

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 18 October 1990 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/4/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 18 October 1990

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Brent Scowcroft (Notetaker)
Charles Powell, Assistant to Prime Minister

DATE, TIME: October 18, 1990, 1330 - 1400
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I share much of your concern. I agree with much. I wonder if we can wait to allow sanctions to work. Worry about mingling in Palestinian problem -- effect on cohesion of our side -- working on Shamir. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}

[REDACTED]

Prime Minister Thatcher: Time is on Saddam Hussein side. He will use it to say we are weak in resolve and will agree to withdraw under all sorts of conditions. He will undermine Arab solidarity. I too worry about the Palestinian problem. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}

[REDACTED]

Your paragraph on 30-45 days. Diplomacy has had 11 weeks. Hasn't worked; won't work. UNSC negotiation will undermine our resolve. The Islands will go, etc. We need to take first opportunity to get Saddam Hussein out.

The President: Agree. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}

^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} Same basis as he had before -- no concessions. But let me move to an urgent issue. There is a UN resolution before us. I hope we are together on it. To me, this could lead to use of force. (Used his argument.) Want you to know if it is undertaken (hope you would join) it could be the provocation.

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2010-0472-MF
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Sorry to spring this on you but it is urgent because not many embassies left.

Prime Minister Thatcher: First, not only people in embassies. There are many in hiding. They will be shot if they come out. Must be other nations in the same fix. Second, embassy in Baghdad - same argument applies and also to civilians in Iraq. They could think this is a prelude to attack and preempt with their missiles. Our embassy thinks they can't leave when so many people are there in hiding. So there are problems.


The President: Difficulty about Kuwait and Baghdad is we can't do anything about Baghdad. We not doing any good for the people in hiding.

Prime Minister Thatcher: We are. We are in touch with some.

The President: So you think provisional is the best way.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. We have one phone line open. If we tried to collect people they would put themselves in jeopardy.

The President: I wouldn't ok people to come out of hiding. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}



Prime Minister Thatcher: The brutality gives us general cause to go when we ready. Don't need more cause. Our embassies are there to protect our people. If we leave aren't we deserting our people. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}



The President: Our embassy must chose anyway. We can't service our people anyway. We are ready for the air campaign. We don't have unlimited time. This appeals to us to act on a moral basis and to act together.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Let me think about it. Your point is to do as much as you can even if you can't do everything.

The President: Yes. We can't get them all -- especially those chained to factories, etc. Our people will be starved out soon -- why wait for that. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}



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Prime Minister Thatcher: Let me think. We are thinking along the same line. I understand your point.

The President: We could do it alone, with you, or whatever. One problem is whether we are ready for full assault yet. (More exploration of our concepts.) Saddam Hussein not 25 feet tall.

Prime Minister Thatcher: We don't have that much time. Can't wait for military to say we need more time. It better for us to keep together but I have to think further about it.

The President: I think the resolution is moving. And if I'm faced with prospect of our people being shipped off to Baghdad, that's bad.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Emir coming next week. He has a letter. We may hold up signing because I know you have some problems. One more point. We see much military activity in the Soviet Union around military bases. We don't know what to make of it. Question is should we tell Gorbachev. I'm inclined not to.

The President: We don't know either. We'll work into it and Brent will call Charles.

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