

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Africa

file Africa

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March 4, 1997

Dear Melanne:

Thanks for inviting me to your meeting last week to scope out FLOTUS' trip to Africa. It sounds like a great set of stops, site visits, speeches and opportunities to learn and instruct. You are all going to have a wonderful time.

I enclose some rather technical materials on girls and women in Africa from various perspectives that might prove interesting. I enclose also that nasty article by Robert Kaplan on "The Coming Anarchy". It suggested that a whole continent -- indeed, a major portion of the world -- was going to hell on the basis of his brief and very limited visits to a couple of troubled places. It caught folks' attention but left what I think is a very misleading and destructive impression. As I said, you need to be aware of the most recent book of this genre (though much better written) by Keith Richberg of the Washington Post (called Out of America). Your press corps will likely have read it. If you need a copy, you can have mine.

Like a good, self-promoting academic, I also enclose a little article I published several years ago about all the transitions in Africa, political, economic, etc. The problems it addresses are still with us and it may set out a framework for thinking about them for you.

I have passed on to you already the best known novel and one of the best poems by African writers, "The Song of Lawino". (The poem was written by a Ugandan, now dead.) There is a pleasant, rather autobiographical novel by Bereket Selaisse (the man who is in charge of the constitutional commission in Eritrea) called Riding the Whirlwind that is worth reading. If you wish to have it and cannot easily get it, you can borrow my copy. (Might I be able to send Bereket a letter through you? He is one of my African "brothers". Everyone becomes a brother or sister quickly in Africa. Friendship is bypassed...)

As you can see, my approach to Africa as to other parts of the world is to try to understand their societies and cultures (as well as all the political and economic stuff) through the people directly when I have the opportunity and through their literature and music and other means of creation and self expression. I sense that is your approach as well. It also enriches us and makes us better able to empathize and communicate. With that in mind, I would recommend Ake* a wonderful book about the childhood of a well-known African writer. Would you like some African music? I can put together a tape with selections that you can take with you. It is wonderful music, both for listening and dancing. Some of it will not let you sit still. (You will undoubtedly hear a Kora player in Senegal -- the kora is a large, stringed instrument with

* I found a copy of this. Sending it in this package.

quite a nice sound that is played and sometimes accompanied by singing from a "griot" -- a professional singer, teller of traditional tales and creator of praise songs. Perhaps they will sing a song of praise for you all...)


There is another manifestation of culture you will want to take note of: things to buy. Be sure to buy yourselves African boubous -- the long, loose fitting dresses made of tie died cloth. Wonderful in Dakar. There are wonderful things in South Africa -- leather goods (also in Zimbabwe and probably cheaper), jewelry (malachite especially but lots of other stones too), and woven, mohair tapestries from South Africa and Lesotho available in South Africa (for example, in the Carlton Hotel shops in Jo'berg). You will like these. In Tanzania, take a look at Makonde wooden statues. Very imaginative. There are woodworkers on the Bagamoyo Road outside of Dar. I suspect there is less to acquire on Uganda and Eritrea (but look for silver Coptic jewelry). You won't need the entire cargo hold of your airplane on this trip, I'll wager.

The thing that will impress you most in Africa will be the women. They are very strong but frank and warm and compassionate. (I always use my 'old Swahili proverb' when addressing African women: If you want a job done right, ask an African woman. I made it up, of course, but all the African woman -- and men -- I have used it with nod their heads vigorously in agreement so it must be true.) The women must function in one of the most difficult social environments in the world for women. In some countries, they are legal minors, unable to own property. Your trip can help strengthen and encourage these women in their difficult struggle for a better life. There are many that stand out in my mind but Mphale Ramphale in South Africa (whom you probably know) is particularly impressive.

One final thought: why not consider using this trip to begin thinking about HRC's next book and why not make that book about the women (who raise the children in the first book)? The challenges that women face are worldwide challenges, differing only in degree. Identifying those challenges and presenting stories of how women in different parts of the world faced them (and overcame them) could be informative and inspirational to women everywhere. You will encounter some individuals on your trip who could be part of such a book. Something more lasting than just a visit ought to come out of these trips, if only because there are important issues you can make an enormous difference on. You haven't got much time and there is so much you can contribute.

Enough. I envy you your trip. Please call on me if I can do anything to help make it successful.

Yours,


Carol Lancaster

*P.S.
I enclose a
little west African
symbol of fertility -
may your trip be a
productive one!!*

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West African
Symbol of Fertility

West African
symbol of
Fertility



THE COMING ANARCHY

by ROBERT D. KAPLAN

*How scarcity,
crime, overpopulation,
tribalism, and disease
are rapidly destroying the social
fabric of our planet*

T

HE Minister's eyes were like egg yolks, an aftereffect of some of the many illnesses, malaria especially, endemic in his country. There was also an irrefutable sadness in his eyes. He spoke in a slow and creaking voice, the voice of hope about to expire. Flame trees, coconut palms, and a ballpoint-blue Atlantic composed the background. None of it seemed beautiful, though. "In forty-five years I have never seen things so bad. We did not manage ourselves well after the British departed. But what we have now is something worse—the revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the people least able to bring up children in a modern society." Then he referred to the recent coup in the West African country Sierra Leone. "The boys who took power in Sierra Leone come from houses like

this." The Minister jabbed his finger at a corrugated metal shack teeming with children. "In three months these boys confiscated all the official Mercedes, Volvos, and BMWs

Right: outside Monrovia, Liberia, civilian victims of civil war, dumped near the airport. Far right: government troops in Sierra Leone reoccupy a rebel position




and willfully wrecked them on the road." The Minister mentioned one of the coup's leaders, Solomon Anthony Joseph Musa, who shot the people who had paid for his schooling, "in order to erase the humiliation and mitigate the power his middle-class sponsors held over him."

Tyranny is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in the rest of West Africa. But it is now part and parcel of an increasing lawlessness that is far more significant than any coup, rebel incursion, or episodic experiment in democracy. Crime was what my friend—a top-ranking African official whose life would be threatened were I to identify him more precisely—really wanted to talk about. Crime is what makes West Africa a natural point of departure for my report on what the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century.

The cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate. "The government in Sierra Leone has

MIKE GOLDWATER NETWORK/MATHEU



no writ after dark," says a foreign resident, shrugging. When I was in the capital, Freetown, last September, eight men armed with AK-47s broke into the house of an American man. They tied him up and stole everything of value. Forget Miami: direct flights between the United States and the Murtala Muhammed Airport, in neighboring Nigeria's largest city, Lagos, have been suspended by order of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation because of ineffective security at the terminal and its environs. A State Department report cited the airport for "extortion by law-enforcement and immigration officials." This is one of the few times that the U.S. government has embargoed a foreign airport for reasons that are linked purely to crime. In Abidjan, effectively the capital of the Côte d'Ivoire, or Ivory Coast, restaurants have stick- and gun-wielding guards who walk you the fifteen feet or so between your car and the entrance, giving you an eerie taste of what American cities might be like in the future. An Italian ambassador was killed by gunfire when robbers invaded an Abidjan restaurant. The family of the Nigerian ambassador

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was tied up and robbed at gunpoint in the ambassador's residence. After university students in the Ivory Coast caught bandits who had been plaguing their dorms, they executed them by hanging tires around their necks and setting the tires on fire. In one instance Ivorian policemen stood by and watched the "necklacings," afraid to intervene. Each time I went to the Abidjan bus terminal, groups of young men with restless, scanning eyes surrounded my taxi, putting their hands all over the windows, demanding "tips" for carrying my luggage even though I had only a rucksack. In cities in six West African countries I saw similar young men everywhere—hordes of them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting.

"You see," my friend the Minister told me, "in the villages of Africa it is perfectly natural to feed at any table and lodge in any hut. But in the cities this communal existence no longer holds. You must pay for lodging and be invited for food. When young men find out that their relations cannot put them up, they become lost. They join other migrants and slip gradually into the criminal process."

"In the poor quarters of Arab North Africa," he continued, "there is much less crime, because Islam provides a social anchor: of education and indoctrination. Here in West Africa we have a lot of superficial Islam and superficial Christianity. Western religion is undermined by animist beliefs not suitable to a moral society, because they are based on irrational spirit power. Here spirits are used to wreak vengeance by one person against another, or one group against another." Many of the atrocities in the Liberian civil war have been tied to belief in *juju* spirits, and the BBC has reported, in its magazine *Focus on Africa*, that in the civil fighting in adjacent Sierra Leone, rebels were said to have "a young woman with them who would go to the front naked, always walking backwards and looking in a mirror to see where she was going. This made her invisible, so that she

could cross to the army's positions and there bury charms . . . to improve the rebels' chances of success."

Finally my friend the Minister mentioned polygamy. Designed for a pastoral way of life, polygamy continues to thrive in sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in Arab North Africa. Most youths I met on the road in West Africa told me that they were from "extended" families, with a mother in one place and a father in another. Translated to an urban environment, loose family structures are largely responsible for the world's highest birth rates and the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent. Like the communalism and animism, they provide a weak shield against the corrosive social effects of life in cities. In those cities African culture is being redefined while desertification and deforestation—also tied to overpopulation—drive more and more African peasants out of the countryside.

**A PREMONITION OF
THE FUTURE**

WEST Africa is becoming *the* symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. West Africa provides an appropriate introduction to the issues, often extremely unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization. To remap the political earth the way it will be a few decades hence—as I intend to do in this article—I find I must begin with West Africa.

There is no other place on the planet where political maps are so deceptive—where, in fact, they tell such lies—as in West Africa. Start with Sierra Leone. According to the map, it is a nation-state of defined borders, with a government in control of its territory. In truth the Sierra Leonian government, run by a twenty-seven-year-old army captain, Valentine Strasser, controls Freetown by day and by day also controls part of the rural interior. In the government's territory the national army is an unruly rabble threatening drivers and passengers at most checkpoints. In the other part of the country units of two separate armies from the war in Liberia have taken up residence, as has an army of Sierra Leonian rebels. The government force fighting the rebels is full of renegade commanders who have aligned themselves with disaffected village chiefs. A pre-modern formlessness governs the battlefield, evoking the wars in medieval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in the era of organized nation-states.

As a consequence, roughly 400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced, 280,000 more have fled to neighboring Guinea, and another 100,000 have fled to Liberia, even as

400,000 Liberians have fled to Sierra Leone. The third largest city in Sierra Leone, Gondama, is a displaced-persons camp. With an additional 600,000 Liberians in Guinea and 250,000 in the Ivory Coast, the borders dividing these four countries have become largely meaningless. Even in quiet zones none of the governments except the Ivory Coast's maintains the schools, bridges, roads, and police forces in a manner necessary for functional sovereignty. The Koranko ethnic group in northeastern Sierra Leone does all its trading in Guinea. Sierra Leonian diamonds are more likely to be sold in Liberia than in Freetown. In the eastern


more mosquitoes. Virtually everyone in the West African interior has some form of malaria.

Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war. West Africa is reverting to the Africa of the Victorian atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry, and an interior that, owing to violence, volatility, and disease, is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, "blank" and "unexplored." However, whereas Greene's vision implies a certain romance, as in the somnolent and charmingly seedy Freetown of his celebrated novel *The Heart of the Matter*, it is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher of demographic doom-day, who is now the prophet of West Africa's future. And West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world.

CONSIDER "Chicago." I refer not to Chicago, Illinois, but to a slum district of Abidjan, which the young toughs in the area have named after the American city. ("Washington" is another poor section of Abidjan.) Although Sierra Leone is widely regarded as beyond salvage, the Ivory Coast has been considered an African success story, and Abidjan has been called "the Paris of West Africa." Success, however, was built on two artificial factors: the high price of cocoa, of which the Ivory Coast is the world's leading producer, and the talents of a French expatriate community, whose members have helped run the government and the private sector. The expanding cocoa economy made the Ivory Coast a magnet for migrant workers from all over West Africa: between a third and a half of the country's population is now non-Ivorian, and the figure could be as high as 75 percent in Abidjan. During the 1980s cocoa prices fell and the French began to leave. The skyscrapers of the Paris of West Africa are a façade. Perhaps 15 percent of Abidjan's population of three million people live in shantytowns like Chicago and Washington, and the vast majority live in places that are not much better. Not all of these places appear on any of the readily available maps. This is another indication of how political maps are the products of tired conventional wisdom and, in the Ivory Coast's case, of an elite that will ultimately be forced to relinquish power.

Chicago, like more and more of Abidjan, is a slum in the bush: a checkerwork of corrugated zinc roofs and walls made of cardboard and black plastic wrap. It is located in a gully teeming with coconut palms and oil palms, and is ravaged by flooding. Few residents have easy access to electricity, a sewage system, or a clean water supply. The crumbly red

The press of population. Right: doing the wash in a lagoon in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast. Left: the nearly impassable downtown of Lagos, Nigeria.



THIS PAGE AND OPPOSITE: BETTY HESS/WOODFIN CAMP

provinces of Sierra Leone you can buy Liberian beer but not the local brand.

In Sierra Leone, as in Guinea, as in the Ivory Coast, as in Ghana, most of the primary rain forest and the secondary bush is being destroyed at an alarming rate. I saw convoys of trucks bearing majestic hardwood trunks to coastal ports. When Sierra Leone achieved its independence, in 1961, as much as 60 percent of the country was primary rain forest. Now six percent is. In the Ivory Coast the proportion has fallen from 38 percent to eight percent. The deforestation has led to soil erosion, which has led to more flooding and

helps to spread the disease. 10 percent of the population is HIV-positive. And war and refugee movements help the virus break through to more-remote areas of Africa. Alan Greenberg, M.D., a representative of the Centers for Disease Control in Abidjan, explains that in Africa the HIV virus and tuberculosis are now "fast-forwarding each other." Of the approximately 4,000 newly diagnosed tuberculosis patients in Abidjan, 45 percent were also found to be HIV-positive. As African birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.

It is malaria that is most responsible for the disease wall that threatens to separate Africa and other parts of the Third World from more-developed regions of the planet in the twenty-first century. Carried by mosquitoes, malaria, unlike AIDS, is easy to catch. Most people in sub-Saharan Africa have recurring bouts of the disease throughout their entire lives, and it is mutating into increasingly deadly forms. "The

great gift of Malaria is utter apathy," wrote Sir Richard Burton, accurately portraying the situation in much of the Third World today. Visitors to malaria-afflicted parts of the planet are protected by a new drug, mefloquine, a side effect of which is vivid, even violent, dreams. But a strain of cerebral malaria resistant to mefloquine is now on the offensive. Consequently, defending oneself against malaria in Africa is becoming more and more like defending oneself against violent crime. You engage in "behavior modification": not going out at dusk, wearing mosquito repellent all the time.

And the cities keep growing. I got a general sense of the future while driving from the airport to downtown Conakry, the capital of Guinea. The forty-five-minute journey in heavy traffic was through one never-ending shantytown: a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence. The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime. Stores were built out of

rusty shipping containers, junked cars, and jumbles of wire mesh. The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere. Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants. When the tide went out, dead rats and the skeletons of cars were exposed on the mucky beach. In twenty-eight years Guinea's population will double if growth goes on at current rates. Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed, and people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry. It seemed to me that here, as elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, man is challenging nature far beyond its limits, and nature is now beginning to take its revenge.

AFRICA may be as relevant to the future character of world politics as the Balkans were a hundred years ago, prior to the two Balkan wars and the First World War. Then the threat was the collapse of empires and the birth of nations based solely on tribe. Now the threat is more elemental: *nature unchecked*. Africa's immediate future could be very bad. The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering. (Nine of twenty-one U.S. foreign-aid missions to be closed over the next three years are in Africa—a prologue to a consolidation of U.S. embassies themselves.) Precisely because much of Africa is set to go over the edge at a time when the Cold War has ended, when environmental and demographic stress in other parts of the globe is becoming critical, and when the post-First World War system of nation-states—not just in the Balkans but perhaps also in the Middle East—is about to be toppled, Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.

To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war. The order in which I have named these is not accidental. Each concept except the first relies partly on the one or ones before it, meaning that the last two—new approaches to mapmaking and to warfare—are the most important. They are also the least understood. I will now look at each idea, drawing upon the work of specialists and also my own travel experiences in various parts of the globe besides Africa, in order to fill in the blanks of a new political atlas.

THE ENVIRONMENT AS A HOSTILE POWER

FOR a while the media will continue to ascribe riots and other violent upheavals abroad mainly to ethnic and religious conflict. But as these conflicts multiply, it will become apparent that something else is afoot, making more and more places like Nigeria, India, and Brazil ungovernable.

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Mention "the environment" or "diminishing natural resources" in foreign-policy circles and you meet a brick wall of skepticism or boredom. To conservatives especially, the very terms seem flaky. Public-policy foundations have contributed to the lack of interest, by funding narrowly focused environmental studies replete with technical jargon which foreign-affairs experts just let pile up on their desks.

It is time to understand "the environment" for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water de-

tween Hungary and Slovakia over the damming of the Danube, a classic case of how environmental disputes fuse with ethnic and historical ones. The political scientist and erstwhile Clinton adviser Michael Mandelbaum has said, "We have a foreign policy today in the shape of a doughnut—lots of peripheral interests but nothing at the center." The environment, I will argue, is part of a terrifying array of problems that will define a new threat to our security, filling the hole in Mandelbaum's doughnut and allowing a post-Cold War foreign policy to emerge inexorably by need rather than by design.



pletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh—developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War. In the twenty-first century water will be in dangerously short supply in such diverse locales as Saudi Arabia, Central Asia, and the southwestern United States. A war could erupt between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile River water. Even in Europe tensions have arisen be-

OUR Cold War foreign policy truly began with George F. Kennan's famous article, signed "X," published in *Foreign Affairs* in July of 1947, in which Kennan argued for a "firm and vigilant containment" of a Soviet Union that was imperially, rather than ideologically, motivated. It may be that our post-Cold War foreign policy will one day be seen to have had its beginnings in an even bolder and more detailed piece of written analysis: one that appeared in the journal *International Security*. The article, published in the fall of 1991 by Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon, who is the head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of

Toronto, was titled "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict." Homer-Dixon has, more successfully than other analysts, integrated two hitherto separate fields—military-conflict studies and the study of the physical environment.

In Homer-Dixon's view, future wars and civil violence will often arise from scarcities of resources such as water, cropland, forests, and fish. Just as there will be environmentally driven wars and refugee flows, there will be environmentally induced praetorian regimes—or, as he puts it, "hard regimes." Countries with the highest probability of acquiring hard regimes, according to Homer-Dixon, are those that are threatened by a declining resource base yet also have "a history of state [read 'military'] strength." Candidates include Indonesia, Brazil, and, of course, Nigeria. Though each of these nations has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late, Homer-Dixon argues that such tendencies are likely to be superficial "epiphenomena" having nothing to do with long-term processes that include soaring populations and shrinking raw materials. Democracy is problematic: scarcity is more certain.

Indeed, the Saddam Husseins of the future will have more, not fewer, opportunities. In addition to engendering tribal strife, scarcer resources will place a great strain on many peoples who never had much of a democratic or institutional tradition to begin with. Over the next fifty years the earth's population will soar from 5.5 billion to more than nine billion. Though optimists have hopes for new resource technologies and free-market development in the global village, they fail to note that, as the National Academy of Sciences has pointed out, 95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world, where governments now—just look at Africa—show little ability to function, let alone to implement even marginal improvements. Homer-Dixon writes, ominously, "Neo-Malthusians may underestimate human adaptability in *today's* environmental-social system, but as time passes their analysis may become ever more compelling."

While a minority of the human population will be, as Francis Fukuyama would put it, sufficiently sheltered so as to enter a "post-historical" realm, living in cities and suburbs in which the environment has been mastered and ethnic animosities have been quelled by bourgeois prosperity, an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in. In the developing world environmental stress will present people

with a choice that is increasingly among totalitarianism (as in Iraq), fascist-tending mini-states (as in Serb-held Bosnia), and road-warrior cultures (as in Somalia). Homer-

Dixon concludes that "as environmental degradation proceeds, the size of the potential social disruption will increase."

Tad Homer-Dixon is an unlikely Jeremiah. Today a boyish thirty-seven, he grew up amid the sylvan majesty of Vancouver Island, attending private day schools. His speech is calm, perfectly even, and crisply enunciated. There is nothing in his background or manner that would indicate a bent toward pessimism. A Canadian Anglican who spends his summers canoeing on the lakes of northern Ontario, and who talks about the benign mountains, black bears, and Douglas firs of his youth, he is the opposite of the intellectually



MICHAEL ENDE/FOCUS/MATRIX OPPOSITE DONNA DECESARE/IMPACT VISUALS

GREG GIMARD/CONTACT

Left: El Playón, El Salvador, repository of garbage and death-squad victims. Right: Rio de Janeiro (top) and Shanghai, crowded and still growing.

severe neoconservative, the kind at home with conflict scenarios. Nor is he an environmentalist who opposes development. "My father was a logger who thought about ecologically safe forestry before others," he says. "He logged, planted, logged, and planted. He got out of the business just as the issue was being polarized by environmentalists. They hate changed ecosystems. But human beings, just by carrying seeds around, change the natural world." As an only child whose playground was a virtually untouched wilderness and seacoast, Homer-Dixon has a familiarity with the natural world that permits him to see a reality that most pol-

icy analysts—children of suburbia and city streets—are blind to.

"We need to bring nature back in," he argues. "We have to stop separating politics from the physical world—the climate, public health, and the environment." Quoting Daniel Deudney, another pioneering expert on the security aspects of the environment, Homer-Dixon says that "for too long we've been prisoners of 'social-social' theory, which assumes there are only social causes for social and political changes, rather than natural causes, too. This social-social mentality emerged with the Industrial Revolution, which separated us from nature. But nature is coming back with a vengeance, tied to population growth. It will have incredible security implications.

"Think of a stretch limo in the potholed streets of New York City, where homeless beggars live. Inside the limo are the air-conditioned post-industrial regions of North America, Europe, the emerging Pacific Rim, and a few other isolated places, with their trade summitry and computer-information highways. Outside is the rest of mankind, going in a completely different direction."

WE are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel's and Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is "poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the Last Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not.

The Last Man will adjust to the loss of underground water tables in the western United States. He will build dikes to save Cape Hatteras and the Chesapeake beaches from rising sea levels, even as the Maldives Islands, off the coast of India, sink into oblivion, and the shorelines of Egypt, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia recede, driving tens of millions of people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions.

Homer-Dixon points to a world map of soil degradation in his Toronto office. "The darker the map color, the worse the degradation," he explains. The West African coast, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, China, and Central America have the darkest shades, signifying all manner of degradation, related to winds, chemicals, and water problems. "The worst degradation is generally where the population is highest. The population is generally highest where the soil is the best. So we're degrading earth's best soil."

China, in Homer-Dixon's view, is the quintessential example of environmental degradation. Its current economic "success" masks deeper problems. "China's fourteen percent growth rate does not mean it's going to be a world power. It means that coastal China, where the economic growth is taking place, is joining the rest of the Pacific Rim. The disparity with inland China is intensifying." Referring to the envi-

ronmental research of his colleague, the Czech-born ecologist Vaclav Smil, Homer-Dixon explains how the per capita availability of arable land in interior China has rapidly declined at the same time that the quality of that land has been destroyed by deforestation, loss of topsoil, and salinization. He mentions the loss and contamination of water supplies, the exhaustion of wells, the plugging of irrigation systems and reservoirs with eroded silt, and a population of 1.54 billion by the year 2025: it is a misconception that China has gotten its population under control. Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities, leading to a crime surge like the one in Africa and to growing regional disparities and conflicts in a land with a strong tradition of warlordism and a weak tradition of central government—again as in Africa. "We will probably see the center challenged and fractured, and China will not remain the same on the map," Homer-Dixon says.

Environmental scarcity will inflame existing hatreds and affect power relationships, at which we now look.

SKINHEAD COSSACKS, JUJU WARRIORS

IN the summer, 1993, issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Samuel P. Huntington, of Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, published a thought-provoking article called "The Clash of Civilizations?" The world, he argues, has been moving during the course of this century from nation-state conflict to ideological conflict to, finally, cultural conflict. I would add that as refugee flows increase and as peasants continue migrating to cities around the world—turning them into sprawling villages—national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups. In the eyes of these uneducated but newly empowered millions, the real borders are the most tangible and intractable ones: those of culture and tribe. Huntington writes, "First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic," involving, among other things, history, language, and religion. "Second . . . interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness." Economic modernization is not necessarily a panacea, since it fuels individual and group ambitions while weakening traditional loyalties to the state. It is worth noting, for example, that it is precisely the wealthiest and fastest-developing city in India, Bombay, that has seen the worst intercommunal violence between Hindus and Muslims. Consider that Indian cities, like African and Chinese ones, are ecological time bombs—Delhi and Calcutta, and also Beijing, suffer the worst air quality of any cities in the world—and it is apparent how surging populations, environmental degradation, and ethnic conflict are deeply related.

Huntington points to interlocking conflicts among Hindu, Muslim, Slavic Orthodox, Western, Japanese, Confucian, Latin American, and possibly African civilizations: for instance, Hindus clashing with Muslims in India, Turkic Muslims clashing with Slavic Orthodox Russians in Central Asian cities, the West clashing with Asia. (Even in the United States, African-Americans find themselves besieged by an influx of competing Latinos.) Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash official borders, bringing their passions with them, meaning that Europe and the United States will be weakened by cultural disputes.

Because Huntington's brush is broad, his specifics are vulnerable to attack. In a rebuttal of Huntington's argument the Johns Hopkins professor Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese-born Shi'ite who certainly knows the world beyond suburbia, writes in the September-October, 1993, issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

The world of Islam divides and subdivides. The battle lines in the Caucasus . . . are not coextensive with civilizational fault lines. The lines follow the interests of states. Where Huntington sees a civilizational duel between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Iranian state has cast religious zeal . . . to the wind . . . in that battle the Iranians have tilted toward Christian Armenia.

True, Huntington's hypothesized war between Islam and Orthodox Christianity is not borne out by the alliance network in the Caucasus. But that is only because he has misidentified which cultural war is occurring there. A recent visit to Azerbaijan made clear to me that Azeri Turks, the world's most secular Shi'ite Muslims, see their cultural identity in terms not of religion but of their Turkic race. The Armenians, likewise, fight the Azeris not because the latter are Muslims but because they are Turks, related to the same Turks who massacred Armenians in 1915. Turkic culture (secular and based on languages employing a Latin script) is battling Iranian culture (religiously militant as defined by Tehran, and wedded to an Arabic script) across the whole swath of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Armenians are, therefore, natural allies of their fellow Indo-Europeans the Iranians.

Huntington is correct that the Caucasus is a flashpoint of cultural and racial war. But, as Ajami observes, Huntington's plate tectonics are too simple. Two months of recent travel throughout Turkey revealed to me that although the Turks are developing a deep distrust, bordering on hatred, of fellow-Muslim Iran, they are also, especially in the shantytowns that are coming to dominate Turkish public opinion, revising their group identity, increasingly seeing themselves as Muslims being deserted by a West that does little to help besieged Muslims in Bosnia and that attacks Turkish Muslims in the streets of Germany.

In Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia, compatriots add one more victim of civil war to a mass grave

In other words, the Balkans, a powder keg for nation-state war at the beginning of the twentieth century, could



be a powder keg for cultural war at the turn of the twenty-first: between Orthodox Christianity (represented by the Serbs and a classic Byzantine configuration of Greeks, Russians, and Romanians) and the House of Islam. Yet in the Caucasus that House of Islam is falling into a clash between Turkic and Iranian civilizations. Ajami asserts that this very subdivision, not to mention all the divisions within the Arab world, indicates that the West, including the United States, is not threatened by Huntington's scenario. As the Gulf War demonstrated, the West has proved capable of playing one part of the House of Islam against another.

True. However, whether he is aware of it or not, Ajami is describing a world even more dangerous than the one Huntington envisions, especially when one takes into account Homer-Dixon's research on environmental scarcity. Outside the stretch limo would be a rundown, crowded planet of skinhead Cossacks and *juju* warriors, influenced by the worst refuse of Western pop culture and ancient tribal hatreds, and battling over scraps of overused earth in guerrilla



conflicts that ripple across continents and intersect in no discernible pattern—meaning there's no easy-to-define threat. Kennan's world of one adversary seems as distant as the world of Herodotus.

Most people believe that the political earth since 1989 has undergone immense change. But it is minor compared with what is yet to come. The breaking apart and remaking of the atlas is only now beginning. The crack-up of the Soviet empire and the coming end of Arab-Israeli military confrontation are merely prologues to the really big changes that lie ahead. Michael Vlahos, a long-range thinker for the U.S. Navy, warns, "We are not in charge of the environment and the world is not following us. It is going in many directions. Do not assume that democratic capitalism is the last word in human social evolution."

Before addressing the questions of maps and of warfare, I want to take a closer look at the interaction of religion, culture, demographic shifts, and the distribution of natural resources in a specific area of the world: the Middle East.

THE PAST IS DEAD

BUILT on steep, muddy hills, the shantytowns of Ankara, the Turkish capital, exude visual drama. Altindag, or "Golden Mountain," is a pyramid of dreams, fashioned from cinder blocks and corrugated iron, rising as though each shack were built on top of another, all reaching awkwardly and painfully toward heaven—the heaven of wealthier Turks who live elsewhere in the city. Nowhere else on the planet have I found such a poignant architectural symbol of man's striving, with gaps in house walls plugged with rusted cans, and leeks and onions growing on verandas assembled from planks of rotting wood. For reasons that I will explain, the Turkish shantytown is a psychological universe away from the African one.

To see the twenty-first century truly, one's eyes must learn a different set of aesthetics. One must reject the overly stylized images of travel magazines, with their inviting photographs of exotic villages and glamorous downtowns. There are far too many millions whose dreams are more vulgar, more real—whose raw energies and desires will overwhelm the visions of the elites, remaking the future into something frighteningly new. But in Turkey I learned that shantytowns are not all bad.

Slum quarters in Abidjan terrify and repel the outsider. In Turkey it is the opposite. The closer I got to Golden Mountain the better it looked, and the safer I felt. I had \$1,500 worth of Turkish lira in one pocket and \$1,000 in traveler's checks in the other, yet I felt no fear. Golden Mountain was a real neighborhood. The inside of one house told the story: The architectural bedlam of cinder block and sheet metal and cardboard walls was deceiving. Inside was a *home*—order, that is, bespeaking dignity. I saw a working refrigerator, a television, a wall cabinet with a few books and lots of family pictures, a few plants by a window, and a stove. Though the streets become rivers of mud when it rains, the floors inside this house were spotless.

Other houses were like this too. Schoolchildren ran along with briefcases strapped to their backs, trucks delivered cooking gas, a few men sat inside a café sipping tea. One man sipped beer. Alcohol is easy to obtain in Turkey, a secular state where 99 percent of the population is Muslim. Yet there is little problem of alcoholism. Crime against persons is infinitesimal. Poverty and illiteracy are watered-down versions of what obtains in Algeria and Egypt (to say nothing of West Africa), making it that much harder for religious extremists to gain a foothold.

My point in bringing up a rather wholesome, crime-free slum is this: its existence demonstrates how formidable is the fabric of which Turkish Muslim culture is made. A culture this strong has the potential to dominate the Middle East once again. Slums are litmus tests for innate cultural strengths and weaknesses. Those peoples whose cultures can harbor extensive slum life without decomposing will be, relatively speak-

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ing, the future's winners. Those whose cultures cannot will be the future's victims. Slums—in the sociological sense—do not exist in Turkish cities. The mortar between people and family groups is stronger here than in Africa. Resurgent Islam and Turkic cultural identity have produced a civilization with natural muscle tone. Turks, history's perennial nomads, take disruption in stride.

The future of the Middle East is quietly being written inside the heads of Golden Mountain's inhabitants. Think of an Ottoman military encampment on the eve of the destruction of Greek Constantinople in 1453. That is Golden Mountain. "We brought the village here. But in the village we worked harder—in the field, all day. So we couldn't fast during [the holy month of] Ramadan. Here we fast. Here we are more religious." Aishe Tanrikulu, along with half a dozen other women, was stuffing rice into vine leaves from a crude plastic bowl. She asked me to join her under the shade of a piece of sheet metal. Each

of these women had her hair covered by a kerchief. In the city they were encountering television for the first time. "We are traditional, religious people. The programs offend us," Aishe said. Another woman complained about the schools. Though her children had educational options unavailable in the village, they had to compete with wealthier, secular Turks. "The kids from rich families with connections—they get all the places." More opportunities, more tensions, in other words.

My guidebook to Golden Mountain was an untypical one: *Tales From the Garbage Hills*, a brutally realistic novel by a Turkish writer, Latife Tekin, about life in the shantytowns, which in Turkey are called *gecekondus* ("built in a night"). "He listened to the earth and wept unceasingly for water, for work and for the cure of the illnesses spread by the garbage and the factory waste," Tekin writes. In the most revealing passage of *Tales From the Garbage Hills* the squatters are told "about a certain 'Ottoman Empire' . . . that where they now lived there had once been an empire of this name." This history "confounded" the squatters. It was the first they had

heard of it. Though one of them knew "that his grandfather and his dog died fighting the Greeks," nationalism and an encompassing sense of Turkish history are the province of the Turkish middle and upper classes, and of foreigners like me who feel required to have a notion of "Turkey."

But what did the Golden Mountain squatters know about the armies of Turkish migrants that had come before their own—namely, Seljuks and Ottomans? For these recently urbanized peasants, and their counterparts in Africa, the Arab world, India, and so many other places, the world is new, to adapt V. S. Naipaul's phrase. As Naipaul wrote of urban refugees in *India: A Wounded Civilization*, "They saw themselves at the beginning of things: unaccommodated men making a claim on their land for the first time, and out of chaos evolving their own philosophy of community and self-help. For them the past was dead; they had left it behind in the villages."

Everywhere in the developing world at the turn of the twenty-first century these new men and women, rushing into the cities, are remaking civilizations and redefining their identities in terms of religion and tribal ethnicity which do not coincide with the borders of existing states.

IN Turkey several things are happening at once. In 1980, 44 percent of Turks lived in cities; in 1990 it was 61 percent. By the year 2000 the figure is expected to be 67 percent. Villages are emptying out as concentric rings of *gecekondus* developments grow around Turkish cities. This is the real political and demographic revolution in Turkey and elsewhere, and foreign correspondents usually don't write about it.

Whereas rural poverty is age-old and almost a "normal" part of the social fabric, urban poverty is socially destabilizing. As Iran has shown, Islamic extremism is the psychological defense mechanism of many urbanized peasants threatened with the loss of traditions in pseudo-modern cities where their values are under attack, where basic services like water and electricity are unavailable, and where they are assaulted by a physically unhealthy environment. The American ethnologist and orientalist Carleton Stevens Coon wrote in 1951 that Islam "has made possible the optimum survival and happiness of millions of human beings in an increasingly impoverished environment over a fourteen-hundred-year period." Beyond its stark, clearly articulated message, Islam's very militancy makes it attractive to the downtrodden. It is the one religion that is prepared to *fight*. A political era driven by environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world's fastest-growing religion. (Though Islam is spreading in West Africa, it is being hobbled by syncretization with animism: this makes new converts less apt to become anti-Western extremists, but it also makes for a weakened version of the faith, which is less effective as an antidote to crime.)

In Turkey, however, Islam is painfully and awkwardly forging a consensus with modernization, a trend that is less apparent in the Arab and Persian worlds (and virtually invisible in Africa). In Iran the oil boom—because it put development and urbanization on a fast track, making the culture shock more intense—fueled the 1978 Islamic Revolution. But Turkey, unlike Iran and the Arab world, has little oil. Therefore its development and urbanization have been more gradual. Islamists have been integrated into the parliamentary system for decades. The tensions I noticed in Golden Mountain are natural, creative ones: the kind immigrants face the world

Euphrates rivers. Much of the water that Arabs and perhaps Israelis will need to drink in the future is controlled by Turks. The project's centerpiece is the mile-wide, sixteen-story Atatürk Dam, upon which are emblazoned the words of modern Turkey's founder: "*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*" ("Lucky is the one who is a Turk").

Unlike Egypt's Aswan High Dam, on the Nile, and Syria's Revolution Dam, on the Euphrates, both of which were built largely by Russians, the Atatürk Dam is a predominantly Turkish affair, with Turkish engineers and companies in charge. On a recent visit my eyes took in the immaculate offices and their gardens, the high-voltage electric grids and phone switching stations, the dizzying sweep of giant humming transformers, the poured-concrete spillways, and the prim unfolding suburbia, complete with schools, for dam employees. The emerging power of the Turks was palpable.

Erduhan Bayindir, the site manager at the dam, told me that "while oil can be shipped abroad to enrich only elites, water has to be spread more evenly within the society. . . . It is true, we can stop the flow of water into Syria and Iraq for up to eight months without the same water overflowing our dams, in order to regulate their political behavior."

Power is certainly moving north in the Middle East, from the oil fields of Dhahran, on the Persian Gulf, to the water plain of Harran, in southern Anatolia—near the site of the Atatürk Dam. But will the nation-state of Turkey, as presently constituted, be the inheritor of this wealth?

I very much doubt it.

THE LIES OF MAPMAKERS

WHEREAS West Africa represents the least stable part of political reality outside Homer-Dixon's stretch limo, Turkey, an organic outgrowth of two Turkish empires that ruled Anatolia for 850 years, has been among the most stable. Turkey's borders were established not by colonial powers but in a war of independence, in the early 1920s. Kemal Atatürk provided Turkey with a secular nation-building myth that most Arab and African states, burdened by artificially drawn borders, lack. That lack will leave many Arab states defenseless against a wave of Islam that will eat away at their legitimacy and frontiers in coming years. Yet even as regards Turkey, maps deceive.

It is not only African shantytowns that don't appear on urban maps. Many shantytowns in Turkey and elsewhere are also missing—as are the considerable territories controlled by guerrilla armies and urban mafias. Traveling with Eritrean guerrillas in what, according to the map, was northern Ethiopia, traveling in "northern Iraq" with Kurdish guerrillas, and staying in a hotel in the Caucasus controlled

Opposite page: Kurds in Turkey defy the government by kindling ritual fires. Above: a Kurdish guerrilla fighter; Kurdish children with spent shells.



THIS PAGE & OPPOSITE: ADEL ROESTER/IMPACT VISUALS



over. While the world has focused on religious perversity in Algeria, a nation rich in natural gas, and in Egypt, parts of whose capital city, Cairo, evince worse crowding than I have seen even in Calcutta, Turkey has been living through the Muslim equivalent of the Protestant Reformation.

Resource distribution is strengthening Turks in another way vis-à-vis Arabs and Persians. Turks may have little oil, but their Anatolian heartland has lots of water—the most important fluid of the twenty-first century. Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Project, involving twenty-two major dams and irrigation systems, is impounding the waters of the Tigris and

by a local mafia—to say nothing of my experiences in West Africa—led me to develop a healthy skepticism toward maps, which, I began to realize, create a conceptual barrier that prevents us from comprehending the political crack-up just beginning to occur worldwide.

Consider the map of the world, with its 190 or so countries, each signified by a bold and uniform color: this map, with which all of us have grown up, is generally an invention of modernism, specifically of European colonialism. Modernism, in the sense of which I speak, began with the rise of nation-states in Europe and was confirmed by the death of feudalism

of creating facts by ordering the way we look at the world.

In his book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson, of Cornell University, demonstrates that the map enabled colonialists to think about their holdings in terms of a “totalizing classificatory grid. . . . It was bounded, determinate, and therefore—in principle—countable.” To the colonialist, country maps were the equivalent of an accountant’s ledger books. Maps, Anderson explains, “shaped the grammar” that would make possible such questionable concepts as Iraq, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. The state, recall, is a

at the end of the Thirty Years’ War—an event that was interposed between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which together gave birth to modern science. People were suddenly flush with an enthusiasm to categorize, to define. The map, based on scientific techniques of measurement, offered a way to classify new national organisms, making a jigsaw puzzle of neat pieces without transition zones between them. “Frontier” is itself a modern concept that didn’t exist in the feudal mind. And as European nations carved out far-flung domains at the same time that print technology was making the reproduction of maps cheaper, cartography came into its own as a way

purely Western notion, one that until the twentieth century applied to countries covering only three percent of the earth’s land area. Nor is the evidence compelling that the state, as a governing ideal, can be successfully transported to areas outside the industrialized world. Even the United States of America, in the words of one of our best living poets, Gary Snyder, consists of “arbitrary and inaccurate impositions on what is really here.”

Yet this inflexible, artificial reality staggers on, not only in the United Nations but in various geographic and travel publications (themselves by-products of an age of elite touring

which colonialism made possible) that still report on and photograph the world according to "country." Newspapers, this magazine, and this writer are not innocent of the tendency.

According to the map, the great hydropower complex emblematized by the Atatürk Dam is situated in Turkey. Forget the map. This southeastern region of Turkey is populated almost completely by Kurds. About half of the world's 20 million Kurds live in "Turkey." The Kurds are predominant in an ellipse of territory that overlaps not only with Turkey but also with Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the former Soviet Union. The Western-enforced Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, a consequence of the 1991 Gulf War, has already exposed the fictitious nature of that supposed nation-state.

On a recent visit to the Turkish-Iranian border, it occurred to me what a risky idea the nation-state is. Here I was on the legal fault line between two clashing civilizations, Turkic and Iranian. Yet the reality was more subtle: as in West Africa, the border was porous and smuggling abounded, but here the people doing the smuggling, on both sides of the border, were

Kurds. In such a moonscape, over which peoples have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders, the end of the Cold War will bring on a cruel process of natural selection among existing states. No longer will these states be so firmly propped up by the West or the Soviet Union. Because the Kurds overlap with nearly everybody in the Middle East, on account of their being cheated out of a state in the post-First World War peace treaties, they are emerging, in effect, as the natural selector—the ultimate reality check. They have destabilized Iraq and may continue to disrupt states that do not offer them adequate breathing space, while strengthening states that do.

Because the Turks, owing to their water resources, their growing economy, and the social cohesion evinced by the most crime-free slums I have encountered, are on the verge of big-power status, and because the 10 million Kurds within Turkey threaten that status, the outcome of the Turkish-Kurdish dispute will

be more critical to the future of the Middle East than the eventual outcome of the recent Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

AMERICA'S fascination with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, coupled with its lack of interest in the Turkish-Kurdish one, is a function of its own domestic and ethnic obsessions, not of the cartographic reality that is about to transform the Middle East. The diplomatic process involving Israelis and Palestinians will, I believe, have little effect on the early- and mid-twenty-first-century map of the region. Israel, with a 6.6 percent economic growth rate based increasingly on high-tech exports, is about to enter Homer-Dixon's stretch limo, fortified by a well-defined political community that is an organic outgrowth of history and ethnicity. Like prosperous and peaceful Japan on the one hand, and war-torn and poverty-wracked Armenia on the other, Israel is a classic national-ethnic organism. Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration, as Islam spreads across artificial frontiers, fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent. Seventy percent of the Arab population has been born since 1970—youths with little historical memory of anticolonial independence struggles, postcolonial attempts at nation-building, or any of the Arab-Israeli wars. The most distant recollection of these youths will be the West's humiliation of colonially invented Iraq in 1991. Today seventeen out of twenty-two Arab states have a declining gross national product; in the next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double. These states, like most African ones, will be ungovernable through conventional secular ideologies. The Middle East analyst Christine M. Helms explains,

Declaring Arab nationalism "bankrupt," the political "disinherited" are not rationalizing the failure of Arabism . . . or reformulating it. Alternative solutions are not contemplated. They have simply opted for the political paradigm at the other end of the political spectrum with which they are familiar—Islam.

Like the borders of West Africa, the colonial borders of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, and other Arab states are often contrary to cultural and political reality. As state control mechanisms wither in the face of environmental and demographic stress, "hard" Islamic city-states or shantytown-states are likely to emerge. The fiction that the impoverished city of Algiers, on the Mediterranean, controls Tamanrasset, deep in the Algerian Sahara, cannot obtain forever. Whatever the outcome of the peace process, Israel is destined to be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam. In that realm, the violent youth culture of the Gaza shantytowns may be indicative of the coming era.

The destiny of Turks and Kurds is far less certain, but far more relevant to the kind of map that will explain our future world. The Kurds suggest a geographic reality that cannot be shown in two-dimensional space. The issue in Turkey is not simply a matter of giving autonomy or even independence to

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PATRICK ROBERT/STYAMA

Kurds in the southeast. This isn't the Balkans or the Caucasus, where regions are merely subdividing into smaller units, Abkhazia breaking off from Georgia, and so on. Federalism is not the answer. Kurds are found everywhere in Turkey, including the shanty districts of Istanbul and Ankara. Turkey's problem is that its Anatolian land mass is the home of two cultures and languages, Turkish and Kurdish. Identity in Turkey, as in India, Africa, and elsewhere, is more complex and subtle than conventional cartography can display.

A NEW KIND OF WAR

TO appreciate fully the political and cartographic implications of postmodernism—an epoch of themeless juxtapositions, in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms—it is necessary to consider, finally, the whole question of war.

"Oh, what a relief to fight, to fight enemies who defend themselves, enemies who are awake!" André Malraux wrote in *Man's Fate*. I cannot think of a more suitable battle cry for many combatants in the early decades of the twenty-first century. The intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka—to say nothing of what obtains in American inner cities—indicates something very troubling that those of us inside the stretch limo, concerned with issues like middle-class entitlements and the future of interactive cable television, lack the stomach to contemplate. It is this: a large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.

"Just as it makes no sense to ask 'why people eat' or 'what they sleep for,'" writes Martin van Creveld, a military historian at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in *The Transformation of War*, "so fighting in many ways is not a means but an end. Throughout history, for every person who has expressed his horror of war there is another who found in it the most marvelous of all the experiences that are vouchsafed to man, even to the point that he later spent a lifetime boring his descendants by recounting his exploits." When I asked Pentagon officials about the nature of war in the twenty-first century, the answer I frequently got was "Read Van Creveld." The top brass are enamored of this historian not because his writings justify their existence but, rather, the opposite: Van Creveld warns them that huge state military machines like the Pentagon's are dinosaurs about to go extinct, and that something far more terrible awaits us.

The degree to which Van Creveld's *Transformation of War* complements Homer-Dixon's work on the environment, Huntington's thoughts on cultural clash, my own realizations in traveling by foot, bus, and bush taxi in more than sixty countries, and America's sobering comeuppances in intractable-culture zones like Haiti and Somalia is startling. The book begins by demolishing the notion that men don't like to fight. "By compelling the senses to focus themselves on the here and now," Van Creveld writes, war "can cause a man to take his leave of them." As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, "technicals" in Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, I vicariously experienced this phenomenon: worrying about mines and ambushes frees you from worrying about mundane details of daily existence. If my own experience is too subjective, there is a wealth of data showing the sheer frequency of war, especially in the developing world since the Second World War. Physical aggression is a part

In Liberia, summary justice meted out against a soldier (above) and suspected thieves (below right). Above right: a scene in Vukovar, the former Yugoslavia.

of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational, and cultural standard is this trait tranquilized. In light of the fact that 95 percent of the earth's population growth will be in the poorest areas of the globe, the question is not whether there will be war (there will be a lot of it) but what kind of war. And who will fight whom?

Debunking the great military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, Van Creveld, who may be the most original thinker on war since that early-nineteenth-century Prussian, writes, "Clausewitz's ideas . . . were wholly rooted in the fact that, ever since 1648, war had been waged overwhelmingly by states." But, as Van Creveld explains, the period of nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict is now ending, and with it the clear "threefold division into government, army, and people" which state-directed wars enforce. Thus, to see the future, the first step is to look back to the past immediately prior to the birth of modernism—the wars in medieval Europe which began during the Reformation and reached their culmination in the Thirty Years' War.

Van Creveld writes,

In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs. . . . Many of them paid little but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf. . . .

Given such conditions, any fine distinctions . . . between armies on the one hand and peoples on the other were bound to break down. Engulfed by war, civilians suffered terrible atrocities.


BACK then, in other words, there was no "politics" as we have come to understand the term, just as there is less and less "politics" today in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, among other places.

Because, as Van Creveld notes, the radius of trust within tribal societies is narrowed to one's immediate family and guerrilla comrades, truces arranged with one Bosnian commander, say, may be broken immediately by another Bosnian commander. The plethora of short-lived ceasefires in the Balkans and the Caucasus constitute proof that we are no longer in a world where the old rules of state warfare apply. More evidence is provided by the destruction of medieval monuments in the Croatian port of Dubrovnik: when cultures, rather than states, fight, then cultural and religious monuments are weapons of war, making them fair game.

Also, war-making entities will no longer be restricted to a specific territory. Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic identity and control will mean more. "From the vantage point of the present, there appears every prospect that religious . . . fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed

conflict" in the West than at any time "for the last 300 years," Van Creveld writes. This is why analysts like Michael Vlahos are closely monitoring religious cults. Vlahos says, "An ideology that challenges us may not take familiar form, like the old Nazis or Commies. It may not even engage us initially in ways that fit old threat markings." Van Creveld concludes, "Armed conflict will be waged by men on earth, not robots in space. It will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large-scale conventional war." While another military historian, John Keegan, in his new book *A History of Warfare*, draws a more benign portrait of primitive man, it is important to point out that what Van Creveld really means is *re-primitivized* man: warrior societies operating at a time of unprecedented resource scarcity and planetary overcrowding.

Van Creveld's pre-Westphalian vision of worldwide low-intensity conflict is not a superficial "back to the future" scenario. First of all, technology will be used toward primitive ends. In Liberia the guerrilla leader Prince Johnson didn't



CHRISTOPHER MORRIS/BLACK STAR

PATRICK ROBERTS/ONYAMA

and in Togo, where the dictator Etienne Eyadema, in power since 1967, was nearly toppled in 1991, not by democrats but by thousands of youths whom the London-based magazine *West Africa* described as "Soweto-like stone-throwing adolescents." Their behavior may herald a regime more brutal than Eyadema's repressive one.

The fragility of these West African "countries" impressed itself on me when I took a series of bush taxis along the Gulf of Guinea, from the Togolese capital of Lomé, across Ghana, to Abidjan. The 400-mile journey required two full days of driving, because of stops at two border crossings and an additional eleven customs stations, at each of which my fellow passengers had their bags searched. I had to change money twice and repeatedly fill in currency-declaration forms. I had to bribe a Togolese immigration official with the equivalent of eighteen dollars before he would agree to put an exit stamp on my passport. Nevertheless, smuggling across these borders is rampant. *The London Observer* has reported that in 1992 the equivalent of \$856 million left West Africa for Europe in the form of "hot cash" assumed to be laundered drug money. International cartels have discovered the utility of weak, financially strapped West African regimes.

The more fictitious the actual sovereignty, the more severe border authorities seem to be in trying to prove otherwise. Getting visas for these states can be as hard as crossing their borders. The Washington embassies of Sierra Leone and Guinea—the two poorest nations on earth, according to a 1993 United Nations report on "human development"—asked for letters from my bank (in lieu of prepaid round-trip tickets) and also personal references, in order to prove that I had sufficient means to sustain myself during my visits. I was reminded of my visa and currency hassles while traveling to the communist states of Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, before those states collapsed.

Ali A. Mazrui, the director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton, predicts that West Africa—indeed, the whole continent—is on the verge of large-scale border upheaval. Mazrui writes,

In the 21st century France will be withdrawing from West Africa as she gets increasingly involved in the affairs [of Europe]. France's West African sphere of influence will be filled by Nigeria—a more natural hegemonic power. . . . It will be under those circumstances that Nigeria's own boundaries are likely to expand to incorporate the Republic of Niger (the Hausa link), the Republic of Benin (the Yoruba link) and conceivably Cameroon.

THE future could be more tumultuous, and bloodier, than Mazrui dares to say. France will withdraw from former colonies like Benin, Togo, Niger, and the Ivory Coast, where it has been propping up local currencies. It will do so not only because its attention will be diverted to new challenges

in Europe and Russia but also because younger French officials lack the older generation's emotional ties to the ex-colonies. However, even as Nigeria attempts to expand, it, too, is likely to split into several pieces. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research recently made the following points in an analysis of Nigeria:

Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and democratization are slim. . . . The repressive apparatus of the state security service . . . will be difficult for any future civilian government to control. . . . The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable. . . . Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing authorities; religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern [Christian] control of the economy is intense . . . the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.

Given that oil-rich Nigeria is a bellwether for the region—its population of roughly 90 million equals the populations of all the other West African states combined—it is apparent that Africa faces cataclysms that could make the Ethiopian and Somalian famines pale in comparison. This is especially so because Nigeria's population, including that of its largest city, Lagos, whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources.

Part of West Africa's quandary is that although its population belts are horizontal, with habitation densities increasing as one travels south away from the Sahara and toward the tropical abundance of the Atlantic littoral, the borders erected by European colonialists are vertical, and therefore at cross-purposes with demography and topography. Satellite photos depict the same reality I experienced in the bush taxi: the Lomé-Abidjan coastal corridor—indeed, the entire stretch of coast from Abidjan eastward to Lagos—is one burgeoning megalopolis that by any rational economic and geographical standard should constitute a single sovereignty, rather than the five (the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria) into which it is currently divided.

As many internal African borders begin to crumble, a more impenetrable boundary is being erected that threatens to isolate the continent as a whole: the wall of disease. Merely to visit West Africa in some degree of safety, I spent about \$500 for a hepatitis B vaccination series and other disease prophylaxis. Africa may today be more dangerous in this regard than it was in 1862, before antibiotics, when the explorer Sir Richard Francis Burton described the health situation on the continent as "deadly, a Golgotha, a Jehannum." Of the approximately 12 million people worldwide whose blood is HIV-positive, 8 million are in Africa. In the capital of the Ivory Coast, whose modern road system only

laterite earth crawls with foot-long lizards both inside and outside the shacks. Children defecate in a stream filled with garbage and pigs, droning with malarial mosquitoes. In this stream women do the washing. Young unemployed men spend their time drinking beer, palm wine, and gin while gambling on pinball games constructed out of rotting wood and rusty nails. These are the same youths who rob houses in more prosperous Ivorian neighborhoods at night. One man I met, Damba Tesele, came to Chicago from Burkina Faso in 1963. A cook by profession, he has four wives and thirty-two children, not one of whom has made it to high school. He has

demographic present—and even more of the future—than any idyllic junglescape of women balancing earthen jugs on their heads, illustrates why the Ivory Coast, once a model of Third World success, is becoming a case study in Third World catastrophe.

President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who died last December at the age of about ninety, left behind a weak cluster of political parties and a leaden bureaucracy that discourages foreign investment. Because the military is small and the non-Ivorian population large, there is neither an obvious force to maintain order nor a sense of nationhood that would lessen



seen his shanty community destroyed by municipal authorities seven times since coming to the area. Each time he and his neighbors rebuild. Chicago is the latest incarnation.

Fifty-five percent of the Ivory Coast's population is urban, and the proportion is expected to reach 62 percent by 2000. The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means that the Ivory Coast's 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants like those of Chicago. But don't count on the Ivory Coast's still existing then. Chicago, which is more indicative of Africa's and the Third World's

the need for such enforcement. The economy has been shrinking since the mid-1980s. Though the French are working assiduously to preserve stability, the Ivory Coast faces a possibility worse than a coup: an anarchic implosion of criminal violence—an urbanized version of what has already happened in Somalia. Or it may become an African Yugoslavia, but one without mini-states to replace the whole.

Because the demographic reality of West Africa is a countryside draining into dense slums by the coast, ultimately the region's rulers will come to reflect the values of these shanty-towns. There are signs of this already in Sierra Leone—

just cut off the ears of President Samuel Doe before Doe was tortured to death in 1990—Johnson made a video of it, which has circulated throughout West Africa. In December of 1992, when plotters of a failed coup against the Strasser regime in Sierra Leone had their ears cut off at Freetown's Hamilton Beach prior to being killed, it was seen by many to be a copycat execution. Considering, as I've explained earlier, that the Strasser regime is not really a government and that Sierra Leone is not really a nation-state, listen closely to Van Creveld: "Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, exist-

tinue to shrink, being gradually replaced by a booming private security business, as in West Africa, and by urban mafias, especially in the former communist world, who may be better equipped than municipal police forces to grant physical protection to local inhabitants.

Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be subnational, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically. This is how many states will ultimately die. As state power fades—and with it the state's ability to help

LESTER SLOAN/WOODFIN CAMP



ing distinctions between war and crime will break down much as is already the case today in . . . Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia."

If crime and war become indistinguishable, then "national defense" may in the future be viewed as a local concept. As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, "develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines." As small-scale violence multiplies at home and abroad, state armies will con-

weaker groups within society, not to mention other states—peoples and cultures around the world will be thrown back upon their own strengths and weaknesses, with fewer equalizing mechanisms to protect them. Whereas the distant future will probably see the emergence of a racially hybrid, globalized man, the coming decades will see us more aware of our differences than of our similarities. To the average person, political values will mean less, personal security more. The belief that we are all equal is liable to be replaced by the overriding obsession of the ancient Greek travelers: Why the differences between peoples?

THE LAST MAP

In *Geography and the Human Spirit*, Anne Buttner, a professor at University College, Dublin, recalls the work of an early-nineteenth-century German geographer, Carl Ritter, whose work implied "a divine plan for humanity" based on regionalism and a constant, living flow of forms. The map of the future, to the extent that a map is even possible, will represent a perverse twisting of Ritter's vision. Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies. Instead of borders, there would be moving "centers" of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would be in motion. Replacing fixed and abrupt lines on a flat space would be a shifting pattern of buffer entities, like the Kurdish and Azeri buffer entities between Turkey and Iran, the Turkic Uighur buffer entity between Central Asia and Inner China (itself distinct from coastal China), and the Latino buffer entity replacing a precise U.S.-Mexican border. To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map—in a sense, the "Last Map"—will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.

The Indian subcontinent offers examples of what is happening. For different reasons, both India and Pakistan are increasingly dysfunctional. The argument over democracy in these places is less and less relevant to the larger issue of governability. In India's case the question arises, Is one unwieldy bureaucracy in New Delhi the best available mechanism for promoting the lives of 866 million people of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic groups? In 1950, when the Indian population was much less than half as large and nation-building idealism was still strong, the argument for democracy was more impressive than it is now. Given that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, it is difficult to imagine that the Indian state will survive the next century. India's oft-trumpeted Green Revolution has been achieved by overworking its croplands and depleting its watershed. Norman Myers, a British development consultant, worries that Indians have "been feeding themselves today by borrowing against their children's food sources."

Pakistan's problem is more basic still: like much of Africa,

the country makes no geographic or demographic sense. It was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcon-

continent, yet there are more subcontinental Muslims outside Pakistan than within it. Like Yugoslavia, Pakistan is a patchwork of ethnic groups, increasingly in violent conflict with one another. While the Western media gushes over the fact that the country has a woman Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Karachi is becoming a subcontinental version of Lagos. In eight visits to Pakistan, I have never gotten a sense of a cohesive national identity. With as much as 65 percent of its land dependent on intensive irrigation, with wide-scale deforestation, and with a yearly population growth of 2.7 percent (which ensures that the amount of cultivated land per rural inhabitant will plummet), Pakistan is becoming a more and more desperate place. As irrigation in the Indus River basin intensifies to serve two growing populations, Muslim-Hindu strife over falling water tables may be unavoidable.

"India and Pakistan will probably fall apart," Homer-Dixon predicts. "Their secular governments have less and less legitimacy as well as less management ability over people and resources." Rather than one bold line dividing the subcontinent into two parts, the future will likely see a lot of thinner lines and smaller parts, with the ethnic entities of Pakhtunistan and Punjab gradually replacing Pakistan in the space between the Central Asian plateau and the heart of the subcontinent.

None of this even takes into account climatic change, which, if it occurs in the next century, will further erode the capacity of existing states to cope. India, for instance, receives 70 percent of its precipitation from the monsoon cycle, which planetary warming could disrupt.

Not only will the three-dimensional aspects of the Last Map be in constant motion, but its two-dimensional base may change too. The National Academy of Sciences reports that

as many as one billion people, or 20 per cent of the world's population, live on lands likely to be inundated or dramatically changed by rising waters. . . . Low-lying countries in the developing world such as Egypt and Bangladesh, where rivers are large and the deltas extensive and densely populated, will be hardest hit. . . . Where the rivers are dammed, as in the case of the Nile, the effects . . . will be especially severe.

Egypt could be where climatic upheaval—to say nothing of the more immediate threat of increasing population—will incite religious upheaval in truly biblical fashion. Natural catastrophes, such as the October, 1992, Cairo earthquake, in which the government failed to deliver relief aid and slum residents were in many instances helped by their local mosques, can only strengthen the position of Islamic factions. In a statement about greenhouse warming which could refer to any of a variety of natural catastrophes, the environmental expert Jessica Tuchman Matthews warns that many of us underestimate the extent to which political systems, in affluent societies as well as in places like Egypt, "depend on the underpinning of natural systems." She adds, "The fact that one can move with ease from Vermont to Miami has nothing to say about the consequences of Vermont acquiring Miami's climate."

Arson and looting in Los Angeles after the acquittal of police officers in the Rodney King case

Indeed, it is not clear that the United States will survive the next century in exactly its present form. Because America is a multi-ethnic society, the nation-state has always been more fragile here than it is in more homogeneous societies like Germany and Japan. James Kurth, in an article published in *The National Interest* in 1992, explains that whereas nation-state societies tend to be built around a mass-conscription army and a standardized public school system, "multicultural regimes" feature a high-tech, all-volunteer army (and, I would add, private schools that teach competing values), operating in a culture in which the international media and entertainment industry has more influence than the "national political class." In other words, a nation-state is a place where everyone has been educated along similar lines, where people take their cue from national leaders, and where everyone (every male, at least) has gone through the crucible of military service, making patriotism a simpler issue. Writing about his immigrant family in turn-of-the-century Chicago, Saul Bellow states, "The country took us over. It was a country then, not a collection of 'cultures.'"

During the Second World War and the decade following it, the United States reached its apogee as a classic nation-state. During the 1960s, as is now clear, America began a slow but unmistakable process of transformation. The signs hardly need belaboring: racial polarity, educational dysfunction, social fragmentation of many and various kinds. William Irwin Thompson, in *Passages About Earth: An Exploration of the New Planetary Culture*, writes, "The educational system that had worked on the Jews or the Irish could no longer work on the blacks; and when Jewish teachers in New York tried to take black children away from their parents exactly in the way they had been taken from theirs, they were shocked to encounter a violent affirmation of negritude."

Issues like West Africa could yet emerge as a new kind of foreign-policy issue, further eroding America's domestic peace. The spectacle of several West African nations collapsing at once could reinforce the worst racial stereotypes here at home. That is another reason why Africa matters. We must not kid ourselves: the sensitivity factor is higher than ever. The Washington, D.C., public school system is already experimenting with an Afrocentric curriculum. Summits between African leaders and prominent African-Americans are becoming frequent, as are Pollyanna-ish prognostications about multiparty elections in Africa that do not factor in crime, surging birth rates, and resource depletion. The Congressional Black Caucus was among those urging U.S. involvement in Somalia and in Haiti. At the *Los Angeles Times* minority staffers have protested against, among other things, what they allege to be the racist tone of the newspaper's Africa coverage, allegations that the editor of the "World Report" section, Dan Fisher, denies, saying essentially that Africa should be viewed through the same rigorous analytical lens as other parts of the world.

Africa may be marginal in terms of conventional late-twentieth-century conceptions of strategy, but in an age of

cultural and racial clash, when national defense is increasingly local, Africa's distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States.

This and many other factors will make the United States less of a nation than it is today, even as it gains territory following the peaceful dissolution of Canada. Quebec, based on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and Francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to be North America's most cohesive and crime-free nation-state. (It may be a smaller Quebec, though, since aboriginal peoples may lop off northern parts of the province.) "Patriotism" will become increasingly regional as people in Alberta and Montana discover they have far more in common with each other than they do with Ottawa or Washington, and Spanish-speakers in the Southwest discover a greater commonality with Mexico City. (*The Nine Nations of North America*, by Joel Garreau, a book about the continent's regionalization, is more relevant now than when it was published, in 1981.) As Washington's influence wanes, and with it the traditional symbol of American patriotism, North Americans will take psychological refuge in their insulated communities and cultures.

RETURNING from West Africa last fall was an illuminating ordeal. After leaving Abidjan, my Air Afrique flight landed in Dakar, Senegal, where all passengers had to disembark in order to go through another security check, this one demanded by U.S. authorities before they would permit the flight to set out for New York. Once we were in New York, despite the midnight hour, immigration officials at Kennedy Airport held up disembarkation by conducting quick interrogations of the aircraft's passengers—this was in addition to all the normal immigration and customs procedures. It was apparent that drug smuggling, disease, and other factors had contributed to the toughest security procedure I have ever encountered when returning from overseas.

Then, for the first time in over a month, I spotted businesspeople with attaché cases and laptop computers. When I had left New York for Abidjan, all the businesspeople were boarding planes for Seoul and Tokyo, which departed from gates near Air Afrique's. The only non-Africans off to West Africa had been relief workers in T-shirts and khakis. Although the borders within West Africa are increasingly unreal, those separating West Africa from the outside world are in various ways becoming more impenetrable.

But Afrocentrists are right in one respect: we ignore this dying region at our own risk. When the Berlin Wall was falling, in November of 1989, I happened to be in Kosovo, covering a riot between Serbs and Albanians. The future was in Kosovo, I told myself that night, not in Berlin. The same day that Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat clasped hands on the White House lawn, my Air Afrique plane was approaching Bamako, Mali, revealing corrugated-zinc shacks at the edge of an expanding desert. The real news wasn't at the White House, I realized. It was right below. ☉

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JOURNEYS WITHOUT MAPS

CAROL LANCASTER

The decade of the 1990s will present the more than forty countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with their most difficult challenges since independence. They must undergo changes of major proportions in their economic systems, in their political systems, and in their role in the world. Moreover, Africans must handle these changes without a clear idea of where they will ultimately lead. They must, in short, embark on a series of perilous journeys without maps.

The Economic Journey

At independence the aspiration to achieve rapid economic development was universal among African politicians and their peoples. The tasks of development seemed clear and there was considerable consensus among Africans on how to achieve that development. Social services, especially education and health care, had to be expanded. Physical infrastructure, often rudimentary, had to be improved, and investment in industry had to be increased.

To spur rapid development, the state took on the key leadership role. The state's role was greater in countries committed to socialism, like Tanzania, but was significant even in the economies of more capitalist-oriented countries, such as the Côte d'Ivoire. The foundations of state-led development were laid or expanded in Africa during the 1960s as governments created state-owned enterprises, increased regulations governing economic activity, and often directly undertook productive activities, particularly in the areas of transport, banking, and public utilities. The role of the state in African economies typically expanded even further in the 1970s with the surge in export earnings which swelled government coffers and expenditures. Later, the collapse in export prices and the resulting compression in imports prompted Africans to expand government controls to stave off economic decline.

By the 1980s the economic situation in much of Sub-Saharan Africa had become desperate. External debts could not be serviced; imports, critical to investment and growth, continued to contract; exports fell further; agricultural yields began to decline; population growth rates accelerated; and the environment, especially in the countries bordering the Sahara, deteriorated. So much economic ground was lost during the 1980s that average per capita incomes

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in Sub-Saharan Africa at the end of the decade were no larger than they had been at the beginning of the independence period in 1960.

Beginning in the early 1980s, one African government after another turned to its traditional developed country patron for debt relief and additional concessional aid. These patrons, including the Soviet Union, responded by advising the Africans first to negotiate an economic stabilization program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 1983 over twenty-five African governments had negotiated at least one stabilization program with the IMF. These programs were aimed at reducing the country's balance of payments deficit through cuts in government expenditures, expansion of government revenues, currency devaluations, and other reforms intended to expand exports. Ideally, an African government would implement reforms agreed upon with the IMF and receive IMF loans to ease the impact of these reforms and spur growth. Economic reforms would lead to an expansion in exports, economic recovery, and sustained growth, generating the additional revenues to repay the IMF loan. This ideal was rarely realized in Africa, and instead the common African experience was to negotiate one IMF stabilization program after another, using new loans to repay old ones without making sustained economic progress. Balance of payments gaps were closed only temporarily, if at all. Economic recovery and sustained growth proved elusive. Reductions in government expenditures and other fiscal reforms, though undeniably needed, in some cases resulted in contracting social services and a rising cost of living, both of which fell heavily on the poor, especially those on fixed wages. It was soon recognized that while IMF reforms were often necessary, they were seldom sufficient to restore Africa to economic health. More fundamental changes were needed in African economies, effected over a longer period of time and supported by larger, more concessional forms of external financing. The World Bank soon became a major lender in Africa in support of sectoral and macro-economic adjustment reform programs addressing these more fundamental needs.

Both IMF stabilization and World Bank structural adjustment programs operate from the basic premise that most human beings—regardless of their economic, political, or social circumstances—will eventually respond to economic incentives in predictable ways. Higher prices will result eventually in decreased demand and increased production. Opportunities to increase incomes through investment will be exploited by entrepreneurs. Market signals reflecting relative scarcities will therefore encourage efficient resource use, and free markets will encourage private initiative and investment, which will sustain future growth. These notions, soon espoused by many Africans as well as Westerners, represented a sea change from views of the 1960s and 1970s, when the state was regarded as the most efficient instrument for spurring development and ensuring economic and social equity. By 1990 only a handful of African countries had not implemented at least one IMF stabilization program or World Bank structural adjustment program—or as was most common, multiple programs with both institutions.

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By 1990, however, there were still no examples of definitive structural adjustment success on the African mainland—no case of a government's implementation of agreed-upon reforms leading to significant increases in private investment and sustained growth. Ghana, whose long and extensive adjustment program made it the country closest to a success story, experienced annual economic growth of 5 percent over several years for the first time since independence. But this growth appears to have been based mainly on an expansion of foreign aid and of existing productive capacity both in agriculture and industry, with thus far only small amounts of new investment in extractive industries such as mining and timber. At the beginning of 1990 other adjusting African countries were even further from success, their governments often failing to implement agreed-upon reforms, reversing implemented reforms under pressure from groups whose interests were threatened, undertaking reform programs inadequate to produce economic recovery and growth, experiencing external shocks, or receiving inadequate external financing. It was too soon to conclude that structural adjustment in Africa was a failure, but neither was it yet a clear success. Furthermore, no one is sure how long it will take to produce clear cut successes—or even if such successes are possible in some countries. Some warn of decades of economic adjustment. Others, like the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), have expressed doubt that the World Bank structural adjustment programs will ever be successful in Africa.

It is clear that the journey toward economic recovery in Africa will be a long one; just how long is as uncertain as the final destination itself. Meanwhile, population growth continues to average over 3 percent per year—the highest of any region of the world. Austerity measures associated with adjustment programs continue to affect some of the poor adversely and to reduce the real income and future economic prospects of the small but politically influential middle class. The challenges of the 1990s for Sub-Saharan Africa are to shape and implement needed economic reforms to fit national capabilities and needs, to ease the impact of these reforms on the poor, and to attract the new investment necessary to promote long-term growth. Moreover, these changes must be implemented over a long period in the face of political discontent and outright resistance by powerful groups and individuals. As difficult as these challenges are, they are the only apparent alternative to continuing impoverishment.

The Political Journey

It is now increasingly clear that Africans also must undertake a political journey in the coming decade, but like its economic counterpart, the final destination of that journey as well as the means of getting there, remain far from clear.

Most African political leaders in the years immediately following independence discarded or undermined any democratic political structures that they

had inherited from colonial powers. Centralizing state power in their hands, indigenous leaders set aside or ignored constitutions, banned or repressed all but the ruling political parties, and rigged elections. The media were brought under tight government controls or directly taken over by the government. What developed throughout most of the continent was a pattern of governance based not on pluralism, open political debate, and free elections, but on personal rule, patronage, and military intervention. Botswana, Mauritius, and the Gambia were among the few exceptions that retained relatively open political systems. Senegal during the 1970s and 1980s moved toward pluralism, while Nigeria and Ghana periodically elected civilian governments, only to have them overthrown later in military coups.

African leaders offered persuasive reasons for centralizing political power. Foremost was the fear that in multiethnic societies, open political competition would center on ethnic loyalties and exacerbate national cleavages. This was not a groundless fear, as indicated by the early political experience of Nigeria and others. Leaders also argued that rapid development required the decision-making efficiency of a centralized political system rather than one where time-consuming debate and compromise were necessary before major national policies could be adopted. As the Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake recently remarked, it was as if a great banner were hung across Africa stating, "Silence. We are developing."

History does not reveal whether political centralization has led to a lower level of ethnic tension in African states than would have been the case with more openly competitive political systems. We cannot know what would have happened if African leaders had retained and built upon the democratic institutions they inherited. There have not been enough cases of sustained democratic experience in Africa to offer an answer. We do know that ethnic loyalties remain a potent force in African politics and that many of Africa's political rulers have tried to moderate such tensions by basing their rule on coalitions of ethnic groups or by incorporating representatives of such groups in their parties and governments. Few Africans would deny that whatever a country's political system, the management of ethnic relations remains an important challenge throughout much of the continent.

What history does suggest is that political and economic centralization has inhibited rather than promoted rapid development in Africa. The suppression of open policy debates, combined with the often limited capacities of African bureaucracies to provide strong economic policy analysis and advice, have circumscribed the economic policy options presented to the political leadership and have discouraged challenges to poor policy choices. In addition, the absence of transparency and public accountability on the part of African politicians and bureaucrats has permitted widespread corruption, arbitrary actions by governments, and the erosion of the rule of law. Economies have been badly mismanaged, public resources wasted or stolen, and development stymied.

As a result of past failures of governance, African leaders face increasing pressures at home and from abroad to liberalize their political systems. It is

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often argued that if political liberalization can occur in Eastern Europe or the USSR—until recently, the most unlikely of places—it can and should happen elsewhere. President Omar Bongo of Gabon remarked recently that "the wind from the East was shaking the coconut trees." In a number of countries, including the Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Togo, and others, there have been demonstrations in favor of democratization—often sparked initially by students and civil servants protesting economic conditions. Outside of Africa senior foreign policy officials of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and other western countries have begun to press for democratization in Africa, emphasizing in particular the need for multiple political parties to replace the one-party state. Several governments, including those of the United States and France, have warned that they will condition future aid to Africa on democratization. The World Bank and the ECA have both called attention to the role of poor governance in inhibiting Africa's economic progress. The ECA has emphasized the importance of political participation for all Africans, but neither it nor the World Bank has yet attempted to prescribe the shape of needed political changes.

Government after government in Africa has responded to these internal and external pressures by announcing constitutional changes permitting multiple political parties and setting dates for elections. Among the reform-minded states are: Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Gabon, Benin, Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville), Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. Captain Blaise Campoare, head of state of Burkina Faso, announced that a commission would decide on the country's future constitution. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, long opposed to multipartyism, agreed to establish a multiparty state in 1991. President Paul Biya of Cameroon also has hinted that he is willing to move toward a more open political system. Many Africans, particularly the young and the educated, clearly harbor a substantial measure of political discontent and yearn for more open and participatory political systems. It appears that a journey in that direction has begun in much of the region.

However, African leaders remain who are adamantly opposed to multipartyism, such as Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, and who justify their opposition with fears of ethnic division. While such justifications from autocrats likely to lose their jobs in free and fair elections appear to be nothing more than self-serving, other Africans whose personal interests are not threatened by multipartyism—former Nigerian head of state General Olusegun Obasanjo, for example—have echoed these sentiments. One of the lessons emerging from the political changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR is that neither the passage of time nor repression is an effective antidote to divisive ethnic tensions. Such disparate countries as India, Malaysia, Switzerland, and Great Britain, however, have proven that ethnic diversity can be managed successfully in a multiparty democracy. In the political experimentation that lies ahead, the Africans will have to be particularly creative and careful in the way they structure political reforms to make sure that ethnic differences do not permit former autocrats to return and say "I told you so."

A second major problem on the road to political liberalization in Africa is factionalism. In a number of cases in the past, African democracies—for example, Somalia in the 1960s—were paralyzed by factional conflict among a multitude of political parties unable or unwilling to cooperate in a stable governing coalition. There remain signs of such factionalism in Africa today. Eight political parties operate in Senegal; thirty-eight have emerged in Zaire; fourteen compete in the Côte d'Ivoire. Africans will have to shape electoral laws carefully to limit factionalism if democracies are to govern more effectively than autocracies.

Behind ethnicity and factionalism, a more basic problem confronting democratization in Africa is that societies lack the economic pluralism and broad class divisions which have often underpinned major political parties in the democracies of Europe and North America. If strong political parties are to develop in Africa and successfully compete for power, on what are they to be based if not ethnicity, religion, regionalism, or the personal charisma of individual politicians (the "caudillismo" phenomenon of Latin American politics)? This is a question without an obvious answer.

Finally, there is the danger of sham democracies being established. It is easy for African leaders, under foreign pressure to democratize in order to receive foreign aid, to announce the legalization of multipartyism but to control or manipulate the opposition parties, to rig elections, and to continue to limit press and other freedoms. Skeptics already suspect this is occurring in Zaire and possibly in Gabon. The consequence of sham democracies might be even greater discontent and disillusionment with African leaders and governments on the part of Africans and foreigners. It maybe that the focus by foreigners in particular on multipartyism is misplaced for Africa today. Arguably improved governance would be more likely if the focus of political change began with freedom for the media, so that citizens would be informed of what governments were doing and could debate and criticize it, and freedom of association, so citizens could air their views with one another and with their political leaders. These kinds of changes are much more difficult for politicians to pretend to implement as they easily can be tested by citizens or monitored by outsiders.

A final point must be made about Africa's economic and political journeys of the 1990s. These journeys are obviously interrelated, but the connections are not certain. Depending on the situation, economic and political reform may either facilitate or militate against one another. For example, democratic governments may find it harder to implement painful economic reforms than autocratic regimes which can override political opposition. On the other hand, it may be more difficult for autocratic governments to sustain economic reforms, particularly where the understanding and cooperation of the populace is necessary for reforms to work. It is very possible that implementing economic reforms and political democratization at the same time will be particularly difficult—although many African governments are now under pressure to do both. It is also possible that some African politicians, skeptical of economic reforms pressed on them by the World Bank or reluctant to imple-

ment economic reforms for political or personal reasons, will use their commitment to political reforms (even sham reforms) as a justification to foreign governments and the Bretton Woods institutions for going slow or reversing economic reforms.

The International Journey

Lastly, the Africans—by no choice of their own—must embark on a third major journey, involving their position in the world community and their relationships with outside powers. International political relations have changed dramatically in the past several years, a fact with enormous implications for Africans. Central to this, of course, has been the end of the Cold War. While Sub-Saharan Africa has always ranked low among the foreign policy priorities of most nations, including the superpowers, the Soviet-American global competition for influence and geostrategic position enhanced the priority ascribed to Africa by the two powers and their allies. The immediate post-independence period was a time of competition for diplomatic and ideological allegiances, and the 1970s saw superpowers intervene diplomatically and militarily on opposite sides of African conflicts. During the entire Cold War period, these powers sought African voices and votes to give their policies credibility and support in various international fora. Although destructive to African lives and interests, the Cold War competition kept Africa on the foreign policy agenda of the superpowers. Similarly, a number of small and middle powers—the Arabs, the Israelis, the two Germanies, the two Koreas, and the two Chinas—all sought African support for their mini-cold wars. As these conflicts diminish in intensity, so too will the interest Africa holds for the competing powers. It appears at present that the only outside power which retains an active interest and engagement in the region is France, but Africa's economic slide may eventually eliminate or greatly reduce French interest as well. One of the foundations for foreign engagement in another country is economic interest: investment, commercial lending, and trade. Economic interests have not been the principal motivation behind French engagement in Africa, but they have certainly helped strengthen that country's involvement in the region. Statistics now show a dramatic decline in French investment in Africa and it is rumored that the franc zones—the two monetary unions between France and its former African colonies which have so long benefited France economically—are now costing the French treasury a large sum of money annually. The decline in France's economic stake in Africa may eventually undermine French engagement in the region.

It is no exaggeration to say that Sub-Saharan Africa has become marginalized from the world economic and political system, and that this clearly poses major challenges to the region in the future. Which powerful governments will want to provide substantial and sustained aid to Africa, to seek its views on world and regional issues, to speak for its interests at the high tables of world politics, to help it solve its very real and growing problems, to include it in international councils deciding issues of importance to the region, or to

pressure international financial institutions or commercial creditors for favorable deals? Of course, the world will not simply turn its back on Africa and its problems. The humanitarian concerns of many outside countries will ensure a measure of interest and continuing aid. However, humanitarian interest alone is not much of a basis upon which Africans can advance their interests with the rest of the world or exert an influential voice in world affairs. If the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s are not simply to become the wards of the international financial institutions—a concern which appears well justified—they must find a way of reestablishing concrete foreign interests in the region. A serious move toward economic union among African countries would be one alternative which would pique the political and economic interest of foreigners. However, though dreams of economic union among African states have been many, real progress toward union has been negligible, and this seems unlikely to change in the future.

Another alternative—but by no means an easy one—is the successful completion of the first two journeys described in this essay. Economic recovery and sustained growth, combined with political liberalization and good governance, will make African countries attractive as economic partners and enhance the credibility of African leaders. Invaluable when seeking understanding and help at international fora, African leaders' credibility has suffered from the widespread perception that many of them are corrupt, repressive, and uninterested in the welfare of their peoples. Indeed, widespread reform may be the only real alternative to a journey toward international irrelevance for much of Africa.



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David A. Hamburg, M.D.
President

March 4, 1997

Ms. Melanne Verveer
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Deputy Chief of Staff to the First Lady
Office of the First Lady
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Melanne:

I would like very much to keep up with the matters we discussed last week and to help in an active, continuing way as you and Hillary suggested might be useful. First, I am enclosing some material.

Selected Items on Africa

- I particularly call your attention to my 1984 speech in Cape Town on human impoverishment. I have marked a few pages to highlight the idea about human origins in Africa that Hillary mentioned was of special interest to her;
- A recently published essay by Larry Diamond, one of our best scholars on democracy, *Prospects of Democratic Development in Africa*;
- Four *Carnegie Quarterly*s on Africa reflecting selected aspects of our work there over the years.

Selected Items Pertaining to the April Conference

- The abridged version of *Starting Points*;
- An in-house report, *Family Support and Parent Education*;
- A set of articles on reading;
- Inscribed copies of our most recent report, *Years of Promise* (3 - 10).

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I hope these materials will be useful. We can follow up in any way you wish.

With respect to the Africa trip, I have talked to Richard Wrangham, who was once my student and is now a professor at Harvard. He is the author of the recent book, *Demonic Males* that Hillary found so stimulating. He will not be in Uganda at the time of your trip but would be happy to brief you before hand if you wish from the perspective of the field station for primate research that he runs in Uganda. It may make more sense to invite him to the conference on the democracy project.

There are two remarkable women in South Africa who would be very much worth meeting. The first is Mamphela Ramphele. When I first met her in 1984, she was banned by the government. I went out to visit her in the boondocks. I was deeply impressed with her creative work in a poor, remote community on behalf of children. Later Mamphela became co-director of the Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa. Last year she became Vice Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, which is very likely the best university in Africa. What a remarkable story!

The other woman is Frene Ginwala, Speaker of the South Africa Parliament. I have never met anyone who has more insight into the process of the democratic transformation in South Africa than she does. She will meet with the Carnegie board here in April. You can well imagine how proud we are that both of these remarkable women have been Carnegie grantees. They are world-class leaders by any reasonable standard.

With respect to the April meeting on brain development and early learning (or whatever is the correct title), I have talked with Rob Reiner, and he is eager to participate. I hope he will be invited. His view, which seems reasonable and constructive to me, is to invite some leading governors from both parties who are deeply engaged in this issue. This would include people like George Voinovich from Ohio and Tom Ridge from Pennsylvania, on the Republican side, as well as Howard Dean from Vermont, Bob Miller from Nevada, Jim Hunt from North Carolina, and Lawton Chiles on the Democratic side. Rob has the same view about the Congress: both houses, both parties -- e.g., Representative John Porter of Illinois and Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont on the Republican side. They were both at the recent Aspen Institute/Carnegie conference in Florida on these issues.

Regarding the business community's participation in the conference, it would make sense to have high officials from organizations such as AT & T, IBM, and Johnson & Johnson since all three have been deeply engaged in the public awareness campaign of 0 - 3. Incidentally, there is some talk that Speaker Gingrich may set up a bi-partisan study group on these issues.

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March 4, 1997

When I was with you last week, I gave you a list of appropriate scientists working on brain development. Several of them might be very useful and informative if they were to attend the conference. Also, Hillary's suggestion about inviting a scientist from the NIH makes good sense. One of the most mature, reflective, and respected scholars in the child development field has recently retired after many years at the NIH, but she is still active and outstanding. Her name is Marion Radke Yarrow. You also asked me if I would be willing to serve on a panel at the spring conference, and I would be happy to do so. Are the dates set yet?

Vivien Stewart, Michael Levine and I have just met to discuss the conference. We believe that the scientific and professional part of the meeting will be the core. It should include neuroscientists concerned with brain development and child development scientists concerned with behavioral development. In terms of best professional practices in response to the scientific information, we need excellent representatives of: prenatal care, primary health care for the young child, early child care and parent education. Beyond that, if there is time, it would be useful to have some illustration of well-grounded, inter-sectoral efforts at the community and state level to put this knowledge to use for young children and their families. We will send a mock up of such a day-long program later in the week, or perhaps I can give it to you in person.

We are wondering about the intended audience and also about the organization of follow up efforts. So far as possible, it seems desirable for the First Lady to play an active, continuing role in the planning and conduct of this meeting.

With respect to the democracy project, our discussion was most stimulating and broadened my horizons. I have read the piece in *American Demographics* and found it fascinating. It suggests to me that we should identify an outstanding person in the field of survey research who has studied changing values and new value clusters in American society. I am getting Diane Eck's book, but my guess is that it would make sense to invite her to the conference -- as well as Richard Wrangham for the long view of human origins and human nature.

Incidentally, no date was mentioned, and I got the impression that Hillary is not in a hurry to get this set, that she would rather get it right than get it soon; but please let me know.

I will be attending the President's Committee on Advisors on Science and Technology meeting this Thursday and Friday, so I will be available if you want me to pop over, even on short notice. I do not have central responsibility in this meeting, so I

Ms. Melanne Verveer

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can be flexible. Someone in Jack Gibbons' office can pull me out. I will be staying at the Hay Adams hotel Wednesday to Friday.

With every good wish,

As always,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely reading "Dale".

enclosures

P.S. I am faxing with this copies of the other letters I wrote to you and the First Lady since our recent meeting, so you can look over the whole batch together.

Incidentally, do you still want me to look at the script for April 28 or is that unnecessary now? I want to help in any way I can.

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David A. Hamburg, M.D.
President

February 26, 1997

Melanne Verveer
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Deputy Chief of Staff to the First Lady
Office of the First Lady
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Melanne:

It was a great meeting yesterday, indeed far beyond my imagination. Do such imaginative, stimulating, wide-ranging, far-sighted discussions actually take place in the White House? The topics we explored were indeed fundamental and have a great bearing on the future of our country.

Right now, I want to follow up as promptly as I can on several aspects of our discussion: 1) the 0-3 conference; 2) the Africa trip; 3) the democracy project.

I am sending you and Hillary a couple of items that bear on 0-3 and the developmental strategy beyond the earliest years. I am also enclosing some material on Africa. In that context, could you let me know which countries you expect to visit so that I can make some specific suggestions?

I hope some of this will be useful to you, and I look forward with great pleasure to our continuing efforts.

Thanks so very much for your kindness to Peggy as well as to me. I am excited about the opportunity she will have and contributions she will make.

With every good wish,

As always,



P.S. Hillary mentioned she would like me to comment on her portion of the Reiner script. I'll be happy to do it.

10mc fr

March 21, 1997

Dear Melanne,

I hope this note finds you well and profitably travelled. I trust that the trip was another great triumph for all. I shall be calling you soon to see if we can do a families dinner with Jan and Robin as well.

Meanwhile, I am taking the liberty to send you a piece of Congressional testimony I gave a week or so ago. It was for the House International Relations Committee on the issue of reorganizing the foreign affairs agencies. I am against merging USAID into State, as you know. This was as articulate a statement of opposition to the idea of merger as I could muster. I hope it is persuasive.

Since my testimony, I have heard that not only are State officials talking about merger but there is some support for dismembering AID and putting various pieces of it into various bureaus of State -- the Africa Bureau of AID (and its funding) would become part of the Africa Bureau of State and so on. This idea comes directly from Senator Helms' legislation of two years ago. It was a terrible idea then and it is a terrible idea now. What it would do is destroy any semblance of a coherent development program and in effect provide separate pots of money to each State bureau to distribute in its region. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the use of funds would quickly become based on short-term, political concerns of the individual bureaus. That would mean most probably that the longer term development mission would be lost and that most of the funding would be government to government (and less of the direct, people-to-people, NGO type programs AID is operating today). It would not be long before Congress would begin to criticize such a use of aid, not to mention NGOs and others outside of government concerned with development. I suspect other governments would also see such a move as the end of development programs on the part of the US. Indeed, this may be the reason why Congressman Obey is threatening to oppose whatever State brings to the appropriations committee if a merger of AID and State goes forward or why Senator Leahy is talking about filibustering any such proposal. This may all sound speculative (or even hysterical?) but I have worked in State and AID on these issues and can attest to the different missions of the two agencies as well as to the pressures that can be generated within State to put resources behind seemingly urgent political goals abroad. Where State controls the resources, that is very likely to happen, a fact recognized by many.

I do not know where Madeline is on all this. But I am concerned that her staff reportedly seem to be so keen to get her to take such an unfortunate position. I hope you will keep an eye on this issue. It is likely to go to the President in the next

week or so. It would be ironic if your trip showcasing the good work the US is doing in development in Africa were followed by a decision that undercut our ability to do such work in the future.

Yours,



Carol Lancaster

P.S.: Did you have occasion to use any of the books I left with you? Any of the African poetry? Did you get a chance to read Ake? If so what did you, or Mrs. Clinton think?

New Thinking on Foreign Aid
House International Relations Committee
February 26, 1997

Carol Lancaster
Georgetown University
and the
Institute for International Economics

I am pleased to have the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today on "New Thinking on Foreign Aid". It is surely an appropriate moment to call such a hearing. With the momentous changes in the world over the past half decade, it is timely to ask what the foreign economic assistance programs of the United States should look like as we approach a new millennium.

Much of the debate on US economic assistance over the past several years has focussed on organizational issues -- should USAID and other agencies be merged into the Department of State or reorganized in other ways? I shall spend most of my time today examining this issue. My strongly held view is that a major reorganization of USAID -- either to consolidate into the Department of State or to separate some or all of it even further from the State Department -- is unwise and unwarranted at this time. That does not mean that we should assume the status quo in foreign aid is necessarily appropriate to the world we now live in. This is a moment for new thinking. But the new thinking should focus first on the missions for which US foreign aid is deployed and the mechanisms by which those missions are best achieved rather than issues of organization. To do otherwise is surely to put the cart before the horse.

Before I turn to the issue of reorganization, I should like to say that my views are based on my experience as a practitioner -- in policy positions both in the Department of State (on the Policy Planning Staff and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) and in USAID (as Deputy Administrator) -- and as a scholar with some acquaintance with the literature on public administration, including the organization and management of public agencies.

The issue of merging USAID into the Department of State arose several years ago as part of a study under the auspices of the Vice President's National Performance Review. At the conclusion of that study, the Vice President decided that a merger was not appropriate. I believe he was right.

At first glance, the idea of merging USAID into the Department of State is an attractive one. USAID is a foreign affairs agency, managing concessional resources in support of US foreign policy objectives abroad. It is now semi-independent, with the USAID

Administrator taking foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State and submitting his budget both to the Secretary and to the President. A merger, it is argued, would ensure greater coherence in US foreign policy, a greater engagement by the Secretary of State in promoting foreign aid (that is, "mainstreaming" foreign aid) and could save significant amounts of money by eliminating duplication.

A closer look at the functions of these two agencies disputes these arguments. The core mission of the Department of State is to manage our relationships with foreign governments. This involves reporting, representation, policy development and often above all, managing problems and crises involving foreign countries. This was the case during the Cold War and remains the case today. The end of the Cold War has not fundamentally changed this core mission. And if there is any doubt about this mission, one has only to look at where the real power in the Department of State is and always has been -- in the regional bureaus, with the regional assistant secretaries, the office directors, the country desk officers and, of course, the ambassadors in the field. In both of the positions I held in State, the priority placed on dealing with other governments on immediate issues was apparent. On the Policy Planning Staff, one could decide to focus on longer term planning and risk being irrelevant. Or one could focus on shorter term policy issues and possibly have an impact. In the Africa Bureau, my job was to find resources to support US policies in various African countries -- often policies designed to deal with immediate crises in those relations, such as bringing about a peaceful end to the rebellion in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, or to protect US interests in the wake of the military coup by Sergeant Doe of Liberia.

The mission of USAID is also "foreign policy" but it is different from that of the Department of State in several key ways. It involves bringing about long term economic, social and political changes in foreign countries through funding a variety of projects and programs, implemented within a strategic framework. USAID now works almost as much with non-governmental organizations as it does with governments and is committed to expanding that partnership even further. And it must manage program funds and be accountable to the Congress for the expenditure of those funds and the results those expenditures produce.

The missions, the time horizons, the foreign partners, the knowledge and skills of personnel, and the management systems of these two agencies are all different enough to warrant a degree of separation between them. Indeed, this was the strategy of those who planned and established USAID early in the Kennedy Administration.

Let me explore for a moment why this should be the case. Much of the thinking in the field of public administration and organization theory over the past half century has argued that the bases for organizing public agencies should be four: purpose, process, clientele and place. Where different agencies share these

functions -- particularly where they share similar purposes -- there is a strong case for combining them. Where the purposes of agencies differ, there is a strong argument for creating or maintaining separate organizations. The only one of these qualities shared by both State and USAID is place -- they both work in some of the same foreign countries. The danger of combining agencies with significantly different purposes is that the purpose or mission of the stronger agency will usually overwhelm the purpose or mission of the weaker one. This is, in my view, the danger inherent in merging USAID into the Department of State.

Thus, the argument that USAID should be merged into the Department of State to ensure that its programs support US foreign policy or that there is more "coherence" between the programs of the Department of State and USAID misses a key point. USAID does support US foreign policy but its particular mission within the broad category of "US foreign policy" is different from State (as is, for example, the CIA or the Department of Defense). And this difference argues for a degree of separation to ensure the preservation of that mission. When it is suggested that a merger will create greater policy "coherence", what I believe is often really being argued is that the distinct mission (and programmatic orientation) of USAID should be set aside and assistance resources should be used to back the core mission of the Department of State. If this is in fact what those favoring a merger between the two agencies want, then it should be made explicit and debated on its merits. To proceed with a merger without such a debate could result in making an unintended decision on mission with important programmatic and political implications.

Just as it would be a mistake to merge USAID into the Department of State, it would also in my view be a mistake to separate completely USAID from the Department of State, as is implied by the proposal to create a separate "development foundation". As long as USAID's mission is one of supporting US foreign policy, there needs to be close and continuous coordination between the two agencies. It is often unrecognized just how much coordination there is at present at all levels between State and USAID officers. I have seen it and have been part of it in both agencies. As a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department, I was on the phone or in the offices of my USAID counterparts daily. As Deputy Administrator of USAID, I attended the Secretary of State's staff meetings when the Administrator was out of town and collaborated frequently with my colleagues in the Department of State and in the field. From the Assistant Secretary and Assistant Administrator levels to office directors, desk officers and above all, in the field, there is extensive coordination and collaboration. I will not claim that coordination cannot be significantly improved. It surely can. As might be expected in agencies with differing missions, there are often problems of policy, program and culture. To bridge the distinct cultures of the two agencies and to resolve differences on policy and programs, continuous leadership is required, beginning at the top.

The organizational relationship between State and USAID is an ambiguous and sometimes confusing one -- neither full independence nor full merger of the two. But it does reflect the real and important differences as well as commonalities between the two agencies and their missions. And as long as both differences and commonalities exist, there is a strong case for leaving the arrangement as it is, however unbeautiful it appears.

Let me turn to the second argument for merging USAID into the Department of State -- that it would "mainstream" foreign aid and development in US foreign policy. I think this argument is a weak one and the result of a merger could easily have the opposite effect. The importance foreign aid for development and other purposes to the Department of State and the Secretary in particular is reliant on the role and importance of what aid does in advancing US foreign policy generally, not where it is located. There is nothing stopping this or any Secretary of State from more actively promoting resources and policies involving sustainable development, even if USAID is semi-independent from State. Secretaries of State have done so in the past. I have written their testimonies before this Committee and staffed their interventions. If the relevance of foreign aid has diminished in the eyes of the State Department and the Secretary, we must ask if that is a transient phenomenon and if it is not, we must examine the issue of the relevance of the mission of USAID is to that of the Department. This brings us back to the issue of mission rather than organization. But there is one more consideration -- does the Secretary of State want to get into the nitty gritty of foreign aid procurement issues, issues of development policy, issues of programming aid by strategic objectives and results packages -- as he or she might have to if USAID is merged into the Department? There are a large set of detailed foreign aid issues quite different from the foreign policy concerns that already crowd the schedule of Secretaries of State. But someone would have to decide policies, direct overall programs and explain policies, programs and problems to the Congress and the US public. If that were not the Secretary of State (as it is not likely to be), it would be a less senior official with less status and credibility than the head of a separate agency. I very much suspect that the program and functions of foreign aid for development and other purposes will end up being downgraded not mainstreamed in the event of a merger.

The third argument for merger is eliminating duplication and gaining budgetary savings. It is sometimes assumed that because the Department of State and USAID both have regional bureaus (for Latin America, Asia, Africa), a merger would save money by eliminating overlapping bureaus. The common names do not signify common functions, however. State regional bureaus are responsible for the Washington end of managing primarily political relationships with foreign governments. USAID regional bureaus are responsible for managing programs in particular countries or regions, often with foreign governments but also frequently with NGOs. Unless the missions of the two agencies were altered significantly, a merger is likely to produce little in the way of

significant budgetary savings.

I would like to suggest further that a merger could actually prove quite costly at least in the short run. A major reorganization is almost always time consuming and creates enormous uncertainties that can distract and demoralize staff while inhibiting the overall effectiveness of the agencies involved. It could prove particularly difficult where one agency -- USAID -- in the throes of internal administrative reforms is merged with another -- in this case, the Department of State -- which confronts the challenge of initiating such reforms in the future. Given the likely costs of a merger of these two agencies, it would seem that there ought to be major benefits to the US taxpayer if a merger is undertaken. I cannot at this point see what those benefits would be.

I would like to comment briefly on the proposal in ODC's well written monograph which would divide USAID into two parts -- a policy part and a program implementation part -- and place the former in the Department of State and make the latter "semi-autonomous" of that Department. While I sympathize with the ideas behind this proposal, I believe it is both unwise and unworkable. There are two major problems with it. First, it divides policy from implementation. This approach to organization is always problematical, creating conflicts over what is policy and what is implementation and between those responsible for the two functions. In addition, it deprives the policy-makers of both the valuable experience of learning that comes from implementation. And it relieves them from responsibility and accountability for that implementation. It reduces the flexibility of implementers to make judgements about when, where and how to use resources to achieve overall programmatic goals. And it reduces their responsibility and accountability for the results of their efforts.

Second, the proposal argues that the four main missions of foreign assistance -- humanitarian relief, economic and political transitions, addressing global issues and promoting development -- are distinct and justify different organizational arrangements for each. Here, I must disagree. These missions are, in fact, often overlapping and the means and resources (including personnel) for achieving them are frequently the same or similar. Humanitarian relief shades into recovery and development in most of the world and it is important that policy, programmatic and organizational linkages exist to encourage common efforts. (I do not argue that such linkages are at present adequate. They are not.) Supporting economic and political transitions is the focus of USAID's activities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But such transitions are taking place in most of the rest of the world too. They are at the heart of much of USAID's work in Africa and Latin America. The same skills that help the Russians write a commercial code can do the same for the Angolans or even the Tanzanians. Development of civil society is a challenge in Cambodia or Peru or Mali just as it is in Bulgaria. The specific needs will differ from country to country but still call on many of the same

technical skills. (Is it not telling that aid funds are allocated to the two party institutes -- the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute -- to promote democracy throughout the world, not just in "transition" countries of the former socialist bloc?)

Similarly, the skills required to address many global issues are the same skills required to tackle those issues in the context of development in particular countries -- for example, environmental conservation, whether to address a global concern or the problem of biodiversity or energy in a particular country, demands similar technical training and experience. In short, the four missions cited in the ODC study share a sufficient commonality of purpose, process and clientele that they should be lodged in one agency and not divided.

Do these arguments against a reorganization of USAID suggest that the status quo is adequate and appropriate to the needs and opportunities in the post Cold War world? No, they do not. They simply urge that there be a moratorium on merger until there has been a debate and some sort of bipartisan consensus reached on mission and mechanisms. Form should follow function, not precede it.

What missions should USAID pursue as we approach the millennium and are these any different from those of the past? Should aid monies be tied more closely to US political interests abroad, as Professor Kennedy has argued in his article on pivotal states? Without having to agree with Professor Kennedy's particular formulation, one could make a case for a more politically oriented US aid program, supporting US efforts at conflict resolution or peace keeping and leaving problems of promoting development to the World Bank and others. This approach would make a strong case for placing bilateral aid resources under the direct control of the Department of State. Or one could argue, as Professor Vernon Ruttan has done in his seminal book on United States Development Assistance that aid be tied more strictly to humanitarian purposes (which apparently the American public supports) and to a transfer of science and technology to poor countries. This approach could justify the creation of separate foundations for each type of aid-financed activity, much as the Canadian government has done. Another purpose might be to concentrate the bulk of US bilateral aid in the "Big Emerging Markets" to help them integrate more rapidly into the world economy and open up opportunities for US business. The organizational implications of this approach might suggest a consolidation of USAID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Trade and Development Agency into one organization. A much heavier concentration on addressing global issues could suggest not a merger of USAID into the Department of State but possibly the creation of programs in a variety of US government agencies to support work overseas -- for example, a significant budget to fund foreign activities of the Center for Disease Control of the

Department of Health and Human Services. I am not advocating any of these alternatives. But they are all real and should be considered as part of new thinking on foreign aid and an effort to build a consensus on the future of US aid.

There is another significant issue regarding the future of US aid, even if there is no major shift in mission or merger. How should USAID implement its programs in a world where most countries have a much greater capacity to manage their own development than they did three and a half decades ago, when USAID was created? And where the number and expertise of NGOs -- both northern and southern -- is so much greater and so much more capable of designing and implementing programs without the close supervision of the past? Is the Administration and the Congress ready to consider a much more "demand driven" mechanism for delivering development assistance -- along the lines of the approach of the great philanthropic foundations and suggested in the ODC monograph -- than the current system? This may be an idea whose time has come but one which invites more detailed analysis and debate.

I would like to close by saying that hearings like these and the various studies done or underway on the future of foreign aid are critical to begin to identify the real options for the future and hopefully, to create a measure of agreement on what that future should be. But we still have a long way to go in my view to clarify those options and just how they fit into the broader foreign policy goals of the United States in the post-Cold War world.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 15, 1997

Note for: Secretary Rubin
Deputy Secretary Summers

From: Dan Zelikow *DZ*

Subject: Your meeting with the First Lady on Africa

The attached two-page draft summary of the Administration's "Africa Initiative" was sent ahead to the First Lady this evening. For your reference, you will also find a longer draft version of the initiative that describes it more fully. Note that there are trade issues that Secretaries Daley and Glickman are not happy about and may try to reopen. Another issue -- bilateral debt reduction -- has not yet been closed. We favor full forgiveness of concessional debt for eligible countries, the more expensive option (about \$35million) rather than third-party swaps or buybacks (which costs nothing but may not work). OMB and State want to think more about it.

Important points on the Initiative to make to the First Lady...

- o There are a few policies listed in the paper that may not be settled within the Administration. Our view is that the program of "US incentives" already appears quite modest, and we should err on the side of "more" rather than "less" in resolving these issues. This needs to be worked through the NEC/NSC process.
- o Apart from what is listed in the paper, we are working with the IFIs to get them to tailor special programs for the boldest reformers ("financing reform"). We don't go into detail in the paper because we don't want to prejudge the outcome or antagonize others in the G7 whose support we need on this.
- o We would hope that this approach, and some of aspects of the program (redirecting commodity assistance, IFI support, unilateral trade concessions) might be replicated by the G7. Having everything ready for the Denver Summit is our goal.
- o Our consultations with the Africans suggest that political and economic recognition by high-level American officials is perhaps the element most valued here, even if the quantifiable elements of the program seem a bit thin.
- o Though the NGO community may be disappointed that we're not proposing even greater resource transfers, early indications suggest Africa's genuine reformers will make approving noises. Our strategy is to give these very reformers the political cover they may need to adopt the reforms that they know are necessary.

- (2)
- 4 - enhancement of exist'g prog (OPIC)
provide guarantees to encourage
foreign investment to Africa.

heavily 29ⁿ

productive entrepreneurship vs.

On Process

o We're hoping to have a joint bill that the President and Congressional sponsors can jointly announce at the White House within the next week or two. Formal Hill consultations are still to occur, however, pending the President's decision. Congressional sponsors plan to submit their version this Thursday.

o Both of us (RER and HRC) are speaking to a Corporate Council on Africa conference on Monday. There will be many high-level African leaders in attendance, as well as Congressional sponsors. I think we should hint about changes in our policy but try to preserve as far as possible the President's opportunity to present this initiative as something fresh.

-- I plan to speak about the HIPC debt initiative, our support for the IFIs, and the economics and strategy underpinning the new Africa initiative, not its specific elements.

-- Insofar as you speak about economics, as I hope you do, I think it would be interesting to draw connections between these programs and institutions and real peoples' lives, as you must have seen during your Africa trip.

-- I would be happy to have my staff work with yours on your speech if you wish.

Attachments: Short version of Africa Initiative
Long version of Africa Initiative
Your March '97 memo on Africa to HRC

Additional background material for LHS

cc: Lipton
Geithner

forces

Adaptivity

②

more towards trade, + act for what
market can't do.

— last yr: - foreign debt of some of most highly indebted
to indiv'l countries + IMF + W. Bank. based
on econ. growth.
Uganda - 1\$1

- 1 - unilateral trade concessions
- 2 - financing (and trading systems, but that takes a while)
- 3 - redirecting commodity assistance to poorer countries - total that amounts to a fair amount of \$.

①

Moral challenge & development challenge - very profound
encouraging signs &
more market oriented - clear evidence Africa ~~not~~
can grow

with right strategies

Starts out behind - many countries landlocked
Closed trade policies - prob. most serious
near term problem.

Machinery is much more expensive
Due to tariffs & quotas

if open economies to outside world → really that in an
flow of aid has a depressing effect - 10% of GNP is
foreign aid