



March 2, 1994

Co-Directors

Michael Pertschuk
David Cohen
Kathleen D. Sheekey

Board of Directors

Patricia Bauman
Helene Brown
Roger Craver
Elise Garcia
Peter Kovler
Terry Lierman
Richard Paisner
Leroy Richie
Jack Sheehan
Linda Tarr-Whelan
Dr. Reed V. Tuckson
Fred Wertheimer
Arthur White
Kenneth Young

Anne Bartley
Office of the First Lady
Old Executive Office Building
Room 100
17th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Anne:

Late last year, the Advocacy Institute – under a grant from the Joyce Foundation – convened two broadly diverse groups of persons deeply experienced in gun control, issue campaigning, movement building, alliance building, media advocacy, political consulting, and lobbying. Together, we addressed this question: what strategies are required to build sufficient political force and momentum to achieve, over the long term, a "gun-safe society?"

Of course, there are no short cuts, but these brainstorming sessions produced both strong insights and a broad consensus on key strategies. These are reflected in the enclosed report, *Toward a Gun-Safe Society: Movement Building Strategies*. We hope it will be useful to you, and we welcome your reactions – and your own strategic insights.

Sincerely yours,

David Cohen

Michael Pertschuk

Kathleen Sheekey

**TOWARD A GUN-SAFE SOCIETY:
Movement Building Strategies**

prepared by
The Advocacy Institute
under a grant from
The Joyce Foundation

February 1994

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	ii
Discussion	1
1) Movement Building	1
2) Reframing	5
3) Separating Concerned Gun Owners from Those Who Profit from Gun Traffic	6
4) Building and Assuring Effective Access to the Gun Policy Scientific Data Base	7
5) Media Advocacy	9
6) Alliance Building	11
7) Infrastructure Development	12
8) Strategies/Tactics	13

Executive Summary

On October 28 and November 9, 1993, the Advocacy Institute convened two broadly diverse groups of health professionals, children's advocates, and others who share a grave concern over the growth of gun violence in America. The participants brought deep experience and insight into the processes of national agenda setting, issue campaigning, movement building, alliance building, media advocacy, and public persuasion. Together, they addressed the strategies required to support and sustain legislative and other initiatives necessary to help achieve a gun-safe society.

This report itself is the work of the Advocacy Institute, and does not, in its particulars, necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the participants. Nevertheless, the report was informed and shaped by the individual and collective insights and judgments of the participants. Their salient observations and recommendations address these areas:

1) **Movement Building**

Despite the evident surge in both popular and governmental support for more aggressive handgun control legislation, no truly significant measures to reduce the threat of gun violence can be enacted without the development of a broadly based, strategically and tactically focused gun-safe society movement.

2) **Reframing**

No such movement can be mobilized or sustained unless its advocates succeed in broadening and reframing its thrust from crime control to the universal public health goal of prevention of firearm injury and safety from violence – safe streets, safe homes, safe schools, safe communities. Advocates must reframe the image of the gun itself to match the reality, from the source of safety and protection (false) to the source of aggravated danger and the *illusion* of security (true). Advocates must reveal the perceived constitutional right to any gun for any purpose as a constitutional illusion, and focus on the gun as an anomalous unregulated hazardous commercial product.

3) **Separating Concerned Gun Owners from Those Who Profit from Gun Traffic**

Many people who own guns are deeply concerned about gun violence – including many NRA members. At the same time, most of those who are concerned about gun violence respect the traditions of hunters and sportsmen. The configuration of forces aligned on behalf of gun-safe society policies must include responsible, concerned gun owners. At the same time, the extreme opposition must be unmasked as isolated extremists and front groups for those who profit from the indiscriminate, unregulated design, sale, and promotion of lethal weapons.

4) **Building and Assuring Effective Access to the Gun Policy Scientific Data Base**

To provide scientific support for both policy development and the reframing of gun policy as a public health issue requires both accelerated development and high-impact dissemination of science-based policy and policy-related research.

5) **Media Advocacy**

A sustained, skilled media advocacy campaign at national, state, and community levels is required to help reshape the media environment so that news coverage of gun violence understands and continuously supports the framing of gun violence stories as public health and safety stories.

6) **Alliance Building**

With such reframing, there will be great potential for mobilizing new alliances and coalition building around a gun-safe society policy advocacy agenda, but such mobilization cannot take place without carefully tailored outreach strategies, resources, and sustaining support.

7) **Infrastructure Development**

To support and sustain all of the above will require the development and financial support for a movement infrastructure which will facilitate information sharing and ready access to reliable data by journalists, policy makers, and advocates. Such movement building will also require strategic and tactical coordination utilizing new communications technologies, alliance and coalition building, advocacy training, and technical support.

8) **Strategies/Tactics**

A legislative strategy must flow from a coherent, long-term political strategy with concurrent community, state, and national agendas. Such a strategy must craft each incremental legislative initiative as a stepping stone to the long term goal of a gun-safe society. No legislative objective should be pursued that does not add momentum – as well as incremental gains – toward the long term goal of a gun-safe society. Legislative initiatives at all levels of government can define and mobilize the movement, laying the groundwork for future initiatives and providing opportunities for movement-building media advocacy – as well as enact concrete gun restraint measures.

Discussion

1) Movement Building

Despite the evident surge in both popular and governmental support for more aggressive handgun control legislation, no truly significant measures to reduce the threat of gun violence can be enacted without the development of a broadly based, strategically and tactically focused political movement.

Strengths and Opportunities. The participants agreed that this is a time of great opportunity for advocacy to reduce gun violence, and that the building blocks for a strong gun-safe society movement are in sight. Among the favorable factors identified:

- Heightened public awareness and concern about violence, and a new sense of public urgency in seeking governmental responses to violence.
- Heightened public awareness of the role of guns in aggravating the toll of death and debilitation from violence – not just crime – and corresponding broad public support for more aggressive gun control measures.
- The success of the Brady Bill provided a taste of the possibilities for significant gun control legislation and served to accelerate – rather than retard – momentum for stronger measures.
- Since no significant legislative campaign can succeed without both "inside" and "outside" support, this Administration's openness and potential leadership in exploring ways to address gun violence (as exemplified by the Joint Department of Justice/Department of Health and Human Services inter-agency task force), as well as the emergence of tested leadership in Congress, presents a window of opportunity.
- Handgun Control, Inc., The Coalition to Stop Gun Violence – experienced and gun control lobbies – as well as strategic resource centers such as the Centers for Disease Control National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, the Earl Warren Legal Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, The Violence Policy Center, The Trauma Foundation and Pacific Violence Center, The Berkeley Media Studies Group, the HELP Network of Concerned Professionals, among others – represent building blocks toward a movement and movement infrastructure.
- Many and diverse individuals and organizations are poised to take up advocacy against gun violence, or to raise the epidemic of gun violence to the top of their advocacy priorities – groups ranging from the Coalition for America's Children and the Children's Defense Fund to the NAACP, and the American Bar

Association; the AFL-CIO; large and small retailers; mayors and law enforcement officials and their organizations; the American Public Health Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and Physicians for Social Responsibility.

- Many other interest groups are potential recruits to a well-framed, well-structured movement which is prepared to nurture and sustain their involvement: churches, civic associations, parent and teacher organizations and youth leaders themselves; alcohol and other substance abuse control advocates; the entertainment industry (with the added incentive of doing penance for violent programming); the marketers of security systems and devices; at-risk government agencies such as the Post Office; businesses at risk both in the workplace and in vulnerable consumer outlets; and the travel, tourism, and insurance industries.
- There are important leaders in urban communities who view reducing firearm violence as integral to the solution to urban violence – Jesse Jackson among them. The victims of gun violence, and the networks of family and friends of victims (such as Detroit's Save our Sons and Daughters), serve as authentic voices within their communities and serve as a potential nucleus of gun-safe society advocates with an intensity of commitment that can match that of the most ardent NRA members.
- A growing group of philanthropic funders are ready to support the development of needed policy-oriented research, public education campaigns, and infrastructure development.
- The national focus on health care reform provides an opportunity to spotlight the mountainous economic costs of gun-related injuries.
- The NRA has lost some of its mythic power over lawmakers.
- Unlike the tobacco or alcohol industries, gun manufacturers are neither conglomerates nor linchpins of the national economy, so that business (and *pro bono* lawyer/lobbyist) mobilization for gun restraint legislation is less inhibited by interlocking dependencies.
- Many aspiring national movements are retarded by the absence of media attention, which is a necessary prerequisite for national agenda-setting. But gun violence is relentlessly newsworthy. Perhaps even more encouraging is that the media have become increasingly aware and focused on the role of gun availability in the acceleration of gun violence.
- Constitutional law experts are virtually unified and increasingly vocal in teaching that the Second Amendment was not intended to, and does not, restrict the ability of the federal or state governments to restrain and regulate the private possession of guns.

Weaknesses and Threats. Despite these notable strengths and opportunities, there are formidable weaknesses, obstacles, and threats to the emergence of a strong, coherent, national movement for a gun-safe society, among them:

- No gun control organization, or coalition of organizations, yet begins to match the fiscal and organizational resources, the grassroots recruitment and networking, the political strategy, and, above all, the focused intensity and threat conveyed by the NRA and its allies to legislators.
- Current gun control efforts are fragmentary, uncoordinated. There is no common long-term vision or consensus on policy goals – e.g., there is ongoing conflict between those who want guns regulated and those who want to ban guns (especially handguns) altogether. Gun control leaders and lobbies offer different, often contradictory framings, widely varying visions and goals, and disparate legislative agendas.
- The lack of such common vision and strategy reflects the complex and intractable causes of gun violence – cf. the relatively clear, simple, and uniform goals of the tobacco control movement.
- There exists only limited connection and communication between national gun control lobbies and community-based organizations. While there are effective leaders and spokespersons, the gun control lobbies lack strategic depth and organizational breadth.
- Economically disadvantaged communities, racial and ethnic urban minority communities – the communities most affected by gun violence – have not been successfully drawn into campaigns to reduce gun violence, even though there are vigorous organized activists in these communities. Indeed, some leadership within such communities views efforts to control the epidemic of gun violence as a diversion from the root causes of violence. And there are those who see limiting access to firearms as designed to disarm urban populations, leaving guns only in the hands of their oppressors.
- The intermediary institutions needed to help incubate and sustain a national movement – strategic resource centers, information clearinghouses, communications networks – remain either unformed or grossly underfinanced.
- Some have promoted gun control laws solely, or essentially, as crime control measures, which plays to the NRA's strongest argument – that gun control will not wrest the guns from the hands of hardened criminals. Thus proponents of gun safety measures have lost control over the terms and symbols of the debate.
- Though there is, indeed, ample media coverage of gun violence, most coverage is still framed in terms of crime and individual violence, not as a product of gun ubiquity.

- Despite the broadening of the advocacy base, especially to the law enforcement community, gun control advocacy is still largely viewed by the media and public as a "liberal" initiative. For too many citizens, to support restrictions on firearms is still to be soft on crime.
- As the perception of violence surges, more and more threatened citizens view gun ownership as vital to their personal safety, especially in the absence of pervasive and effective violence prevention and law enforcement.
- People who feel immediately threatened by gun violence are more likely to respond by seeking personal protection through guns or other security systems than by enlisting in a problematic gun control campaign.
- There remains a dearth of sound scientific data, and the absence of systematic dissemination of such data as do exist in formats designed to inform the media and establish the scientific basis for gun policy initiatives.
- While generally supportive of measures to restrict access to guns, the public remains unconvinced of the efficacy of such measures in reducing either crime or gun violence. This lack of conviction leads inevitably to fatalism or numbness in confronting gun violence which, in turn, leaches away the conviction and intensity essential to an effective political movement. Such skepticism is reinforced by the patent lack of effectiveness of existing gun control laws and regulations, including the assumption that the Brady Bill will have little effect.
- The NRA has succeeded in promoting the constitutional myth that gun possession is an unrestricted right, thereby undermining the legitimacy of initiatives to restrict guns and further enervating potential citizen activism for measures to reduce the epidemic of gun violence.

2) Reframing

No such movement can be mobilized or sustained unless its advocates succeed in broadening and reframing its thrust from crime control to the universal public health goal of prevention of firearm injury and safety from violence – safe streets, safe homes, safe schools, safe communities. Advocates must reframe the image of the gun itself to reflect the dangerous reality, rather than the false illusion of security. Advocates must reveal the perceived constitutional right to any gun for any purpose as a constitutional misunderstanding, and focus on the gun as a quixotically unregulated consumer product, the source of proliferating death and maiming.

Guns, not criminals, must be the focus of public debate: guns in the home, prey to curious children; guns handy in sudden anger, perhaps inflamed by alcohol; guns in the hands of school children, in the hands of depressed, suicidal, and mentally unstable persons; guns in the hands of persons under the influence of alcohol and other drugs.

Crime control cannot be ignored – just the opposite. But restricting access to guns cannot stand only as a crime control measure; it's simply not credible in the absence of other measures that promise the security which people seek in guns.

The problem definition of gun violence must shift:

- from crime control to *public health and safety* (which encompasses but is far broader than crime control);
- from guns as an issue of crime to *guns as an issue of women, children, family, business, labor, and crime*.
- from gun control to *reducing gun violence*;
- from gun violence as a problem of young, mostly black, inner-city criminals to *gun violence as a universal affliction of our society*;
- from gun violence equating with criminal violence to gun violence equating with *suicide and alcohol-induced gun use and* criminal violence;
- from the right to bear arms to *the right to be safe and secure from guns*;
- from guns as a symbol of strength and security to guns as *symbolic of weakness and fear*;
- from firearms regulation as politically left/soft on crime to firearms regulation as *centrist/tough – an integral part of comprehensive crime control measures*.
- from guns as an American birthright to *guns as an insanely unregulated and unconstrained marketed consumer product*.

3) Separating Concerned Gun Owners from Those Who Profit from Gun Traffic

Many people who own guns are deeply concerned about gun violence – including many NRA members. At the same time, most of those who are concerned about gun violence respect the traditions of hunters and sportsmen. The configuration of forces aligned on behalf of gun-safe society policies must include responsible, concerned gun owners. At the same time, the extreme opposition must be unmasked as isolated extremists and front groups for those who profit from the indiscriminate, unregulated design, sale, and promotion of lethal weapons.

There are delicate ethical as well as strategic issues here. The NRA contains thousands of moderate sportsmen and citizens who are rationally – if misguidedly – arming for their safe defense. They must not be scorned or marginalized. Yet certain essential truths need to be highlighted: much of the financial support of the NRA comes from the \$8 billion* industry that profits from the unregulated proliferation of guns – so to that extent the NRA needs to be exposed as an industry "front."

Again, NRA policies and tactics are heavily influenced by staff and board members who are rightly labeled – and must be seen as – outer-fringe ideologues.

The symbolism of unrestrained gun bearing – and those who advocate it – needs to be transformed from the defense of a right and a tradition to the reckless and ruthless defense of gun violence – a constitutionally unrecognized and illegitimate threat to society, killing our children and making our streets unsafe.

* *USA Today*, December 29, 1993, p. 1.

4) Building and Assuring Effective Access to the Gun Policy Scientific Data Base

To provide scientific support for both policy development and the reframing of gun policy as a public health issue requires both accelerated development and high-impact dissemination of policy and policy-related research.

Among the research needs identified are:

- "Social math," the presentation of basic research data in a form which gives content to, and supports framing strategies such as: the universality of gun violence in all communities; and the medical toll of gun violence, e.g. mandatory reporting by emergency rooms of gunshots as a source of injury/death.
- Searching out and evaluating promising policies, techniques, interventions, and opportunities to reduce gun violence (such as the use of electronic devices to detect concealed handguns) to advance and replicate successes, to learn from failures.
- Comparative studies between other countries and the U.S., such as those which show equivalent crime rates, but death rates from guns dramatically lower outside the U.S.
- Election studies and data, including polling data, which can dispel the myth of the NRA political threat.
- Polling and focus group formative research in support of strategic development and message framing, including the test of such issue frames as the pursuit of a "gun-safe society" and of guns as anomalous "unregulated consumer products."
- Studies/report cards comparing gun violence policies in vanguard and regressive jurisdictions.
- Legal research and model briefs which show the fallacious nature of Second Amendment rhetoric.
- Case studies of successful community mobilization efforts in support of gun-safe society policies.

Equally critical is the need for the systematic dissemination of comprehensive and reliable data to journalists, policy makers, and policy advocates. The following tasks demand high priority:

- The identification and evaluation of the state of existing gun policy and policy related research.

- The identification of critical gaps in such research and the development of a priority research agenda.
- The development of a gun science resource center and consortium of gun policy researchers, with the capacity to inform actively and provide ready access to journalists, policy makers, and advocates.

Such a center and consortium could provide a broad range of information services, including:

- 1) Developing, organizing, and maintaining an electronically accessible gun policy and policy-related research data base.
- 2) A system producing periodic gun policy research information alerts and updates to key journalists.
- 3) A system for making consortium and other gun policy researchers available and readily accessible to journalists.
- 4) Training and technical support for researchers to assist them in the effective dissemination to the media of their research findings and the policy implications of such findings.

5) Media Advocacy

A sustained, skilled media advocacy campaign at national, state, and community levels is required to help reshape the media environment so that news coverage of gun violence continuously supports the framing of gun violence stories as public health and safety stories.

Well-trained and up-to-date informed media advocates throughout the country must undertake a variety of media initiatives, directed at national, state, and local mass media.

They must:

- Develop ongoing relationships and, on a regular basis, alert (and remind) columnists and journalists on crime, education, family, and health beats of the role of gun availability in breaking gun violence stories.
- Develop localized stories on policy and policy-related research designed to gain the optimum exposure and understanding of the policy implications of such research.
- Visit editorial boards, develop and disseminate editorial memoranda on gun issues, develop and place op-ed articles and letters to the editor.
- Develop credible community spokespersons, authentic voices – such as police chief/hunter, gun victim/school teacher, youth sports hero, military combat hero, musicians credible to teenagers.
- Design and utilize limited paid advertising to frame the message, especially if such advertising can itself be made newsworthy and stimulate "free" news media coverage.
- Promote investigative reporting on the NRA, especially stories which expose its gun industry funding base, its cruder lobbying and campaign spending strategies, its internal dissent, the ties of its leadership to extremist political groups, its bullying tactics in response to internal dissent, its distortions of research data, and its misrepresentations.
- Promote investigative stories zeroing in on the profitability, aggressive marketing practices, and corporate irresponsibility of gun manufacturers and sellers.
- Create or dramatize newsworthy events, such as Congresswoman Pat Schroeder's night in an emergency ward, that can help frame gun violence as a public health issue.

- Initiate and promote stories contrasting the stringent, safety-based regulation of other hazardous consumer products with the unregulated and unrestrained design, manufacture, marketing, advertising, and sale of guns and bullets.
- Encourage entertainment producers and writers to offer programs and stories modeling non-gun, non-violent conflict resolution or demonstrating the inherent dangers of gun possession.

6) Alliance Building

With such reframing, there will be great potential for mobilizing new alliances and building coalitions around a gun-safe society policy advocacy agenda, but such mobilization cannot take place without carefully tailored outreach strategies, resources, and sustaining support.

As we have seen (in *Strengths and Opportunities*, above), there are new constituencies and organizations ready to be integrated into a coherent national gun-safe society movement – and others potentially reachable.

Some, such as the Coalition for America's Children, have already placed arresting the epidemic of gun violence high on their policy agendas. But such groups lack both internal staff resources and external technical support – including the strategic counseling and training, and readily adaptable campaign materials needed to translate interest into focused activity.

Others must be actively recruited, with policy agendas, supporting data and messages crafted to appeal to special constituencies. For example, it is possible to recruit sportsmen and hunters to support policies which restrict access to guns – the small NRA dissenters group, the American Firearms Association, so attests. But the recruiting messages for hunters – and the identity of the best messengers – will necessarily be far different from those required to convince urban minorities that giving up their guns will not simply invite armed racism by police.

Business groups will need to see convincing data on the economic costs of gun violence in the workplace. Professional sports enterprises might be mobilized by creative analysis of the impact of threatened gun violence on game attendance and the risk to athletes – and an affirmative appeal to the use of sports heroes as role models. The imagination of youth groups in the Southwest might be fired by the recruitment of their role models, e.g., "real cowboys don't carry guns." Groups focused on the advocacy of policies designed to prevent alcohol problems should be provided with compelling evidence of the nexus of alcohol, guns, and violent death.

Low-income and minority communities pose special challenges for alliance building. Some see guns as a crucial line of defense – not solely against criminals but against police, whom they may also perceive as a threat. Others see the focus on guns as a diversion from core issues breeding violence, such as the lack of adequate economic development and jobs. To build successful alliances in these communities will require willingness to embrace a broad agenda addressing gun policy along with the underlying issues that give rise to violence.

In all these cases, the potential for recruitment will be lost without the presence of a resourceful movement infrastructure to develop recruitment strategies and sustaining technical assistance.

7) Infrastructure Development

To support and sustain all of the above will require the development of – and financial support for – a movement infrastructure which will facilitate information sharing, ready access to reliable data by journalists, policy makers, and advocates, and the development and dissemination of campaign materials. Such movement building will also require strategic and tactical coordination utilizing the new communications technologies, alliance and coalition building, advocacy training, and technical support.

Such infrastructure must include, in addition to the strengthening of "front-line" lobbying organizations:

- a national interactive communications system or systems readily accessible to community-based advocates – to facilitate data sharing and access, strategic exchanges, networking and alliance building, media advocacy, and lobbying;
- coordination of strategic and tactical development and guidance;
- technical assistance, including support and training in alliance building and organizing, media advocacy training and guidance;
- a systematic, readily accessible, coordinated system for tracking gun industry and gun lobby organizations, strategies, and tactics, and for the study, development, and teaching of effective counter-strategies and tactics.

8) Strategies/Tactics

A legislative strategy must flow from a coherent, long-term political strategy with concurrent community, state, and national agendas. Such a strategy must craft each incremental legislative initiative as a stepping stone to the long term goal of a gun-safe society. No legislative objective should be pursued that does not add momentum – as well as incremental gains – toward the long term goal of a gun-safe society. Legislative initiatives at all levels of government can define and mobilize the movement, laying the groundwork for future initiatives and providing opportunities for movement-building media advocacy – as well as enact concrete gun restraint measures.

Several strategic concepts may help to flesh out this general framework, though they are by no means comprehensive:

1. It is important that the gun-safe society movement set a long-term goal which is realistic, yet ambitious and significant – and capable of mobilizing broad and intense long-term support. Such a goal might be:

the virtual elimination of handguns in the home or concealed on the person, except for a controlled, limited number of licensed owners who demonstrate both need and competency.
2. A legislative agenda that addresses the epidemic of gun violence – at local, state, and national levels – must be part of a broader policy and legislative framework that addresses public concerns and the need for crime control along with social legislation that addresses the root causes of violence and crime.
3. It is important to develop a political strategy in support of the legislative strategy that consistently challenges pro-NRA candidates' campaign funding and other ties to the NRA, and that provides support for candidates willing to take a strong stand against gun violence. A handbook for political consultants providing guidance to candidates on how to address gun violence issues and respond to NRA attacks would be useful.
4. A gun-safe society constitutional and product liability litigation strategy should support and complement the legislative strategy, for example by developing and pursuing test cases that challenge the NRA's claims for the reach of the Second Amendment.

Finally, there exist both an immediate opportunity and an immediate threat that should be addressed now:

The Opportunity: the Clinton Administration's Violence Task Force, co-chaired by HHS and Justice, is a potential launching pad not only for specific gun control measures but for the building of a true national movement. All those concerned about gun violence should seek to guide the task force and the Administration to a set of sound and far-reaching proposals grounded in the prevention-oriented public health vision of a gun-safe society.

The Threat: The NRA has succeeded in gaining the passage in many states of preemptive state legislation which bars cities and counties from enacting innovative, or vanguard gun control ordinances. The potential role of cities and states as laboratories and incubators is highly promising; challenging the denial by remote state capitals of the right of cities and counties to secure the safety of their citizens is a soundly conservative principle. Resisting and overturning such preemptive legislation is not only a priority legislative objective, but has the potential for mobilizing broad support.

GUN VIOLENCE MEETING PARTICIPANTS
October 28 and November 9, 1993

Rebecca Archer
Intern
Advocacy Institute

Douglas Bailey
Chairman
American Political Network, Inc.

Susan Bales
Director of Children's Programs
Benton Foundation

Kathy Bonk
Co-Director
Communications Consortium

David Bositis
Joint Center on Political and Economic Studies

David Cohen
Co-Director
Advocacy Institute

Laurie Duker
Senior Fellow, Children's Safety Network
National Center for Education for Maternal and
Child Health

Charles G. Ehrlich, Esq.
Pettit & Martin
Founder, Legal Community Against Violence

Veronica Johnson
Assistant to Co-Directors
Advocacy Institute

Susan Kaplan
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on the
Constitution
Senate Judiciary Committee

Larry Kirkman
Executive Director
The Benton Foundation

Erna Koch
Legal Fellow
Center for Policy Alternatives

Deborah Leff
President
The Joyce Foundation

Wendy Schaetzel Lesko
Activism 2000

Green Lewis
Director of Community Services
AFL-CIO

Andrew McGuire
Executive Director
The Trauma Foundation

Zoe Mikva
Director of Development
The Advocacy Institute

Mark MacCarthy
Vice President, Government Affairs
Capital Cities - ABC Inc.

Vicki Otten
Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Simon

Michael Pertschuk
Co-Director
Advocacy Institute

Manny Rouvelas
Preston, Gates, Ellis & Rouvelas, Meeds

Kathleen Sheekey
Co-Director
Advocacy Institute

Shoshanna Sofaer
Department of Health Care Sciences
George Washington University

Josh Sugarmann
Executive Director
Violence Policy Center

Linda Tarr-Whelan
Executive Director
Center for Policy Alternatives

Larry Wallack, Ph.D.
President
Berkeley Media Studies Group

Judy Weitz
formerly Executive Director of Kids Count