythm and a logic of their own. I don't believe that all the time will be spent with the leaders. What's going to happen is you'll have discussions with the leaders and you'll have discussions with the key negotiators. Negotiators will be talking with each other. We will be working with both sides. We'll be in the negotiations that they have; then we'll sit separately with each of them.

I would also expect that they will meet at different levels with each other. So this is a process that will operate even within the setting of this kind of a -- even in the setting of a summit, you're going to have them working together at several different kinds of levels. But I think you'll have the President wanting to take advantage of his presence to work not only with the leaders, but from time to time with the negotiators themselves.

What this involves is, obviously, a very active involvement by the President. It helps to change the dynamic of what is going on, but it also means the President can work with the leaders and the negotiators, and go back and forth to some extent between them. And we will -- the President's team, starting with the Secretary and then with us -- we will be working, I think, at every level throughout this. And each day we'll have to reflect a kind of judgment of where we think we are and what is the best way to approach where we are.

Q -- this summit for some time, and yet the sense we were getting was the President didn't think it would be productive. Is it that you made some progress, that the Secretary made some progress in her talks, or was it simply a last hope for the process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's more a case that we came to the conclusion by the end of the last set of trips that were taken -- I was out there for about eight days, and then the Secretary came, and I think after those discussions our conclusion was we really had taken it as far as we could take it without involving the leaders with the negotiators, and that also meant with the President.

This is -- it is a process that has gone on for a long time, but the process of working on the permanent status, as I said, has really been a function of this year. But we really did come to the conclusion we had taken it about as far as we could take it.

And frankly, one of the things that began to worry us, we began to see that the logic of stalemate was beginning to reflect the way the negotiators were dealing with each other. They became -- on their own, they were beginning to produce more bitterness than results. And if you began to slide from stalemate into deterioration, you move inevitably towards what might end up being a kind of competition in unilateralism by each side, which at a minimum would make it far more difficult, and a maximum could really create a lot of turmoil.

Q To follow up on that point, based on your extensive dealings with both parties, do you think if this does not produce dramatic progress or a solution, does either side at this point have the appetite to continue working, or will everything be put aside for a time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think again, there's a duality here. On the one hand, we've reached a point where we can see we can't take it further. On the other hand, based on all the discussions we've had, we also see a potential. If we didn't see a potential, then we wouldn't be making this effort.

Part of the logic of this is not to miss the opportunity that exists because we didn't take it to this next step. I think there continues to be a very strong desire on the part of the two to find a way to an agreement. But these are excruciatingly difficult decisions to make, and I don't know anybody who rushed to make excruciatingly difficult decisions.

Q Have you gotten some sort of commitment from the two leaders that this is the time, that they're ready to make and face some of those historic concessions that the President was talking about earlier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we have heard from both sides is they have known there needed to be a summit. And I wouldn't say

that they -- they both came to a conclusion some time ago there needed to be a summit. I think on the Israeli side, there was a view that a summit made it easier -- not that it was going to be easy -- but easier to overcome the difficulties and it would be almost impossible to do so without it. So, from their standpoint, they saw the logic of the summit sooner rather than later.

On the Palestinian side, there was also recognition you couldn't get this done, you didn't have a chance to get an agreement to deal with these issues unless you brought it to a summit. But their attitude was they saw greater value in some greater preparation. But they also, both sides in the end, came to the conclusion that they would leave it to the judgment of the President as to when the time would be right.

Q But they've accepted this timing now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- by accepting the invitation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, yes.

Q The President mentioned a need for regional support, and I was wondering, could you elaborate on that a little, and if there will be any specific roping in of countries or leaders of other countries in the region to this summit process.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary has already begun speaking to a number of different leaders in the region, more to explain the logic of what we're doing and to call on them to provide support for the effort. What the President is getting at is, at the end of the day those in the region who are committed to peace also need to be prepared to be supportive of it, in word and in deed.

We don't anticipate that others would be coming to the summit. The summit is focused on the Israelis and the Palestinians. But clearly, we want both leaders, who have to make hard decisions, to be operating in a context where others in the region are supportive of making tough decisions, understanding that this is a moment to take such tough decisions. And from that standpoint, basically being behind the logic of your question, which is this is the time to do it.

Q Only a month or two ago, someone like you, if it wasn't you, indeed, said the two sides hadn't even begun to negotiate the key issues. Now your description today is that in the spring, thereabouts, things began to quicken. Can you say specifically whether the two sides -- you don't have to recite the key issues, we all know what they are -- are they actually in negotiations on those issues? And what happened to the third stage Israeli withdrawal? What is the U.S. position now, that it can be wrapped into the summit, or do they still have an obligation -- summit success and failure, whatever -- to pull back one more time at least?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me parse your questions. First, they have been since the spring, they have been in serious discussions on the permanent status issues. It is true that on one of the issues, the Israeli side preferred to delay -- meaning Jerusalem -- they preferred to delay negotiations on that. But they have had serious discussions on the permanent status issues since the spring. And as I said, they basically -- I think they reached a point, I would say at least

four weeks ago, where it became difficult to move them beyond where they were.

There was an initial period of, I think, very hard work where both sides really were making an effort to not only to explain their own needs, but to try to take account of the other's. But they got to a point where they found it very difficult to overcome the gaps that remained on the issues.

That's number one. On number two, the third phase of further redeployment is something that is required by the Interim Agreement. It was reaffirmed in the Sharm Agreement. It is something that is a part of the process and that the Palestinians, as part of the agreement, are entitled to.

Our focus at this point is clearly on doing a permanent status, trying to address the issues of permanent status and trying to work with the parties to reach an agreement that deals with those permanent status issues.

Q All right, but just a quick follow. June 23 was the day, and with U.S. support, it was postponed. Now, is there an indefinite postponement now, pending the outcome of the summit? Or does it stand on its own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The issue has not gone away. It is still a source of concern. But our particular focus is to try to see if we can work with the parties to reach an agreement that deals with the permanent status, the core issues of permanent status.

Q Is the decision of the Palestinian National Council a couple of days ago to set a September 13th deadline for declaring a state if no agreement had been reached -- did that influence the President's decision to call this summit in the sense of raising the stakes and sort of heightening the tension?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the reality is September 13 has been out there for some time. It as part of the Sharm Agreement; it's been talked about for some time. Both sides have understood it was looming there. And the fact is when you look at where we are, when you look at the difficulties they were facing, when you look at the time remaining, I think the basic decision the President made was, if we didn't act now to change the dynamic in a way that gives us a chance to produce an agreement on the core issues, that you would have an inevitable slide into a deterioration that, as I said, would at best produce turmoil, and at worse would make the situation much more difficult in which to negotiate.

Q If I could follow up, the Council had been expected to delay any kind of final statehood declaration until later in the year, possibly December. They didn't; they said September 13, that's it. Did that become a factor in the President's thinking?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say that what they decided changed our expectation. I think our expectation has been pretty much driven by a recognition that September 13th was a very important date.

Q We in the press like to put odds on these sorts of things. Could you indulge us and tell us what your working assumption is,

what you think the odds of success are coming out of the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been doing this process for a long time and I never engaged in odds before; I don't think I'll start now.

Q You know, the President sounds terribly optimistic that something is going to come out of this. And unless I'm missing something, the justification for having the summit is that you can't move forward without the two sides meeting. Is there any other reason for optimism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said, look, this is going to be a tough go. That's the reality. But we also have to look at the alternative. The alternative is, if there is -- if we don't go to a summit, the process will stay where it is, meaning they will not move forward. A friend of mine who is in this process once described this as like riding a bicycle -- once you stop the bike, you fall off. You have to keep peddling and keep going forward.

We're at a point where basically they're going to stop the bicycle, and knowing that we have dates looming ahead of us, knowing that there's a potential in light of that for a real deterioration, this is -- we're looking at this from a standpoint of there is not an alternative to it because an alternative means there will be no agreement and you'll see that deterioration, on the one hand; and there is, based on everything we know from the two sides, there is a potential. Yes, it's hard to overcome the differences. But there is a potential to give us a chance to succeed as well.

Q Isn't a failed summit a bigger risk than not negotiating, successfully? Look, you've termed the tactics of summitry upside down, but no one is saying it today. I mean, summits were called when the two sides were relatively close, and the intervention of the President would close the gap and give them a cover for making hard decisions. Now you're calling a summit because you're at an impasse, the President says. The President's word was impasse.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, fine. Barry, Barry --

Q Okay, what if this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know about Camp David. You go back to the original Camp David, at the original Camp David they were also at a point where they were stuck. They did not call that summit because they thought they had everything lined up. They did not do that.

Q No, in fact, they had to go to the Middle East to keep it from getting unstuck again. Or putting -- no one will acknowledge that you're doing a high-wire act here, that this isn't the way summits generally are staged. They're staged with a greater likelihood of success. If you won't acknowledge that, at least tell us whether there isn't, indeed, a graver risk of hostility and violence if this summit fails, because having brought the President into it, if he doesn't succeed, you know you've played your final card? Doesn't that make the situation just desperate if that should happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, right now we can see what the trend line is if we do not have a summit. Is there a risk associated with this? Yes, there's a risk associated with this. But the President used the following words -- he said there's a risk of action and there's a

risk of inaction. And this is a case where we judge the risk of action to be less than the risk of inaction.

Q So would you consider this a success if you just keep the peace process going and keep the bicycle moving along?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, obviously, when you create an event like this, your objective is to ensure that you get the kind of progress that gives you a chance to reach agreement that deals with the core issues. So we clearly want to change the dynamic in a way that allows us to move towards the agreement. Both sides have established, as I said, an agreement on a timeline, so our objective here is obviously to try to reach an agreement that deals with these core issues and moves us towards being able to address that timeline.

Q Is it fair to assume, or would you say that some progress was made in the talks between the spring start and their effective impasse of four to six weeks ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was.

Q Can you give us some idea how much?

Q Where?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to do that, but the point is that what we saw, based on those talks, and also based on the talks we've had with each side -- understand, the way this process has worked is not only they have direct talks, but then each side talks with us -- based on everything that we have seen, we see a potential to reach an agreement. We obviously see differences, but if we didn't see some potential to overcome the differences, then the logic of trying this would be less compelling than it is.

Q Have those differences narrowed in any substantial way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's a case in some areas, yes; but I think the most important thing, in a negotiation one of the most important things is to distill and understand how the issues break down -- to understand where you can see convergence as relatively easy; to understand where you can see convergence as possible; and to understand which particular issues are going to be the hardest to be able to bridge or to overcome. And when you come to that conclusion, then you have a strategy for dealing with the first two sets, which is how you built convergence, and then also you can begin to focus on what are the way that you might overcome what are the hardest differences.

They clearly went through what I would call a distillation process between themselves that revealed much more to each other on the nature of each side's position on each issue, what was most important to them on each issue, and where there might be some room for give. They did a fair amount of that, themselves, in a way that obviously didn't overcome the differences, but could begin to paint a picture or direction for you of how you might move towards that.

So we see a potential, but it's a very difficult one. I mean, there is no two ways about it. Partly it's very difficult because the issues, themselves, are so fundamental.

Q Can you elaborate on that? Can you describe where you

see convergence that's easiest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, because -- the fact of the matter is all of these issues are hard. It isn't a case that any one of these issues is particularly easy. But the fact is they, themselves, as they deal with these, also create a kind of hierarchy of what they think they can do and what they can't do. Or at least we form that kind of a judgment. And I don't want to break that down.

Q To follow up on Barry's question, has there ever been a certain stage in your recollection where a summit has been convened under these circumstances?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The original Camp David in 1978. It was.

Q It was less complex.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was, but the fact of the matter is Sadat had gone to Jerusalem, you had this enormous psychological breakthrough, and 10 months later they were stuck, completely stuck, after what had been an unbelievable psychological breakthrough. But they were stuck. They were completely stuck.

Q Is it the President's strategy to keep the leaders up there until he gets something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- you heard the President talk about "several days." The fact is he will be going to Okinawa so you have a kind of window --

Q With them? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Do you see some of these issues as separable, or is there a subset group you could be working on and if you spend a week and you break through a couple -- or do you have to really get the whole enchilada at this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the objective on both sides is to work on all the issues. But obviously you have to work on all the issues and also try to make progress where you can.

Q Is there an advantage to having a President who is at the end of his term do a negotiation like this, or is it just the opposite because he has lost some of his power and initiative because they know he won't be there to implement an agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the greatest single advantage is that you have a President who knows the issues, knows the leaders. You're dealing with a -- I won't say that personal relationships aren't an important part of any negotiation, but especially in the Middle East I think the political culture has emphasized the importance of the kind of personal connections. So you have a President who is very well-known to the two sides and you have a President who the two sides know understands the issues very well. So there's a kind of cache in credibility that is built up, and I think it's made easier because of the longevity in office and the long association with the issues. I think that's the most important point here.

Q But the down side -- can you address that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Having been around this process for a long time, as you know, I don't see the down side operating in this case because I see, in a sense, there is a kind of window that is also created with his presence which each side is quite acutely aware of, and I don't see them operating on a principle that somehow knowing he's not going to be here is limiting. On the contrary; knowing that he's not going to be here I think concentrates the mind in terms of recognizing here's the potential and you should act on the potential now.

Q How much of this is likely to turn on U.S. assistance -- U.S. aid, U.S. security guarantees, things that the President has always built in as part of previous negotiations and had some trouble sometimes delivering?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in the history of this process there hasn't been an agreement that wasn't accompanied by U.S. assistance. So it's very hard to believe that if, in fact, there's an agreement on something that is as fundamental as the permanent status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, that the U.S. would not, in fact, have to play -- I mean, the U.S. would not have to be in a position where we would have to provide assistance. Clearly, if we go down that road we're going to have to consult with the Congress.

Q In Europe, Barak is saying he's hoping for an agreement that covers most, if not all, of the issues. Is the way you're going to get out of this hole you're in possibly a partial agreement, wrapping up the things that are achievable, calling it a success and moving on to the next administration?
Is a partial agreement one possibility?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me put this one in context. You are dealing with two sides who, number one, want this, who are looking at, in the case of both sides, they realize we're nearly seven years into the process that we launched at Oslo. On each side, there's an expectation that trying to conclude this conflict is in both their interests.

From the standpoint of the Israelis, they want to know that if they're doing something and they're making certain kinds of tough choices, that the payoff for making that is that basically the claims are over. From the standpoint of the Palestinians, they're dealing with the reality that this is a process that hasn't fulfilled their aspirations and there's a lot of frustration.

So if you operate on the premise that you shoot for something less than the whole, I don't think that you're addressing the interests or needs of either side. So I think we will try to work with them to produce an agreement that deals with all of the issues. But as I said, the most important thing is that you really do have to make progress where you can. We have to operate in a context, and that context, quite frankly, is that for both sides, ironically, I think it is easier to try to resolve everything than it is to resolve only part of it. I'm not sure in the end it becomes something that works for either side.

And the real impetus for this, in no small part, comes from them, and I think they realize they have very tough decisions to make, but somehow making those decisions in the presence of the President is more

thinkable than in a situation where he's not there.

Q Is the U.S. anticipating any sort of middle-of-the-way agreements on where the gaps are on all these issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A, the parties will have to make the decisions; B, we're going to help them in any way that we can help them. If you're asking, do I expect that there will be American ideas that get presented somewhere along the line here, it's pretty hard to believe that in this kind of a setting that we won't be offering some ideas, as well.

But we won't make the decisions; only they can make the decisions. And our role is not to take the place of them as negotiators, but our role is to do all we can to help them overcome the obstacles to an agreement.

Q And yet the Secretary says now is the time to start calling the audibles. Is this where the audibles are called, at Camp David?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to use that as the metaphor --

Q It was her language.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let's put it this way, there's a question of definition of audible and --

Q Is this a Hail Mary? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I would stick with what I said. The reality is it's hard to believe that in a setting like this, that we won't be called on to offer ideas. We'll have to.

Q Well, let me ask for further explanation. Is the audible the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the audible -- since Oslo of last year, when the President met the two leaders in Oslo at the Rabin memorial, which was in November, he made it clear that he was prepared at a certain point to convene them. And we've obviously come to the judgment that this is the time to do it.

Q Considering the recent reshuffling in the Barak cabinet -- and I'm referring to the basically loss of power of the dovish party and the increase of power of the hawkish party -- is the Prime Minister somewhat reticent about coming here, or is he somewhat -- or is there a likelihood of a lack of support of his cabinet should anything proceed from this Camp David --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he has been a believer that a summit was necessary, if, in fact, you were going to be able to overcome the differences. From his standpoint, his view was the negotiations were obviously very difficult, but the most likely circumstance in which the hard decisions would be made would be in the presence of the President.

So I don't think -- he doesn't come to this with a view that he can't deliver. His view is that he can deliver. His view is he won a strong mandate of the Israeli public, and they voted him in and he has an

approach on peace which he feels he can present to the Israeli public if there's an agreement, and they will support him.

Chairman Arafat also has understood the logic of a summit, and his view was, let's go to a summit; his interest was in wanting to take time to prepare it. We have just come to the conclusion that this is the point to do it, and both leaders basically made a judgment that if the President decides the time is the time, they would agree with that.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

12:05 P.M. EDT

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

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2000
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July 5,

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

MIDDLE EAST TALKS AT CAMP DAVID

As announced earlier today by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat will come to Camp David early next week.

A press facility will be established in the area. At the moment no site has been selected for a press facility.

Media organizations will be notified once a site has been selected.

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===== ATTACHMENT 1 =====
ATT CREATION TIME/DATE: 0 00:00:00.00

TEXT:

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CREATION DATE/TIME: 6-JUL-2000 21:34:19.00

SUBJECT: 000706 U.S. State Dept. Daily Press Briefing

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #70

THURSDAY, JULY 6, 2000, 1:15 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

If there is just one thing I can mention off the top and that's good news from Poland. We are closing our Agency for International Development mission. The Administrator of the agency, Brady Anderson, will be traveling on July 11 on a five-day trip to Poland and Romania, and he will close the USAID mission in Poland and get a first-hand look at the agency's programs in Romania.

Closing this mission in Warsaw marks a successful end to US foreign aid programs in Poland and we always consider it a success when we can help out and support people in their development needs but then see them reach a stage of development where that kind of mission is no longer necessary. The Prime Minister will join Administrator Anderson at the time in honoring the many governmental and nongovernmental partners who contributed to Poland's accomplishments over the last 11 years. You will all remember that when the Secretary was in Poland, she also spent a lot of time with the nongovernmental organizations

and people who work there.

QUESTION: Will there be champagne involved in the closing ceremony?

MR. BOUCHER: We'll have to see about that. I'm sure it wouldn't be funded by public funds.

QUESTION: The prime minister's wife will be there as well.

MR. BOUCHER: No ships that I know of.

QUESTION: Do you know how much aid we've given to Poland?

MR. BOUCHER: I can give you fact sheets. Do I have a total? Agency for International Development will have to get you a total. Basically, in '98, it was \$35.5 million and in '99 it was \$19.1 million. The program closes out in September 2000.

All right, with that, I'm happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: Could we pick up on Iraq a little bit? Since yesterday, I wonder if the US has any better idea now whether Iraq conducted the reported missile test of a short-range missile? And the baleful comment by the State Department that without inspection it is hard to know what Iraq is up to, I wonder what positively the US might be doing to try to get those inspections going again? Are you simply back up against the wall?

MR. BOUCHER: Were we baleful?

QUESTION: Well, it's sort of -- what's the word? I don't know what the word would be.

MR. BOUCHER: All right, let me try to fill you in -

QUESTION: But, you know, gee, without inspections, how could one ever hope to know what's going on? For sure. So what are you doing about it or can you do anything about it.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, first of all, Barry, this is a situation we follow closely. And, obviously, having inspectors there is one way of determining the exact status of various Iraqi programs and is one way particularly for Iraq to try to justify their statements that they are no longer developing things.

We also have other ways of knowing what's going on and we follow these developments very, very closely. But, you know, it's not our practice to comment on stories that purportedly relate to intelligence information. What I can say, though, is we are concerned about activity at Iraqi sites that are known to be capable of proscribed activity, including sites that are capable of producing weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles and also by Iraq's practices regarding procurement activity that can include dual-use items that are useful in weapons of mass destruction applications.

In the absence of UN inspectors on the ground who should be carrying out the UN Security Council mandate, uncertainties about the significance of these activities will persist. As time passes, obviously our concerns increase.

In the end, the best means for the international community to know whether Iraq is taking steps to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles is with the United Nations inspectors and monitors on the ground with the right to visit any site they wish at any time.

QUESTION: You referred to long range. Is there a short range? Is there a short-range threat and is it a larger threat now?

MR. BOUCHER: On the short range, I can say that the majority of Iraq's permitted short-range missiles were obtained in pre-Gulf War acquisitions. Since then, Iraq has made its own modifications to the missiles. The US, as a member of the sanctions committee, can and does stop Iraq from importing items that we believe might be used for weapons of mass destruction or prohibited missile systems under cover of the Oil For Food Program. So it is something we do watch and we do try to prevent developments of missiles in Iraq.

QUESTION: Does the US have the capability without on-site inspection to determine, even if the State Department doesn't want to share it with the public, whether Iraq has tested successfully a new short-range missile or new tests of a short-range missile?

MR. BOUCHER: That gets a little too specific into the kind of intelligence capabilities we might have. All I can tell you is we are concerned about activities at places that proscribed activity has occurred in the past.

QUESTION: Richard, am I correct in thinking that the short answer to Barry's first question was, no, you're not in a position to say anything more than what you read which was basically what you had to say yesterday or the Department had to say yesterday?

To the first question, are you now more in a position to say whether Iraq has tested - actually tested --

MR. BOUCHER: I am not in a position to say more. I am in a position to say that we are concerned about activities at proscribed locations.

QUESTION: Richard, are you any closer to getting the inspectors back in than when the resolution was passed creating the new agency?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I can go through the whole history of this, but I think you know it, that Hans Blix was asked to provide for approval of the Security Council with a plan for verification and inspection. He has taken a serious approach to organizing this process, he has set up a structure. His plan would provide a UN monitoring and verification committee, the tools it needs to implement the

Council's mandate. He is in the process of hiring international staff that would be used for UN monitoring. We think that he needs to get -- he should have the space, he does have the space to get his operation up and running. But in the meantime, if Iraq wants the benefits of sanctions suspension that are outlined in Resolution 1284, they are going to have to avail themselves of this opportunity and let him and his team come in and do their work. That's where we stand. And we are getting prepared to go do it.

QUESTION: But, Richard, it used to be that President Clinton and everybody else would demand that inspectors be allowed back in and use almost every public occasion to say that. You're not demanding it. That's not even in the guidance anymore. Has there been a change and, if so, why aren't you as emphatic about it as you once were?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we're trying to signal some kind of shift here. The fact is that Iraq is under a Security Council obligation and that we think that they need to abide by the Security Council resolutions. I think we've made that quite clear. But I don't want to say that this is the only way we have of constraining Iraqi programs. We obviously have capabilities to monitor, to watch, and to take action as necessary if we need to. So Iraq should, by all means, abide by the UN Security Council resolutions and allow the inspectors in.

QUESTION: Are you suggesting the cutting edge is Iraq being motivated to get out from under sanctions, as if this problem, the best way of resolving this problem is for Iraq to suddenly become aware that it is being deprived economically by not admitting inspectors. That's quite a shift from the original aggressive position. And, secondly, you keep easing the sanctions anyhow. So what would motivate them? They can wait for the next easing.

MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I don't think that's true. And what we're trying to make clear here is that if Iraq has any hope for any kind of suspension or easing or any other shift, that they are going to have to cooperate with the UN. They are under a UN Security Council obligation, they should fulfill that obligation. They should let the inspectors in. Our position on that has not changed.

But they do sometimes make these arguments that somehow that, you know, they deserve to be treated better. What we are saying right here and right now is if they want to be treated better, first and foremost they have to comply with all the UN Security Council resolutions. And not until then would we ever consider it.

QUESTION: New subject. This is somewhat summit-related. The Japanese haven't responded very well to the Secretary's decision not to go to the G-8 meeting. I'm just wondering how you would phrase it, that Strobe Talbott would be able to represent the US just as adequately as the Secretary, one. And, two, if the Secretary herself has any reaction to this decision by the local town council to no longer name the building after her, Albright Hall, because she's not

going to speak there. Is she disappointed?

MR. BOUCHER: I hadn't seen the local council's statement or decision, so I don't want to talk about that. Certainly, the Secretary very much regrets that she won't be able to present her public speech as planned at the Miyazaki Civic Center and she is expressing her regret directly to the Mayor of Miyazaki. In addition, she had been looking forward very much to the Miyazaki G-8 program that was prepared under Japan's leadership and she regrets that she's unable to travel to Japan at this time.

Yesterday evening, she phoned Foreign Minister Kono to express her regret. They spoke for over half an hour. Foreign Minister Kono expressed his understanding of the critical timing of the Middle East peace talks. As you know, the President has personally requested that the Secretary participate in the Camp David summit. The Middle East peace process is at a critical juncture and the summit offers a real chance for an historic agreement.

The Secretary has asked Deputy Secretary Talbott to attend the G-8 ministerial in her stead. He has the Secretary's full confidence and is extremely well versed in the topics that will be discussed at the G-8 ministerial and, of course, the President plans to go to the leaders' meeting 10 days from now.

QUESTION: Might she go at some future point? Even before this came up, it struck me that going to China and to Korea without stopping in Japan, 20 years ago, that was unheard of. I mean, every trip to China called for a stop in Japan, almost every. Henry Kissinger -

MR. BOUCHER: We can have a debate on the history of this.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, is Japan - beginning with - let me just say one more thing. Beginning with George Shultz, Japan was a bedrock of US policy. In fact, he tried to look as much to the Pacific as to Europe. And you bypass Japan all the time. I wonder if Japan isn't considered as important in US policymaking as it used to be. Not going on the trip has nothing to do with naming village squares after Albright.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay, I'll come back in an hour and answer your question.

The question is, might she go to Japan at some point. And the answer is, absolutely yes. She has visited Japan periodically. There is no shift in US policy towards Japan. They are strong allies and friends. She meets with the Japanese Foreign Minister in a variety of settings at a variety of moments. They had a lot of things to discuss, the issues that we share and concerns that we share with our Japanese allies. And there should be no implication for US-Japanese relations over the fact that she's unable to make this particular trip.

I am certain she will visit and stop in Japan on future occasions. And we certainly look forward to doing that.

QUESTION: Can I ask, you said that Deputy Secretary Albott was well versed in the subjects which would come up at the summit. Which are the key subjects?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't do the summit pre-brief for you now. But I think we all know that the summit covers a broad range of economic and political issues around the world and I'm sure that the Deputy Secretary is prepared to address all those issues.

QUESTION: Just a brief follow-up on Japan, if I could. Why is it so essential that Secretary Albright be here for the whole of the summit and not take a day -- make one of the whirlwind air cruises over to Japan to be there? What is it that is so essential she be in Thurmont or --

MR. BOUCHER: I think I'll refer you back to the President's briefing yesterday and my briefing yesterday. The President made quite clear that this was a critical moment in time to bring about, if we can, where we see the potential of making peace. And I think it's quite clear that the Secretary has a full-time and active role in that process and it's just not possible for her to pull out and to go off and come back within some short space of time.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the biological herbicide that the Colombians are thinking of using against coca plants and the opium poppy?

MR. BOUCHER: I can give you a little clarification on what's involved there, if I can find it.

We are providing funding to the United Nations Drug Control Agency to work with the government of Colombia on field testing the scientific use of fusarium oxysporum as a coca control agent. That's more Latin than we've used at this podium for a long time.

Testing is expected to take approximately two years to complete, then it will be up to the government of Colombia to evaluate the results and to determine next steps. Only the government of Colombia will be in a position to make the decision on whether to use the fungicide in the future on coca fields.

QUESTION: How does the US address critics of the plan that US money for drug control is a virtual biological weapon and could be a violation of international conventions?

MR. BOUCHER: I will look into the actual status vis-a-vis international conventions. I think what I've described here is a testing program being done under United Nations auspices with the government of Colombia involved. It's a two-year testing program. I don't think one should exaggerate the scope or the impact of this particular program at this moment.

QUESTION: The prohibition on use and testing is the same in the international conventions?

MR. BOUCHER: I will look into the status vis-a-vis conventions, but I would imagine that we, the government of Colombia and the United Nations are all quite aware of the requirements of those conventions.

QUESTION: You seem to be going out of your way to seem to suggest that this is an all-Colombia show here. I think hasn't this been tested in the US for years, this idea?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the Department of Agriculture can tell you about that. But there has been testing going on for some years. You'll have to check with Agriculture.

QUESTION: President-Elect of Mexico Vincente Fox has said that the United States is demanding more cooperation from Mexico in the fight against narco-traffickers. And he says first of all the United States has to put more attention to or money to stop the drug users in the United States. And he promised to combat corruption in that matter in Mexico, since the US Government always says that the Mexican authorities need to put more attention to combat the corruption of narco-traffickers.

What is the response of the United States to these arguments?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we've dealt with these issues over yesterday's briefing, and frankly over the weeks. These are subjects that we both work on where we do cooperate very closely with our Mexican allies. We look forward to working with Mr. Fox when he becomes President. The Secretary, as a matter of fact, talked to him yesterday on the phone. She talked to Foreign Secretary Green, she talked to President Zedillo as well, basically to express our view. First, to congratulate them on the democratic process in Mexico and to say that we look forward to working with the new government when Mr. Fox takes over.

So these are things that we will continue to work on together. They have been part of the US-Mexican agenda and I am sure they will remain part of US-Mexican relations.

QUESTION: Would it be better for Mexico, for the cooperation on narco-trafficking, if he combats corruption that the PRI and the government for 71 years do nothing about it?

MR. BOUCHER: We're against corruption. I'm not going to accept any characterizations of what you're saying. Certainly this has been an issue of what we have worked on with Mexican governments in the past, and one where we hope to continue to work and make progress.

QUESTION: Something else. There is a move afoot in Germany, at least among the Social Democrats, to disinvite President Khatami over the Iranian trials, the trials of Jews. Does the State Department have any -- it's an embryonic move but is that something the State Department has an opinion of? And, more directly, is there anything the Administration is contemplating besides woeful statements to somehow act against Iran for the way these trials have been concluded?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm being given pieces of paper. They just say what we thought they would say.

QUESTION: It's a fast-breaking story.

MR. BOUCHER: It's a fast-breaking story.

Barry, I'll have to check on this potential visit. I am not sure this is something we would necessarily be involved in, first of all. Second of all, I think we've expressed our strong concerns from the President to the Vice President to the Secretary about the situation and about the lack of due process. And certainly this is a situation we follow very closely and we hope that the defendants in this case will have the opportunity to have their sentences and the verdicts reviewed and to establish through a fair process of law what the facts are in this situation.

So at this point, it is something we are following very, very closely. It is something that we are deeply concerned about. But I don't have anything new to announce on that score.

QUESTION: Can you just talk about the summit in terms of the reports now that the pre-summit talks will be Saturday and Sunday? Is that set in stone, is that fluid?

MR. BOUCHER: The talks, as you know, at the leaders' level, President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat begin on Tuesday, July 11th, at Camp David. A small group of senior Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will arrive this weekend for discussions in advance of those Camp David talks. At this point, the location is not settled.

QUESTION: What about time, day?

MR. BOUCHER: Over this weekend.

QUESTION: Do you have anything further about the ongoing discussion about whether or not the talks will continue once the President leaves for Japan?

MR. BOUCHER: I think what we'd say is what the President said yesterday, we would hope to reach agreement as soon as possible. He said that if we really bear down and work on the issues, it can be done in a matter of days. So I don't think it's time yet to start predicting anything beyond that. Certainly, the President is going to be there and is going to devote the time necessary to working on this as soon as he can. These are issues that need to be addressed at the summit level. There also is the potential there to get new agreement on these core issues of permanent status and that will be what we're seeking to do and we will try to do that using every means available that we have.

QUESTION: Back to these pre-summit talks, these presumably are not going to be at Camp David. They will be closer to Washington?

MR. BOUCHER: Location at this point not settled.

QUESTION: I mean, is it possible that they would go directly to Camp David?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not anticipating that. It's not settled yet, so I can't tell you for sure.

QUESTION: Now, these basically are going to be a continuation of the negotiations that were going on at Bolling and Andrews?

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't describe them that way, Matt. I think they have to be seen in the context of the summit, the context of your first question, seeing them as pre-summit discussions.

Once the decision is made to go to the summit level and to deal with these very difficult, very basic core issues, then knowing that that is coming changes - I have to say, changes the dynamic of the situation and therefore I think it's better to see these talks with the negotiators as a pre-summit discussion rather than as a mere continuation of efforts in the past that we have already said hadn't been able to resolve these issues yet.

QUESTION: Does that mean they are going to be talking about logistics and, like, table size? I mean, you know, what - issues -

MR. BOUCHER: No, these will be senior negotiators to discuss the issues that will be discussed at the summit. And I would say I would also expect the Secretary to meet with these negotiators before the summit.

QUESTION: With Dennis and Aaron, too? In other words, is it going to be a three-way -

MR. BOUCHER: We will be involved with our Special Middle East Coordinator and his deputy and the team. But I would also at some point expect the Secretary to meet with the negotiators before we get to Camp David.

QUESTION: Can you give a time for Tuesday? Is there a time?

MR. BOUCHER: No, not yet.

QUESTION: And do you know it? It's not set yet, right?

MR. BOUCHER: Not yet.

QUESTION: And where is the press center going to be?

MR. BOUCHER: Not decided yet. It's being worked on. We have some people out today looking at possible sites to accommodate your needs.

QUESTION: Are you going to be briefing the way you did at Wye River and Shepherdstown and where is that likely to take place in the venue near Camp David? Are you going to do it

back here?

MR. BOUCHER: There will be briefings for the press. They will be at the press center, once we decide where the press center is. And how can I say? I wouldn't expect to get any complete and full daily readout of the issues under discussion. We will try to make available what information we can but I don't want anybody to anticipate enormous amounts of information.

QUESTION: Was there anyone that was doing that?

MR. BOUCHER: He almost implied we might say something.

QUESTION: I think he is talking about other topics. Basically, he's asking is the regular State Department briefing - will kind of follow whatever you can say -

MR. BOUCHER: We're going to have to shuffle some of these issues depending on where we are and how it works. We may answer some subjects down here and try to answer some subjects out there. It depends where people are and what they're interested in, frankly. We'll try to accommodate your needs.

QUESTION: I think you described these weekend talks as not agenda setting but, you know, negotiations. Is the US, as the host, going to take over the order of the discussion and how you approach things? Can you give us any idea of how much in charge of the flow of conversation the US will be?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't give you that at this point, Barry, exactly. Obviously, we are going to play a role. We're hosting the summit. We're going to play a role with the parties as they come to negotiate, as they come to talk and as they come to the leaders' level. We are going to be very actively involved in this entire process. But I don't think I'm quite prepared yet to use a new adjective or noun for our role.

QUESTION: Richard, can you say now whether the talks, the pre-summit talks, will be three way or will there be the US going to each side or both?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't really do that for you yet. I think we'll have to see that as it unfolds. And, as you know in the past, there have been all kinds of different configurations and, particularly at Camp David, I would expect there would be different meetings between leaders, between negotiators, Israelis and Palestinians together, Israelis, Palestinians and us. And that's been the pattern in these past negotiations; I would expect it to apply throughout the whole process.

QUESTION: Very briefly, do you expect all the teams, the leaders and their negotiators, once the summit begins, to be staying at the Camp David compound, and as well as the Secretary? Or are they going to be staying elsewhere?

MR. BOUCHER: I think I'm not quite prepared to specify. But

basically, the negotiating process will take place at Camp David and the people who are working that process, we would expect to be there.

QUESTION: Staying over night, in other words? In other words, spending the nights there, not shuttling back and forth?

MR. BOUCHER: Who's going to be there at which moments when the President comes and goes and things like that are still to be specified.

QUESTION: I'm talking about the delegations.

MR. BOUCHER: But the people negotiating, the delegations, we would expect to be at Camp David.

QUESTION: And the talks will start on Tuesday; is that correct?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: Are they arriving Monday night or are they coming Tuesday?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have arrivals yet.

QUESTION: Do you have anything to add to what you said yesterday about the trip of John Holum and his colleagues to Asia?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't have anything to add. The talks begin I think tomorrow and Saturday in China.

QUESTION: On that same subject, what's your reaction to the latest Chinese outpouring of anger at plans for NMD which came out of Rome today?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not exactly sure what you're referring to. Let me start that way.

QUESTION: A Chinese official repeated Chinese opposition to NMD and TMD.

MR. BOUCHER: I think there are a couple things worth saying on this. First of all, I think we've been quite up front with our concerns about missile developments. We've been quite up front about the criteria that we need to consider. We have been quite up front about the fact that this consideration is not directed at any existing arsenal like the Chinese or the Russians. And we've made quite clear that we are prepared to continue to discuss and consult with the Chinese Government on these issues and we would expect that Mr. Holum will be doing that during his visit to China, among many other things.

QUESTION: Could I go back to Madame Albright's cancellations of her visit to Japan? Today, the Prime Minister, Japanese Prime Minister Mori's personal representative, made a harsh critical comment on the cancellation. He said, "I wonder how

much of the US view will be reflected when everyone else attending is a foreign minister? I think the United States will suffer loss."

Do you think such a comment is unfair?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not going to try to get into some kind of debate with comments that I personally haven't seen anyone make. I think the point is to go back to what we said before, that the Secretary did talk to Foreign Minister Kono last night and he expressed his understanding of the need for her to stay and work on the Middle East peace process. And, second of all, that Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott will fully and completely represent the Secretary and the United States at the meeting.

QUESTION: The Yugoslav parliament has approved constitutional changes that will allow Milosevic to seek a second term, meaning we could see him in power for another eight years. Do you have any reaction?

MR. BOUCHER: I think there's actually more to it than that. And so let me talk a little bit about it.

First of all, the regime has manipulated the parliamentary rules in order to restrict the expression of views that oppose the regime's. The size of the majority shows that the current parliament is little more than a rubber stamp. There appears to be a grotesque effort underway by Milosevic to stifle prospects for democratic, peaceful change in Yugoslavia. It reveals his own fears. He is changing the rules because he cannot win fairly now. He is stripping away legal formalities behind we think, for the people of Serbia and for his coalition is stark; it's either him or democracy in Serbia.

The changes that he's making are unusual in several respects. I mean, we don't know yet the mechanics. He's proposing some kind of elections. But the amendments have been now approved in principle before they're even written. So there are some changes to elections being proposed but they haven't been written yet. They've been approved already, though.

Second of all, I point out, we have supported the opposition's call for fair and free elections at all levels including for the Serbian parliament. Then the Serb voters could reject Milosevic and elect a democratic leader who could lead Yugoslavia out of the disaster that this regime is causing.

QUESTION: Can you also comment, Montenegrin officials, as a result of this, today announced that they will take further steps toward independence.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, this change is undertaken, we understand, without any consultation with Montenegro, Serbia's sister republic in Yugoslavia. It's another of the many examples of the Milosevic regime of Belgrade ignoring Montenegro's rights under their constitution.

QUESTION: But in answer to your actual question, which was what do you think about Montenegro taking more steps towards independence as a result of this, is that something that the US would support? Or are you still imbued with the idea that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should remain both Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo?

MR. BOUCHER: We think that people should be able to freely decide on their own destiny. I'll leave it at that for the moment.

QUESTION: Do you have anything new on the Eritrea-Ethiopia talks?

MR. BOUCHER: They continue in this building as proximity talks and the atmosphere continues to be constructive.

QUESTION: Is there a terminal point that you're aware of?

MR. BOUCHER: No.

QUESTION: The US Embassy in Ankara announced they decided not to open office in (inaudible). What was the reason in this subject. Is that the Turkish Government opposition to opening this kind of office in the (inaudible) or area security situation?

MR. BOUCHER: I have to assume if the US Embassy announced that they weren't going to open an office, they probably explained why. So I think I would rather leave it to them but I'll see if I can get you anything from them on it.

QUESTION: And also the Government of Turkey last week asked or called Athens (inaudible) talks on the Aegean subject. In the past, the United States has stopped several unwanted events in the Aegean Sea. How do you relate this kind of call?

MR. BOUCHER: I haven't seen the specific call so I don't have a particular reaction on that. The situation in the Aegean has been something of concern to us. It's something that we've discussed with the governments out there. It is something we work with them on quite closely. So without knowing anything more specific about what's being proposed, I think I'll just have to leave it at that.

QUESTION: Yesterday, was signed United Nations Protocol on Child. And Colombia was mentioned as the second reason to sign this protocol because of the children working with guerrillas. Do you have any comment on this?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me do two things. First of all, the White House put out a fact sheet on the protocols and made quite clear the various types of concerns we have, one of which is that in Colombia, the armed forces of Colombia, the FARC, does use children as soldiers. And the protocol would bar any compulsory recruitment under the age of 18, prohibits the recruitment and use of soldiers under 18 by nongovernmental armed forces - which are the principal culprits in fact in the use of child soldiers. So those

things are outlined in more detail in the White House fact sheet.

I would also add to what I said yesterday, I was asked about the Convention on the Rights of the Child and I think we said no decision had been made on submitting that one to the Senate for its advice and consent. But the Administration does intend to submit both the optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the optional protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography to the Senate for ratification later this month. This was done in such a way that the protocols can be ratified independently of the convention.

QUESTION: So the two protocols, not the convention, not the treaty?

MR. BOUCHER: The two protocols we intend to submit and we intend to seek ratification. They can be ratified without the convention.

QUESTION: I thought I heard you say the armed forces of Colombia, the FARC. You mean the Revolutionary Armed Forces?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Is that the way it reads in the final fact sheet?

QUESTION: Do you have any time line for when they are going to be submitted?

MR. BOUCHER: For when we can submit it? No, I don't. Soon, in parlance.

QUESTION: On Germany. Today, the Bundestag approved the legislation enacting the slave labor compensation fund. Do you have any reaction to that?

MR. BOUCHER: That's good. (Laughter.) No, I don't have any other reaction than that. This is something that we've talked about before and we were quite pleased we were able to work out the arrangements.

QUESTION: And as part of that agreement, though, I believe the US is supposed to make a statement discouraging any further claims against the companies. Can you tell us how and when that statement might come?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we've said that in the past. We've talked about the terms that were discussed and particularly with regard to further claims. I will see if there is anything more we can say as of ratification.

QUESTION: I just wonder if you have an idea of if the Secretary has already made a decision about the Helms-Burton Chapter III has to be suspended? There is no announcement and the time is already passed.

MR. BOUCHER: I will have to check on that one for you.

QUESTION: Do you have any new comment or reaction on the latest development in Chechnya?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new to say on Chechnya. It's certainly a subject of continuing concern that we've followed. No, I mean, clearly the situation is one, as we've said before, that doesn't have a military solution, that it needs to have a political resolution and that remains our view. We've been following the situation there closely. We've been concerned about many of the developments and we would hope to see a political resolution here.

QUESTION: The Russian president yesterday ordered military officials running the war in Chechnya to improve their performance. So that doesn't seem like an order that would be given to stop the violence and seek a negotiated peace.

MR. BOUCHER: Again, you know, we have expressed our concerns about the situation, we've made quite clear our views at the Secretary's meetings with the Russians, at the President's meetings with the Russians. We don't think there is a military solution there; there needs to be a political solution to the conflict and we've urged the Russians to follow a path that will lead to that.

QUESTION: I don't know if you will have anything on this but Cambodia and the UN today finally came to their agreement on the Khmer Rouge trials. It's an agreement that Senator Kerry and in particular this building as well was particularly instrumental in getting the Cambodians to agree to. Do you have anything to say about that?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I don't have anything new on that. The developments there, we've welcomed and we've praised the role that Senator Kerry and others have played.

QUESTION: On a completely different subject, the Russians are saying that they are expecting some senior or some State Department official to come and brief them about North Korea. Do you have any idea who that is that is going there?

MR. BOUCHER: I'll check on that for you.

QUESTION: I've got one more. This has to do with this Iranian woman who some have called a human rights advocate who the INS is trying to deport. And her case comes up on Monday. And I don't really want to talk about her case, because I know it's an INS decision. But she is - the INS is trying to deport her because of her one-time involvement with the People's Mujaheddin.

She was given political asylum in the States in '95, two years before these groups were placed on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. And I'm just wondering was it the State Department's intent, specifically in this case, to have FTO sanctions apply ex post facto, after - to apply to things and events that happened before these groups became identified as terrorists?

MR. BOUCHER: Matt, there is no way I could answer a question

like that without having an impact on a legal situation. I really have to refer you to the Department of Justice for that.

QUESTION: It was a foreign policy decision. And I'm not asking about the specific case. I just want to know, when you designate a group a terrorist organization -

MR. BOUCHER: Matt, you wouldn't be asking the question except in the context of the specific case and there's no way I can answer a question like that except in the context of this specific case.

QUESTION: It's a pretty general foreign policy question, isn't it?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we have to leave it to the Department of Justice to handle any matters involved here.

QUESTION: Does the Department have any position on the arrest of Mr. Ibrahim in Egypt?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we've expressed some views on that in recent days so I will leave you with the Press Office on that one.

QUESTION: Yes, sir. Does the State Department believe that there is some kind of coordinated conspiratorial type of -

MR. BOUCHER: Can I just say "no" and we'll have done with it? (Laughter).

QUESTION: I'll say, it's South Korea, is a headline in one of our papers here. Are there attacks against US service people and other US citizens that are going on there by anti-American groups? Or do you know?

MR. BOUCHER: South Korea is well known for its demonstrations. It is also well known that they are a very close ally of ours. We recently addressed with the South Korean leadership the question of US troops. They made quite clear their view. The democratically elected leaders of South Korea made quite clear their view that our troops needed to be there for both deterrence and stability. We made clear that was our view and that we will coordinate very closely with the democratic government of South Korea on these issues.

QUESTION: Last week, several US companies announced that they are withdrawing from the Caspian-based pipeline project. And the reason is they said that is because of the Turkmen's behavior or the Turkmen leader's behavior on this subject. In the past, you were very supportive of this project and do you have any reaction on this issue?

MR. BOUCHER: Still very supportive of the project. I don't have any reaction specific to whatever commercial decisions might have been made. I'll check and see if we have anything. But we're still very supportive of the project.

QUESTION: You're starting a new chapter in Middle East peace by going to the core issues instead of a framework agreement, which you've been talking about for six months now. And I noticed that there was no reference, either Presidential or otherwise, about the framework agreements. The Palestinians are very unhappy in that Wye River has not been implemented. Does this summit mean that you are dropping the third redeployment and all the other things and going direct to the core issues?

MR. BOUCHER: The focus at this point on the core issues of permanent status means we're trying to resolve the very fundamental issues that the parties have between them. And one of the reasons we're doing that is because we think that we need to go to the summit level to resolve those issues. And, second of all, we think there is the potential to resolve them and to work out the arrangements on these very fundamental issues.

Certainly the redeployment interim issues remain important to the parties and they still have obligations in that regard. But our hope now is if we can focus on the core issues, to really resolve these very fundamental permanent status issues that are very important to all the parties.

QUESTION: What about the framework?

MR. BOUCHER: This process has been described in various ways at various times. The summit is different. Not that the issues are different, but the summit is different in the attempt to really deal seriously with these core issues of permanent status, the issues that are most fundamental to reaching a resolution, a fundamental resolution between the parties. That's what we're trying to do at this summit.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, I want to go back to Montenegro. I just wanted to make sure I understand your answer. Has the US refined its position on independence for Montenegro and the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav -

MR. BOUCHER: I will get you the full and complete and total description of our view of the independence of Montenegro or suggestions in that direction. I think the summary I gave to Matt is a fairly accurate reflection of it, but I will give you the absolute complete mantra on that one. No, we haven't changed.

Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:03 p.m.)