

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
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File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

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AR Case #:	MR Case #: 09-0742-MR(526)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/21/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0742-MR
32 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Interpreter: No
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 28, 1992, 7:58-8:11 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David



The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine and you, George? (U)

The President: I am calling on the situation in Sarajevo. As you know we haven't been out front on this, but now we are very concerned. It sounds like the same is true for the EC from reading my morning papers on your meeting. I talked to Yeltsin and Major briefly yesterday. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, we discussed this yesterday. People here are much more motivated than a few months ago. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

We came to the common position that we should organize our humanitarian aid and that we want the Security Council of the UN to do the most to give the possibility of action. Of course, this would be working with the U.S. I think Jim Baker's statement before the (EC) Council met made clear that the U.S. would not stand by. Then as you have heard, Mitterrand went to Bosnia. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: We think we have got to act now. We have the feeling that we should take this into the UN and get a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means and of course tying this only to the humanitarian assistance situation.

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John Major is very hesitant and worried about a situation like Dien Bien Phu. We would be willing to do all possible on the air side -- airlift support, open the airport and if needed provide air cover. I wanted to get a sense of how forward-leaning you are. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Very much. Mitterrand did not want to get involved precisely because of the Dien Bien Phu example, but

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The problem now is to do this the right way. (S)

The President: The next step is to go to the U.N. I am reluctant to put U.S. troops in. I don't think the parties want us to do so. But we have an enormous ability to support in the air transport area and to provide air cover, if needed. We also have a carrier tank force in the Mediterranean. But the first step is to act in the U.N., and I think Boutros Ghali is taking the same line on this. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Plus, George, this can have a good effect by showing the U.S. and Europe acting together. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

It will be good to have the U.S. defending the same idea as Europe, and maybe we can involve NATO in some way. (S)

The President: Yes, Jim Baker was thinking of perhaps coming to Europe. I do not know if it will happen for this, but perhaps for a GATT Ministerial. We'd like to try to do something on GATT before Munich. If he does, maybe he can meet on this, too. Are there any changes on GATT? (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, Major and Kohl were active on this in Lisbon. Things changed a little for the good. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

But Jim Baker, who seems to be taking the lead now, is so close that it is not impossible to find agreement. So we should take advantage of the opportunity of Jim being in Europe. Maybe if an agreement was reached and the conclusion reported to governments, people wouldn't say "no".

(b)(1)

(S)

The President: You have been wonderful and I know people think we have been tough. But we want an agreement. (S)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: The problem has been on both sides. I'd say the chances of agreement are still less than 50 percent, something like 40 percent. But with luck and courage, it could happen, especially if we can get people ^{(b)(1)} to act with the authority they already have and then report back. (Ø)

The President: Many Thanks. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: All best wishes. (U)

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