

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary General (3 pp.)	7/9/92	(b)(1)	S

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File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2000-0233-F/3
SCS 3/14/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary General

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas M. T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
Gephardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary General
Roland Wegener, Director of the Private Office


DATE, TIME July 9, 1992 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Helsinki Fair Center, Finland

The President: Tell me about yesterday's NATO meeting. We are not trying to push the WEU off the scene. I take it there may be a serious problem with the French. We are running into this a lot. (C)

Secretary General Woerner:

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(b)(1)



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Declassify on: OADR

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The President: What is this talk about the WEU opening up a land corridor? (C)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: What is the attitude of the French? (C)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Secretary Baker: I have been talking to the other foreign ministers and they have been talking to Dumas. I have to wonder about whether we want a NATO ministerial here in Helsinki. It could appear as if we are seeking to displace the WEU. Could we not just have a quiet conversation? We are prepared to see the WEU involved as much as NATO is. (S)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Secretary Baker: What the President has said is this. The U.S. cannot sit back on a humanitarian role. We support use of all necessary means the not too settle the political problem. We haven't ruled anything out, but we are unlikely to provide ground combat forces. We would consider making air and naval forces available. NATO might play a useful role. I offered that to Boutros Ghali. Amato definitely would support NATO-WEU coordination. (S)

The President: What if Boutros Ghali says that NATO should go into Bosnia? Would we have some obligation? (S)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(S)

The President: If NATO were not involved what would the WEU do? (C)

Secretary General Woerner:

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(b)(1)

Secretary Baker: Yes, maybe. But propose we do it cooperatively between NATO and the WEU. We would cooperate for this discrete problem. The question of intervention is a separate bridge to cross. (S)

The President: But we have to consider how we define this at the beginning. We can't be contradictory. We will cooperate with the WEU and provide sea and air forces. But I want to be careful about NATO being in the lead. (S)

General Scowcroft: This could be a precedent setting. If NATO stays in the background, France will say that such conflicts are to be managed by Europeans. Also let's not forget that these are NATO ships. (S)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Secretary Baker: We can confront that question later. The key is not to prejudge it. (U)

Secretary General Woerner:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(S)

Secretary Baker: The WEU will not be able to handle it if the situation gets bloody. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Let's stay in touch. I will be talking to everybody today. (U)

Secretary Baker: The real issue is this. Why not go to the French, sit down with them and say we don't want a confrontation? This is the time to put that behind us. Let's fess the agriculture question by doing it cooperatively. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Okay, I would expect you to prepare the ground with the French. (S)

Secretary Baker: In the meantime, Gompert, Zoellick or Niles will stay in touch with you. (S)

The President: I am trying to look over the horizon. I don't see how we can say that the NATO is in and the U.S. is out. (S)

- End of Conversation -

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