

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Case Number: 268618SS Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters to Congressional Leaders on Loan Guarantees for Israel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Records Management, White House Office of (WHORM)
Series: Subject File - C.F.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.: FO004-02
File Location: 268618 to 268618SS

Date Closed:	9/25/2007	OA/ID Number:	00002-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0255-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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01b. Memo	Case Number: 268618SS Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters to Congressional Leaders on Loan Guarantees for Israel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Records Management, White House Office of (WHORM)
Series: Subject File - C.F.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.: FO004-02
File Location: 268618 to 268618SS

Date Closed:	9/25/2007	OA/ID Number:	00002-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0255-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Memo	Case Number: 268618SS Edmund J. Hull through Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letters to Congressional Leaders on Loan Guarantees for Israel (1 pp.)	09/05/1991	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Records Management, White House Office of (WHORM)
Series: Subject File - C.F.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.: FO004-02
File Location: 268618 to 268618SS

Date Closed:	9/25/2007	OA/ID Number:	00002-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0255-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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retain
for # 6525

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

This effort on our part does not take place in a vacuum. Over the past two years, Israel has opened its doors to more than 300,000 Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants. The steady influx of men, women and children from around the world over past decades has been central to Israel's success. The United States has long supported immigration to Israel. I have been pleased to play a role in this enterprise. It is no exaggeration to state that many of the Soviet and Ethiopian Jews now in Israel would not be free and safe were it not for years of sustained U.S. effort -- an effort supported by both Republicans and Democrats and by Congress and the Executive alike.

Earlier this spring, the Administration came to agreement with Congress and the Government of Israel on the provision of emergency supplemental economic assistance to Israel. In turn, Israel and its supporters agreed to defer a request for additional absorption assistance until September. Now we find ourselves on the

verge of historic direct negotiations, possibly as early as October.

On both sides of the conflict, absorption assistance is a very important and very complex issue. I am deeply concerned that if we address Israeli absorption guarantees now -- on the eve of the conference -- we could divert attention and momentum from our efforts to get the parties together for these historic negotiations.

At the moment, we are involved in extremely sensitive negotiations to pin down the final details related to convening the conference. What we must avoid is anything that would distract the parties from the hard choices and decisions they have yet to make to get to the negotiating table.

It is our judgment that if we address absorption assistance now we risk losing everything we have been working on for the past six months. An issue of this sensitivity could be seized upon by rejectionists intent on thwarting negotiations. If Congress chooses to press forward now, we stand a very real chance of losing the participation of either our Arab or Israeli negotiating partners. The best chance to promote Arab/Israeli peace since the Camp David Accords will be lost, with uncertain and potentially dangerous consequences in the region.

Postponement will afford us an opportunity to study Israel's needs in greater detail and to craft a program which has the greatest likelihood of promoting successful absorption at minimal taxpayer cost while contributing to prospects for peace. We will ensure that an appropriate legislative vehicle is made available to address the absorption assistance issue in January.

Next week Secretary Baker will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and a number of Arab leaders. He will assure all these leaders of unequivocal U.S. support for Soviet Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel. But I

want him also to be in a position to report to them that, in the interests of advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East, the Administration and the Congress -- with the support of the bipartisan leadership of both Houses -- have agreed to defer consideration of Israeli absorption assistance until January.

Armed with such a commitment, he will have the flexibility he needs to try and nail down remaining modalities for the peace talks. Absent such a deferral, the attention of all the parties could well be diverted from the key choices they have yet to make in getting to the negotiating table. The result could well be the loss of the peace process.

Providing a pause is the single most important step Congress could take to get these historic peace negotiations launched. We have an excellent record of cooperation on Arab/Israeli issues. Won't you please support me now in a 120-day pause for peace?

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jamie L. Whitten
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Michel:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Michel
Republican Leader
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Hatfield:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
Ranking Republican, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Mitchell:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable George Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman McDade:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph M. McDade
Ranking Republican, Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Gephardt:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

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Armed with such a commitment, he will have the flexibility he needs to try and nail down remaining modalities for the peace talks. Absent such a deferral, the attention of all the parties could well be diverted from the key choices they have yet to make in getting to the negotiating table. The result could well be the loss of the peace process.

Providing a pause is the single most important step Congress could take to get these historic peace negotiations launched. We have an excellent record of cooperation on Arab/Israeli issues. Won't you please support me now in a 120-day pause for peace?

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard Gephardt
Majority Leader
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1991

September 10, 1991

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

This effort on our part does not take place in a vacuum. Over the past two years, Israel has opened its doors to more than 300,000 Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants. The steady influx of men, women and children from around the world over past decades has been central to Israel's success. The United States has long supported immigration to Israel. I have been pleased to play a role in this enterprise. It is no exaggeration to state that many of the Soviet and Ethiopian Jews now in Israel would not be free and safe were it not for years of sustained U.S. effort -- an effort supported by both Republicans and Democrats and by Congress and the Executive alike.

Earlier this spring, the Administration came to agreement with Congress and the Government of Israel on the provision of emergency supplemental economic assistance to Israel. In turn, Israel and its supporters agreed to defer a request for additional absorption assistance until September. Now we find ourselves on the

verge of historic direct negotiations, possibly as early as October.

On both sides of the conflict, absorption assistance is a very important and very complex issue. I am deeply concerned that if we address Israeli absorption guarantees now -- on the eve of the conference -- we could divert attention and momentum from our efforts to get the parties together for these historic negotiations.

At the moment, we are involved in extremely sensitive negotiations to pin down the final details related to convening the conference. What we must avoid is anything that would distract the parties from the hard choices and decisions they have yet to make to get to the negotiating table.

It is our judgment that if we address absorption assistance now we risk losing everything we have been working on for the past six months. An issue of this sensitivity could be seized upon by rejectionists intent on thwarting negotiations. If Congress chooses to press forward now, we stand a very real chance of losing the participation of either our Arab or Israeli negotiating partners. The best chance to promote Arab/Israeli peace since the Camp David Accords will be lost, with uncertain and potentially dangerous consequences in the region.

Postponement will afford us an opportunity to study Israel's needs in greater detail and to craft a program which has the greatest likelihood of promoting successful absorption at minimal taxpayer cost while contributing to prospects for peace. We will ensure that an appropriate legislative vehicle is made available to address the absorption assistance issue in January.

Next week Secretary Baker will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and a number of Arab leaders. He will assure all these leaders of unequivocal U.S. support for Soviet Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel. But I

want him also to be in a position to report to them that, in the interests of advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East, the Administration and the Congress -- with the support of the bipartisan leadership of both Houses -- have agreed to defer consideration of Israeli absorption assistance until January.

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Providing a pause is the single most important step Congress could take to get these historic peace negotiations launched. We have an excellent record of cooperation on Arab/Israeli issues. Won't you please support me now in a 120-day pause for peace?

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1991

NOTE FOR BILL SITTMANN:

I'm returning these to you for dating,
but would also raise two points:

The salutations should be changed to
first names, per Fred McClure, as is
usual on letters to members of Congress
the President knows personally.

Second, depending on Secretary Baker's
travel schedule, should the reference
to "next week" (i.e., the week
beginning 9/15) be changed to "this
week"?

Thanks.

Phillip D. Brady

P.S.: I understand from Fred that
these letters should be dated and
delivered tomorrow.

Other two letters OK for signature
for Phil.

John L. Marden

9/9/91

0/2

WJ

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6525

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

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Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	Not Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>9/9</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>West Wing Andriacos 9/9</u>	<u>D</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

91 AUG 9 P 2: 21

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

These ltrs. were to be dated 9/10/91

* **DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:** Andriacos wants all original ltrs to Senators in his hands ASAP - He will deliver by hand.

Florence:

The President signed
Cong'l Ltrs on Friday
but BS is HOLDING THEM

BS wanted to do Cong'l
phone calls before
releasing letters.

Attached is cover memo
plus 1 cy -- plus
backup etc.

Wilma

**Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page**

**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Congressional letters
should be dated
September 10, 1991.*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*When ready please
call Mike Andrieus for pickup.
Thank you Wren*

**National Security Council
The White House**

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SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

Copy

A

Bill Sittmann

2

copy

Bob Gates

3

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

91 AUG 5 P8: 50

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Presidential letter to
Congressional Leadership re:
Loan Guarantees for Israel*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has dish to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9106525
RECEIVED: 05 SEP 91 14

TO: DOLE, ROBERT J
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 10 SEP 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

CO

PERSONS: DOLE, ROBERT J
FOLEY, THOMAS S

MITCHELL, GEORGE L
MICHEL, ROBERT H

SUBJECT: PRES LTRS TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON LOAN GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL

ACTION: PRES SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 09 SEP 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HULL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDRICOS
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NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DTL NARA, Date 9/25/2007

COMMENTS: *** ORIGINALS HANDED TO ANDRICOS FOR DISPATCH ***

DISPATCHED BY VH DATE 9/9 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 3 OF 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9106525

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
002 PRESIDENT
003

Z 91090613 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 91090612 FOR SIGNATURE
X 91090919 PRES SGD LTRS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJC NARA, Date 9/25/2007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~