

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Sandra Kristoff to Steven Naplan and Jill Schuker, re: stuff (13 pages)	04/09/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 10/21/2024
002. email	Shawn McCormick to Susan Rice, re: [Draft] (3 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 10/21/2024</i>	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)
003. email	Susan Rice to Robert Kyle and Helen Walsh, re: FLOTUS trip to Africa (5 pages)	01/02/1997	P1/b(1)
004. email	Pat Battenfield to Eric Barks-Ruggles, et al., re: FLOTUS trip (11 pages)	01/10/1997	P1/b(1)
005. email	Shawn McCormick to Eileen Biernacki, et al., re: Pkg. 0024 (7 pages)	01/11/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 10/21/2024
006. email	Susan Rice to Erica Barks-Ruggles, et al., re: FLOTUS trip memo (6 pages)	01/15/1997	P1/b(1)
007. email	John Prendergast to Pat Battenfield, re: Cable re FLOTUS itinerary (8 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)
008. email	Charles (Jack) Pritchard to John Norris, re: VP trip (20 pages)	03/20/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 10/21/2024

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F

ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 April 96 19:03
FROM Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT stuff [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Naplan, Steven J.
Schuker, Jill A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0739-17 (1.80)
K&H 8/19/2022

TEXT_BODY

jill and Steve---i no longer know what is needed, completed, still to be done. try these on and let me know what you want me to draft tonight. items that are classified can be converted to unclassified quickly, e.g., econ sit in Japan makes ref to clandestine source; we take that out and recraft sentence to not talk about internal Japan MOF paper and we are good to go. some of this is not to be announced yet---comprehensive communique, okinawa results. let' coordiante. i'll ask bob suettinger to e-mail the korea background papers. sjk

[[CMNAGDA.DOC : 4876 in CMNAGDA.DOC]][[COMPCOMM.DOC : 4877 in COMPCOMM.DOC]][[DOMSIT.DOC : 4878 in DOMSIT.DOC]][[ECONSIT.DOC : 4879 in ECONSIT.DOC]][[OKINAWA.DOC : 4880 in OKINAWA.DOC]][[SECDECL.DOC : 4881 in SECDECL.DOC]][[TRADE1.DOC : 4882 in TRADE1.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 9 April 96 18:19

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CMNAGDA.DOC
U.S.-JAPAN COMMON AGENDA

The Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective ("Common Agenda") was launched in July 1993 as part of the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership. Under the Common Agenda, our two countries are cooperating on twenty projects that address pressing global problems including eradicating polio worldwide, curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS in Asia, slowing population

growth,
preserving coral reefs in the Pacific, expanding educational
opportunities for girls and combating narcotics trafficking.
The
Common Agenda has become an important symbol of the
broad-based
nature of U.S.-Japan relations and our ability to cooperate
on
solving difficult transnational issues.

For the April 1996 Tokyo summit, we have agreed to initiate
five new
projects including combating new and reemerging infectious
diseases,
improving global food supply, strengthening civil society in
new
democracies, mitigating damage from natural disasters, and
exploring
the use of technology in the classroom. We have also agreed
to
bring existing bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism
under the
Common Agenda.

Common Agenda Highlights:

We have virtually eliminated polio in the western Pacific
and are
working to eradicate polio worldwide by the year 2000. Full
immunization against polio will soon occur throughout
Southeast Asia
and our cooperation is extending to Africa. We are working
closely
on population and HIV/AIDS programs in Bangladesh, Kenya,
the
Philippines and Indonesia.

We are strengthening natural disaster preparation, response
and
research activities, including establishment of a
Pan-Pacific
natural disaster watch system through which countries in the
region
will be able to exchange information and monitor natural
disasters.

In 1995, we launched an initiative to improve education for
girls
and to support women's microenterprises in developing
countries.

In 1994, we agreed to join forces against narcotics trafficking and are coordinating efforts on chemical controls, demand reduction and crop substitution.

The United States and Japan galvanized world support for the International Coral Reef Initiative and are collaborating to establish a marine research center in the Pacific. We have launched joint conservation projects in the Philippines, Indonesia, Central America and the Caribbean.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:16

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

COMPCOMM.DOC
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNIQUE

In planning the November 1995 Tokyo Summit, U.S. and Japanese officials decided that a comprehensive communique, along with a separate security statement, would contribute significantly to an improved public perception of the relationship, particularly in the wake of the damage done by the Okinawa rape and the resulting questioning of the value of the relationship by many Japanese. The comprehensive communique describes for our publics in one document the extent of our joint accomplishments, the shared values and interests which bind us, the benefits both countries gain from the relationship, the breadth of our cooperation and the potential of our future cooperation. The communique that was prepared for November has been revised and updated for the April 1996 Summit.

The communique reaffirms the critical importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship for peace and security in the

Asia-Pacific region. It refers to the separate Joint Declaration on Security.

The communique outlines the broad scope of U.S.-Japan bilateral and multilateral diplomatic cooperation, including on the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, Bosnia, the UN, the CTBT and other arms control initiatives.

The communique acknowledges our joint responsibility for effective management of the world economy and for strengthening the multilateral free trade system. It highlights the successes of the U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement, calling for full implementation of Framework trade agreements and for expeditious resolution of new issues that arise. The statement notes progress on macroeconomic issues in both countries. It pledges the two countries to further APEC cooperation.

The communique highlights the successes of the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda and its expansion to include five new projects. Finally, the statement endorses expanded people-to-people contact between our two countries.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:30

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

DOMSIT.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 04/08/06

DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION

Ryutaro Hashimoto was elected Japan's 24th postwar prime minister by the Diet on January 11, succeeding Tomiichi Murayama, who resigned after eighteen months in office. The Hashimoto cabinet

reflects
balance among the three parties in the ruling coalition (the
Liberal
Democratic Party; the Socialists; and the Sakigake party) as
well as
among factional groupings within the LDP, which Hashimoto
heads.
Since the formation of the Murayama government in June 1994,
the
three coalition partners have sustained a political alliance
despite
differences in policy.

The political opposition is dominated by the New Frontier
Party
(NFP), an amalgamation of several opposition parties and
groups that
was created in December 1994. The NFP fared well in the
July 1995
Upper House election, but its representation in the Diet is
still
considerably less than that of the government parties, and
it has
been unable to generate popular enthusiasm.

The primary domestic issue at present is Hashimoto's
proposed \$6.5
billion taxpayer bailout of several failed housing loan
corporations, or "jusen." The government's plan, which
precipitated
a three-week stoppage in normal Diet deliberations in March,
is
highly unpopular with the public and has contributed to a 15
percent
drop in the cabinet's approval rating in recent public
opinion
polls. Following the end of the opposition-led boycott, the
Cabinet
on March 26 approved a \$110 billion provisional budget to
fund
government operations for 50 days beyond April 1, the
beginning of
the Japanese fiscal year.

An election for the Lower House, the more important chamber
in the
bicameral Diet, can be called at any time, but must be held
no later
than July 1997. Most observers believe that the earliest
time frame

for an election would be the latter part of this year, and more likely in 1997. The next contest will be the first under a reformed election system that aims, inter alia, to reduce the number of Diet seats from over-represented rural areas. Some existing political parties will probably split, merge or realign after the election.

Hashimoto's domestic political challenges suggest he will seek to embellish his leadership credentials at the summit by portraying himself to the President as an equal -- and friendly -- partner. In order to convince voters of this, however, Hashimoto will need to strike a delicate balance on trade and security. On trade, Hashimoto must make headway on key bilateral issues without being perceived as weak by voters; on security he must show his strong support for the alliance while still demonstrating progress on Okinawa base consolidation.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

ECONSIT.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X1, X5, X6
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC SITUATION

Japan's economy appears headed for a modest rebound in 1996 after four years of little or no growth. Real GDP growth rose from 0.5% in 1994 to 0.9% in 1995 and is expected to go above 2.0% in 1996. Domestic demand is beginning to strengthen and industrial production rose by 3.3% in 1995. Unemployment is now at a seven year high; the official figure for 1995 (3.2%) excludes a large number of underemployed workers. Inflation was -0.1% in 1995. While

pursuing
a tight monetary policy, Japan last year adopted a temporary
fiscal
stimulus package which has contributed to recovery.
However, unless
private sector activity increases, the phase-out of the
fiscal
stimulus could stall the recovery.

Banking Problems: With the end of Japan's "bubble economy,"
steep
drops in prices of stock and real estate used as loan
collateral led
to problem bank loans amounting to \$500-800 billion (private
estimates). Four credit unions, including the country's
largest,
and two banks were closed in the last year as a result of
excessive
bad loans. An internal Ministry of Finance study concluded
that 50
of Japan's top 200 banks would be insolvent if they had to
absorb
fully their loan losses, according to a clandestine source.
The
banks' weak capital position limits their ability to make
new loans,
which in turn may curb investment activity. For example,
investment
by small-to-medium-size firms, which employ 70 percent of
the
workforce and are most dependent on bank loans, remains
stagnant.

In December 1995, Japan announced a comprehensive plan to
deal with
the problem. However, opposition to the use of public funds
to bail
out failed financial institutions (especially housing loan
corporations, or jusen) forced the Cabinet to pass only a
50-day
stop-gap budget for FY96 and has sharply reduced public
support for
the Hashimoto administration.

Trade/Investment: Japan's global current account surplus
fell from
\$131 billion (2.8% of GDP) in 1994 to \$110 billion (2.2% of
GDP) in
1995. A stronger yen and economic recovery are expected to
cut the

surplus to about \$90 billion in 1996. Our bilateral trade balance improved last year as Japan's merchandise trade surplus fell from \$66 billion in 1994 to \$59 billion in 1995. The decline is expected to continue in 1996. U.S. exports to Japan jumped 20% in 1995 and since the beginning of the administration, U.S. exports are up 32 percent. Our exports to Japan are growing at four times the rate of our imports and have grown at a rate of 80% in those sectors where we have concluded trade agreements. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Japan, with \$37 billion at the end of 1994. Foreign investment in Japan remains extremely low.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:25

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

OKINAWA.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)

Declassify On: 04/08/06

OKINAWA

Following the September 4 rape of an Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen, a public uproar in Japan erupted. (The three were convicted and sentenced on March 7, two individuals to seven years imprisonment, the other to six and a half.) Japan asked for a review of criminal jurisdiction procedures and for base consolidation in Okinawa where the U.S. military presence in Japan is concentrated. This represented a distinct shift in central government policy, which had deflected previous Okinawan demands for base reductions (thereby allowing the U.S. to become the focus of the anti-base movement in Okinawa) and reflected the enormous

political pressure faced by Hashimoto on this issue.

On October 25, we agreed to revised criminal jurisdiction procedures that would allow the United States to transfer, "at any time," to Japanese custody individuals suspected of "heinous crimes such as murder or rape." On November 1, Secretary Perry and then-FM Kono and Defense Minister Eto established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to review base-related issues. Previously, we had dealt with base issues through the Joint Committee, a working-level, bilateral body established by the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement.

The SACO and its subordinate working groups have met almost continuously since the first meeting on November 21, 1995, with the objective of developing a package of measures to reduce the burden that the U.S. presence places on local communities. These measures will cover adjustments to bases, facilities and procedures (in areas such as training, administration, noise reduction and safety), while preserving current operational effectiveness and readiness. These adjustments will not change the U.S. force structure but are intended to decrease our profile in Okinawa. Over the course of the remainder of 1996, the SACO will develop and expedite plans for the full and complete implementation of the initiatives agreed to in preparation for the state visit.

Significant progress in the SACO process is being equated increasingly in Japan with the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, a major U.S. base lying in the center of Ginowan city in Okinawa. Because of its critical role in regional contingencies, however, Futenma was not on our original list of base adjustments

that we passed to Japan. We have reconsidered this position and have now reached agreement with Japan on a return of Futenma over the next five to seven years, provided adequate replacement facilities are completed and other conditions related to maintenance of critical military functions and capabilities are met.

Secretary Perry and Prime Minister Hashimoto will announce the Okinawa package two days before the state visit.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:14

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

SECDECL.DOC
SECURITY DECLARATION

The joint security declaration will be the culmination of a bilateral dialogue started in late 1994, intended to reaffirm the continuing strength and increasing importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance into the next century. We are now updating and refining the draft. The outlines of the statement, which will be signed by the President and Prime Minister, are clear and include the following points:

☐ the continuing importance of the bilateral alliance, both to the defense of Japan and to regional security.

☐ the commitment of the United States to remain engaged in the region, including the forward deployment of 100,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region and at current levels in Japan, and its continuing support, financial and otherwise, for U.S. troops in country. (Japan, responding to domestic political sensitivities, prefers that the declaration not refer specifically to the 47,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan.)

□ the abiding community of strategic interests shared by the two countries: support for democracy and human rights; promotion of the prosperity resulting from free-market capitalism; common views of other key players in the region; and increasing bilateral cooperation on PKO, technology exchange, military coordination and nonproliferation.

The declaration will send an important signal about the health of the U.S.-Japan security relationship to our publics and to the region. It will buttress those within Japan who seek enhanced defense cooperation with the United States but who face political and constitutional constraints. It will address issues raised by critics of the alliance in the aftermath of the rape in Okinawa. The statement also will serve as a capstone to complementary defense policy blueprints produced unilaterally by each country: the U.S. East Asia Strategy Report, published in February 1995, and Japan's National Defense Program Outline, released in November 1995.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 April 96 18:38

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

TRADE1.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 04/08/06

U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

General Economic Relationship: Our economic relationship over the past two years has developed under the principles set out in the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership, signed in July 1993 and extended in June 1995. The goals of the Framework have

been furthered by 20 trade agreements in a wide range of sectors including autos, insurance, flat glass, investment, agriculture, IPR, cellular phones and government procurement of medical technology, telecom and construction.

Trade Data: Our trade figures with Japan are improving. The U.S.-Japan trade deficit fell 9% to \$59 billion in 1995, down from \$65 billion in 1994. Japan's global current account surplus declined to 2.5% of GDP in 1995, down from 3.2% in 1992. Additionally, U.S. exports to Japan in 1995 reached an historic high of \$64 billion, nearly 20% greater than in 1994 and 34% greater than in 1992. In those sectors covered by recent trade agreements with Japan, exports have grown by more than 80% since the beginning of the Clinton administration.

The GOJ's stance has become increasingly hard-line on outstanding trade problems; on several issues the GOJ has sought to resist substantive discussions or negotiations. Current economic issues with Japan include:

Civil Aviation: We reached agreement March 27 with Japan on a package of new commercial opportunities for both sides which liberalizes and expands our bilateral aviation regime.

Japan's Film Market: Kodak has submitted a petition alleging market access barriers in Japan's film sector. A Section 301 investigation is underway. The GOJ has refused talks, forcing us to consider other options including a WTO case. The Japan Free Trade Commission (JFTC) in February initiated a survey of the film sector.

Semiconductors: We believe the U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement, which expires in July of 1996, should be renewed in some form. The

GOJ is adamantly opposing renewal. We are proposing a new alliance on chips based on greater industry responsibility for activities and functions provided for under the current agreement, but with a continued government role (and agreement) to monitor progress in improving market access.

Insurance: The GOJ is threatening to violate terms of our 1994 insurance agreement. Intensive discussions over the past several months have yielded no progress. If Japan does violate the agreement, sanctions will have to be considered.

Housing Initiative: The Prime Minister's initiative to reduce the cost of housing in Japan, first announced in Santa Monica on February 23, offers great potential for increased U.S. exports and other bilateral cooperation.

Deregulation: The government's deregulation program is proceeding very slowly. The March 31 announcement of the latest deregulation measures was disappointing. Through our Deregulation Working Group we continue to encourage the GOJ to undertake more comprehensive and profound deregulation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 April 96 06:19
FROM Wiley, Mary C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cicio, Kristen K.
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

For SRB and TL

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor;
Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Fuerth, Leon S.; Wise, William M.;
@LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, April 18, 1996 08:09 PM

Note for Tony, Sandy and Nancy:

BOSNIA: HIRC hearing next week on Bosnia policy. Thus far Tarnoff and Dine. DoD may participate as well.

-- HPSCI has requested documents from the Agency, similar to the SSCI request.

-- No SFRC hearings scheduled as of yet. But you can be sure they will schedule some.

-- SSCI may/may want Christopher to appear on May 1 and Redman and Galbraith to appear on May 8.

-- Nunn is concerned about this issue according to his staff. Could Tony call him or could we set up a meeting with Nunn upon Tony's return to discuss this (and maybe a few other issues). Best to do it next week since SASC likely to mark up its bill the following week. Please advise.

HAITI: Sent fact sheet to Hill State and WH LA made calls to the Hill to get them to support our policy in light of Dole staff report.

CHINA MFN: Interagency call today. Will continue to work with friendly Senate and House groups.

TERRORISM BILL: Conference report passed the House today 293-133. Likely to be sent to the President by tomorrow. WH LA was very helpful to us throughout this whole process.

CONTINUING RESOLUTION: Negotiators have met several times and are close to reaching a deal on numbers (still troublesome "riders", especially on environmental issues); regarding our issues:

- Israel - Hill firm that no DOD or domestic funds be used to offset; State considering potential 150 offsets
- Jordan - set at \$70M with offsets from DOD
- Bosnia - no further offsets required
- ONDCP supplemental - very negative reception on the Hill; members and staff like McCaffrey and want to be supportive, but view the supplemental/rescission proposal as coming too late in the process and being too much for the traffic to bear
- State Authorization Waiver - will be extended through the remainder of the fiscal year
- Vietnam - staff mulling over our proposed fixes

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: Eric Schwartz did a great job in a brief but useful meeting with Rep. Chris Smith to clarify our position on the conclusion of the Comprehensive Plan of Action

KEDO: State sent letters to the Hill today notifying of our intent to use Presidential waiver authority to free up funds for KEDO

STATE AUTHORIZATION BILL: HIRC considering an attempt to override the President's veto next Tuesday, after which (assuming the override falls short, which it will) they may introduce a new bill that strips out all the objections cited in the veto statement. State will begin a process of making calls to the Hill tomorrow. We will follow up with them and make additional calls on Mon and Tues.

TRAIN & EQUIP BRIEF: Jim Pardew and John Feeley briefed the Hill L-ship staff on E & T trip of McLarty and its successful results. Hill was receptive of the good news (especially Mira), but expressed concern over the foreign forces issue. We told them there is a positive trend on their removal, and some Hill staff were skeptical, based on recent CIA briefs.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: Dem staffers from the HIRC have told us that the Gilman

Bill on NATO may have stalled. Dems will continue to work with us to prepare an alternative, if needed. However, the Dems were told by the Repubs that they wanted a bi-partisan bill and no Committee Dems were supporting Gilman. Will update as this situation evolves.

96 OLYMPICS: Global held a meeting with OVP, OMB and us to discuss funding options and plans to support the Atlanta games. We'll attend the update to Ron Klain next week also. We're working with Hill offices (notably Nunn and Gingrich) to see that adequate funding is available to for security. We anticipate some problems on the Hill with the sources of the funding, especially if it's determined that 050 must be used.

DOD AUTHORIZATION: HCONS will markup in their subcs on April 24th (MILCON, MWR and Merchant Marine), April 25th (Readiness and Personnel) and April 30th (R & D and Procurement). Full committee will markup on May 1st. Floor action is scheduled for May 14th. NMD and UN C2/Insignia legislation is also tentatively planned for the week of May 14th.

HIV: We are told that the Approps Cmte Chairs have decided to delay any decision on the full repeal til next week. This gives Shali an increased window to make contact with the key Members.

SASC NMD MARKUP: The SASC discussed the NMD Bill, but delayed the markup til next Tuesday in deference to the POTUS being in Moscow. We are told that they will consider the C-17 Multiyear Procurement as a stand-alone bill.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 April 96 18:58
FROM Boynton, Peter J.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT \$250 million CN FW: Signing SBTP on Omnibus Consolidated
TO Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY Jim; FYI, short bullet on pg 6 of SBTP expressing "disappointment" re the \$250m.

tk

From: Wozniak, Natalie S.
To: @ALLNSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Signing SBTP on Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 26, 1996 05:32 PM

[[OMNIBUS.DOC : 4650 in OMNIBUS.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 26 April 96 17:31
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** OMNIBUS.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 26, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today I have signed into law H.R. 3019, the "Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996."

This bill helps us move toward a balanced budget in a way that honors our Nation's values by protecting our commitments to education and training, the environment, law enforcement, science and technology, and national service. It restores \$5.1 billion of the \$8.1 billion I had sought for these priorities over levels in the appropriations bills that I had rejected. In addition, H.R. 3019 provides emergency disaster funding as well as funding for our troops in Bosnia and for the furtherance of the Middle East peace process.

We should have reached this conclusion 7 months ago, at the beginning of the fiscal year instead of more than halfway through it. Unfortunately, the Congress passed versions of the appropriations bills that were far outside of the mainstream, leaving me no choice but to veto them.

Rather than move quickly to reach a compromise such as the one achieved with this legislation, the Congress shut the Government down twice and then I had to sign a record 13 continuing resolutions funding the Government.

The extent of conflict and delay was unprecedented. It should never happen again.

Nonetheless, 7 months later, we have a bill we can all be proud of, one that achieves savings, protects investments, and avoids outcomes that could have been disastrous for our environment and our people.

For example, the bill eliminates, or permits me to suspend, the most egregious legislative riders that the Congress had sought to attach to the appropriations bills, including those that would have blocked enforcement of some of the Nation's key environmental laws. These riders reflected a philosophy of disregard for our environment that the American people and bipartisan majorities in previous Congresses and Administrations had long ago rejected.

At my insistence the Congress dropped the rider that would have prevented the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from using

its authority to protect our Nation's wetlands.

Likewise, this bill provides me the authority to suspend three other riders -- authority that I invoked immediately after signing this legislation. If I had not suspended these riders, they would have:

overridden existing environmental laws and led to unsustainable levels of timber cutting in Alaska's Tongass National Forest;

drastically undermined the level of protection provided to the Mojave National Preserve by the 1994 California Desert Protection Act; and

prohibited proposed or final listing actions by the Departments of the Interior and Commerce under the Endangered Species Act, which could have resulted in a greater risk of extinction of some of the over 400 species that are currently either proposed for listing or for which proposed listings are awaiting evaluation.

At my request, the bill also deletes the measure contained in the Senate- and House-passed Interior appropriations bills that would have extended the repeal of environmental laws and allowed the clear-cutting of old growth trees for 3 years or more. That authority is currently set to expire on September 30 of this year, just 5 months away. I am disappointed, however, that the Congress was unwilling to support an immediate repeal of these provisions, despite the fact that, by imperiling salmon and other species, these provisions threaten the environment and economy of the region.

The bill also funds important programs that the House or the Senate -- or both -- had sought to eliminate.

The Congress, in a bill I vetoed, sought to kill AmeriCorps, the National Service program. This bill retains it, as I had insisted, funding the Corporation for National and Community Service at \$402 million. Through National Service, we will continue to allow young Americans to help address vital needs in their communities, such as health care, crime prevention, and education, while earning a monetary award to help them

pursue additional education or training.

The House sought to terminate Goals 2000, which is providing schools throughout the country with the resources to improve teacher training and raise academic standards to prepare our children for the 21st Century. This bill restores funding for Goals 2000.

In another bill I vetoed, the Congress sought to end the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, the commitment I made with the previous Congress to put 100,000 additional police officers on the streets of our cities and towns by the year 2000. At my insistence, that program is continued. As a result, we remain on track for fulfilling our commitment, with 45,000 police officers funded by the end of this fiscal year, including 19,000 provided by this legislation. These police are working hand-in-hand with their communities to fight crime. Crime is down in many communities across the Nation, and we can make further progress through the COPS program and similar efforts.

In the same bill that I vetoed, the Congress proposed to end the Department of Commerce's Advanced Technology Program (ATP), an integral part of my civilian technology strategy to promote economic growth. Adequate funding is provided for that program, while proposed language that would have prohibited new grants was deleted. ATP provides an effective mechanism for augmenting U.S. economic growth through highly-leveraged, industry-led research and development. It is a rigorously competitive, cost-shared program that fosters technology development, promotes industrial alliances, and creates jobs. The continuation of a strong ATP is a fitting tribute to the late Secretary Ron Brown, who deserves so much credit for making ATP what it is today.

Other programs or agencies that one or both houses sought to end, but which this bill restores, include the Community Development Financial Institutions program, the Summer Youth jobs program, and the Council on Environmental Quality.

Very importantly, the bill provides \$22.8 billion

for the Education Department. I am pleased that the Congress restored critical education programs -- among my highest priorities to levels near or above the fiscal 1995 levels. The restorations include important funding for Title I - Education for the Disadvantaged (which the House had sought to cut by \$1.2 billion), Goals 2000, Safe and Drug-Free Schools, School-to-Work, and Education Technology.

This bill also ensures that colleges, universities, and vocational schools can continue to choose the Federal student loan program -- either the new Federal Direct Student Loan Program or the bank-based guaranteed student loan program -- that best serves the needs of their students and ensures that students have access to the most flexible student loan repayment provisions, including income-contingent repayment. Institutions of higher education that now participate in the program or have planned to participate in July 1996 will be able to do so; other schools that wish to participate can enroll without facing limits on the program. Students with guaranteed student loans who want access to income-contingent repayment will be able to switch into the Direct Loan program. The House had sought to place a severe cap on the Direct Loan program, a step that would have had the effect of killing in its infancy an effort that has benefited students, colleges and universities, and taxpayers alike.

The bill also restores other programs to close to, or above, last year's levels that at least one house of Congress had sought to cut deeply. These include Head Start, Department of Labor worker protection programs, and payments to inter-national organizations for peacekeeping and other programs. To help finance these priorities, the bill provides new debt collection authorities, calls for selling the United States Enrichment Corporation, and cuts Government overhead.

The Congress, also at my insistence, dropped from the bill the most seriously objectionable language provisions affecting the Education Department. The Congress also eliminated controversial language affecting Goals 2000, paving the way for renewed bipartisan support for this program.

The bill provides \$6.5 billion for the EPA. The cuts originally proposed by the House for the EPA would have crippled its ability to protect the health of families throughout the Nation. I am pleased that the Congress deleted or modified other objectionable legislative riders, including restrictions on the size of the diplomatic presence in Vietnam, the District of Columbia school voucher provision, and a measure that could have resulted in bans on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions for victims of rape or incest.

I am also pleased that the Congress dropped political advocacy disclosure provisions. These provisions could have interfered with the First Amendment rights of such nonprofit organizations as the Girls Scouts, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the American Red Cross.

I commend the Congress for repealing the language in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act that unfairly required the discharge of military personnel with HIV.

I am disappointed that the Congress chose to modify the conditions under which prison grant monies are distributed to the States. The Congress carefully crafted a distribution mechanism just 2 years ago to ensure that States implementing "truth in sentencing" would be rewarded for doing so. That mechanism is in place and has no need for change. These program changes will significantly delay getting these resources to the places they are needed most.

I note with regret the other objectionable legislative riders that remain in the bill.

They include a provision intended to allow the construction of a third telescope on Mt. Graham, Arizona, affecting the Mt. Graham red squirrel, Native American cultural lands, and the abortion accreditation provision.

While I am disappointed that the Congress chose to reduce funding for the Legal Services Corporation, I am pleased that the bill assures continued funding of legal services programs for all eligible populations, including migrants.

I am also disappointed that the Congress did not approve my request to increase funding by \$250 million for our anti-drug initiative. But I am pleased that the conferees stated their intent to provide additional funds for these important programs in FY 1997, ensuring that we can continue our anti-drug effort at full strength.

Unfortunately, the Congress did not include legislation I had sought to stabilize the Savings Association Insurance Fund. It is important for the Congress to take action on this issue quickly so that we can put the thrift crisis behind us without imposing any further costs on the taxpayers.

In addition, I note that section 119(a) of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996, contains a legislative veto, which would be unconstitutional under *INS v. Chadha* (462 U.S. 919) (1983). However, because I am suspending section 119(a) pursuant to section 119(b), the constitutional problem will be avoided.

With regard to defense, this bill also permits the Federal Government to undertake a multi-year procurement of the C-17 aircraft, the critical next-generation military transport. The C-17 will greatly enhance our ability to respond to crises around the world; buying it this way will save hundreds of millions of dollars for the taxpayers.

This bill represents true compromise and bipartisan cooperation. Clearly, when we work together we can enact good legislation for the American people.

With this in mind, we should build on our efforts here and move on to the larger challenge of balancing the budget over the next 7 years. The American people deserve a balanced budget, and we should give it to them.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 26, 1996.

#

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

002. email	Shawn McCormick to Susan Rice, re: [Draft] [partial] (2 pages)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F
ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 April 96 19:19
FROM McCormick, Shawn H.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT Deutch Draft [~~SECRET~~]
TO Rice, Susan E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2017-0739-M (1.81)
KBH 8/19/2022

Susan:

As per your request. Hope this answers the mail.

[[SMDEUTCH.DOC : 4958 in SMDEUTCH.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 26 April 96 19:19
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SMDEUTCH.DOC

E.O. 12958 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

E.O. 12958 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

☐ AIDS:

3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(6)

there is little comprehensive information on the overall scope and impact of AIDS in Africa. We could benefit from a greater understanding of the impact of AIDS on Africa's growing educated class, the economic impact of this disease and longterm trends on how this deadly virus will affect

Africa overall.

□ Islam: We have very little information on the impact of Islam in

Africa and the influence of exterior sponsors of religious activities including Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. Islam is an increasingly important societal force in East, West and portions of Central and Southern Africa.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 April 96 09:31

FROM Verville, Elizabeth G.

CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****

SUBJECT FW: \$250m FW: Signing SBTP on Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and

TO Boynton, Peter J.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

The second sentence makes it look as if the President accepts that getting it in 97 will ensure our programs, etc. I don't think it forecloses us, but it didn't indicate he planned to fight it.

From: Boynton, Peter J.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Verville, Elizabeth G.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: \$250m FW: Signing SBTP on Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 26, 1996 06:57 PM

[[OMNIBUS.DOC : 2318 in OMNIBUS.DOC]]

Dick/Liz; short bullet expressing "disappointment" re the \$250m on pg 6 of the SBTP.

From: Wozniak, Natalie S.
To: @ALLNSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Signing SBTP on Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 26, 1996 05:32 PM

ck

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 26 April 96 17:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** OMNIBUS.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 26, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today I have signed into law H.R. 3019, the "Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996."

This bill helps us move toward a balanced budget in a way that honors our Nation's values by protecting our commitments to education and training, the environment, law enforcement, science and technology, and national service. It restores \$5.1 billion of the \$8.1 billion I had sought for these priorities over levels in the appropriations bills that I had rejected. In addition, H.R. 3019 provides emergency disaster funding as well as funding for our troops in Bosnia and for the furtherance of the Middle East peace process.

We should have reached this conclusion 7 months ago, at the beginning of the fiscal year instead of more than halfway through it. Unfortunately, the Congress passed versions of the appropriations bills that were far outside of the mainstream, leaving me no choice but to veto them.

Rather than move quickly to reach a compromise such as the one achieved with this legislation, the Congress shut the Government down twice and then I had to sign a record 13 continuing resolutions funding the Government.

The extent of conflict and delay was unprecedented. It should never happen again.

Nonetheless, 7 months later, we have a bill we can all be proud of, one that achieves savings, protects investments, and avoids outcomes that could have been disastrous for our environment and our people.

For example, the bill eliminates, or permits me to suspend, the most egregious legislative riders that the Congress had

sought to attach to the appropriations bills, including those that would have blocked enforcement of some of the Nation's key environmental laws. These riders reflected a philosophy of disregard for our environment that the American people and bipartisan majorities in previous Congresses and Administrations had long ago rejected.

At my insistence the Congress dropped the rider that would have prevented the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from using its authority to protect our Nation's wetlands.

Likewise, this bill provides me the authority to suspend three other riders -- authority that I invoked immediately after signing this legislation. If I had not suspended these riders, they would have:

overridden existing environmental laws and led to unsustainable levels of timber cutting in Alaska's Tongass National Forest;

drastically undermined the level of protection provided to the Mojave National Preserve by the 1994 California Desert Protection Act; and

prohibited proposed or final listing actions by the Departments of the Interior and Commerce under the Endangered Species Act, which could have resulted in a greater risk of extinction of some of the over 400 species that are currently either proposed for listing or for which proposed listings are awaiting evaluation.

At my request, the bill also deletes the measure contained in the Senate- and House-passed Interior appropriations bills that would have extended the repeal of environmental laws and allowed the clear-cutting of old growth trees for 3 years or more. That authority is currently set to expire on September 30 of this year, just 5 months away. I am disappointed, however, that the

Congress was unwilling to support an immediate repeal of these provisions, despite the fact that, by imperiling salmon and other species, these provisions threaten the environment and economy of the region.

The bill also funds important programs that the

House or the Senate -- or both -- had sought to eliminate.

The Congress, in a bill I vetoed, sought to kill AmeriCorps, the National Service program. This bill retains it, as I had insisted, funding the Corporation for National and Community Service at \$402 million. Through National Service, we will continue to allow young Americans to help address vital needs in their communities, such as health care, crime prevention, and education, while earning a monetary award to help them pursue additional education or training.

The House sought to terminate Goals 2000, which is providing schools throughout the country with the resources to improve teacher training and raise academic standards to prepare our children for the 21st Century. This bill restores funding for Goals 2000.

In another bill I vetoed, the Congress sought to end the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, the commitment I made with the previous Congress to put 100,000 additional police officers on the streets of our cities and towns by the year 2000. At my insistence, that program is continued. As a result, we remain on track for fulfilling our commitment, with 45,000 police officers funded by the end of this fiscal year, including 19,000 provided by this legislation. These police are working hand-in-hand with their communities to fight crime. Crime is down in many communities across the Nation, and we can make further progress through the COPS program and similar efforts.

In the same bill that I vetoed, the Congress proposed to end the Department of Commerce's Advanced Technology Program (ATP), an integral part of my civilian technology strategy to promote economic growth. Adequate funding is provided for that program, while proposed language that would have prohibited new grants was deleted. ATP provides an effective mechanism for augmenting U.S. economic growth through highly-leveraged, industry-led research and development. It is a rigorously competitive, cost-shared program that fosters technology development, promotes industrial alliances,

and creates jobs. The continuation of a strong ATP is a fitting tribute to the late Secretary Ron Brown, who deserves so much credit for making ATP what it is today.

Other programs or agencies that one or both houses sought to end, but which this bill restores, include the Community Development Financial Institutions program, the Summer Youth jobs program, and the Council on Environmental Quality.

Very importantly, the bill provides \$22.8 billion for the Education Department. I am pleased that the Congress restored critical education programs -- among my highest priorities to levels near or above the fiscal 1995 levels. The restorations include important funding for Title I - Education for the Disadvantaged (which the House had sought to cut by \$1.2 billion), Goals 2000, Safe and Drug-Free Schools, School-to-Work, and Education Technology.

This bill also ensures that colleges, universities, and vocational schools can continue to choose the Federal student loan program -- either the new Federal Direct Student Loan Program or the bank-based guaranteed student loan program -- that best serves the needs of their students and ensures that students have access to the most flexible student loan repayment provisions, including income-contingent repayment. Institutions of higher education that now participate in the program or have planned to participate in July 1996 will be able to do so; other schools that wish to participate can enroll without facing limits on the program. Students with guaranteed student loans who want access to income-contingent repayment will be able to switch into the Direct Loan program. The House had sought to place a severe cap on the Direct Loan program, a step that would have had the effect of killing in its infancy an effort that has benefited students, colleges and universities, and taxpayers alike.

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I am also pleased that the Congress dropped political advocacy disclosure provisions. These provisions could have interfered with the First Amendment rights of such nonprofit organizations as the Girls Scouts, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the American Red Cross.

I commend the Congress for repealing the language in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act that unfairly required the discharge of military personnel with HIV.

I am disappointed that the Congress chose to modify the conditions under which prison grant monies are distributed to the States. The Congress carefully crafted a distribution mechanism just 2 years ago to ensure that States implementing "truth in sentencing" would be rewarded for doing so. That mechanism is in place and has no need for change. These program changes will significantly delay getting these resources to the places they are needed most.

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This bill represents true compromise and bipartisan cooperation. Clearly, when we work together we can enact good legislation for the American people.

With this in mind, we should build on our efforts

here and move on to the larger challenge of balancing the budget over the next 7 years. The American people deserve a balanced budget, and we should give it to them.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 26, 1996.

#

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Susan Rice to Robert Kyle and Helen Walsh, re: FLOTUS trip to Africa (5 pages)	01/02/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F

ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Pat Battenfield to Eric Barks-Ruggles, et al., re: FLOTUS trip (11 pages)	01/10/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F
ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 January 97 12:23
FROM McCormick, Shawn H.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT RE: Pkg. 0024 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Biernacki, Eileen V.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.

CARBON_COPY Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat
McCormick, Shawn H.
Orr, Robert C.
Rice, Susan E.
Scott, John F.

TEXT_BODY

Heeeeere ya go!

[[0024FLO.DOC : 3089 in 0024FLO.DOC]]

From: Biernacki, Eileen V.
To: @AFRICA - African Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Pkg. 0024 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Saturday, January 11, 1997 10:57 AM

Please Email or provide a diskette for pkg. 0024, FLOTUS Trip to Africa. We need to make some changes to it. Thanks.

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

10 January 97 19:32

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

0024FLO.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0024
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1/2/07

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
~~September 11, 2006~~ 5/16/2017
By 12 NARA, Date 7/16/2018
2017-0735-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FIRST LADY

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to Africa

Purpose

To recommend two proposed itineraries for your travel to Africa in March 1997 as a precursor to a proposed Presidential trip in early 1998.

Background

An early trip by you would afford visibility to U.S. successes in Africa, demonstrate our commitment to sustain active U.S. engagement with the continent through the second term and enable us to make a high-profile announcement of the President's intention to travel to Africa in early 1998. This trip would be the first solo travel to sub-Saharan Africa by a sitting American First Lady. As such, it will generate substantial media interest and be viewed as significant by numerous constituency groups. We should consider taking along a few individuals who have demonstrated sustained interest in Africa such as leaders from business, religious, African-American and women's groups, state and local politicians, Members of Congress or PVO representatives.

Themes

We propose four key themes for a trip to Africa.

-- Empowerment of Women: African women are playing increasingly prominent roles in domestic and international affairs, and many U.S.-funded democracy and human rights projects support women's groups or women's rights efforts. UNICEF, of which you are Honorary Chair, funds many projects that directly and indirectly benefit women.

-- Child Survival and HIV/AIDS: There are several successful U.S.-supported child survival and HIV programs in Africa. You could highlight these programs and make an effective (and timely) pitch for sustained development assistance to Africa.

-- Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Africa: There are now more than 25 democracies in Africa, up from 5 in 1990. Still, these gains are fragile and there have been notable setbacks. You could underscore the importance of strengthening democracy and protecting human rights in Africa by visiting some success stories and works in progress.

-- Reaffirmation of U.S. Interest and Engagement in Africa: Key to our ability to advance U.S. interests in Africa will be to demonstrate sustained commitment early in a second term. Given that a POTUS trip must wait until early 1998, a trip by you in March would be optimal, especially if coupled with an announcement of the President's intention to visit in early 1998.

Notional Itinerary

We are proposing two optional itineraries for your travel to Africa consisting of either a shorter seven day trip, or a longer thirteen day trip. In either case, the trip should be geographically balanced, including stops in East, Southern and West Africa and in Francophone as well as Anglophone countries.

Seven Day Trip Option

1 day - Travel from U.S. to Cote d'Ivoire

1 day - Cote d'Ivoire: The West African region's solid Francophone democracies (Mali, Benin, and Senegal) have already received high-level visits. Among the others, Cote d'Ivoire -- the jewel of French West Africa and a regional hub -- is likely the best choice.

There, you could visit a Peace Corps training facility, projects

in rural health/HIV education, urban environmental management and sanitation/rural water supplies, drop-by a CDC-funded HIV/AIDS research center and, potentially, visit remote Liberian refugee settlements. An address to the American Chamber of Commerce could also boost U.S. business interests. The downside to Cote d'Ivoire is the President was elected in flawed elections, and restrictions on press freedom and opposition activities continue.

1 day - Uganda or Eritrea: Uganda has begun to turn the corner after decades of despotic rule and mismanagement. President Museveni, who came to power in 1986, was re-elected in non-party elections last year, although he has not allowed formal political party structures to form. He has instituted tough economic reforms in conjunction with multilateral institutions and has reopened Uganda's doors to international investment. Uganda is hosting approximately 10,000 refugees from Rwanda and Zaire, and has been integrally involved in regional efforts to negotiate a settlement in Burundi. You could visit USAID and Peace Corps bio-diversity conservation projects in a number of parks, including one of the few in the world with mountain gorillas. The United States also runs teacher training, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS education projects which the First Lady could visit. The downside to a visit is that tensions between Uganda and Zaire over alleged support by Uganda of rebels in Eastern Zaire could be exacerbated and detract from your message.

Eritrea is a young country with strong independent leadership, an excellent economic reform program and a slow, if deliberate, process of transition from a one-party, revolutionary movement. A stop in Eritrea would show support for the new generation of self-reliant, dynamic leaders in Africa.

2 days - South Africa: This is the only essential stop. You would want to visit some combination of Pretoria, Cape Town and

Johannesburg/Soweto. You could also visit the newly opened Peace Corps program. South Africa also offers a number of excellent venues for a major speech.

1 day - Mozambique or Namibia: Either of these stops would highlight U.S. support for young democracies that have completed peace processes after long civil wars. There are also impressive AID programs to highlight. The game-viewing in Namibia is excellent.

1 day - return travel to the U.S.

Thirteen Day Trip Option

1 day - travel from the U.S. to Liberia or Sierra Leone, late flight to Cote d'Ivoire

Liberia or Sierra Leone: Neither are garden spots, but you could do some important work in either country in the course of a few hours' refueling stop. Liberia is the African state with the closest historical ties to the U.S. but has received few high-level visitors from this Administration. Liberia's current (14th) peace accord may well fail, but offers the best chance yet of success. Elections are planned for May. The Chair of Liberia's transitional government, Ruth Perry, is Africa's only female head of state. Women's groups are active in Liberia, and the problem of child soldiers is particularly serious. You could strike many important themes, concentrating on civil society, child welfare, women's leadership and the need for peace and reconciliation. A visit would resonate positively with the large Liberian-American community in the U.S.

Sierra Leone is emerging from civil war and making the transition to democracy in peace. This stop would underscore our commitment to support regional efforts to resolve conflicts and demonstrate our gratitude for Sierra Leone's critical assistance during the evacuation operation from Liberia.

1 day - Cote d'Ivoire: (see Cote d'Ivoire description under seven day schedule option)

1 day - Ghana: Ghana is an economic and political success story.

President Rawlings was re-elected in December 1996 in one of the most

open elections ever conducted in Africa. Ghana has been the linchpin to negotiations to end the civil war in Liberia.

Rawlings

has also focused on attracting foreign investment and instituting economic reforms. The downside of a visit is that we have recommended that POTUS visit Ghana during his proposed trip to Africa

in early 1998, and Ghana has received regular high-level visitors.

2 days - Tanzania or Uganda: Tanzania is a fragile democracy recently visited by Secretary Christopher. President Mkapa has instituted free-market reforms and opened Tanzania to foreign investment after years of a socialist style economy. There are significant USAID and Peace Corps programs to visit in Tanzania, as

well as game parks where we are participating in bio-diversity programs. [NB: Ambassador Brady Anderson is a political appointee from Arkansas.]

Uganda (see Uganda description under seven day schedule option)

1 day - Eritrea or Ethiopia: Eritrea (see Eritrea description under seven day schedule option)

Ethiopia is a democratic work in progress, seeking to overcome nearly two decades of authoritarian Marxism (overturned in 1991) and

the oldest feudal monarchy in the world last administered by Emperor

Haile Selassie. The government is undertaking laudable economic reforms in its rebuilding process. Host to some 400,000 refugees from Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti, Ethiopia has been a strong

partner, especially on regional issues such as Sudan and the Great

Lakes area. The drawback of an Ethiopian stop is the fact that, as

host to Organization of African Unity (OAU) headquarters, it has received regular high level visitors; we also have proposed a POTUS

visit to Ethiopia early in 1998.

1 day - travel to Rwanda and on to South Africa

Rwanda: A brief refueling stop in Rwanda would demonstrate support for the GOR's successful efforts to reintegrate refugees, highlight our efforts to provide humanitarian relief and support reconciliation efforts after the 1994 genocide in which up to one-million people were killed. You could also show U.S. concern for thousands of orphaned and traumatized children, many of whom witnessed their parents and family members being murdered.

2 days - South Africa: (see South Africa description under seven day schedule option)

1 day - Mozambique or Namibia: (see Mozambique and Namibia descriptions under seven day schedule option)

2 days - Botswana: Africa's longest standing democracy, Botswana is a model of good economic policy, wise use of assistance, and nascent conservation efforts. Several high-level visitors, including the Vice President, have visited recently.

1 day - return travel to the U.S.

Morocco

We do not recommend a visit to Morocco for policy reasons. It is likely the Moroccans would attempt to exploit your visit to support their position on the Western Sahara conflict, where they continue to delay constructive diplomacy while seeking any public relations opportunity they can use to their advantage. There are no U.S. objectives of sufficient magnitude that could be advanced by your visit which would outweigh the risk of embroiling you in this controversial issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you travel to Africa in March 1997.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Susan Rice to Erica Barks-Ruggles, et al., re: FLOTUS trip memo (6 pages)	01/15/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F
ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 February 97 20:16
FROM Prendergast, John P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: FLOTUS trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Barks-Ruggles, Erica
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Erica, just wanted to note to you that SEAN Rice is the recipient, not SUSAN. But she'll get it anyway I guess from the @AFRICA.

From: Barks-Ruggles, Erica
To: Rice, Sean P.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs
Subject: FLOTUS trip[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, February 28, 1997 07:18 PM

Susan -
We had a good constructive meeting Friday afternoon. Chaired by Melanne Verveer (though she stepped out for about 1/2 the meeting). We were a bit surprised that Judy Johnson, AID (Roberta), Carol Lancaster and Theresa Lorr had been invited, but their input was useful.

FLOTUS staff meeting with her on 3/1 (Saturday) to discuss. Meeting on Tuesday at 4:30 (not confirmed) to brief FLOTUS - they would like you to attend. (Not sure if just you and staff or if others from today's group are invited)

Stops on trip, in order, are: Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and Eritrea.
(Cities in
parantheses below)
3 major speeches are planned for Senegal, South Africa and Uganda

We cautioned them about the pitfalls of going to Uganda with the current Zaire situation. They are sensitive and want us to tell them if they shouldn't go. All want your input. They have not yet talked to the airforce about flying times and need to refuel. As we know from the VP trip, Senegal to South Africa will require a refueling. Shawn and I agree that Ghana is the refuel point of choice (have not told them), but we will let the Air Force tell them about the need to stop.

Speechwriters were in the meeting, so we went over broad themes for speeches

and specific highlights she can hit in appearances in all countries. In brief:

Senegal: legacy of slavery links Africa and U.S.
(Dakar) people to people cultural connection
enrichment of U.S. cultural diversity by
African-Americans
importance of diversity/ Islam / multilingual / global
village themes
role of women in diversity and women's education (speech at University)

South Africa: importance of diversity, reconciliation and building bridges
= common ground for
(Jo'burg & S. Africa and U.S. (speech at University of Cape
Town)
Capetown) democracy
non-discrimination (race and gender) - vital to nation-building
and growth
economic development - microenterprise (might
announce USAID grant)
role of NGO's and role of regional links

Zimbabwe: women's health - family planning, fertility reduction, child
survival
(Harare & micro-enterprise, economic empowerment of women
Vic. Falls) environment - preservation (Vic. Falls)

Tanzania: Economic success (socialism to free market)
(Dar, micro-enterprise
Arusha & education of girls
Ngorongoro) peacekeeping
environment - partnerships for conservation,
economic base for conservation

Uganda: African challenges remain, work together (speech at Nile
Conference Center)
(Kampala) even disasters can become economic and (political) successes
economic turnaround and empowerment of women -
micro-enterprise
AIDS - public awareness campaigns, women's involvement, NGO role
girl's education

Eritrea: Pioneer spirit
(Asmara) Our common ground in nation-building on democratic foundation
women's leadership in independence and nation-building
national service/democratic spirit
economic development
health

I have provided speechwriters with all of Christopher's speeches and am

working on getting them some other information (re: AID, Peace Corps programs, etc.). John is doing a short brainstorm on the role of women in the independence movement in Eritrea. Shawn is working on getting Lake speeches in Africa. - Erica

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 March 97 17:22

FROM Barks-Ruggles, Erica

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Senegal sample [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Prendergast, John P.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

John - I'm still waiting for fill in the blanks in a few spots and still waiting to show to Susan, but for what it is worth, here it is. - Erica

[[FLOTSEBK.DOC : 4401 in FLOTSEBK.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 3 March 97 17:21

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** FLOTSEBK.DOC

Fact Sheet - Senegal

Political Environment

Senegal has been a democracy since achieving independence April 4, 1960. In practice, however, Senegal has been ruled as a one party state by the Socialist party, first by President Senghor and now by President Abdou DIOUF (president since January 1981). The most recent presidential elections were in February 1993 and the next are not scheduled until February 2000. The next elections for Senegal's unicameral legislature are scheduled for May 1998. Local, municipal and regional elections in November 1996, showed how far Senegal still has to go to achieve open transparent democracy. There were widespread allegations of vote rigging and electoral commission incompetence--including balloting stations not opening, the loss of voter lists, and confusing and contradictory instructions to voters--especially in Dakar, the stronghold of the opposition led by Abdulaye Wade. Senegal has been supportive of U.S. policies, especially in the

peacekeeping arena,
contributing troops to multinational force sent to the Gulf and
offering to participate in the
ACRF initiative. Corruption in bidding for commercial and
government contracts has created
some difficulties in our bilateral relations in past two years.

Economy

Senegal is part of the West African CFA zone, which devalued its
currency by 50% in January
1994. It has economic reform programs with the IMF, and World
Bank, and received Paris
Club debt rescheduling, most recently in 1995. etc. In general
its economic performance has
been amongst the top economic performers in West Africa since the
devaluation. The GDP of
\$554 is growing at 4.5%, but is not keeping up with over 7%
inflation. Senegal exports \$6.5
million in goods annually, mainly fish, peanuts, phosphates and
cotton to French, European
and regional markets. U.S. investment is, Mobil has
a petroleum processing facility
outside of Dakar, and recently won a competitive
bid to invest in the
telecommunications industry. Senegal carries a heavy debt burden
of \$3.5 billion which
hampers its ability to invest in social, educational and health
infrastructure. Unemployment is
approximately 45%, although the majority of Senegalese work at
subsistence agriculture or in
the informal trade sector.

Geography

Area: 192,000 sq km, slightly smaller than South Dakota Land.

People

Population: 9,007,080 (July 1995), with 45% under age 14 and
only 3% over 65
Population growth rate: 3.12% (1995), with 42.87 births/1,000
population (1995)
Infant mortality rate: 73.6 deaths/1,000 live births (1995)
Life expectancy: average = 57 years, male = 55.6 years, female
= 58.7 years
Total fertility rate: 6.03 children born/woman (1995)
Ethnicities: Wolof 36%, Fulani 17%, Serer 17%, Toucouleur 9%,
Diola 9%, Mandingo 9%, European and Lebanese 1%, other 2%
Religions: Muslim 92%, indigenous beliefs 6%, Christian 2%

(mostly Roman Catholic)

Languages: French (official), Wolof, Pulaar, Diola, Mandingo

Literacy: (1988) average = 27%, male = 37%, female 18%

Bilateral Assistance

USAID - FY96 \$20.9 million, planning for FY97 \$21.4 million.

Peace Corps - 125 volunteers in country, operating budget of \$1.4 million

Self-help Funds - FY97 \$100,000

Democracy and Human Rights (ESF) - FY97 \$75,000

Food Assistance - FY96 \$1.2 million for Mauritanian refugees in the north.

IMET - \$650,000

USAID programs focus on decreasing family size, increasing crop production through

improved natural resource management, and expanding liberalization of agricultural markets.

Smaller, more targeted programs attempt to make credit available to rural producers (mainly women), reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence, and improving democracy and governance. All

programs including cross-cutting elements designed to benefit women and children.

Peace Corps focuses on small enterprise development (especially tourism, retail and

artisanal production), agricultural resource management, forestry and environmental

education and conservation and rural primary health care. Peace

Corps also has a training

center to train volunteers prior to their postings in neighboring Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	John Prendergast to Pat Battenfield, re: Cable re FLOTUS itinerary (8 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/09/1996 - 03/20/1997]

2007-1550-F

ke2077

RESTRICTION CODES

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 March 97 12:22
FROM Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT VP trip[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Norris, John J.
CARBON_COPY Kristoff, Sandra J.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Uriu, Robert M.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0739-M (1.83)
KBH 8/19/2022

TEXT_BODY

John,

Here are the remaining Japan papers.

[[JAPBILAT.DOC : 3111 in JAPBILAT.DOC]][[JPNCMNAG.DOC : 3112 in
JPNCMNAG.DOC]][[JPNINFRA.DOC : 3113 in JPNINFRA.DOC]]
[[JPNRGION.DOC :
3114 in JPNRGION.DOC]][[JPNSCRTY.DOC : 3115 in JPNSCRTY.DOC]][[
JPNTRADE.DOC : 3116 in JPNTRADE.DOC]][[JPUNRFRM.DOC : 3117 in
JPUNRFRM.DOC
]]

Jack

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 20 March 97 11:56

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME JAPBILAT.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ISSUES

Our overall relationship is fundamentally sound, thanks in
large part to
U.S. initiatives over the last four years. We want to
maintain the momentum on
defense cooperation and market opening, raise the profile of
the Common

Agenda, consult closely on regional matters, and prod the Japanese for greater cooperation in emissions reductions negotiations.

SECURITY

Force Structure: Some in the GOJ continue to show interest in reducing the Marine presence in Okinawa. In her February 23-24 visit, Secretary Albright told PM Hashimoto that while we will remain sensitive to Okinawan concerns, we expect to maintain current force levels in East Asia. She also reminded Hashimoto that our troops in Japan are a vital part of the Asian security system and the alliance serves both U.S. and Japanese interests, as well as regional peace and stability. Additionally, senior DoD officials have told Japanese visitors to Washington that any discussion of reductions in force levels is premature and unwise because of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Hashimoto is reported to have told the press that he will not request a review of force in Japan when he meets with the President, but that such a review at some point is natural.

SACO Implementation: The key issue in implementing the December 2, 1996 Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) is the location for the off-shore facility to replace Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. We must maintain pressure while being sensitive to the delicate relationship between Okinawa and the central government.

Okinawa Land Leases: Okinawa Governor Ota has refused to pressure a slow-moving Prefectural Committee considering extending 3,000 land leases covering parts of U.S. facilities. Our role is limited to expressions of concern to ensure the GOJ pushes ahead with the leases. The GOJ intends to introduce legislation to permit the extension of the leases, which expire May 14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel advocated a potential review of

U.S. forces in Japan as a means of providing a political trade off to gain support for pending expropriation legislation. This is a short-sighted, domestic issue that should be rebuffed at every opportunity.

Review of Defense Guidelines: The Security Declaration at the April 1996 Summit committed both countries to revise our bilateral Defense Guidelines to allow greater military cooperation in Japan's defense and in response to regional contingencies such as one on the Korean peninsula. The issue is politically sensitive and the GOJ is responding very slowly. We need to keep the pressure on. The goal is to complete work on the guidelines by Fall, 1997.

ECONOMIC

Civil Aviation: We seek to replace the 1952 agreement with one preserving U.S. carriers' existing rights and expanding access to Japan and beyond. Japan opposes our Open Skies proposal which would benefit consumers and firms in both countries with increased efficiency and innovation.

Deregulation: We need to encourage the GOJ to take concrete actions on deregulation, focusing on areas where U.S. firms are competitive like imported housing, telecommunications and financial services.

Port Practices: To compel the GOJ to eliminate the monopoly of the Japan Harbor Transportation Association over port management, our Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) has announced \$100,000 sanctions on Japanese container ships when they call at U.S. ports, effective April 14 unless reforms are made. Restrictive port practices raise costs for U.S. and Japanese carriers as well as for other businesses.

WTO Film Case: This could be our most important WTO case

this
year. It addresses GOJ toleration of anti-competitive
business practices
restricting access to Japan's photographic film and paper
market. The WTO
decision is expected in September.

Implementation of Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements: High
level officials
must continue to emphasize the importance we attach to full
implementation of
trade agreements to stave off Japanese backsliding. Key
sectors we are
watching include telecom, autos, and construction.

ENVIRONMENTAL

The Common Agenda: The next Common Agenda Plenary will be
held
May 22 in Washington and will be co-chaired by U/S Wirth
and MOFA VM Ogura.
New areas for possible inclusion include work in climate
change observation
facilities worldwide, which Japan proposes to fund with as
much as \$5 billion,
and a joint oil spill study in light of the January
shipwreck of a Russian oil tanker
off the coast of Japan.

COP-3: We have discussed jointly preparing for
negotiations to adopt
a protocol on greenhouse gas emission reductions at the
Conference of the
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(COP-3),
scheduled for December 1-12 in Kyoto. Japan's inability to
develop internal
consensus has allowed its leadership in international
negotiations to drift. We
need to stress the urgency of bringing our two draft
protocols together.

DIPLOMATIC

Japan works closely with us on international matters,
especially those in
Asia. Regionally, Japanese cooperation has been most
important in KEDO and
related activities with North Korea. Japan is also active
-- primarily as a

financial contributor -- in Bosnia reconstruction, and helpful in the Middle East Peace Process, African humanitarian crises, Latin American development, and Afghanistan.

United Nations: Japan would like recognition as a global player and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, an objective the U.S. supports. We also need Japan's support for our UN reform proposals, including budget cutbacks in the UN system and a lower U.S. share of the UN budget, which will entail a higher share for Japan. The U.S. supports permanent membership for Japan and Germany on the UN Security Council, and we are working with both countries to develop international support for such an initiative. Any lowering of the United States' UN assessment would likely cause Japan's to increase, a burden the GOJ appears unlikely to be willing to accept without clear progress toward permanent status on the Security Council.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 March 97 12:18

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JPNCMNAG.DOC
JAPAN: COMMON AGENDA

President Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa launched the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective ("Common Agenda") in July 1993, as part of the Framework for a New Economic Partnership. The Common Agenda Plenary meets regularly, under the leadership of U/S Wirth and MOFA Vice Minister Ogura, and issues a joint report to the President and the Prime Minister. The next Common Agenda Plenary will be held May 22 in Washington.

Under the Common Agenda, we are cooperating on more than two dozen initiatives covering a broad range of the world's most pressing global problems such as health, rapid population growth and the environment. The Common Agenda is an important symbol of the broad based nature of U.S.-Japan relations and further demonstrates our ability to cooperate on solving difficult transnational issues.

Both the USG and the GOJ are pleased with the concrete accomplishments under the Common Agenda and its role in strengthening the bilateral relationship. GOJ officials regularly watch to see whether our side raises the Common Agenda in bilateral discussions and attach much importance to our continued attention to the Common Agenda in bilateral discussions on U.S.-Japan relations.

Under the Common Agenda, the U.S. and Japan have launched joint conservation efforts in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia, we have jointly-funded a biodiversity center. We are also working together to protect nature reserves in five Central American and Caribbean countries through the Parks in Peril Program. Together with other international partners, we have galvanized world support for the International Coral Reef Initiative, a program aimed at protecting and conserving these valuable marine resources.

In light of the devastation recently caused by earthquakes in Japan and California, we are working together to improve earthquake forecasting and warning, to mitigate the damage caused by earthquakes and to improve the design and construction of buildings. The second U.S.-Japan earthquake policy symposium will be held in Japan in the fall.

On the health front, we are working with longstanding programs to

eradicate polio worldwide by the year 2000. We are also funding a project to enhance the availability of children's vaccines in the developing world. We are working closely on rapid population growth and HIV/AIDS programs in Bangladesh, Kenya, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Pending the results of negotiations between now and the visit, we expect the Vice President will be able to discuss new areas of environmental cooperation under the Common Agenda.

Japan's Science and Technology Agency is considering supplying over \$5 billion during the next five years to fund climate change research facilities worldwide. As envisioned by the Japanese, this would begin as a bilateral effort involving, among others, the Universities of Hawaii and Alaska. The Embassy is probing the GOJ to determine if this cooperation can be announced as part of the Global Observation Information initiative under the Common Agenda during the Vice President's visit.

After the disaster caused by the shipwreck of a Russian oil tanker off the coast of Japan in January, Japan has indicated a desire to jointly study oil spills. This cooperation could begin in the form of joint monitoring of Prince William Sound (the site of Exxon Valdez) and the Sea of Japan as well as by inviting Japanese scientists to visit NOAA's Hazardous Materials Division in Seattle to see its computer modeling of oil spill movement. We are working to see if an announcement of joint cooperation under the Common Agenda can be made during the Vice President's visit.

As a result of the Lima hostage crisis, Japan has expressed an interest in further strengthening counter-terrorism cooperation. Also pending resolution of the standoff in Lima is our shared priority for expanding

collaboration in Latin America. Successes in the region--civil society and democracy in El Salvador, alternative crop development in Peru, girls education in Guatemala--make us optimistic that this is an area of significant opportunity for the future.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 March 97 12:0

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JPNINFRA.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: 3/11/02

JAPAN: GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES

Global Positioning System

Last year Vice President Gore announced our policy directive on the management and use of the Global Positioning System (GPS). (This part of the Global Information Infrastructure uses satellite data to provide a precise location anywhere on the earth.) We seek to promote the civilian use of this system worldwide. We are discussing technical, national security, and commercial issues in separate talks with the Japanese, Europeans and Russians. We intend to propose a bilateral agreement on cooperation with Japan at the next talks tentatively set for late April.

Encryption

U.S. cryptography policy seeks to protect the privacy of electronic communications and data, promote development of electronic commerce and the Global Information

Infrastructure, and ensure lawful access to these protected items on national security or law enforcement grounds. On October 1, 1996, the Vice President announced an encryption policy initiative that would establish a Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) designed and built by the private sector. In such a plan, encryption users would deposit a copy of their key with a trusted private or government entity who provides the key to the user or to authorized law enforcement officials. The Administration is drafting legislation to implement this system. Although the GOJ is sympathetic to our aims, Japan's laws strictly protect individual privacy. An international encryption agreement could, however, make key recovery more palatable domestically in Japan. We are discussing Japan's idea to hold an export control experts' meeting soon with key countries. Japan has also suggested addressing the encryption issue in the G-7/P-8 process.

International Space Station

Japan is contributing more than \$3 billion to develop the International Space Station. This contribution, which is managed and integrated by the National Space Development Agency (NASDA), will fund a pressurized laboratory module with an attached exposed facility and remote manipulator system. While the other non-US partners (Russia, Europe, and Canada) are having budget shortfalls, cost overruns, or both, the Japanese have made steady progress in developing the components. They are concerned that the Russian Space Agency's funding problems may cause the date for beginning on-orbit assembly of the space station to slip well beyond the current target of November, 1997.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 March 97 12:16

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JPNRGION.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: National Security Advisor to the Vice President

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/6/2007

JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Japan's greatest national security preoccupations are China and the Korean

Peninsula. Despite strong economic ties with China and South Korea, and shared

concern about North Korea, Japan's relations with its two continental neighbors are

burdened with historical, political and territorial problems, as well as incipient strategic

rivalry. Relations with Russia are complicated by Russian occupation of an island

group north of Hokkaido, the "Northern Territories." Japanese relations with the

Southeast Asian countries are better, and there are no territorial issues.

China: Japan is both fascinated with and wary of China. The

Japan-China economic

relationship, and Japan's huge Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loan

program, cushions periodic bumps in political relations, since

China identifies Japan's

market, and technology and aid, as crucial to Chinese economic success. Although

fairly sanguine about the short to medium term, Japan is wary of identifying China as

anything other than a potential long-term security problem.

China's nuclear tests,

military modernization program, attempted intimidation of Taiwan, actions in the

Spratleys, continuing evocation of World War II and portrayal of a potentially

remilitarized Japan as an adversary of China, and competing claim to the Senkaku

("Diaoyu" in Chinese) islands cast a new light of concern, in

Tokyo's eyes, on China's

rapid economic growth.

Japan welcomes U.S. efforts to improve ties with China, but requires constant

reassurance that the United States is not neglecting Japan.

Therefore, the GOJ places great value on frequent and detailed consultations with the U.S. at all levels on policy toward China, their key strategic rival. The U.S. would like greater Japanese support on human rights and non-proliferation issues involving China.

Korean Peninsula: Japan views North Korea as its most dangerous short-term threat.

Although its concerns have moderated greatly since the signing of the U.S.-DPRK

Agreed Framework in 1994, Japan remains worried about political instability in North

Korea and the DPRK's No-dong missiles, which can reach Japanese territory. Japan

relies heavily on the U.S. presence in South Korea to contain this security threat and

closely coordinates its Korean Peninsula policies with those of the U.S.

Accordingly, Japan has strongly supported the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO), the Agreed Framework, which terminated North Korea's nuclear

weapons development program, and the Four Party process.

Japan-South Korea

relations are cooperative, despite historical difficulties, a sovereignty dispute over the

Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tok-do islands), and bilateral differences on fisheries and

exclusive economic zones.

Further timely and generous Japanese financial backing for the North Korean light

water reactor project will be crucial to keep the KEDO program viable and on schedule.

Careful bilateral coordination with Japan and with the ROK to deal with food shortages

and other dangerous developments in North Korea must be continued.

Russia: Japan's Russia policy is moving slowly beyond a sole focus on the Northern

Territories issue. Japan recognizes the international community's interest (and its own)

in supporting development of a democratic and prosperous Russia.

It wants to see

Russia continue its cooperative engagement in the international community rather than

lapse into a purely nationalistic pursuit of self-interests.
Japanese apprehension about
China boosts interest in Russia as a possible counter-weight.
Actual and potential
Russian sales of arms and military technology to China are of
concern to Tokyo. Japan
has paid increasing attention to NATO-Russia discussions and
possible Asia security
implications of a NATO-Russia Charter, specifically impact on
Russian Far East military
deployments.

In the early 1990s, Japan agreed on a USD four billion dollar
framework for
investment in Russia, and government-to-government agreement have
been reached
on a USD 400 million first tranche of Exim Bank funding. Even
here, however, there
have been problems in finalizing concrete projects, and economic
ties are still relatively
weak. At this critical juncture for Russia, we hope that Japan
will continue to find ways --
including increased trade and investment -- to further the
process of economic reform
and Russia's integration into international economic
institutions.

Southeast Asia: Japanese trade with and investment in Asia --
especially the
Southeast Asian "tigers" -- is growing at an increasingly rapid
rate. During a January trip
to five ASEAN countries, Prime Minister Hashimoto tried to
balance those economic ties
with a call for closer regional coordination in Common
Agenda-like non-economic areas:
environment, cultural exchanges, counter-terrorism cooperation,
food and energy
shortages, and health and welfare issues. In a policy speech
delivered during the trip,
Hashimoto also proposed annual Japan-ASEAN summit meetings for
broader and
deeper exchanges, an idea which the ASEAN countries appear to be
considering.
Hashimoto also touched lightly on Burma human rights, but Japan
is not as concerned
as we are about Burma's accession to ASEAN. Japan is an active
participant in the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which aims at greater regional
security dialogue and
military transparency. Still, the legacy of Japan's role during

the Second World War
continues to place limits on its acceptance as a regional leader.

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JAPAN: U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is in good shape -- the result of last April's summit and more than two years of high level attention in Tokyo and Washington. Our defense relationship, including forward military deployments, makes Japan central to the United States' strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Governments in the region generally see the U.S.-Japan partnership as key to political and military stability and to economic prosperity in the region, although China has expressed concern that the U.S.-Japan Security Declaration is a vehicle to "contain" China. The U.S. forward deployment strategy in East Asia relies on our bases in Japan. At present about 47,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Japan. The Japanese Government provides about \$5 billion a year in host nation support (HNS), about 70 percent of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.

Common Strategic Goals

The United States and Japan share major strategic interests and concerns in the region. Both seek continued stability on the Korean Peninsula and the faithful execution of the Agreed Framework. We both encourage China to play an active, constructive role in the international community. China and Japan dispute the sovereignty of the Senkaku ("Diaoyu" in

Chinese) islands. We do not side with either country on the relative merits of their competing sovereignty claims. Japan continues to view Russia's presence in Northeast Asia warily, in part as a result of the lack of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty and Russia's occupation of the Northern Territories. We support Japan's position on the latter issue.

Current Review of the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines

At the April 1996 Summit in Tokyo, President Clinton and Hashimoto signed a joint Security Declaration reaffirming the bilateral alliance. The Declaration noted areas of continued tension in the region and underscored the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship to both countries and to regional peace and stability. The two leaders agreed to a Review of the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and to closer policy coordination on situations around Japan that would have an important influence on Japan's security (e.g., the Taiwan Strait). The review was formally established in late June and is scheduled to be completed in Fall, 1997.

The U.S. objective for the Guidelines review is to provide the underlying political authority for bilateral military planning both for U.S. military operations in regional contingencies and for the defense of Japan. Japan's Constitution and the provisions contained in Article 9 ("Renunciation of War") have not been -- and will not be -- a subject of this Guidelines discussion. In bilateral workshops and meetings, we are identifying specific support we would want from Japan in a Korean contingency, but the issue is politically sensitive and Tokyo is responding

very slowly. We need to keep the pressure on.

Progress on SACO

The Security Declaration also endorsed the then ongoing work of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which completed its work in December and announced substantial consolidations of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Eleven U.S. bases will be returned, in whole or in part. The returned areas total 12,000 acres, more than 21 percent of the land now used by U.S. forces in Okinawa. We agreed to complete a detailed implementation plan for the return of Futenma Marine Air Corps Station within a year and to return the base, after adequate replacement facilities are finished, within seven years. The SACO Final Report states that the replacement for Futenma will be a sea-based facility on the east side of Okinawa. Japan is committed to designating a site early this year, but its coordination with Okinawa Prefectural authorities and local communities is complicated by the domestic political scene and Okinawa's desire to extract concessions from Tokyo in exchange for its cooperation on base issues. We must maintain pressure while being sensitive to the delicate relationship between Okinawa and the central government.

Another Okinawa problem looms this spring. Okinawa Governor Ota may once again refuse to renew base leases in the face of opposition from anti-base land owners. On May 14, 3,000 leases that cover large parts of Kadena Air Base and other facilities will expire. The GOJ plans to seek special legislation to shift control of the renewal process to the central government from the prefecture, but will face strong opposition in the Diet. Our role is limited to private expressions of concern to ensure the GOJ pushes ahead.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is a controversial issue in

Japan
because of worry about China's reaction, concern about the
high cost,
technological uncertainties, and opposition from the left.
We (largely DOD) have
engaged the GOJ in technical, office-director level
exchanges on this issue for
the last two years.

Japan is unlikely to decide to get on board this year, when
JDA completes its
study of the issue, but prospects are good for an agreement
that will allow Japan
to build many aspects of TMD under the rubric of enhanced
air defense.

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JAPAN: BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES

U.S. trade policy has aimed at opening Japan's markets, so that
foreign firms can
compete on an equal footing. The Framework Agreement, signed by
President Clinton
and PM Miyazawa in 1993, governs our bilateral trade
relationship. We have negotiated
23 Framework agreements since then. Despite recent successes in
insurance,
semiconductors, extending IPR protection, and distilled spirits,
Japan remains a difficult
market. Government regulations and restrictive private business
practices impede entry
and expansion. We are pressing Japan to implement existing
agreements and to
deregulate its economy. Full implementation of bilateral and
multilateral agreements is
key. High level officials must continue to emphasize the
importance we attach to the
U.S.-Japan economic agenda to stave off Japanese backsliding.

Civil aviation is the most pressing bilateral issue we face in
the coming months. We
seek to replace the 1952 agreement with one preserving our

existing rights and expanding access of U.S. carriers to Japan and beyond. The Japanese consider the present agreement an occupation era relic unbalanced in our favor because, they allege, certain U.S. carriers abuse their unlimited rights to fly beyond Japan to other points in Asia. We have proposed "open skies" with safety and security as the only constraints on operations. An "open skies" agreement, although unlikely, would greatly benefit consumers and firms in both countries by increasing competition, efficiency, and innovation. The March 4-6 talks were a useful exchange, but a significant gap remains. Further meetings are planned later this spring.

Our dispute over Japan's port practices also has a short fuse. On February 26, the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) announced sanctions of \$100,000 per entry from abroad on Japanese-owned or operated container ships, effective April 14. The FMC is seeking to compel the GOJ to eliminate the monopoly of the arbitrary and corrupt Japan Harbor Transportation Association (JHTA) over port management and stevedoring, an issue we have raised since 1982. The FMC's concerns include: 1) restrictions on granting stevedoring licenses that shield the JHTA and its members from competition, and 2) JHTA arbitrary requirements for "prior consultations" on even minor aspects of vessel operations. These practices raise costs and reduce the efficiency of all shippers. The GOJ has asked us to remove the sanctions, but we are insisting on concrete progress.

Deregulation has also been a focus of our attention, but progress has been slow. Though Prime Minister Hashimoto has said deregulation, which would stimulate Japan's sluggish economy, is a priority, Japanese bureaucrats and politicians have resisted the short-term dislocations deregulation would bring. We can make an impact by focusing high-level attention on special areas of interest to U.S. companies, such as telecommunications, financial services, imported housing,

distribution, and
transportation.

Government procurement practices in Japan are a concern. Some government entities have shielded procurement from open bidding despite existing WTO and bilateral agreements, particularly in telecom, satellites, and construction. For example, ensuring that foreign firms can bid on Chubu airport construction projects would be a major step forward. The GOJ needs to ensure that its National Policy Agency addresses the exclusion of a major U.S. firm from a telecom procurement and adheres to applicable agreements in the future.

We have several concerns regarding telecom market access. Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) maintains monopoly control over Japan's local phone service and equipment and dominates long distance service. Because NTT's progress in increasing purchases from foreign firms has not been adequate, we will seek renewal of our NTT procurement agreement in the fall. Although the GOJ maintained its cap on foreign investment in telecom firms at 20% in the WTO Global Basic Telecom Agreement, it promised to reconsider. In response, we have recommended that the FCC delay issuing licenses to NTT and another Japanese firm for long-distance service from the U.S. to third countries.

We have filed a case in the WTO regarding access problems in Japan's photographic film and paper market. This case promises to be our most important at the WTO this year and will highlight GOJ toleration and promotion of anti-competitive business practices. If we can break the stranglehold on the distribution sector, U.S. and other foreign firms will be able to compete on a more equal basis in Japan. A WTO decision is expected by mid-September.

Implementation of the 1995 Auto/Auto Parts Agreement has been generally good, but some problems remain, including the low number of new dealer outlets and inadequate

deregulation in the replacement parts market. As our bilateral trade deficit with Japan worsens with the weaker yen, attention to this sector is likely to rise.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The pace of UN Security Council reform efforts is intensifying: Germany and Japan have stepped up their campaigns to gain permanent seats and would like to see progress by the end of this year; and UNGA President Razali hopes to have the UN's Open-Ended Working Group on UNSC expansion conclude its work by this summer (it has been working the issue for several years, but has made little headway). Widespread disagreement continues on size and composition issues, as well as on the rights and prerogatives of existing permanent members and possible new permanent members. These disagreements, focused on the number of new permanent seats and on veto rights, make any acceptable expansion formula unlikely in the near term; gaining the necessary two-thirds UNGA majority for amending the UN Charter will be an arduous process.

USG support for Germany and Japan has produced a growing acceptance of them as appropriate candidates for permanent seats. However, many countries assert that if the two become permanent members, the UNSC must be made "more representative" by expanding it further to include members from other regions, in particular, the developing world.

The U.S. position is clear and of long standing: we do not want Charter changes to affect Perm Five status and prerogatives; we want to preserve UNSC effectiveness; we support Germany and Japan as new permanent members; we believe the world's regions should be fairly represented, without making the Council large and unwieldy (a Council of 20 would be acceptable); we are open to ending the restriction on self-succession by non-permanent members; and we support further procedural changes to increase transparency and broaden opportunities for non-members. We have taken no position on extending veto powers to Germany and Japan.

While pleased with our support, the Japanese have increasingly made a linkage between UN financial reform (our priority), which would result in Japan's paying more, and Tokyo's quest for permanent membership, pointing out that it will be difficult for the GOJ to "sell" increased costs to the Japanese public absent progress on increased status. Secretary Albright recently reiterated our firm backing for Japanese permanent membership, but warned that Japan must take the lead in making its case. In discussions with GOJ officials, it is useful to restate our support for Japanese permanent membership, underscore the need to avoid increasing Council size to a point that would render the UNSC ineffective, and to exchange thoughts on how to give impetus to the UNSC reform process.