DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

ALL COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CARBON COPY AND ADDRESSED TO
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

APR 8 2657-2-33 1932

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
WASHINGTON

TO INSURE PROMPT ATTENTION
IN REPLYING REFER TO

No.

ATTENTION OF

WAR DEPARTMENT
100

O.O. WAR DEPT.
32.1.12
NOV 22 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~ November 23, 1931.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
By authority letter of Dec. 11, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By _____ Date 6-25-64

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR R. H. SMITH:
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
(Military Division)

With reference to the two attached memoranda, please note the inclosed memorandum to me from the Chief of the General Supply Division of our Field Service, which is in partial reply. Any further information which may be obtained from the action referred to in paragraph one will be forwarded as soon as received.

For the Chief of Ordnance:

O. J. Gatchell.
O. J. Gatchell,
Major, Ordnance Department,
Executive Officer.

3 inclosures.

RECEIVED
NOV 23 1931
Ordnance Department
Mail and Records Branch

Note for record section:

The memo from Chief of the Gen. Supply Div of Ordnance Field Service to Major Gatchell, ref was attached to file concerning purchases of Arms & Ammunition by H/A countries from our Ordnance Depts.

(2724-P-20)

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

ALL COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CARBON COPY AND ADDRESSED TO CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

APR 8 1932
26 57-2-330
101
WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
WASHINGTON

TO INSURE PROMPT ATTENTION
IN REPLYING REFER TO
No. 321.12/3712 Confd

ATTENTION OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 13, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By [illegible]
Date 6-4-69

December 16, 1931.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Subject: Shipment of Arms and Ammunition to Cuba for use of the Revolutionary Forces.

1. With reference to the attached copy of confidential correspondence, O.O. 321.12/3701-Cuba, it is advised that the records of this office indicate that the ammunition lots listed in paragraph 1-(a) were never in the possession of any organization of the Army but were shipped from the factory of the National Brass and Copper Tube Company to various Naval establishments, as listed below:

<u>To Hingham</u>: Lots 123, 102, 132, 118, 89, 104, 95, 109, and 88.

<u>To Iona Island</u>: Lots 81, 68, 72, 79, 48, 54, 77, and 57.

<u>To Fort Mifflin</u>: Lot 14.

<u>To Lake Denmark</u>: Lot 152.

2. From the fact that the number "315" is reported to appear on the cartons, and lacking information as to whether this number is printed or stamped, and noting that Ammunition Lot 315 was rejected on inspection, and determining with fair assurance that it does not represent the smokeless powder lot number, it would appear that it is an inspection symbol, having no reference to the identity of the ammunition lot.

3. It would appear, therefore, that none of the ammunition in question could have been procured from any Army establishment. It is believed that this conclusion is borne out further by the fact that the cases were stenciled with a Naval address.

For the Chief of Ordnance:

O. J. Gatchell.

O. J. Gatchell,
Major, Ordnance Department,
Executive Officer.

2 Encls. Enclosures retained in A. A. Sec.
(copy of file O.O.321.12/3701)
(copy of file O.O.402.2/336)

Carbon copy clucked to O.N.I. for info. + file 11/27/31

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

ALL COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CARBON COPY AND ADDRESSED TO OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.

AR 2657@2-3302
1932

TO INSURE PROMPT ATTENTION
IN REPLYING REFER TO
No. 321.12/3719
ATTENTION OF

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
WASHINGTON

Cuba

January 11, 1932

WAR DEPARTMENT
102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO BE RECORDED.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 6-24-69

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR R. H. SMITH:
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
(Military Division)

Supplementing our memorandum to you under date of November 23, 1931, with inclosures (file O.O. 321.12/3700-Cuba), relative to Springfield rifles captured from Cuban rebels by the Cuban Army, you are advised that inquiry of all corps areas and major depots does not reveal any information which would lead to possible identification of any of these rifles.

Delay in securing this information was occasioned by the tracing of numbers reported which proved to be the same as some of those listed but evidently of different manufacture. Approximately 260,000 of these rifles manufactured at Rock Island Arsenal during the World War bore the same serial numbers of a like number of rifles manufactured at Springfield Armory.

In cases where serial numbers were similar to those reported, investigation revealed these rifles to be still in possession of the Army or some civilian component.

For the Chief of Ordnance:

O. J. Gatchell,
Major, Ordnance Department,
Executive Officer.

Carbon copy retained in G/A Section
Jan 13, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
APR 19 1932

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2657-B-330

G-2 Report 4-1 3600-a.

WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 18 1932

1. Except for the resignation of Dr. Gutierrez from the presidency of the Supreme Court, which, as previously reported, has been interpreted as a protest against the interference of the Machado Government with the regular administration of justice by the civil courts, there have been no new developments of political importance since the rendition of the last report on this subject.

2. Terroristic activities have practically ceased, only one bomb explosion having been reported in the month of March. The results consequently appear to justify the stern repressive measures adopted by the Government in dealing with violators of the Explosives Law. There also seems reason to believe that the radical student element, which has been responsible for practically all of the bomb plots during the past year and a half, finally realized that such activities were alienating public sympathy rather than attracting it to their cause.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and
Personal Observation.

From M.A., Havana No. 3743 Date: April 14, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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4-1 APR 19 1932 2657-g-330
3600-a/0%
WAR DEPARTMENT
7

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 18 1932

1. There was only one law enacted during the month of March, 1932:

March 17th: An Act providing that the Municipalities shall use a part of their revenues for the establishment and support of cattle-raising farms.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3745 Date: April 14, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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6300-c
3600-a

G-2 Report

WAR DEPARTMENT
APR 25 1932

CUBA (Combat)
(Political) 4-1 2657-Q-330
105

Subject: Military Tribunals.

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 23 1932

1. On April 21st. a General Court Martial was convened in Havana for the purpose of trying the three students (Ruben de la Leon Garcia, Rafael Escalona Almeida and Ramiero Valdes Dausa) who were arrested when, on January 25, 1932, the police discovered an automobile loaded with dynamite and with which the three above named men claimed they were going to "blow up Havana". (See paragraph three, report No. 3687, index 3600-a, dated January 29,1932). This is the first case in which civilians have been brought to trial under the amendment of the Military Penal Code which was approved by the President on February 17, 1932, contents of which were forwarded by report No. 3707, index as above, dated February 26, 1932.

2657-Q-330 a+

2657-Q-212/10

2. Immediately after their arrest, the three accused persons were sent to the Isle of Pines prison, where they were held "incommunicado" until a few days prior to their trial. They were then brought to Havana and confined in Cabanas Fortress. Their attorneys were not even permitted to see the defendants until April 12th, on which date they were served with the copies of the charges against them. The ire of the Opposition element was considerably aroused by the fact that the accused persons are to be tried by a military court rather than a civil one, their claim being that the offense for which they are being tried took place before the passage of the above referred-to law, which has no retroactive provision.

3. On the opening day of the trial the defense lawyers withdrew from the case because of the refusal of the President of the Court Martial to hear arguments for the return of the case to the civil courts. The defendants were instructed to ask for new civil attorneys, which they refused to do, and, as a result, three Army officers were appointed by the Court as defense counsels. The trial lasted but two days and very little was offered by the defense to break down the Government's very strong case. While the verdict will not be made public until the defendants have exercised their right of appeal to the Supreme War Council, and this body has reviewed the case, there is very little doubt that the Court found all three guilty. As previously reported, the passage of the law referred to in paragraph 2 above has already had its effect on the radical student element, and it is believed that the Court has awarded very severe sentences in this first case to be tried under it, in order to further discourage the activities of this element in bomb-throwing activities.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3751 Date: April 19, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 2657-f-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

Summary of Articles:

The conspiracy for the revolution began in October, 1930, upon the arrival in New York of Colonel Rosendo Collazo, who had left Havana hurriedly when his plan for capturing the fortress of Cabanas was betrayed. The first directing group of the revolution was composed of Collazo as Military Chief, Rafael Iturralde, former Secretary of War, and Robaina. In December, these were joined by Aurelio Alvarez, former President of the Cuban Senate, and now acting as delegate from the Union Nacionalista, the opposition party in Cuba. In April, 1931, arrived Jose Bosch as the financial agent of the revolution in charge of the resources necessary for financing a revolutionary expedition. Bosch was an employee of the National City Bank in Habana, and was the son-in-law of Enrique Schueg, President of the powerful Casa Bacardi. Saying that he was going to Canada to inquire into the purchase of rifles, Bosch went on to Halifax and established a contact with the bootleggers there who had relations with the Casa Bacardi. Robaina regarded this alliance as a tactical mistake and an unwarranted assumption of authority. Robaina believed that firearms could be legally bought in the United States and shipped through the friendly consulate of another Latin American country, and he attributed many of the later troubles of the expedition to this liaison with bootleggers. Collazo also objected to the arrangement and there took place the first of the repeated quarrels between the conspirators.

Accompanied by Carlos Hevia, a graduate of the Naval Academy of Annapolis, Bosch arrived at an arrangement with the largest group of bootleggers in New York, by which the bootleggers should guarantee to provide all the necessary materials for the expedition and be ready to transfer them to the expeditionary boat one hundred miles outside the three mile limit. The search for a boat then began, and Hevia and Bosch decided on the Isla de Vormaner, which was then in Havana, and had been engaged in smuggling. They paid $30,000 for the boat. After the revolution, the broker handling the transaction informed Robaina that the New York bootleggers had heard that the revolutionists were intending to buy this ship, and promptly bought it for themselves for $11,000, selling it through the broker to the revolutionists for the sum previously mentioned.

In the meantime, the selection and training of the personnel began in New York City. Iturralde was given charge of enlisting 200 Cuban and Latin American legionnaires, who were instructed by a Cuban officer of Artillery, Emilio Laurent, in military discipline. They were trained on the beach at Coney Island, in Central Park, and any place that offered itself. Not being paid, one of them, a negro named Angel Penalver, who was later shot by the police in New York, organized a gang which roamed the entire Lenox district in New York stealing bread and milk in the early morning. In addition to this contingent, an American, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. Hoffman, who had fought in the World War, took charge of raising a force of one hundred American soldiers and training them, particularly in the use of machine guns. As Robaina puts it, this was probably the only time in its history that New York had enjoyed the experience of serving as a training camp for machine gunners who practiced daily in certain cellars throughout the city.

In the first days of July, an expeditionary boat arrived off the coast of New Jersey, where Hoffman had some fifty men waiting for it. This boat was to meet a large boat at sea, to which the personnel was to be transferred. Under command of Laurent and one other Cuban, the

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American volunteers went aboard the boat which was captainsd by a bootlegger named Gallagher. Bosch had been responsible for provisioning the boat and had assured the revolutionary committee that it held sufficient provisions for a week. When the boat was at sea, however, it developed that there was neither food nor water of any kind; and after sixty hours under a hot sun the men mutinied and, fearing arrest by the coast guard, threw the munitions into the sea.

The announcement of this fiasco caused another flareup in the revolutionary committee, Hoffman bitterly upbraiding Bosch and Collazo for inexcusable negligence. The loss of the munitions was a severe blow to the revolutionists and Robaina implies that it was a frame-up; the munitions were valued at $40,000 and he says that, after the loss, he was informed by someone "worthy of credit" that they had never been puton the boat, but were kept by the bootleggers and replaced by bricks; in general support of this he points out that Gallagher, the boat's captain, was a seasoned veteran of boot-legging expeditions and yet never investigated the water or food supply before sailing, and never made a real effort to quell the mutiny.

The vigilance of the Department of Justice was now aroused, and from that time on the Department's agents were continually at the heels of the revolutionists. From Robaina's story it would appear that the Department's men, acting under existing treaties preventing the launching of revolutionary expeditions against friendly governments, were largely responsible for the failure of the revolution; their investigations on land and the watchfulness of the coast guard at sea prevented the launching of any expedition of any real importance. Among some munitions stored in a warehouse in New York was a trunk full of medical supplies belonging to a Doctor Aldereguia, medical officer of the expedition. A case of ether broke in the trunk and a woman passing in the street smelt it, became suspicious and informed the police. The police found papers mentioning Jorge de Zaldo, a Cuban acting as interpreter for Laurent, and Robaina; both de Zaldo and Robaina were detained. After one day, Robaina was released for lack of evidence and, aware that he was being watched, left his own home, shook off his followers, and rented lodgings in an American private house.

The work of organizing a second expedition was then begun. A shipment of munitions in charge of Moderne, Sergio Carbo, and some fifteen Cubans was safely embarked in a bootlegger's boat which waited off Atlantic City for the rest of the personnel to join it. Collazo and his son, Alvarez, Captain Luis Hernandez and Iturraldo formed one group which set off by auto from Bryant Park; Hoffman, Robaina and their numerous followers formed the second group which left by bus from Times Square, near the Hotel Knickerbocker. Both left on August 3rd; Robaina's group arrived at Atlantic City at about one in the morning. It was pouring rain and the large fishing launches which were to take them to the big boat smelt so badly of decayed fish that they could not stay in the cabins. The searchlights of the coastguard cutters played on them all night; there was no food and practically no water. All that night and the next day the two launches cruised about, looking for their ships. Finally, Robaina decided to transfer the thirty-five Cubans and Latin Americans from his boat to the other, and return in his boat to shore with only Americans (to avoid investigation by the immigration authorities), going to Cape May where they could telephone the bootleggers, find out where the ship was, and get some provisions. This was done and Robaina's boat put in at Two Miles Landing at one in the morning. Going to a fisherman's

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restaurant, the party communicated by telephone with the bootleggers who promised to send money and a navigator at once. The morning papers reported the capture of Collazo's group by the coast guard, and the spirits of the party were further dampened by the fact that a coast guard boat had tied up next to their own boat at the dock and was examining it. When it was reported that Department of Justice agents were on the scene, the entire party (probably 30 or 40 men), except Hoffman who waited for the money, set out by foot to Wildwood City where they naturally attracted considerable attention. When Hoffman arrived with the money, they rented cars and departed in groups of seven; the last group was arrested and jailed in Atlantic City whence they were all released for lack of evidence.

Robaina then went to New York where he confirmed the report that Collazo, Alvarez and Iturralde had been captured and arrested. According to Robaina, this was largely due to the fact that Collazo had delayed the auto trip down to Atlantic City by stopping at a wayside restaurant and having prepared for him a plate of macaroni of which he was inordinately fond; as a result, Collazo's group arrived at Atlantic City after the others had left in their fishing boat, and since Collazo had the navigator with him, the others were unable to make contact with the expeditionary ship. The Collazo group was also released by the authorities a few days later.

In the meantime, Senator Alvarez, Iturralde, Hoffman, Robaina and other revolutionaries continued to meet in a central hotel in New York. Great perturbation was caused in the group by the news that Menocal and Mendieta had been captured by the gunboat BAIRE. At the same time, Bosch arrived on the scene and communicated to the group that the expeditionary boat had started for Cuba. He did not know who had given the order for departure, but said that he had received a message announcing that the thirty-seven expeditionaries on the ship preferred to run the risk of the trip to losing their ammunition by capture by the federal authorities. Most of the members of the New York Committee were stunned by this announcement which they regarded as fatal to their plans. Bosch, however, believed that the expedition would be successful. There appeared in the newspapers a portrait of Carlos Hevia, the supposed chief, with his biography, and Robaina pointed out to his confreres that this was certainly in error, inasmuch as there were on board the boat a military expert with an excellent career, Laurent, and a man of political and popular eminence, Sergio Carbo. In any event, Robaina states that the efforts of the New York Committee were concentrated on some method of avoiding the continuation of this expedition. Bosch said it was impossible to communicate with the expeditionary boat, despite its wireless equipment, because the codes had been destroyed. Much time was lost in discussing the possibilities of sending airplanes to supplement the expeditionary force, or of acquiring another boat, but none of these plans proceeded any further than the council table. Three days passed bringing news of a general uprising in Cuba, and one night when passing through the Grand Central station on the way to his hotel, Robaina bought a newspaper and read the Cuban reports aloud to Senator Alvarez, who was living with him incognito. The report carried the announcement of the death of the Senator's son, a boy of nineteen years, and the Senator was overwhelmed with grief. It was decided to send Hoffman to Cuba with three men of recognized courage for the purpose of finding out where the expedition had landed, and Senator Alvarez was able to obtain $1000.00 for this trip.

Hoffman and these three sailed from Florida to Habana, after

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

obtaining an introduction to the Bacardi people in Santiago as an excuse for their mission. They managed to get as far as Camaguey, where they were suspected by the proprietor of the hotel and denounced to the police. They were put in fail for twenty-one days and held incommunicado in the Castillo de Principe while detectives attempted to get from them a confession or at least the names of those involved in plotting the revolution; but Hoffman and his aides refused to answer unless an American consul was present; when the latter appeared, they were set at liberty for lack of evidence and Hoffman returned to New York.

In addition to Hoffman's mission, Victor Schueg, brother-in-law of Bosch, was sent to Havana as a messenger to inform the Havana leaders of the departure and destination of the expedition. Robaina highly praises the conduct of this young man. Upon arriving at Havana, Menocal, Mendieta, Mendez Penate and Hevia had already gone into the field and Doctor Miguel Mariano Gomez was hiding, awaiting for the result of the battle, and unable to communicate with any revolutionary sector. Schueg went to Gibara and from there went to Velasco, where he induced Colonel Balan to offer aid to the expedition when it arrived. He returned to Santiago grying to organize groups to blow up the bridges, but failing in this and knowing that the police were looking for him, he took an airplane and returned to Havana and took a ship for New York.

In the meantime, the expedition arrived at Gibara in the Isla de Vormaner" and instead of a wharf crowded with friends, found no one to meet them. The fight was lost before it began, although, as Denny, the New York correspondent pointed out, it might have been won if, instead of thirty-seven inexperienced men, only two of whom knew how to operate machine guns, there had arrived the complete expedition with World War veterans familiar with military tactics. The prisoners who escaped from Gibara reported to Mendez Capote in New York, and no one was able to solve the mystery of the expedition's premature order to depart. The order was received in a code message signed only by the word "Gibara", and on the basis of this cable, Laurent, Carbo and Hevia directed that the ship should start.

The New York Committee then considered what should be done in view of the failure of the expedition. One Alejandro Teixidor, a discontented merchant, who had a somewhat questionable claim of $400,000 against the Cuban Government which Machado had refused to pay, had been aiding the revolution with small amounts totalling $8,000 from the Royal Typewriter Company and some 200,000 rifles from the Remington Rifle Company, which agencies he had in Cuba. This man now urged that the expeditionary boat should be sold in order to pay its debts and that Doctor Mendez Capote should be removed from his position as Chief of the Revolutionary Junta. The first proposition was accepted by the Chiefs in New York, but the second was firmly refused, inasmuch as Mendez Capote had been appointed by the military leaders in Cuba and could only be removed by them.

In a stormy meeting with the New York Committee, Hoffman denounced Bosch as a traitor and urged his dismissal. This the Committee said it was powerless to effect as Bosch had been appointed by the leaders in Cuba. Hoffman said his men had besought Bosch for financial aid as they had been paid nothing and they and their families were starving, that Bosch had refused to see them, and had denounced them to the police. They in their turn brought a claim against Bosch, but the latter disappeared to a new address which he kept secret. At this time Collazo was also seeking Bosch for payment of an overdue note for $2,000. To add to these charges and counter charges, the Department of Justice agents had recommenced their investigations which had ceased

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

when the expedition failed and were renewed at the instigation of Ambassador Ferrara and his military attache, Captain Prieto. Prieto traced some of the conspirators by noting the munitions seized at Gibara, going to the companies concerned in the States, and getting the information about the buyers.

Robaina, Alvarez and Collazo were put in jail, the others being warned in time to move out of town. Colonel Hoffman was also being sought by the police. When they obtained bail, they were informed that Colonel Jose M. Tarafa, then in Europe, had instructed his attorney, Martin W. Littleton, to take charge of their case. Robaina informed Littleton that Ferrara was behind this prosecution and that Cosme de la Torriente, the revolution's diplomatic agent in Washington, was watching Ferrara through his spies and would keep them informed of Ferrara's plans. Through Torriente, the New York Committee had learned, among other things, of the existence of a "Diario de Campana", which the expeditioners had edited on the boat and which was seized at Gibara. This gave an account, with names and dates, of the organization of the expedition, and Littleton was worried for fear Tarafa was mentioned therein. According to Robaina, Tarafa was one of the largest single contributors to the Revolution, donating $100,000. In connection with Ferrara, Littleton made the following comment to Robaina:

> "In the very chair which you now occupy was seated, not many years ago, and in a situation very similar to this one, Doctor Ferrara himself, who was then seeking protection against the persecution of those who today, in his turn, he persecutes; and a generous man (Tarafa) who was a friend of both the persecutors and the persecuted (Menocal, Ferrara), interested himself in urging me to arrange through my connections in Washington that they should leave Doctor Ferrara alone. The latter is a man of brilliant talent, who possesses, in addition, the refined manners of a cultivated European, but, at bottom, represents all that hardness of steel which is only found in some Italians."

(NOTE:- The rest of this statement was apparently censored by)
(Cuban officials when these articles were published in Habana.)

Robaina then called a meeting of the Committee in New York, at which Littleton said that he would represent them, at Colonel Tarafa's request, but on the condition that if any one of them did or said anything damaging to Tarafa, he, Littleton, would have to withdraw from the case. Littleton wanted all of the revolutionaries under indictment to present a united defense, but Collazo was unwilling to do this, preferring to retain his own lawyer. The others attempted to persuade Collazo to join them, but a day or so later, he and his son jumped their bail and left for a foreign land. This at once put Alvarez and Robaina under greater suspicion from the federal authorities and Robaina, after consulting with Littleton, decided to follow Collazo's example. It was felt that Alvarez' position was fairly secure, since there were relatively few documents extant which might compromise him.

Robaina, therefore, left immediately for France and communicated with Tarafa in Paris. Tarafa met him secretly and said that he was trying to avoid being seen with opposition elements in Paris, which were headed by Rene Morales. Also in Paris were Enrique Schueg and his son, Victor, who, as previously mentioned, had been the messenger of the revolution. Tarafa expressed himself as being very disillusioned by the conduct of the revolutionaries, and Enrique Schueg felt equally bitter about the imprudence and incapacity of the revolutionary leaders.

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Robaina says that Tarafa confessed to him that he had given a large sum of money to General Menocal, and that although this money was transferred in some secret manner, not clearly explained, Machado heard of it and remarked: "It is strange to me that a man of constructive action like Tarafa could be interested in revolutions."

In a few days, Littleton himself came to Paris, bringing the news that Alvarez had also skipped bail. All three of the leaders under indictment, therefore, were now in a foreign land and could not be extradited since those who commit political offenses of this sort are not subject to extradition.

Littleton was somewhat worried by the fact that Hoffman, feeling that he and his American companions had been badly treated, had presented to the New York Committee a document detailing very serious charges against some of the New York leaders - a document which would be dangerous if it reached the hand of the Department of Justice. Robaina assured Tarafa, however, that Hoffman was a man of very high character, and however bitter he might be, he would not betray the conspirators to the United States authorities. After further conference with Tarafa, Robaina came to the conclusion that Littleton's protestations and alarms represented an effort on the part of Tarafa and Littleton to induce the conspirators indicted to jump their bail and get out of the country, thus avoiding the possibility of any legal prosecution which might involve Tarafa's name.

Tarafa now felt that the way was clearing for his return to New York and Cuba, which was essential in view of his very large business connections, particularly so at this time when the zafra was about to begin. He was still worried, however, about the possibility that his name might be mentioned in the Diario de Campana which Ferrara had given to the Department of Justice, but Robaina assured him that, if it had been mentioned, he would have heard of it before this, inasmuch as the Diario was seized at Gibara and was certainly shown to Machado and Machado's cabinet, and since Molinet in the Cabinet was an intimate friend of Tarafa's, Molinet would have passed the word on. Robaina added that Molinet had never been negligent in informing Tarafa of any matter that might interest him. In order that Tarafa might return without attracting attention, however, it was suggested that he should go to England, take a boat for Canada, and cross from Canada to New York, thereafter journeying to Cuba by rail. This idea appealed to Tarafa and shortly after the announcement of the release of Menocal and the negotiations in the Cuban Congress for an Amnesty Law, he left for the United States and for Cuba.

Robaina concludes his articles with a severe criticism of Bosch as financial agent, because of his lack of practical experience, his ignorance of methods, and his arrogant pretensions. Collazo, also, due to his ignorance of the United States was, according to Robaina, a bad choice for the development of activities in that country; and the Casa Bacardi was responsible for the dangerous alliance which the revolutionaries made with the bootlegging traffic in New York. Tarafa, Robaina says, was not only the most important contributor to the revolution with a known quota of over $100,000, but also participated in many of its decisions, including the decision not to send a subsequent expedition to assist the ISLA DE VORMANER. As has been stated, he was also responsible for the bail jumping of those under indictment in New York, which cost the bonding companies more than $20,000.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~. Use Only.

G-2 Report

3020-d

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY DIV.

MAY 2 2657-J-330 1932

4-1 106

WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Armed Revolutionary Movements.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 2 1932

1. Attached hereto is a summary of newspaper articles which appeared in the Heraldo de Cuba during March, 1932, written by Emilio Robaina, former New York correspondent for El Pais, a Havana daily.

2. While Robaina was working in New York, he was, at the same time, one of the Cubans who was actively plotting against the Machado Government. When the revolution failed, and he was under indictment by the Department of Justice for conspiring against a friendly government, he left for France and subsequently for Madrid. There he wrote a very frank account of the revolution, involving the names of several people whose complicity had been suspected, but not definitely known.

3. It is generally believed that Robaina took these articles and attempted to blackmail the people who might be damaged thereby. Whether or not this is true, it is evident that he sold damaging and confidential revelations about his comrades to a newspaper for publication. These articles were published in La Prensa in New York during March, 1932. President Machado's newspaper in Havana, Heraldo de Cuba, was clever enough to see the value of these articles in discrediting the already fairly thoroughly discredited revolutionary cause, and commenced their publication in Havana.

4. Apparently taking advantage of the amnesty, Robaina returned to Cuba, and immediately upon the appearance of the first article, called at the office of the Heraldo de Cuba and asked that further publication of these articles be stopped. In an editorial note to its readers the editors of this newspaper explained that while they would be glad to oblige a newspaper confrere, they felt that loyalty to their readers made it necessary for them to continue so interesting an exposition. At the close of the series of articles, this newspaper, in a sarcastic and witty editorial, pointed out that the leaders of the so-called reform movement in Cuba had attempted this purification by organizing a band of Cuban and foreign adventurers in New York and forming an alliance with American bootleggers. This questionable procedure was financed principally by the House of Bacardi, one of the most solid and profitable Cuban industries which, according to Heraldo de Cuba, had objected to paying to the present Government taxes for the alleviation of the general Cuban distress.

5. Unquestionably the publication of Robaina's articles has been advantageous to the Government. With a pitiful tale of bad management, continual squabbling, egotism and treachery, the articles cast a very unfavorable light upon those who called themselves the leaders of the cause for freedom, truth and national integrity. Naturally the publication of Robaina's articles in Havana caused very bitter resentment against him by Cubans on both sides of the controversy. While these articles were being published, Robaina was suddenly jailed by the Government, after having been left unmolested for some time, and the accepted explanation of this action was that Robaina was afraid of being murdered and requested the Government to incarcerate him for safety's sake. The articles developed two facts of interest:

From M. A., Havana No. 3755 Date: April 22, 1932.

Copied by M. P. D. 5/17/32 akb

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(a) The possibilities offered to organizers of revolutions by the bootleggers in New York, now prepared to supply men, ships, and ammunition on demand.

(b) The effectiveness of the treaties against the organization of revolutionary expeditions in friendly countries, since the Department of Justice, compelled to act under the treaties (and urged on by Ferrara), was largely responsible for the expedition's failure..

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3755 Date: April 22, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 10 1932
6300-c
3600-a
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Combat)
(Political)

Subject: Military Tribunals

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 10 1932

1. The three students, Leon, Escalona, and Valdes Dausa, recently tried by Court Martial on a charge of illegal possession of explosives in connection with the so-called automobile bomb plot of January 25, 1932 (see report No. 3751, indices as above, dated April 19, 1932), have each been condemned to serve eight years in prison.

2. The sentence was approved on April 26, 1932 by the superior military authorities, and on May 4, 1932, the military counsel for the students filed an appeal. The case will now be reviewed by the Superior War Council.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3760 Date: May 5, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 13 1932

1. There has been no relaxation of measures adopted to preserve order, nor in their method of enforcement. Constitutional Guarantees remain suspended. The University of Havana, the provincial institutes (high schools) and the normal schools remain closed. The trial of offenders against the Law of Explosives, and persons accused of burning or attempting to burn agricultural property, is by Military Court Martial.

2. While exact figures are lacking, the number of arrests during the past month on charges of a political nature, including those of labor and communist agitation, is believed to exceed the number of political prisoners who were released in the general amnesty.

3. No bombings or attempted bombings have recently been reported, and the only disorder of even moderate consequence was a communist demonstration at the Japanese Legation on April 24th, in the course of which several stones were thrown, causing damage to glass windows and doors.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3769 Date: May 10, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
4-1 2657-g-330
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MAY 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

7

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 17 1932

1. There were only two laws enacted during the month of April, 1932:

April 14th: An act which validates all electoral registrations of the political parties in 1932, even though such registrations may have been effected before only two members of a registration committee, and which authorizes the Provincial Assemblies to appoint municipal and ward committees of not more than three members when inferior organizations have failed to do so.

April 14th: An act which makes obligatory the destruction of cattle ticks.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3770 Date: May 11, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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MAY 24 1932

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CUBA (Combat)
Cuba (Political)

WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 24 1932

Subject: Military Tribunals.

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

1. On May 14, 1932, the Cuban Supreme Court, in the case of Antonio Mendieta, nephew of one of the Opposition leaders, who had been indicted on a charge of having placed a bomb in La Salle College last November, declared unconstitutional Articles I and IV of the so-called Military Jurisdiction Law of February 17, 1932, and null and void the transitory provisions of that law which gave it retroactive effect. (See report No. 3707, index as above, dated February 26,1932).

2657-B-212/10

2. Among other things, this law transferred from the Civil to the Military Courts jurisdiction in all pending and future cases arising out of violations of the Law of Explosives. The first such cases involving civilians to be tried under this law were those of Leon, Escalona and Valdes Dausa, who, as reported in report No. 3760, index as above, dated May 5, 1932, were each sentenced to serve eight years in the penitentiary.

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3. The Supreme Court's decision has not been published in the Official Gazette, as is customary, nor has any notice of it been permitted to appear in the Cuban press. The Government is apparently apprehensive of a recurrence of terroristic activities should it become generally known that the Military Courts are not competent to try civilians accused of violating the Law of Explosives.

4. This is the second instance within a month that the Supreme Court has exhibited an unwonted independence in dealing with cases which may be characterized as having major political importance.

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5. As stated in report No. 3772, index No. 2500-c, dated May 11, 1932, the Court admitted two appeals against the constitutionality of the Executive Decree of July 1, 1931, concerning the closure of the University of Havana.

F. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3778 Date: May 19, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

G-2 Report

U. S. Embassy, Havana, Cuba.

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MAY 26 1932
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WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 28 1932

1. During the past few days there has been a recurrence of terroristic activities on the part of the Opposition, which would seem to indicate that the Government's apprehension in publishing the recent decision of the Supreme Court, which held unconstitutional certain portions of the Military Law of Jurisdiction of February 17th, 1932, was well founded.

2. On May 18th the secret police discovered, as a result of a raid on the office of the Amateur Athletic Union in a large office building in Havana, large quantities of seditious literature, names of persons and other documentary evidence which indicated the existence of a plan to create serious public disturbances on May 30th, the Cuban Independence Day.

3. Following these discoveries, more than one hundred arrests were made and the police are reported to be apprehending additional members of the Athletic Union, and others who are supposed to be implicated in the affair.

4. Extraordinary precautions were taken to prevent disorders on May 20th. All the police not on active patrol duty were kept in quarters, and all public celebrations were cancelled. However, the day is reported to have passed off quietly in all parts of the Island.

5. On the following day, May 21st., Lieutenant Diez Diaz, in command of the rural guard post at Artemisa, in the Province of Pinar del Rio, was killed and two soldiers were badly wounded by a bomb which had been sent by express from Havana. Suspicious packages believed to contain explosives were also received by the military commanders of the First and Seventh Military Districts, as well as by the Chief of the Secret Police. The postal authorities and the express companies have been instructed to require persons desirous of sending packages to identify themselves.

6. The killing of Lieut. Diez Diaz is of particular significance by reason of the fact that he was one of the few Army officers accused of improper conduct during the uprising of last August. The Opposition claim that he had ordered the shooting of several insurrectionists who had already been disarmed, and his death may, therefore, be reasonably ascribed to motives of vengeance.

7. On the night of May 21st. a number of bombs exploded in the Vedado residential district. While the Opposition leaders state that this recurrence of terroristic activities after a lapse of more than two months is to be attributed to radical elements, rather than to the Opposition to the Government, the latter has shown by its recent acts that it feels quite the contrary.

8. On May 23rd. Colonels Carlos Mendieta and Roberto Mendez Penate, prominent leaders of the Opposition, were arrested and confined at Cabana Fortress. At the same time, the secret police

From M. A., Havana No. 3782 Date: May 24, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

attempted to find General Mario Menocal, but were unable to locate him. It was learned later that he has taken refuge in the Brazilian Legation. These sensational arrests of the leaders of the Opposition seem to confirm the belief on the part of the Government that another revolution is in the offing.

9. CONFIDENTIAL

In a long conversation with the Assistant Chief of Staff this morning he explained that while definite confirmation on the subject is lacking, he had information to the effect that a new revolutionary movement was being prepared and that an expedition for this movement was now being equipped in Mexico, and possibly another in Canada. He further stated that he felt that should such an expedition be launched, an attempted landing would be made on the north coast, either at Nipe Bay or at Maniti, and that with this thought in mind he had already made his plans to combat it. His plans, in general, as outlined to me, are as follows:

(a) Should the expedition come to either place, a strong force would be moved there immediately for the purpose of attacking it in its process of debarkation.

(b) If the revolutionary forces make a successful landing at either place, to immediately blow up the bridges on the railroad and on the roads which lead from Nipe Bay to Alta Cedro, should this point be chosen as a point of debarkation, and the same to apply for the railroads and roads between Maniti and Victoria de las Tunas, should this point be chosen.

10. Just how an expedition of this magnitude could be financed is rather difficult to understand at this time, due to the extreme poverty of practically all the leaders of the Opposition. In answer to a question concerning this, General Lores stated that there are still one or two of them, presumably Colonels Callazo and Tarafa, who have sufficient funds to finance this type of expedition, and that, moreover, many foreign business firms doing business in Cuba could be coerced into contributing considerable money on the promise of business concessions, should the revolutionaries be successful.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

SOURCE: Personal Contacts
and Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3782 Date: May 24, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE SECRETARY OF STATE
DIV. INTEL. DIV.
FILE NO. 2657-G-330
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Banditry, Riots and Similar Infractions of Public Peace and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 1 1932

1. On the evening of May 22, 1932, a group of forty or fifty men staged a demonstration in front of the Consular Agent's office in Manzanillo, Oriente Province, a "hot-bed" of the radical labor element. Red banners were carried, and the demonstrators gave vent to their feelings by the usual cry of "Down with Yankee Imperialism".

2. An attempt was made to tear down the coat-of-arms, and a few windows were broken, but the prompt arrival of the police and military authorities prevented any serious property damage.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3786 Date: May 26, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Confidential: The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

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2657-g-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 1 1932

1. Although surface conditions indicate normalcy, the political situation in Cuba remains in a state of uncertainty.

2. The jails are already crowded with hundreds of the political prisoners, including those of the principal Opposition leaders who were unable to evade arrest. The fact that the people in general are ignorant of the reasons which prompted these wholesale arrests has created a feeling of insecurity and alarm in the minds of thousands of persons whose innocence of designs against the Government are beyond doubt, but whose business or social relations with those accused may, they feel, suffice to bring them under suspicion.

3. The Government to date has offered no public explanation, which could be considered as entirely adequate, of its repressive measures. Its most obvious justification seems to be the sending of infernal machines by express to some of the senior Army officers. It is, however, difficult to believe that responsibility for this is so widely distributed as to include both communists and such responsible members of the community as General Menocal, Colonel Carlos Mendieta and Colonel Mendez Penate.

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By authority of letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date

4. Official statements have emanated which confirm the Government's apprehension of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government. The alleged discovery resulted from a police raid on the headquarters of the Amateur Athletic Union of Cuba, and the homes of its members. Police aver that they found evidence that this organization was used as a cloak for a terroristic association, known as the "A.B.C." It would appear, however, judging from statements of unbiased persons, that the police have greatly exaggerated the importance of this detail.

5. The Government has not made known the fact that its precautionary measures were adopted partly on the basis of information indicating that adversaries of the Government were setting on foot hostile expeditions, as stated in paragraph 9 of my last report on this subject. The fact, however, that the secret orders (which I actually saw) were issued on May 21st. to all district commanders, enjoining them to be on the alert for any expeditionary forces, indicates very clearly that the Government is either really alarmed over the present situation, or wants to create this impression to justify its repressive measures. However, it is very difficult for me to agree that, after the ignominious failure of the revolutionary forces at Gibara last year, such a feeling actually exists in the minds of the President and the Chief of Staff.

6. If then, as appears to me to be the case, the Government is deliberately exaggerating the known factors in the present situation, even to the extent of allowing the armed forces to believe that a revolution is imminent, the reasons for its actions must be sought elsewhere. The most logical reason that can be deduced at present is that the President's dependence upon the Army has induced him to offer reprisals against the Opposition leaders on account of the assassination of one of its officers, and the attempted assassination of several others. In this connection, the press agencies recently sent a story

From M. A., Havana No. 3787 Date: May 27, 1932.

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NND 74002
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

to the papers of the United States, which appeared in the issues of May 24th, to the effect that the four men who were held in connection with the murder of Lieutenant Diez Diaz were summarily executed by their military guard. While this story was emphatically denied by the Chief of Staff, all of the press representatives have stated, in confidence, that although confirmation of this story is lacking, they still believe that the executions took place as stated. Needless to say, with the strict press censorship still in force, this story did not appear in any of the Spanish dailies in Havana.

7. Another possible explanation of the Government's attitude, although somewhat far-fetched, is that the Government seized upon the bombings and other recent incidents to enable it to circumvent the effects of that part of the Supreme Court's decision of May 12th, which declared null and void the retroactive provisions of the Law of Military Jurisdiction, compliance with which would require that the Military Courts return to the Civil Courts all cases involving infractions of the Law of Explosives committed by civilians prior to February 17, 1932. However, new charges brought against the same persons, and, of course, charges brought against other persons for new offenses would be affected by the Supreme Court's declaration of unconstitutionality only in each individual case, and upon the request of the attorney in the case, addressed to the appropriate military court. It is doubted if any lawyer would, in the present state of affairs, have the courage to formulate the required petition.

8. General Menocal continues to be offered asylum in the Brazilian Legation where he sought refuge in company with one of his nephews and a Congressman named Martinez Fraga. The granting of this asylum by the Brazilian Minister naturally provoked considerable comment. However, the Acting Secretary of State, Dr. Averhoff, soon put an end to rumors that something was amiss in the relations of Cuba and Brazil, and that by his actions the Brazilian Minister had rendered himself "persona non grata". He further stated in a press interview that the action of the Brazilian Minister was entirely proper and justifiable under the provisions of the Inter-American Convention, in regard to asylum, which was signed at Havana on February 28, 1928, to which both Cuba and Brazil are parties.

9. The Government announced that Mendieta, Mendez Penate, and several other political prisoners have been sent to the Isle of Pines for incarceration in the prison there. Colonel Aurelio Hevia, another prominent Opposition leader, is reported not to have been molested up to the present time, due, probably, to the delicate state of his health.

10. There have been no bombings during the past few days, and from all outward appearances, the situation is normal. No extra precautionary measures, other than those above referred to, and the guarding of the Brazilian Legation to prevent General Menocal's escape, are in effect. The feeling of the average Cuban and foreigner, not immediately connected with Cuban politics, seems to be that the present situation is "Much Ado about Nothing".

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press, and
Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3787 Date: May 27, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 7 1932

1. The political situation in Cuba remains outwardly calm, no incidents to disturb the public peace having been reported during the past few days.

2. The police are still investigating the activities of the organization known as the "A.B.C." Several more persons have been arrested, although none of any prominence. The Government insists that there existed a widespread plot for the overthrow of the Government, and that it has indisputable evidence of the fact that all the political leaders of the Opposition were actively working toward this end.

3. No announcement has yet been made as to what line the Government expects to follow in connection with those arrested during the past two weeks. However, it is believed that certain of the leaders of the movement will be brought to trial, if the evidence on hand warrants it.

4. It was learned from a very authoritative source that when the Opposition leaders were released in the general Amnesty of last January, the Government attempted, without success, to have these leaders agree to the signing of a "manifesto" to the Cuban people in which they were to state that although their ideals had been unchanged by the failure of the revolution and their subsequent incarceration, they would henceforward attempt to gain their end by legal means, that is, through the ballot box. In return for this, the Government was to allow the formation of a new political party, and to so arrange it that during the coming elections certain vacancies in both the Upper and Lower House of the Congress would be filled by members of this group. Although these leaders did not issue the "manifesto", and despite the fact that no conditions were attached to their release, the Government feels that these leaders are most ungrateful for the excellent treatment they have received, and that from now on, no quarter of any kind will be given them.

5. General Menocal is still in the Brazilian Legation, and the Government has not decided just what course it will pursue in his case. Under the International Agreement it might demand his expulsion from the national territory, to which the Brazilian Minister would have to conform, the only condition being that the Government furnish him safe conduct from the Legation to his point of departure from Cuba. However, if he were expelled, Menocal would undoubtedly choose to go to the United States, where he has a great number of friends, and his presence there would undoubtedly cause considerable embarrassment to the Government. In the meantime, his presence in the Brazilian Legation, without any correspondence with the outside, appears to be a very satisfactory solution for the Government.

6. The Government continues to deny the truth of the story of the killing of the four men who were held in connection with the

From M. A., Havana No. 3790 Date: May 31, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

murder of Lieutenant Diez Diaz, to which reference was made in paragraph 6 of my last report on this subject. This story has been circulated throughout the Island, although it has never appeared in the Havana press. The Government fully realizes that the best means it has at its disposal to discredit this story is to produce the four men in question. That an attempt is being made in this direction is evidenced by the fact that one of the persons allegedly killed was located on May 30th, and notice to this effect, using his name only and not referring in any way to his alleged murder, appeared in the press on that date.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press, and
Personal Contacts.

NOTE: At 2:00 P.M. today, while all the students were at classes, a bomb exploded in the La Salle School. Although the detonation was very loud, it did comparatively little property damage. The reason for setting off this bomb is ascribed by the authorities as a means of intimidation on the part of former students of the National University to prevent the authorities of the school from conducting final examinations while the former are denied that privilege, due to the Government's closing of the University.

(Due to lack of time for forwarding in today's pouch, it was impossible to re-write the above report, in order to include this incident.)

J.J. O'H.

From M. A., Havana No. 3790 Date: May 31, 193 .

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 7 1932

1. There have been no new developments in the political situation in Cuba since the last report on this subject. Other than the explosion of one bomb in the toilet of a motion picture theatre in Santiago de Cuba on the evening of June 1, and the finding of an unexploded one in the same theatre on the morning of June 2nd, no terrorist activities have been reported on the Island.

2. Interest centers principally on the case of General Mario Menocal, who is still at the Brazilian Legation. It now appears that the Brazilian Minister has applied to the Cuban Government for Menocal's safe conduct from the Legation to a point of departure from Cuba. The Cuban Government has denied this request on the grounds that any such request for quitting the national territory must be initiated by the Government of which the refugee is a national, and that this right does not repose, in any way, on the country which has granted asylum. In my opinion, Cuba's interpretation of the treaty is correct. If the Brazilian point of view were sustained, it would make it very easy for political offenders in countries which have ratified the treaty (Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia and Nicaragua), not only to escape punishment for their acts at the time of their commission, but also to be assured of safe conduct out of the country.

F. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3797 Date: June 3, 1932.

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CUBA (Political)

WAR DEPARTMENT 116

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action. 7

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 13 1932

1. Other than the continuance of arrests of alleged members of the so-called "A.B.C." organization, there have been no new developments in the political situation in Cuba during the past few days.

2. The censorship of the press has been intensified, with the result that it is even more difficult than formerly to keep informed, by that means, of what is happening. The press has, however, been most energetic in condemning the recent terroristic activities. That this condemnation is not necessarily the true expression of the various editors is evidenced by the fact that one of them, who did not publish his "condemnation" editorial on the same day as the others, was severely reprimanded for his dilatory action. Needless to say, the required editorial appeared on the following day.

3. The feeling of apprehension on the part of the public has gradually diminished and barring further terroristic activities, conditions will soon return to that state of "normality" which existed prior to the recent arrests of the Opposition leaders.

4. While it was announced last week that the Congress would be asked to enact emergency legislation, giving the Executive extraordinary powers to cope with the present situation, no such measures have, as yet, been introduced, which would seem to indicate that the Government considers that the emergency no longer exists.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3804 Dated: June 7, 1932.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

1. Following is a list of laws passed by the Cuban Congress and approved by President Machado during the month of May, 1932, together with their dates of promulgation:

May 9th - Authorizing the Executive to fix the rate and regulate gambling taxes.

May 11th - Authorizing the Secretary of Public Instruction to appoint member of examination board until University Faculty makes such appointment.

May 12th - Appropriation of $866,797.82 for census expenses, printing of stamps, forage for Army live stock, and payment of National Police.

May 14th - Granting ten days for rectification of census of Matanzas for political purposes.

May 24th - Amending the age fixed in the Electoral Code for being representative, so that the 25 years required must be reached not before the election but before actually taking office. This is to favor the son of General Herrera who is to be a candidate from Pinar del Rio.

May 26th - Suspending for three years the privilege of exchanging notaryships as limited by the Code thus providing for freedom of such exchanges.

May 28th - Providing that violations of highway regulations shall be tried at domicile of the accused rather than where committed as formerly.

May 30th - Amnesty for fines as disciplinary measures imposed on officials and employees of the Judiciary.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents.

From M. A., Havana No. 3805 Dated: June 7, 1932.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 14 1932

1. A very large bomb exploded in the park in the City of Santa Clara during the evening of June 7th, just prior to the beginning of the regular military band concert, which resulted in the death of two people and the wounding of several others. The local police of that town have arrested several suspects, but have thus far failed to apprehend any of the guilty persons. This outrage has, of course, aroused universal indignation.

2. On June 7th the secret police arrested six persons suspected of complicity in the "A.B.C." terrorist organization. These persons are charged specifically with having participated in the recent plots against the lives of prominent Army officers. Included with those arrested are Dr. Carlos Eduardo Finlay, a prominent physician whose late father gained considerable fame for the discovery of the transmission of yellow fever by the mosquito, and Ramiero Capablanca, brother of the world famous chess expert. An interesting sidelight on these arrests is that they occurred in the office of Dr. Francisco Mario Fernandez, Liberal Senator from Camaguey Province, and formerly Secretary of State, who is in medical partnership with Dr. Finlay.

3. On June 8th the Government gave out for publication a statement regarding the discovery of a conspiracy to set on foot a revolutionary expedition from Honduras. This is believed to be the same expedition to which reference was made in paragraph 9 of report No. 3782, index as above, dated May 24, 1932, which referred to an expedition being equipped in Mexico. According to the Government's statement, the leader of the expedition was to have been Colonel Alfredo Lima, who was captured with General Menocal during the insurrection of August, 1931. The Government's informant, a sailor named Antonio Estrella, stated that he was a member of the crew of the motor schooner "Ferrer II" which cleared from Havana about April 1, 1932 for the Mugeres Islands off the coast of Yucatan; that about thirty miles south of Cape San Antonio this vessel signaled another schooner, from which it took on board Colonel Lima and five other persons, all armed with revolvers; that the "Ferrer II" with the second schooner in tow then started on its course toward the Mugeres Islands; that the commander of the "Ferrer II" was, however, forced by Colonel Lima, under threat of death, to change his course to Tela, Honduras; that after reaching the latter port the vessels anchored to await the arrival of the party composing the expedition; that this party failed to materialize, and that Colonel Lima and his associates abandoned the vessels, leaving only the members of the two crews who were later arrested by the Honduran authorities.

4. The statement further asserted that the facts as alleged by Estrella have been confirmed by certain information in its possession.

From M. A., Havana No. 3811 Date: June 10, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. There have been no recent disturbances of any kind in Havana, although police were called upon to quell a riot at a political meeting in Marianao two days ago, as a consequence of which the military commander of Havana Province has issued orders prohibiting all public political meetings until further orders.

J. V. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Observation.

From M. A., Havana No.3812 Date: June 10, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 21 1932

1. There has been no change in the political situation in Cuba during the past week. But for the explosion of a few bombs of the noise-making variety, the country has once more settled down to the superficial calmness that reigned during the greater part of last winter and spring.

2. The latest terrorist plot - the attempted assassination of President Machado - is still the main topic of conversation. No new developments, other than the President's present determination to bring the accused persons to trial within the immediate future, have been reported. It is known that considerable pressure is being brought to bear on him for the release of the mother (Mrs. Mariana Mendoza) of one of the perpetrators of the plot, but he has thus far remained firm and has not indicated that any clemency will be shown her.

3. The status of the release of General Menocal from his self-imposed asylum at the Brazilian Legation remains as heretofore reported. Brazil is still pressing her point, through her Minister, to have him afforded safe conduct to his point of debarkation, but the Cuban Government continues to maintain that the right of initiating General Menocal's expulsion from Cuba rests with the Government of which the refugee is a national.

4. The police continue to arrest alleged members of the "A.B.C." organization, although no persons of prominence have been incarcerated during the past week.

5. That the Government no longer seeks to blame communists for the terrorist activities of the political Opposition was brought out very clearly in a press interview on June 15th by Secretary of State Ferrara, in which he stated in part: "Every time a bomb is set off we attempt to find an "unknown communist", but instead we find a member of the political Opposition."

F. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press, and
Personal Observation

From M. A., Havana No. 3822 Date: June 16, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

THE SECRETARY OF WAR DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS RADIO AS FOLLOWS:
ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS if answer is unnecessary.
If answer is NOT SENT WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON MUST BE STATED.
C. H. BRIDGES,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

G-2 x
TAG v

(MWW)

CODE.

WN-46.

RADIOGRAM

Received at the War Department.
May 24, 1932.
5:00 P. M.

From Havana, Cuba.

To The Adjutant General.

MAY 1932 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

10 2657-2-330
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Number 34. May 24th.

See State Department's cables numbers 59 and 60 for recent political activities. Report follows.

O'Hare.

2657-2-330/11

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 9 1932

1. On June 23rd the Cuban Congress passed an Administration measure providing for the suspension of Constitutional Guarantees for one year, and authorized the President to extend the suspension of Guarantees for an additional period of two years. This law further provided that during the suspension of the Guarantees the Law of Public Order of April 23, 1870 shall be in force; that the President may re-establish the Guarantees when he shall see fit in the event that there would be no danger to the security of the State or to public peace, and also when the Guarantees may be necessary for the full exercise of the right of suffrage during the electoral periods; and that the President is authorized to dispose of the Treasury funds in the amount he may deem proper in order to meet the expenses caused by the extraordinary measures that it might be necessary to adopt.

2. On the morning of June 24th, Daniel Buttari, a member of the national police force, was arrested by members of the secret police for a conspiracy to over throw the Government. On the afternoon of the same day while he was being conducted to the Atares Fortress to be examined by the military authorities, he "attempted to escape" and was shot and killed. It is, of course, popularly believed that the Government had merely followed the well-known procedure of applying the "Ley de la Fuga" in order to be rid of the prisoner. When Buttari was arrested and his house was searched there were discovered a small quantity of arms, ammunition, bombs and uniforms together with a recruiting list for a so-called revolutionary movement. The police then proceeded to another house which Buttari had visited upon occasion, and discovered a large quantity of arms and explosives of various kinds together with military charts of several of the military forts of Havana in strategic portions of the City. The police immediately arrested as many of the persons mentioned in the documents seized as could be found.

3. General Mario Menocal, accompanied by his wife and nephew, left Havana on July 2nd. on the German liner "Karlsruhe". The Cuban Government finally agreed, after many protests from the Brazilian Minister, to allow Menocal to leave the country, and it is understood that he will remain in France for a period of at least one year.

4. The trial by Court Martial of the persons accused of attempting to assassinate the President on June 1st. took place during the past week. While the findings and sentences have not yet been announced, it is expected, from the evidence submitted, that the four persons will be found guilty and that the maximum sentence will be imposed.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3834 Date: July 5, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 12 1932
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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 12 1932

2657-S-330/121

Asylum of ex-President Menocal in the Brazilian Legation.

1. With reference to paragraph 3, report No. 3834, index as above, dated July 5, 1932, the following paragraphs give an account of the asylum in the Brazilian Legation of General Mario Menocal, former President of Cuba and leader of the political Opposition, who was allowed to leave the Legation unmolested, together with his wife and nephew, and embark on a boat for Europe on July 2nd.

2. The final practical solution of the so-called Menocal asylum case was achieved somewhat after the public had ceased to pay attention to the affair. On May 24th, immediately after the report of the arrest by the Government of Colonels Carlos Mendieta and Roberto Mendez Penate for alleged political activity, Menocal, his nephew, and Martinez Fraga took refuge in the Brazilian Legation, apparently in the belief that they were in imminent danger of not only arrest but personal injury by the Government forces. The asylum was granted by the Brazilian Minister on the basis of his interpretation of the Convention of Asylum, signed in Havana on February 20, 1928. The Legation was promptly surrounded by a heavy guard, and discussions between the Government and the Brazilian Minister continued for sometime with no result other than to exhaust public interest in the matter.

3. Upon the return of the American Ambassador to Cuba on June 22, the case was discussed by him with the Secretary of State, the Mexican Ambassador, who had been acting as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps during Ambassador Guggenheim's absence, and the Brazilian Minister. During this conversation the American Ambassador expressed the opinion that the problem was one between Cuba and Brazil alone, and not one that affected the Diplomatic Corps as a whole. On June 30th, the Cuban State Department issued a statement to the effect that a solution of the matter had been found: For its part, the Government of Cuba was assured that General Menocal would not in the future be an obstacle to the maintenance of public peace and that he would go to Europe to reside for one year, while the Government of Brazil was satisfied that the necessary guarantees would be given General Menocal for his unmolested departure from Cuban territory. On the basis of this declaration, General Menocal was permitted to embark on the S. S. "Karlsruhe" on Saturday, July 2nd., after very elaborate precautions had been taken by the police to prevent any disturbance or manifestations.

4. The status of Menocal's two companions in the Legation, his nephew and Martinez Fraga, was peculiar and required special handling. The Government had at first refused to give the Brazilian

From M. A., Havana No. 3836 Date: July 8, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Minister passports for them, stating that there was no order of detention against them and that they should come to the State Department for their passports in the normal manner. The Brazilian Minister, however, feared that as soon as the two left the Legation an order of detention would be issued and that they would be arrested. A compromise was finally arranged whereby Martin Menocal, who had been acting as his uncle's nurse, should accompany those on the "Karlsruhe", and Martinez Fraga should be permitted to leave the Legation a week later to journey to Europe.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3836 Date: July 8, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
6300-c

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
(Combat)

Subjects: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Military Tribunals.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 12 1932

1. The four persons accused of attempting to assassinate President Machado have been found guilty by a Military Court Martial and each sentenced to imprisonment of fourteen years, eight months and one day.

2. This sentence was approved by the President on July 7th, and notice has been served on the defense counsels, in order that they may, if they so care, appeal from this sentence to the Supreme War Council.

3. It has also been announced that these four persons will be tried twice more: Once for having sent bombs through the mail and by express to various military commanders, and then for having sent the bomb which caused the death of Lieutenant Diaz Diez.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3838 Date: July 8, 1932

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 16 1932

Assassination of the Chief of the Secret Police:

1. At about 7:30 A.M. on July 9, 1932, Captain Miguel Calvo, Chief of the Cuban Secret Police, and two of his assistants, were killed by shot gun fire from an automobile which drove alongside of Calvo's car, after another car had crowded it to the curb. The fourth occupant of the car, Agent Francisco Avila, escaped injury, although his clothing was riddled with bullet holes.

2. The killing took place on the Malecon, directly in front of the Hotel National, and within a stone's throw of the recently erected monument to General Machado at the corner of 23rd. Street. At the time, two motorcycle policemen were on duty at the monument and, according to reports, were so frightened by the fire that they hid behind the monument during it, and failed to recover their sensibilities in time to give chase to the assassins' car. These two men have been suspended from the police force for an indefinite period.

3. The police have been extremely active in rounding up suspects, but, to date, no definite clue as to the identification of the assassins has resulted. Although somewhat far-fetched, a theory to the effect that the assassination must have been done by "imported" gangsters is being given great consideration. In a recent conversation with a high official of the Government, he expressed the opinion that no Cuban would have had "nerve" enough to have done such a complete job of the affair and, for that reason, he felt that it must have been the work of professionals, especially hired for the occasion. As a result, a very strict vigilence is being kept on all departing foreigners.

4. Immediately after the murders, it was rumored that Major Arsenio Ortiz, former Military Supervisor of the Province of Oriente, who came into the limelight a little over a year ago over the alleged killings in Santiago, was being named as Calvo's successor. This caused considerable consternation among the population, for it would have obviously meant that a campaign of reprisals would be initiated. Although Ortiz was not appointed, it is known that his name was being considered for this office, and that it was only due to the insistence on the part of several of the more conservative members of the Cabinet, that the President decided against this appointment.

5. As a temporary expedient, General Alberto Herrera, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, has assumed complete supervision of all police forces in the City of Havana. The City has been divided into two zones: the downtown section under the supervision of Major Fernandez de Lara, of the Army, and the outlying districts in charge of Major Antonio B. Ainciarte, of the National Police. Major Manuel Baxter, of the Cuban Army, has been detailed as assistant to Major Carrera, Chief of the National Police.

6. Calvo's assassination was hailed with joy by all the members of the Opposition forces. He was particularly unpopular, due

From M. A., Havana No. 3841 Date: July 12, 1932.

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to his intensive activity in rounding up members of the various Opposition forces at any time when the occasion demanded. A man of independent means, whose vocation and avocation were police work, he served the Government without remuneration for a number of years. He has often been accused of taking the law in his own hands, and, according to the Opposition, he was responsible for many mysterious "disappearances". While he was eccentric to the extreme, he always impressed the undersigned as most conscientious in what he conceived to be his duty. Even his bitterest enemies are forced to admit that he was a man of great physical and moral courage.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3841 Date: July 12, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues
Requiring Governmental Recognition
and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 18 1932

1. There have been no new developments in the political situation in Cuba during the past few days. Interest still centers in the assassination of Captain Calvo, and while numerous arrests have been made, followed by the release of many of the suspects, nothing of a definite nature has thus far come to light in connection with the case.

2. Feliz del Cristo, one of the motorcycle policemen on duty in close proximity at the time Calvo was murdered, "committed suicide" on July 13th at the Atares Prison, where he had been confined as a material witness pending the investigation of the assassination. It is, of course, generally believed that he was killed by persons who were "planted" in the prison for this purpose.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3845 Date: July 15, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 23 1932

1. There have been no changes in the political situation in Cuba since the last report on this subject.

2. The Government is still very active in trying to solve the murder of Captain Calvo and two of his assistants. To date it has been not only unsuccessful in its endeavors, but has failed to uncover any clue that might even be considered remotely connected with the case. Scores of persons are arrested daily, usually followed by their release after two or three days confinement. No reprisals on the part of the Government have been reported during the past few days.

3. On July 16th, an outbreak by the members of the crew of the cruiser "Cuba", as a protest against their not having been paid for the past three months, was quickly brought under control by the Naval and Military authorities. Similar demonstrations took place on the training ship "Patria" and the gunboat "20th of May", with the same result. More detailed information on this incident will be reported.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3847 Date: July 19, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

JUL 23 1932
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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 23 1932

1. Following is a list of laws enacted during the month of June, 1932, together with the dates of their promulgation:

June 23 - An act providing for the suspension of the constitutional guarantees for one year, and authorizing the President to extend the suspension of guarantees for an additional period of two years. (See report No. 3834, index as above, dated July 5, 1932). 2657-9-330/121

June 23 - An act which ratifies, confirms and approves the contract entered into by the Republic of Cuba and the Chase National Bank on June 16, 1932, for the temporary advance of $2,217,125 by the Bank to the Republic of Cuba. (See report No. 3824, index No. 5030-c, dated June 21, 1932). 2657-9-34/18

June 24 - The General Budget Law for the fiscal year 1932-1933, in which receipts are estimated at $51,700,000, and expenditures at $51,475,213.73. (See report No. 3835, index No. 5020-b, dated July 7, 1932). 2347-9-38/21

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Official Documents.

From M. A., Havana No. 3848 Date: July 19, 1932

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 26 1932

1. There have been no new developments in the political situation in Cuba. From all outward appearances, everything is normal and no incidents, other than the continued activity on the part of the Government to arrest a score of suspects in the Calvo case, have been reported during the past few days. While surface conditions are calm, there is considerable rumbling beneath the surface and the breach between the Government and the Opposition is as wide, if not wider, than ever before.

2. Nothing of note has been uncovered in the Calvo case. For a time the Government thought that the assassination might have been the work of friends of policeman Daniel Buttari, who was killed on June 24th, when he "attempted to escape" while being conducted to prison, and the opinion was freely expressed that members of the national police force were responsible for Calvo's death. However, the Government now feels certain that it was not an "inside job", but the work of the younger and more daring members of the Opposition.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3851 Date: July 22, 1932

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Combat)

Subject: Loyalty and Discipline.

2657-S-330/124

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 26 1932

Alleged Mutiny of the Cuban Navy:

1. The incident which took place on certain of the Cuban Naval vessels on July 15, 1932, reference to which was made in report No. 3847, index 3600-a, dated July 19, 1932, and which the Opposition characterized as a mutiny, was, according to the Government's version, another "communist plot" similar to that which took place in Camaguey on December 27, 1931. (See report No. 3659, index as above, dated December 31, 1931).

2. It appears that the secret police had information to the effect that subversive literature was being distributed among the enlisted personnel of the Navy, and, with the permission of the Chief of Staff of the Navy, a search was made on the three boats which were then in Havana Harbor, with the result that a number of Opposition flysheets were seized, and one petty officer and ten ordinary seamen were arrested and lodged in Cabanas Fortress to await trial by Navy Court Martial.

3. The personnel of the Navy has not been paid for two month and the enlisted men are quite naturally in a receptive frame of mind for any promises on the part of the Opposition which might alleviate their present situation. In addition to this, as pointed out by my informant, the Navy as a whole is far less amendable to discipline than the Army.

4. Despite the censorship of the press, reference to this incident, details of which were completely lacking, was made by the English language newspapers of Havana, and resulted in "gossip" to the effect that the incident was more serious than it appears to have been.

5. In spite of the Government's insistence that this incident was of communistic origin, it is my opinion that the Opposition was responsible for it.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3852 Date: July 22, 1932.

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 30 1932

1. Since the assassination of Captain Calvo on July 9, 1932, the political situation in Cuba has been marked by an increase in violence on the part of the Government and the Opposition groups. Searches and arrests by the police have continued unabated, and, although figures are lacking, it is estimated that at least three hundred persons have been arrested. Apparently heartened by the fact that the Government has failed to uncover any clues in the Calvo case, the members of the Opposition have recently become much more reckless in carrying out their feats of terrorism.

2. Several incidents which tend to show the boldness of the Opposition group have occurred during the past few days:

(a) On July 21, four persons attempted to seize a radio station in Havana, for the purpose of broadcasting anti-Government propaganda. The police were warned of this plan and were waiting for the individuals when they arrived. After considerable shooting on both sides, three of the men were apprehended, but the fourth managed to escape. One policeman was severely wounded in this affray.

(b) On July 22, in Cerro, a district of Havana inhabited almost entirely by people of the laboring class, a package was delivered to the house of a family by the name of Proenza, who has been suspected of anti-Government activities. The occupants of the house refused to accept the package, not knowing its contents. Upon being opened by the messenger, the package exploded, killing the messenger and severely wounding two members of the family who were in the doorway at the time. A son of the family has already been arrested, while a daughter has been in hiding for sometime. In the search of the house, a diary was found which gave an accurate account of recent bombings, with plans for several more. In addition to this, subversive documents were seized and some of the family's relatives were detained. The police have not been able to escape suspicion that the bomb was sent on Government authority.

(c) On July 23, Colonel Esteban Delgado Acosta, a Veteran of Cuba's War of Independence, and an Opposition leader, was killed in a gun battle with members of the secret police who had been warned of Opposition meetings that were being held in Colonel Delgado's house in Havana. According to the Government's version, the police surrounded the house and demanded that the door be opened; but instead of this, they were greeted by a volley of bullets from inside. Shortly thereafter the door was opened and Colonel Delgado stepped out, attempting to shoot at the police, but was immediately shot down. Whether there was any fighting at all has been seriously questioned by members of the Opposition, who point out that whoever shot Colonel Delgado must have been a remarkably good marksman, since he had no other wounds except two bullet holes in his forehead.

From M. A., Havana No. 3855 Date: July 26, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(d) On the night of July 23rd, the taxicab driver ordinarily used by Colonel Delgado was mysteriously shot in a street of Havana. The policeman who found the body said he had heard the shot, saw the man fall, but could not see the assailant. Colonel Delgado had for considerable time been active in the Opposition and was arrested in connection with the meeting of the Union Nacionalista in Artemisa in May, 1930, when several persons were killed and a score injured in an attempt by the Army to break up the meeting.

(e) On July 24th, Captain Garcia Sierra, Chief of the Fourth Precinct of the national police, was instantly killed and four policemen seriously wounded when a bomb exploded in a house on Revillagigedo Street in the downtown section of Havana. The police went to the house in answer to an anonymous telephone call to the effect that an Opposition meeting was being held there. Upon arrival the police searched the premises and, although they found considerable subversive literature and arms, the house itself was unoccupied. As he was about to leave, Captain Garcia picked up a book on the table which was apparently connected to a bomb, which caused the latter to explode, inflicting the fatalities above mentioned.

3. As has been previously stated, the police forces on the Island have been placed under the general supervision of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Army is now seeking, however, a more direct and effective command of these forces and has recommended to the President the appointment of an Army officer to be in direct command of the national, judicial, secret and municipal police forces. While the President is believed to be in favor of such a plan, he has not as yet agreed to it on account of opposition to it by many of his political friends.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3855 Date: July 26, 1932.

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 2 1932

1. There have been no new developments in the political situation in Cuba during the past few days. The Government is still very active in trying to solve the killings of two of its police captains, Calvo and Sierra, but have made no progress toward a solution of these cases.

2. A number of "killings", said by the Opposition to be reprisals on the part of the Government forces, have been reported, but in each case the Government has appointed an Army officer as official investigator, with the result that usually nothing other than the report "killed by persons unknown" is ever made public.

3. From outward appearances, everything is calm in Havana and in the provinces. However, the Cuban people, especially those who have at any time been connected with any of the Opposition elements, are living in constant fear of possible arrest or summary execution. While their fears in many cases are unquestionably greatly exaggerated by many unfounded rumors, it is believed to be true that the Government's attitude now is one of almost desperation, in which it is felt that the best method of procedure is to do away with its known enemies, whether or not any immediate justification exists. That the agents of the Government are now taking more precautions for their own safety than at any time in the past is demonstrated by the fact that the Chief of Staff of the Army, who formerly rode about the City without any protection, is now followed by a car containing members of the secret police.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3857 Date: July 29, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAY 26 1932
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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By authority letter of Dec. 13, 1963, from [illegible] Archivist
By
Date 12-21-79

GRAY

Havana

Dated May 24, 1932

Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

60, May 24, noon.

My telegram No. 59, May 23, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. I learn from an authoritative source that arrests of Opposition leaders determined upon as a precautionary measure. Government claims to have information that another revolutionary movement is imminent and General Staff has issued secret orders to cope with rebel expedition which it believes may come from Mexico or Canada. Ex-President Menocal whose arrest was ordered yesterday has taken asylum in the Brazilian Legation.

Revival of terroristic activities including despatch of infernal machines to army officers by express which, in one case had fatal results, probably largely responsible for Government's uneasiness.

Quiet prevails here and Embassy has received no reports of disorders from Consuls excepting telegram reporting Communist demonstrations at United States Consular Agency at Manzanillo, Sunday night.

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WWC

MAY 26 1932
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AUG 6 1932

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2657-G-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

(COPY)

GRAY

Havana

Dated July 9, 1932

Recd 12:55 p.m.

cib

Secretary of State

Washington.

84, July 9, 10 a.m.

Captain Calvo, Chief of Expert (Secret) Police, who has had primary responsibility for Government's investigations of oppositionist and so-called Communistic activities was shot to death on streets of Habana with two other members of corps about 7 o'clock this morning by unknown persons using machine guns from closed automobile.

GUGGENHEIM

OX PFC

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AUG 6 1932
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4-1 2657-G-330

WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 5 1932

1. The political situation in Cuba remains unchanged. Surface conditions indicate normality and no incidents nor terroristic activities by the Opposition groups, other than the explosion of a small bomb in Santiago on August 1st, have been reported during the past few days.

2. General Mario Menocal, who was permitted to leave Cuba on July 2, 1932, with the understanding that he would remain in Europe for at least a year, is now reported to have sailed for the United States and is expected to arrive in New York City on August 2, 1932. The general feeling about this is that while he may be pardoned for having broken faith with the Cuban Government, his failure to keep his word with the Brazilian Minister has placed the latter in a very embarrassing situation. As soon as General Menocal's return from Europe was reported, many of his lieutenants immediately left Cuba for the United States. His two sons have been in hiding since this report leaked out, and they have signified their intention of going to the United States as soon as they can safely quit Cuba.

3. Colonel Rosendo Collazo, ex-Senator from Camaguey and prominent leader of the Junta in the United States during the past year, was seriously injured when his automobile collided, on July 30th, with another car on the Central Highway. Colonel Collazo has been here for two months, under promise that he would not participate in any of the Opposition's activities. It is reported that when his car collided, several guns and some ammunition were found. He is now in the Army hospital at Camp Columbia, and his case is being investigated by the Army authorities.

4. In a search of a house in the Vedado section of Havana on July 31, a considerable amount of arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the sole occupant, Antonio Lopez Rubio, former secretary of Colonel Peraza, who was killed in the revolution last August, was summarily executed.

5. Due to the large amount of arms and ammunition that have been discovered during the past few weeks, the Army is now considering a plan for a systematic house-to-house search of all the buildings in Havana. General Lores, the Assistant Chief of Staff, stated this morning that he thought such a search could be accomplished in one day, and would reveal all the Opposition's hiding places, not only of arms and ammunition, but of persons whom the Government is seeking in its investigations. This plan was initiated by General Lores and has not yet been approved by the Government. It is doubted if the plan will be approved, due to the opposition to it by prominent politicians.

6. An unconfirmed rumor to the effect that Major Arsenio Ortiz has been placed in charge of the "Porra", the organization

From M. A., Havana No. 3858 Date: August 2, 1932

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

which is responsible for all summary executions by the Government, was emphatically denied by General Lores. He did state, however, that Major Ortiz, due to his long experience in the rural guard and in quelling public disturbances in the past, has been called into conference several times on matters pertaining to the public peace.

7. With reference to the explosion of a bomb on July 22nd, 1932, in the house of a family named Proenza (see report No. 3855, index as above, dated July 26, 1932), the daughter therein mentioned as in hiding took refuge in the Mexican Embassy. As yet, both the Mexican Ambassador and the Secretary of State have refrained from commenting on this assumption of asylum.

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J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Embassy and
Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 3858 Date: August 2, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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AUG 15 1932
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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1 2657-9-330

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Propaganda of Foreign Origin.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 5 1932

3

Communistic Activities:

1. August 1, 1932 had been set, according to various communistic proclamations, as a day of street celebrations commemorating the inauguration of the Soviet Republic, but, due to the vigilance of the authorities, the day passed uneventfully, except for minor disturbances in some of the cities in the provinces.

2. Headlines in the Havana press of July 30, 1932, announced the discovery by the secret police of a communistic plot to bomb the American Embassy and the Japanese Legation here on that day. This was denied by the police, who stated that the subversive documents seized indicated nothing more than a plan for street demonstrations in front of the diplomatic missions mentioned.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3859 Date: August 2, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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AUG 10 1932
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G-2 Report

4-1

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 10 1932

1. The Cuban political situation remains unchanged. Anti-Government outbursts, which started with the killing of Captain Calvo on July 9th, are reported daily. Although the Government is taking extraordinary precautions to cope with the situation, and despite the fact that everyone knows that offenders will probably be summarily executed if caught "red handed", the Opposition groups are apparently so determined to keep the situation alive that they are even willing to risk their lives in doing it.

2. On August 4th, two soldiers were instantly killed by gun fire when they were ambushed in the outskirts of Trinidad, Santa Clara Province, by four unknown assailants.

3. On the same date, a bomb exploded prematurely in the wash-room of the Trianon Cafe in Havana, causing the complete destruction of the room, and mortally wounding the man who is believed to have "placed" the bomb.

4. The Havana press reports that General Mario Menocal, upon his arrival in New York on August 3rd., stated that he had made no promise to remain in Europe, and that he is at liberty to go where-ever he pleases. Menocal's friends in Cuba expect that he will immediately assume the leadership of the "Cuban Junta" in New York, and will initiate an extensive campaign of anti-Administration pro-paganda. He has many influential American friends whom he will undoubtedly try to convert to the "cause", and his presence there is bound to be a source of continual concern to the present Admin-istration.

5. The status of Miss Proenza remains unchanged. She is still at the Mexican Embassy, and it has not been determined whether she is to be charged with a political or a criminal offense. If it is the latter, the Mexican Ambassador will have to turn her over to the Cuban authorities; if, however, the charges against her are of a political nature, her case will be similar to that of General Menocal.

6. Despite the fact that the press is still throttled by Government censorship, the Secretary of the Interior recently announced that "too many inexact stories have been published in the newspapers" and added that criminal charges would be placed against reporters who furnish their newspapers with them.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Embassy, and
Personal Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 3863 Date: August 5, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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AUG 16 1932
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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3900
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 16 1932

1. Following is a list of laws enacted during the month of July, 1932, together with the dates of their promulgation:

July 6th: Providing a daily allowance of $10.00 for ex-officio members of the Provincial Electoral Boards.

July 7th: Amnesty for homicide where two counts have been admitted for self-defense and providing there has been a dissenting vote for acquittal. (One man amnesty).

July 7th: Amnesty for fraud, counterfeiting signatures or maps, etc. (One man amnesty).

July 7th: Amnesty for fraud in commercial instrument, prior to fixed date. (One man)

July 7th: Amending Civil Register Law so as to grant one year for registration of births, providing a fine for failure to do so and granting one year for registration of all unregistered children.

July 7th: Transferring the pension of Jesus Cruz to his widow.

July 7th: Providing that three years from date of the law, all sugar mills and refineries shall be directed in fabrication department by a Sugar or Agricultural Engineer, Sugar Chemist, graduate of Havana University or with revalidated foreign degree.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents, and Embassy.

From M. A., Havana No. 3865 Date: August 10, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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AUG 20 1932
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OPERATIONS & TRAINING STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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C-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 20 1932

1. There have been no specific political events in Cuba since the rendition of the last report on this subject.

2. Miss Caridad Proenza, who took refuge in the Mexican Embassy, is expected to depart for Guatemala today. The Government still maintains that no order of detention has been issued against her and, hence, there is no question of asylum under consideration.

3. The American press dispatches of August 14th announced the capture of eleven Cubans, lead by Pedro Diaz, a former lieutenant in the Cuban Army and a representative of the Opposition, by the American Coast Guard service of Miami, Florida. According to the press accounts, the Cubans declared themselves to be Cuban refugees who had fled from Cuba in the same boat in which they were traveling because they feared that they would be involved in the detentions following the assassination of Captain Calvo. The accounts further stated that these men were released on the pledge of the Cuban residents in Miami.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 3871 Date: August 16, 1932

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

THE SECRETARY OF WAR DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS RADIO AS FOLLOWS:
ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS if answer is unnecessary.
If answer is NOT SENT WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON MUST BE STATED.
C. H. BRIDGES,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

G-2 X
TAG √

Code

RADIOGRAM

Received at the War Department.

AUG 23 1932

LMB

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-2-330
139

WAR DEPARTMENT

July 9, 1932

1:00 P. M.

From Havana

To The Adjutant General

WN 27

Number 37 July 9th

See State Department's cable Number 84 July 9th relative to recent developments Cuban political situation.

O'Hare

FORM NO. 0 635-3-A.G.O.
ED. MAY 15, 1922.

X INDICATES RADIO ROUTED FOR ACTION; √ FOR INFORMATION

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G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 20 1932
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WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 20 1932

1. The most recent public discussion of the issues between the Government and the Opposition were presented in letters between Juan Gualberto Gomez and Secretary of State Ferrara, published recently in Heraldo de Cuba.

2. Juan Gomez is one of the Conservative leaders of the Opposition who has taken no active part in its more violent manifestations. His correspondence with Ferrara was publicly initiated by a remark he made to the press on the occasion of his seventy-ninth birthday, when he said that he would shortly commence some conversations as to the best method of achieving tranquility in Cuba. Such conversations had already been initiated by Cosme de la Torriente. Numerous meetings of unjailed leaders of the Opposition had taken place to reopen negotiations with the Government on the basis of proposals similar to those made by the Opposition after the revolution of August, 1931.

3. Ferrara, since his return to Cuba, has changed to a marked degree his philosophy regarding the Cuban political situation. He has frankly admitted to various representatives of the Embassy staff that he is considerably worried about the eventual change from President Machado to his successor. While in Washington, Ferrara was opposed to any solution in which, due to his absence, he could not be assured of a leading role. It would appear at the present time that he is now seeking a solution that will even preserve his position after Machado leaves office.

4. The Ferrara-Gomez correspondence was, in effect, a public supplement to the various private discussions which had taken place. In his first open letter to Gomez, Ferrara stated that he was not writing in the name of the Government, but merely as a man commenting on what he sees, and that the alarming feature about the situation is the bitterness that has developed on both sides. Discussing the lack of organization in the Opposition, Ferrara raises the question as to who would govern should the present Government abdicate in accordance with the Opposition's demand. Continuing, he stated that he knew at least seven members of the Opposition who expected to be President, if the revolution of August, 1931 had succeeded; that the Opposition is divided into several hostile groups; and that agreement among its elements must be the first step for the arrangement of an agreement among Cubans as a whole.

5. In his third letter, Ferrara gave a very strong statement regarding certain abuses which he attributed to the Government, but which he said the Government was forced to commit because of the terroristic tendencies of the Opposition. He listed these as follows:

(a) The extension of the policy of cooperation outside of the Congress into the elections themselves. A coalition of parties in Parliament is, at times, useful, but when carried into the elections it destroys the will of the people.

From M. A., Havana No. 3873 Date: August 22, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(b) Supplementing the first error for the failure to reorganize the parties in accordance with the law, this action lead to monopoly by the party leaders, and the prevention of the expression of new ideas.

(c) The spread of nepotism in party councils. Ferrara pointed out that, against the President's will, political appointments have the tendency to be of a family nature.

6. In admitting this official commission of errors, Ferrara stated that the Opposition must bear part of the responsibility because, by its own violence and its own complete disregard for the established institutions of the Republic, it has forced the Government into taking, at times, extreme measures. He urged that the Opposition, having failed once in a revolution, should now give up its revolutionary ideas, and work for the elections that will take place in 1934.

7. In his reply, Gomez agreed that both the Government and the Opposition have some responsibility for the present difficult situation. He pointed out, however, that the Union Nacionalista, to which he belongs, did not exist until the Constitutional Reforms of 1928 fell very unexpectedly on Cuba. This party was then organized by men whose intelligence and patriotism Ferrara himself would not before have questioned; but the new party was prevented by the Government from a legal expression of its ideas and was forced to use more violent methods. Gomez suggested that the Opposition and the Government should consider the following two propositions:

(a) The original proposition terminating the presidential term in 1933.

(b) The immediate abandonment of the Government by its present administration, and the appointment of a neutral government, until new elections could be held.

8. As was expected, this correspondence, while not greeted with any great public interest, renewed the conversations in Cuba in regard to the retirement of President Machado, and gave rise to a number of rumors of compromises between the Opposition and the Government. The Cooperating politicians, among them notably Vasquez Bello, who have suffered an eclipse since the return of Ferrara, saw an opportunity to discredit him with the President. They convinced the latter that Ferrara was playing the role of "president-maker", and that any indication of a compromise would be a sign of weakness and bring about Machado's downfall. Indeed, all of this Machado had heard from Ferrara himself when in a different mood. The letters were abruptly ended, at the instigation of the President, but the last letter from Ferra to Gomez stated: "Our expression of ideas, if continued, would have unfavorable repercussions on the public spirit, placing in doubt the authority of the Government which, under the present circumstances, needs all its prestige to

From M. A., Havana No. 3873 Date: August 22, 1932

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preserve intact the patriotic institutions and to defend the interests of all." This vulnerable statement was immediately commented upon by Gomez in a letter saying that he regretted very much that Cubans were living in such a period that "in order to safeguard the prestige of the Goverhment, one cannot freely discuss among Cubans the solutions which might restore a normal, civilized and free life to the country."

9. Shortly after the termination of this correspondence, the Secretary of the Interior, in a vigorous statement to the press, said "that General Machado and his Government would not cease in their functions until 12-Noon of the 20th of May of 1935; not one minute before." The Secretary supplemented this by sending a circular telegram to the Governors and Representatives of the Republic, denying emphaticslly the rumor that there would be a possible change in the Government, stating"that the Government was conscious of its responsibility and sure of its power." This same tone was evidenced in a statement issued by the President to the Liberal Party on August 12th, in which he stated that the time was not opportune for any member of the party to aspire to the presidency of the Republic, nor for any one, in any way, to announce himslf a candidate. The President stated that it was necessary to think of the country of Cuba as a whole and not of personal ambitions; and that he would regard the appearance of a candidate, or the announcement of a candidacy, as an act of frank hostility to the Government and to the true interests of the Liberal Party, as well as a grave danger, which he would have to combat with the same energy and decision which had marked his maintenance of public order. Due to the strict censorship of the press, there have been no editorials commenting on or criticising this statement.

10. At about the same time as the above statements appeared, the National Assembly of the Popular Party held a meeting under the leadership of Senator Jose Manuel Cortina, and issued a declaration of principles, admitting the present political crisis and advocating the following:

(a) The formation of a National Committee for Patriotic Conciliation, to find a formula of harmony for the disturbed conditions, and to facilitate the reestablishment of the Constitutional Guarantees.

(b) The convocation of the highest representatives of industry, labor, banking and commerce to develop a program to improve the domestic economy of the country.

(c) The necessary action to expedite the functioning of the University of Havana, the institutions and the normal schools.

11. Aside from the above statements, there have been few events during the past ten days of any particular importance, and practically no acts of violence.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3874 Date: August 22, 1932

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4-1 AUG 30 1932
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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Present Executive RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 29 1932

1. Mrs. Mariana de la Torre de Mendoza, who was convicted by a Military Court Martial on July 7, 1932, for her part in the attempted assassination of President Machado on June 7, 1932, was pardoned by the President on August 22, 1932, and left immediately for the United States, where she will reside semi-permanently.

2. Although the President believed her guilty, considerable pressure had been brought to bear on him for her release, and it is believed that his action in this case was to appease some of his closest political and personal friends who had sought her release.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3874 Date: August 23, 1932

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G-2 Report

3600-a
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 10 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 10 1932

1. During the past two weeks the Opposition elements of the Government have again resorted to bomb-throwing. On the evening of August 24th, a very powerful bomb was thrown in the home of Dr. Ricardo Nunez Portuondo, Vice-President of the Federated Physicians of Habana, causing considerable property damage. On August 25th, a large bomb containing eight packages of dynamite was located, prior to its explosion, in Vibora, a suburb of Havana. On the morning of August 30th, a bomb exploded in the home of the Chief of Police of Marianao. Early in the morning of September 4th, a very large and powerful bomb exploded in the Art and Technical school building in the center of Havana. The front of the building was completely demolished, but, fortunately, no persons were injured.

2. On September 2nd., four persons were killed and five wounded in a gun battle in Vinales, a small town in Pinar del Rio. The fight occurred during a political rally in which the opposing political factions of the town failed to come to an agreement on the candidacy for mayor in the November elections.

3. There is considerable feeling of uneasiness throughout the Island, and unfounded rumors of an impending revolution are increasing daily. The authorities state that these rumors are groundless, and while they admit the possibility that a large amount of arms and ammunition might still be concealed in the Island from the revolution of August, 1931, they contend that a revolutionary movement would be impossible at this time without the arrival of a new expeditionary force. This, they state, is impossible, due to the strict vigilance that is maintained by all Government agencies.

4. Lieutenant Echenique, Military Supervisor of Marianao, was killed, and Captain Mansip, to whom reference is made in paragraph one above, was mortally wounded on the morning of September 6th, when a bomb exploded in a house in the Reparto Mendoza, a suburb of Marianao. The police had been warned of the presence of the bomb in this house, and upon arrival there, Lieutenant Echenique cut what he thought was the wire leading from the bomb to the starting magneto located at some distance from the house. Then, feeling certain that nothing would happen, he started the magneto and the bomb exploded immediately, killing him and mortally wounding Captain Mansip. It appears that another concealed wire actually connected the bomb with the magneto, and the perpetrators of the act had placed the other wire in the open so that the authorities, upon discovering it, would do exactly as Lieutenant Echenique had done. No arrests, in connection with this latest outrage, have been reported.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3883 Date: Sept. 6, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

SE 1932
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 15 1932

1. Despite the fact that scores of suspects have been arrested in a nation-wide hunt for the perpetrators of the infernal machine which caused the death, on September 6th, of Lieutenant Francisco Echenique, Military Supervisor of the police of Marianao, and Captain Estanislao Mansip, Chief of Police of that town, who died on the morning of September 7th, no definite clues have as yet been uncovered.

2. The construction of the machine and the manner in which it was placed seemed to indicate that it was designed to kill not the officers mentioned, but Captain Florindo Fernandez, expert in explosives who is customarily called upon to examine and render harmless all suspicious packages or articles which are believed to contain explosives.

3. Coincidental with this latest outrage has been the discovery in various places near Havana of the bodies of several unidentified persons. The mystery enshrouding the deaths of these individuals has encouraged the inference that they were suspected of complicity in the various attacks against the police and military authorities that have occurred during the last two months.

4. While it is doubtful whether the existing prevalence of acts of terrorism can justifiably be inscribed to inefficiency on the part of the police, it is significant, however, that Major Rafael Carrera was on September 6th relieved of command of the National Police and his place taken by Brigadier Antonio B. Ainciart, titular chief of that body. On the same day, Colonel Rogerio Caballero y Gomez, Chief of the Fifth Military District, was appointed in command of the National, Judicial, Secret and Municipal police forces of the Island. As stated in paragraph three of report No. 3855, index as above, dated July 26, 1932, the Army has for sometime been seeking this type of control of the police forces, which the President finally conceded to do after this last outburst of terrorism.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3884 Date: Sept. 9, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
(Combat)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Military Tribunals.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 20 1932

1. On September 12, 1932, the Cuban House of Representatives, complying with a request contained in a presidential message to Congress, passed without serious opposition, an administration bill to supersede the so-called "law of military jurisdiction" of February 17, 1932. This law was reported in report NO. 3707, index as above, dated February 26, 1932. It was afterwards declared unconstitutional as to certain of its provisions, by the Supreme Court on May 12, 1932, in an appeal made against the indictment of the student, Antonio Mendieta, as reported by report No. 3778, index as above, dated May 19, 1932. (Mendieta was subsequently tried by the Audiencia of Havana and was, last week, adjudged guilty and sentenced to serve eight years in prison.)

2. It is reported that the Supreme Court recently confirmed its decision in two other cases, but if this is true, the Court's action has not been permitted to receive publicity in the public press. Other possible motives that may have prompted the President to request that the law be re-enacted, are:

(a) There are discrepancies between the text of the law as entered on the Minutes of the House, and the text as published in the Official Gazette.

(b) There is some foundation in the reports current that the law was approved in the absence of a quorum of the House.

(c) The Government, as a conciliatory gesture toward the Opposition, desires to eliminate one or two of the objectionable provisions of the law.

3. The jurisdiction of the Military Courts will, when the new measure becomes a law, extend to the same offenses as those enumerated in the law of February 17th. Their jurisdiction over civilians will, however, be limited to offenses committed in time of war, sedition, rebellion or serious disturbance of public order, but only while the Constitutional Guarantees are suspended. The transitory provisions of the law of February 17th, which sought to give it retroactive effect and which were annulled by the Supreme Court's decision of May 12th, were entirely omitted from the present law.

4. Unfortunately, any conciliatory effect which might have been expected to result from the above changes is offset by the knowledge that the Government is at present authorized to maintain indefinitely the existing suspension of Constitutional Guarantees and, by the new

From M. A., Havana No. 3887 Date: Sept. 17, 1932

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provisions inserted in the bill, giving the Military Courts jurisdiction without limitation as to time of criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces. It will be recalled that the Amnesty Law of January 13, 1932, restricted the exercise of such jurisdiction to the succeeding thirty months.

5. On September 15, 1932, the Senate unanimously approved this bill, and it will undoubtedly be signed by the President within the next day or two.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3887 Date: Sept. 17, 1932

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G-2 Report

7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 20 1932

1. During the past week, the Government has released approximately one hundred political prisoners, including twelve women, and has stated that others would be set free in the near future. Among those released are some of the more important lieutenants of the Opposition elements, including Carlos Eduardo Findlay, son of the famous collaborator of Dr. Walter Reed.

2. On September 8th, the Opposition leaders, Mendieta and Mendez Penate, were brought to Havana from the Isle of Pines where they had been confined for the past three months. They were incarcerated in Principe jail, and the press announced that their families would be permitted to visit them while there. However, without any announced reason for its action, the Government, on September 14th, returned these two men to the national penitentiary at the Isle of Pines. It now develops that they were brought to Havana in order that the Government might deal with them, through Cosme de la Torriente, in a "cordiality pact". Neither of them would deal with the Government, however, and were consequently returned to their former place of confinement.

3. On his first day in office the new Chief of Police gained popular favor by disbanding the "liga patriotica", usually referred to as the "porra", a Government organization composed of henchmen of the lowest type, whose activities for many months past have been designed to terrorize the adversaries of the Administration.

4. While the actions of the Government, as outlined in the above paragraphs, show that it is in a conciliatory frame of mind, the Opposition elements are not in a receptive mood to receive these gestures, and the breach between the two elements is as wide as ever.

J. F. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3888 Date: Sept. 17, 1932

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~~Confidential~~: The Military Attache.

G-2 Report

7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. OCT 8 1932

1. On September 27, 1932, Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bello, President of the Cuban Senate, was killed in the Country Club Park while he was returning home in his automobile. After his death, fifty-four bullets were extracted from his body.

2. On the same afternoon, Congressman Freyre de Andrade and his two brothers were brutally murdered in their home in the Vedado section of Havana by a group of unidentified persons. At almost the same time, Congressman Miguel Aguiar, a close personal friend of ex-President Menocal, was shot by unknown persons and died on the morning of September 28th.

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By _____
Date _____

3. The assassination of Dr. Vasquez Bello and the brutal murder of the four other persons have inspired feelings of horror and terrified apprehension beyond description. Practically every member of the Opposition who is not in prison fears that he may be the next victim of Vasquez Bello's avengers.

4. There is no doubt in the public mind that the murder of the de Andrade brothers and Miguel Aguiar were acts of reprisal. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether they were carried out with or without the connivance of the Government; the more rabid adversaries of the Government even insisting that the Government itself is to blame.

5. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In discussing these deplorable events with a member of the Embassy staff, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Orestes Ferrara, pointed out that every political boss in Cuba is surrounded by a group of persons dependent on him for preferment, maintenance or funds. If their chief is removed, these persons suffer the consequences, which may mean the ruin of all their hopes and aspirations. He stated that it was not unnatural, therefore, that Vasquez Bello's henchmen might have sought to avenge his death. Dr. Ferrara further stated that there had been two previous attempts made on Vasquez Bello's life. He further stated that he had understood that Vasquez Bello had informed certain of his people, in the event of his meeting a violent death, to kill three men, Gonzalo Freyre de Andrade, Miguel Aguiar and Ricardo Dolz. Two of these had been immediately accounted for and the third, Ricardo Dolz, had sought protection in the Mexican Embassy where he will remain until allowed to leave the country.

6. The police report progress in running down the assassins of Vasquez Bello. The automobile which they used was found and identified, and they are working back from this important piece of evidence.

From M. A., Havana No. 3894 Date: October 4, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

7. On September 28th, the police discovered a 200-pound dynamite mine at Colon Cemetery, close to the mausoleum in which Vasquez Bello would have been interred had he been buried in Havana. This is believed to be the most definite proof that Vasquez Bello's assassination was but the prelude to a wholesale slaughter of Government officials, and seems to eliminate the theory that his death might have been due to dissension in the ranks of the Liberal Party.

8. The authorities have adopted extraordinary precautions to prevent the escape of the criminals, even going so far as to curtail the issuance of permits to Cubans to embark for foreign ports. Although several arrests have been made, it is not believed that the actual perpetrators of the crime have as yet been apprehended.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy and Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3894 Date: October 4, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 11 1932

1. There has been little, if any, relaxation in the tension that has prevailed here since the assassination of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bello and the subsequent murder of the four members of the Opposition on September 27, 1932.

2. The feeling of personal insecurity exists not only among the adversaries of the Government but also among the high officials of the Administration. Should any of the latter meet a fate similar to that of the late President of the Senate, the common belief is that there will be further reprisals on an even larger scale against the lives of such leaders of the Opposition, or their sympathizers, as are still at large.

3. On October 6th, the Government announced that insofar as it was informed, diplomatic asylum had been granted by the following missions:

Spanish Embassy: Gabriel and Mario Menocal y Moreno.

Mexican Embassy: Ricardo Dolz and Eliceo Arguelles,Sr.

Uruguayan Legation: Carlos Manuel de la Cruz and Pedro Cue y Abreu.

Colombian Legation: Eliceo Arguelles, Jr., and Julio Rabell.

4. Of the eight persons listed above, only one, de la Cruz, has been permitted to leave the country. The President has let it be known that he is very much annoyed at the freedom with which certain missions have extended their hospitality and that he did not intend to permit any of the refugees to leave the country for the time being. At the same time, it was pointed out that in the majority of cases, the refugees had been actuated by a desire to embarrass the Government through unfavorable publicity abroad, rather than by motives of personal fear. Judging from the degree of anxiety displayed by the number of persons who have sought the asylum of the American Embassy, this opinion cannot be concurred in.

5. On September 30th, the second anniversary of the death of the student, Trejo, a number of demonstrations were incited in certain of the public schools in Havana. On the night of October 1st, a large bomb was placed in the home of Representative Fidel Cainas, which practically destroyed the building. Both of these acts seem to indicate that the Opposition elements, despite the reprisal measures that they know the Government will take, are apparently willing to sacrifice themselves for what they consider their "cause."

6. The Government is convinced at this time that there will be no general uprising, unless the Opposition elements are successful in assassinating the President. They point out that, in the first place, sufficient funds are lacking and, in the second place,

From M. A., Havana No. 3899 Date: October 7, 1932

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if a revolutionary movement from within or an expeditionary force from without were in the offing, none of the acts that have been committed within the last two weeks would have occurred at this time.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3899 Date: October 7, 1932

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 17 1932

1. There have been no changes in the political situation in Cuba during the past few days. The tension that has existed since September 27th, both in the ranks of the Opposition and in Government circles, is as strong as ever, but no acts of terrorism nor retaliatory measures by the Government have been reported.

2. It was reported that something of a definite nature would happen on October 10th, a national holiday, the sixty-fourth anniversary of the "Grito de Yara", but no disorders of any kind were reported.

3. No new clues have been unearthed in connection with the assassination of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bello nor have any arrests been made in connection with the retaliatory deaths of the three Freyre de Andrade brothers and that of Dr. Miguel Aguiar.

4. There has been no change in connection with the various members of the Opposition who have sought asylum in the diplomatic missions in Havana. It is reported, though not confirmed, that two young ladies, the Misses Freyre de Andrade and Clarita Porcell, are "guests" at the British Legation.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3902 Date: October 11, 1932

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 18 1932
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1. Although no anti-administration or retaliatory acts of violence have been reported since the bombing of the residence of Representative Fidel Cainas (see report No. 3899, index as above, dated October 7, 1932) on October 1, 1932, there has been little, if any, diminution in the mental tension affecting all branches of society, both Government and Opposition. The murders of September 27th touched socially prominent families exclusively, and wherever the responsibility therefor may rest, their effect has been to augment the latterly significant tendency of this social group, normally pretending superiority to practical politics, to assume active roles in opposing the Machado Administration. Probably the fear for personal safety inspired by recent events will be discovered to have been instrumental in uniting this element, with others, not behind the political ambitions of any of the heterogeneous leaders of the recognized Opposition, but for the sole purpose of overthrowing the present Government, lawfully or by continued indulgence in acts of terrorism. That this feeling of personal insecurity is not confined to sympathizers with the Opposition movement is indicated by a remark made to an officer of the Embassy by a prominent Cuban official to the effect that, whereas appeals were being made to foreign diplomatic missions for asylum and for guarantees of safety of life and property, in fact guarantees against acts of fanatics might more appropriately be requested by the members of the Government.

2. The cases of the refugees under the protection of the Spanish and Mexican Embassies and of the Colombian and Uruguayan Legations are reported to be under investigation by the several police corps, the indication being that if charges are discovered to exist, their departure from Cuba will not be permitted. One of the "guests" at the British Legation, Miss Maria Teresa Freyre de Andrade, is reported already to have been issued a passport by the Cuban Foreign Office.

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3. In accordance with authorization contained in Article IV of the Law of June 23, 1932 (see report No. 3834, index as above, dated July 5, 1932), the President yesterday signed a decree providing that the suspended Constitutional Guarantees shall be restored from October 15th to November 1, 1932, inclusive, or, that is to say, during the fortnight preceding the elections which are scheduled for the latter date. The decree further provides that after November 1, 1932, Constitutional Guarantees shall again be suspended. This temporary reestablishment of the guarantees will probably not exert any appreciable effect upon the political situation, since military control of the police forces will continue in practical effect and since the Government is said to have no intention of permitting political meetings or the free expression of opinions. However, it must be assumed that for the period stipulated in the said decree, the civil courts will recover jurisdiction over offenses against the Law of Explosives and certain other crimes committed by civilians which, according to the Law of Military Jurisdiction, are tried before military courts during periods of suspension of Constitutional Guarantees.

From M. A., Havana No. 3903 Date: October 14, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

4. The prohibition against the departure of Cuban citizens from Cuba (exceptions are made) which was put into effect immediately following the assassination of Senator Clemente Vasquez Bello, continues in rigid force. Foreigners are permitted to depart under military permit, but such permits are obtainable with increasing difficulty and inconvenience. Foreigners of local standing, known to their diplomatic and consular representatives, are most favored; others require police certificates of good character or documents of similar import. It is evident that the theory that the assassins of Senator Vasquez Bello were imported "gunmen" or "gangsters" has not been discarded.

5. No progress has been reported in bringing the assassins of Senator Vasquez Bello, the Freyre de Andrade brothers, and Representative Miguel Aguiar to justice.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

By: V. Moore
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Source: Embassy and Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3903 Date: October 14, 1932

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
(Combat)

Subjects: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Military Tribunals.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. OCT 24 1932

1. The evening press of October 15, 1932, announced that the Superior Military Tribunal had confirmed the sentences which were imposed by Military Court Martial, on July 7, 1932, upon Mrs. Mariana de la Torre de Mendoza, her son, Ignacio Mendoza de la Torre, Luis Perez Hernandez and Francisco Corrons Canalejo for their complicity in the frustrated attempt of June 10, 1932, upon the life of President Machado. (Report No. 3838, indices 3600-a and 6300-c, dated July 8, 1932.) Mrs. Mendoza's pardon by the President and her immediate departure for the United States for permanent residence were covered in report No. 3874, indices 3600-a and 3110-a, dated August 23, 1932.

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2. Except for Mrs. Mendoza, the convicted persons named, with the addition of Mrs. Mercedes Morales Corrons, are under trial by Court Martial at Artemisa, Province of Pinar del Rio, on charges of having been complicated in sending bombs to various military functionaries on May 20, 1932, one of which killed Lieutenant Diaz Diez, military commander at Artemisa. Interest in this case is heightened by the recent arrest of one Jose Antonio Mora, a mechanic called the "Cuban Edison", who has long been sought by the military and police. His statements are said definitely to incriminate, not only the present accused, but others still fugitives from justice, and definitely to link the principal bombing outrages of the terroristic campaign against the Government. Suspension of the Artemisa trial is probable, pending consideration of this new and important evidence and the inclusion of additional defendants.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By: V. Moore
Clerk.

Source: Embassy and
Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3909 Date: October 18, 1932.

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 24 1932

1. No terroristic acts have been mentioned in the press or have otherwise came to the attention of the observer since the last report of this series. Outwardly, the state of suppressed expectation and nervous tension which has been evident since the violent incidents of September 27th appears to have abated somewhat.

2. Sufficient progress has been made by the police in their investigations of the Vasquez Bello murder to permit announcement to be published. Apparently largely through the accident which compelled the assassins to abandon one of the automobiles used, definite identification of certain participants is said to have been possible. Although the principals have not been apprehended, several arrests of suspects or alleged accomplices are reported to have been made and the murder car, with two others which were used to cover its escape, are now in the hands of the police. The success which has attended this investigation, as well as the uncovering of important information apparently fixing responsibility for the major bomb outrages of 1932, naturally has acted as a deterrent upon the person or group directing the campaign of terrorism in Cuba.

3. The vigilance over persons departing from Cuba is increasingly severe. According to a report published on October 14th and which has not been denied, the Secretary of State on that date announced the temporary suspension of the issuance of passports to Cubans. The military commandant of Habana, attempting explanation of the obstacles put in the way of issuance of the requisite military embarkation permits to foreigners, states that particular suspicion attaches to the continuous exchange of Cuban-Americans between Florida and Habana. To prevent clandestine departure by small vessels, the Cuban Navy is maintaining a patrol of the north coast west of Habana.

4. It is not without significance that the judicial investigations of the murders of Miguel Aguiar and the three Freyre de Andrade brothers have been fruitless, whereas such marked progress has been made in the Vasquez Bello case. It is generally rumored that there is no lack of witnesses whose evidence would be of value, but that fear deters them from voluntarily appearing to give testimony.

5. The temporary restoration of Constitutional Guarantees in contemplation of the elections of November 1, has thus far been without effect upon the existing situation. Civilians arrested prior to October 15th and held at the disposition of the military authorities remain in apparently the same status, while others ordered released on writs of habeas corpus have been rearrested and placed at the disposal of the military authorities. To judge by the precedent set by the Military Court Martial at Artemisa, which has suspended activities until November 2 because of the "necessity for its members' return to active duty during the electoral period", it is intended that military trial of civilians shall be immediately resumed after November 1. During the brief period in which the Guarantees are restored it is remote that capable attorneys may be found having the courage to sue out writs of habeas corpus under existing conditions, and impossible

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that such attorneys exist in sufficient number to handle the large number of cases which call for such treatment.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

By V Moore, clm 9

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3910 Date: October 18,1932.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 25 1932

1. There has been no change in the political situation since the last report of this series. The Government continues to report tranquility throughout the island, except for scattered acts of violence concerned strictly with the approaching elections. The theoretical restoration of the Constitutional Guarantees has had no noticeable practical effect.

2. The persons thus far accused by the judicial police in the Vasquez Bello murder case appear to be youths between the ages of twenty and thirty, educated at the University of Habana, or in the United States, and having good family connections. The police statement, as given wide publicity in the press, names ten direct participants, and speaks of financial support of the conspirators from sources in the United States. Rewards have been posted for information leading to the arrest of the fugitives named.

3. The special judge appointed to investigate the retaliatory murders of Miguel Aguiar and the Freyre de Andrade brothers remitted the records of his investigations to the Court of Appeals with a report to the effect that it had been impossible to discover the identity of the assassins! There can be no question but that the action of the special judge was instructed; and the public indignation at this miscarriage of justice, although the result was freely predicted and expected, has ample justification.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By: V. Moore
Clerk.

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3911 Date: October 21, 1932.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

THE SECRETARY OF WAR DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS RADIO AS FOLLOWS:
ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS
if answer is unnecessary.
If answer is NOT SENT WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON MUST BE STATED.
C. H. BRIDGES,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

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TAG V

Code- **RADIOGRAM**

JJ
CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

Received at the War Department.
September 28, 1932. 153
11:30 A. M.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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From M. A. Havana

To The Adjutant General.

WM 13

Number 40. September 28th.

See State Department's cable number 103 and 104 dated September 27th and 105 today regarding recent developments Cuban political situation.

O'Hare.

FORM NO. 0 635-3-A.G.O.
ED. MAY 15, 1922.

X INDICATES RADIO ROUTED FOR ACTION; ✓ FOR INFORMATION

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
(Combat)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Military Tribunals.

Verdict in Col.Carlos Mendieta's Case.

1. The press of October 25, 1932, reported that the Supreme Court of Cuba had denied an unconstitutionality appeal filed by Dr. Pedro Herrera Sotolongo against Military Order No. 427, dated October 15, 1900, the effect of which decision was to sustain the previous rejection by the Court of Appeals ("Audiencia") of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in favor of Colonel Carlos Mendieta.

2. Since the arrest of Colonel Mendieta, with Colonel Mendez Penate, on May 23, 1932, on charges of conspiracy against the Government, he has been incarcerated in the Isle of Pines prison except for a brief interval of transfer to Principe Prison in Habana, when he was permitted to receive "selected" visitors. Dr. Pedro Herrera Sotolongo, himself a prominent member of the Opposition, was unsuccessful in his attempt to sue out a writ of habeas corpus before the Audiencia under Article II of the said Habeas Corpus Order of 1900, the Courts rejecting his petition on the technical ground that the writ had not been sought by the interested party himself.

3. Dr. Herrera Sotolongo next instituted unconstitutionality proceedings before the Supreme Court, maintaining that Article II of Military Order No. 427 is a violation of Article 20 of the Constitution, which guarantees Cuban citizens their civil rights, including the right of defense and trial by jury. The Supreme Court's decision denied the alleged incompatability of the Order and the Constitution, but is said to have stated that the Audiencia was in error in refusing the writ on the grounds above given.

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4. Dr. Herrera Sotolongo's success in unconstitutionality proceedings will be recalled in previous reported cases. Articles I and IV of the so-called Law of Military Jurisdiction of February 17, 1932, were declared by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and the transitory provisions thereof which gave that Law retroactive effect were declared null and void as a result of his efforts in the case of Antonio Mendieta, a youth who had been tried by Court Martial under charges of having placed a bomb in LaSalle College. (See report No. 3778, indices as above, dated May 19, 1932.) He had successfully instituted unconstitutionality proceedings in the "University Cases" which compelled the theoretical reopening of the University of Habana and the restoration of its faculty. (See reports Nos. 3772, 3837 and 3850, dated May 11, July 8 and July 21, 1932, index 2500-c.)

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5. There is probably direct connection between Dr. Herrera Sotolongo's embarrassing legal activities on behalf of the Opposition

From M. A., Havana No. 3912 Date: October 25, 1932.

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and his subsequent arrest and incarceration. Upon the recent temporary restoration of Constitutional Guarantees he was successful in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from the Civil Courts. No charges existing against him, he was ordered released on October 24, 1932, and immediately hastened to depart for "Europe". His expressed intention, however, was to join the growing group of Opposition leaders gathered in New York.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By: V. Moore,
Clerk

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3912 Date: October 27, 1932

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

General Situation.

1. The cessation of acts of violence and terrorism continues. Deterrents acting upon the terroristic element of the Opposition would be the certainty, already effectively demonstrated, of multiplied reprisals in kind, and the lesson of the apparent success of the authorities in discovering the identity of the group or groups responsible for the Vasquez Bello murder and for the major bomb outrages and in tracing such acts to a possible common origin. That the campaign of violence will be resumed is certain. The Government reports present tranquility throughout the Republic.

2. The Government is practically exclusively occupied with problems connected with the elections of November 1, 1932. There is no absence of rumors that the day will be made the signal for general disorders, and every effort is being made by the Government to forestall such a possibility.

3. Eleven persons have been indicted by the Court of Instruction at Marianao in the Vasquez Bello murder case, only one of whom has thus far been apprehended.

4. The name of Dr. Alfredo Belt should be added to the list of refugees who have successfully sought asylum in diplomatic missions at Habana. When notified by the Panaman Minister in accordance with diplomatic custom, the Secretary of State is reported to have said that, inasmuch as no charges against Dr. Belt existed, he could not be considered as a political refugee. Confidentially, Dr. Belt is believed to be under no suspicion of being the leader of the organization known as the "A.B.C.", and the reason for his flight to the Panaman Legation was probably terror of possible reprisals at the hands of Vasquez Bello partisans. Except for Carlos Manuel de la Cruz, one of the guests of the Uruguayan Legation, whose departure from Cuba has been permitted, the cases of the Oppositionists whose recourse to diplomatic asylum was reported in report No. 3899, index as above, dated October 7, 1932, remain without resolution.

5. Since the temporary restoration of the Constitutional Guarantees, no success has attended petitions to the Civil Courts for writs of habeas corpus made by or on behalf of persons who are held at the disposition of the military authorities, except in the case of Dr. Pedro Herrera Sotolongo. (See report No. 3912, index as above, dated October 26, 1932.) Denials of such writs on October 25, 1932, by the Audiencia of Habana, were reported in the cases of Roberto Gonzalez de Mendoza y de la Torre and of Alfredo Pequeno Mejias.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

By: T. Moore, Clerk.

Source: Embassy and Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3916 Date: October 28, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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1932 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
NOV 3600-a 156
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 8TH 1932

General Situation

1. Bombings were resumed on October 29th after almost a month of respite. On that day a "white-wings" was killed when he innocently exploded a disguised bomb which had been left along the curb in the Vedado residential section of Habana presumably in the hope that the suspicious packet would be investigated by the explosives expert of the police. The following night a small bomb was exploded in the garden of a primary school in the Vedado, without causing casualties. Another small bomb, evidently intended to incite terror rather than for fatal effect, was exploded in the window of a theatre at Santa Clara during a performance on the night of November 1st. It is the opinion of the military that these occurrences, without apparent direction against selected individuals, are to be construed as notification to the authorities that acts of terrorism may be expected to continue in spite of their late success in identifying persons allegedly responsible for previous outrages.

2. On November 1st the police suddenly raided some sixty residences in the Vedado, announcing for publicity that the searches had been made in connection with a newly-discovered revolutionary plot. The Embassy has been confidentially informed, however, that the police were seeking the fugitives who are under indictment in the Vazquez-Bello murder case who were rumored to be concealed in the homes of friends of the Opposition in Habana. The raids were fruitless; indeed, it was said to have been discovered that many of the owners had abandoned their homes. It is generally believed that most of those sought by the authorities in the Vazauez-Bello case have succeeded in escaping from Cuba, presumably to the United States. Vigilance over departures, however, has been strengthened.

3. The suspension of Constitutional Guarantees, which had by Presidential Decree been restored for the electoral period, October 15 to November 1, 1932, automatically again became effective at midnight of November 1st. Previous reports have mentioned petitions to the Civil Courts for writs of habeas corpus during the period of restoration of the guarantees. A further case, reported by the press from Santiago de Cuba on October 29th, concerns the refusal of the Military Commander to honor a request of the Court of Appeals for presentation of certain prisoners in whose favor writs of habeas corpus had been presented. Although the Court is reported to have convened to insist upon its authority to command the presentation of the prisoners, presumably the Military Commander found means to delay compliance until the guarantees were again suspended on November 2nd.

4. The Military Court at Artemisa, which suspended its sittings in the trial of the persons accused of sending bombs to various military functionaries on May 20, 1932, for the period corresponding to that of the restoration of Constitutional Guarantees, resumed hearings in the case on November 2, 1932.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache
By V. Moore, Clerk.

Source: Press
From M. A., Havana No. 3925 Date: Nov. 4, 1932

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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~~Confidential:~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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CUBA (Social)
(Political) 5-1

Subjects: Propaganda of Foreign Origin.

Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Communistic Activities:

1. The police have announced through the press their belief that a death-blow has been dealt to the Communistic element in Cuba supported by the "Third International" of Moscow. The facts are that a raid was made by the police which is believed finally to have discovered at Habana the central headquarters of the Communistic Party of Cuba and of the Cuban headquarters of the so-called International Labor Defence. A printing and mimeographing plant was seized, together with thousands of proclamations, numerous incriminating documents and valuable records. Three persons, all Poles, were taken in the raids and other arrests are expected to follow. In accordance with established custom, the aliens will be summarily deported.

2. The Government continues to insist upon the gravity of the "Communist" menace in Cuba, and has confidentially informed the Embassy that steps are being taken to organize a special corps under the direction of the military to deal with this problem.

3. As to "Communistic" participation in the repeated acts of terrorism which have disturbed the Cuban scene for the past two years, there is apparently a present tendency on the part of the authorities to depreciate the influence of this element and to emphasize the responsibility of the "left" University group and of the younger element of the political Opposition, possibly directed bymature leaders of responsible social and political affiliations. The previous theory of union or of close cooperation between the "Communists" and the political element seeking the Administration's overthrow by recourse to terroristic activities appears to have been shaken, although there is reluctance to admit the lack at least of loose connection between these organizations.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By: J. Moore.
Lieut.

Source: Embassy, Press, and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3927 Date: Nov. 8, 1932.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 15 1932

1. There has been no recurrence of acts of terrorism since the isolated bombings of October 29 - November 1, as already reported. The Government reports tranquility throughout the island, disregarding as of purely local import several reported cases of recourse to firearms during political alterations arising out of the recent partial elections.

2. The landing of seven Cubans from an open boat at Key West, Florida, on November 8, 1932, has caused considerable excitement in higher Government circles. Police have been sent to Key West to identify these persons, who are suspected of connection with the Vazquez Bello murder. Extradition proceedings will be instituted in the case.

3. CONFIDENTIAL

Chiefs of diplomatic missions at Habana have received copies of a communication alleged to have been addressed to the American Embassy by the "A.B.C.", the secret organization of the Opposition, stating that the President and Arsenio Ortiz would be assassinated within a week and that, if intervention by the United States should not result therefrom, the British and German Ministers would be murdered in turn in order to compel intervention.

Classified
By authority of
1503, Executive
By
Date

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By:

Source: Embassy and Press

From M. A., Havana No. 3933 Date: Nov. 11, 1932.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 2 8 1932

General Situation.

1. The activities of all agencies of the Government have been concentrated upon the problems presented by the cyclone of November 9, 1932. (See report No. 3934, index 2700-a, dated November 15, 1932). The President and the higher Cabinet officers visited the devastated areas, abandoning temporarily the elaborate precautions taken at Habana against public acts of assassins.

2. The public mind, stunned by the magnitude of the catastrophe in the eastern provinces, appears further to have been diverted thereby from the condition of inflammable tension created by the events of September 27, 1932. No act definitely attributable to terrorists has been reported since November 1, 1932, although the murder of a member of the "Expert Police" on the streets of Habana on the night of the 15th is irresponsibly rumored to have disposed of one of the so-called death squad, whose services were employed in despatching the Freyre de Andrade brothers on September 27th. The police appear to be unable to decide between the Opposition and a usual murder founded in an unlawful "affaire d'amour".

3. No apparent success has attended the efforts of the Government to apprehend the persons under indictment in the Vazquez-Bello murder case. According to the press, the seven persons who were detained at Key West, Florida, on November 8th were ordered released by the United States Commissioner, who is said to have ruled that the evidence presented by the Cuban Government was insufficient to prove their complicity in the crime. According to Cuban authorities, all seven were suspected of terroristic activities and had been under police surveillance therefor; the police are unconvinced that two of the group were not participants in the Vazquez-Bello affair.

4. The cases of the refugees sheltered in various Embassies and Legations at Habana remain as previously reported.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press

By: J. J. O'Hare
Mil Att.

From M. A., Havana No. 3937 Date: Nov. 17, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 2 1932

1. The attention of the Government is still being concentrated on the problems incident to the cyclone of November 9, 1932. All of the Government leaders have returned from their tours of inspection of the stricken areas, and are now attempting to do something of a constructive nature toward the relief of the sufferers.

2. As to be expected, each political leader is attempting to get the most possible aid from the Government and other sources for his particular constituency. The relief measures thus far adopted are entirely inadequate to meet the needs, and already rumors of misappropriation of the funds subscribed by private donations are being heard.

3. The American Legion Post in Havana has been particularly active in the relief work, with particular attention being paid to the sufferers in the town of La Gloria, Province of Camaguey, whose population is almost entirely composed of Americans who have been there in the fruit business for many years. The response to the Legion's appeal for help has been especially gratifying, and the reconstruction of the town, which was practically wiped out, has been reported to have been progressing in a very satisfactory manner.

4. On November 21st. the Senate voted a donation of $50,000 for the reconstruction of the town of Santa Cruz del Sur, Camaguey Province, which was completely wiped out by the cyclone. When this bill reached the House of Representatives on the same day, an amendment was passed,raising this amount to $100,000, with the proviso that a portion of this money be used to benefit the town of Camajuani, Province of Camaguey. This bill has not yet become law.

5. The status of the various Cubans who sought asylum in the foreign Embassies and Legations a few months ago was changed on November 22nd. by the departure for Europe, with the Government's consent, of Dr. Ricardo Dolz, Rector of the University of Havana, who had been a refugee in the Mexican Embassy. On the same day, Mario Menocal Moreno and Gabriel Menocal Moreno returned to their homes from the Spanish Embassy. When they left the Embassy, Dr. Ferrara, Secretary of State, issued a statement to the press in which he stated: "These two men will not be molested in any way, as there never have been any political or judicial charges against them."

6. On November 22nd. Angel Vasquez Bello, warden of Santa Clara Prison and brother of the late Clemente Vasquez Bello, slain President of the Cuban Senate, was murdered by his brother-in-law, Dr. Ricardo Rodriguez Martinez, at a family reunion in the city of Santa Clara. As an example of the strict Government censorship of the press, all the Spanish and English language papers of November 23rd. carried the story as one of suicide, and it was not until a day later that the public were informed of the assassination. While the Opposition elements claim that this murder was the result of political differences between the two, the Government's version was that it was the work of a maniac in a dispute over a purely personal matter.

From M. A., Havana No. 3939 Dated: Nov. 25, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

7. On November 22nd. Colonels Carlos Mendieta and Roberto Mendez Penate, Opposition leaders, were returned to Havana from the national penitentiary on the Isle of Pines, and were immediately incarcerated in the Principe Prison. This is the second time that these two men have been returned to Havana since their arrest on May 23, 1932, when the Government made wholesale arrests of the Opposition leaders as the result of information in its possession to the effect that a revolution was in the offing. Unconfirmed reports have it that these two leaders will be released from prison within the next few days.

8. President Machado, in a recent press interview, intimated that within a short period of time he would attempt to restore the Constitutional Guarantees which have been suspended throughout the island, except for brief periods, for the past two years. In his statement he is quoted as having said: "I hate to see Cubans behind the jail bars. My Government did not want to suspend Constitutional Guarantees, but I was forced to sanction the decree when it was necessary to protect life and property. As soon as I learn that the country will return to its normal standing, I will then restore the rights of the inhabitants of this beautiful island."

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contact, Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 3939 Nov. 25, 1932.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 6 1932

1. The political situation in Cuba remains unchanged. The public mind has apparently recovered from the shock of the recent cyclone and is now concentrated on the political situation of the country. Unfounded rumors of various events that are supposed to happen in the near future are heard daily. The principal one of these, which has caused widespread attraction, is that the United States Government is going to intervene and take over the reins of the Government. As an example of how firmly rooted this ridiculous rumor has become, a high government official recently asked a Cuban newspaper owner if he could ascertain the veracity of this through his personal friendship with members of the Embassy staff.

2. On November 28th, the War Department announced that the four persons (Ignacio Mendoza de la Torre, Francisco Corrons Canalejo, Luis Perez Hernandez, and Mrs. Mercedes Morales de Corrons) who had been accused of sending the bomb which killed Lieutenant Diez Diaz on May 20th last, were found guilty by the Court Martial at Artemisa, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was approved by the War Department, and will not have to be reviewed by the Superior War Council. It will be recalled that the three men involved were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in connection with the attempted killing of President Machado on June 10, 1932.

3. The celebration of Students' Day on November 27th, in commemoration of the eight students who were put to death by the Spanish authorities sixty-one years ago, passed without any serious disorders either in Havana or the provinces. The Government took extraordinary measures to prevent any demonstrations, and only a few arrests were reported.

4. In another statement to the press, President Machado stated that he expects to release about eighty political prisoners in the near future. As a forerunner of this statement, he released, on November 25th, Colonel Lico Balan, the military leader of the revolutionary force of August, 1931. He further stated that he was very well satisfied with the results of his last amnesty of political prisoners, only twelve of whom had been rearrested since their release. It must be added, however, that many of them left Cuba for the United States immediately after their release, and it is expected that a similar exodus will follow this amnesty.

J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press, and Personal Contact.

Note: At 11:20 A.M. today, President Machado released Colonels Roberto Mendez Penate and Carlos Mendieta, Opposition leaders, who were returned to Havana from the Isle of Pines prison on November 22nd. At the same time, he released sixty-six other political prisoners.

J. O'H.

From M.A., Havana No.3942 Date: Nov. 29, 1932.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. DEC 7 1932

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

1. That the Government is once more attempting to bring about a "rapprochment" between the Opposition elements and itself is demonstrated by the recent acts on its part, described below:

(a) On November 29th, in addition to releasing a great number of political prisoners, President Machado signed a decree terminating the duties of thirty-three military supervisors in various localities.

(b) By executive decree of December 1st, Constitutional Guarantees were restored throughout the island, with the exception of the Province of Habana. At the time of the issuance of this decree, the President stated that he hoped that conditions would soon permit him to restore the guarantees in Habana. He further stated: "I know that my government has opponents. It is natural and normal in every democratic regime. The Cubans who form the Opposition have the same rights, and will enjoy the same guarantees as the rest. They must also consider themselves obligated to the peace and public order. For the good of the country, it would be most patriotic that they should unite, accepting the responsibilities of an opposing party, within the law. I do not pretend to dictate standards nor give advice to anyone, but by doing thus they would serve the interests of Cuba, to which we are all obliged."

2. While the acts described above should have an excellent effect on the public, it is doubtful, in my mind, if anything the Government might do, other than the President's resignation, followed by a general election, can bring about a real spirit of "cordiality" between the two elements.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3947 Date: December 2, 1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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DEC 15 1932
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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

1. Political conditions in Cuba, since the last report on this subject, are summarized as follows:

(a) On December 3rd. the Government released fourteen more political prisoners, thus bringing the total released in the past two weeks to eighty-two.

(b) On December 6th, an attempt to kill Major Arsenio Ortiz, former Military Supervisor of Santiago de Cuba, whose alleged acts of violence during the spring of 1931 brought him into the public eye, failed, when three Cuban youths whose ages range from seventeen to twenty years, attacked him with rifle and pistol fire in Marianao. Major Ortiz, accompanied by two Cuban soldiers, was on his way, in an automobile, to visit his son, a student at Belen College. As he was about to turn off the main road into the College grounds, he was warned by a passer-by that the small car which followed him contained a machine gun. Almost immediately, fire broke out from both cars, and a running duel ensued, which lasted for about a mile and ended only when the assailants' car turned over.

Neither Major Ortiz nor the two soldiers accompanying him were wounded. Two of the youths and the chauffeur of the attacking car were severely wounded, and one escaped when the automobile "turned turtle".

This attack was very evidently one of inexperienced youths and cannot be connected with the successful assassinations of Captain Calvo and Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bello.

(c) Mrs. Mariana de la Torre y Mendoza, who was convicted by a Court-Martial for her participation in the plot to assassinate President Machado on June 10th last, and was later pardoned, returned to Havana on December 6th. It is reliably reported that the Government allowed her to return to Cuba for a short time, on account of the sickness of one of her sons. (It was erroneously reported in paragraph two of report No. 3942, index as above, dated November 29, 1932, that her son and co-conspirators were sentenced to life-imprisonment by an Army Court-Martial at Artemisa. The three men were sentenced to death, and the woman to life imprisonment. This error was due to the first reports published by the press, which were not corrected for several days.)

(d) On December 7th, President Machado made his first public appearance in some time, the occasion being the ceremonies in commemoration of the death of the great Cuban patriot, Maceo. During the ceremonies he is quoted as having said, in part: "I have neither censure nor rancor for anyone. Let us return to lawful ground and see who is right. If it be they, I will submit: if not, I will ask them to submit. Here before the tomb of Maceo, I pledge myself, TYRANNY NEVER, LIBERTY FOREVER."

(e) Just before midnight on the night of December 8th, Public School No. 12, located on San Lazaro Street in the downtown section of

From M. A., Havana No. 3952 Date: December 9, 1932.

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Havana, was badly wrecked by a bomb thrown by unidentified persons. This is the first instance of bomb-throwing since November 1st. last.

2. From its definite acts for the past two weeks, it is evident that the Government is in a conciliatory frame of mind, but it is also very clear that certain elements of the Opposition, notably the radical student group, are not in a receptive mood for anything the Government has to offer.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Embassy and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3952 Date: December 9,1932.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

DEC 22 1932 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 21 1932

1. The following are the developments in the political situation in Cuba during the past week:

(a) On December 11th, four persons were injured when a large bomb exploded in a park in the central part of the City of Santa Clara while a band concert was in progress. Another bomb exploded in an office building in the same city on the evening of December 14th, and while no one was injured, the building itself was considerably damaged.

(b) Miguel Angel Quevedo, director of Bohemia, a comic weekly, was arrested on December 10th and all of last week's number of the magazine was confiscated by the police. In explaining the arrest the Secretary of the Interior stated that it was made because Quevedo was opposing the desires of the President to establish peace and cordiality in Cuba, and that he did not intend to allow anyone to obstruct the President's patriotic intention to enable the Cuban people to live in peace and order.

(c) On December 14th, Herbert C. Wilford, son of the editor of the English language daily, Havana American News, was tried by a Court Martial for his alleged complicity in the bombing, on August 30th, of the home of Captain Mansip, Chief of Police of Marianao, who was killed by a bomb on September 7th. Young Wilford has been incarcerated for the past three months, and his father has been carrying on a very strong campaign for his release. It will be recalled that the elder Wilford was deported from Cuba on January 16th, 1931, and was allowed to return in January of the present year. The result of the Court Martial has not yet been made public, but the press, basing its opinion on the evidence introduced, expects an acquittal.

(d) Changes in the Constitution, about which there was so much discussion about two and a half years ago, are again being discussed, and it has been intimated that the Government is now willing to make all the changes that were originally sought by the Opposition.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3959 Date: December 16, 1932.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 28 1932

1. While the general political situation in Cuba is, from outward appearances, as tranquil as it has been at any time during the past two years, certain happenings during the past week indicate that the breach between the Government and the Opposition groups is far from healed.

2. Early in the morning of December 17th, a large bomb exploded in the building occupied by the Department of Sanitation in lower Havana, causing considerable damage to the building but, on account of the time of the explosion, no one was injured.

3. As predicted, Herbert C. Wilford was acquitted on December 17th by a General Court Martial of the charge of complicity in the bombing on August 30, 1932, of the home of Captain Mansip, former Chief of Police of Marianao.

4. The three young men who attempted to assinate Major Arsenio Ortiz on December 6th were indicted by the civil courts on December 19th, and will be brought to trial at sometime in the near future. Major Ortiz has been subjected to severe criticism by the Opposition for his part in the affray, their claim being that after the car in which his assailants were riding had overturned and the occupants were in no position to defend themselves, he deliberately attempted to assassinate them.

5. Because he gave the Opposition's view of the attempted slaying of Major Ortiz in his paper, El Sol, a Marianao daily, Cesar San Pedro, the owner, was arrested on December 18th, and is being held at the Principe prison at the disposition of the Army authorities.

6. On December 18th, Miguel Quevedo, publisher of Bohemia, whose arrest was reported in the last report on this subject, was released from confinement.

7. All the Cubans who have been under the protection of the embassies and legations in Havana have left their places of asylum. Many of them went to the United States to swell the ranks of President Machado's opponents now domiciled there.

J. T. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press, and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No.3968 Date: December 23, 1932

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4-1 JAN WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 10 1933

1. That there can be no such thing as cordiality between the Government and the Opposition, so often talked about by various leaders of both groups, until there is a radical change in the attitude of certain elements of these groups, is clearly demonstrated by the acts of violence described below. As stated in previous reports, the radical student element will never accept anything that the Government might offer other than the President's resignation. Both sides, in the meantime, are so embittered against each other that reprisals, with complete disregard of the law and human life, continue unabated, each killing by one side resulting in an immediate killing of one or more persons on the other side.

(a) On the night of December 22, 1932, Julio Perez, son of a former mayor of San Antonio de los Banos, Havana Province, was killed, and one soldier was severely wounded in a raid which was made upon a house in Vibora, a suburb of Havana. The authorities stated that two hundred pounds of dynamite, a machine gun and other military supplies were captured by them during the raid. According to the official version of the shooting, information had been gained by the Army that there would be a movement of dynamite to a house in Vibora, and that the Rural Guards arrived just as several sacks containing dynamite were being deposited in the house where Perez was subsequently killed. The authorities further state that upon the arrival of the Rural Guards, Perez immediately opened fire upon them and that in the ensuing battle he was killed.

(b) On December 30, 1932, an attempt was made by three young men on the life of Detective Sergeant Rafael Castro. This officer was the constant companion of Captain Calvo, Chief of Detectives, whose murder last July 9th was followed by many reprisals against persons identified with the Opposition to the Machado Administration. According to popular belief, Castro has carried out or supervised many of the killings during the past year and is said to have been one of the party that murdered the three Freyre de Andrade brothers after the assassination of Dr. Clemente Vasquez-Bello on September 27, 1932.

According to the press reports of the incident, Castro was riding in an automobile in the central part of the City when he observed that he was being followed by three men in another car. He descended from his car and mounted the running board of the other, preparatory to arresting the occupants. One of the others, however, pushed Castro into the street and the occupants of the car opened fire on him, wounding him in the chest and arm. Policemen in the vicinity, attracted by the shots, pursued the automobile but were unable to overtake it. A by-stander informed them that one of the fugitives had entered a certain house. A search of the house resulted in the arrest of one Mario Gonzalez Rubiera, an eighteen year old student from Santiago de Cuba, former member of the Student Directorate of the Havana Institute, who was said by the police to have been implicated in subversive activities during recent months.

Rubiera was identified as one of the occupants of the car. He admitted that he had been a passenger, but denied having had any

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knowledge of or participation in the attack. His explanation, as reported, was most unsatisfactory, and he was retained by the police. Later in the day, Rubiera's body, riddled with bullets, was found lying in the street in Miramar, a suburb of Havana. According to the press' version of his death, Rubiera stated in his declaration that some of the persons implicated in the attack on Castro lived in Miramar. The police conducted him there in an automobile and when the car was passing the corner of 15th and 6th Streets, he tried to escape and was, consequently, fired upon by his custodians.

A photograph published by El Pais on December 31, showed Rubiera's half-naked body lying on the ground with his feet close together and apparently bound by a strip of cloth. Whether or not this furnished confirmation of the generally accepted belief that Rubiera was killed by the police in cold-blood, the admitted circumstances would seem to indicate it as an excellent example of the application of the "ley de fuga."

Rubiera's companions have apparently made good their escape, although the newspapers report that a considerable number of arrests have been made.

Sergeant Castro is reported to be in no danger of dying as a result of his wounds.

(c) On January 3rd. a mutilated body, later identified as that of Francisco Rafael Cepero, was found by two American tourists on the corner of 12th and G Streets in Almendares. Tied to the hand of the dead man was a tag bearing the inscription "The A.B.C. will mete this death to all whose tongues are too long."

Cepero, a former member of the disbanded Special Public Works' special police, was the man who gave warning to Major Arsenio Ortiz when he was about to be attacked, on December 6, 1932, by four young students. This warning enabled Major Ortiz to shoot first, and resulted in the capture of three of his assailants and mortally wounding one of them, Argelio Puig Jordan, who died on December 26th.

(d) On January 4th, Angel Alvarez, a former student of the University, was killed by the police after his arrest when he "attempted to escape from their custody." Police say that Alvarez was a member of the A.B.C. organization and that he was arrested in connection with the killing of Captain Calvo on July 9th.

The death of Alvarez is precisely similar to that of Rubiera referred to above. Both victims are said to have offered to give information as to the whereabouts of their accomplices and to have attempted to escape from the automobiles in which they were being guarded by the police.

2. The events of the past ten days, as reported herein, have caused a feeling of uneasiness and apprehension throughout the City. Many members of the Opposition have appealed to the Embassy for protection, fearing that the members of their families, especially boys of the student age, will meet the same fate as did Rubiera and Alvarez.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3977 Date: January 6, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

3600-a

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 1 1933

1. A brief resume of political happenings in Cuba since the last report on this subject follows:

(a) On January 6th, Colonels Carlos Mendieta, Mendez Penate and Aurelio Hevia, Opposition leaders, took refuge in the Mexican Embassy. They considered themselves in danger of immediate arrest and were fearful that in case of the assassination by students of some prominent member of the Government that they might be objects of reprisals.

(b) On the night of January 14th, a bomb exploded in the city of Santa Clara in the home of a municipal policeman, causing considerable damage. This officer, one Pedro Over, had been credited with the killing of a man in Santa Clara on the night of January 10th, during a labor demonstration.

(c) On the night of January 15th, a student by the name of Marianao Gonzalez Gutierrez, age twenty, was killed by the police.

According to the official and only published version of this incident, the police were fired upon by three persons when they attempted to seize a motor truck loaded with arms and ammunition which had been discovered in a garage in the Cerro district of the City. The police returned the fire and Gonzalez Gutierrez fell mortally wounded. This story is at variance with that told by residents of the neighborhood where the truck was captured. They affirm that Gonzalez Gutierrez was arrested during the afternoon following a spectacular pursuit, the inference being that he was subsequently taken to the garage by his captors and there put to death. It is also said that when the body was turned over to the boy's mother it was found that the wrists were badly scarred as if by bonds.

Although born in Cuba, Gonzalez Gutierrez appears to have been a citizen of Spain by reason of the Spanish nationality of his parents. The press reported that the Spanish Charge d' Affairs has requested an investigation of the matter.

(d) On January 17th, the Supreme Court confirmed the eight-year present sentence of Antonio Mendieta, nephew of the Opposition leader, who had been convicted of placing a bomb in La Salle College on November 1, 1931. (See report No. 3778, index Nos. 6300-c and 3600-a, dated May 19, 1932.)

2. During the past two weeks a superficial calmness has reigned over Cuba, and while no outward manifestations have been reported, there is no indication that any political truce between the Government and the Opposition is in the offing.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Press and Personal Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 3992 Date: January 31, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
5600-a 168
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 28 1933

1. During the past few weeks there has been no perceptible change in the political situation in Cuba. In fact, from all outward appearances, everything is as tranquil as it has been for sometime past. Havana is now crowded with winter tourists. It had been expected that the radical elements of the Opposition, in order to attract comment from the press of the United States, would institute a new campaign of bomb-throwing during this period. However, with the exception of the explosion of a bomb of the noise-making variety in Havana on the night of February 20th, no disturbances of the public peace have been reported.

2. On February 13th, Mrs. Mercedes Morales de Corrons, who was convicted for her complicity in the death of Lieutenant Diez Diaz on May 20th, last, was pardoned by the President and left Cuba for the United States. On the same day, the police arrested several members of one of the largest law firms in Havana for their alleged participation in subversive activities.

3. On February 18th, Colonels Carlos Mendieta, Mendez Penate and Aurelio Hevia, who took refuge in the Mexican Embassy on January 6, 1933, left Cuba, presumably for Miami, Florida.

4. During the past few weeks the New York press has devoted considerable space to Cuban affairs. The staff correspondent of the New York Times, whose presence in Cuba was previously reported, wrote an extremely interesting, and, in general, accurate series of articles on the Cuban situation. Only in one instance did he, in my opinion, make an obviously exaggerated report of conditions, and that was in quoting the number of murders by the Government as having exceeded a hundred. Even members of the Opposition find it difficult to place this figure above forty. As a contrast to this series, some of the American dailies have printed grossly inaccurate and absurd stories, one of them, the New York Herald-Tribune going so far as to state, about a week ago, that three columns of revolutionists were actually approaching Havana. In addition to this, great capital has been made of the burning of sugar cane. At this time of the year there are always a number of cane fires throughout the Island, but from official and private sources it has been ascertained that these fires thus far this year are much below the usual average.

5. By the above it is not intended to convey the impression that the situation has in any way improved. On the contrary, it is constantly getting worse, and what was thought to be the "breaking point" between the Government and the Opposition has long since passed. However, the entire problem seems to revolve itself around the financial condition of both sides. On the one hand, the Government has exhausted all available means, and then some, to meet its foreign obligations and to prevent itself from falling any more in arrears in its payments to public employees, especially the armed forces. How it can possibly meet further obligations is unknown, as revenues are falling considerably behind expenses, and it is known that the loyalty of the armed forces depends to a large extent upon the regular receipt of its salaries.

From M. A., Havana No. 4011 Date: February 21, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

The Opposition, on the other hand, is known to be bending every effort to collect funds for the "cause". While reports continue to the effect that they are meeting with considerable success in the North, it is rather difficult, in view of the financial situation in the United States and the miserable failure of the August, 1931 revolution, to place too much credence in these reports.

6. Another unsolved problem insofar as the Opposition is concerned, is that, as yet, no real leader has emerged from the scramble for leadership. All the elements of the Opposition are still united in one cause - the ousting of President Machado - but should this be accomplished, it is doubted if they would remain united under the leadership of any of the present "chieftains". While at the present General Mario Menocal is the self-appointed leader of the largest group of Oppositionists, it is very much doubted that, in the event of a successful revolution, he would be able to gain and keep control of the various elements. Each of the other leaders has his own following, none of whom would be willing to submerge their personal ambitions to Menocal's leadership.

W. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Press and Personal
Contact.

From M. A., Havana No. 4011 Date: February 21, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

3600-a

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 7 1933
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167
WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAR 7 1933

1. The superficial tranquility that has existed in Cuba for some time came to an abrupt ending about four days ago when elements of the Opposition inaugurated a new series of terrorist activities, described below:

(a) On the night of February 23rd, the eve of Cuba's national holiday commemorating the "Grito de Baire", eight bombs were exploded in Havana. Most of these were of the noise-making variety, causing no property damage nor injuries to persons. However, one large bomb which was set off in the Partagas Cigar Factory caused considerable damage to that building.

(b) On the same night, the police raided the building occupied by the Y.M.C.A. in Havana, and seized a quantity of arms, including a machine gun of German manufacture, an automatic rifle, an automatic shotgun, five other shotguns, three of which were double-barreled, a Winchester rifle, and several pistols and revolvers. A large quantity of ammunition was also confiscated. The literature seized at the time indicates that the Y.M.C.A. has been used as the headquarters of a group known as the "Thirteen", a branch of the "A.B.C.", the terrorist wing of the Opposition. Several arrests were made after the raid, including the secretary of the local Y.M.C.A.

(c) On the night of February 24th, a raid on a house at 144 San Rafael Street, in the downtown section of Havana, resulted in the arrest of eight youths, alleged members of the "A.B.C." organization, and the confiscation of a large quantity of dynamite, arms and ammunition. According to the Government, all of the youths arrested have police records, and have taken part in the activities of the radical student element during the past two years.

(d) Activities of the Opposition elements in the provinces are given below:

1. On February 23rd. a group of about seven men entered the barracks of the Rural Guards at Central San Antonio in Oriente Province, under the guise of seeking first aid for one of the group who feigned sickness. After gaining entrance, they brandished guns and demanded arms and ammunition. At the time, there were only two soldiers present. One of them jumped out of a window and immediately opened fire on the intruders. The seven men left after a brief exchange of fire. The automobile in which they were traveling was recovered, and the blood stains in it indicated that at least one of the attackers was wounded. The Government agents claim that they know these men, all residents of Guatanamo, and expect their early apprehension.

2. On February 23rd, telephone and telegraph wires were cut in various parts of the country, mostly in Camaguey and Santa Clara, causing the interruption of wire service between Santiago and Havana for three days.

From M. A., Havana No. 4013 Date: February 28,1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

3. For the past week a group of about twenty outlaws have been operating near the boundary of the provinces of Santa Clara and Camaguey, with headquarters at or near the little town of Guadalupe. They have been burning cane fields and destroying property. While the Rural Guards have had some skirmishes with them, none have yet been captured. The War Department has assigned additional Rural Guards to the area of their operations, and expect their immediate capture.

4. There were four railroad accidents during the period February 23 - 27. The most serious one occurred on the night of February 26th, between Esperanza and Santa Clara, and resulted in the death of the locomotive engineer and fireman. The others occurred in Colorado, Coliseo, and on the road between Puerto Tarafa and Ciego de Avila. In each case, excepting the one at Coliseo where a bomb was used to blow up the track, the spikes holding the tracks were taken out at a switch, causing the derailment of the train. (A separate report will be rendered on this subject.)

2. Nothing concerning the activities described above, with the exception of the police raids in Havana, have appeared in the press. This outburst of terrorist activities has caused an extreme mental tension in all branches of Cuban society. As yet no retaliatory acts by the Government have been reported. The Government's view on the present activities of the Opposition is that its leaders are bending every effort to focus the attention of the incoming American Administration on Cuba.

Source: Personal Contact and
Press

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

From M. A., Havana No. 4013 Date: February 28,1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 8 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 8 1933

2657-G-330/169

1. With reference to the railroad accidents briefly reported in paragraph 1 d-4 of report No. 4013, index as above, dated February 28, 1933, the following is submitted:

(a) On the night of February 23rd. a switch and a culvert in Colorado, a small town in Camaguey Province, were destroyed, causing the derailment of a train. The damage to the train was slight, and the accident caused very little interruption of service.

(b) On the same night, a train was derailed between Puerto Tarafa and Ciego de Avila. This was caused by the loosening of spikes of the rails at a switch. The train was going very slowly, and very little damage resulted.

(c) At 2:20 A.M. on February 25th, a locomotive and three baggage cars of the Havana-Santiago express train were derailed near the town of Coloseo, Matanzas Province, injuring a trainman and destroying about 400 meters of road bed. This derailment was caused by the explosion of a large bomb which spread the rails.

(d) At 9:45 P.M. on February 26th, a freight train was derailed between Esperanza and Santa Clara. The locomotive engineer and fireman were killed, and the locomotive and the first two freight cars turned over and were damaged beyond repair. This accident was caused by the removal of the spikes from the rails at a switch.

(e) Just prior to the arrival of the Santiago-Havana express train at 5:20 P.M. on the 26th, railroad inspectors found the rail loosened at a switch near the town of Elance Retamal, and were thus able to prevent what might have been a very serious accident.

2. The railroad companies and the authorities are united in the belief that the accidents described above were a part of the terrorist program of the Opposition.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 4019 Date: March 3, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
3600-A WAR DEPARTMENT 171

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 13 1933

1. A brief resume of acts affecting the Cuban political situation during the past week follows:

(a) At 10:00 A.M. on February 28th, a truck containing about one hundred pounds of dynamite and scrap iron was found parked in front of the Central Police Station of Havana. A time fuse was set for 10:15 A.M. The police state that had the truck not been discovered in time, the force of the explosion would have resulted in the complete destruction of the building.

(b) On March 2nd. a bomb exploded in the second floor apartment of Dr. Armando Menendez, an employee of the Treasury Department, residing at 39 Manrique Street, in the downtown section of Havana, destroying most of the furniture and windows in his home, and throwing the neighborhood into a panic. Menendez, his wife, and eight children were in the apartment at the time of the explosion, but none of them were injured.

(c) The outlaws who had been operating near the boundaries of the provinces of Santa Clara and Camaguey, were surprised and routed by Rural Guards on the night of March 3rd. near Moron, Province of Santa Clara. One of the outlaws was killed and several were wounded. The chief of this band has signified his willingness to surrender to the Government, and orders were issued today to accept his surrender and to send him to Havana for trial.

(d) A band of about twelve men, who have been operating for the past week between Guantanamo and Baracoa, Province of Oriente, were disbursed by the Rural Guards on March 5th. They left most of their arms and ammunition, and the authorities now believe that they have returned to their homes.

(e) Several bombs, none of which have resulted in injury to persons, have exploded in the Province of Santa Clara during the past week. The most serious of these exploded in the moving picture theatre in Moron on the night of March 5th. Fortunately, the explosion occurred just after the audience had left. It completely destroyed the balcony of the theatre.

(f) Small bombs of the noise-making variety were placed in two moving picture theatres of Havana on the night of March 5th, but caused no injury to persons nor damage to property.

2. While the situation is not even approaching a solution, the authorities seem to be much more optimistic than they have been for some time. They had expected demonstrations on March 4th, and were prepared to meet any emergency. One report that had gained sufficient headway as to cause the Government to warn the Embassy of it, was that a group of the radical element of the Opposition had planned an anti-Government demonstration in which they were going to carry American flags, under the guise of celebrating the inauguration of President Roosevelt, and thus gain favorable comment from the press of the United States, when dispersed by the authorities. Nothing of this nature happened, and no incidents, either in Havana nor the provinces, were reported.

J. J. O'Hare,
Major General Staff,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy and
Personal Contact

From M.A., Havana No.4022 Date: Mar. 7,1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(16) AG 000.2 Cuba (3-3-33)

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MAR 17 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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172

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS AREA
Office of the Corps Area Commander
Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia.

March 3, 1933.

Subject: State of affairs in the Republic of Cuba.

SECRET
WTB
Colonel, AGD,
Adj. General

To: The Adjutant General
Washington, D. C.

1. One of my staff officers has recently returned from Key West, Florida, where he was on legislative furlough from February 4th to 22d inclusive.

2. This officer has informed me that all classes of both the American and Cuban population of this city are deeply concerned and generally excited about the state of affairs obtaining in the Republic of Cuba. He says that a veritable stream of Cuban refugees are passing through the port of Key West and that a local organization of Cubans is said to be assigning these refugees to groups that are being organized at many different points around the Gulf Coast of the United States and Mexico. Such groups are said to be in existence in Miami, Tampa, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston.

3. Mendieta passed through Key West on Monday, February 20th and was said to have been on his way to Miami for a conference with Menocal. At this time Mendieta gave out a lengthy statement to the local press in which he vividly pictured the outrages that are being perpetrated by the present government, and he gave assurance that present conditions would not continue for long. The majority of the local colony of Cubans hailed Mendieta as the next President of Cuba.

4. On February 21st a prominent American business man of Key West informed this officer of my staff that he had just returned from Washington where he had a conference with a high official of the Cuban Government and who informed him that his government could not hold out much longer in the face of the rapidly increasing strength of the opposition. This same American business man said at this time that he had just had a conversation with a Cuban Government official in Key West, who confirmed the opinion expressed by the high official of his government in Washington.

(signed) EDW. L. KING,

Edw. L. King,
Major General, Commanding.

16 Received A.G.O. Mar. 6, 1933

(2 copies to M.P.W., G.N.I. & State
2 " retained in h/a Seat.)

SECRET

Original returned to A.G.O. 3/8/33, Thru G-2 Exec. Off. ars

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAR 30 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-S-330
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mam

GRAY

HABANA

Dated September 27, 1932

Rec'd 5:15 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

103, September 27, 4 pm

Clemente Vazquez Bello, President of Cuban Senate and of Liberal Party was shot and killed by unknown persons early this afternoon in Country Club Park while returning to his home from the Habana yacht club. His assassins escaped in an automobile. Fifty-four slugs were extracted from his body after death occurred at Camp Columbia hospital. Circumstances of crime so closely resemble those which attended murder of Captain Calvo, chief of detectives, last July that authorities believe same persons involved. This crime has caused great excitement and will probably be followed by wholesale arrests.

Vazquez Bello was regarded as a likely candidate for the Presidency to succeed Machado but for some time past there had been an increasing coolness in his relations with the president.

REED

CSB

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAR 30 1938
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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mam

GRAY

HABANA

Dated September 27, 1932

Rec'd 7:40 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

104, September 27, 5 pm

My telegram No. 103, September 27, 4 pm

I am reliably informed that a number of Oppositionists including Freyre de Andrade, Conservative Deputy and one of his brothers have been killed and others including Miguel Aguiar, close friend of Menocal, have been severely wounded. Those would appear to be acts of reprisal by partisans of Vazquez Bello. Other well known adversaries of the Government are reported to be seeking refuge in foreign diplomatic missions but none has yet applied to Embassy.

OX

REED

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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DEPT OF STATE
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RSP

GRAY
Havana
Dated September 28, 1932
Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

105, September 28, 10 a.m.

My numbers 103, September 27, 4 p.m.; and 104, September 27, 5 p.m.

Following murder of Vazquez Bello, Representative Freyrede Andrade and his two brothers were shot to death in their home in Vedado by seven unidentified persons. Aguiar another conservative representative was shot by two unknown persons, his condition is critical.

Confidential. It is possible that Vazquez Bello was murdered by disgruntled members of his party but I incline to the belief that terrorist element of opposition is responsible. I see no reason to change my opinion that other murders were acts of reprisal by partisans of Vazquez Bello.

REED

CSB

WSB

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 12 1933
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2657-S-330
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G-2.Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 11 1933

1. There has been very little change in the political situation in Cuba since the last report on this subject. The Constitutional Guarantees are still suspended in the Province of Havana. In the other provinces normal constitutional procedure prevails in theory, but the practice of bringing to Havana persons arrested on charges of a political nature and the tendency of the military authorities to arrogate to themselves functions which really belong to the civil officials, seem to warrant the inference that the restoration of the Constitutional Guarantees has made very little change in conditions. Military supervisors have been assigned to most of the important cities in the Island from which they were withdrawn at the time Constitutional Guarantees were established.

2. There have been several bomb explosions during the past month although it is impossible to estimate the number, as reports of this nature are not made public.

3. On March 11th, Leopoldo Fernandez Ros, formerly assistant chief of the "Porra", was killed in the down-town section of Havana in broad daylight as he was about to enter an automobile. It was thought that some retaliatory killings would follow, but none have been reported.

4. At the present time, due to the death of Juan Gualberto Gomez, there is no accredited leader of the Opposition in Cuba. As a result of this, most of the news pertaining to the activities of the Opposition is sent out either from New York or Miami.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Retiring Military Attache

Source: Personal Contacts
and Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 4048 Date: April 6, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 15 1933

1. According to information furnished from sources believed to be reliable, there were several killings in and near Habana on the night of April 6th.

2. Lieutenant Pau, Military Supervisor of Cuanabocoa, was shot and mortally wounded while returning from Habana. The persons firing the shots are as yet unidentified. Rural guards arriving on the scene are said to have fired indiscriminately at the first group of persons they encountered, seriously wounding or killing three villagers whose curiosity had been attracted by the shots. Policemen along the road into Habana unsuccessfully endeavored to stop an automobile believed to have been the car used by Pau's assassins. One policeman is reported to have been killed and another wounded by the occupants of this automobile.

3. In the meantime, according to the Embassy's informants, the Secret Police arrested a young man named Carlos Manuel Fuertes outside of the Payret Theatre in Habana. Fuertes is said to have been a member of the student directorate and to have been in hiding in the theatre for several months past. Later on during the night his body was found near the Eremita de las Catalinas on Ayesteran Street. It is also reported that the police arrested one Charles Pemberton, believed to be an American citizen, son of the owner of the Payret Theatre. Pemberton is accused of having sheltered Fuertes, who was wanted in connection with the murder of Vasquez Bello, former President of the Senate, and another youth named Ildefonso or Mario Alvarez. Pemberton was "released" for two days, which means that he has been given an opportunity to leave the country.

4. There were bomb explosions in Habana and Santa Clara on the night of April 6th. In Habana three persons were injured. In Santa Clara the bomb did considerable damage to the principal hotel and killed one person.

5. None of the above incidents were reported in the local press.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 4051 Date: April 10,1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date

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APR 26 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-S-330
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G-2 Report

WAR DEPARTMENT
3600-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 24 1933

Recent Subversive Activities

1. On April 9th the military authorities of Havana gave instructions to arrest two sergeants and one corporal belonging to the 5th Battery of Artillery stationed in Vedado, a suburb of Havana, on suspicion of being involved in a local communistic plot. One of the sergeants while being placed under arrest, Sergeant Hernandez by name, attempted to escape and seriously wounded, with a hatchet, one of the non-commissioned officers of the detachment sent to make the arrest. Sergeant Hernandez was shot and seriously wounded. Although the military authorities have informed the undersigned that the three non-commissioned officers who were placed under arrest were involved in communistic activities, it has also been stated by civilians that these three soldiers were under suspicion of complicity in the murder of Lieutenant Pau, a few days before, a report of whose death was given in report No. 4051, index as above, dated April 10, 1933.

2. On the morning of April 13th, a bomb exploded close to the residence of Dr. Orestes Ferrara, Secretary of State, killing a small boy aged three and seriously wounding a man. This bomb was hidden in an abandoned push-cart and was probably intended for Dr. Ferrara's new and very ostentatious house near the University.

3. There were other bomb explosions on the night of April 13th, variously estimated at from eleven to seventeen, in different parts of the City, including two churches, a theatre and several schools. A few persons are reported to have been injured but information regarding their number and the extent of their injuries is not available.

4. According to the local correspondent of the New York Times, who claims to have been an eye-witness, the "ley de fuga" was applied by the police yesterday afternoon to two young men, whom, he states, were shot down in the Vedado section of Habana. General Lores states that these students were largely responsible for the recent bombings, as bombs similar to those used on April 13th were found in their rooms.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
(Brig.Gen.E.Lores,
A.C,of S,Cuban Army;
other contacts civilian.)

From M. A., Havana No. 4055 Date: April 17, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS AREA
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
FORT McPHERSON, ATLANTA GEORGIA

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1933, from TAGO to Archivist
By [illegible]
Date 4-2-71

April 28, 1933.

Colonel Wm. H. Wilson, General Staff,
G-2 Section, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Wilson:-

Attached is a report recently received on the Cuban situation.

In this connection, a telegram received at this headquarters today from the Adjutant General of Florida stated that the National Guard Armory at Sanford was burglarized on April 27 and seventy-five pistols and a quantity of ammunition were taken.

Sincerely,

R. M. HOWELL,
Major, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl.
Report on Cuban situation.

RECEIVED
RECORD SECTION
M. I. D.
1933 MAY - 1 - PM 2:04

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copy to: State, ONI, WPD + and CA (for 1st Dist.) 5/4/33
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Executive Officer G/2 W.D. MAY 2 1933

Showed to Col. Waldum, Militia Bureau.
P.C.P

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

~~SECRET~~

2-1 2657-B-330

A RECENT REPORT ON THE CUBAN SITUATION

"From confidential sources believed to be authoritative and above reproach, but the course of which cannot be disclosed, as such would prevent further information being secured, I have reason to believe that on or about May first, or a very short time thereafter, that is within two or three weeks at the outside, ~~that~~ there is grave and serious danger of wide spread property damage and destruction in Cuba.

"It has been definitely ascertained that a completely organized Revolutionary Junta has been organized, and is functioning, and represents an exceedingly large following.

"It has also been definitely learned that this Junta has fairly strong control of the populace at large throughout Cuba, and for some weeks past has been more or less holding the general situation in hand, keeping down disorder and outbreaks on its pledges to work out a solution within a given time; and that for the success of their plans disorders and outbreaks must not occur.

"This Junta is not seeking, nor does it desire intervention by the United States, but some very small factions do so desire, and such disorders as have occurred are largely attributable to this source.

"The allotted time for carrying out certain plans of the Junta is soon to expire, and with the present indications that it will be unable to keep its pledges because of failure to successfully and properly finance its intended plans. Should this happen, - and it seems now to be doomed to meet that result, (my source of information reliably indicates) - then the heretofore control of the populace will be abandoned with possible instructions to 'start some fire works.' In this event I am informed that wide spread and serious property damage will result, with the liklihood of some loss of life.

"My information is that unless new developments for carrying out plans of the Junta are quickly reached, hope, to a considerable degree will be abandoned for the present, and matters will be permitted to take whatever course they may ensue - with the avowed purpose and intention behind it all to rid the country of what is termed by the Junta 'Machado's Gangster Regime.'"

Enel

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

A RECENT REPORT ON THE CUBAN SITUATION.

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CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By NNE 4-3-71
Date

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 1 1933

Organization of New Political Party

1. Under the direction of General Alberto Asbert, former Governor of Havana Province, a new political party known as "Renovacion Nacionalista" or National Renovation, has been organized and duly registered with and sanctioned by the Supreme Electoral Council of Cuba.

2. Delegations of this party are now being organized in Matanzas, Camaguey and Oriente, to be followed by the establishment of similar headquarters in all other sections of the island, according to General Asbert.

3. The main headquarters of this political organization have been established at 154 San Miguel Street, this City. General Asbert has personally taken charge of the registration of voters and, according to the latest available information, a large number of people have alrsady become affiliated with the new organization.

4. The return of General Asbert to active politics after a lapse of more than twelve years since he was Governor of Havana Province, has been the subject of varied conjectures.

5. The purpose of this party, according to Asbert, is to organize a so-called "legal" organ of opposition to the party in power, no matter which one happens to control the destinies of the country. As stated by General Asbert "in every democracy there must exist a government and an opposition to check and express constructive criticism on its work. This is strictly the purpose of "Renovacion Nacionalista." He added the remark that one of the major purposes of the organization was to uphold and defend Cuba's constitution.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4065 Date: April 26, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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MAY 10 1933
2657-G-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 10 1933

1. On April 29th a band of approximately sixty revolutionists armed with rifles and two machine guns, captured the town of San Luis about fifteen miles north of Santiago, Province of Oriente. These revolutionists captured about 100 Springfield rifles and a quantity of ammunition from the local garrison of Rural Guards, who were surprised while grooming their horses.

2. About eighty-five of the young men of the town joined the revolutionists, who issued to them the captured arms and ammunition. The band with its recruits split up into four groups, three of which retreated to the mountains toward the north. The fourth group which consisted of about twenty-five men remained in the town to disrupt the telegraph and telephone lines. However, they were surprised in this attempt and driven off by a detachment of Rural Guards which arrived from Palma Soriano.

3. The Rural Guards took into custody and placed in jail in Santiago several of the fathers and brothers of the young men who joined the revolutionists. A later report states that four of these hostages were killed while attempting to escape.

4. During the short action at San Luis there were several casualties. Among those killed was the Chief of Police of the town.

5. The Government report of this affair makes no mention of the capture of the arms and ammunition, nor of any of the young men of the town joining the revolutionists. Since this affair, the situation in Oriente has quieted down.

6. Havana has been singularly quiet since the naming of Mr.Sumner Welles as Ambassador to Cuba. Prior to the announcement in the local press regarding his appointment, bombs were not only a daily occurrence but appeared to be increasing in intensity, with the usual prompt retaliatory action by the Government.

7. Contrary to expectations, the Labor holiday of May 1st. passed without any subversive activities, and the entire Island was reported to be very quiet. President Machado, meeting with a selected delegation of labor representatives on May 1st. told his visitors that he would continue in power until 1935, and counted on the concurrence of labor in his policies. On a petition submitted by the labor delegation, the President ordered the immediate liberation of a number of laborers who had been detained by the authorities on various minor charges.

T. N. Gimpelling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 4074 Date: May 5, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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IN REPLY REFER TO:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA
OFFICE OF THE CORPS AREA COMMANDER

WAR DEPARTMENT
GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

May 15, 1933.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Notes on the New York Cuban Junta.

The attached report was voluntarily submitted to this office, and is forwarded for any value it may have.

A. C. SANDEFORD,
Major, F. A. (DOL),
Ass't. A. C. of S., G-

1 Incl.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE NY CUBAN JUNTA. MAY 16 1939

During the past winter when I was obtaining information in NYC on Gun Running for a contemplated article, the following bits of intelligence were gleaned which are submitted for such value as they have.

1. I met a Doctor Gomez and his secretary a Mr. Enriquez. Dr. Gomez does not talk English very well, but Enriquez speaks it fluently, being educated at Cornell. They stated that they had acquired all the arms and ammunition that they needed for their proposed revolution in Cuba, but they still lack sufficient funds to pay salaries as well as to charter ships. They already have one ship on which their arms have been loaded and shipped out, but they need one or two other smaller ones for the personnel. Apparently, they are in need of officers for their army. So far, they have done quite a bit of business with some German soldiers of fortune, but the Cubans do not seem to be able to get along with them. Consequently, these Germans are about to be eased out of the CRA (Cuban Revolutionary Army). Hence, they have turned to Americans. Incidentally, there is a group of White Russians in Harlem who want to join the CRA, but the Cubans do not trust them.

2. About a month ago, the Cubans were issuing propaganda to their American recruits that the President was behind their move. The basis of this rumor were the supposed interviews between a Cuban named Torriente (or de la Torre -- I couldn't get the name straight) and the President himself.

3. I believe that the ship carrying the Cuban arms is the same one that was loaded with arms to go to Mexico last fall during the Guadalajara trouble. In fact, one American soldier of fortune who oversaw the loading of this ship loaded 1500 Russian rifles that he had an interest in. This was to the great disgust of one of the Mexican leaders, Guion, who went to Europe a few months ago where he is supposed to have visited the Vatican. Incidentally, Russian rifles are the trash of the arms trade. These 1500 rifles were disposed of in Central America, probably Honduras, last winter. The remainder of the arms are being held for the Cubans.

4. It is believed that there is some sort of an agreement between the Mexican junta under Guion and the Cubans. That is, if the Cuban junta succeeds in displacing Machado, they will support any Mexican revolutionary activities on Cuban soil insofar as equipping and training men are concerned. When Menocal visited NYC a few months ago, an American soldier of fortune inadverdently "crashed" one of these interviews much to the great disgust of Guion (the American was an employee of his).

5. The arms that the Cubans intend using are Springfield rifles, automatic rifles, and Browning Machine guns.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6. The Cuban junta will attempt to gain control of the province of Oriente in their first landing or drive. They state that the present guerrilla tactics are nothing more or less than a smoke-screen to keep the Machadistas worried. Also, these present guerrilla tactics in Oriente afford an excellent means of keeping alive the revolutionary spirit in Cuba as well as to train men for the field.

7. The Cuban junta seems to be particularly worried about the six crack troops (approximate number only) that are stationed in the capitals of the various provinces. These troops, two hundred strong --- cavalry, are armed with six heavy machine guns. The CRA seems more worried about these troops than the rest of the Cuban regular army stationed in Oriente.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

G-2 FOR CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 19 1933
2657-2-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2/2657-Q-330

CONFIDENTIAL.

May 17, 1933.

Subject: Report on Cuban Junta in New York.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Second Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. Your confidential memorandum of May 15, 1933, inclosing a report on the Cuban Junta in New York is of considerable interest. We note that you have not attempted to evaluate it.

2. If you can divulge the name, occupation and antecedents of your informant we may have a line on him down here which will enable us to evaluate it and hence render the report of further value.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

Mailed G/2 W.D. MAY 18 1933

WM. H. WILSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.

cp

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAY 1933 MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-g-330

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3600-a/84

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 20 1933

1. After two weeks of comparative tranquility in Cuba, a band of about eighty revolutionists swooped down on the town of Taguasco near the eastern border of Santa Clara Province about 8:50 A.M. May 15th. They cut the telegraph and telephone lines on both sides of the town and disrupted rail communications. After a short skirmish with the Rural Guards the band retired toward the town of Jatibonica. Rail and wire communications were resumed later in the day.

2. On the evening of May 14th, a small band of approximately twenty revolutionists attacked the Rural Guard detachment on the outskirts of the town of Sancti Spiritus, about fifteen miles from Taguasco. Several men were killed on each side.

3. The undersigned received information of the Taguasco affair a few minutes after it had occurred, through a very reliable and important civilian contact. Later in the day while discussing the affair with officials of the Cuban Army the latter admitted that there are several, probably six, small bands of revolutionists operating in Santa Clara and Oriente Provinces, and that the attack on San Luis on April 29th (see report No. 4074, index as above, dated May 5, 1933), and Taguasco on May 15th, were made by two of these small bands.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 4093 Date: May 16, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 9 1933
2657-S-330
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
(Governmental Recognition and Action

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 9 1933

Maintenance of Public Peace and Order:

1. According to the official bulletin released on the morning of June 3, 1933, by the General Staff of the Army, several skirmishes between rebel bands and armed forces of the Government were registered in the Province of Santa Clara during the past twenty-four hours.

Forces under the command of Lieutenant Bacallao surprised a rebel camp at Finca Linares, near Bellamota, Santa Clara, and dispersed the group after inflicting heavy casualties and confiscating large quantities of arms and ammunition. After a small skirmish with the army the rebels fled to the woods, but are being relentlessly pursued by Lieutenant Bacallao's forces, according to the dispatch received at Army headquarters in Habana.

Another band of rebels fell into a trap set by the force of Lieutenant Ibargollin at Estancia del Monte, in the same province, where the federal troops killed Enrique Hernandez Pereira, alleged leader of the band, and confiscated arms and ammunition left on the field by the rebels after the clash.

Other minor skirmishes between the National Army and rebels throughout Santa Clara have been registered, according to the official communique.

2. On June 4, 1933, a police raid of the Dodge Brothers building in Habana resulted in the confiscation of a number of rifles, ammunition, shot-guns, army tents, first-aid packets and other items of military supply.

A Dodge and a Marmon car were found in the building which are alleged to have been used by terrorists during the attempt to kill Sergeant Balmaseda of the Habana police.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 4107 Date: June 5, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-B-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
(Governmental Recognition and Action)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1933

Political Activities during the Week of May 26--June 2:

1. There were few important political developments during the week under review. On May 26 the Government, after a lapse of seven or eight days, again began to order the gradual release of political prisoners. An unexploded bomb was found in one of the Habana churches on May 28, and early in the morning of June 1 three powerful infernal machines were discovered within a block of the 10th Police Station in the Vedado and rendered harmless. With these exceptions there were no indications of terroristic activities during the week. As a matter of fact, there is good reason to believe that the members of the A. B. C. and O. C. R. R. have been instructed by their chiefs to desist from such activities for the time being.

2. Major Arsenio Ortiz was relieved of his command in Santa Clara as a result of an investigation of his allegedly atrocious conduct in suppressing insurrectionary activities in that province. The situation there and elsewhere in the island is reported as quiet, although several groups of malcontents, including that led by Juan Blas Hernandez in southern Santa Clara, are still at large.

3. The situation in Congress remains unchanged. It appears that at the time the Law of Electoral Validation went into effect a great many appeals had already been granted or were pending in circumstances to which the law could not apply, and that the number of these was sufficient further to delay the seating of candidates whose elections had been contested. In numerous districts, notably in Santa Clara Province, new elections have been ordered to take place in June.

4. The disorganized Conservative Party has been showing renewed signs of life during the week. Daily conferences of party leaders are reported to have been held in the Senate offices, and it is understood that a serious attempt is being made to conciliate the dissident factions of the party with a view to presenting a united front in the presidential elections of 1934. However, it would seem that these discussions have not yet achieved much in the way of definite results, as the Habana delegation of Conservative members of the House has thus far declined to participate in the meetings.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy files

From M. A., Havana No. 4110 Date: June 8, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

3600-a

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

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CUBA (Political) 182

Subject: {Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 17 1933

Press Statement by a Leader of the Opposition:

1. Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, one of the charter members of the Nationalist movement and former Cuban Ambassador to Washington, gave his views to the press on June 9, 1933, as to the solution of the Cuban political situation. He declares against violence and advocates a settlement of the political problems by a conference between the Government and the leaders of the opposition, first seeking to enlist the American Government as a mediator to act in case an agreement is not reached between the two elements.

Dr. de la Torriente's statement, in part, is as follows:

"I have always been opposed to certain of the provisions of the Permanent Treaty which govern the political relations between the two nations (Cuba and the United States), principally to the right of intervention which the United States reserved to itself by Article third of the Platt Amendment, quoted textually in the said treaty. My opposition is due to my conviction that this provision has so educated the Cuban people that frequently both governors and governed have appealed to the Government at the White House to settle our political crises, with more or less success depending upon the person who might at the time be presiding over the great nation of Washington and Roosevelt....

"Up until now the United States has not wished to apply the Permanent Treaty in this unhappy conflict, the most serious which in its short independent life has divided the Cuban people and which commenced with the beginning of the constitutional reform; but this attitude on the part of the United States does not imply that the treaty no longer exists, nor that it is not in force, because what is happening is that the treaty is inactive....

"The constant agitation amidst which we are living, with its sequel of all kinds of violence, will, as I indicated above, whether or not the present American administration desires it and whether the Cubans accept or reject it, bring us some day through anarchy to intervention, because of the international engagements of the United States, the Paris Treaty of Peace which ended the war with Spain, the Monroe Doctrine, the necessity of protecting the interests of its nationals and of seeing to it that equal protection is given to those of other foreigners, in order to prevent that the said Monroe Doctrine should suffer as the result of the intervention in Cuba of some other non-American power. If, instead of this constant agitation, the opposition, whether impelled thereto by the Government and its supporters or because many of the members of the opposition desire it, appeals as a last resort to a new revolution in order to implant the program

From M. A., Havana No. 4114 Date: June 13, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

which the unsuccessful revolution of August, 1931, failed to impose on their adversaries, Cuba will run a serious risk of incurring another foreign intervention similar to that of 1906, at the time of the revolution against Estrada Palma, no matter whether the success of the movement threatens to sweep away with fire and sword the entire existing regime or whether it degenerates into an interminable civil war.

"....in accordance with my usual line of conduct on any occasion when the case may arise, just as I would recommend acceptance of the mediation of any Cubans of authority or of any foreign representative authorized to offer it, so will I accept with the greatest pleasure the good offices and the mediation, official or unofficial, of the United States whenever two apparently irreconcilable factions, regardless of the one with which I might be connected, may not be able to settle their difficulties amicably between themselves and for that reason threaten to bring about the intervention provided for in the Permanent Treaty....

"I read on May 27 the 'Impressions' of my good friend, Dr. Rivero, the editor of the Diario de la Marina, wherein he reported his conversation with General Machado and in which, among other words, the following appeared: 'I wish that they would discuss with me, like good Cubans, around a table. If we were to have a discussion without prejudices, I believe that I should convince them; but if. on the contrary, they convinced me, believe me that they would save themselves from the hardships of exile and they would spare the country the effects of the prolonged agitation from which it is suffering; I would go to my home with my conscience clear of all blame.'

"These phrases of President Machado refer to his present political opponents and, as I am one of them, although there are others more important, I wish to state, with the freedom with which I always proceed in all my actions in fundamental questions affecting Cuba, that I have for a long time--since the end of 1931, or perhaps since even before that--maintained that the only way for Cuba to emerge successfully from her present difficulties is for the most moderate members of each group, those who are freest from passions and those who have in no way suffered, in their own persons or in those of their relatives or dear friends, or in their own interests, the effects of the political cyclone which has for so long been scourging us, to discuss among themselves, or through one or several representatives, all our hitherto insoluble public problems in order to solve them in the manner which Cuba requires of her leading men.

"Accordingly, General Machado must realize that when two or more persons are seeking through discussions a final adjustment of their conflicts, the only way to prevent the effort from being in vain lies in a previous agreement that when they do not find an appropriate solution on certain

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

points they must, in order to avoid finding themselves in a blind alley, agree in advance to have a reputable person, in whom both parties have confidence, prepared by his mediation and counsel to bring them to a final agreement.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Souce: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 4114 Date: June 13, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By letter of Dec. 18,
1969 GO to Archivist
24-2-71

G-2 Report ~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
G-2 INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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CUBA (Political) 5-1

Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
(Governmental Recognition and Action

2657-9-58

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 20 1933

Current Political Conditions:

1. The immediate political situation in Cuba appears more tranquil than in many months. Unquestionably the above is due to the efforts of the American Ambassador, and, although the plan which the Ambassador hopes to achieve is not known to the undersigned, it is becoming daily more apparent that a very definite constructive policy is being tactfully but steadfastly unfolded with a view to the ultimate relief of the present Cuban economic and political situations.

2. It is believed that a suspension of anti-Government activities by the opposition has been agreed upon; this is probably of temporary duration, but is necessary in order to permit of an undisturbed study and solution of the problem. It is further believed, from a study of recent political statements, that constructive political reforms will probably be forthcoming. It may be accepted as a statement of fact that the opposition will not agree to the domination of Machado or of his clique indefinitely; that is to say, they will oppose Machado's remaining in office until the expiration of his present term, which expires May 20, 1935; likewise they are determined to prevent any partisan of Machado from succeeding him in office. It is my belief that a material improvement of the present economic distress will relieve to some extent the political unrest, but it will not remove the political and personal hatreds; so, therefore, I consider that political peace can only be obtained by the removal of Machado from office within the ensuing few months. The plan to re-establish the Vice Presidency and place in this office a man of integrity, acceptable to both the Government and Opposition, as has been recently announced by Machado, appears to be one of the most important steps towards an orderly and peaceful solution. I believe that this step will be accomplished within the next few months, and that immediately following the election of a Vice President Machado will resign.

3. It is to be expected that those in political power today in Cuba will withdraw only with reluctance, and many obstacles may be presented to prevent or delay their exit; however, no practical solution of the problem can be found except by this means. Taxes today are imposed upon practically everything that can be taxed, and, although the 1932-33 Budget shows slightly less than $10,000,000 available to the Army and Navy, it is believed that a much larger sum is actually expended on National Defense, or, to be more exact, on the maintenance in power of a military government.

Two months ago the situation seemed to be almost desperate; a revolution appeared to be in the offing and immediate and complete American intervention the only hope. Today there is a pronounced and constantly increasing evidence of optimistic hope among not only well-informed Americans, but among many Cubans.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal observation

From M. A., Havana No. 4115 Date: June 16, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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5-1 Copies sent to Miss Blackwell 89 Boston 50 cw P/C

CUBA (Political)

Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
(Governmental Recognition and Action

Local Press Comment on Statement of Dr. Cosme de la Torriente:

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUN 20 1933

1. The local press generally approves the recent statement made by Dr. Cosme de la Torriente (Report No. 4114, June 13, 1933). Dr. Torriente is a diplomat by training, which accounts for the use of 2,000 words in a statement which may be summed up as follows:

> "I believe the political situation in Cuba has reached a state that makes it impossible for the Cubans themselves to solve it. While I am unalterably opposed to the United States fulfilling its obligations under the Platt Amendment, I believe it absolutely necessary for the Washington Government to interpose in the solution of the present political impasse in order that Cuba may be saved from the throes of anarchy."

The Director of "Diario de la Marina" endorses Dr. Torriente's statement with the comment that

> "Perhaps Dr. Torriente may not be crying in the wilderness, as many Cubans are beginning to perceive that the program of revolution can be carried out more easily without than with a revolution; that a revolution would probably not accomplish more than its primary goal, viz., imprisonment and slaughter of the present Government officials and its partisans, but it would present the appearance of complete anarchy, which would engender an American military dictatorship; that mediation carries the germ of civilization and implies profound respect for citizenship; and that it is the only way in which the situation can be normalized without sullying citizenship honor: that revolution is the last recourse and is unwarranted if an opportunity to obtain the justice demanded is offered."

The "Havana-American News" carries a Miami despatch dated June 13 which indicates that the Cuban Revolutionary Board has declared a month's truce in revolutionary activities to assist Ambassador Welles in solving Cuba's economic and political problems. It also states that a representative of General Menocal was sent from Miami to Cuba last week to urge insurgents in the field to cease activities for a time. "El Mundo" and the other newspapers contain articles which state that Congressman Wilfredo Albanes' visit to Miami and New York will result in further political conciliation and the return to Cuba of many members of the opposition. All elements interested in the national problem appear to have reached a patriotic agreement, and a committee of the Cuban Revolutionary Board is working along the lines of the recent declaration of Dr. Cosme de la Torriente.

From M. A., Havana No. 4117 Date: June 16, 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2. It is stated that Professor Howard Lee McBain, who has been invited by President Machado to assist in modifying the Electoral Code, will arrive in Habana June 26. It is the opinion that the present General Election Laws, which are the work of General Crowder, are suitable and practicable for Cuba, and it is believed that General Crowder's Election Laws, if applied fairly, would serve with no need for further revision.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and personal observation

From M. A., Havana No. 4117 Date: June 16, 1933

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
(Governmental Recognition and Action

Acceptance of Plan of Mediation by Oppositionists

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 23 1933

1. Practically every important sector of the Cuban opposition to the present administration has agreed to accept the friendly mediation of Sumner Welles, the United States Ambassador to Cuba.

University and high school professors, who signed the protest made in 1930, since which time the university and high schools have been closed, accepted the plan of mediation on June 19, 1933, with the understanding that it is not intervention, but "the equitable and friendly mediation of the representative of a friendly nation."

Shortly after the "Organizacion Celular Radical Revolucionaria," a powerful group in the files of the opposition, accepted with the stipulation that they would withdraw their co-operation should the negotiations for a friendly solution of Cuba's political problems continue for too long a time.

The A. B. C., another opposition organization which has been so actively engaged in opposing the administration, accepted several days ago, and it is believed only a matter of time before General Mario Menocal, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez, and other members of the revolutionary "junta" in the United States as well as the student group accede to the popular clamor for uniform action in settling the problems.

Dr. Wilfredo Albanes, one of the leaders of the lower house, who is regarded as an outstanding member of the opposition, and who returned Sunday from a conference in Miami with Menocal, said on June 19 that Menocal has informed him that he would not stand in the way of a peaceful solution of the Cuban difficulties. He warned against the placing of confidence in "notices received from far away," explaining that it was not infrequent for friends of the members of the "junta" to explain what they thought another person might think on a subject.

Albanes added that whether or not the revolutionary "junta" in the United States should be dissolved, he, who "knows the patriotism which it inspires in its members, knows that they are amenable to reason and logic and that Menocal is willing to settle the differences, and that, therefore, they cannot refuse the friendly mediation of Ambassador Welles."

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 4123 Date: June 20, 1933.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority of letter of Dec. 13, 1950, from Asst. Sec. of War
By [illegible]
Date 4-2-47

Confidential. The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

G-2 Report

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Subject: (Important Problems and Issues Requiring
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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1933

Additional Details of the San Luis Affair:

1. On May 5, 1933, this office submitted report No. 4074 on the above subject, upon which comments are made in Evaluation of Reports, your office, dated June 14.

Although the San Luis affair of April 29, 1933, is now past history and unimportant, the following additional details of the engagement may be of interest. This information is absolutely authentic.

San Luis was captured on April 29 by a party of the A. B. C. of Santiago de Cuba. The trip was made by automobile from Santiago to San Luis. Upon their return to Santiago they attempted to destroy a small but important bridge, using two bombs. One bomb exploded and slightly damaged the bridge, bending the girders of one side, but the bridge is still passable by motor vehicle.

This raid was planned in conjunction with a plot to capture the daily transport plane of the Cuban Aviation Company, the technique of capture to have been as follows: Four members of the A. B. C. had purchased tickets on the plane from Santiago to Guantanamo. Each carried a suitcase containing bombs. One of the group had some experience as an airplane pilot. They intended to occupy the transport plane and immediately upon its departure from Santiago to bind the regular pilot and then fly over and bomb the cavalry barracks just west of Santiago and at Bayamo and Holguin. This was to be a signal for a general uprising of the A. B. C. in Oriente Province. The plan miscarried because the transport plane was very late and arrived at Santiago after news had reached the military authorities there of the San Luis clash; when the plane did arrive, due to the suspicions of the detachment of soldiers at the landing field, no attempt was made by the party to enter the plane. In fact, the group, realizing the probability of their own capture, left the landing field.

The A. B. C. group of Camaguey Province had been asked to join the uprising on the same day, April 29, but they had declined to do so because they were not sufficiently organized nor armed.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal contacts

From M. A., Havana No. 4127 Date: June 21, 1933.

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G-2 Report

2700-a

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CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 5 1933

Recent Bombings:

1. Several days ago a small bomb was placed in the entrance of the home of Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, and a larger one, containing about three pounds of dynamite, was placed outside. The small bomb exploded, doing little damage, but the larger bomb did not explode.

Early on the morning of June 30 one bomb was exploded inside the doorway and another on the sidewalk in front of the National Cash Register Company. Slight damage was done.

At about 2 a.m. on June 30 a bomb was exploded in the doorway of the American Grocery Company, on Neptuno Street. No one was injured, but some damage was done.

So far as is known by the undersigned, these are the first activities of the terrorists against Americans in several months. It may be well to bear in mind that there have been many persistent rumors of threats of terrorism directed particularly against Americans and British subjects.

2. It is not possible to determine at this time what political group or groups are responsible for these outrages, but if a group of the opposition and not the police department itself is responsible, it would seem probable that such political group is opposed to the present mediation plan and it is probable that it represents an element which considers that American intervention and nothing less will solve the Cuban political and economic problems. There is no denying the fact that there are many Cubans of the better class especially who vehemently insist that American intervention is the only possible solution. They insist that Machado will attempt by every means in his power to continue in office until March 20, 1935, and, furthermore, that so long as he controls the Army and the political machine now in power there is no hope and can be no hope for honest elections, regardless of such changes as may be made in the electoral laws.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
personal contact

From M. A., Havana No. 4142 Date: June 30, 1933.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 18 1933

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action

Cuban Government and Opposition representatives in mediation conference.

1. The offer of the American Ambassador to act as mediator in the present political impasse between the Cuban Government and the several Opposition factions was accepted by President Machado during the latter part of June, and on June 30, 1933, the President appointed two members of his cabinet and one member of the Cuban Congress to represent the Government in these conferences. The members appointed by President Machado are: Secretary of War and Navy and acting Secretary of State, General Alberto Herrera; Secretary of the Treasury, Octavio Averhoff; Representative (in Congress) Mario Ruiz Mesa.

2. During the same period the several Opposition groups, except that headed by General Mario Menocal and the University students' organization, accepted the offers of mediation proffered by the American Ambassador, although in the cases of some of these groups the acceptances were conditional. The representatives of these Opposition groups in the mediation conference are as follows: Cosme de la Torriente, Association Union Nacionalista; Luis Baralt, professors of the Havana Institute; Manuel Dorta Duque, professors of the University of Havana; Nicasio Silverio, O.C.R.R.; Wilfredo Albanes, Oppositionist Conservatives; Hortensia Lamar, Organization of Women Oppositionists; Maria Corominas de Hernandez, Normal School teachers; Joaquin Martinez Saenz, A.B.C.; Rafael Santos Jiminez, Followers of Miguel Mariano Gomez; Jorge Lopez, Union Revolutionists; Carlos M. Pineiro, Men's Normal School.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy and Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4149 Date: July 12, 1933

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1933

Mediation Proceedings.

1. With the acceptance by the Government of practically all of the demands of the Opposition groups participating in the mediation proceedings for the release of political prisoners and for the assurance of personal guarantees for their members during the negotiations and for a period of thirty days thereafter in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations, the stage has been set for the next step in the proceedings, namely, the consideration of a program of constitutional reforms.

2. It may be said without risk of exaggeration that every political, professional and social organization of any importance in Cuba has announced its support of these negotiations. The only groups which continue to reject the Ambassador's efforts at mediation are General Menocal, with a few of his adherents, the students, and, of course, the communists.

3. During the past week the leaders of the three political parties, Liberal, Conservative (Cooperativista) and Populars, published statements endorsing mediation, and these parties will be represented by delegations composed of five members each in the discussions concerning the proposed constitutional reforms. The anti-Government or "orthodox" faction of the Conservative Party has arranged to be represented in the Opposition delegation.

4. The country is reported to be quiet, nearly all of the groups of malcontents having been induced to lay down their arms and return peaceably to their homes after receiving assurances that they would not be improperly molested by the authorities.

5. Excepting for the bomb outrage at the American Club on July 11th, there were no terroristic activities during that week. The bombing of the American Club elicited public expressions of severe condemnation from the Opposition groups, this being the first time that the anti-Government elements have seen fit to censure activities of this nature. Fortunately, no material damage was caused by this bomb.

6. Forty-nine political prisoners were released during the week, including Dr. Agustin Castellanos and certain of his associates, whose arrest about two weeks ago and continued detention awaiting trial by Court Martial on a charge of having arms and explosives in their possession, threatened for a time to cause the withdrawal of the "A.B.C." from the mediation proceedings.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy

From M. A., Havana No.4155 Date: July 20, 1933

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 31 1933

Restoration of Constitutional Guarantees.

1. The President signed a decree yesterday, July 26th, restoring the constitutional guarantees, and almost simultaneously he signed another, lifting martial law from Havana Province. Brigadier General Federico Rasco, who has been military supervisor of the province, returned to his former post at Army headquarters.

2. After signing the two decrees, the President turned his attention to the two amnesty bills passed by Congress a few days ago, providing for the release of all political prisoners. One of these includes those persons accused or convicted of violation of the law of explosives, under both the military and civil penal codes. The other covers those accused or convicted of violation of the electoral code, either during the recent reorganization or during the elections last November. In addressing the Senate, the President mentioned the recent approval of the amnesty bills, proposed by himself, and declared that he believed this step was necessary "to end the era of tragedy which the nation had been passing through". He affirmed that the reestablishment of constitutional rights made a memorable day in his administration, the courts having been reinvested with their traditional jurisdiction over the rights of citizens.

3. It is understood that the authorities are making arrangements for the prompt release of all the prisoners included in the amnesty. It was announced that practically all of them will be freed today.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4162 Date: July 27, 1933

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 11 1933

Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees

1. On the afternoon of August 7th, the Cuban Congress suspended constitutional guarantees for a period of thirty days, and authorized the President to expend such funds as might be necessary to restore public order. It may be recalled that the constitutional guarantees were restored on July 26, 1933, upon the suggestion of the American Ambassador.

2. About 4 P.M. on August 7th, a broadcasting station which announced that it was operated by and speaking for the A.B.C. leaders, spread the news over Cuba that Machado had resigned. It has been reliably reported that this broadcasting station was operated by Government agents and not by the A.B.C., as the latter, a little later on, repeated their advice to the Cuban people to remain off the streets and stay quietly in their homes, reiterating that the American Ambassador is sincerely working for the best interests of the Cuban people. The effect of the false news that Machado had resigned brought thousands of people onto the streets, shouting and cheering, with flags unfurled from windows all over the City. These crowds were dispersed by police and soldiers using machine guns and rifles. It is known definitely that a number of people were killed and wounded in front of the Capitol and other casualties occurred in other sections of the City. It is also known that twenty-four civilians were killed and between eighty and one hundred wounded by police and soldiers yesterday afternoon during these demonstrations.

3. The political situation is extremely grave throughout Cuba. Information from places other than Havana is very meagre. However, I have been able to obtain sufficient information from certain reliable contacts as to convince me that there have been riots, some loss of life and destruction of property in several of the larger cities. In Manzanillo, Santiago and Cienfuegos the situation is considered by the Chief of Staff of the Army to be especially grave.

4. In Havana the people are causing no disturbances; most of them are remaining at home, hoping and expecting that the American Ambassador will force the resignation of Machado unless the latter withdraws willingly, which it is not expected that he will do.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 4175 Date: August 8, 1933.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Government.

Overthrow of Machado Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 12 1933

1. The deadlock between the Machado Government and the people of Cuba which had existed for eleven days in the form of a "passive revolution" in which commerce and labor throughout Cuba were paralyzed, was finally brought to an end on the morning of August 12, 1933, when Machado resigned. The direct cause of Machado's resignation was the revolt of the entire Cuban Army, lead by Colonel Julio Sanguily and Lieut. Colonel Erasmo Delgado in Havana, and other officers in the province, the names of whom are not known at present but will be submitted later.

2. After Machado's resignation, he, with several members of his cabinet, fled to Nassau, Bermuda, in an airplane belonging to Pan-American Airways.

3. Colonel Sanguily, Lieut. Colonel Delgado and certain Opposition leaders met in the office of the American Ambassador on the morning of August 12th and refused absolutely to accept General Alberto Herrera as acting President. General Herrera and his family were placed in hiding in a local hotel and on the night of August 13th, the American Ambassador accompanied by the undersigned and preceded by Colonel Sanguily himself, who had secured the protection of the party by the Army, were taken aboard the S. S. "Quirigua" which sailed that night for New York.

4. With General Herrera absolutely "persona non grata" with the Army, under the guiding hand of the American Ambassador, Carlos Manuel Cespedes was sworn into office as provisional President on August 12, 1933.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation and
Embassy

From M. A., Havana No. 4176 Date: August 15, 1933.

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G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Trend of Recent and Current Events.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 25 1933

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Strength of Public Sentiment.

1. Estanislao Cartaña, newly appointed Mayor of the Central District, as stated in report No. 4178, index No. 3110-b, dated August 16, 1933, resigned from that position yesterday, in a letter addressed to President Cespedes, explaining that public opinion required that he be substituted by another man for the position. Pressure had been brought to bear by the A.B.C. and other sectors of the Opposition to secure his removal, although Cartaña is well regarded by practically all those who sought his resignation. Their action was due to business connections of the former mayor.

2. Governor Jose Ramon Barcelo, of Oriente Province, was discovered and arrested by members of the A.B.C. and soldiers yesterday, in the second floor of a house in Havana. He was taken into custody by the military and carried to Castillo de la Fuerza, where he is now held. Sergio Carbo, a prominent Oppositionist, who was present at the time of Barcelo's capture, plead eloquently with the people, who sought to take him away from the authorities. Carbo promised that he would be confined by the military authorities, and recalled the occasion when Barcelo had aided him in his escape from the Machado government following the defeat of the revolutionists at Gibara in August of 1931, and urged that he now be given the privilege of saving Barcelo. Police Chief Bofill, who arrived shortly after Barcelo's discovery, alternately plead with and threatened the people, in his anxiety to carry Barcelo to prison. With the help of the A.B.C., who added their influence to the cause, Barcelo was taken to La Fuerza in a police car, followed by five other automobiles suspicious of a possible attempted escape.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4185 Date: August 22, 1933.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
(Combat)

Subject: Stability of Government.
Loyalty of the Army.

Current Situation in Cuba.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. AUG 29 1933

1. Political

The actual government of Cuba is a government "de facto". By Decree No. 1155 of August 12th, Machado accepted the resignation of all the secretaries of his Cabinet with the exception of General Alberto Herrera, Secretary of War and Navy, in whom Machado had the greatest confidence and to whom he preferred to turn over the Government, if he was compelled to turn it over to anybody. After the resignation of the Cabinet, Machado appointed Herrera Secretary of State,and that night such members of Congress as could be assembled, actually six Senators and ten Representatives, met and abrogated a law which prohibited a member of the Cabinet from acting as President unless he had resigned his portfolio at least thirty days prior to his appointment. The "rump" Congress then granted Mahcado a leave of absence for two years and authorized him to depart from Cuba. Machado also submitted his resignation, which has, as yet, not been accepted. On the afternoon of August 12th, Machado and several of his closest advisers took commercial airplane at General Machado Airport for Nassau, Bahama Islands. Several hours prior to Machado's departure, General Herrera, in the presence of Ambassador Welles, Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes and Dr. Carlos de la Torriente, had been accredited and accepted as acting President, although he never actually took oath of office. The only official acts which Herrera did during the few hours he held office was to appoint Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as Secretary of State and to assist in every way possible in the safe departure of political refugees from Cuba.

(a) On the morning of August 12th, Colonel Julio Sanguily and Lt. Col. Erasmo Delgado reported to the American Ambassador at the Embassy that the Army had revolted, although it was definitely known by this office on the 11th that the revolt was taking place simultaneously throughout the Island. The above mentioned Army officers refused absolutely to accept Herrera as President and informed the Ambassador and the undersigned that he was absolutely "persona non grata" in the Army. Since the Army was in control of the political situation, their views were accepted and Herrera resigned, and Dr. Cespedes, with the title of Secretary of State, assumed office as President ad interim.

(b) In the official government Gazette of August 14th appeared the proclamation of Dr. Cespedes that at 9:30 A.M. on August 13th he assumed the duties as President ad interim. Under the guiding hand of the American Ambassador, a cabinet was selected, composed of the leading representatives of several of the more powerful Opposition groups, all men of personal and professional integrity and imbued with patriotic ideals. This cabinet was sworn in on the morning of August 14th, and immediately thereafter the American Ambassador with the undersigned and the commanding officers of the two U. S. destroyers,which had arrived in the harbor during the previous night, paid an official call of congratulation upon the President and his Cabinet.

From M. A., Havana No. 4187 Date: August 25, 1933.

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(c) There was much confusion for several days, which was but natural, and it appeared at the time that personal and political animosities might tear apart the newly organized "de facto" government. Powerful leaders of the A.B.C. and other organizations visited the Embassy and denounced this and that member of the Cabinet for one reason or another. However, the excellent advice of the American Ambassador and the Embassy staff to support wholeheartedly the new government was listened to and generally followed. It was pointed out to them that Cuba at least had a government which would have many difficulties and dangers to overcome - particularly the increasing power and aggressiveness of the communistic elements. It was also pointed out that these subversive elements were bent upon destroying the Government and throwing Cuba into chaos and anarchy; that the lives of their families and their property could only be protected by supporting and maintaining the "de facto" government.

(d) The general strike in Havana, settled on August 14th, and dock and harbor workers strike, settled on August 21st, have already been reported. In the meantime, the communistic elements of Cuba, influenced largely by foreign agitators recently arrived, and by irresponsible University students of communistic inclinations, have been and continue to be the only serious threat against the Government. At the present writing this threat still exists in Havana, Santiago, and generally throughout Cuba; a number of the less important labor unions are actually on strike, no newspapers are being delivered, and the laboring class, as a whole, is extremely restless. The Consolidated Railway strike is unbroken, which paralyzes rail traffic from Santa Clara (City) east, throughout Santa Clara, Camaguey and Oriente Provinces. The strike of the Punta Alegre sugar central was settled August 24th, by the operators complying with the workers' demand for one dollar per day wage. This wage cannot be paid, nor half the amount, by any sugar company at present sugar prices. Perhaps the only factor in the present Cuban situation which was underestimated was the large number of communists and their powerful influence upon the laboring classes. It was realized that in Havana this influence was very powerful, but it was believed that among the sugar central employees and in the agricultural districts communism did not exist. It is probable that the operators of many of the sugar centrals realize today that they must consider this factor among their problems.

(e) In summing up the political situation, it can be said that the Government is barely holding its own, with the support of the Army. Whether this "de facto" government will continue in office until the expiration of Machado's present term on May 20,1935, or whether it will continue only until a Vice-President can be elected has, as yet, not been decided. The recent return of General Mario Menocal, Colonel Carlos Mendieta and Colonel Mendez Penate, and hundreds of refugees, many of whom are seeking office, may tend to complicate the political situation if elections are held before the complete reorganization of all the political parties. Probably the wisest course would be to continue the present Government in office until May 20, 1935.

From M. A., Havana No. 4187 Date: August 25,1933.

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2. Military

A detailed report of the Army revolt of August 11th was submitted in report No. 4182, index No. 6300-a, dated August 21,1933. Immediately after the revolt, the Army became the popular idol and, although much confusion and disorganization existed in Army headquarters and among the organizations for about forty-eight hours, it has re-established itself beyond my best expectations considering the shock which the entire organization underwent during and for several days following the revolt. The best type of officers available are controlling operations at Army headquarters and in the field; all, or at least most of them are believed to be loyal to the present government.

(a) The Chief of Staff, Major General Julio R. Sanguily, is an officer of personal and professional honor and ability, but,unfortunately, he has been incapacitated since August 14th. He seemed to be recovering rapidly from the major operation of August 14th for ulcer of the stomach, and actually dictated policies and orders from his sick-bed until a serious relapse occurred on August 23rd. He is now improving but will not be able to perform any duty for some time. This is a very serious handicap to the Army and especially to Army headquarters, as there is no officer available who has sufficient rank, ability or aggressiveness to properly command and control the Army, although Lieut. Colonel Quesada and his assistants are doing as well as can be expected, and I am spending as much time as is available with them and with the troops.

(b) Although there have been rumors in Havana of a possible military "coup", I feel very sure that nothing of the sort will be attempted. I base my estimate on several reasons, the principal reason being that no officer in the Army (except Sanguily who is dangerously ill) is capable of successfully undertaking a military "coup".

(c) All of the former general officers and colonels have been retired, are in confinement or have fled the country, except three colonels. A list of approximately thirty officers, ranging in grade from colonel to second lieutenant, are in confinement awaiting trial for alleged offenses ranging from wanton murder of civilians, excessive brutality and torturing to financial dishonesty in handling government funds. Although the present government and Army headquarters are proceeding with fairness, justice and wisdom in their efforts to place blame on officers and enlisted men for unlawful acts, nevertheless, a radical wing of the A.B.C. organization and other groups who have a voice in the present government, are sorely trying the patience of the Army by their vociferous and vindictive demands that a large number of officers and enlisted men,still on active duty, be punished for alleged actions under the Machado regime, which, in most instances, were only actions taken in the performance of military duty, such as the apprehension, trial and conviction of individuals,under lawful orders.

(d) In view of the fact that the Army has been more tolerant than was either necessary or desirable in its recent dealings with the street rabble, with communists, and especially with the University students and A.B.C. Radical Group, who openly carry fire-arms, including Thompson machine guns, commandeer automobiles, and openly commit acts

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

of violence and pillage, it is probable that the present unreasonable persecutions of the Army by these radical groups will cause the Army to stiffen its back and deal with subversive and disorderly activities with more firmness than has been the policy since the revolt.

(e) The Army as a whole appears to be on its mettle in this serious and dangerous period, and, notwithstanding the difficulties under which it is operating, to wit: a woefully weak President and Central Government, lack of strong and efficient leadership, and unfair persecution by radical elements while it is earnestly trying to maintain public order throughout the Island, I feel that it deserves great credit for its behavior. I am unstinted in my praise and encouragement to them which appears to be most gratefully accepted.

(f) Some instances of mingling of younger officers and soldiers with University students have been reported, but these were but isolated and rare cases. I am urging Army headquarters to strive to instill in all ranks the highest degree of discipline attainable and to deal with disorders with all the force and aggressiveness necessary to maintain public order.

(g) Several battalion and other unit commanders have recently offered, in case of grave emergency, to unreservedly place themselves and their organizations at my disposal and under my personal command. Although I could not rely on these offers, nevertheless, I interpret them as the indication, to some extent, of a state of mind in the Army, and as a gesture of friendship and confidence.

(h) Although I distinctly wish to refrain from making any prediction as to the near future in reference to either the political or military situation, I am confident that in case of United States intervention, our soldiers or marines would meet with no resistance from the Cuban Army and, in fact, we could fully expect its sincere cooperation in our task of reestablishing peace and public order.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and
Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 4187 Date: August 25, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/16/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

2657-8-330/199

Summary of Cuban Situation since Rendition of report No. 4187, index No. 3020, dated Aug. 25, 1933.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 6 1933

1. Although report No. 4187 discussed the current political and military situation, the actual situation which threatens Cuba today may be considered as social.

2. The Cespedes government, as has been previously reported, although imbued with the highest of ideals, is woefully weak. Although any government established by revolution should manifest exceptional strength and power, this Government is the antithesis of this. There are several reasons for this condition -- the principal of which are: First, the President's instructions to the Army which require the maintenance of public order without bloodshed; second, lack of cohesion among the leading Oppositionist groups now in power; and third, the unwillingness of the Army to control mobs by the ultimate resort to force, because it believes that it will not be upheld by the Government in doing so.

3. Two subversive factors have been at work undermining Army discipline and confidence of the populace in the Cespedes Government:

(a) First: Anarchy of a sort in the attitude and actions of the A.B.C. radical group and the University students. This is expressed by groups of armed young men holding up and searching private automobiles in Havana and on the Central Highway to ascertain if such conveyances contain proscribed Machadistas; the taking over of privately owned radio stations by armed force; also the giving of licenses by the Government to certain members of the A.B.C., authorizing them to carry arms and to accompany soldiers and police in the search of premises, ships, etc., and the maintenance of officially authorized A.B.C. representatives at headquarters of battalions and companies on guard duty in Havana. The natural reaction of this interference is to irritate the Army and lower its prestige and morale. Needless to say, I am bitterly opposed to such action, as is also the Ambassador. The replacement of Demetrio Castillo y Pokorny by Dr. Horacio Ferrer as Secretary of War and Navy, and the return to active duty of General Armando Montes as acting Chief of Staff during the illness of General Sanguily, was an extremely wise move, for, although Demetrio Castillo was earnest and sincere in his endeavor to maintain public order, he was so disliked by the Army as to greatly nullify his efforts. He is quoted as having made a remark at the American Club (which has been more or less circulated) that when Ambassador Welles or Colonel Gimperling told the Army to do something, it was instantly obeyed, but that when he issued orders to the Army, they merely listened and walked away. The latter part of this remark is, of course, an exaggeration, but, nevertheless, it indicates the state of affairs. Dr. Ferrer is one of the most capable, respected, and influential men in Cuba. He refused to permit certain powerful Opposition groups to present his name for the presidency "de facto", and I believe that he accepted the portfolio

From M. A., Havana No. 4199 Date: September 1,1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

of War and Navy against his personal wishes, and only because it is believed that he is the only man in Cuba capable of dominating the Army, and, by his influence with the political factors now in power, and with the Army, prevent Cuba from slipping further into anarchy and chaos.

(b) Second: The more pressing subversive danger is open communism, which appears to be gaining control of labor. A number of sugar mills have been taken over by employees lead by communist agitators. The manager of the electric light plant at Cienfuegos was informed on August 29th that he would be given twenty-four hours to reduce by one-half electric light rates to consumers; that if this ultimatum was not complied with at the expiration of the time limit, the entire plant would be destroyed, including poles and wires. I told Army headquarters to protect this property at all costs, for if they did not do so, in a week similar action would be taken against every other electric light plant in Cuba. I reminded them that the Compania Cubana de Electricidad is the heaviest taxpayer in Cuba, paying the Government one million dollars of its ten million dollars gross receipts; that it is operating at almost no profit; that if it complied with the demands of consumers and the populace, it would be forced out of business; that if it did not comply, its properties would be destroyed, and, consequently, there was no alternative - the Army must protect its property at Cienfuegos. It so happened that the Company entered into an agreement with the agitators, extending the time limit until September 2nd., and it is expected that the question of rates will be submitted to the Government for arbitration.

(c) With respect to the sugar mills, the increased wages demanded by workers cannot be complied with, considering the present cost of production and price of sugar. Organization of workers into labor unions, and labor agitation with demands and strikes throughout Cuba has been growing, although, as yet, the threat of a general strike,which would paralyze the economic life of Cuba, is not considered to be imminent.

4. The political, military and social situation in Cuba appeared to be growing steadily worse between the 25th and 31st of August, and as I see it, the only ray of hope in Cuba's storm-clouded sky is the appointment of Dr. Ferrer as Secretary of War and Navy.

5. I wish to repeat that I can make no predictions as to whether the present Government will or will not be able to establish public order without our assistance. However, many of the best-informed resident Americans and Cubans are of the opinion that United States intervention will be absolutely necessary within a very short time. Personally, I believe that the situation may be saved at this eleventh hour, and, in any case, we will know within the next few days whether or not the Cuban Government is able to stem the tide of rising communism which, after all, may be considered as the one real danger we now face. If communism gains control, resultant chaos and anarchy will compel intervention to protect American lives and property.

T. N. Gimpelling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

From: M. A., Havana No. 4199 Date: September 1,1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By [illegible]
Date 2-25-71

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Government.
Armed Revolutionary Movement.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 12 1933

1. On the evening of September 4th, the enlisted personnel of the Cuban Army took over command of all military posts in Havana and, so far as information is obtainable, the movement has spread throughout the entire Army. Some of the junior officers are involved in the uprising, but just what percentage is not known. The revolutionary government is headed by an executive committee composed of the following men:

Ramon Grau San Martin (doctor).
Dr. Portela (ex-University professor and lawyer).
Gergio Carbo (radical journalist).
Jose N. Yrizarri (lawyer).
Porfirio Franca (ex-banker).

2. The Army is headed by two sergeants, Juan Batista of Headquarters Staff, Camp Columbia, and Pedro Santana of the Aviation Corps, who informed me that he was a soldier in the Air Corps at Kelly Field, Texas, about 1920.

3. This revolutionary movement is extremely radical with strong leanings toward communism. The A.B.C. radical group, University Students Association, and the Order Cellular Revolutionary Radicals are the groups which organized and are controlling the revolution. The regular A.B.C. group is opposed to it.

4. The situation in Cuba is extremely critical. I expect much bloodshed and looting within the next few days. Unless intervention by the United States is forthcoming within the immediate future, I predict tragedy with the loss of much life and property among the better class foreigners and Cubans. I wish to repeat that United States intervention is, in my opinion and in the opinion of all or practically all of the American Colony and Cuban officers with whom I have discussed the matter, the only thing that will prevent the loss of life and property - not only of Americans but of other foreigners and the better class Cubans.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Contact and
Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 4201 Date: September 5, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache.
Havana. Cuba.

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SEP 15 1933
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CATION CANCELLED
ority letter of Dec. 13,
rom TAGO to Archivist
12-25-71
Date

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 15 1933

Summary of Situation

1. The Revolutionary Government in control of Cuba is radical, with the University Students Directorate the most powerful factor in the Cuban political field. Much propaganda is being disseminated by means of the radio, hand-bills, and the more radical newspapers against the United States, the Platt Amendment, Wall Street bankers, intervention, and American Residents and property in Cuba. Hand-bills printed in Spanish and English, call on the American sailors and marines to join their brothers, the workers, soldiers and sailors of Cuba, against American and Cuban capitalists. (Copy of hand-bill in English enclosed herein.)

2. It must be admitted that the situation insofar as public peace and order is concerned, is much quieter than at any time during the short Cespedes government; however, this may be accounted for by reason of the fact that under the Cespedes government, the radical and labor elements in many localities were creating disturbances, and destroying or appropriating private properties, which the Army was expected to prevent; but due to lack of adequate numbers against the armed mobs, and fear of punishment from the armed secret societies if the mobs were fired upon, the Army became impotent as a safeguard to life and property.

3. The present Revolutionary Government wishes above all else just now to demonstrate to the world and especially to the United States that, except for minor local outbreaks in Oriente, it is maintaining public peace and order, which, as said above, is being done to a reasonable degree, although armed bands of young students and members of other political secret societies and groups are permitted to carry arms openly and to search private dwellings, make arrests, and otherwise conduct themselves as unofficial amateur assistants to the Army and police force. However, it must be understood that the Army and radical elements are united, and they are using rare good judgment in not permitting the laboring class to commit acts of anarchy and violence, although there are numerous labor unions now on strike for higher wages or improvement of labor conditions; these are being conducted quietly. It will be seen, therefore, that the social situation with which the Army under the Cespedes Government was confronted, and the social situation with which the Revolutionary Army is confronted at present, are not comparable and cannot be used as a guide or basis for purposes of evaluating the efficiency or ability of the present Revolutionary Army in handling civic disturbances. It is the fixed opinion of the undersigned that if civic disorders occur again, this Army will fraternize with and join the mobs. It is also quite apparent that the clever radical politicians in control believe that the United States will not land naval forces, nor will our government intervene so long as foreigners and their properties are molested no more than is the case at present. The Revolutionary Government is simply playing a shrewd, waiting game, believing the United States cannot justify landing naval forces under present conditions, and hoping and expecting that in due time our naval vessels will be removed from Cuban waters; which will permit the Revolutionary

From M. A., Havana No.4205 Date: September 12,1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Government to consolidate its position more firmly and to proceed with its ultra-radical policies and plans.

4. The present impasse, as it may be termed, between the American Ambassador and the Revolutionary Government, cannot continue longer than a few days because of the tenseness of the situation, the class and racial hatreds, and the impatience and excitability of the Cuban temperament. Street-fighting between the A.B.C. Group on one side and the University Students Directorate and other groups and soldiers on the other side, which, spreading over the city of Havana, will create mobs and cause mob violence to Americans and other foreigners and damage to foreign property, is an ever-present possibility. Another possibility is a counter-revolution led by the A.B.C. Group, some 400 Army and Navy officers who refused or were not permitted to return to duty with their units, and some of the better-class Cubans. The present situation cannot continue longer than a very few days and when it breaks, much disorder and bloodshed may be expected.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Observation,
Press and Radio

From M. A., Havana No. 4205 Date: September 12, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

MARINES!

Once more, the capitalist exploiters of your country try to utilice you in their criminal purpose against the masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and marines of an oppresed people under their terrible yoke.

Your Goverment, tool of bankers and bosses try to smash the strong revolutionary movement of workers and peasants in the sugar mills; try to mantain in their sits the officials laid off by the revolutionary moyement of soldiers and marines and shooting down its leaders.

AMERICAN MARINES!

All of you, like the marines and soldiers of Cuba, are the sons of workers and peasants. The ones who direct you against the Cuban marines and soldiers are the tools of the big financiers and bankers, who exploit your fathers and brothers in your country land. Do not make a common cause with your exploiters against your own class brothers.

FRATERNIZE WITH YOUR BROTHERS THE WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS, MARINES, STUDENTS, ALL THE OPPRESED CUBAN PEOPLE!

DO NOT SHOOT THEM!

COMPEL YOUR OFFICERS TO RETURN THE SHIPS TO YOUR COUNTRY!

ORGANIZE MARINES COMMITTEES IN THE SHIPS TO FIGHT FOR YOUR INMEDIATE DEMANDS!

LONG LIVE THE SOLIDARITY OF THE MARINES, SOLDIERS, WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF CUBA AND AMERICA.

ANTI-IMPERIALIST LEAGUE OF CUBA.

September 7, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1953, from TAGO to Archivist
By JJ
Date 12-23-71

CUBA (Social)
(Combat)

Gray
2657-9-330

Subjects: Public Order and Safety.
Commissioned Officers.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 19 1933

Summary of the Political and Military Situation.

1. The political situation although very tense is extremely quiet in Havana. This, however, is merely the appearance on the surface. What plots and counter-plots may be going on behind closed doors with reference to the Revolutionary Government is not definitely known. However, there are indications that a counter revolution may occur at most any time. If so, it would have the moral support of all the better elements in Cuba. This would be conducted by the A.B.C. secret society, with the several hundred Army officers who are living at the National Hotel and who have, as yet, come to no agreement with the Government. They would be joined by General Mario Menocal and his followers; the Union Nacionalista, and a portion of the Order Cellular Revolutionary Radicals.

2. In support of the present Government would be the Army under Sergeant (Colonel) Fulgenico Batista, the Navy under Lieutenant Felipe Loys, who is now Chief of Staff of the Navy. Loys was, until the revolution, aide to the Chief of the Southern Naval District. One of the most aggressive and militant forces supporting the new Government is the University Students Directorate. The Directorate itself consists of only thirty University students, but they have an organization of approximately 2000 men, all fully and heavily armed with rifles, revolvers, and Thompson automatic machine guns. A large issue of arms and ammunition was made to this organization on September 11th by the Army. In addition to the Army, Navy, and Students Directorate, there is the A.B.C. Radical Organization, which is not large in numbers, but which is fully armed; the communists - many of whom are armed, and Cuban organized labor, all of whom are in full support of the Government. There would probably be the same line-up throughout Cuba, except in Santiago where, it is believed, the struggle would be almost purely racial, i.e. the arrogant and numerically superior blacks against the whites.

3. It was stated in a report submitted by this office about three months ago that if Cuba is to be saved by her own people and without outside assistance, it would be through the A.B.C. It is still believed that if Cuba is to be saved from communism and from intervention, it can only be accomplished by the A.B.C. It is believed that this group will organize what they term an "A.B.C. militia" for the purpose of restoring order and combating communism. It would be a difficult task but it is possible. The Army would have to be taken by surprise and disarmed, as would the University Students Directorate Organization, and the A.B.C. Radicals.

4. In the meantime, Sergeant (Colonel) Fulgenico Batista, following the example of Machado, travels in an armored car convoyed by half a dozen other armored cars filled with heavily armed soldiers.

From M. A., Havana No. 4209 Date: September 14, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

It was reliably reported to the undersigned that last evening the Chief of Police of Havana issued instructions to his police captains that the police must not molest the communists in anything they do.

5. The three hundred Army officers in the National Hotel were joined on the night of September 9th by approximately five hundred armed A.B.C. members who agreed to go anywhere with them and do anything to overturn the present Government. The junior officers wanted to capture the Palace, the Army and the Navy Headquarters, and Camp Columbia, but the older officers held back. That opportunity was permitted to pass. Since then these Army officers have lost much of the sympathy of the better class people. Having been ignominiously driven away from their commands, they could have wiped out the disgrace and become popular heroes - perhaps the saviors of Cuba - had they displayed the courage and initiative to do so. As a matter of fact, they seemed to feel that they should have been aided in any aggressive action against the Government by a landing force from the U. S. Special Service Squadron in Havana harbor.

6. Whether Cuba is to be finally saved by a "Fascista" movement, or by United States intervention, it would be necessary to muster out the entire Cuban Army and Navy, applying appropriate punishment, of course, to the ring-leaders. Their usefulness in supporting constituted government has ended. They are now simply the tools of a clever, ambitious, wholly radical sergeant, and his friends and associates, the communist leaders of Cuba.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 4209 Date: September 14, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1933, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] Date 4-2-71

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August 31, 1933

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Cablegram.

The Secretary of War directs that a cablegram, in secret code, substantially as follows be sent to the Military Attache, American Embassy, Havana, Cuba:

No. 147 Sent 8-22-33 (mlw)

Paragraph____

Please send by diplomatic pouch a summary on the situation in Cuba both political and military with particular reference to latter.

Alfred T. Smith,
Brigadier General, General Staff.

bap

AUG 21 1933 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE G-2 MIL. RA

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Government - General Type.

Plans of New Government as
Explained by President.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 23 1933

1. In a speech over the radio delivered at 9 o'clock last evening, provisional President Grau San Martin pledged the new government to the maintenance of cordial relations with all nations, and to apply "scientific means" to the relief of the poor and the finding of jobs for the unemployed. He added that a national labor congress will be called, probably in the near future, where workers may air their problems before a government commission. The Department of Agriculture, he said, will be divided into two, one of which will be the Department of Labor, to devote its full efforts to the welfare of Cuban workers.

2. Immediately following this speech, the executive secretary of the President, Armando Roa, addressed the English-speaking colony of Cuba. The text of this speech follows:

"The President of the Republic of Cuba, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, has just addressed the Cuban people. He has appealed to the nation for peace and order and close union against those who would disturb it. He has absolute confidence that all law-abiding and liberty loving citizens will stand by him and will help to preserve national unity.

"President Grau San Martin desires to emphasize that the present Cuban government will do its utmost to maintain the closest and most cordial relations with all the foreign powers, especially with the United States. The President realizes fully what it means for Cuba to attain the fullness of its international life with the support and cooperation of the United States, and he realizes as well that the United States cannot overlook the necessity of cultivating and maintaining these relations with Latin-America.

"The Cuban Government is willing to go a long way toward cooperating with the United States in the forthcoming Pan-American Conference in Montevideo, thus adhering to the policy enunciated in President Roosevelt's speech April 14, 1933 at the Pan-American Union when he declared that 'friendship among nations, as among individuals, calls for constructive efforts to muster the forces of humanity in order that an atmosphere of close understanding may be cultivated.'

"President Roosevelt expressed not only the policy of the United States as one of neighborliness, but exhorted the nations of the western hemisphere to shoulder mutual obligations and responsibilities and to effect closer economic cooperation.

"The aspirations of the Cuban people have been handed down through a century of almost incessant struggle for freedom; that struggle, that labor, that suffering cannot have been in vain. For the first time in our history, the Cuban people have assumed the

From M. A., Havana No. 4213 Date: Sept. 16, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

responsibility of choosing their own government without any pressure whatsoever, and to do this, they had to risk their lives against great odds. Cuba has been subjected to the worse of tyrannies under that murderous president, Machado, whose political dictatorship, the cruelest ever registered in the annals of history, brought Cuba nothing but ruin, desolation and misery. If it had not been for the perseverance, tenacity, and indomitable valor of a united will, Cuba would not have been able to overthrow the Machado regime.

"Years of untold horrors, labor and struggle have not quenched the overwhelming desire nor discouraged the efforts of the Cuban people to make of themselves a free and prosperous people. They have undergone the most dreadful tortures and persecution with Spartan fortitude; a long and arduous struggle for independence from Spain; the inevitable reverses inherent to the founding and consolidation of the Republic; and they have experienced physical, social and economic upheavals. From all these vicissitudes they have emerged with a greater love of liberty, a firmer national spirit, and a stronger purpose to make our beloved land truly prosperous and independent."

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4213 Date: Sept. 16, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700-a
6200-b

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)
(Combat)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.
Commissioned Officers.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 23 1933

Revolutionary Leaders Meet with President:

1. Leaders of factions in opposition to the provisional government who on September 17th adjourned their conference with President Grau San Martin after a four hour session, will resume their negotiations in the interest of compromise this morning. Refusing to comment on the matters discussed in the meeting, the President said simply that he "was tired and wished to rest." Martinez Saenz, representing the A.B.C. declared briefly that he believed they had moved definitely toward a solution of their problems. Former President Mario Menocal, urged by press representatives to make a statement, declared that he had nothing to say.

2. Dr. Luis Machado, director of Rotary International and Chairman of the Rotary Committee which brought about the meeting of the Oppositionists and the President, revealed before the conference that the Rotary Committee had arranged with Sergeant Batista to enter the Hotel National for a conference with Colonel Julio Sanguily, chief of the officers barricaded there, and that the mediators had successfully negotiated an agreement that both the troops of Sergeant Batista and the officers would take no action pending the outcome of the conference which is to be continued today. Dr. Machado also said that the leader of the troops had agreed to permit the resumption of water supply at the Hotel National.

3. Others attending the conference with the President include Colonel Carlos Mendieta of the Nacionalistas, Miguel Mariano Gomez of the Marianistas, and the representatives of the O.C.R.R. and the Student Directorate.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 4214 Date: Sept. 18, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 22 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Government - General Type

Economic Groups Declare Against
San Martin Government

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 23 1933.

1. After a long session yesterday, a joint committee of economic organizations of Cuba resolved to urge the formation of a concentration cabinet, composed of all revolutionary sectors. Of even greater importance, perhaps, was their decision to order the closing of all commercial establishments as a protest against the violence of the laboring classes. The closing of the stores, it is understood, will take place Tuesday, unless a satisfactory arrangement is reached previously.

2. With the national treasury facing serious difficulties, the associations yesterday scored the present administration, warning the Government that a concentration cabinet must be formed, or the country will find itself in the throes of an armed revolution. The declaration against the administration came after hours of deliberation, and stressed the point that an armed revolt would bring the sad consequences of an intervention. The following statements were contained in the declaration:

"The coup d'etat of September 4th could have only two objects; either to initiate the rapid development of a more radical revolutionary program than that which the previous government was effecting, or to raise to power certain sectors of the Opposition excluding all others.

"In the first case, the country has been needlessly and perilously excited, as the same result could have been obtained by a modification of the Cespedes cabinet, employing for the purpose the force of public opinion civilly and orderly expressed.

"In the second case, the lamentable system of governments sustained by armed force has been reestablished, fundamentally contrary to the program of the revolution.

"The constant appeal for support in order to consolidate the regime which arose by a coup d'etat lacks logical force.

"Those who overthrew the previous regime have no moral authority to ask support now, setting forth as its only reason the possibility of an American intervention; a danger which, in any case, should have been considered before the coup d'etat of September 4th.

"We are opposed to North American intervention in Cuba in problems which should have and can be solved among Cubans. But we must point out that the problem now planted in Cuba cannot be resolved among Cubans in any other but one of these two forms; either those who form the actual regime, recognizing the undeniable evidence that they do not constitute a majority, and consent to the formation of a government of national concentration; or, by a struggle which must necessarily be an armed struggle between the actual regime and the majority of revolutionary sectors, a struggle to which the lamentable epilogue will be the intervention of the United States of America."

From M. A., Havana No. 4216 Date: Sept. 18,1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

3. Meanwhile, neither bankers nor leaders of any economic or civic organization visited the Secretary of the Treasury yesterday. This is in contract with past custom. Students, the sponsors of the present Government, faced with the demand of other Oppositionist sectors for the resignation of provisional President Ramon Grau San Martin, threw their forces into a counter-attack in an attempt to disarm their opponents by urging actual support to its administration, in a meeting at which was represented every important revolutionary sector. The meeting was attended by the provisional President, the Student Directorate leaders; Dr. Martinez Saenz, Secretary of the Treasury in the Cespedes administration; representatives of the A.B.C.; General Mario Menocal, and others.

4. Those opposing this Government argue that it does not follow the revolutionary plan proposed and accepted in the "Junta Revolucionaria" in New York, according to which all sectors which cooperated in the overthrow of Machado were to have a part in the revolutionary government. Another point made by the Government's adversaries hangs on the origin of the regime, which, they recall, was launched in Army barracks, without the participation of the public. The probability that the government of provisional President Grau San Martin will not be recognized in other countries is another argument employed by the Opposition to persuade the present administration to resign, preferably in favor of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. Several alternatives are offered, however, by those seeking the resignation of San Martin. One plan would have Cespedes return to power only long enough to name a Secretary of State, who would immediately assume the presidency on the resignation of Cespedes. One other formula would have a cabinet composed of representatives of the University, the A.B.C., the Union Nacionalista, and Menocalistas, calling in the other sectors to occupy other important though secondary posts in the Government. Under this formula, the sergeants implicated in the latest coup d'etat would be transferred to civilian posts. The students, replying to all these suggestions, maintain that the Government is the product of popular will, and is rooted in the people, adding that it is the intention of the administration to carry out the revolutionary program in its entirety and expressing the opinion that the Government is in itself a guaranty of the fulfillment of that program. They counter that none of the reasons extended warrant a change in government tactics, and less, the resignation of the provisional President.

5. The students advance the argument that all truly democratic governments must have an Opposition to judge its acts. "A country is governed as much by the Opposition as by the Government," they say, blaming a large part of the evil of the Machado rule on the fact that there was too much cooperation and no opposition. As no definite solution of the problem was reached, the reunions are to be continued. The meeting of all sectors with the Government was proposed by the Havana Rotary Club, a branch of Rotary International.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

From M. A., Havana No. 4216 Date: Sept. 18, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 23 1933

1. Labor throughout Cuba continues turbulent and restless. In the three eastern provinces of Santa Clara, Camaguey and Oriente, the labor situation is becoming daily more serious. It is reported that in Camaguey Province, sugar central workers have taken possession of ten sugar centrals and have established soviets. In Santa Clara the same situation exists in perhaps nine sugar centrals, and while it is impossible to determine the exact number of centrals taken over in Oriente Province, the number is estimated to be fifteen. In Santiago de Cuba fifty or sixty Americans have removed to a place known as Rente for better mutual protection. In Antilles and Preston the recent serious labor disturbances have subsided. In Manzanillo mobs of communists and laborers were dispersed by soldiers on September 18th, and a similar attitude of firmness against the lawless element has been shown within the past two days in several other localities in Oriente Province. This is in marked contrast to the attitude of the troops in other localities, which has been rather sympathetic and not unfriendly.

2. While a report has just been received from a fairly reliable source to the effect that the communists intend to loot the wholesale district in Havana this afternoon (September 19th), it is difficult to evaluate the numerous reports and rumors, many quite contradictory in nature, that are being constantly received in this office. It is known that the present government does not want U. S. intervention, and it is believed that if mob violence is attempted in Havana, the Army will be called upon to suppress it, in order to prevent the landing of U. S. Naval personnel, if for no other reason.

3. In summary, it may be said that the social situation in Cuba is growing steadily more serious and more dangerous to foreign, and particularly American, lives and property.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

From M. A., Havana No. 4218 Date: Sept. 19, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By 54-2-71

CUBA (Political)

Subjects: Trend of Recent and Current Events.
Radicalism.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 23 1933

Desirability of Present Administration

1. Although it has been expected ever since the Army mutiny of September 4th, 1933, that a counter-revolution would materialize to overthrow the present revolutionary government and restore the Cespedes Government, there appears to be no sign of such movement anywhere in Cuba.

2. For the past several days much pressure has been brought to bear on revolutionary President Grau San Martin by leaders of political groups and parties for the purpose of effecting some form of compromise in the Government that will be less radical and that will be acceptable to all groups and political parties which participated in the Opposition to Machado. Nothing appears, however, to have been accomplished up to the present.

3. The censorship placed on the press, radio broadcasting services, telegraph and cable services, and the listening-in on telephone conversations and opening by government agents of mail matter, is, indeed, more severe and thorough than at any time during the Machado regime.

4. Colonel Fulgencio Batista (ex-sergeant) now Chief of Staff of the Army, appears to be in absolute control of the military and, to a large extent, of the governmental situation. He follows Machado's example of traveling through the streets and to and from adjacent Army posts in a bullet-proof automobile with a guard of four soldiers heavily armed, and with an escort of six or seven similar type automobiles filled with armed soldiers. In several of the cities and towns in the provinces, Army sergeants, with two or three members of the University Students' Organization, have driven out the local mayors and are in control of the local governments.

5. In the meantime, the revenues of the government have greatly diminished and it is believed that the only important income which is being received by the Treasury is the revenue from the gasoline tax which amounts to 14 cents on each gallon of gasoline. Other taxes are being paid but are not appreciable in amounts.

6. It may be stated that the Army and Navy and the University Students Directorate control the present government, and both are communistic in policy; although the attitude of these organizations toward communism and labor disturbances differ somewhat in different localities on the Island.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

From M. A., Havana No. 4219 Date: Sept. 19,1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/39

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS, NARS Date 7/12/74

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Trend of Recent and Current Events.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 26 1933

1. Since the last report submitted by this office on the above subject, there appears to be little change in the political government and the political situation. Strong rumors were current on September 20th that a counter-revolutionary movement would take place at midnight, September 20-21st, the chief participants of which would be the A.B.C. organization, the 458 Cuban officers who are stationed at the Hotel National, and certain units of the Army. However, this did not materialize.

2. It is known that the National Police of Havana are opposed to the present Government and desire a change. The police force resent having to take orders from Army non-commissioned officers and University Student Directorate members, who are stationed at every police precinct station.

3. The well-known rebel leader, Juan Blas Hernandez, who had maintained an organization in the field in Santa Clara and Camaguey Provinces for two years against Machado, visited the American Embassy on September 12th; he immediately returned to the town of Moron and announced that he was opposed to the present Government and would take the field against it. Several hundred troops and an armed contingent of the University Students Directorate took the field against him. Hernandez found upon his return to Camaguey Province, after having been in Havana for some days, that he could no longer rely upon the fidelity of a large portion of his former followers who have become imbued with the present spirit of labor, under the influence of labor and communistic agitators, against the large sugar properties. Finding it impossible to reorganize his scattered following and weed out the disloyal, Hernandez sent his son to revolutionary President San Martin on September 20th, to arrange, it is reported, for an armistice, which means that Hernandez will probably lay down his arms.

4. Governmental fiscal receipts appear to be diminishing, as recently reported by this office. It is believed that the present Government will find it impossible to pay its employees for September. The status of pay in the Army is as follows: Payment for the months of April, May and June are still due; Machado paid the Army and Navy for July, and Cespedes paid all Government employees for August. If this Government continues in power for the next two weeks with the Army unpaid at the end of the month, it is possible that the loyalty of the armed forces may be seriously affected.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Observation and
Press.

From M. A., Havana No. 4225 Date: Sept. 22, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 29 1933

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

Last night members of the ABC secret society had an extended conference with representatives of the Student Directorate, in a move to compose their differences over the provisional government of President Grau San Martin. It is reported by those attending that it ended without definite agreement, but plans are afoot to continue the parley today.

Meanwhile supporters of the government are claiming a distinct victory in the visit of Colonel Juan Blas Hernandez, famous rebel chieftain during the Machado regime to the palace yesterday morning where he pledged his support to the government.

The famed leader, pleasant and courteous, emphatically denied that he had at any time taken arms against the present government and that reports of such activities were due to misunderstanding. Accompanying Colonel Blas were three of his sons and members of a student commission who had been sent to Santa Clara province to negotiate with him for his visit to Havana.

After his conference with President Grau, in which he reiterated his loyalty to the present government, he posed for news reel men, flanked on one side by the president and on the other by Colonel Fulgencio Batista, and made again a declaration of loyalty which was recorded and translated for motion picture audiences.

Sources close to President Grau declared that conditions in the interior were becoming increasingly quiet and that many groups in the government's opposition were showing an increasing spirit toward co-operation with the present regime.

The Student Directorate has called a mass assembly of university students for tomorrow, at which about three thousand students are expected to give a vote of confidence in the present government. This is considered as a challenge to the numerous assertions that the mass of the student body is not in favor of the Directorate, and that the leaders of the Directorate have been discredited by the rest of the university.

The mediatory commission of the Havana Rotary Club yesterday announced officially that it has suspended its efforts to find a conciliatory solution to the national problem.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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From M. A. Cuba Report No. 4230 September 26, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/16/74

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL SITUATION

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 28 1933

There appears to be no important change since last report in the political situation although the control of the central government over the provincial governments such as they are at the present moment is becoming less, as expressed by a well informed observer this morning. The influence and authority of the central government is felt only in the Havana province.

In the army the discipline is becoming more lax every day. The soldiers are selling rifles, revolvers, Thompson sub-machine guns and ammunition for small sums, and advantage is being taken of this situation by American residents to acquire arms and ammunition. Sergeant Batista, the chief of staff, is very much in evidence in the councils of the central government, but his orders are indifferently obeyed or are totally ignored by the five commanders of the military districts outside of Havana province, and it is necessary for Batista to send one of his trusted sub-alterns from Havana to see that an order or a movement of a special importance is complied with by the commanders of outlying districts. On the other hand it has been observed by the undersigned during the trips which he makes daily when practicable but always on alternate days around the several army barracks and fortifications of Havana that the animals are well taken care of, and the appearance and the uniforms of the enlisted personnel are better than during the Cespedes government. It may be stated as a fact that the army and police are unwilling to preserve public order. This may be attributed in some instances to sheer indifference but in other instances to fear that if they use their fire arms or other forceful measures against lawbreakers, they will not be upheld by the student directorate. On September 24 a young Spaniard, a charcoal vendor, was robbed of his money purse by two large negroes one of whom pressed his knee against the young Spaniard's stomach thereby ripping the purse from the leather belt to which it was attached. The young Spaniard cried for help and a crowd gathered. Two police men and an armed soldier on sentry duty watched the robbery with complete indifference. The affair occurred during business hours in front of the Cuban telephone office in the central part of the business district and was reported to the undersigned by reliable American witnesses. This incident is mentioned here as a typical example of many similar instances.

The army officers, approximately 450 who are occupying the National Hotel, are well supplied with food, but their morale is decreasing due to prolonged inactivity and confinement. They are well supplied with revolvers, but have very few rifles. Some of the troops have been paid for the month of September, others have not. The troops are also being fairly well fed. It is understood that the sudent directorate are planning to replace a number of the Havana police force by students, and also that the local police force will be increased by a thousand members.

SOCIAL. Social unrest throughout Cuba is steadily increasing, with robberies and hold-ups increasing at an alarming rate. The situation

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

in the provinces is more critical than in Havana and unquestionably many American and foreign residents are in grave danger.

Mr. Emilio Bacardi, one of the owners of the rum industry which bears his name informed the undersigned on September 25 that he was told at the presidential palace on the same date by an official of high authority and very close to the revolutionary President Grau San Martin to remove his family from Oriente province as a communistic coup by communistic labor groups, negroes and soldiers is imminent. It was also stated that the up-rising will be limited to Oriente province for the time being. Counter-revolutions of groups of soldiers are of daily occurrence in the eastern provinces, but so far all have been easily suppressed. Strikes of labor unions are also of daily occurrence. Some last a few days, others longer, but usually work is resumed by the employers' giving in to most or all of the demands. Many of these demands are so unreasonable that it will be impossible for many industries to continue operations under the handicap being imposed by their employees. The negroes of Havana are almost all in favor of communism as they are throughout Cuba. While no overt acts in Havana of consequence have been reported to the undersigned, the negro element is becoming more and more surly. The food supplies in Havana are very limited. There is enough flour on hand for several days, but the bakery employees are all on strike, as are most of the grocery and food store employees. As stated in a recent report, approximately 35 sugar centrals have been taken over by the workers. In some of these communistic soviets have been established, some few others have been, according to reports, returned to their owners, and no reports are obtainable from the remainder.

No Spanish language dailies have been published for several days due to a strike of the linotypists.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut, Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from WACO to Archivist
By
Date 12-22-71

G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

REPORT OF CUBAN POLITICAL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL SITUATION FOR PERIOD SEPTEMBER 27-29, 1933.

1. POLITICAL SITUATION. There appears to be no change in the Cuban political situation and nothing of especial interest to report. The Revolutionary Government has stated to the local press that it expects to pay the salaries and wages of all government employees for the current month on September 30, 1933; however, due to the scant current fiscal receipts since September 4 when the Revolutionary Junta overthrew the Cespedes Government, it is no believed that there are sufficient funds available to pay all government employees for the current month. A large part of the Army has been paid for the month of September; however, it is believed that some units have not been paid as yet.

2. The influence of the University Students' Directorate is still paramount in the government. A large number of students are on duty with the local (National) police; uniforms are being manufactured for them, and it is believed that approximately thousand students will be enrolled in the National police. On September 27, an armed student in charge of a detachment of soldiers, consisting of a sergeant and ten privates, attempted to search the Horter Office Building in which is located the office of the American Consulate General, for fire-arms. However, the search was not made due to the vigorous protests of the Consul General.

3. MILITARY SITUATION. Although one or more military revolts have occurred in every province, except Havana province, within the past ten days, all were quickly suppressed by the Army, in some instances assissted by local armed groups of the University Students' Directorate. There remain at the National Hotel approximately 450 officers who refuse to return to duty with the Army. There is sufficient food for eight or ten days. Several messages have been received by the undersigned, via third persons, from officers within the National Hotel and those in hiding elsewhere in Havana. The tenor of these messages is to the effect that a sortie of the officers from the hotel, in conjunction with a supporting operation on the part of certain units in sympathy with the officers, may be expected within the immediate future; and this effort will coincide with a more comprehensive operation to be led by the officers now living outside of the hotel. As previously reported, discipline in the Army continues to become more lax. It is observed that enlisted men do not salute their officers under any circumstances, and some instances are noted of the enlisted personnel of verious organizations failing to or deliberately refusing to obey the orders of their officers.

4. SOCIAL SITUATION. There appears to be nothing more to report. While it is believed that the present government is in sympathy with the ultra-radical and communistic elements, it appears to be the present policy to check the more unreasonable demands and the more turbulent anti-American demonstrations of these ultra-radical elements and organizations. It is very probable that this policy has been adopted in

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order to appease the growing hostility of the better class of Cubans, the commercial and industrial interests, and to avoid ~~the~~ U. S. intervention.

5. The laboring class continues to be kept in a state of extreme agitation against employers and against so-called "Yankee Imperialism" and U. S. intervention. Strikes continue all over Cuba. At the present moment the employees of the local ice-plants and the typesetters of all the Spanish language newspapers are on strike, with the marked exception of La Voz, a notoriously unreliable news sheet of ultra-radicalism. A general strike in all branches of industry ordered by the labor leaders for September 28 failed to materialize.

6. In Oriente Province the white element of the population, less than 20% of the total, fears a general negro uprising. This has been reported as a grave danger in the near future, not only by the U. S. Consul at Santiago and the commanding officers of the U. S. Navy destroyers in ports in Oriente Province, but also by better class Cubans.

7. There is not much change in the local situations reported on daily by the U. S. consuls and vice-consuls; in fact, as a whole it is generally more quiet at present than at any time in several weeks.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1933

1. On September 29, 1933, there was a clash in Havana between government troops on one side and communists and radical students on the other, with the result of 5 dead and 25 wounded, mostly civilians.

2. The fight originated as follows: about three thousand communists and students were parading and marching to the Fraternity Park located south of the Capitol, to inter there the ashes of Julio Antonio Mella, a Cuban student and communist labor leader, who was slain in Mexico more than three years ago, reputedly by agents of the then Cuban President Machado. His remains had been brought to Havana a few days ago. The students allied to the communists belong to the "Students' Left Wing".

3. The official version of yesterday's fight is that shots were fired on the troops from a building where the remains of Mella had reposed since their arrival from Mexico and that the troops returned the fire.

4. Another version of the shooting is that the soldiers had been ordered to permit the manifestation, but to refuse to allow the ashes to be deposited in the pantheon erected for the purpose in the Fraternity Park the night before; that this refusal led to an altercation and finally to a fight between soldiers and followers of Mella, inside the building where the remains reposed.

5. Order was restored within a short time and a heavy guard prevented further outbreaks during the night following.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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From M. A. Cuba Report No. 4244 September 30, 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OCT 10 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

SUMMARY OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 3 1933

1. POLITICAL. No change since last report.

2. MILITARY. Separate report is submitted on combat between officers and Cuban Army at National Hotel October 2. No other changes of note.

3. SOCIAL. Situation is generally quiet throughout the provinces except that central Agramonte in Camaguey Province has been taken by communists. This property belongs to the General Sugar Company, an American corporation.

4. Central Senado, a Cuban property in Camaguey Province, about 25 miles northeast of Camaguey, belonging to the Sanchez family of Havana, one of the finest sugar centrals in Cuba, has been taken over by employees who have formed a soviet government under the dictatorship of the recently arrived Russian communist Pedro Stodolky.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

From M. A. Cuba Report No. 4252 October 3, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1933

1. The daily telephonic reports from the several consular officers located in the larger towns and cities throughout Cuba indicate that public order and safety and the attitude of organized labor are steadily improving. Santiago, Antilla, Nuevitas, Cienfuegos, and Matanzas are comparatively quiet. Labor troubles continue, however, at some of the sugar mill properties in Camaguey province.

2. In Havana two negroes caught looting a shop in the business district during the night of October 3rd were killed on the premises by soldiers. On October 5 and 6 several bombs were exploded in various sections of the city. One injured four employees in a Cuban dry cleaning plant. A plot to blow up the Bank of Nova Scotia (Canadian) was discovered in time to take preventative measures.

3. It is not improbable that in the immediate future a period of retaliatory reprisals will be made against the present government, in the nature of bombings, sniping of soldiers, armed and uniformed ABC radicals and university students, and possibly an intensive persecution of foreigners, especially American and British residents, in order to cause U. S. intervention. There is much tenseness among the American colony and among the better class Cubans.

Sources: Press and personal contacts.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4255 October 6, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OCT 10 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority Act of Dec. 18, 1933, from TAG to Archivist
By
Date

CUBA (Combat)

2657-g-330/206

Subject: Loyalty.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1933

1. Reference evaluation of report No. 4214, index as above, dated September 22, 1933, it has been reliably reported that Captain Aran and his followers were tricked into surrender. Lieutenant Benitez, son of Colonel Benitez, was sent out to capture Aran. It is understood that Benitez met Aran and told him that"there was no need to fight, as Cuba had a new president and everything was all right" With these assurances, Aran and his following walked into the trap and, taken off their guard, were promptly disarmed and made prisoners.

T. N. Gimpeding,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M. A., Havana No. 4257 Date: October 6, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from AGO to Archivist
By 84-2-71
Date

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Government.

Mailed G/2 W.D. OCT 23 1933

Current Political Situation.

1. The political situation is comparatively quiet. The latest rumor, which, however, is unconfirmed, is to the effect that the several Opposition groups which have refrained from supporting the present Government have agreed to do so upon the bases of the maintenance of Ramon Grau San Martin as President; one-half of the Cabinet to be filled by members of the Student Directorate, and the other half by members of the other Opposition parties. It is not believed that the A.B.C. has agreed to support or will support the present Government.

2. Persistent rumors are received in the Embassy of impending revolutions in Oriente and Camaguey Provinces.

3. It may be stated as a fact that Grau San Martin intends, if possible, to force the American Ambassador to leave Cuba by giving him his passport, unless the United States recognizes the present Cuban Government. This attitude of Grau San Martin is definitely known to be a fact.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4276 Date: October 20, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(Stamp) MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS AREA
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
FORT McPHERSON ATLANTA GEORGIA

Dear Col Nulsen:

Am inclosing two rpats recently received from Miami. Knowing their source I believe they are very reliable.

In forwarding these rpats to me, the author asked me particularly not only to keep the source confidential but also not to divulge the place from which the rpts emanated.

Will you please handle them accordingly.

Sincerely
P. M. Powell
Major G-2

NOTED BY W. P. D.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1969, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] Date 12-23-71

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-8-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

RESUME OF CUBAN SITUATION:

From authentic and reliable sources reaching Miami from Havana late yesterday (Tuesday, October 10th).

No restrictions as to freedom of movement is placed upon the populace, and one goes and comes freely and undisturbed; BUT, it is exceedingly dangerous to go upon the streets at night. There is indiscriminate and uncontrolled firing of rifles and pistols, with from 300 or 400 uncontrolled youngsters armed and prowling around who fire anywhere and at any one on any pretext. Even in day time this situation prevails, and, in the words of one of high prominence in Havana put it: "One's life isn't worth a nickel in Havana".

The members (that is a large body of them) of the A.B.C. fire at soldiers, and the soldiers return the fire, or fire upon any suspected members of this uncontrolled large group.

The real heart of the situation is a problem between the present army, in its attempted control, and the groups of politicians, each with their own ideas and desires, in what is their idea of working out the problem to the best interests, while the people as a whole are more or less indifferent to the situation, not siding with either side, (if the situation might be considered as between these two sides). The reason for this is that the people do not know what is going to happen, nor what may happen, and are in an expectant frame of mind that anything may happen at any time, but no one knows, or has any idea, what might happen, the source from which it might come, the form it might take, or the results.

The general mental condition is nearing a par with the complete demoralization of business, and extreme danger lurks in any little movement which might cause a "flare-up" of any sizable group.

The present government does not have the support of the people, and its following is small. What government is being conducted is practically being done under the orders of Batista, as head of the army. Even the President's signature on a pass or letter permitting entrance or visit to the forts or prisons will not be recognized by the soldiers on guard there without the signature of Batista.

The army is holding together, having received their pay last month, but there is no control whatever over it. Some units follow orders from Batista, while others ignore them and class him as still a Sargeant, and of no higher rank than other Sergeants, and these others, as Sargeants, obey or otherwise as they please. Among the officers which have been returned to the army there is no unity, and no exercise of discipline over the men. The army is in a deplorable condition as to discipline, efficiency and dependability. Yet, it is the army, in this condition which is really controlling and running what government functions are accomplished.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

The newspaper stories of the past two days with respect to a possible succession of Grau by Carolos Mendietta are without foundation, and no such movement is now considered likely by those who actually favored such a change. There was an actual movement fomenting along this line, but which was completely dissipated Monday night (Oct. 9) when the group was dispersed. Anything thing, or any change can happen quickly, but for the past several days things have been quiet, and it is felt will remain quiet for at least a week, barring the unforseen.

Grau has promised a complete revolutionary change, with a new Government to be elected to serve until a constitution can be duly and properly adopted; and this would appear to satisfy most of the populace, but the politicians (as well as a large portion of the people) are not satisfied that these guarantees will be properly met, and thus the failure of support of the Grau government. Among the people as a whole, the present government has little support, although they have no other definite type or form of government, or other officials to turn to, or seek to put in office, developed sufficiently to warrant or even suggest a sudden change.

The absence of recognition by the United States seems to be the greatest factor in preventing the proper support of the Grau administration. Unless the U. S. recognizes his government very soon, it is bound to fail. The condition of the army, with its control of the Grau government, does not make for confidence or support of the Grau Government.

A complete reorganization of the army is absolutely necessary to prevent what is feared serious results. This reorganization cannot be accomplished under the present state of affairs, or under the present management of the army. It is generally felt that only intervention by the U. S. for the reorganization of the Cuban army can save a catastrophe.

There are about 200 well known and recognized members of the Communist organization, and it is known that they have been supplied with some funds from Russia. They are not spreading in membership, as communists, as the people of Cuba know that their aim is to cause trouble for the U. S., and that the welfare of Cuba means nothing to these communists. Cubans seem well posted on their aims and activities, and their number is small, and not many converts following them. However, their influence is extremely dangerous, their work is insistent, steady, and is rapidly having telling effects. For instance: They will harrange several hundred workmen of a sugar mill, urging them to make impossible demands, and then encouraging the working men to seize the mill when such demands are not complied with. This stage of their work is becoming serious and fast spreading. However, there is no communistic influence behind any of the revolutionary groups in governmental matters, and this includes the A.B.C. the Students' Group, and each of the five factions which formerly constituted the Revolutionary Junta. No communists are among any of these factions. As to the army, - it is in a very susceptible condition for communist propaganda, but it cannot be learned to what extent, if any, progress is being made by the communists among the ranks, but it is feared that there may be a leaning in that direction unless some reorganization, control and discipline is quickly effected.

It is widely felt that Ambassador Wells was in sympathy with the

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besieged group of Army Officers, and upon the belief that some coup was being arranged by this group, with the knowledge, at least, of Wells (and some say with his tacit permission and probable influence) the army opened the attack against the officers in order to stop any movement, and, in the vernacular, to "beat them to it". This is accepted as the cause of the attack. Now it is openly said that Wells has thus lost a great deal of prestige and confidence, and further negotiations and conferences with him towards mediation are actually looked upon with askance and suspicion by some of those participating, even though they exhibit a willingness and sincerity of purpose in conferring. The impression is given that whenever he deals with any one faction, the others are inwardly opposed with the ever-suspicious Latin mind unwilling to accept things at their face value in such negotiations.

Business is at a standstill. Starvation is facing the provinces. Demoralization is island wide. Conditions cannot continue as they are, and it is much feared that great loss of life and property will soon result unless immediate, sure, and positive remedies are applied. However, no one has the answer as to what remedies to apply, or how. Conditions at present are much worse than before, but the entire island is still extremely bitter against former President Machado, and a good deal of feeling has been aroused because of failure to prosecute (persecute, they really mean) the Machadistas, and to permit many of them to leave the island, with most of the people believing that they got away with much wealth. The absence of any positive move against the Machadistas by any government will bring criticism to that government. This is the Latin mind.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT 7

Supplementing Information of October 11th, on:

SITUATION IN CUBA:

Contacts between Officers and enlisted men in the Cuban Army are by no means close as in the U. S. Army. The Cuban Army, in actual daily practice is practically run by the Sargeants and other non-coms, while the officers live at their respective homes, and have really little intercourse or relations with the men. Especially is this true throughout the Provinces. In Havana, where about 4,000 troops are now stationed, there is more contact between men and officers than in the provinces.

While the army at Havana is now following Batista, this does not maintain throughout the Provinces, and there is practically no central control over the army units of the Provinces. Batista will be unable to continue his present leadership strength, or continue to have the Havana units follow him much longer, and the present army situation is decidedly "ripe" for the unbending efforts of the communistic groups which are now using every effort of propaganda and persuasion to create unrest and dissatisfaction, and to destroy all remaining semblance of discipline, in the army units. It can be expected that very soon there will be absolutely no central control of the present army whatever,-and then,-disaster.

Summing the entire situation, there are but three solutions of the Cuban problem, as believed by many of the prominent and influential Cubans who know, but none of whom dares to express the opinion if he thinks he would be quoted, or that such an expression could be traced to him.

The solutions all involve the U. S., and are:

1. For the U. S. To abandon Cuba to her fate.

2. For the U. S. to give positive and unequivacal orders to Grau to assure properly supervised elections of a government committed to the adoption and establishment of a proper constitution. AND, such assurances would only be accepted by the people of Cuba, with any degree of confidence, by an immediate and complete re-organization of the Cuban Army, which they are positive cannot be accomplished by the present, or any other regeime, under present conditions; and that the only manner in which the army can be re-organized would be for the U. S. to send 5000 to 6000 troops solely for the purpose of reorganization of the army, and do this job. It is confidently felt that 60 to 90 days ONLY would be required for this to be accomplished by the U. S.,-and without a general intervention, with the present Government recognized, but made to carry out such definite plans.

3. Widespread and disastrous civil strife, with much loss of life, and no one foreseeing the end, must follow, and soon and swiftly, if the second solution is not adopted. This, of course, then means a complete intervention by the U. S. should such conditions arise, and with an army of much greater proportions, and covering

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a long period of time.

Under the Treaty of Paris and the Platt Amendment, the above appear as the only solutions to pre[illegible]inent interested parties, NONE of whom really want U. S. intervention, and NONE of whom would DARE suggest it, or even suggest that either of the above three solutions are necessary or possible; YET they feel that way about, say so among themselves, but all the time hoping that something else instead might occur.

Instead of passing as time goes on the feeling against everything even remotely connected with Machado's establishment is increasing; and this is one cause of danger from the army. A number of the older officers have been called back; and among the some three hundred officers now in the army no one seems to be able to definitely place on one side or the other any large group of these officers; these officer do little, have no control over discipline, and, because of the mixture they represent do not command any large degree of confidence either from the populace or the army itself.

Matters are expected to remain somewhat quiet the rest of this week, but all are fearful of the forthcoming week.

With expected wide spread strikes throughout the island about to begin again, urged and fanned by communistic influences, much fear is felt that enlisted personnel throughout the Republic, and although the communist element is really small at present, and has no control or voice in any of the various "factions", the situation and mental condition is such that much apprehension is felt that unless some positive remedial measures are effected that the communists will have wide spread control, cause disastrous unrest, and lend encouragement to civil strife and be the cause of much property damage and bloodshed.

The populace at present is passively submitting to present governmental control, but has no confidence of its success with the uncontrolled army as it is, and the main backing of the present government being this type of unreliable army.

Real Cubans feel that the U. S. is in a large degree responsible for their present troubles, and so blames it; they also blame it for non-action during the past weeks; and will further blame it if it intervenes in any manner, BUT, will lay more blame on the U. S. if it does not intervene to at least the extent of re-organization of the army, and giving positive indications to the present government that it must take actual steps to guarantee proper elections, aconstitution, and stable government. Cubans do not believe that Grau, -or any one else, - can satisfy the people on these measures unless it is known and felt that the U. S. has taken a firm hand, and the Cubans feel it is obligated to do so under the Treaty of Paris and Platt Amendment.

As to Menocal:

General Mario G. Menocal has refused to support the present government

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

on the grounds that he cannot subscribe to what he terms "radical" tendencies behind it. (By this is not meant "communistic", but "radical" as opposed to sound conversatism). He takes the position that youthful students and enlisted personnel of the army (and these constitute the bulk of Grau's support) are not sufficiently mature of age or thought to realize, much less effect, what the situation demands.

Menocal refused to "turn to the left" with the radical element, although strongly urged to do so, and with every opportunity of making himself a power by so doing; and, instead "kept to the right" with what he thought were the sound, conservative, thinking men of Cuba, who had Cuba at heart more than they did themselves or political spoils. His closest friends criticize him for not heeding the opportunity, but search among them will reveal that there is perhaps a selfish motive behind this criticism. It is firmly and deeply believed that Menocal is seriously interested in the welfare of Cuba, and does not seek anything for himself. He has proven this by refusing to take advantage of opportunities offered, and has personally stated to his closest friends that he does not seek, nor would he accept, anything for himself. Menocal has often been referred to as a "cagey politician". If he ever were such it has been in day past. Today, it may be accepted that he is sincerely a sound, conservative Cuban, with the welfare of his people at heart.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 RDP
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O. C. B., M. I. D., G. S.

(Date) (Initials)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

October 31, 1933.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By JFL
Date 4-2-71

Major R. M. Howell,
A. C. of S., G-2, 4th Corps Area.
Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Ga.

My dear Major:

I wish to acknowledge the two reports dated October 10 and 11, 1933, from a Miami source transmitted with your undated personal letter to Colonel Nulsen, who is on leave.

The reports have been read with great interest and we assume from the context that they emanated from General Menocal or some of his entourage.

Any further information that you may gain from Miami will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

C. M. THIELE,
Major, General Staff,
Acting Executive Officer.

cp

Mailed G/2 W.D. OCT 31 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS AREA
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
FORT McPHERSON ATLANTA GEORGIA

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CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By JJT
Date 4-2-71

November 2, 1933.

SUBJECT: Reports Regarding Cuba.

TO: Executive Officer,
G-2 Section, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

This report, as well as the two preceding reports I have mailed, emanated from a source close to General Menocal. For this reason my agent is particularly concerned that they be regarded with greatest secrecy.

R. M. HOWELL,
Major, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Incl.
Report re Cuba.

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
MIAMI NEWS 10/31/33

PRESIDENT — Cuba's post-revolution past presidents may gain a member in President Grau San Martin within the next 10 days, if the whirligig within the authentic sources in Havana learns from the incumbent president is hailed as "a fine fellow and a gentleman," the fact that he did nothing more remarkable in the public eye prior to his ascendancy than to become an outstanding surgeon and mathematics teacher in Havana university, weighs against him. Above all, in a president, Cuba wants action—action in capital letters.

PAL—"'N he was making a lot of noise and yelling you were his pal, judge, and said you'd never send him to jail. That was the tale an arrest officer told Judge Dunn in municipal court yesterday. "My pal, huh," mused the judge, looking coldly at the prisoner. "Thirty days."

MACHADO—Betting among well-informed Cubans is that Machado will attempt a return to the island as the national savior. He may possibly get there if he doesn't stand too close to windows. Ambassador Welles isn't very popular in Havana. He is tagged by Cubans as "welles mal," which means "smells bad."

ber 1, 1933)

e of the conference set for noon today as a result of rective measures" by a wing of the Student Group is not ward to by the general mind of the public as a soultion oms.

arlos Mendieta be persuaded (and he may be susceptible step into the picture in place of Grau he could not ac-nds,-and such action would merely be changing the the "team" to pull them over the hill.

ista still holds the reins and is the real power behind the ot intend to step aside and relinquish his control, al- of the Cuban Army is opposed to, or disinclined to ing Presidents with Batista still in control will not The army (under Batista) controls the Government,-nment controlling the army. This order of things must ranquility, peace, or recovery can be had;-because no confidence will be placed in any situation which might be developed with this reverse order of things continuing.

Meanwhile unrest increases, laboring people and the general masses are becoming easier prey for the disturbers and communistically inclined, and very fertile fields are opening up for the spread of discontent;-and this discontent gives present indications of increasing to destructive action unless quelled.

These observations are an analysis of expressions which thinking Cubans will make to each other when they know to whom they are talking, but will not speak for publication or repetition as to source,-based upon actual happenings from hour to hour in Havanna.

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CUBA: (November 1, 1933)

The outcome of the conference set for noon today as a result of demands for "corrective measures" by a wing of the Student Group is not being looked forward to by the general mind of the public as a soultion to existing problems.

Even should Carlos Mendieta be persuaded (and he may be susceptible to persuasion) to step into the picture in place of Grau he could not accomplish desired ends,-and such action would merely be changing the "wagon" instead of the "team" to pull them over the hill.

Florencio Batista still holds the reins and is the real power behind the scenes. He does not intend to step aside and relinquish his control, although at least 50% of the Cuban Army is opposed to, or disinclined to follow him. Changing Presidents with Batista still in control will not effect a solution. The army (under Batista) controls the Government,-instead of the Government controlling the army. This order of things must be reversed before tranquility, peace, or recovery can be had;-because no general confidence will be placed in any situation which might be developed with this reverse order of things continuing.

Meanwhile unrest increases, laboring people and the general masses are becoming easier prey for the disturbers and communistically inclined, and very fertile fields are opening up for the spread of discontent;-and this discontent gives present indications of increasing to destructive action unless quelled.

These observations are an analysis of expressions which thinking Cubans will make to each other when they know to whom they are talking, but will not speak for publication or repetition as to source,-based upon actual happenings from hour to hour in Havanna.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

3020-d

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) or NSC 10 B
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/12/74

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(d) Armed Revolutionary Movements

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 9 1933

1. The following is a translation of the statement made by the Cuban Chief of Staff Colonel Fulgencio Batista, to a reporter of the newspaper LA MAÑANA, a morning paper edited by the striking employees of EL DIARIO DE LA MARINA, as published in LA MAÑANA edition of October 15, 1933. This statement will, no doubt, be of interest to the Department as it describes in detail Batista's moves during the last few days before September 4, 1933, that led to the overthrow of De Cespedes.

2. "The mediation came to obstruct the course of the revolution. Once again the will of the Cuban people was being thwarted. The politicians, identical with those of the previous regime (-Machado's), sought positions, resulting in the continuation of the same state of affairs. They sold another piece of the country already torn to tatters. The only ones who did not accept the mediation were the students and some real revolutionists. I believe we had to count with them. I also had with me these upright officers with whom I was acquainted. My group of indefatigable comrades, Pedraza, Rodriguez, Echeverria, Alfonso, and Molino, and many others had been working hard. The Cespedes government, product of the then state of affairs, aggravated the situation. The same officers who sustained Machado now continued at the head of the army. It was worse. There were brought into the army the retired chiefs whose activities the non-commissioned officers did not remember with pleasure. The intended renovation was only another pre[illegible] betraying the true revolutionary ideals of the people."

3. "We had already extended our activities to several organisms within the District (that is, Havana). We counted upon comrades in others. We began to appoint delegates. Since we had to work actively, our superiors began to learn of what was taking place. Besides, the bloody spectacles which we were witnessing caused us to make haste. That was not justice; it was looting and murder which did not obey, could not obey any logical or revolutionary procedure."

4. "Thus we were extending our work throughout the island. We made trips under any pretext, myself or my comrades, in order to establish connections with the soldiers and non-commissioned officers. A few well tried officers were with us. But we had left them aside because we knew better than anyone else the situation of the officers in the army. The superiors feared their subordinates. The latter hated their old chiefs who had taken advantage of things. Among thevery young officers there were several tendencies. Some followed a leader. Others were reactionary. Others were frankly in favor of the new ideals. They also were preparing a coup which would have been a bloody one due to the diversity of tendencies. This was the reason why we decided to eliminate them from our movement. Thus we could not be accused of partisanship."

5. "No one was more respectful than myself toward the personality

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4298 November 1, 1933

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of Dr. Cespedes, but his person was precisely the screen behind which all uncontrollable ambitions struggled. If these ambitions would have succeeded, they would have put an end to our nationality."

6. "We were lacking the provinces Oriente and Pinar del Rio. I was going to leave for the Oriente province where we knew our work was already being carried on but where it was necessary to establish a concentration. On September 2, when I arrived at General Headquarters, Captain Heriberto Serdiñas called me to one side and tried to find out what we were up to without exercising his authority. I could not refrain from telling him that the privates and non-commissioned officers were not pleased with the situation and that we would not hesitate before any danger to bring our country out of the shameful situation in which it had been placed. The interview ended somewhat brusquely, and then I realized that the time for action had come. The sensation of anguish and of shame which I felt from the very moment of the funeral of Miguel Angel Hernandez, a martyr to our cause, overwhelmed me. I decided to play the game for what might be in it. The speech I made at the cemetery at the tomb of sergeant Hernandez and the laborer Iglesias, whom we buried the same day as the student Alpizar, obsessed me and at the same time illuminated me before the civil elements whose consent and cooperation we were to count on."

7. "This was not lost sight of at any time, since I personally or thru delegates was always in contact with civilian elements. I decided to summon the privates and non-commissioned officers to an assembly on my return from a trip to Matanzas. We were not asleep. As a matter of fact, I called the sergeants and privates of the Revolutionary Junta of Columbia to the Enlisted Men's Club. Pedraza and Rodriguez had charge of that. On reaching the doorway, sergeant Claussel told me that Captain Torres Menier was waiting for me. Before that a corporal had approached me, from the Aviation Field, who not being acquainted with our intentions of separating the officers from the movement, had in good faith committed the indiscretion of asking the captain if we could count on the aviation corps. I told this comrade to leave, in order to meet later, and I went into the hall where the captain was waiting for me."

8. "Several of those in accord with me arrived and then I placed the captain at the head of a long narrow table, around which we all sat. The captain began to talk, asking what our motives were for this movement, and he told us that it was not true that the pay of privates was going to be reduced to $13 per month. I answered that the moment had come in which the Cuban soldier was willing to lose everything so long as the Republic might be saved, and that this could not take place along the lines that were being followed by the new government. I told him of the discontent in the ranks. As I talked the hall was being filled with men, and then audaciously I told Captain Torres Menier: "'In the same manner as so many soldiers were standing in that hall, so was the Republic standing on the alert.'"

9. "Torres Menier spoke to me of Colonel Sanguily. He mentioned the necessity of telling him of our state of mind. He asked us for time until two o'clock that afternoon, in order to call on him and report what had taken place at the meeting. I guaranteed the life of all officers. Captain Torres Menier left immediately but did not return, and when the time set had elapsed, we commenced to telephone orders and broadcast them by radio. The news was to the effect that sergeant Batista

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had assumed command of the Army by virtue of the revolutionary demands of the people of Cuba, expressed by soldiers and sailors."

10. "I knew that those same elements were preparing a military coup - non-revolutionary - with the object of seizing the power. I tried to stop that by precipitating our own. How were we to admit them again? I am in favor of the free concurrence of all Cubans and of their full p articipation in the public administration. But I realized that all moments are not the same. The revolution has a very clear program. It has to fulfil it and that purpose can be carried out only thru the homogeneous action by men identified with the same aim. We are doing that."

11. "To-day I am just as close to the Student Directorate as I was on that night. We in the military service have proceeded as they have in public life. The vitiated air of Cuba will soon be cleared up. I think it is much clearer now."

12. "Since I am in favor of civil government, I at once got into contact with the students whose program had circulated a few days before and which to me seemed to contain the revolutionary ideals of the nation in the time thru which it is passing. I am not unaware of the fact that there are more revolutionary programs, but I and my comrades consider them not yet ripe enoughfor the historical moment thru which we are passing."

13. "The history of that night's doing is still to be written. When the whole Republic became acquainted with our intentions, there was initiated the work of the Revolutionary Assembly that culminated in the Junta of the Five. I delivered the power to it which, in spite of having been in my hands only a few hours, was already burning them. I was called upon right there and besought to take part in the government by the very persons from whose side I had withdrawn some time ago by my own well considered decision. I adduced that it was necessary for them to change their political standards in order to take part in the new revolutionary era."

14. "The tendency of the government of Grau San Martin is clearly specified in each one of the public declarations of the President himself, and in all the acts of the government. It does not persecute anyone because of his ideas. But if the propaganda of any future effort seeks to prevent the realization of the program, it must be suppressed. The virtue of our country is for us above all other considerations. The Cubans can have and propagate any ideals they wish, including the communistic ideal, but we will not allow the professional foreign propagandist to carry on his disturbing work, just as we will not allow the foreigner, no matter what his situation may be -banker or revolutionist- to continue exploiting the native. We ask for freedom to put our nation in order, and we are ready to maintain order at all costs against anybody both here and abroad."

15. "We will never persecute those well intentioned persons who are not of our own opinion. But we can not permit our liberty to be coerced because it is for the good and the prosperity of the Cubans. Because they are of the same mind is the reason that the sergeants and non-commissioned officers of the Cuban Army placed the power in the hands of students and professors. Whatever else may be said in this respect

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is merely insidious propagenda and false. We wanted to avoid a civil war, even at the cost of a sacrifice. Do you believe we should permit a civil war to be stirred up now?"

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

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Bombing Activities in Havana.

1. During the past week there has been much bombing in Havana. The largest number of bombs exploded in any one night during this period was the night of November 1st-2nd., when ten bombs were exploded in the city; one on Neptuna Street destroyed plate glass windows of shops for a block on each side of the place where the bomb was put. Another bomb was exploded at headquarters of the Havana police department, about 5 P.M., November 1st., while it was being examined, and this resulted in three police officers being killed and seven seriously wounded.

2. Between 2 and 3 A.M. on November 1st. several hundred shots were fired at soldiers and police in the Almendares section of the city. No known casualties have been reported. An American eye-witness reported to me that some twenty automobiles containing armed civilians cruised through the streets in the vicinity of his home, firing at men in uniform. At about the same hour on November 2nd., several hundred shots were fired from the Presidential Palace, Castillo de la Punta and the Malecon. Although the American Embassy was not fired upon, the night policeman on duty in front of the Embassy sought shelter inside the building.

3. It is our opinion that the bombings and shootings are not the work of communists or labor agitators, but are the work of a political organization opposed to the present government.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Contacts.

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4300 Date: November 2, 1933.

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G-2 Report 3020-b 7

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

1. The Students' Directorate formally declared to the assembled student body on November 5 that the provisional revolutionary government (that is, the administration of Ramon Grau) is "firmly consolidated and has initiated its constructive course".

2. In its report the Diretorate claims that it has obtained the foundation for economic liberty, and, for the university, has effected its autonomy and the vindication for which the student body has clamored.

3. It was voted that the Directorate shall be maintained until the "Federation of University Students" will have been organized.

4. In the proclamation read to the assembled students it was stated that "the Students' Directorate has terminated its historic mission,.....has succeeded in overthrowing the Machado tyranny and in establishing the principles of a new republic.....that it was necessary to bring down also the Cespedes administration which was only a new servant to imperialistic interests, formed in the laboratories of the American Embassy, behind the back of public opinion, by the shameful process of mediation."

5. The present administration of Ramon Grau is highly praised in said proclamation.

6. The students are planning a demonstration seeking the withdrawal of the American Ambassador Welles whom they accuse of being mainly responsible for the economic crisis the island is suffering. This oral attack was led by the student Eddie Chibas who accused the ambassador of seeking to overthrow the Grau government in defending American interests.

7. Another student, Julio César Fernandez, editor of the newspaper ALMA MATER, published in this paper on November 5 that he has sent the following cablegram to

"Presidente Roosevelt, Washington, D.C. - Interpretando sentir pueblo
"cubano, periódico ALMA MATER reclama inmediata retirada embajador
"Welles, perturbador de la paz pública y conspirador sistemático al
"lado de elementos reaccionarios. Julio César Fernandez, editor."

Translation:

"President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C. - Interpreting feeling of
"Cuban people, newspaper ALMA MATER requests immediate withdrawal
"of ambassador Welles, disturber of the public peace and systematic
"conspirator on the side of reactionary elements.
Julio César Fernandez, editor."

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4304 November 6, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2657-g-330

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS, NARS Date 2/12/74

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Armed Revolutionary Movement.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 13 1933

Counter-Revolutionary Movement.

1. During the night of November 7-8th, a counter-revolutionary movement was started against the present Cuban Government. The Aviation Corps, Dragones Barracks, San Ambrosio Supply Depot and Fort Atares revolted. Three airplanes piloted by former Cuban officers of the Aviation Corps took off from the field and attacked Camp Columbia, Castillo de la Punta and Battery No. 5, Vedado, with machine gun fire. No bombs were dropped. A number of members of the A.B.C. and others opposed to the Government assembled at the several forts and barracks which revolted, where arms and ammunition were issued to them. There was much fighting in and around the aviation field and although casualties were slight, the rebels were either captured or driven off. Various estimates are given as to the number of A.B.C.'s and others who reported to San Ambrosio; one estimate is as high as 4000; another and possibly more accurate estimate is 2000. Approximately 1100 arms with ammunition were issued to these civilians, and most of them left the barracks.

2. Nine of the thirteen police precincts revolted, and although all were subsequently recaptured, the rebels, in most cases, were able to escape without serious loss. Many of the soldiers who revolted at the above mentioned barracks were permitted to withdraw with their arms.

3. All day long on November 8th the Government made concentrated attack on San Ambrosio Supply Depot, both by land and water; light artillery and infantry operating against it from the streets of Havana, and the Cuban cruiser "Cuba" and gunboat "Patria" firing from the harbor. Some damage was done to the depot, but very few, if any, casualties were inflicted among the defenders. Throughout the day there was much sniping all over Habana. A squad of soldiers located alongside the Embassy fired on several occasions during the day, and also intermittently during the day of November 9th, at snipers across the park in front of the Embassy. This, of course, was very annoying to the personnel in the building and particularly to those in the office of the Military Attache, as the soldiers were firing directly outside and in direct prolongation of the large open windows of the office.

4. During the night of November 8-9th, the defenders of Dragones and San Ambrosio concentrated at Fort Atares, which they defended until 3 P.M. in the afternoon when the fort surrendered. The Government opened the bombardment at 10 A.M., surrounding the fort which stands on a round knole about 100 feet above the surrounding terrain. Not many casualties could have been caused by the attacking infantry, but many resulted from the light artillery which was placed at several surrounding points, and from the fire of the cruiser "Cuba" and the gunboat "Patria". The latest report gives the number of dead in the fort as approximately 100, with many wounded. This cannot be confirmed at this time. The actual number of defenders is not known. The Government lists the number as approximately 400, which is believed to be about

From M. A., Havana No. 4311 Date: November 10, 1933

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correct as the fort is small and could not have accommodated a much larger force. However, friends and relatives of the besieged estimate the number as high as 1800. Some sniping from roofs throughout the fight caused casualties among the government troops, but the total losses are not known at this time. Last night, except for some sniping, Havana was quiet.

5. Communication with the provinces has been broken for two days. The meagre reports that are received indicate that the revolution was half-hearted and that the revolutionists were generally unsuccessful, although it is possible that certain localities in the provinces are in revolt. Colonel Juan Blas Hernandez, the rebel leader, who made a stand for two years in the fields of Camaguey against Machado, and whose recent activities against the present government have been reported, was among the casualties.

6. A more detailed report will be submitted as soon as reliable information can be obtained.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4311 Date: Nov. 10, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89



Vista panorámica del legendario Castillo de Atarés cuyos macizos muros resistieron en un lejano ayer el brioso ataque de las fuerzas inglesas y que convertido en baluarte de la rebelión contra el Gobierno de Grau San Martín, se rindió en la tarde de ayer a las fuerzas del Coronel Batista.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV.
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Armed Revolutionary Movements.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 17 1933

Desertion of Soldiers, Etc.

1. On November 10th or 11th a detachment of Rural Guard, squad No. 18, stationed at Holguin, and a number of other soldiers, presumably from the 3rd. troop of the 3rd. Cavalry Squadron and the 4th company of the 3rd. Battalion of Infantry, deserted. Official reports deny this; however, I have absolutely reliable information to the effect that a wholesale desertion occurred, although I cannot obtain any information as to the number of men that deserted. It is most probable that the deserters have joined a counter-revolutionary movement in the zone of Gibara, Chaparra and Holguin. Trunk telephone lines connecting Holguin with Havana and Santiago were cut by counter-revolutionists on November 11th. These lines were repaired and again cut on November 12th just west of Holguin. A bridge on the Cuba Railroad's main line, just southeast of Holguin (possibly over the river at Mir) was destroyed by counter-revolutionists on November 12th. Late the afternoon of the same day a railroad bridge and a Central Highway bridge were destroyed at points between Holguin and Santiago. However, the exact locations cannot be determined.

2. The size of this counter-revolutionary force and the extent of its operation cannot be definitely ascertained. This area, however, is strongly "Menocalista", and, although it is definitely known to this office that Menocal himself was in Miami on the night of November 11th, it is believed that this movement has been organized by his supporters.

3. The situation in Santiago is comparatively quiet, but tense. When the commander of the 1st. Military District at Santiago requested reinforcements from Havana on November 10th, he was informed that there were no troops in Havana available for the purpose. However, Batista agreed to send to him the cavalry squadron stationed at Santa Clara. No confirmation of the movement has been obtained, and I am of the opinion that the promise to send the troops has not been carried into effect; otherwise I am sure that I would have obtained information of the movement from some point along the Central Highway or the Cuba Railroad between Santa Clara and Holguin.

4. November 12th was predicted to be "bloody Sunday". However, it was comparatively quiet, with some sniping in the central part of the city and in the suburbs, but much less than at any time since November 8th. A bottle of gasoline was discovered in the laundry of the Anglo-American Hospital on the night of November 10th, with fuse attached. However, it was discovered in time to prevent damage. On Sunday morning, November 12th, a small bomb was found, with fuse burned out, during church services at the Episcopal Cathredal.

5. The Government refuses to give any information as to casualties among soldiers and sailors during the fighting and sniping since the morning of November 8th, but their losses are believed to be very heavy. Three sailors were killed in a room near the telephone building on November 9th, and five were killed on November 11th, by snipers at the Castillo de la Punta. On November 9th, a 7-ton truck loaded with soldiers, which was blocked by traffic in a narrow street, was fired into by snipers with machine guns and, according to an eye-witness, some forty of these soldiers were killed and wounded. These are but a few of the numbers of casualties which filter into this office from eye-witnesses or otherwise. It is possible that the losses among the counter-revolutionists are even greater than those of the Government. These losses include the casualties on November 9th in Fort Atares. There were no casualties among the defenders

From M. A., Havana No.4315 Date: Nov. 13, 1933.

NOV 21 1933 NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

at San Ambrosio, but there have been heavy casualties among the snipers and they also caused heavy losses among the soldiers and sailors patroling the streets,and very materially lowered the morale of these forces. Had intensive sniping continued for a few days more, it is possible that the morale of the Government troops would have been so shaken as to have caused many desertions or a refusal on the part of units to do further patrol duty in the city.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contact and
Observation.

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4315 Date: Nov. 13, 1933.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

2657-J-

Subject: Trend of Recent and Current Events.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 17 1933

1. Captain Franco Granero, Cuban Army, was replaced as Chief of the National Police of Havana on or about November 5th. He had been a very close friend and warm supporter of the Chief of Staff, Fulgencio Batista.

2. About a week ago, Franco called at my office with his adjutant and a Cuban newspaperman, and as escort three automobiles filled with soldiers and police armed with rifles and sub-machine guns, who remained outside. Franco seemed very nervous and the reason of his visit was disclosed when he told me that conditions in Cuba were very bad indeed - that they could hardly be worse and that almost the entire populace were displeased with the present Government and he desired very much to know whom I thought should be President. I replied that I could not offer any suggestions. The next day he was relieved as Chief of Police, to be followed by Lieutenant Marcos del Arno, who in turn has been relieved by Mario Labourdette, appointed Chief of the National Police on November 12th. Labourdette was not connected with either the Army or the Police, but is a very prominent member of the Pro Ley y Justicia organization. Confidential information indicates that Labourdette will be a figurehead and that the police force will really be controlled by a Lieutenant Gonzalez.

3. It is the present intention of the Government to completely reorganize the National Police, reinstating those members who have been loyal to the Government and replacing the disloyal members by personnel from the Pro Ley y Justicia organization.

4. It was the announced policy of the Government some days ago to disband and disarm the Pro Ley y Justicia organization and it is believed that steps were taken to disarm some of the units of the organization. However, it is a fact that one or two of these units were not disarmed. Since the counter-revolutionary movement started on November 8th, the Government has issued arms and ammunition to many civilians, and, from personal observation it was noted that many of these civilians were negroes, mulattoes and disreputable looking whites; whether they have been incorporated in the semi-military-political organization known as Pro Ley y Justicia or not has not as yet been ascertained by the Embassy.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4317 Date: Nov. 14, 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 23 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. NOV 21 1933

1. As a consequence to the last outbreak of rebellion of November 8 and 9, the government issued on November 10 a Decree No. 2591, published in the Gaceta Oficial of November 11, which revokes all licenses for arms and orders that all arms be given up within 24 hours.

2. Those who deliver arms but do not wish to give their names are officially promised that they will not be molested and that no investigations will be made.

3. All houses all over Cuba are to be searched by army and police forces, and all persons found in possession of arms are to be summarily arrested and prosecuted for the crime of rebellion.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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M. A. Cuba Report No. 4323 November 15, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MILITARY INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report 3020-d

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(d) Armed Revolutionary Movements

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 21 1933

1. As per newspaper reports, five rebels were killed November 15 in an encounter with loyal troops near Bayamo in Oriente Province. Seven other rebels were wounded and taken prisoner by the soldiers who also captured a quantity of arms and ammunition.

2. Another armed band reported to have taken the town of Niquero, Oriente Province, on November 14, cut off telegraph and telephone communications, according to the chief of communications of that town. They refused to permit reparation of the lines, but were later pursued by army troops.

3. In Havana a large cache of arms was reported found November 15 by soldiers in the Collazo Building and taken to army headquarters. No arrests were reported following this find.

4. On November 14, a band of 300 well armed rebels was in control of the town of Agramonte, Matanzas Province. This band had not been molested by the Government prior to receipt of latest official report of U. S. Vice-Consul at Matanzas dated November 15.

Source: Press and Embassy

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4324 November 16, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/01

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

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By C. Chief of Div. 18,
1500, from IAGO to Archivist
By
Date 12-25-71

NOV 23 1933 MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Armed Revolutionary Movements.

RECEIVED G/2 W. P. NOV 21 1933

1. With respect to the last revolutionary movement of November 8-9, it will be of interest to note the spirit of moderation with which the Government of Ramon Grau San Martin is dealing with the prisoners.

2. According to newspaper reports, the Chief of Staff, Fulgencio Batista, declared on November 14th, that the Government was not seeking further bloodshed nor vengeance and for that reason was giving a close study to the recommendations made by the council of war held at Camp Columbia a few days ago. It is understood that this council of war is considering death sentences for the three alleged military leaders of the recent revolt and six years imprisonment for the other thirty-one prisoners, but the Government is postponing its decision. The Consuls of twenty-six countries accredited to Cuba held a meeting and made a plea to the Cuban Government to be lenient with the prisoners and to avoid death sentences. The Peruvian Liberal Party also sent a cable to the President, asking him to use the utmost leniency, especially in the case of Rafael Iturralde, prominent revolutionist, when it was reported that he had been taken prisoner at the Atares Fort. The President replied by cable on November 14th, promising that "the Cuban Government will act with the greatest justice and generosity in connection with the prosecution of those who participated in the latest revolt." The Minister of Uruguay, Benjamin Fernandez Medina, called several times on President Grau San Martin during the last revolt, trying to mediate and to avoid bloodshed by the bombardment of Fort Atares. The Minister has now moved to the Hotel Bristol, where he occupies an entire floor, and is taking care of many Cuban political refugees.

3. Civilians taken prisoners on November 8-9 numbered more than a thousand, a number of whom have since been released, including all who were under seventeen years of age. It is understood that the civilian prisoners will be tried in the civil courts by Judge Andres Domingo Morales del Castillo, who is also reported to be in charge of the investigation as to the guilt of the officers captured at the battle of the Hotel National on October 2nd. Thirty-four of the soldiers captured at the Atares Fort on November 9th that were tried by the council of war at Camp Columbia, are still awaiting sentence. The delay in imposing sentence is due mainly to the numerous petitions for clemency which the Government is receiving from many sources.

4. Sergio Carbo, one of the leaders of the coup d'etat which installed the present Government on September 4th, made the following statements on November 13th, which were published in the local papers:

"After the painful occurrences that all true Cubans must mourn bitterly, my duty as a revolutionary Cuban is to declare that victory by force is short-lived and nothing can be built on it. The only permanent and definite victory must be by elevation of the spirit of all fellow citizens to realize the urgent need to cooperate in good faith, in order that the Republic can progress without obstacles. Regardless of its material strength, the Government cannot govern against a counter-current. It must govern for all Cubans, including its opponents.

"Until the Constitutional Convention takes place, governing should be limited to three very simple points: first, public order; second, honest and orderly administration; third, the development of

From M. A., Havana No. 4325 Date: Nov. 16, 1933.

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a preelection political functioning, with absolute guarantee to all political parties.

"Attack provokes counter attack, as has already been shown, and struggle or sabotage will provoke the failure of our sovereignty sooner or later, staining us with civil incapacity, which we cannot permit to be brought by the strength of foreign steel to our borders.

"When I hear talk of executions, I suppose it refers to those blood-stained assassins of Machado's who are smiling in forts and prisons, and who up to the present time are untouched, while the survivors from their clutches kill each other in the streets."

(Note: Reference Sergio Carbo's statement quoted above, it may be of interest to know that Carbo, Guiteras, Batista and Grau San Martin are in a state of agitation as to the security of their government. It is our opinion that they would be only too glad to liberalize the present government by taking in the A.B.C., the O.C.R.R., U. N. and others; however, these organizations refuse to participate in the Grau Government.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy

TNG:VM

From M. A., Havana No. 4325 Date: November 16, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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NOV 23 2657-Q-330 1933

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY, (MECHANIZED)
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER

Fort Knox, Kentucky.
November 20th.1933.

SUBJECT : Military Attache Reports.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Request the following report be furnished this office:

2657-Q-330/222 Cuba Overthrow of De Cespedes Government-
Statement by Col. Batista.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

J. I. GIBSON.
Captain, 1st. Cavalry, Mech.
ADJUTANT.

1st Cavalry
NOV 21 1933
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M. I. D.
1933 NOV-23- AM 10:38

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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RECEIVED
1933

2657-Q-330

G-2/2657-Q-330
W. D., G-2, Washington, D. C. November 28, 1933. To: The Adjutant, Hdqs. First Cavalry, Office of the Regimental Commander, Fort Knox, Ky. 231 WAR DEPARTMENT

1. Military Attache Report requested in basic letter is transmitted herewith for your information and use.

2. In order that Military Attache Reports may be freely loaned to all branches and serviceshaving use for them, in no case will reports be held longer than ten days. Your cooperation is requested in returning reports to this office within the time specified.

For the Chief of Divisions:

C K Nulsen

DEC 1 1933

C. K. NULSEN,,
Lieut. Col., General Staff,
Executive Officer.

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G-2/2657-Q-330 2d Ind. JIG/llg

Headquarters, First Cavalry (Mechanized), Office of the Regimental Commander, Fort Knox, Kentucky, December 2, 1933. To: War Department, G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Military Attache Report inclosed herewith.

DEC 4

For the Commanding Officer:

J. I. Gibbon

J. I. GIBBON,
Captain, 1st Cavalry (Mechanized),
Adjutant.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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3020-d

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(d) Armed Revolutionary Movements

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. NOV 24 1933

1. Sergio Carbó, one of the most influential advisers to the Grau Government, made the following statement to press on November 16:

"Almost all prisoners of the revolt of November 8 and 9 with "whom I have talked say they were fooled, and they must be right, "because when the leaders and organizers of such affairs are not "found in the battle lines, the recruits have good reason to con- "sider themselves victims of a bloody deception."

"The civilians, mostly youngsters, were excited and harangued "by the intriguers to do the fighting for them."

"The military prisoners are under special jurisdiction, and "foreigners who bore arms against the republic should be deported "as undesirable ingrates. The native civilians should be released "without delay."

"I am certain that no Cuban would conscientiously serve as a "stepping stone for others to climb."

"There are three classes of prisoners: soldiers, foreigners, "and native civilians who until a few days ago were sniping from "housetops, violating the laws of Cuba."

"With this and the withdrawal of Mr. Welles, whose diplomatic "errors we have no reason to wash out with our blood, the atmos- "phere that is too heavily charged with "foreignism" should be "cleared."

"When we have no more foreign "managers", we Cubans will get "along ourselves. After all, this was the most important point "indicated by the revolution."

2. In his weekly paper LA SEMANA of November 19, Sergio Carbó published an insulting article against Ambassador Summer Welles, saying in the leadlines: Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, we Cubans thank you for having recalled Mr. Welles, and we hope his absence will be permanent.

3. About 500 members of the National Police stationed in Havana have been discharged as a consequence of the revolt of November 8 and 9.

Source: Press

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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M. A. Cuba Report No. 4327 November 20, 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Political Issues and Problems
(a) Important Problems and Issues
Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 24 1933

1. Confiscation of the property and money of former government officials acquired during the Machado administration will be definitely launched within a few days when provisional President Ramon Grau signs a decree that will authorize an audit of the goods, including bank deposits.

2. The audit will include acquisitions to the estates of the various former officials between the dates of May 20, 1925, and August 12, 1933. Registrars in charge of real and personal property records, it is understood, will be forbidden to register any transfers until the audit is concluded.

Source: Press

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4329 November 20, 1933

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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NOV 24 1933
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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2657-B-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

3020-b

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 24 1933

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

1. The Havana Post of November 21, 1933, publishes a statement made by Dr. Herminio Portell Vilá in an interview at Colon, C. Z., where he arrived November 20 en route to Montevideo (by air via Chile). Dr. Portell is one of the Cuban delegates to the 7th Pan-American Conference to convene December 3 at Montevideo and former secretary of the Cuban-American Friendship Council of Washington. In this statement he says:

2. "The U. S. Embassy to Cuba must close or the United States must recognize the Grau Government. One of these two things must happen. While Welles is ambassador, Cuba is unable to progress. He is the worst enemy of the present regime and wants recognition only for Cespedes. Some day Welles will be ejected by force. He was popular because he is very intelligent but he is also very proud. He can regain his popularity if he will forget his pride. If we have recognition, civil power in Cuba will be strengthened. It is doubtful that we shall have recognition while Welles remains in Cuba. Even Americans think so."

3. The U. S. Consul at Matanzas reported on November 20, 5 p.m., that a demonstration was being planned to protest against Ambassador Welles' return to Cuba.

4. The Grau administration is continually being confronted with new political difficulties. As a consequence, it has changed the chief of the Havana police forces three times during the last three weeks, and several of the governors of the provinces have been recently replaced. The mayor of Havana Dr. Eduardo Blanco, a marianista, has been substituted last week by Dr. Antonio Vergara, a close friend of the Students' Directorate.

5. Local Spanish language newspapers have on several recent occasions published statements that Dr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, Cuban Ambassador to Washington and appointed Secretary of State, and Dr. Manuel Costales Latatú, Secretary of Public Instruction, had resigned. However, these statements have been denied in other local newspapers and may be considered merely as an indication of the unreliability and irresponsibility of all the local Spanish language papers which are owned, managed, and operated by employees of former local newspapers.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4330 November 21, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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NOV 27 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

G-2 Report

3020-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Trend of Recent and Current Events.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 27 1933

Proposed Plans for Solution
of Political Problems.

1. Several plans for the solution of the political problems of Cuba are under discussion. The leaders of the Nationalist Union convened yesterday with the Uruguayan Minister, Fernandez Medina, at the country home of Colonel Carlos Mendieta to discuss a new mediation formula. Mendieta is considered as the Nationalista candidate for the presidency in the next elections. It is understood that the Uruguayan diplomat will assume the role of mediator between the Grau administration and its foes. Among others at the meeting were Cosme de la Torre and Rodolfo Mendez Penate, who were prominent Oppositionists against Machado.

2. Spokesmen of various secret societies have also been holding a series of conferences to discuss what procedure is to be followed in the new efforts at a reconciliation. One of these conferences was said to have been held in secret last night between leaders of the ABC and other Oppositionist sectors. What was the outcome of the reported meeting could not be learned. Other conferences were being held between student supporters of the present government and their political adversaries. Notwithstanding the efforts which are being made, several observers have expressed the opinion that a solution of the problem will be hard to find, and have expressed themselves as pessimistic over the outcome. One of the leaders of the Student Directorate expressed the opinion that it was the Government's desire to remain in power until it could deliver the reins over to the Constitutional Assembly.

3. Rumors of a brewing revolt which had been circulating for the past several days simmered down yesterday as no confirmation of the rumors could be obtained. Reports that Colonel Carlos Mendieta had interviewed several prominent members of the ABC, the OCRR and other groups regarding the proposed mediation program, served to cast further doubt on the possibilities of a new revolt in the immediate future. It is said that Sergio Carbo, close adviser to the present Government, has been approached by Mendieta and to have admitted that he would welcome an open discussion of the present difficulties. Miguel Mariano Gomez is also said to be anxious for the peace parleys.

4. One of the first conditions to be exacted by government opponents, however, is the release of a large number of prisoners arrested after the battle at the Hotel National and during the latest insurrection. As to the two alleged leaders of the recent revolt who are awaiting final approval or disapproval of the death sentences imposed by a council of war, Colonel Batista has stated that "justice will be done."

5. A truce between loyal government troops and rebel bands in Oriente Province was reported to have been declared by the Government yesterday. The purpose of the truce, it was said, was to attempt to persuade the rebels to surrender. It is not known at this time just what the peace terms offered would be.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:VM
From M.A., Havana

No.4336

Date: Nov. 22, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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DEC 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

L-1 2657-J-330
236

WAR DEPARTMENT

3020-b

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED D.M.I. DEC 1 1933

1. Provisional President Ramon Grau declared November 24 that his government is anxious to bring about the sorely needed cordiality among the Cuban political factions, that he had always favored a peaceful solution, that it is not pleasant to govern in a state of war, with bayonets, and under suspension of guarantees.

2. Revolutionary sectors opposed to the present administration continue their efforts to find an axis on which peace conferences could rotate. These conferences have reputedly been proposed by the Minister of Uruguay Dr. Hernandez Medina and are expected to begin as soon as the preliminaries, which are now being worked over, can be arranged.

3. Colonel Carlos Mendieta, leader of the National Union, has expressed the belief that if the Nationalists agree to open the peace parleys, the ABC society will not hold back. Leaders of the various groups, however, have agreed not to voice any official opinion, leaving that "to the government of Grau and Batista about whom all revolves." In the ranks of the ABC there are thought to exist two opinions: one that would support the peace talk, and the other that would resist all attempts at compromise with the present government.

4. The Nationalists now count with 47 mayoralties and other secondary political posts, which they consider as giving them a strong strategic position from which to operate in the conference.

5. The Minister of Uruguay, when told at the palace that the United States did not intend to recognize the present government, said he was certain the United States would change their policy toward Cuba when they realized what was being done. Ruben Leon, strong student leader, and one of the most ardent supporters of the present government, also expressed confidence that the Grau administration would finally be recognized.

6. Eddie Chibas, another student leader and one of the aides of the provisional president, said he was certain that the proposed demonstration against Ambassador Welles, on his return here, would not be held, that the better judgment of most of his fellow students would rule against the idea, and furthermore that he thinks "that Mr. Welles will now come with new proposals to give the problems of Cuba a rapid and good solution, among Cubans."

Source: Press
TNG/aem

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4341 November 25, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

DEC 1 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 1 1933

1. Under the auspices of Dr. Fernandez Medina, Uruguayan Minister to Cuba, efforts are proceeding toward conciliation of all political factions referred to locally as Opposition factions because of their opposition to the (former) Machado Government. It is the desire of the Uruguayan Minister to have the opposing Opposition factions agree to a coalition government which will maintain revolutionary President Grau San Martin in office until February 24, 1934, or until a Constitutional Assembly can meet and draw up a new constitution.

2. General Mario Menocal flatly refuses to enter into the negotiations. Menocal has an extremely large following in Oriente and Camaguey Provinces and also quite a considerable following in Santa Clara Province, but his influence is not strong in Havana.

3. The ABC secret society, which is especially strong in Havana, has not as yet decided to support the proposed conciliation project. A majority of the ABC Directorate, which consists of seven members, favors the project, altho the chief of the ABC, Martinez Saenz, and a large number of the members of the society are opposed to it. A prominent member of the ABC recently returned from Europe and the United States, informed this office on November 27 that he "had recently returned from a trip to Italy to study Fascism, and was able to furnish Martinez Saenz much information on the subject." The meeting was in New York, and Martinez Saenz stated that he had been able to obtain but $100,000 for the purchase of munitions, in order to organize an armed revolutionary force and that he felt he could notproperly organize such an expedition with less than $400,000. I am under the impression that Martinez Saenz informed Ambassador Welles prior to the latter's departure from Havana for New York that he had about $300,000.

4. Opinion among the better informed Americans in Havana, is that the conciliatory efforts of the Uruguayan Minister will not be successful.

Source: Personal contacts

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4346 November 28, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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W.P.D., G.S.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

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Initial
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
238
WAR DEPARTMENT

November 1, 1933.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Subject: Political situation in Cuba.

If you have any set-up that would give a picture of conditions in Cuba it would be interesting -- something like the following:

Political Situation in Cuba.

Parties	Prominent Men	Supported by	Influence	Remarks

C. E. KILBOURNE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.

lcw

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By 24-2-71
Date

~~SECRET~~

NOV 1 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
In replying refer to

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

G-2
FWB
DEC 1933
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-B-330
239
WAR DEPARTMENT

November 21, 1933.

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-2:

Subject: Political Situation in Cuba.

1. In response to General Kilbourne's request for some data that would give a bird's-eye view of the political situation in Cuba there is submitted a short analysis of leading parties and groups in that Republic.

2. Even this picture as presented may be clearer if the reader reviews some fundamental principles and policies which have caused the organization of these parties and groups. Some basic causes that have influenced the formation of parties and groups are the beliefs of the Cubans: That the Platt Amendment should be abrogated; that changes in the governing party controlling the Presidency were not frequent enough; that Latin people cannot be governed best under a constitution copied so closely after that of the United States; that the treaties between Cuba and the United States should be revised, particularly as to tariff. To these reasons for forming groups should be added that one springing from personal ambition for leadership of a number of perennial office seekers.

3. There is much material in the Latin American Section available to enlighten the subject.

4. Some of the more recent political groups were born of the coincidence of these factors: The intolerable government of President Machado and the world political and economic unrest as influenced by the world depression.

5. The changing situation makes it difficult to allocate, except for the time, leaders to principles of government they represent. The analysis above is submitted in this light.

FAY W. BRABSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Intelligence Branch.

ml

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] Date 4-2-71

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November 21, 1933.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.

Subject: Political Situation in Cuba.

1. In compliance with your memorandum of November 1st, 1933, there if forwarded herewith a short analysis of leading parties and groups in Cuba.

2. This picture as presented may be clearer if you will review some fundamental principles and policies which have caused the organization of these parties and groups. Some basic causes that have influenced the formation of parties and groups are the beliefs of the Cubans: That the Platt Amendment should be abrogated; that changes in the governing party controlling the Presidency were not frequent enough; that Latin people cannot be governed best under a constitution copied so closely after that of the United States; that the treaties between Cuba and the United States should be revised; particularly as to tariff. To these reasons for forming groups should be added that one springing from personal ambition for leadership of a number of perennial office seekers.

3. There is much material in the Latin American Section of this Division available on the subject.

4. Some of the more recent political groups were born of the coincidence of these factors: The intolerable government of President Machado and the world political and economic unrest as influenced by the world depression.

5. The changing situation makes it difficult to allocate, except for the time, leaders to principles of government they represent. The analysis above is submitted in this light.

Alfred T. Smith.
Brigadier-General, General Staff,

1 encl.
hcm

NOV 21 1933 MAILED EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 W. D.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Gumperling

[redacted] The Military Attache. 2657-B-330
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] 2-5-72
Date

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 4 1933

Statement of Existing Conditions.

1. The statements quoted below represent the views of twenty-two of the foremost American business organizations operating in Cuba. Although strongly worded, it is considered to be a very accurate statement of conditions:

"Control of this Island is in the hands of a small group of men who seized the reins of government following mutiny of the non-commissioned officers and rebellion of the army against the Cespedes government. First known as the Revolutionary Junta and now headed by Grau San Martin, it is representative of but a small minority of the Cuban people and has its origin in the extremely radical so-called Student Directorate and elements affiliated with communism, various members of the Cabinet being recognized communists. It is a government in form only, openly and unalterably opposed by all of the constituted political parties and by all of the responsible commercial, industrial and agricultural interests of the Island. Because of its origin, small minority representation and its power being derived from an undisciplined, unreliable, mutinous army, it can never establish or maintain law and order or acquire the support of the majority of the inhabitants of Cuba. Unified control of this army does not exist and there is a wide breach not only in the forces in Havana, but between the Havana heads and the armed forces in the interior.

"The regime, although confronted with extremely grave national problems,is totally inexperienced in public administration, is utterly imcompetent to govern, composed as it is principally of radical youths appointed to most of the important public offices, and lacking the fundamentals for the establishment and maintenance of adequate government. Consequently, it is doomed to failure. Antagonistic to capital and business in general, its very existence has completely destroyed confidence of the commercial, industrial and agricultural interests of the nation and produced almost complete paralyzation of these activities, resulting in a state of chaos and disintegration of grave consequences to the future welfare of this Island. Cordial international relations are of interest to the regime only insofar as they would serve to prolong its existence, but international respect is not even sought because it does not consider the rights or privileges or good faith of its own or other people. Therefore, recognition by the American Government of such a regime and, consequently, recognition of such a situation, would not only be a great injustice to the Cuban people, but it would lower the prestige of the American nation with the responsible elements of the Island. Loss of respect for Americans by the great majority of the inhabitants of all walks of life would follow recognition and, due to the bitterness that would be engendered, would place American and other lives and property, already none too secure, in grave jeopardy.

"Communism is more deeply rooted in the regime tha is generally believed outside of Cuba and would have manifested itself even more drastically were it not for the recognition by those in power that too open a declaration of intentions would defeat their cause at its very inception. Seizure of sugar mills - Cuban, English and American, with the expulsion or imprisonment of owners and managers, by labor,directed

From M.A., Havana No. 4347 November 28, 1933.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

by communists who promised that within a given time the properties would be delivered to the workers and their future operations financed by the government, went unopposed by the present regime for some time. Soviets were established at a number of sugar mills and the properties were returned to their owners only after negotiations with the communist leaders through Cabinet officers of the regime, distinctly sympathetic to the agitators. While physical possession of the mills has in most cases been recovered by their proprietors, control of the organization has been lost, due to communistic agitation and recognition by labor, directed by communists and other radicals, of the sympathy of the regime for their cause. Where seizure did not occur, strikes directed by communists were declared at all other mills on the Island but, due to its origin, the regime lacked moral force to provide effective protection for the owners. Breakdown of authority of owners and managers - Cuban and foreign alike - is not confined to sugar mills but applies equally to practically all commercial, industrial, shipping, railroad and public utility activities throughout the country.

"While openly catering to mob psychology to accomplish its ends and supplying a veneered protection which was cleverly delayed until the mob had accomplished its purpose, chaos spread so rapidly that the regime decided at least a temporary change of front would impress the United States and perhaps bring it recognition. Consequently, a general order went out through the army for the arrest of agitators and the cessation of strikes and seizure of properties for at least ninety days, during which time they believed that recognition by the American Government would be forthcoming and once this was obtained, restraint would be lifted. Imprisoned communists and agitators were released about as quickly as arrested and are available to renew their agitation at the opportune moment.

"Confidence of mill owners and those financing sugar properties has been so shattered by developments and fear that under existing conditions, whether the present regime is recognized or not, a sugar crop could not be made, that they are unwilling to expose funds for the financing of a crop. The existing breakdown of law and order, absence of guarantee for property and the spread of communism are responsible for increased unemployment of labor and farm hands by tens of thousands and should this state of affairs continue, hunger and desperation will be so widespread throughout the Island that no force could prevent destruction of cane fields and sugar mills as well as other properties -- the state of chaos sought by communism.

"Accompanying the above developments has been an intensive and unmolested anti-American campaign of street demonstrations and radio talk, although the latter has been under strict government censorship. All of this appears to have been conducted by elements friendly or close to the Government, although the vast majority of the population of Cuba is distinctly friendly to the United States and openly expresses condemnation of the unwarranted criticism by an ignorant or malicious few who, out of temporary self-interest, refuse to recognize that the welfare and prosperity of their country are so dependent on cooperation and understanding with the United States. Our country would be called upon to deal with the same irresponsible elements in any negotiations tending toward the revision of the existing reciprocity treaty or sugar quota plan. To assist this country back on its feet, financial aid from the United States Government or the Reconstruction Finance Corporation will be imperative, yet we fail to see how financial assistance could be granted to such a regime, which shows strong tendencies toward confiscatory legislation by decrees, and is already misappropriating revenues collected under the Public Works Law and which should be remitted to the innocent American bondholders. Of equal importance to Cuban, American and other foreign residents is the breakdown of sani-

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

"With its existence entirely at the mercy of an unreliable, undisciplined and mutinous army whose leaders do not recognize the authority of the President of the regime, and with its overthrow constantly threatened by the important Opposition factions as well as by subversive propagenda among the armed forces, either by these political factions or the ex-officers of the Cuban Army, now in prison, but who do not and never will accept the present authorities, recognition of such a regime would be an unhealthy and grave precedent not only in Cuba but throughout Latin America. A further danger from recognition would lie in the tacit approval that it would carry to continued legislation by decree or by legislative assembly which might be created by elements of the regime. It is easily conceivable that after recognition, such legislation would be of a more decidedly confiscatory nature which would be certain to produce further serious complications. This regime does not have the ultimate good of Cuba as a patriotic objective and it does not represent the will of the people."

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Confidential

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4347 November 28, 1933

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety

POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE OF MATANZAS
DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1933

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 4 1933

1. The situation in the Province of Matanzas continues very unsatisfactory and is probably daily growing more acute. The populace is ruled entirely by soldiers who swagger through the streets at all hours of the day and night. Officers and soldiers alike go into any business house they fancy and order food, drink, and merchandise with never a thought of payment therefor while the owners of the houses merely stand mute. The latter state that to ask for payment would be useless as well as dangerous.

2. Since the rebellion against the de facto Government on November 7 scores of the leading business men of Matanzas have been forced to leave the city and go into hiding. Bombs continue to be exploded throughout the province and keep the inhabitants in a state of fear. With the exception of a small amount of retail trade business is stagnant and at least 60 per cent of the people of Matanzas are actually hungry. The sanitary affairs of the city have been so neglected that Matanzas is filthy with a stench prevailing from unmoved garbage which is attended by swarms of flies and mosquitoes.

3. With the exception of meat, chicken, and fish very little other foods are available in Matanzas; no fresh vegetables and fruits are stocked.

4. The army has been enlisting men and the new recruits are being stationed in the cities while the older men, when possible, are transferred to the country districts as Rural Guards. This procedure has caused dissatisfaction amongst the older soldiers who in many instances have refused to be transferred.

5. The soldiers have little or no respect for their newly commissioned officers, and it is the desire of these officers to rid themselves of the older men and deal with the recruits, in the hope that they can manage and command respect from them. There is, however, practically no military order prevailing at the barracks in Matanzas and the enlisted men do just about as they please. Their uniforms are becoming ludicrous to see, so varied are they as to uniformity. The enlisted men who can afford it dress as offieers. However, the army in Matanzas continues to give the American consulate cordial cooperation. Adequate protection when requested by the consulate has always been immediately accorded American property, and army officers call several times every week to ask if anything is desired. It is only right to state

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

that several of the men who were elevated from the ranks conduct themselves in a manner befitting army officers and have shown ability. On the other hand, some of the newly appointed army officers are sadly lacking in the requirements necessary to make officers. Out of the eleven newly appointed officers who were chosen from the 384 soldiers stationed in the city of Matanzas six are negroes.

6. The Matanzas Institute which opened on November 20, 1933, has witnessed a state of turmoil among the students since that date. The professors at the opening hour frankly showed their fear of the students and informed them that they could pursue unmolested any course they cared to follow. After the Institute had been opened less than one hour, fighting broke out amongst the students, and then a two day strike was declared as a protest against the government not releasing student prisoners. A delegation of students left for Havana to request from the Provisional President the release of the students. However, the American Consulate learned that they were granted an interview with the President who, immediately after the students had been ushered in, informed them that he was arranging to have a swimming pool and foot-ball field erected for them in Matanzas. The President and delegation of students talked "foot-ball and swimming pool" for a while and the students returned to Matanzas without mentioning the object of their visit. After their arrival in Matanzas other fights occurred because they had not brought to the President's attention the desire of the students to have the imprisoned Matanzas students released. Fighting with pistols, knives, and brass-knuckles have been daily affairs during the week the school has been open, and on November 25 one student was critically wounded by pistol fire while another was beaten so badly that he is not expected to recover. About half of the students here belong to the ABC party which are opposed to the de facto government while the others belong to the student party which are supporters thereof.

7. The assassination of the five Machado army officers on the morning of November 25 outside of Colon, Province of Matanzas, has aroused among the better classes of the people here a greater feeling, if possible, of evinced disgust. The five officers killed were Colonel Herrera, Commandant of the Cuban armed forces in Matanzas during the Machado Government; Captain Castillo, Military Supervisor, and three Lieutenants. The report that the army issued regarding the assassination of these officers was that they were being transferred from a Havana prison to Colon, Province of Matanzas, to stand civil trial as perpetrators of crimes during Machado's Presidency. However, the Consulate has reliably learned that the army arranged as early as November 21 for these officers to be delivered to the mob at an exact place and time, and even the Civil Judge at Colon knew and helped plan the details. It is believed here that the soldiers actually did the executing of these officers whose bodies were literally shot to pieces with machine guns.

8. In the small San Severino prison at Matanzas, which

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

has crowded accomodation for about 50, there are over 300 prisoners, among whom there are 6 soldiers who are reported to be connected with crimes for which the above mentioned officers were assassinated. These 6 soldiers are in one small cell, and for weeks they have been given the third degree by prisoners and soldiers alike until they are reported to be insane.

9. Since the open revolution against the Cuban Provisional Government on November 7 only comparatively minor disorders as reported above have occurred throughout the province; however, the feeling of opposition to the government has in no way lessened and a conservative estimate is that at least 80 per cent of the people here are against the de facto government. During the last week of November it has been learned that considerable firearms and ammunition to be used by the opposition have been smuggled into Cuba through the Matanzas port. Soldiers continue a house to house search for arms and ammunition and have in this manner confiscated a large supply.

10. Armed bandits in large groups and numbers have been reported very active in the country for the past two months and the last week has revealed many robberies by them.

11. Mail addressed to the American Consulate in Matanzas is without doubt being tampered with; as a matter of fact little effort is made by the guilty party or parties to conceal the fact. At the hour mail should be ready for delivery the person calling for it will be informed that it is not ready but all other mail will have been delivered. A few minutes later it will be placed in the post office box bearing marks that it has been opened and will be delivered sealed with paste that is still very wet.

Source: Report of American Vice-Consul to American Ambassador, dated November 27, 1933. A copy of this was forwarded to the State Dept. by the Embassy.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1953, from Archivist.
By
Date 4-2-71

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 9 1933

Current Political Situation

1. There appears to be little or no change in the political situation since the last report on this subject. The attempt to form a government of conciliation composed of all parties and political societies which opposed Machado awaits the result of the announcement of the A.B.C. society on December 7th, as to whether this society will or will not participate in the negotiations.

2. The policy of the A.B.C. will depend directly upon the result of a vote of its members which is now being recorded. It would be futile to attempt to forecast the result of this vote, but it is definitely known that a very large proportion of the A.B.C. society is bitterly opposed to the retention of Grau San Martin and Batista as President and head of the Army, respectively. They insist upon the release of all political prisoners, including former officers confined since August 12th, and upon the relinquishing of command by Batista.

3. In the meantime, constant rumors are being received on the subject of counter-revolutionary movements which may be expected in the near future.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:v,

From M.A., Havana No. 4359 December 5, 1933.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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By authority letter of Dec. 18,
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Date 4-2-71

6-1 2657-J-330

G-2 Report 3020-b 244

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 15 1933

Current Political Situation.

1. The efforts to solve the Cuban political situation by means of a conciliation of all political parties and groups which opposed Machado have definitely failed with the refusal last night of President Grau San Martin to resign in favor of a Cuban more representative of the Opposition sectors than himself.

2. It has become quite evident that Batista and the Army located in and around Havana do not intend to permit Colonel Carlos Mendieta, or any other representative of the Opposition sectors (not now supporting the Grau San-Martin Government), to obtain control of the Government. Mendieta's dislike for and distrust of Batista is well known, and his opinion is shared by the A.B.C. and other Opposition groups and by the bulk of the Cuban people. It is understood that Mendieta has said that since Batista and the Army overthrew the Cespedes Government and appeared to be open to suggestions to overthrow the Grau San Martin Government, until the last few days, it might be expected that if he became president, with Batista in control of the Army, he, Mendieta, would have no assurance that this military group might not overthrow him if and when they desired to do so. This same opinion is held by the A.B.C., the Menocalistas and the Marionistas.

3. Unquestionably, the Army is in control of the political situation of Cuba today. They will probably continue to recognize Grau San Martin as president so long as he does not conflict with their policies and ambitions. Strong current rumors have been in circulation in Havana that a military coup may be expected which would make Antonio Guiterras president. Guiterras states that the Grau San Martin Government is not radical enough to suit him and he contemplates resigning his cabinet portfolio in order to become the leader of the ultra-radical or communistic factions of Cuba. His sister is the Secretary of the Communistic Party of Cuba, and is considered to be the second in rank in that party. It is generally understood that Guiterras himself is a communist and also bitterly anti-American.

4. On the other hand, Batista wishes above all else to remain in his present position and, it may be added, in addition to the power which he enjoys, he is receiving, personally, considerable money from the Cuban treasury. It is my opinion that he would be disinclined to favor any change in government which might produce conditions so ultra-radical in scope as to compel interference by the U. S. Government. Bad as conditions are today in Cuba, they might be worse, and it is to Batista's credit to state that in many circumstances he has effectively opposed the communists in their endeavor to destroy or take over private properties, particularly properties of foreigners. To sum up Batista's position as I see it, he cannot permit a government in Cuba so radical that intervention would be forced upon Cuba, because he would lose his position and probably his life. On the other hand, he cannot play into the hands of the political parties and groups opposed to Grau San Martin, because he knows they would only use him and as soon as possible thereafter would get rid of him. Therefore, he is following the only possible policy whereby he can maintain himself and the newly made Army officers in their present positions.

M. A., Havana No. 4369 December 12, 1933.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. Since the foregoing was written, it is understood that Grau San Martin agreed, on the night of December 11th, to carry out certain demands of the ultra-radicals or "Leftists", as they are called. The demands were made by Antonio Guiterras, Dr. Moreno, Fernandez de la Velasco, Carlos Hevia, Dr. Torrado and Dr. Enrique Fernandez, all of whom hold important positions in the present government. The four points in question are, briefly:

(a) No outside interference or meddling in the Government.

(b) More rapid progress in the handling of cases before the Tribunal of Sanctions.

(c) To fully and promptly enforce the revolutionary laws, especially the reduction in cost of electric light; the "Fifty Percent Law", etc.

(d) Removal of all members from the Cabinet who are not members of the "Leftists" or ultra-radical group.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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3020-b 2-5

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 28 1933

Students Censure Present Government.

1. The students of Havana University passed a vote of censure, on December 20, 1933, against the government of Grau San Martin, bitterly attacking him and particularly the Army. Some of the causes for the demonstration were: the mutilation and death of the student, Mario Cadenas, believed to have been caused by soldiers; also the attack upon the home of Porfirio Franca and mortally wounding of his daughter by eight masked men, one of whom has been identified as a sergeant of the Pro Ley y Justicia organization. Franca was one of the five members of the Revolutionary Junta following the Army mutiny of September 4th; however, two days later he resigned.

2. A resolution to force the expulsion of Dr. Manuel Dorta Duque from the faculty of the University was voted by the students for the reason that he had taken an active part in the councils of 1927-28 which ordered the expulsion of several students from the University because of their protests against the Machado constitutional reforms. Dr. Duque actively assisted Ambassador Welles in his recent efforts for a conciliation of all Opposition groups and parties for the purpose of having their support and participation in a government more representative of the Cuban people than the present one. It is also understood that the expulsion of Dr. Antonio S. Bustamente, former president of the Hague International Court, is planned by the students, on the grounds that he presided over the Constitutional Assembly which approved the governmental reforms during the Machado regime.

3. On the morning of December 21st. a large number of students of the Havana high schools made a demonstration in front of the presidential palace, shouting "down with Grau and death to Batista". After some time, President Grau circulated among the crowd and advised them to disperse and go to their homes, which they finally did.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4384 December 22, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1933

6-1 2657-g-330
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Propaganda of Domestic Origin.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 28 1933

Pro-Government Demonstration.

1. On the afternoon of December 21st. a pro-government manifestation was held in the nature of a parade which passed the American Embassy and broke ranks and assembled in front of the presidential palace where speeches were made by revolutionary President Grau San Martin and other Government officials. From the standpoint of numbers, the parade was a disappointment to the Government, which had issued the statement that the number of demonstrators might be expected to run over 150,000, but actually only about twenty or twenty-five thousand people participated. Of this number, fully 60 per cent were negroes and the remainder mulattoes and quadroons. The Government brought in at its own expense several trainloads from the interior, and to many of these who came from the provinces the Government agreed to pay $1.00 per day during the time they were absent from their homes. During the early morning of the 21st. three trains containing pro-government demonstrators were derailed enroute to Havana. These wrecks caused three or four deaths and several persons were injured. Banners and flags were furnished by the Government, the inscriptions on many reading "Mr. Caffery, we demand recognition"; others reading "no intervention, no foreign interference, Cuba for the Cubans". Many of the marchers applauded as they marched past the American Embassy, which is believed to indicate that they were instructed to do so as a gesture of friendliness toward Mr. Caffery, with the hope of U. S. recognition.

2. Although a small number of streetcar and bus employees in uniform and several small delegations of other labor organizations participated, the balance, judging from appearances, consisted of the lowest social strata of the Cuban people.

3. A large number of soldiers and sailors were on guard along the route of march with some in front of the Embassy and many on the roof of and around the presidential palace. Soldiers were also stationed on the roofs of all of the taller buildings along the route. No trouble occurred during the day. However, on the nights of December 20th and 21st. there was much shooting throughout the city and much bombing, with two small bombs exploding in front of the American Club; casualties were, however, slight.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4386 December 22, 1933

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority of letter of Dec. 18, 1933, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 4-2-71

MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Current Situation

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 2 1934

1. The situation in Cuba, both politically and economically, is steadily growing worse, and prospects for a betterment of conditions in the near future are remote, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Caffery, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, the Uruguayan Minister, and others, are again trying to bring about a conciliation of political parties and groups known as the Opposition Group because of their opposition during the past four years to Machado.

2. Colonel Carlos Mendieta, leader of the Union Nacionalista Party, and Miguel Mariano Gomez, leader of the Marianistas, appear to be willing to enter into an agreement with Grau San Martin in the formation of a coalition government. Menocal and the A.B.C. Group seem to be unwilling to have anything to do with the present Government, unless Colonel Batista relinquishes command of the Army, and the former Army officers whose records are clean be returned to duty.

3. Undoubtedly Batista is in command of the Government, as has been demonstrated on many occasions and very recently by his refusal to obey certain orders of the President and instructions from the Courts. Several days ago it was announced that all former officers imprisoned since September 4th would be released on a $500.00 bond each; bond was put up by the families of these officers, but, so far, only about twenty-six officers have been released and these are former medical, dental and legal officers. Batista simply refuses to release the other officers and this is causing a stream of protest from the Bar Association and other Cuban societies and from the local press.

4. While peace and economic improvement are the things most desired for Cuba at the present time, it is the opinion in the best informed circles that if a conciliation government is formed which includes Batista, and it would not be possible to form one without him, a revolution which is now brewing will break over the Island in January; on the other hand, if the conciliation efforts fail, Cuba will undoubtedly have a revolution just the same, so in either case we may expect a well-organized and well-directed revolution in January, which will probably start in Oriente Province, spread westward and, after two or three days, involve Havana.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4395 December 29, 1933.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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JAN 1 1934
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

3020-b)

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 13 1934

1. On January 5, 1934, about 700 university and high school students of Havana staged a noisy procession shouting "Down with Batista and Grau", but were soon dispersed by firemen who turned the water hose on them.

2. Next day, January 6, the students held a meeting at the University of Havana and passed a resolution declaring themselves "in open opposition to the provisional revolutionary government, for failure to carry out the program of the revolution"; but they also declared themselves as "against the counter-revolution" which is reportedly being prepared.

3. The students who were instrumental in placing the present government in power after overthrowing the Cespedes administration, recently became estranged after a series of disputes with army leaders, with the Secretary of War and Interior Antonio Guiteras, and with the Provisional President Ramon Grau.

4. The killing of student Mario Cadenas and other acts of violence, the students contend, proved to be the last straw which led to the final break ratified by the meeting of January 6. (The murder of student Mario Cadenas, as also mentioned in paragraph 1 of report #4384 of December 22, 1933, index 3020-b, is believed to have been caused by soldiers, and the government has offered $500.00 reward for information leading to the capture of the culprits.)

2657-G-330/245

Source: Press reports

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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M. A. Cuba Report No. 4410 January 8, 1934

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JAN 2 1934
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WAR DEPARTMENT

3020-b

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 22 1934

1. The present administration of Provisional President Ramon Grau is being faced with growing opposition and daily protests against its procedures and decrees.

2. Among these are the protests of thousands of students against the decree which declared null the examinations held in 1930, 1931, and 1932 under the Machado regime; the threatened medical strike; and the resignations of the Secretary of the Presidency Dr. Ramiro Capablanca and of the Secretary of Public Works Dr. Gustavo Moreno.

3. Havana's bar association, according to Dr. Enrique Llanso, its president, will protest January 15 to the Supreme Court the refusal of the military authorities to obey the decisions of the judicial courts in regard to prisoners held by the army. The association will meet in the evening of January 16 to decide on its future course, after hearing the reply of the Supreme Court. Dr. Llanso says that if the army insists on continuing its present attitude, the lawyers will "adopt violent measures", probably agreeing to strike, in accordance with a motion presented some time ago and still held pending.

4. It is said that Dr. Carlos Finlay, Secretary of Sanitation, also intends to resign.

5. Dr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, Cuba's Ambassador to Washington, arrived here January 12. He declared here to-day that a wrong interpretation has been put here on the recent statements on intervention made by President Roosevelt, and that they actually meant that the United States can intervene if it deems it necessary. According to Dr. Marquez Sterling, there are three distinct opinions held by United States senators: that of the largest group is that the United States should not intervene until the Cuban problem has become so complicated that it is impossible for the country itself to take further action; that of the second largest group maintains that intervention should be declared before Cuba is involved in a bloody revolution; and that of the smallest group holds out for the recognition of the Grau government.

Source: Personal Observation and Press.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG/aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4420 January 13, 1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Confidential: The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

JAN 22 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Executive.

Change in Executive.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN

1. Dr. Carlos Hevia was named provisional President of Cuba on the afternoon of January 15, 1934, by the Revolutionary Junta of Camp Columbia.

2. The leading candidates for president were Dr. Carlos Hevia, and Colonel Carlos Mendieta, leader of the Nacionalist Party. Colonel Batista, Chief of Staff, strongly advocated Mendieta, because Mendieta as provisional President would mean the support of the Nacionalist Party and prompt recognition by the United States. After long hours of deliberation and argument when it was found that Mendieta would not be acceptable to the Junta, he threw his support to Dr. Carlos Hevia.

3. The political situation in Cuba, and especially in Havana, at this moment, is extremely acute and further trouble may be expected. Dr. Antonio Guiteras, Secretary of Interior, War and Navy, is determined to have Batista removed and Batista, on the other hand, realizes Guiteras' control over the Navy, his probable control or alliance with the military forces in Las Cabanas, and his strength with the communists and ultra-radical labor element. There is a very definite cross current of activities being developed by these two individuals. Batista, during the afternoon of January 15th and the night of January 15-16, sent many messages by Government radio to military district commanders in the provinces, notifying them of Hevia's selection as President and, in general, keeping them informed of the situation. These messages were intercepted and decoded by the U.S.S. "Wyoming". Guiteras was at the long-distance telephone during almost the entire night of January 15-16th in conversation with his more prominent supporters, mostly civilians, in all of the eastern provinces. The tenor of his conversations were bitter harangues against Batista, and instructions to his supporters to use the same tactics against the public utilities companies in their localities, by means of strikes, as was used against the Cuban Electric Company, in order that these utilities could be taken over and operated by the Government. This would indicate that the local surprise strike of the employees of the Cuban Electric Company in Havana on the morning of January 14th was planned by Guiteras and his associates in order to confiscate the properties. It may be of interest to note that all American employees of the Cuban Electric Company in Havana were discharged by Government order on January 15th and that the present administrator of the company is the head of the local labor union, which included most of the employees of the company.

4. As this is written, information is lacking as to whether Colonel Carlos Mendieta has agreed to support Dr. Carlos Hevia. Many rumors are being received at this time to the effect that Antonio Guiteras is contemplating a movement of some kind against Batista, but these rumors cannot, as yet, be confirmed. All of my very recent information as to the revolution which is planned by the A.B.C., the Menocalistas and the O.C.R.R., is to the effect that it will be delayed until sometime in February. It is possible, however, that if the split which now exists and is apparently becoming greater between Batista and Guiteras leads to fighting between Batista's loyal troops and the Navy, with probably the troops of Las Cabanas, the A.B.C. will take advantage of the situation.

From M.A., Havana No. 4425 January 16, 1934

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. Further information from A.B.C. leaders is expected later in the afternoon. If received in time, this information will be forwarded in today's pouch.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation and
Contacts.

TNG:vm

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JAN 23 1934
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Present Executive and Cabinet
(a) Present Executive

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 23 1934

WHO'S WHO - CARLOS HEVIA Y REYES GAVILAN, Provisional President of Cuba elected by the Revolutionary Junta at Camp Columbia on January 15, 1934

1. Carlos Hevia is 34 years old, a son of Colonel Aurelio Hevia, veteran of the war of independence and Secretary of Interior during the administration of General Menocal. He is married to Elisa Edelmann y Ponce, a daughter of Juan Federico Edelmann, chief magistrate of the Supreme Court of Cuba. They have two children: a boy Carlos Aurelio, 7, and a girl Margarita, 5.

2. He is engineer and a graduate of the Naval Academy of Annapolis class of 1920. During the World War he served as midshipman in the Atlantic fleet of the U. S. Navy, on the battleships KANSAS and MICHIGAN. He was the main leader of the ill-fated Gibara expedition of August 1931 against Machado, together with journalist Sergio Carbo and lawyer Lucilo de la Peña (advisers), Emilio Laurent (military), and A. Bosch of the Bacardi Rum Co. (financial). During the four months of the Ramon Grau administration he was Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.

3. His first political affiliation was with the Conservative Party. In 1927 he joined the Nationalist Union, the leaders of which were four colonels: his father Aurelio Hevia, Carlos Mendieta, Roberto Mendez Peñate, and Cosme de la Torriente. In 1932 he joined the Secret ABC Society and acted as their delegate before the Revolutionary Junta that was organized in Miami in March 1932. Later he lived in New York. After the coup d'etat of September 4, 1933, he quit the ABC Society, together with three of his brothers and his father, giving his support to Dr. Ramon Grau who appointed him Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.

4. When the cabinet members of the Grau administration began to split, Carlos Hevia's inclination was to the leftists whose outstanding figure was Dr. Antonio Guiteras, 27 year old Secretary of Interior and War, who had been influential in obtaining his appointment as Secretary of Agriculture. His election as Provisional President is mostly due to Sergio Carbo, Antonio Guiteras, and Lucilo de la Peña, all leaning toward radicalism.

Source: Excerpts from Havana daily EL PAIS and other sources

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:
A. E. Milmore,
Clerk.

aem

M. A. Cuba Report No. 4427 January 17, 1934

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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JAN WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3110-a

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Present Executive and Cabinet
(a) Present Executive

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 23 1934

COLONEL CARLOS MENDIETA SUBSTITUTES CARLOS HEVIA AS PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF CUBA.

1. In the morning of January 16, 1934, CARLOS HEVIA took oath of office as Provisional President of Cuba to which position he had been exalted by the Revolutionary Junta of Camp Columbia the afternoon of the day before, mainly due to the decided attitude taken in his favor by journalist Sergio Carbo, Secretary of Interior and War Dr. Antonio Guiteras, and lawyer Lucilo de la Peña.

2. During the debates of the Revolutionary Junta, the Chief of the Army Colonel Fulgencio Batista had pushed the candidacy of Colonel Carlos Mendieta but finally gave way and, altho opposed to the leftist ranks of which Hevia had been one of the most prominent members, declared that the Army would stand behind Hevia. In a message to the military districts he explained that the support to Hevia was to avoid bloodshed and to be momentary.

3. However, the outlook for 34 year old Hevia as president was hopeless: he had to contend at the outset with the same opposition as the Grau administration, that is, the ABC Society, the OCRR (-Organizacion Celular Revolucionaria Radical), the Menocalists, the Marianists, and the Nationalists, all of whom considered him as a prolongation of the Grau regime. He could only count on the Left Wing of the Students' Directorate and probably most of the working classes. The Nationalist leader, Colonel Carlos Mendieta, had promised his individual cooperation to the new government a few days before, but had been careful to avoid a statement that he would give it his support and had refused to speak for the Nationalists. Part of the Nationalist directors held a meeting on January 17 and refused to support the Hevia government. Thereupon, Carlos Hevia resigned in the evening of the same day, January 17, after having been in office for two days.

4. There were rumors that the army was planning another coup d'etat but Colonel Batista denied this, declared that "tranquillity reigned at Camp Columbia", and invited reporters to visit the army stronghold to verify his statement. There were also rumors that the Navy would uphold ex-Secretary of Interior and War Dr. Guiteras and would oppose the Army, but this was also denied by Captain Angel Aurelio Gonzalez, one of the outstanding figures of the September 4th revolution and now commander of the recently formed Naval Infantry Corps (300 men including officers). Captain Gonzalez declared that all the naval officers who have obtained their

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promotion since the overthrow of Machado would rather relinquish their positions than cause bloodshed by fighting the Army, and he informed the Army on January 17 that the Navy would support whatever course the Army would take. The Army then decided to accept the change of president.

5. At 1 a.m. of January 18 said Captain Gonzalez left the Palace with Hevia's resignation to be presented to the Revolutionary Junta which was meeting at Camp Columbia. Immediately afterward Colonel Carlos Mendieta was named provisional president. He was assured that the Army and Navy would present no problem. A large number of army and navy officers called at once at his home to pledge their support and to quell rumors that the army was planning to oppose him.

6. Colonel CARLOS MENDIETA took charge of office in the Presidential Palace on January 18, at noon. The new cabinet has not yet been chosen. It is understood that Mendieta is in favor of a concentration cabinet.

7. Salvador Mendez Villoch, Chief of the Navy, declared that Mendieta as President can count on the support of the armed forces, and that he is convinced that a great part of public opinion is in favor of Mendieta.

8. Fulgencio Batista, Chief of the Army, declared that the armed forces are determined not to interfere in political issues that pertain to the civil administration; that his greatest wish is to see the country in complete order under a stable government capable of protecting everybody without necessity of intervention of the army, performing all functions thru civilians, excepting only the maintenance of order and the protection of civil rights.

9. Ex-President Dr. Ramon Grau intends to leave for Mexico on the Ward liner ORIENTE sailing from Havana January 20.

10. The whereabouts of ex-Secretary of Interior and War Dr. Antonio Guiteras are not known. Reputedly he has gone to the Oriente Province.

11. Dr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, former Cuban Ambassador to Washington, took possession of his post as Secretary of State on January 17, following his ratification by provisional President Carlos Hevia, but relinquished it the same day, due to Hevia's resignation.

Source: Press reports coordinated and abridged.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

A. E. Milmore,
Clerk.

aem

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 13, 1933, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] Date 2-25-71

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G-2 Report 3020

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 30 1934

Current Political Situation

1. Although the installation of Colonel Carlos Mendieta as President, and a government composed of all Opposition groups, except the students, is hailed with much satisfaction in Cuba, the situation is very difficult and the new Government is faced with many difficult and conflicting problems which must be solved within the very near future.

2. The most dangerous situation confronting this Government is communism. Dr. Antonio Guiteras and other communistic leaders are actively sowing the seeds of discontent among the labor elements. It is said that the Cuban Navy is seething with communism, and a consular report from Cienfuegos on January 24th stated that communists meetings were being held upon several Cuban gunboats in that harbor, which is the headquarters of the Southern Naval District. Another source of danger is the attitude of the A.B.C. and the Menocalistas toward Batista and the present Cuban Army. Although it has been rumored that some of the ex-officers recently released from prison are now plotting to overthrow Batista, but not to overthrow Mendieta, I can find no foundation of fact in these rumors. I know that Colonel Julio Sanguily, and other ex-officers whom I know personally, are not connected with and I am sure they have no knowledge of any such plot, and I have advised them that it would be the worst possible move that could be made, which is in accordance not only with my personal views but in strict accordance with the views of Mr. Caffery, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt.

3. It would seem, however, that something must be done for these ex-officers by the Government, either in the form of pensions or civil positions, and it is possible that some action along these lines will be taken very soon by Mendieta. It will have to be done, or, otherwise, certain powerful Opposition sectors may, in a short time, withdraw their support from Mendieta.

4. The other difficult factor in the political situation is the almost dictatorial powers and attitude of Batista. While it is believed that he, himself, is friendly toward Americans and American interests, and that he will support Mendieta, it is quite probable that such support may be withdrawn if Mendieta's policies are not in accord with Batista's wishes. In other words, Batista remains the paramount figure in Cuba, which has today the best president and cabinet that was possible to obtain, but, undoubtedly, this president and cabinet are not only more or less fearful of Batista and the Cuban Army, but they recognize that at any time their policies are not in accord with those of Batista, his support will be withdrawn. As one of Batista's most intimate friends and staff officers said yesterday "the Army will support Mendieta as long as Mendieta governs Cuba as we think it should be governed; however, if Mendieta displeases Batista and the Army, we will throw him out".

5. It is believed that the policy of Mendieta is to strengthen his political position, or, in other words, the position of his government, and the question which is on everyone's lips - "what

From M.A., Havana No. 4435 January 26, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

will be done with Batista" - remains open and unanswered officially. Close friends of Mendieta hint, however, that the problem of the Cuban Army and Batista will probably be solved in the course of two months.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4435 January 26, 1934.

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G-2 Report 3600-a 7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 12 1934

New Amnesty Decree

1. President Mendieta signed a decree on February 8th, which extends amnesty to hundreds of persons facing court charges in connection with the Island's series of revolutions.

2. All those accused of conspiracy, rebellion, sedition, treason, espionage, desertion, or other offenses, growing out of the revolution of August 12, September 4th, October 2nd. and November 8-9, 1933, were granted amnesty, as were officials of governments succeeding that of Machado, charged with offenses against the rights of individuals.

3. This decree automatically cancels charges against the hundreds participating in the several revolutions, including the 500 or more officers arrested after the battle at the National Hotel, who, recently released, were scheduled to appear at their various military districts on February 15th.

4. Specifically excluded from the amnesty provisions were persons charged with offenses under the Machado regime.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4460 February 9, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 27 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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"TRANSLATION".

I, CARLOS MENDIETA Y MONTEFUR, Provisional President of the Republic of Cuba,

HEREBY MAKE KNOWN:

That the Cabinet has approved, and I have sanctioned, the following:

WHEREAS: Different cases have been instituted for desertion, rebellion and sedition, and for other felonies and misdemeanors, all of which are closely related to political events.

WHEREAS: The greater part of the persons accused in said actions are at liberty and it is necessary, in order to reestablish peace and order, to bring the same to a close.

THEREFORE: In use of the powers granted to the Cabinet by the Constitutional Law of the Republic, it is resolved to issue the following

DECREE-LAW No. 5.

ARTICLE 1. - Amnesty is granted:

a) To the accused, whether convicted or not, for crimes of conspiracy, rebellion, sedition, treason, espionage and desertion, provided for and punished in the Military Penal Law and in the Penal Code, committed after the eleventh day of August, 1933.

b) To the accused, whether convicted or not for misdemeanors or felonies committed on the eleventh and twelfth days of August and the fourth of September last, by reason of, or as a result of the revolutionary uprisings which took place on said dates, and for the felonies and misdemeanors which originated as a result of the revolutions of October 2nd and 8th, and November 9th of the past year 1933.

The authors, accomplices and accessories accused, whether convicted or not, for the crimes committed against the exercise of the individual rights defined and punished in Sections First and Second, Title Second of the Penal Code, and for the crimes provided for and punished in Titles III, Chapters IV, V, VI and VII; Title XII, Chapter I, V and VI, all of Book Second of the Penal Code in force will be included in the benefits of this Article, provided said crimes were committed commencing on August 12, 1933, down to the date of the promulgation of the Constitutional Law of February 3, 1934.

ARTICLE 2. - The benefits of this Decree-Law may not be applied in any case nor under any form nor pretext to the accused, whether convicted or not, for crimes of parricide, murder, manslaughter, serious or slight mayhem, discharge of fire arms against a determined person, corruption of minors, rape, dishonest abuse, unlawful marriage, robbery, theft, usurpation, misappropriation, frauds, embezzlements and other swindles, fraudulent insolvency, counterfeiting, manufacture of obnoxious substances and their unlawful sale, counterfeiting of stamps and trademarks, nor for other crimes and misdemeanors not included in the preceding article.

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ARTICLE 3. - The benefits of this Amnesty shall not include the accused, whether convicted or not, for misdemeanors or felonies committed in supporting, sustaining, defending and reestablishing the tyranny overthrown on August 11, 1933.

ARTICLE 4. - The application of this Amnesty will in no case bring about the restoration of the right to positions nor to the collection of retirement pay, remuneration or other rights.

ARTICLE 5. - This Decree-Law shall be applied automatically, or on the petition of an interested party or of the Ministerio Fiscal, and through the procedure established in Book Third, Title II, of the Law of Criminal Procedure.

ARTICLE 6. - This Decree-Law shall take effect from the day of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic.

THEREFORE: I order that this Decree-Law be fulfilled and executed in all of its parts.

Given at the Presidential Palace, in Habana, on the eighth day of the month of February, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-four.

CARLOS MENDIETA.

ROBERTO MENDEZ PENATE.
Secretary of Justice.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 27 1934
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1 2657-9-330
255

3600-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

2657-9-330/254
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 26 1934

Amnesty Decree

1. Supplementing report No. 4460 (3600-a) dated February 9, 1934, relative to the recent amnesty decree issued by the Cuban Government, there is transmitted herewith a copy of the translation of this measure, from the Official Gazette of February 9th.

2. The decree is as described in the above mentioned report, defining the offenses covered and exempting from its benefits all those "accused, whether convicted or not, of misdemeanors or felonies committed in supporting, sustaining, defending or attempting to reestablish the tyranny overthrown on August 11,1933." It also contains an Article providing that the extension of amnesty shall "in no case bring about the restoration of the right to positions or to the collection of retirement pay, remuneration or other rights." Insofar as this provision applies to the former officers of the Army, their position has been defined in another report which transmitted copy of a decree, also signed on February 9th, providing for the reorganization of the Army.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Official Documents.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4489 February 23, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 1934
GENERAL STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-S-330

WAR DEPARTMENT 256
3110-b

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Cabinet.

Attempted Assassination
of Secretary of State.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 12 1934

1. At 11 A.M. on March 7th, an attempt was made to assassinate Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, Secretary of State, and General Julio Sanguily, former Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, as they were leaving the home of the former. A Buick automobile containing four young men, which had been loitering for some time in the vicinity, drove rapidly past the house as Dr. de la Torriente and General Sanguily reached the sidewalk in front of the house. As the would be assassins passed, they attempted to fire a Thompson sub-automatic machine gun, which, however, failed to function. The license number of the car was taken and the car was followed for a short distance, but the trail was lost in the traffic. It is believed that the would be assassins are University students of the "Left" or communist group.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4506 March 8, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 17 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1 2657-G-330
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3600-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 17 193

Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees.

1. On March 5, 1934, the President issued an Executive Order, suspending for ninety days certain Constitutional Guarantees. This had the effect of placing the country under Martial Law, similar to the condition which pertained during the last days of the Machado regime and during most of the period of the Gran San Martin regime.

2. This decree empowers the military forces to retain in confinement labor agitators who would otherwise be promptly released, without punishment, by the civil courts.

T. N. Gimpering,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4512 March 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 20 1934
OPERATIONS DIVISION OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

3600-a

G2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 20 1934

Labor Reforms, Council of State, Etc.

1. In preliminary sessions of the Cabinet, the secretaries of the present Administration are planning the formation of the Council of State called for in the provisional constitution. Part of the labor legislation to be taken up by the Government will be the ratification of the Fifty Percent Labor Law, which, however, may be submitted to certain modifications. All the syndicates dissolved by recent decrees, owing to strike activities, may be reformed although their activities will be limited by law.

2. Organization of various political parties to campaign for the presidency in the elections to follow the Constitutional Assembly, is now under way. One group composed of the OCRR and other sectors is reportedly supporting Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, who, however, has not yet announced his acceptance of the nomination. Another group formed of Nationalists will support Dr. Cuervo Rubio, and a third group will back Dr. Grau San Martin. The A.B.C., considered as the most powerful faction, is forming a political party, based on the platform outlined by Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, in accordance with the program of the organization.

3. The general platform of the Government which has been proposed is considered by observers to be of a decidedly socialistic tendency, based on government distribution of lands, government aid and partial supervision of agriculture, possible issuance of paper money, an extensive public works program, centered on the building of roads branching out from the Central Highway, confirmation of new treaties with the United States and other countries, seeking new markets for Cuban products, and drastic reforms in the postal, scholastic and police systems.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M. A., Havana No. 4514 March 15, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 26 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-J-330
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G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Mendieta Assailed by Growing Number.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 24 1934

1. Dissatisfaction with the course of the present government has been expressed in several quarters lately as representative of the opinion of the A.B.C.,the O.C.R.R. and the Menocalists. A group of Menocal's followers has left for the United States, reportedly to urge the party leader (Menocal) to withdraw his support from the present Government.

2. The Government is scored in some sectors for its "reactionary" tendencies, and criticized in others for the alleged vacillation shown in handling the labor crisis.

3. The protests against the Government have caused a rift in the ranks of the Menocalists, a strong faction within the party insisting that the Government needs the support of all patriots and objecting strenuously to the course being pursued by other members of the party. This faction holds the opinion, as expressed by one of the leaders of the group, that if, through party dissensions, the Mendieta Government which was put into power with public acclaim, should fall, the futility of expecting Cuba to be self-governing will have been demonstrated.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4524 March 19, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 31 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-J-330

3020-b

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Menocalists Still Allied with Present Regime.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 31 1934

1. Allaying public fears that the Menocalists were planning to break with the present Government, party leaders announced, on March 24th, that General Menocal would continue to support the Administration, and plans for the holding of a conference among leaders of the faction in Miami, Florida, were completed. As reported in No.4524 (3020-b) dated March 19, 1934, dissatisfaction with the present Government has caused a rift in the ranks of the Menocalists, some of whom are reportedly urging the leader to withdraw his support from the Mendieta Government.

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2. Meanwhile, the "board of sectors," is being formed by President Mendieta for the purpose of naming governors and mayors. Each sector will have its delegate to the board, who will submit the names of candidates from his faction for the approval of the other sectors. This board is being created by the President due to the bickerings over political offices as each political party sought to gain more prominence, and has apparently assauged the most bitter dissenters in the ranks of each sector, at least for the present.

3. The cohorts of the self-identified "authentic revolutionaries," who were responsible for the installation of Grau San Martin in the presidency, are reported to be threatening to direct an ultimatum to President Mendieta , demanding that he annul all decrees which they consider as contrary to their ideals of the revolution. Failure to comply with these demands, it is reported, within a limited time, will cause them to adopt revolutionary procedure against the present Government. This report has aroused an indignant protest from public-spirited men, who strongly score any attempt at revolt at present as "anti-patriotic and short-sighted egotism."

4. The components of the Council of State, called for by the provisional Constitution, will probably be named this week.

5. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, former provisional President of Cuba, overthrown by the revolt of last September, called on President Mendieta at the Palace on March 24th, accompanied by one of the founders of the OCRR. Cespedes, who has been appointed Cuban Ambassador to Spain, was enthusiastically received at the Palace, while along the streets to and from the Palace he was vociferously acclaimed by those who caught a glimpse of him as he passed.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4538 March 26, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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3020-c

G-2 Report

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/12/74

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 31 1934

Communistic Literature Distributed.

1. Large quantities of communistic literature have been distributed in many interior towns for the past month, according to reports received at the War Department on March 25th from military authorities throughout the Island.

2. Many pamphlets have been issued by the "Communist Party of Cuba" in protest against the "fascist measures" being adopted by the present Government, blaming President Mendieta, as well as Colonel Fulgencio Bastista, and others, for their "policy of hunger, misery and terrorism."

3. Other pamphlets urged workers and peasants to organize armed groups in order to defend themselves from attacks by their enemies, and to prepare a general political strike to foment and establish a "government of workers and peasants.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.
TNG:vm

P. C. P.

From M.A., Havana No. 4539 March 26, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 10 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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2700-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 7 1934

Communistic Activities.

1. Although surface indications point to a continued improvement in the economic and political situation in Cuba, nevertheless, persistent rumors are daily received in this office from "contacts", whose reliabilities are rated from fair to excellent, that the communists are steadily increasing in numbers and that they plan a campaign of sabotage. Nightly bombings have recommenced after a short period of comparative quiet in the city of Havana. I am reliably informed that the communists are wholly responsible for the present bombings, and by communists I mean to include the communistic wing of the University students. The discharge of firearms, ranging from only a few shots to a great many, continue to occur nightly in one or several parts of the City.

2. Havana has become so accustomed to these nightly disturbances during the past two years that not much attention is paid to them, and it may be said that considering the amount of ammunition expended and the bombs exploded, casualties have been remarkably small. On the other hand, damage to property has been considerable.

3. In general, the American business firms in Havana show a marked improvement recently in their business. The American owner of the largest agricultural implement agency in Cuba informed me that his business is better at the present time than at any time during the past five years. This concern handles American made farm implements exclusively, and, for the past twelve months, until very recently, its business had dropped to practically nothing. I can also cite a number of other somewhat similar cases.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4547 April 3, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 16 1934
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2340

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

Hunger Strike of Communists.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 14 1934

1. Sixty-three alleged communists, mostly aliens arrested for infractions of national defense laws, are reported to be starting today on a hunger strike in Principe prison, unless they are given immediate promise of freedom by the authorities. The number contemplating the strike has been reported as 125. The hunger strike, however, may be abandoned through action of prison officials this morning, as prison doctors are prepared to feed the communists forcibly in case they refuse the food that is sent to their cells. Authorities expressed the opinion that the impending strike will be called off shortly after it is found that the doctors intend to carry out such a plan.

2. Since their arrest three weeks ago, the communist prisoners, according to reports from Principe, have been trying every means in their power to exasperate the prison officials.

T. N. Gimperling
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

P.C.P.

From M.A., Havana No. 4554 April 9, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 15 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 16 1934

Communistic Activities.

1. Three alleged Soviet citizens were arrested on April 11th by Havana plain clothes police at the former home of Dr. Octavio Averhoff, Secretary of Treasury under Machado. At the same time, police confiscated a truck load of communistic literature, the nature of which leads them to believe that the communists are planning a vigorous campaign of instruction to school children in the Soviet principles.

2. In Camaguey on April 10th a plot to establish a May Day Soviet in Cuba was discovered by the police who arrested thirty of the alleged communist leaders following a raid on their meeting place in that City. According to some of the prisoners, they counted on the support of soldiers and sailors to assist them in the proposed revolt. At the time of the raid it was also learned that a certain amount of arms and ammunition were hidden by communists on the outskirts of the City.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4567 April 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Dec. 13,
E.O. authority
1933, Sec. 3(A)
By Archivist
Date 4-2-71

APR 24 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

~~Confidential~~: The Military Attaché
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 24 1934

Government's Attitude toward Communism.

1. On April 18th, prisoners held in various jails throughout the Island for violation of national defense laws were being freed by the authorities as the amnesty decreed by the Government was put into effect. A conservative estimate placed the number of prisoners to be liberated at three hundred, and it was learned that at least one hundred were given their freedom on April 18th. Among the first to be freed were thirty of the prisoners who had taken part in the so-called hunger strike at Principe prison.

2. At the same time that the labor agitators were freed from prison, President Mendieta issued an order staying the deportation of some sixty foreign agitators who had violated the labor decree issued in February, 1934, and it was understood that the majority of these agitators would gain immediate release from prison.

3. Meanwhile, the Juvenile Communist League, the Anti-Imperialist League, Left Wing Students' Association and other organizations which took an active part in telling the world about the "hunger strike" through public protests, are now reported to have been bewildered by the Government's decision to free the prisoners, and, for the time being, at least, they seem to have nothing in particular about which to protest.

4. An official at one of the prisons where an alleged hunger strike was declared by the communists said that many of the released prisoners were "laughing up their sleeves" at the Government. He explained that while much publicity had been given the slogan "liberty or death" manifested by the so-called hunger strikers, all but one or two of the men were actually being well fed with food brought to them by relatives and friends.

5. It is rather difficult to predict just what effect this releasing of communistic agitators will have upon the country and the Government. Of course, the communists, as a result of their hunger strike and their protest against treatment of prisoners undergoing the hunger strike, believe that their demonstrations have forced the Government's hand and that the release of the prisoners was a great stroke forward for their cause. It may be that the Government in releasing the agitators is trying to do everything possible to insure that the communists have nothing of which to complain, but it seems rather that it is playing directly into the hands of the communists by granting all their demands. Undoubtedly they now feel more powerful and more secure, and we may look for further developments at an early date.

6. It begins to appear that President Mendieta is not as strong as at first seemed probable, as is evidenced by his issuance of decrees which he has not backed up and more recently by the incidents

M.A., Havana No. 4575 April 20, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
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mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.

7. Another apparent victory for the communists and the striking workers of the Cuban Telephone Company is the order issued on April 17th to the Telephone Company to reinstate all former members of the company with full back pay for the time they were out on strike regardless of any acts of sabotage which they may have committed. It has been stated in some quarters that this order was issued at the request of the Telephone Company in the hope that by taking back the workers and strikers, the bombings and cutting of telephone cables would cease; whether or not this is true can not be ascertained at present, but, undoubtedly, the effect will be that the communists will believe that their recent efforts at terrorism have forced the Government to accede to their demands to reinstate the strikers in order that telephone service may be resumed. This will also make the communists more satisfied with themselves and feel that unless they get what they want they have only to resort to terroristic tactics to attain their ends.

L. V. H. Duffee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

LVHD:vm

M.A., Havana No. 4575 April 20, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 24 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report 2700 7

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 24 1934

Bombing Activities.

1. Bombs continue to explode at various points throughout the city despite efforts of the police to put a stop to these acts of terrorism. Two postmen were gravely wounded and a state of panic caused when a huge bomb was set off in the central post office of Havana. The injured, both veteran employees of the postal department, were struck by flying pieces of steel. The explosion, which occurred shortly before noon, caused great alarm to the hundreds of employees and other persons who crowded the large building. The police upon arriving at the scene found that the lavatory rooms were completely demolished. It was reported that three employees of the postal department might be arrested for participation in the plot.

2. What is believed to be the largest bomb placed since 1930, exploded shortly after midnight on April 19th at the residence of Dr. Hdliodoro Gil, noted Cuban lawyer and former senator. He is also the legal counsel for several tobacco companies, who, on account of labor difficulties, closed their factories thus causing a bitter fight with striking tobacco workers. The family of Dr. Gil were in the building at the time of the explosion and are reported to be suffering from severe shock. No arrests have as yet been made, but police seized an automobile in front of the house, presumably left by the terrorists. Large quantities of "red" propaganda were found inside the car.

3. Meanwhile, two other bombs caused damage and considerable alarm in Havana during the day. The first bomb, exploding early yesterday morning in a cable pit, cut off telephone service in a hundred residences and broke a city water main. The second bomb was discovered by police in an abandoned automobile which they had pursued when the actions of its occupants aroused their suspicions.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press
LVHD:vm

P.C.P.

From M.A., Havana No. 4577 April 20, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 25 1934
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)
Subject: Stability of Government
(b) Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 24 1934

1. A public demonstration against the Provisional Government took place on April 16 when about 300 Left Wing Students, members of the Juvenile Communistic League and others, marched through Habana to the Presidential Palace where they halted to shout: "Down with Mendieta - down with Batista - down with Caffery - kick out Yankee Imperialism!" They waved banners and placards calling for the immediate freedom of imprisoned workers and students. and inciting workers to join in a "May Day" strike movement.

2. The students did not seem much impressed by the occasional barks of army rifles fired by soldiers over their heads to disperse them - more than a score of shorts were fired- but their shouting suddenly ceased when two soldiers wearing gas masks appeared. A general scramble for safety followed when the soldiers made ready to ignite the fuses which protruded from the suspicious looking cans placed on a nearby corner.

3. It was the natives' first experience with tear gas, and only a few of the demonstrabors stayed to see what was going to happen. The officials themselves were surprised with what did happen: The fuses of the gas bombs burned readily enough, but the bombs, recently brought to Cuba by American experts, failed to explode. The only casualty of the day was an army sergeant who burned his fingers on one of the fuses.

4. This demonstration was made in behalf of 63 alleged communists held in the Principe prison in Habana who have been carrying on a hunger strike since April 9. At the beginning of the second week of their fast, 48 of them were reported weak, but all of them were determined to continue in their movement for "freedom or death". On April 16 seven prisoners were transferred from the Cabana prison to the Principe prison and five of them at once joined the hunger strike. Dispatches from other prisons throughout the island where sympathtetic hunger strikes were called during last week, stated that the majority of prisoners had begun to accept food. Students in Santiago gave up the hunger strike after four days.

5. Radical labor leaders are taking advantage of the movement to urge a 24-hour general strike in protest against the government's treatment of prisoners.

Source: Press

aem

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

M. A. Cuba Report 4571 April 17, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 30 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 23 1934

Police Blame Communists
for Recent Bombings.

1. The police of Havana stated today that they plan to use strong measures to curb the terrorist campaign which during the last twenty-four hours has resulted in the death of one Cuban, injury to two others, damage amounting to $500.00 to the American-owned Snider's Antique Shop, and lesser damage to other buildings. The bomb which exploded in the doorway of the American-owned antique shop shook buildings for a radius of three blocks, shattered all of the plate glass windows of the antique store and demolished many valuable pieces of merchandise on display.

2. Extra police are being placed on patrol duty throughout the Capital and all of the law enforcers on the streets have been instructed to keep a sharp lookout for the terrorists whose campaign of terror recall the days of Machado, when five to ten bombs exploded almost every night. The Chief of Technical Police states that these attempts against public order are the work of communists who were recently released from prison in accordance with the amnesty signed by the President last week, and that many of them are soon to be deported from the Island..

3. Lieutenant Colonel Jose Pedraza, newly appointed Chief of the National Police, has revealed that members of the Army will play a large part in strengthening Havana's law enforcement body. The soldiers, it was explained, will cooperate with police in maintaining order and act as "shock troops" in case of major disorders. The entire police force will be given a thorough examination by Lieut.Colonel Pedraza, with the aim of modernizing the tactics and increasing the efficiency of the force. It has been stated that armored motorcycles will be placed into service today.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain. Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press.

LVHD:VM

From M.A., Havana No. 4579 April 23, 1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-9-330
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 2 3 1934

Gas Disperses Manifestation.

1. Havana authorities on April 23rd. for the first time successfully used tear gas bombs as a means of dispersing disorderly demonstrators. Shortly before noon approximately 500 alleged communists, students and workers marched to the Palace, shouting "down with Mendieta", which turned into howls of dismay when a number of gas bombs were exploded in their midst, and a general scramble out of the neighborhood followed. However, Palace attendants and residents of nearby buildings also suffered the effects of the tear gas. Police officials were highly pleased with the results of the use of gas. It is recalled that this attempt was far different from the first attempt to use the gas bombs several weeks ago, when they failed to explode.

2. Later in the day Havana University students threw rocks at soldiers who were sent to restore order after the students had put soap on the street car tracks leading up to the University. The tracks were cleaned by the soldiers intermittently between dodging the rocks thrown by the students. Soldiers were later stationed outside of the University but strict orders were given for them not to enter the grounds where students were shouting insults. The restriction ruling was to observe the autonomy of the institution. While general disorder was being created in front of the University by demonstrating students in the afternoon, a group set fire to an Havana street car after ordering the passengers at the point of guns to abandon the car. The incendiarists escaped before arrival of the authorities.

3. The Rector of the University has now announced that the University will be closed for forty-eight hours as a protest against the alleged mistreatment of students by members of the Army. Officials of the University were reported to have offered the support of the student body in seconding a campaign against the Army, which started in Camaguey the first part of last week when students there were alleged to have been mistreated.

4. It was admitted by high officials of the Government that the Nation is faced with threats of a strike of students and professors, which might become a general strike of serious proportions unless some solution can be found.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

P. C. O.

Source: Press.
LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4580 April 24, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 1 1934

Preparations for May Day.

1. Rumors have been current to the effect that a considerable demonstration is planned for the City of Havana for May 1st, 1934, wherein an effort will be made to cause a general cessation of all labor on that day. The extent to which organized labor will go, beyond the usual parades and demonstrations through the public streets of Havana, is at this time not known. However, that certain firms are apprehensive as to the damage which may be done to their equipment on that day is evidenced by the fact that a transportation company has refused to move, on May 1st., the household effects of Mr. Dorsey G. Fisher, who is going as Vice Consul from Havana to Matanzas, and the fact that the date of arrival of the SS "Morro Castle" of the Ward Line has been changed from May 1st to May 2nd. because of the possible cessation of all labor on May 1st.

2. According to press reports, the Cuban Army is taking steps toward controlling any demonstrations that may arise by placing an unusually large number of soldiers in the City of Havana, with the idea of assisting the Havana police in controlling any demonstration that might take place. The Government has been petitioned for authority to hold parades and peaceful demonstrations on May 1st., but, to date, no information has been received as to whether or not these petitions have been granted. However, it is doubtful that any untoward incident will occur on this date in view of past experiences. In Cuba, as in other countries, May 1st. is supposed to be a day set apart for communistic agitation; but it is a well-known fact that events in Cuba planned for a certain date, if they happen at all, occur several weeks later. For this reason, no particular apprehension is felt that any incident will occur on May 1st. which may have any lasting effect on the Government or its policies.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
LVHD:vm

M. A., Havana No. 4584 April 27, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-G-330
G-1 2-71

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY

May Day Demonstration.

1. One of Cuba's largest "May Day" demonstrations ended precipitously when the column was fired upon by what is believed to have been snipers. Panic occurred immediately when eleven marchers were wounded,and the march to the Cristal Stadium where the communists had planned the mass meeting was not continued nor was the meeting subsequently held. In addition to the eleven persons wounded, a large number suffered temporarily from tear gas released by soldiers and police in an effort to restore order.

2. The march started at 8 A.M. at Industria and Reina Streets in the downtown section of the City, and the number marching grew rapidly as the procession continued. Although the local papers state that approximately 25,000 took part in the demonstration, this estimate is greatly exaggerated. The Government gave permission to the communists to hold the parade and mass meeting, but insisted that no disorders would be permitted. The progress of the marchers was slow with shouts of impatience and continued singing of the "Internationale". The police confiscated a number of red banners which were considered offensive because of personal slanders to President Mendieta, Ambassador Caffery and Colonel Batista, also other prominent persons. Although it is illegal to parade with red banners in Cuba, nevertheless, there was a profusion of them and, except for those which were considered offensive, no effort was made towards confiscation.

3. As the head of the parade was nearing the Havana Emergency Hospital, a sudden burst of shooting occurred which caused a panic-striken rush to safety as the shooting continued. Within a few moments the streets were practically deserted. During the panic, soldiers and police who had been closely watching the progress of the parade appeared on the scene and tear gas bombs were exploded while soldiers fired at housetops where snipers were suspected of hiding. Among the wounded were several soldiers, one policeman, and the balance were among the demonstrators in the marching column. Some communists accuse members of the A.B.C. of the sniping; others accuse the Government for purposely breaking up the demonstration. Most of the banners bore slogans calling for action towards bettering the existence of Cuba's working class and also protesting against injustices alleged to have been committed by the Government, and there were also numerous anti-imperalistic banners.

4. All business houses in Havana were closed during the day, and all transportation facilities, with the exception of privately owned automobiles, were stopped. No mail deliveries were made and no newspapers were published. Many persons were unable to take full advantage of the holiday by going to the country or to distant parts of the City to visit friends and relatives, due to lack of transportation.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4586 May 2, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAY 8 1934

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)
Subject: Public Order and Safety
Clash of Students + soldiers

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 8 1934

1. On the afternoon of May 3rd, 1934 one high school student was killed, four students, one soldier, and one civilian who was a passer-by, were seriously wounded when students, soldiers, and police clashed in front of the Havana Institute, which is the high school on Zulueta street, about two blocks from the Capitol.

2. The students were protesting because of the death of Ludovico Moreno during the May 1st communist demonstration, from the effects of a high concentration of tear gas thrown in the form of a bomb by a soldier. Moreno, according to the press, was never a student, as his name is not carried in the archives of the university. Nevertheless, his death seems to have been the reason for the demonstration of May 3rd.

3. For some hours prior to the clash, the Institute's students had set up a barricade in front of the Institute on Zulueta street which completely blocked traffic. A newspaper photographic cut shows this barricade. At about 2.30 p.m. a police automobile containing two police and two soldiers appeared on the scene. Students flung inkwells and other missiles at the riot squad who then released tear gas bombs some of which failing to explode, were thrown back at the riot squad by students, so that they exploded in the midst of the riot squad. Soldiers who had reinforced the riot squad then fired a number of shots in the air. Almost immediately, however, firing occurred from roofs of houses and from the Institute, and then the soldiers fired into the students. A student Antonio Gonzalez who is also private secretary of the governor of Santa Clara province, was killed instantly, and two others wounded nearby. Thousands of pedestrians and onlookers fled panic stricken to safety or dropped prone to the sidewalk, to avoid being hit by bullets. I happened to have been on the sidewalk nearby, and I judge that several hundred shots were fired. I saw no snipers but I am convinced that many shots were fired from nearby roofs. In less than two minutes every window and door was closed, and the rolling iron doors which are rolled down at night and during disturbances, were in place almost instantly. The rapidity with which these precautions were taken by storekeepers were due perhaps to constant practice in situations of a similar nature during the last nine months.

4. Students and their parents are loudly complaining that the incident was a non-provoked massacre, worse than anything in the days of Machado. It is being predicted that

M. A. Cuba Report 4593 May 4, 1934

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the students will cause further trouble seeking retaliation against the army and police. Notwithstanding the hysterical outcry of students, parents, and teachers, the opinion quietly expressed among the more conservative people is that the students brought the trouble on themselves and richly deserved what they received. Their daily conduct has become so overbearing by turning over and burning up street cars, crowding on street cars and busses and refusing to pay fare, and their silly, childish criticisms of the government, coupled with communistic leanings and utterances, have alienated the support and good will of the better class Cubans and foreigners. The common expression among these older people is that the students need a good spanking coupled with a huge dose of castor oil.

5. It has been stated by a local Spanish language newspaper that Ramon Grau San Martin is returning to Cuba May 12. This cannot, however, be verified. If he does return, trouble may be expected, as the communists, disgruntled laborers, communistic students, and perhaps a large percentage of the unemployed will flock to him as their leader. It is even possible that his return may precipitate a revolution which, if successful, would throw the government into the hands of the communists.

Source: Personal observation and press.

TNG/aem

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Enclosure: One newspaper clipping.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

HAVANA, CUBA, FRIDAY MORNING, MAY 4, 1934

MIL INTEL

STUDENTS, SOLDIERS CLASH

2657-9-330/272



(Top) Students line the barricades built across the streets outside Havana Institute to halt traffic protesting the death from tear gas fumes of Ludovico Moreno Wednesday night.

(Below) Students seek protection behind parapets of institute as bullets fired by soldiers whistle overhead. A wounded youth lies on the ground in the left foreground.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Social)

2657-G-330/272

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Student Demonstrations.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1934

1. Supplementing report No. 4593, I. C. No. as above, dated May 4, 1934, a detachment of soldiers of the Cuban Army searched the Havana Institute during the night of May 4-5th, and have since occupied the building, excluding instructors and students. The searchers found six bombs loaded with dynamite and lead slugs, 20 rifles, a large quantity of ammunition and dynamite, six red communist flags, a small printing press and a very large amount of communistic literature, including plans for the overthrow of the present Government. There were also many empty revolver shells found, which, it is believed, had been used in firing against soldiers and police on the afternoon of May 3rd., when the latter broke up a demonstration in front of the building, as previously reported.

2. From Santiago de Cuba the American Consul reports that student demonstrations were broken up by soldiers and a large number of students barricaded themselves in their high school and exchanged several shots with soldiers outside. The students later left the building peaceably, and there were apparently no casualties.

3. The Vice Consul from Matanzas reports that on May 5th the students demonstrated against the Government's treatment of students in Havana on May 3rd; they declared a strike for a period of three days. No violence was reported.

4. I noticed, on the morning of May 4th, a large sign painted on the stone wall in front of the Havana University, bearing the following inscription: "MENDIETA, CAFFERY, BATISTA, MANACH ARE ASESINOS", which in English would read "MENDIETA, CAFFERY, BATISTA, MANACH ARE ASSASSINS". The sign was painted with red paint and the letters were about 12 inches long. It has been apparent for some time that the communists and anti-Imperialists have been trying to connect Mr. Caffery with the present Government and to blame him as one of the principals in the Government's policy of restoring order and preventing sabotage.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation and
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4596 May 7, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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C-1

WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1934

Secretary of Instruction
Plans Rules for Institutions.

1. Secretary of Public Instruction, Dr. Jorge Manach, who id also one of the leaders of the A.B.C., is quoted in the press of May 8th as follows:

"In accordance with the policy of the present Government, I am dictating dispositions, the object of which will be to eliminate Communism from our institutions of learning, regardless of what form it assumes. National defense laws will now summarily end all manner of anti-government manifestations. With reason, it is esteemed that the State, which pays for the operation of public schools, cannot be encumbered by attitudes against itself. Until now it has been found preferable not to apply these laws vigorously to educational institutions, but the practice of Communism has passed the novel stage. It is deemed necessary to put an end to it.

"There are adult elements outside of the educational systems who have interested themselves in fomenting Communist opinions and adding "left wings" with painful consequences.

"The "vista gorda" (beautiful dream) has ended. In this, as in other things, the patience manifested by the Government has been interpreted as weakness. Now it is going to be demonstrated, for the well-being of the students that the Government can be serene in energy. Red flags, left wing groups and pictures of Lenin are finished. They will have no further place in our institutions of learning. Directors of schools will be held responsible to see that this is fulfilled."

2. On April 7th, a mammoth meeting of Havana University students decided by overwhelming vote to end the student strike and to resume classes. The Rightist, or Conservative faction, decidedly out numbered the Leftist, or communist faction. Radicalism on the part of students and recent student disorders were bitterly assailed. It was even proposed to expel radical student leaders. It is believed that this will end, for a time at least, the troubles which the Government has been having with the radical elements in the Cuban schools.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4601 May 8, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Confidential: The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report 2140-c

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Important Social Questions and Movements.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 15 1934

Communistic Activities.

1. I am reliably informed from contacts in close touch with several educated communists who, although not members of the directing group, have some influence in the local communist organizations, that the communists are extremely discouraged because of the forceful attitude of the Government in putting down communistic and anti-government activities among the high school and University students, and because of the signing of the Jones-Costigan Bill by President Roosevelt, which will materially better the economic conditions in Cuba, and, consequently, reduce discontent among the unemployed, and give honest employment to many ignorant Cubans who are now the gullible prey of communistic agitators. This is not meant to infer that the communist threat in Cuba is not serious -- it remains the most serious problem which confronts the Cuban Government.

2. As reported by the Chief of Mission to the State Department recently, Vice Consul Johnson of Matanzas has reported that communistic agitators in Matanzas Province are making all sorts of promises to laborers working in the fields, one of which is that they will receive $2.00 per day as in contrast to their present 40 and 50 cents daily wage, if Cuba becomes a communist State. Mr.Johnson states that in some cases laborers have been so swayed by these promises that they have actually deserted their plows and oxen in the fields. There has also been much communistic propaganda in the provinces to the effect that if the Mendieta Government is overthrown and Cuba becomes a communistic State, all the American owned sugar properties and lands and American-owned public utilities will be turned over to the workers -- the large estates being parceled out to the present Cuban plantation laborers. This form of propaganda has bitten deep and made many converts not only among the more ignorant Cubans, but also among many of the better educated Cuban farmers.

3. It has been persistently reported, but unconfirmed, that the communistic leaders who are operating from Moscow or New York, or both, are determined to set up the "red" flag in Cuba, if only for a few hours, and that their fixed goal is to make Cuba the first Soviet State in the Western Hemisphere. In this connection, Madame Ping Ling, wife of the Chinese Minister to Cuba, a charming, educated and intelligent Chinese of Cantonese birth, returned not long ago to Havana from a long visit in San Francisco. She is a graduate of the University of California. During a visit one afternoon to my home, she informed me in the presence of Dr. Ping Ling and Mrs. Gimperling that she spent much time at the University during her stay in California, and that through curiosity and to better inform herself on the alleged communistic activities of the students, she posed as a communist, was welcomed into the communist circles and gained much information. According to Madame Ping Ling, more than ten per cent of the students of the University

From M.A., Havana No. 4608 May 11, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

are communists; most of them, however, are foreigners. She was shown maps of all of the countries where communistic centers had been organized, and from these centers when fully organized, secondary centers are pushed out to other localities; these are built up and from them other centers of activity are pushed out. This method of operation is, I think, fully understood by our Government. However, according to my informant, the communistic activities in Cuba were the subject of much interest and she was informed that activities were centered on Cuba for the purpose of making it the first Soviet State in the Western Hemisphere. I have every reason to believe in MadamePing Ling's sincerity, and I accept without reservation her statements as being authentic. Ambassador Caffery was very much interested in my information on this subject.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.(Confidential)
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4608 May 11, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Confidential: The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
3800-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date

Former Revolutionary President Grau San Martin will Return to Cuba.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 21 1934

1. Former Revolutionary President Grau San Martin, who has been on leave of absence in Mexico since he resigned as Chief Executive last January, is on his way at the present moment to Havana, and is expected to arrive here on May 18th.

2. Some trouble has been anticipated in certain quarters with the arrival of Grau. However, President Mendieta is going to meet him at the gangplank when he arrives and welcome him back to Cuba. This very wise move on the part of Mendieta will have an excellent effect, and should, of itself, prevent trouble.

3. In a statement issued to the press before leaving Mexico yesterday, Grau stated that he does not intend to become involved in politics, but, if called to serve his country, he will most willingly and promptly do so.

4. It is most probable that if all the voters of Cuba could cast their votes today, Grau San Martin would be elected President; he not only represents the jobless and the disgruntled, but the political radicals and communists, and he has a particularly large following of blacks.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4614 May 15, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~: The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
CANCELLED
Authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963 from TAGO to National Archivist
By 23
Date

G-2 Report 3600-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Return of Dr. Grau San Martin to Cuba on May 18th.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 22 1934
2657-g-330/226

1. As stated in report No.4614, index as above, dated May 15, 1934, Dr. Grau San Martin left Mexico City on May 14th and will arrive in Havana on the S. S. SIERRA VENTANA at 6:30 A. M., May 18th. It is understood that President Mendieta intends to be present at the dock when Grau disembarks, although I was informed late yesterday that he probably would not meet him.

2. The following is an extract of an official communication from the Charge d' Affaires of the American Embassy in Mexico to the State Department, dated May 12, 1934, a copy of which was furnished Ambassador Caffery:

"In a conversation which I had with Doctor Jose Manuel Puig Casaurane, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mexico) last evening, he stated that he regretted that Doctor Grau San Martin was returning to Cuba at this time, as he thought it was very inadvisable from every viewpoint for him to do so. He said that in his opinion, Dr. Grau San Martin would probably be given a tremendous welcome upon his return to Havana and that for about a week he would be the recipient of a great many courtesies and ovations from the Cuban Government and also from the various political factions, but that before a month had passed one of three things would have happened; one, he would have been expelled from Cuba; two, he would have been assassinated, or; three, he would have gone into hiding.

"Dr. Puig stated that he knew Dr. Grau San Martin very well personally and admired his ideals, but that there was no question in his mind that it was very unwise indeed for him to return to Cuba at the present time.

"Dr. Puig stated that a few days previously the President's office had telephoned him for his opinion as to the advisability of General Gerardo Machado, former President of Cuba, coming to Mexico, and that he had replied that, while of course, the Government of Mexico would not make any objections to such a visit, nevertheless, he thought that the public here might give Machado a rude reception and that it would be better for him not to come to Mexico.

"Respectfully yours,

(Signed)"R.Henry Norweb.
Charge d' Affaires ad interim"

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and Embassy.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4615 May 16,1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

Confidential: The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

G-2 Report 3600-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 26 1934

Arrival of Former Revolutionary President Grau San Martin.

1. Former revolutionary President Grau San Martin arrived in Havana on the S. S. "Sierra Ventana" from Mexico City at 9 A.M., May 18th. It was understood that President Mendieta was to have met Grau personally at the dock -- he did not do so, however, but was represented by several aides. Most of the prominent figures of the new Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolutionario) were present, and a large crowd of Grau's enthusiastic supporters. It had been estimated that there would be between one hundred and one hundred and fifty thousand present at the demonstration, and although one local newspaper estimated the crowd at 100,000, this is a gross exaggeration. The Commander of the U. S. Special Service Squadron estimated the crowd at not to exceed 5000. There were certainly not more than that number at the docks to greet Grau, and, as an eye-witness to the crowd along the Malecon, I would estimate the number at not to exceed 10,000, of which from 75 to 90 per cent were negroes or part negro. It may probably be described as an unwashed, ragged rabble.

2. It was understood that Grau was very much pleased with the demonstration, although upon arrival at his home on 17th Street in the Vedado he was removed from the automobile in an unconscious condition. He was soon revived, however, from the fainting spell, and issued a short statement to the representatives of the press, the substance of which is as follows:

"There has been a gross misunderstanding regarding the anti-imperialist campaign which I took part in while in Mexico. There is one point which I would like greatly to have cleared up, and that is that my campaign against "Yankee Imperialism" is not a campaign against the American people nor against the American nation. I cherish the greatest admiration for the freedom of America and the contribution of the American people toward world progress. My campaign is against those capitalists -- those imperialists -- who have so often and so grossly abused my people, Cuba's working class, and the workers of other nations of the world."

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
8-4-69

3. Doctor Grau then, according to the newspaper, bitterly assailed the Platt Amendment and expressed the opinion that for the good of the Cuban people, it should be summarily cast aside. He is further quoted as saying that "the saddest damage of the Platt Amendment is that it perturbs and demoralizes the responsibility of the Cuban people. With the fear that some greater force outside of the nation is waiting for the chance to strike, Cubans cannot be expected ever to stand alone nor to surmount their own obstacles."

From M.A., Havana No. 4620 May 19, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

4. The attitude of the communists toward Grau will be observed with much interest. It is most probable that they will re-align themselves in support of him. Communism has grown so rapidly in Cuba within the last few months among the lower classes, in particular among the unemployed and the negroes, that without the support of the communists, Grau's following would be so reduced as to make it improbable that he could win the forthcoming presidential election.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4620 May 22, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2657-G-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT 279

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Recent Bombing Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 29 1934

1. During the night of May 22-23, a large bomb was placed in the front entrance of the Havana Post building where it exploded and caused considerable damage to the building and fixtures. It did not, however, prevent the publication of the May 23rd. issue of the paper.

2. During the same evening, Jose I. Rivero, director and publisher of the Diario de la Marina, which is the leading and most conservative Spanish language daily in Cuba at the present time, was seriously wounded and one of the two Cuban soldier guards riding in Rivero's machine at the time was slightly wounded. The car was attacked by five unidentified men who suddenly fired at Rivero's car, while travelling at a high rate of speed. The unwounded soldier returned the fire, and a short time later the car used by the assailants was found abandoned in the business district of the City. An unexploded bomb and blood stains were found in the car, but no clue as to the identity of the assailants.

3. Also during last evening bombs wrecked a drug store in the central part of Havana and also did considerable damage to a toy shop.

4. Several weeks ago the largest antique store in Havana, located on the Prado and owned by a Mr. Snider, an American, was seriously damaged by a bomb. This is the second time that this establishment has been bombed within the past several months. Mr. Snider had no insurance but he has presented a claim for damages to the Cuban Government.

5. Several days ago the Electrical Equipment Company of Cuba, owned by Mr. R. V. Waters, an American and a prominent member of the local American Legion post, was damaged by a bomb. The damage was, however, fully covered by insurance.

6. In connection herewith, it may be noted that a number of business concerns have been visited by Cuban gangsters who have proposed to furnish protection to their properties upon the payment of a certain sum of money, and warning the proprietors that if these payments were not made, their properties would probably be damaged. Of course, this is similar to the blackmailing methods of certain rackateer groups in some of the larger American cities, particularly Chicago. I am inclined to believe, however, that the sabotage of the Havana Post and the wounding of Mr. Rivero were caused by communists in retaliation for the strong support given the Mendieta Government by these newspapers.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4626 May 24, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~: The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

STATE DEPT. MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3840.

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Diplomatic and Consular Representatives Accredited from Foreign Countries.

Activities in Vicinity of Embassy Residence.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 2

1. About noon on May 27th, an automobile containing four men drove past the home of Ambassador Caffery at 9th and 11th, Alturas de Miramar, and fired three shots at the two soldiers who were standing on the corner between 75 and 100 yards away, one of whom was seriously wounded and was taken to the Army hospital at Camp Columbia. These soldiers are part of a detachment which guards the Ambassador's residence, which, strictly speaking, is the American Embassy.

2. At the time the shooting took place the Ambassador was at home, preparing to go to the Havana Yacht Club. As he described the affair to me, he heard three shots, each timed between one and two seconds apart.

3. The Army doctors believe that the wound of the above mentioned soldier was made by a machine gun bullet. How they can determine this, I do not know, as the Thompson sub-machine gun, the most common of all varieties in Cuba, uses a .45 pistol cartridge, and the timing of the shots would seem to indicate that the weapon used was a .45 revolver or pistol. Strange to say, the eye-witnesses were unable to determine what weapon was used. The chief reason for my interest in the type of weapon used is because in almost all cases during the past year attacks from automobiles have been made with sub-machine guns and not with revolvers. The men who attacked Dr. Cosme de la Torriente and General Sanguily from a moving automobile some weeks ago as the two were standing in front of de la Torriente's house on the Malecon, used a sub-machine gun, but they were able to fire only one shot from the weapon, as explained in a previous report.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 6-24-69

4. About 10:00 A. M. this morning the automobile of the First Secretary of the Embassy, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, which was being driven by the negro chauffeur but contained no passengers, was driven into the curb on Fifth Avenue in the suburb of Miramar, by four young men, one of whom got out and addressed the chauffeur in English, telling him that he would be given just two weeks to get out of Cuba and that if he did not do so, he would be killed. The young man then pulled out a revolver and broke the windshield of the car with the butt of it, exclaiming as he did so - "and that's for your boss, Matthews," or words to that effect. Mr. Caffery told me that he believes the attacks are directed by communists, and that Mr.Matthews appeared prominently in the Colombian press during the communistic activities there and their repression when Mr. Caffery was the U. S. Minister and Mr. Matthews was a Secretary to that Legation.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4634 May 28, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For ~~Official Use Only.~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

G-1 2657-G-330
281

G-2 Report 2810-a

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Domestic Press.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 5 1934

Director of Local
Newspaper "Ahora" Arrested.

1. Guillermo Martinez Marquez, director of the newspaper "Ahora" was arrested on May 31st by the military authorities and lodged in Cabanas Fortress. Later, in explanation of the arrest, Lieut.Colonel Pedraza, Chief of the National Police, declared that the authorities had data which showed that Martinez was apparently connected with the attempt made against the life of Ambassador Caffery on May 27th, as reported in report No. 4634, I. G. No. 3840, dated May 28, 1934.

2657-G-330/240

2. The director of "Ahora" was also charged by the police chief with publishing an article which "cast a bad reflection on the Cuban Army." Details regarding the accusations were guarded with strict reserve.

3. The Reporters' Association of Havana and prominent newspapermen protested to the military authorities against the arrest of Martinez.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4641 June 1,1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For ~~Official Use Only~~.

JUN 13 1934
NAVY DEPT. OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-Q-330
8 2+2

WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3600-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

Constitutional Guarantees

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1934

1. Decree No. 1448 dated June 5, 1934, continues the suspension of Constitutional Guarantees, as reported in report No. 4512, I. G. No. 3600-a, dated March 13, 1934, for an additional period of ninety days.

2657-Q-330/257

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents.

LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4646 June 6, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Confidential: The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2657-J-330
243

3700-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Importance of Party Organizations in Political Life of Country.

Possibility of Clash between A.B.C. Members and the Communists.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 16 1934

1. The A. B. C. society is preparing to have a concentration of its members in Havana on June 17th, and the communists hope to be able to cripple this concentration by calling a strike of bus and tramway employees, and, possibly, employees of other transportation lines.

2. It is possible that there will be a clash between the A.B.C. and the communists during or shortly after the concentration, and if this does occur, I should not be surprised if the present Government is taken over by Martinez Saenz and his A.B.C., supported by Batista and his army.

3. As previously reported, the A. B.C. society has become a political party, with the election on May 26th of Dr. Joaquin Martinez Saenz as President of the organization. The following were chosen as Directors of the organization.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By [signature] 12-24-69
Date

For one year:

Dr. Orestes Figuerdo,
Dr. Carlos Pineiro,
Sr. Jose M. Ribas,
Sr. Manuel Marti,
Sr. Carlos Iribarren.

For two years:

Dr. Pedro Lopez Dorticos,
Dr. Carlos Saladrigas,
Dr. Alfredo Botet,
Dr. Jorge Manach,
Dr. Joaquin Martinez Saenz.

For three years:

Sr. Ramon O. Hermida,
Dr. Juan Andres Lliteras,
Sr. Eudaldo Celi,
Dr. Aurelio Espinosa,
Sr. Juan Pedro Bombino.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and Embassy

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4648 June 12, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential:~~ The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

2657-9-330
6-1
2700

G-2 Report

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 15, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 6-24-89

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 19 1934

Bombing and other subversive activities.

1. On June 12th the police raided the laboratory of a Dr. Reuben Penate in Havana. Two young men were captured in the act of making bombs, and over fifty bombs were reported to have been seized by the police, in addition to material for the manufacture of bombs.

2. On the same date, a bomb exploded in the doorway of a negro political club in Vibora, a suburb of Havana, wounding two members seriously.

3. A huge bomb exploded shortly before 3 A.M. this date in the residence of a lieutenant of the National Police. The officer, his wife and one child were injured. The detonation was so great that it was felt in downtown Havana which is approximately five miles from the scene of the explosion.

4. Four students were arrested on the night of June 12th for attempting to create a panic in a large moving picture theatre in Havana by throwing lighted fire crackers and stones at the screen during the performance. A serious panic in the filled theatre was narrowly averted.

5. The second daylight holdup in the history of Havana occurred about noon on June 12th when five armed bandits made a bold daylight holdup of La Casa Riguera, jewelry and loan establishment in the central part of the City. Between $20,000 and $25,000 in cash and jewels were taken. The first daylight holdup occurred about three months ago when several armed bandits with sub-machine guns held up the Vedado branch of the Royal Bank of Canada, escaping with several thousand dollars taken from the cash drawers and counters.

6. Not long ago the communists threatened that they intended to wage war against the Government with fire and bombs. The National Paper Factory in the suburb of Marianao was almost completely destroyed by fire about two weeks ago, with the loss estimated at between $1,000,000 and $1,500,000. This has thrown out of employment about 450 people. The fire is said to have been of incendiary origin. In addition to bombings which can almost certainly be attributed to work of the communists, it is believed that some of the bombings against commercial houses may be attributed to racketeers.

7. During the Grau regime, most of the bombs were small, only weighing about one pound and most of them were set off in the streets and parks after 1 A. M. in the mornings, very little damage to persons or property resulting therefrom. I have counted as many as 23 of these small bomb explosions within one hour. The A.B.C. was responsible for a great deal of this at that time and also some of the bombing was done by Left Wing students; also during this period of several months there were a few heavy bombs which

From M.A., Havana No. 4650 June 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

caused considerable damage to plate glass windown of business concerns. These were the work of communists or possibly students, as I know that the A.B.C. at that time were limiting the weight of their bombs to one pound. The motive of the bombings directed by this organization was to keep the city stirred up during the Grau regime, rather than to injure persons or property.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4650 June 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~For Official Use Only.~~

JUN 25 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1

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285

G-2 Report

3110-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Cabinet.

Tense Situation in Cabinet
due to A.B.C. Tragedies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1934

1. Since Sunday, June 17th, the political situation in the Government has been somewhat tense. There have been several long conferences of the President and Cabinet with Colonel Batista. Nothing has been reported in the press as to the purport of these meetings; however, it is known that their purpose was to discuss the complaints lodged by Martinez Saenz, head of the A.B.C. society, and Secretary of the Treasury in the present Cabinet, that the police and the Army did not afford adequate protection to the A.B.C. paraders. In addition to this, it is definitely known that two members of the police force parked a police car in the rear of the American Embassy building, and when firing started on the Prado at the head of the A.B.C. parade (as reported in report No. 4657, index 2700, dated June 19, 1934) these men, from a point just outside of my office, fired a number of tear gas bombs from revolvers at a large group of A.B.C. members who were assembled in the Park just in front of the Embassy, waiting to join in line in their proper places. It is definitely known that these people were orderly and quiet. One member of the A.B.C., I am informed, made a sworn statement before he died that he had been hit by a shot fired from the building adjacent to the American Embassy.

2. It is understood that Martinez Saenz has demanded that Lieut. Colonel Pedraza of the Army, Chief of the National Police, be removed. Pedraza is probably Batista's best friend and closest confidant, and it is he, according to rumor, who is named by Colonel Batista to take command of the Cuban Army in case Batista is killed.

3. The A.B.C. also contend that Batista refused to permit them to carry any arms whatsoever in the parade although they had informed him that they expected to be attacked.

4. It is rumored this morning that the A.B.C. has withdrawn from the Government, although I am unable at the present time to verify this

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4660 June 22,1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JUN 26 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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286

3110-a

7

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Executive.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 25 1934

Mendieta Slightly Wounded by Explosion of Bomb.

1. During an official luncheon given on June 15th at Headquarters, North Naval District at Tiscornia across the bay from Havana, and while President Mendieta was on his feet delivering an address, a powerful bomb exploded in the room directly in the rear of where the President was standing. Lieutenant Manuel Colomar, Navy paymaster, and a sailor named Matia Tapia, who were standing behind the President, were killed. The President received a wound in the hand. Dr. Emeterio Santovenia, Secretary of the Presidency, and Dr. Gabriel Landa, Secretary of Communications, were also slightly wounded. The remaining number of wounded, some gravely, are from the enlisted personnel of the Navy.

2. Approximately ten photographers of local Spanish language newspapers have been arrested for investigation due to the fact that among the debris were found parts of a photographer's camera, and near where the bomb had been placed was found a handkerchief said to belong to the photographer of the student newspaper Alma Mater.

3. The Secretary of State, who was knocked unconscious by the blast but not seriously injured, labeled the attempt upon the life of the President as "a savage act which merits universal reproach." To newspaper men the President remarked: "I was speaking at the banquet when the explosion occurred. Navy men behind me saved my life but lost theirs. It was a terrible surprise, but just one of those things. We must carry on." Colonel Batista rushed to the Palace from Camp Columbia upon receiving news of the explosion. When questioned by newspaper men he is quoted as having replied - "This is a disagreeable shock and a warning. We know who the terrorists are that made this regrettable attempt, but for lack of tangible evidence, we are unable to arrest them. They are really gangsters posing as political groups. We have proof that an Havana banker paid them $20,000 when they threatened his life recently."

4. Chiefs of diplomatic missions and other high officials paid their respects to President Mendieta last evening. Ambassador Caffery, accompanied by one of his secretaries, called at the Palace and left cards for the remainder of the staff, including the Military Attache and Assistant Military Attache.

5. I am inclined to disagree with Colonel Batista's opinion that this outrage was the work of gangsters. I believe it to be the work of a small group of communists who are also supporters of Grau San Martin.

From M.A., Havana No. 4655 June 16, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6. The A.B.C. society is to hold an all-day concentration in Havana on June 17th, with motorcycle and boat races along the Malecon during the morning and a parade in the afternoon. As recently reported, an attempt has been made to call a strike of transportation workers, which, however, has apparently failed to materialize. It is understood that the communists have threatened to break up the parade. I expect that there will be an attempt to do so, and it is quite possible that there may be some bloodshed and terrorism on the streets during the day.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.
Personal Contacts

From M.A., Havana No. 4655 June 16,1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~For Official Use Only.~~

JUN 27 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

A. B. C. Parade Marred by Tragedy.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1934

1. On Sunday afternoon, June 17th, a parade of the A.B.C. society was held according to plans of its leader, Dr. Martinez Saenz, Secretary of the Treasury.

2. The parade was an hour and 35 minutes passing the American Club near the head of the Prado. The number of marchers has been estimated at from thirty thousand to seventy thousand, of which I would estimate fifteen per cent were women. My estimate of the number in the parade is 25,000 to 30,000. The formation consisted of from ten to fourteen persons abreast; each of the eight ramals or grand divisions of the society was represented by its ten sub-ramals, making a total of 80 of the latter, and each of the sub-ramals was represented by an average of 300 or more. Martinez Saenz' own ramal, which is No. 1, has 15,000 members, and its sub-ramals are numbered from 0 to 9; approximately one-fourth of this ramal participated. The Chief of the A.B.C. society's secret service informed me that 24,000 members of the A.B.C. had arrived from points outside of Havana. I noted sub-ramals from Santiago and Guantanamo as well as the other cities of the Island.

2657-9-330/2

3. As was to be expected, and as predicted in report No.4655, I. G. No. 3110-a, dated June 16th, oppositionists attempted to break up the parade by following tactics similar to those used by the Army and police in breaking up a recent communist parade, shooting into the head of the parade which completely disorganized it. Mrs. Gimperling and I with Captain Durfee and several others were witnessing the parade from the American Club, one square from Central Park - Captain Durfee from the balcony on the second floor and Mrs. Gimperling and I from a window on the first floor, when the head of the parade, consisting of about fifty standard bearers, was fired on when passing directly in front of the window where we were standing. There were several hundred shots fired within the next few minutes. The standard bearers crouched down on the street and the parade would probably have been disorganized right there had it not been that a group of specially selected A. B. C. members armed with revolvers under their coats returned the fire of the automobile which had started the firing at the paraders. The car then drove rapidly away. The parade was quickly reorganized and the marching continued without further interruption. We counted several dead and wounded in the street, not only among the marchers but among bystanders as well. A number of marchers carried concealed weapons. They were determined to carry out their parade regardless of opposition. Along the line of march there were several other incidents of shooting - one witnessed by my clerk, Miss Moore, when the parade was broken up for a few minutes as it was fired upon by snipers stationed on roof tops along the Malecon. The paraders ran for shelter to nearby buildings, but when the firing ceased they immediately resumed the march. An automobile containing four young men armed with sub-machine guns and revolvers, drove rapidly southwest down the Malecon against the parade which was marching in the opposite direction. The occupants of this car fired point-blank into the marchers, killing and wounding several. It was finally overturned and burned by the marchers near the tail of the column at Maceo Park.

From M.A., Havana No. 4657 June 19, 1934.

1st Div. ONI & State 6/27/34 WPD to note & return

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Eye-witnesses among the paraders say that they saw snipers from the Cuban Navy fire into their ranks from the vicinity of La Punta (Navy Headquarters). Three Havana police fired revolvers and gas bombs at the marchers from just outside my office window.

4. Newspaper accounts list the dead at between 12 and 14, and the wounded at 50 or more. Among the severely wounded is the husband of the telephone operator of this Embassy. The courage, especially of the women paraders, in continuing to march, although shot at from numerous points along the route, has raised the A.B.C. enormously in the opinion of the public. The appearance of the marchers made an excellent impression also. Most of them were white men and women; many of them of the better class of Cubans. Some few appeared to be of the laboring class and some few were negroes.

5. The communists had called strikes on transportation companies in Havana, effective June 16th and 17th. However, the tramway employees continued to work and although there was some interruption of the street car service, in general, it functioned very well. One street car was emptied, derailed and ran down the steep hill near the University, where it crashed into another street car, severely injuring a number of passengers in the latter car.

6. On the night of June 16-17th a number of bombs exploded in the City, one of which killed a young man as he was placing it in a doorway. The same evening about 8:30 as I was conveying Admiral Charles S. Freeman and Captain W.O. Spears, of the U.S.S. "Richmond" now in Havana harbor, along the Malecon to a supper club outside of the City, we passed two cars without lights at the farther end of the Malecon in Vedado, and as we passed them, Captain Spears saw one of the occupants pick up a gun - probably a sub-machine gun - and aim it at our car. My car was traveling at 50 miles an hour, otherwise we undoubtedly would have been fired upon. During the dinner a squad of specially selected Cuban soldiers was placed on guard around the Club to protect the American Ambassador and others of the diplomatic corps who were our guests. On Saturday night, June 16th, terrorists attempted to burn the A.B.C.'s "Arch of Triumph" recently erected and facing Central Park. Eye-witnesses said that the occupants of three speeding automobiles opened fire with sub-machine guns on pedestrians in the vicinity, after throwing a flaming bomb at the "Arch". Several pedestrians, including a former member of the Havana police force, were killed.

7. The following is a translation of a hand-bill circulated several days ago by the Young Communist League:

"Young Workers of the whole City.
"Young Supporters of Grau San Martin and A.B.C.'s.

"Let us frustrate the concentration of the green shirt "fascists" of the A.B.C. on June 17th! Those who have organized the killings of negroes, who have assassinated workers and students, and have given the last drop of Cuban blood to the Yankee Imperialists must not be allowed to parade the streets of Havana carrying the "fascist" emblem, symbol of hunger and terror.

From M.A., Havana No. 4657 June 19, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

"Young Men of the Railway and Street car Transport:

"Go on strike from noon June 16th to 3 P.M. June 17th. Refuse to transport the "fascists!

"Young Supporters of Grau San Martin and A.B.C.'s:

"Form a solid front in the suburbs to impede the passage of these who have been guilty of treason and have sold you, of those who have put themselves at the service of the great native industrials and those of the Yankee Imperialists.

"All Young People:

"Raise barricades in the streets on June 17th. Impede the passage of the "fascists" of Martinez Saenz and Manach. Organize counter-demonstrations in the suburbs. Organize shock pickets.

"Only by snatching the power from the hands of the exploiters will we have bread, land and liberty. By the soviet power of the workers, farmers, soldiers and sailors.

District Committee of the Young
Communist League."

8. There is also given below translation of an article that appeared in the newspaper El Mundo on Monday, June 18,1934. The newspaper states that the article is published purely as news and that it does not agree with the ideas expressed therein. The article reads as follows:

"The Confederacion Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC) (National Workers Confederation of Cuba) and other revolutionary organizations have had a new success in their fight against the fascist A.B.C. concentration with the aid of a strike of 50,000 workmen from 9-10 Saturday morning and Sunday, wherein a disciplined strike of bus drivers and street car operators severely handicapped the mobilization of the A.B.C., and in other sectors the effective measures which were taken in the attempt to break up the fascist march by means of constant fights which had for their scene the streets of the capital. With all courage and decision the working masses responded to the call of the C N O C to participate in combative actions which, on more than one occasion, broke up the so-called "concentration," and if they did not succeed in totally dissolving it, it was due to the official help which the A.B.C.'s received and the armament which they enjoyed, they being well paid by national or imperialist patrons.

"The A.B.C. concentration has been a visible proof of their bourgeois social character, as the C N O C has always claimed. Bourgeoisis of all colors; official employees forced to take part, high officials of shops and factories, and an insignificant number of workers who have not yet the conscience of class. Which is, at the same time, one more proof which affirms our assertion, so many times repeated, that the A.B.C. is an organization which is trying to install a bloody dictatorship of fascist character,

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NND 740058
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in order to save the capitalist regime in the complete bankruptcy of Cuba, at the cost of terrorism and starvation for the proletariat and the negro masses.

"Moreover, yesterday's happenings have demonstrated that all the oppressed groups, especially the negro masses, are in sympathy with the C N O C and that along a united front with the members of the "authentic revolutionaries" (supporters of Grau San Martin), these have participated shoulder to shoulder with the workers of the C N O C in spite of the breach between the directors of these organizations.

"On the other hand, the keeping of the Army and the Police in barracks, which were measures taken to prevent the fraternization of these forces with the workers and the members of the "authentic revolutionaries", are demonstrative facts which confirm what we have always maintained, namely, that the Army and the Police, in spite of the acts of terrorism in which they participate under pressure from the bourgeois' high authorities, understand, more every day, that the defense of their interests can only be effective in a close alliance with the proletariat.

"But we must not only speak of the successes obtained and of the enormous significance of yesterday's events, but also insist again that the fight against the A.B.C., the fascist organization of the dominating classes, must become a daily affair together with the struggle for bread, and that now, more than ever, we must increase our fight against the green shirts, by means of an intensive preparation for the Congress, ~~the~~ War, Intervention and Fascism - which will take place on July 15th - and against the concentration which is being prepared for August 12th, and which must be fought with a counter-demonstration of the masses which will frustrate the insolent fascist movement.

"For the Executive Board Table.

(Signed) Joaquin Ordoqui
General Secretary".

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press.

TNG:vm

Encls - newspaper pictures from Cuban Press of June 18/34

From M.A., Havana No. 4657 June 19, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

DRIL BLANCO
GARANTIZADO $100 LEGITIMO
Thos Taylor Sons
IMPORTADO POR SOBRINOS DE NAZABAL

DURANTE UN "CLINCH", ambos pugilistas rodaron por el pavimento, mientras los miles de espectadores presenciaban la lucha que decidiría al nuevo campeonato de peso completo. Esta escena, que tuvo lugar en el octavo round de la pelea habida entre Primo Carnera y Max Baer en la noche del 14 de este en el Madisor Square Garden, le dió el título a Baer en el undécimo round (Foto Wide World)





EL PANTEON DEL ABC que se va a levantar en el Cementerio de Colón. El doctor Martínez Sáenz pronunció un bello discurso en honor de los abecedistas caídos en la contienda contra la tiranía, después de la colocación de la primera piedra (Foto D. M.)

AL LLEGAR AL CEMENTERIO los restos del patriota fallecido en la mañana de ayer, doctor Domingo Méndez Capote. El armón en el que eran trasladados los mortales despojos del gran cubano (Foto D. M.)





UNA DISTINGUIDA ABECEDARIA contribuye con una cucharada de cemento durante la ceremonia de la primera piedra, que se llevó a cabo en el Cementerio de Colón, para el panteón que se erigirá en ese lugar



AYER DOMINGO, se cumplió el 29 aniversario de la muerte del libertador Máximo Gómez. Junto a la tumba del invicto caudillo de nuestras libertades, aparecen devotos del Generalísimo. Se ve al corneta del gran mambí con el histórico instrumento que tantas veces sonara en beneficio de la causa cubana (Foto D. M.)



EL ARMON DE ARTILLERIA que condujo a su última mansión los restos del gran patriota cubano doctor Domingo Méndez Capote, en el momento de llegar a la Capilla Central (Foto D. M.)







XND 740058
AMF 05/04/89

UNA DISTINGUIDA ABECEDARIA contribuye con una cucharada de cemento armado a la ceremonia de la primera piedra, que se llevó a cabo en el Cementerio de Colón, para el panteón que se erigirá en ese lugar



AL COMPÁS DEL SEPTETO del doctor Domingo Méndez Capote, el presidente que falleció en las primeras horas de la mañana del sábado, observa como el doctor Fernando Ortiz despedía el duelo en el Cementerio de Colón. (Foto D. M.)



UN BELLO ASPECTO del acto de concentración abecedaria celebrado en la tarde de ayer domingo. La enorme manifestación desfiló a lo largo del Paseo de Martí. (Foto D. M.)



EL ARMON DE ARTILLERIA que condujo a su última mansión los restos del gran patriota cubano doctor Domingo Méndez Capote, en el momento de llegar a la Capilla Central (Foto D. M.)



ANTE LA ESTATUA DEL APOSTOL, los manifestantes abecedistas rodearon el monumento de Martí con banderas cubanas y enseñas de su afiliación. (Foto D. M.)

Recomiendo el delicioso jabón "Hiel de Vaca" de Crusellas, para conservar la belleza de un cutis fresco, suave, lleno de vida y juventud.

Eva Barcelós





TRANVIA DESTROZADO, por elementos disolventes empeñados en restarle grandiosidad a la gran manifestación de ayer domingo, que se llevó a cabo con inusitado lucimiento por la concentración de los abecedistas

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SUPLEMENTO DIARIO EN ROTOGRABADO; DE ACTUALIDAD MUNDIAL

DIARIO DE LA MARINA

HABANA, LUNES, 18 DE JUNIO DE 1934

PARA ASUNTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL DEPARTAMENTO GRAFICO llamar al Teléfono M-3775

LA GRANDIOSA MANIFESTACION ABECEDARIA DE AYER



PORTANDO UNA ENORME BANDERA de la patria, bellísimas abecedarias contemplan el magno desfile desde las gradas del Capitolio (Foto D. M.)



UNOS MINUTOS DE CONFUSION al sonar algunos disparos, pero el orden y disciplina de los manifestantes continuó inalterable. Se produjo al pasar la manifestación por el Paseo de Martí y Virtudes (F. D. M.)



CONTINGENTE ABECEDARIO, estacionado en la escalinata del Capitolio, durante la gran manifestación de concentración abecedaria en la tarde de ayer domingo (Foto D. M.)



EL DOCTOR MARTINEZ SAENZ y la plana mayor de los abecedarios contemplan el desfile de la gigantesca manifestación al cruzar por frente al Capitolio (Foto D. M.)







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CONTINGENTE ABECEDARIO, estacionado en la escalinata del Capitolio, durante la gran manifestación de concentración abecedaria en la tarde de ayer domingo (Foto D. M.)



EL DOCTOR MARTINEZ SAENZ y la plana mayor de los abecedarios contemplan el desfile de la gigantesca manifestación al cruzar por frente al Capitolio (Foto D. M.)



UN TRIBUTO DE PIEDAD Y RECUERDO se le rindió ayer en el Cementerio de Colón al valiente revolucionario Miguel Angel Hernández, miembro destacado que fué del ABC, por sus compañeros de filiación. Se ve la enorme concurrencia que desfiló ante la tumba del heroico batallador (Foto D. M.)



EL PUEBLO DESFILO ante la tumba del general Máximo Gómez, con motivo del aniversario de su muerte, que tuvo lugar ayer domingo. Una enorme concurrencia acudió al Cementerio de Colón en piadosa misión recordativa (Foto D. M.)



EN EL PANTEON DEL HEROICO REVOLUCIONARIO Mariano González Gutiérrez, el doctor Moisés Maestri dirige la palabra a la muchedumbre, que escucha conmovida (Foto D. M.)



BELLAS MUJERES de filiación abecedaria, cruzan integrando la gran manifestación por la amplia avenida del Malecón (Foto D. M.)



FRENTE A LA OFICINA DEL ABC, cruza la enorme manifestación en ordenado desfile y correcta formación (Foto D. M.)



PARTE DE LA CONCURRENCIA ABECEISTA, al cruzar junto al arco levantado entre los edificios del Centro Asturiano y la Manzana de Gómez (Foto D. M.)

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LA CEREMONIOSA AUSTRIA no puede prescindir de sus interesantes escenificaciones, que, por algo, la tradición es tara inextirpable. Aquí aparece un bello acto, sin música, desde luego—Strauss vive ahora en París—donde se muestra al canciller Dollfuss con el uniforme de las tropas de choque, rodeado de la nobleza y el clero (Foto W. W.)



CON UNA SONRISA DE SINCERO REGOCIJO, muestra su magnífico trofeo Lawson Little, de San Francisco, ganador en un reñido match de golf celebrado recientemente en Prestwick, Inglaterra, contra James Wallace, carpintero escocés de recia fama en ese deporte (Foto W. W.)



ESTAS SI SON AMERICANAS, por lo menos hay un porcenta[je] de más efectividad étnica, pues todas son de ancestro indio. La [reina] de mayo, al ser coronada recientemente en Lawrence Kans[as] por el doctor Henry Roe Cloud, presidente de una insttución do[cente] de ese lugar. Ella es una joven llamada Genevieve Saunder[s] y al igual de sus damas de honor, son descendientes de una tribu [de] pieles rojas, hoy, desgraciadamente, en plena civilizaci[ón]
(Foto Wide World)





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ESTAS SI SON AMERICANAS, por lo menos hay un porcentaje de más efectividad étnica, pues todas son de ancestro indio. La reina de mayo, al ser coronada recientemente en Lawrence Kansas por el doctor Henry Roe Cloud, presidente de una institución docente de ese lugar. Ella es una joven llamada Genevieve Saunders y al igual de sus damas de honor, son descendientes de una tribu de pieles rojas, hoy, desgraciadamente, en plena civilización (Foto Wide World)



GANO EL PREMIO ANUAL DE ESCULTURA.—Joe M. Montosh, de New York, obtuvo un premio con su escultura "Jesús descendiendo de la Cruz", en el Instituto de Bellas Artes y Dibujo de París. Aparece junto a su bella concepción, después de notificársele la grata nueva que implica un premio en metálico ascendente a $1.200 y una beca de viaje (Foto W. W.)



FRAGMENTOS DISPERSOS y hierros retorcidos fué todo lo que quedó del avión americano que desapareció desde el día 9 del presente mes de junio, cuando hacía un vuelo regular de su itinrario con siete pasajeros. Hace varios días fué hallado en un lugar de la montaña Mongaup, conocido por "Ultima Oportunidad", al oeste de Catskills. Al descender el aparato se estrelló contra la rocosa superficie y el pasaje íntegro murió carbonizado (Foto Wide World)



ASPECTO GENERAL de la concurrencia que acudió a la Universidad de Columbia, New York, con motivo de la gran ceremonia verificada en el más alto centro docente de esa ciudad en el día de la conmemoración del 180 aniversario de su fundación, habiendo asistido al memorable acto el Presidente de dicha institución, Nicholas Murray Butler, quien confirió el grado a algunos de los 4.000 estudiantes. Además del claustro que se halla en primer término de la foto, asistió el Secretario de Estado, Mr. Cordell Hull y otras personalidades (Foto Wide World) ➡

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HONRANDO A LOS HEROES.—La presente foto muestra la hermosa tarja de bronce develada en la Catedral de Washington a la memoria del Mayor General George Barnett, Comandante que fué de la Marina de Guerra de los Estados Unidos durante la guerra mundial. Un aspecto de la sencilla, pero honda ceremonia rendida por sus compañeros de arma (Foto Wide World)



LA REINA DE LAS ROSAS, Miss Beth Skinner, el dulce e ingenio festival que se celebra periódicamente en Portland, Oregon, de una muestra del sentimiento y delicadeza espiritual de los residentes de ese pueblo, que a despecho de tantas cosas absurdas y de tanto problema económico hay seres humanos que rinden pleitesía a una de las más bellas manifestaciones de la madre naturaleza (Foto Wide World)





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AYER MARAVILLA FUI, podrá evocar, no con cierta melancolía este señor que aparece llevado sobre un cochecito por uno de los paseos de la Exposición de, Chicago y que no es otro que el célebre Samuel Insull, destronado monarca de las compañías de servicio de Utilidad Pública. Dicho caballero, que se halla envuelto en un ruidoso proceso por malversación y otras cosas similares, fué extraditado recientemente después de una fuga poco elegante para un magnate tan poderoso y estirado... Aparece solamente acompañado por su hijo, que se muestra a la derecha, el único hombre que no lo ha abandonado (Foto W. World)



HAZAÑA FOTOGRAFICA, que fácilmente le puede costar una pulmonía doble al valeroso exaviador y hombre decidido señor "Slim" Jones, al pasar unas cuantas horas dentro de un pedazo de hielo como muestra la foto. "Slim" manifestó que a fin de huir de la ola de calor que en estos días se intensifica en Filadelfia, se sentía muy confortable en su glacial cabaña (Foto Wide World)



EL DIMINUTO JUGADOR de golf, Bobby Cruicksanhk, de Richmond, aparece antes de comenzar el interesante match con que dió comienzo el gran evento verificado días pasados en el Merion Cricket Club de Filadelfia. El notable lanzador se ve en una de sus características posiciones mientras hacía algunas demostraciones públicas (Foto Wide World)



LA BELLA ACTRIZ CINEMATOGRAFICA Raquel Torres, pasó unas cortas vacaciones en las rientes playas de Malibú con su prometido y varios amigos entusiastas del sol y del agua. Aquí aparece sonriendo con el simbólico collar emblemático de los nativos, mientras da las primeras lecciones del famoso baile hawayano a sus invitados (Foto Wide World)

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DOCE MUERTOS Y MAS DE CIEN HERIDOS EN LOS TRAGICOS SUCESOS DE AYER

American Club is one very short block from this corner.





A LA DERECHA puede contemplar el lector la esquina de Prado y Neptuno en los momentos en que se inició la agresión al desfile abeceista. En el lugar marcado con el número (1), se encuentra en tierra el doctor Figueroa, muerto por una de las balas; en el marcado con el número (2), el lugar de donde partió la agresión, y donde hay gente que se parapeta detrás de faroles y columnas; en el lugar marcado por el número (3) gente igualmente parapetada para defenderse de las balas, tras un farol; a la izquierda aparece el utomóvil "Pontiac", desde el que se inició la "masacre" en el Parque Maceo, disparando con ametralladoras sobre los manifestantes.

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ON AL CONFLICTO TELEFONICO

Reconocien do la Fuerza Abrumadora de la Mayoría de sus eados y Obreros, Firma con la Repr esentación Genuina de nio de Bases de Trabajo al Amparo de las Leyes Cubanas

los Empleados que se encuentran s cuales 700 son de los antiguos, ue en defensa de sus intereses

En el Convenio se da una oportunidad para que regresen al trabajo los huelguistas que no quieran seguir siendo engañados. :: :: :: :: ::

orman la Comisión especialmendesignada en Asamblea General ordinaria de dicha organización, poderes amplios y bastantes paonvenir y firmar este documenconvienen libremente, y al amparde las leyes vigentes, con la resentación oficial que ostentan, en igarse a cumplir el siguiente:

CONVENIO PROVISIONAL DE BASES DE TRABAJO

PRIMERA: **Reconocimiento del Sindicato y de sus Delegados.** La Compañía reconoce de manera expresa y como única representación colectiva de los empleados y obreros que prestan servicios en sus oficinas, talleres y demás departamentos, al **Sindicato del Personal de la Cuban Telephone Company** por constituir esta organización la absoluta mayoría de sus antiguos empleados y obreros, así como los delegados y delegaciones del Sindicato, y tratará con éste todos los problemas que el Sindicato le presente en relación con el personal y demás asuntos del trabajo; sin que ello implique en forma alguna que el Sindicato pueda intervenir en la Administración de la Compañía.

SEGUNDA: **Aumento Progresivo de Sueldos y Salarios.** — La Compañía concederá a los empleados y obreros afiliados al Sindicato, aumentos de sueldos y salarios de acuerdo con sus aptitudes y dotes de capacidad, en relación con la evolución y mejoramiento progresivo de los negocios de la Compañía, al criterio de la misma, si bien tendrán que ser del mínimo que se establece a continuación.

Si cada tres años de servicios siguientes a la firma de este Convenio, la Compañía no hubiese aumentado a cualquier empleado u obrero, al menos un 5% de su sueldo, estará obligado al final de cada trienio de servicios, a aumentar o completar los aumentos que hubiere hecho hasta un 5%. Este aumento mínimo obligatorio del 5% sólo será aplicable a los empleados u obreros cuyos sueldos o salarios no excedan de $100.00 mensuales, y que no hubiesen tenido nota desfavorable en su expediente durante el período de tres años de que se trate. Para calcular el 5% se tomará como base el sueldo que se estuviere ganando al comienzo de cada trienio.

TERCERA: — **Establecimiento de Sueldos Mínimos.** — La Compañía queda expresamente obligada a partir de la primera quincena de la firma de este Convenio, a pagar a sus empleados y obreros afiliados al Sindicato, sueldos no menores de los fijados en la siguiente escala:

	En la Habana	En el Interior
, y Secretarias ..	$50.00	$35.00
ntes, mecanógrafas, ...	„45.00	„35.00
.. ..	„45.00	„35.00
manuales, con casa	No.	„30.00
os:	„40.00	„30.00
s	„45.00	„35.00
n casa	No.	„20.00
casa	No.	„25.00
.. ..	„25.00	„20.00
lectricistas, herreros	„45.00	„30.00
s y Repartidores, y Rachmen	„50.00	„40.00
a-jurados, conserjes, res	„40.00	„30.00
.. ..	„70.00	„50.00
s	„50.00	„40.00

sentación oficial del Sindicato, la Compañía dará vista a aquel del expediente que se trate.

La Compañía expedirá y entregará nombramientos por escrito del cargo que desempeñen todos los empleados y obreros, expresando los sueldos o jornales que devenguen de acuerdo con las nóminas, sin perjuicio de los cambios de cargo o funciones que hiciere la Compañía, de los cuales expedirá también certificación cuando lo hiciere.

QUINTA:—**Establecimiento de Escalafones.**—La Compañía al realizar economías o ascensos en el personal se obliga a tener en cuenta la antigüedad, buena conducta y capacidad de sus empleados y obreros. Todos los que por esta razón de economías quedaren fuera del trabajo pasarán a la categoría de excedentes, comprometiéndose la Compañía a tomarlos en consideración cuando necesitare nuevo personal en el futuro.

Preferencia a los obreros.—Siempre que fuese necesario cubrir algún puesto de oficinas con personal ajeno a la Compañía, y manifestare su aspiración a este cargo algún afiliado al Sindicato, que trabajare como obrero, reuniendo las condiciones de capacidad y preparación necesaria, la Compañía, previo examen del interesado en que acredite sus aptitudes, preferirá dicho obrero para el puesto.

Ideas e iniciativas de mejoramiento.—La Compañía se obliga a considerar para su aceptación o no, toda comunicación oficial del Sindicato en que se participe cualquier idea o inciativa de mejoramiento para el funcionamiento de cualquier aparato, taller, u oficina o departamento, expresando los datos y documentación correspondiente, así como el nombre del empleado u obrero que lo propone que tiene derecho a solicitar esta comunicación como afiliado al Sindicato.

Mensajeros.—A partir de la firma de este Convenio, la Compañía se obliga a no admitir como mensajero a ninguna persona mayor de quince años y una vez llegado a los diez y ocho lo pasará, si fuere posible a otro departamento, oficina o taller de acuerdo con sus aptitudes, salvo que por las leyes o convenios internacionales se dispusiese otra cosa.

SEXTA.—**Abono de diferencia de sueldo por sustitución.**—En todo caso que la Compañía designase expresamente un empleado para sustituir con carácter temporal e individualmente a otro de mayor sueldo en el desempeño de su cargo, si fuere de funciones distintas, abonará al sustituto, después de los primeros 30 días de sustitución, y mientras dure la misma, el sueldo correspondiente al sustituído.

SEPTIMA.—**Derecho a la Huelga.**—La Compañía reconoce de manera expresa a todos sus empleados y obreros, el derecho a la huelga legítima.

OCTAVA: **Cooperación del Sindicato en la designación de empleados.**—Al cubrir nuevas plazas, la Compañía procurará escoger de entre sus antiguos empleados de la categoría de excedentes en cuanto éstos tengan capacidad, buena conducta y condiciones para desempeñar los cargos, y admitirá para su estudio y selección, las listas de antiguos empleados que se sometan a su consideración por el Sindicato.

yores de quince días durante cada año. La Compañía concederá estas licencias, escalonadamente y para la fijación de las fechas de las mismas, se tendrán en cuenta las necesidades del servicio.

La Compañía mantendrá las licencias por enfermedad como hasta ahora y cumplirá las leyes en vigor sobre indemnizaciones de accidentes del trabajo y beneficios en caso de cesantías.

UNDECIMA: **Reorganización Departamental.**—La Compañía podrá reorganizar todos sus Departamentos estableciendo los sueldos, categorías y distribuciones que ella estimare oportuno, pudiendo en todo caso, la Compañía, utilizar personal de un departamento en otro.

DECIMA-SEGUNDA: **Mes completo de trabajo.**—La Compañía se obliga siempre que el desarrollo de las actividades de trabajo y negocio de la misma lo permita, a mantener el mes completo de trabajo para todos los empleados y obreros afiliados al Sindicato, a quienes resultare aplicables esta cláusula.

DECIMA-TERCERA: **Puestos fijos de plantilla.**—La Compañía se obliga a pasar a sus nóminas como obreros y empleados fijos, automáticamente a todos los afiliados al Sindicato que llevaren más de dos años trabajando permanentemente para la Compañía; y en cuanto al nuevo personal designado después de la huelga, que se encuentra trabajando con carácter permanente y definitivo, tendrá la misma consideración que el antiguo, y los mismos derechos que se derivan de estas bases cuando fueron afiliados al Sindicato.

A los efectos de aplicar la disposición anterior se establece lo siguiente:

a.—La Nómina de la Compañía será dividida en personal a sueldo mensual y personal jornalero, y ambos serán a su vez, divididos en personal fijo y personal temporero. Personal fijo será el integrado por los obreros y empleados que presten sus servicios con carácter fijo o permanente, ya sea a base de un salario mensual o a base de un jornal. Personal temporero, será el integrado por los empleados u obreros que presten sus servicios sin carácter fijo o permanente.

b.—El empleado u obrero temporero que pasare automáticamente a la nómina a formar parte del personal fijo, continuará devengando sus haberes a base de un salario mensual, o de un jornal, según los hubiera venido devengando con anterioridad.

c.—No se considerará como parte del personal de la Compañía, todas aquellas personas pertenecientes a los llamados Centros a Comisión.

d.—La Compañía hará lo que fuere legalmente posible, para que la clasificación del personal no perjudique los derechos de jubilación de los interesados, así como para que los agentes de Centros a Comisión, puedan disfrutar los beneficios de las Leyes de Jubilación.

DECIMA-CUARTA: **Gastos de mantenimiento del Servicio y Viajes.**—Además del salario que ganen los obreros y empleados fijos, la Compañía se obliga a abonar los gastos extraordinarios en que tuviere necesidad de incurrir su personal en la prestación del servicio, cuando por exigencia del servicio tengan que realizar trabajos extraordinarios o trabajos ordinarios fuera de los límites de su demarcación

DECIMA-QUINTA: **Entrega de checks del Interior.**— La Compañía abonará los sueldos de su personal de nómina al final de cada quincena, y con respecto al personal del interior, queda comprometida a realizar cuantas gestiones fueren necesarias para que los checks lleguen a su poder los días 16 y 1o. de cada mes; obligándose a ponerlos en correo a más tardar los días 15 y último de cada mes y asumiendo todos los gastos que ocasionare el cobro de los mismos, incluyendo comisiones bancarias, siempre que no excedan de los tipos o tarifas que cobran los Bancos asociados al Clearing House de la Habana.

DECIMA-SEXTA: **Consideraciones y respeto para los empleados y obreros.**—La Compañía exigirá a sus Jefes, Empleados y Obreros que observen la mayor corrección, consideración y respeto en el trato de los unos con los otros; y los derechos y deberes de cada uno, serán objeto de especificación detallada en el Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo.

DISPOSICIONES GENERALES

PRIMERA: **Vigencia de este Convenio Provisional.** — Este Convenio Provisional, de Bases de Trabajo, quedará en vigor durante un año para con vista de los resultados de su aplicación en la práctica, otorgar el correspondiente Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo, pero dentro del plazo de un año, cualquiera de las partes si estimare que la experiencia tenida es suficiente, podrá dándole un aviso previo con sesenta días de anticipación : la otra, pedir que se firme el Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo, que necesariamente se fundará en las presentes Bases.

SEGUNDA: **Aplicación y exigibilidad de los derechos del Convenio.**— Queda expresamente convenido entre ambas partes que las disposiciones de este Convenio, amparan exclusivamente a los afiliados al Sindicato y sólo podrán ser exigibles por dichos afiliados al Sindicato del Personal de la Cuban Telephone Company, antiguos y nuevos, por igual.

TERCERA: Con la firma de este Convenio de Bases de Trabajo, acordadas entre la Compañía y la mayoría, absoluta de sus antiguos empleados y obreros, se dan por terminados por ambas partes, y por expreso acuerdo de dicha mayoría, todos los problemas pendientes hasta la fecha, entre la Compañía y sus empleados y obreros, obligándose éstos a cumplir conscientemente sus deberes como tales y prestar su concurso al mejor desenvolvimiento de la Empresa en el desempeño de sus cargos.

CUARTA: **Jornada de Trabajo.**—La jornada de trabajo, será la legal. No obstante la Compañía respetará la costumbre de jornadas reducidas en la forma y condiciones en que vienen realizándose actualmente, a saber: Se establece la semana de **treinta y nueve horas** para el personal que ha venido trabajando hasta ahora ese tiempo; la semana de **Cuarenta y cinco horas** para el personal de día y la de **Cuarenta y dos horas**, para el personal de noche y se pondrá en vigor la reglamentación necesaria, que será estudiada por la Compañía, para que con ello no se afecte la prestación eficiente del servicio que hay ahora, con el personal que existe actualmente.

Las horas que semanalmente trabajen los empleados y obreros en exce-

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







ASPECTOS DEL DESFILE ABECEDARIO. — Arriba, a la izquierda, un grupo de señoritas abeceístas, llevando la bandera en el desfile; al centro, la bandera del ABC; a la derecha, otro aspecto del grupo de señoritas que portaba la bandera abeceísta. Abajo, a la izquierda, la formación abecedaria iniciando la marcha en el Prado; a la derecha, las banderas abeceístas junto con la guardia que custodiaba el Arco de Triunfo en el Parque Central.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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JUL 2 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Cabinet.

Received G-2 W. D. JUL. 2 1934

Resignation of Cabinet Members.

1. Three of the four cabinet members who are members of the A.B.C. society have submitted their resignations to the President. The resigning secretaries are Martinez Saenz, President of the organization and Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Emeterio Santovenia, Secretary of the Presidency, and Dr. Jorge Manach, Secretary of Education. Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, Secretary of Justice and a prominent member of the A.B.C., did not resign from the Cabinet and this may indicate a split in the A.B.C. society.

2. The basis for the withdrawal is the A.B.C.'s criticism of the Cuban Army and National Police's failure last Sunday to take proper action towards safeguarding the parade of the A.B.C. society. Dr. Saenz has bitterly criticised the conduct of the Army and police in this respect. He alleges that members of the police force were involved in a concerted plot to break up and disperse the paraders by not only failing to prevent sniping at the marchers, but for firing, in at least one instance, gas granades at groups of the paraders who were quietly waiting to join the march. Dr. Saenz also asserts that members of the Cuban Navy actually shot at the marchers, wounding and killing several. He states that a large percentage of the personnel of the Havana police force and the Cuban Navy are communists and that there are also quite a number of communists in the Cuban Army. The prime objective of the A.B.C. society, he states, is to suppress communism in Cuba, and that until the Cuban Government sees fit to purge the Cuban Navy and National Police of these radicals, his organization cannot, because of its principles, continue to support the Government. He states, however, that he will not oppose the present Government, but simply that he cannot support it. If I understand it, his attitude now becomes simply neutral. The press states that Mendieta and the Government are still hopeful that the resignation of the three above named Secretaries will be withdrawn and that the A.B.C. will continue to support the Government.

3. When the A.B.C. society gave its support to the Mendieta Government last January, there was much opposition among the rank and file of the society who were antagonistic to Colonel Batista and the present Army and Navy. So far as I know, no definite statement was ever made by Mendieta; however, it seemed to be generally understood among the rank and file of the organization that the situation in the Army and Navy would be changed - probably by giving Batista a foreign diplomatic post. It is no secret that the bulk of the A.B.C. had been given to understand that the above mentioned changes would be made within a comparatively short time after Mendieta assumed office. The general opinion seemed to be that it would be done before the end of two months. Of course, nothing was done because nothing could be done by Mendieta. Batista continued to dominate the Government and he has since continued to do so. It can be said, however, that he has done more than anyone else to correct the drift towards radicalism which

From M.A., Havana No. 4662 June 23,1934.

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was so unfair and so distressing, not only to foreigners, but also to Cuban business interests. Batista has apparently made every effort to assist Mendieta in the difficult task of returning property to its rightful owners and settling vexing labor disputes. He has supported Mendieta in these policies and his task has been difficult,because the Army, Navy and police forces throughout the Island, especially in Havana, Santiago and Camaguey, were filled with supporters of Grau San Martin. I believe that if he is given time, Batista will eventually purge these forces of radicals, but, under the existing conditions, it will take a long time to do so. His hold on the Army is apparently secure in the garrisons in and around Havana; however, he has many enemies in the armed forces outside of Havana, and it requires extreme tact and diplomacy to gradually weed out disloyal and radical officers, many of whom boast that they were the leaders of the September mutiny in their organizations.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4662 June 23,1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Local Disorders

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 10 1934

1. The communistic agitators apparently are continuing to work on the University students of Havana, for a new outbreak of trouble occurred on July 4th when police riot squads were called out at least half a dozen times to quell disorders created by groups of students and others who were staging protests against the arrest of students, "politicos" and workers who have been imprisoned for one reason or another, and who now are apparently resorting to the old hunger strike method to obtain their release. The firing of shots into the air had little effect but the loosing of tear gas granades in various parts of the City where crowds had collected was sufficient to disperse the groups without serious injury to anyone.

2. Students of the Havana Institute and Havana Normal School have announced their decision to call a 48-hour strike in protest against the Government's attitude toward the hunger strikers, as several students are reported to be among those not partaking of nourishment.

3. Of course, the agitators are greatly over-exaggerating the number of prisoners undergoing the hunger strike and their weakened condition as a result thereof. According to the Secretary of the Interior, there are only 58 prisoners participating in the strike, and not 126 as has been estimated, and that five of these had already taken nourishment. He stated to newspaper men and to a commission of students that he had already asked for the charges filed against these political prisoners and that he expected to have the matter settled very shortly.

4. On July 4th a heavy bomb exploded at the residence of Serafin Garcia Conde, an official of the Pan-American Company, and great damage was incurred. Another large bomb was discovered by several bystanders opposite Conde's home, but it was extinguished with water.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press.
V LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4674 July 5, 1934.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

2657-9-330/257
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 14 1934

Decree No. 679 - Suspending Constitutional Guarantees.

1. Supplementing report No. 4512, index as above, dated March 13, 1934, there is given below translation of Decree No. 679, published in the Official Gazette of March 6, 1934, and which suspended Constitutional Guarantees for a period of ninety days:

"DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

"Decree No. 679

"WHEREAS: The present Provisional Government from the time that it assumed the direction of the destinies of the Nation has had the firm intention of safeguarding the maintenance of public order, of peace and of tranquility, indispensable for the development of its purposes and for the progress of the political and economic life of the nation.

"WHEREAS: Its principal preoccupation has been to draft, discuss, approve and promulgate the Constitutional Law of the Republic which regulates the rights and duties of its citizens and sets forth the necessary limitations to the public power for the better development of the activities of the citizens.

"WHEREAS: Notwithstanding the desires of this Provisional Government of affording to the nation the enjoyment of the fulness of its individual rights and the predominance of the civil authority, an intensive seditions propaganda is being carried on throughout the whole national territory in grave detriment to the general interests and with the consequential disturbances of public order which it is absolutely necessary to restrain.

"WHEREAS: The principal function of the Government is to issue pertinent measures for maintaining order throughout the whole of the national territory and to offer the necessary guarantees to the citizens so that they may carry on their activities without being disturbed by the agitators who place the national interests in serious jeopardy and who, likewise have provoked a state of alarm during the past few days by the numerous strikes which have been declared, which oblige the Government, greatly to its regret, to decree the suspension of the constitutional guarantees.

"THEREFORE: In use of the powers conferred upon me by the Constitutional Law of the Republic, having consulted the Cabinet and on proposal of the Secretary of the Interior

I RESOLVE

"First: To suspend, throughout the national territory and

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

for a period of ninety calendar days, the guarantees established in articles 15thm 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 29th, 30th and 31st of Section First of Title Fourth of the Constitutional Law of the Republic.

"Second: The Secretary of the Interior is entrusted with the fulfilment of this Decree.

"Given at the Presidential Palace, in Habana, on this sixth day of the month of March, one thousand nine hundred and thirty four.

(Signed) CARLOS MENDIETA
President.

Felix Grannados
Secretary of War and Navy
and of the Interior Ad Interim"

L.V.H. Durfee.
L.V.H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Embassy files.

From M.A., Havana No. 4680 July 9,1934.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Combat)

Subject: Commissioned Officers.

2657-F-330/291

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 17 1934

Ex-Army Officers
Released from Prison.

1. Supplementing report No. 4681, index as above, dated July 9, 1934, the remainder of the ex-officers who were confined for plotting against the present regime have been released for lack of evidence. These ex-officers were given a hearing before the Audiencia Court, which failed to find any reason for their being detained further.

2. It is said by some persons that these officers were arrested by the military for the sole purpose of annoying and harassing them. On the other hand, Colonel Batista has stated, in the press, that he is positive that some plotting is going on among the ex-officers and enlisted men, not only in the City of Havana but in the provinces as well. It is certain that Colonel Batista does not trust the ex-officers and believes that upon the slightest provocation they would join any movement which had for its object the overthrow of the Army and the Government, and it is logical to suppose that he will continue to keep the ex-Officers Association under surveillance in order that he may keep himself informed of everything that they are doing.

L. V. H. Duffee

L. V. H. Duffee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press

LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4686 July 13, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3600-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1934

General Political Situation

1. During the entire past week the political situation of Cuba has been extremely quiet. Press reporters have been in daily contact with the President and members of the Cabinet, but the contributions to the public have been very meagre on the subject of politics.

2. To date, the problem of the resignation of Havana's Mayor, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez, has not reached a solution. Dr. Gomez submitted his resignation to the President sometime ago, as reported in No.4673, index No. 3110-b, dated July 6, 1934, but it was not accepted. Frequent conferences, the last of which occurred last night, have been held between the President and members of the Cabinet and Dr. Gomez. As a result of this last conference, there seems to be a feeling on the part of the Cabinet that Dr. Gomez' resignation will be withdrawn within the next few days. If this should happen it should have the effect of strengthening the position of President Mendieta and his Cabinet, for Dr. Gomez is a very popular man in Havana and has done excellent work as Mayor of the City. He is also a very close personal friend of President Mendieta, and it is reported that the above mentioned conferences have been conducted in a very quiet and peaceful manner, so different from the usual conferences among Cubans. This fact in itself tends to foster the belief that Dr. Gomez will, in the end, withdraw his resignation, especially if he can receive one or two slight concessions for the Marianista Party of which he is the head.

3. Colonel Batista is approched on every possible occasion by newspaper reporters asking for his views on various subjects, both political and military. In a recent editorial in El Pais the authoir states that Colonel Batista has said that a military dictatorship will not solve the situation." The editorial highly praises Batista's actions during the entire revolutionary period beginning September 4th, and infers that without his patriotism and organizing ability the country would be in chaos. In this editorial Colonel Batista is quoted as having made the following statements:

Regarding Elections: "I am sure that there will be elections, honest elections with the completest guarantees on the part of the Army throughout the national territory. The Army is a military institution, without political connections, which exists to furnish guarantees and not to inspire lack of confidence, much less to convert itself into an electoral agent of any candidate or party. The forthcoming elections will be the 'golden proof' of the Army."

Regarding President Mendieta: "Colonel Mendieta has a right partly to blame me for his sacrifice of the presidential candidacy of his party. Some accuse him of weakness and others of being emotional - I am only interested

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in his public and private integrity, which is great, so great that his merits largely outweigh his defects. He is an honorable and patriotic Cuban...and the best guarantee of impartial elections that the political parties can have."

Regarding a military dictatorship: "Recently various people are thinking that a military dictatorship would rapidly resolve the situation. I do not believe it. I have never and I shall never experience the madness for dictatorship ("vértigo dictatorial"). I am not good at it....I do not aspire to that glory."

Regarding the police (in answer to an inquiry as to whether the reorganization of the force had been finished): "On the contrary, we are only beginning with the police. The p police force still requires 'serios expurgos.' If among the old dismissed policemen there are those with good records and the necessary qualifications, they will be reinstated; if among the new ones are those who fail in their duties, they will be dismissed. My mission is to guarantee order and there will be order."

4. Of importance in its bearing on political developments was the recent approval of the Decree-Law governing the electoral census. The official text of this measure has not yet appeared in the Official Gazette, and the press reports that certain modifications have been suggested and will probably be incorporated before the final draft appears. The Census Law has been well received although skepticism is expressed as to whether registration of voters can be completed within the allotted period of two months.

L. V. H. Durfee.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press.

LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4692 July 19, 1034.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 28 1934

Subversive Activities.

1. Havana continues quiet with now and then a bombing or other incident to remind citizens that the Communist Party is still active. Several of the recent bombs which have been placed at the homes of various more or less prominent Havana residents have been accompanied by a warning not to trade with the department store, El Encanto. This store is still having difficulties as its strike has never fully been settled. The more radical elements among the strikers are taking this means of attempting to inflict a boycott on the store. Their efforts have so far been without appreciable result.

2. On the night of July 22nd. an automobile drove past the home of Major Jaime Marino, personal aide to Colonel Batista, and the occupants fired several sub-machine gun shots at the house. Major Marino was not at home at the time and the guards which were on duty were fortunately not within the line of fire, so no one was injured. The police were called and sent two or three of their new pursuit cars in the hope of apprehending the terrorists, but, so far, they have been unsuccessful.

3. Bombings are frequent in other parts of the Island, scarcely a night passing but what at least one bomb is set off in all of the larger towns. Since these bombs usually explode around midnight, there is very little harm done to human-beings, it being the exception rather than the rule when one is wounded.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press

LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4694 July 24, 1934.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Largest Department Store
is Bombed.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 28 1934

1. Shortly after 5 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, August 18th, when the store was filled with shoppers, two large bombs exploded in El Encanto, Cuba's largest department store. Two people were killed and fourteen were injured.

2. This bombing followed a period of comparative quiet throughout the City as regards terrorist activities, and it was pointed out that it comes shortly after a shipment of dynamite consigned to the Government had been received. This is not meant to implicate the Government or the Army in the terrorist activities, but it is evident that there is a leak somewhere and that the terrorists gained access, by some means, to the supply of dynamite received. The police suspect that one of the persons killed, a former Army sergeant, was the one who actually placed the bombs. The character of his wounds tend to indicate that he might even have been carrying the second bomb at the time it exploded. It is pointed out in substantiation of this belief that his bank account had dwindled from $1700.00 to $10.00, and that a man who had a total of only $10.00 would hardly be making purchases at El Encanto.

3. Expressions of horror were heard on all sides when the news spread that El Encanto had been bombed. Cubans, as well as foreigners, decried the attack and expressed the sincere hope that some drastic action would be taken on the part of the Government. This bombing is one of a combination of attempts on the part of terrorists, who, in this case are undoubtedly former employees of El Encanto, to make the people of Havana boycott the store. (See report No.4694, index as above, dated July 24, 1934). Before this, several homes have been bombed and each time a note was found stating that the bombing was done because the occupants of the building persisted in trading at El Encanto. In at least one case a note was received informing the person that he had been seen trading at El Encanto in spite of repeated warnings not to do so, and informing him that if he was again seen in the store, his home would be bombed. This leads to the conclusion that some present employee of the firm is in sympathy with the strikers and is tipping them off to the names of prominent persons who habitually trade at El Encanto.

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4. In connection with terrorist activities at this time, last week the general manager of the Westinghouse Electric Company in Cuba showed me a printed letter which he had received in connection with his advertising in certain Havana newspapers, principally Diario de la Marina, and warning him that unless he withdrew his advertisements from these papers, his store would be bombed. The letter called his attention to several stores which had failed to heed the warning and had "paid the penalty," by having their places bombed. This is part of a campaign on the part of the terrorists to force certain

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4725 August 20, 1934.

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newspapers out of business, their attacks being aimed at Pepin Rivero, the owner and editor of Diario de la Marina, who, they claim, is a Machadista. Some months ago Rivero was shot and wounded by these agitators, who, incidentally, were not apprehended.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

LVHD:vm

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4725 August 20,1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 1 1934

Recent Bombings, etc.

1. The terrorist campaign, which appears to have started up again in Havana after a lull of a few weeks, which lull was probably due to a lack of dynamite, has resulted in a series of bombings, one or two taking place nightly. Last night a large bomb was placed in front of the residence of Dr. Mario Diaz Cruz, Secretary without Portfolio in the present Cabinet. The house is located on Habana Street, one of the narrow down town streets of Havana. It is stated that this bomb was the largest that has ever been placed in Havana, weighing somewhere between 75 and 100 pounds. The explosion caused a great amount of damage, not only to the residence of Dr. Cruz but to the buildings across the street and on either side of the home of Dr. Cruz. The perpetrators of the deed have not been apprehended.

2. I learned last night that the terrorists are planning the greatest outrage yet; they are planning to place an enormous bomb in the Sarra Building, owned by Dr. Sarra, proprietor of a series of drugstores in Havana, and one of the richest men in Cuba. Dr. Sarra has had a considerable amount of trouble with his employees, several of whom have been discharged and who, undoubtedly, will be the perpetrators of the crime, if it takes place. It is said that the bomb which they expect to place will be big enough to demolish the entire block, and that they plan to announce it over the radio two hours before the explosion is to take place, in order that any persons in the building may have time to escape before the explosion. This statement was made to me by a man who says that he was told beforehand of the exact hour and day in which the bombing of El Encanto Department Store was to take place. (See report No. 4725, I. G. No. as above, dated August 20, 1934). He states that the time for the Sarra bombing has not been set, and that it will not take place if Dr. Sarra accedes to the demands which they will make to him. This may prove nothing more than a rumor.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

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R.

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4735 August 28, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 11 1934

Terrorist Activities.

1. Two civilians and one soldier were killed and at least four other persons were wounded during shooting which occurred in the streets of Havana yesterday afternoon and last night. Two attempts were made to kidnap an alleged terrorist, and port workers clashed with strikers. More than two dozen men were arrested.

2. Shortly after 3 o'clock yesterday afternoon, three unidentified youths armed with sub-machine guns entered the Court room in the old jail where a man by the name of Sanchez was being tried on charges in connection with a bombing attempt on La Casa Grande, one of Havana's largest department stores, and kidnaped Sanchez from the Court. The three then boarded a machine in which four heavily armed companions were waiting outside. In the attempt to escape the terrorists were forced to abandon their car in a congested section of the City.A police cordon was immediately thrown around the district and an intensive search netted three of the terrorists, who were captured without a shot being fired. Two machine guns seized at the same time were found to be jammed. The men were taken to police headquarters where Sanchez was identified as the youth who was kidnaped from Mercedes Hospital where he had been held for treatment for wounds obtained in the A.B.C. parade of June 17th. (See report No. 4657, index as above, dated June 19, 1934).

3. Later in the afternoon when the prisoners were being taken to Principe Prison, police state that a new attempt to kidnap Sanchez was made. In the shooting which followed the three prisoners were fatally wounded. It is also stated that one soldier was slightly wounded. The prisoners were taken to the hospital where they died a few minutes after being admitted.

4. The probabilities are that no second attempt was made to liberate the prisoners, but that for the first time, the police took matters into their own hands and disposed of the three terrorists, for it seems hardly likely that had the second effort to liberate the men been made, they would have been the only ones killed, while surrounded by police and soldiers.

5. This occurrence leads to the conclusion that the police have, at least in some cases, become tired of the practice on the part of the judges of releasing terrorists for lack of evidence, and have decided to take matters into their own hands. So far as this office has been able to ascertain, there have been no convictions of individuals accused of placing bombs or of having bombs in their possession. One instance of which I was told tends to prove the above statement. A young man was arrested and taken to Court for having a bomb in his possession. The judge ordered the bomb taken away from him and released the prisoner without confiscating the pistol which he carried.

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4740 Sept. 1, 1934.

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6. It is hoped that the police will continue to take energetic measures as they did yesterday, and it is believed that when the terrorists find out that serious consequences will result to them if they are apprehended, the numerous bombings which have taken place recently will cease, or, at least, be reduced.

L. V. H. Dunfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

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G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities.

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 11 1934

1. Supplementing report No. 4740, index as above, dated September 1, 1934. As an aftermath to the killing of the three men mentioned in the above report, on Saturday morning, September 1st., the radical element among the University students took it upon themselves to endeavor to avenge the deaths of the terrorists, or, at least, to cause as much trouble as possible. In a meeting of the students it was decided to request the bodies of two of the three men killed, one of whom was alleged to have been a student, in order that they might be rendered the final honors by members of the student body. The excitement grew, and before long trolley wires were cut and a few shots were fired. Police, using the radio cars, hastened to the scene, dispersing crowds with tear gas. However, delegations were sent to the Palace to request that the police withdraw from the vicinity of the University, which request was granted.

2. For several hours the students held the University and sniped at police and soldiers and official automobiles from the windows, the authorities being powerless to intervene, since they apparently are afraid to antagonize the students by sending law enforcement bodies into the University.

3. The students accused the police and army of murdering the three men and are demanding guarantees from the Government. One of the men was able to testify that they were shot by the police and army and not by their comrades who were attempting to rescue them. The fact that these men were guilty of terrorism seems to have no effect on the students, or, at least, upon that small percentage of students who are causing all the trouble. On the other hand, the fact that they were guilty of terrorism, bomb-placing and shooting makes them heroes in the eyes of this radical group and makes their demand for "justice" all the more vigorous.

4. During Saturday's trouble apparently no one was injured in spite of the many shots which were fired not only in the vicinity of the University, but in other parts of the City.

L. V. H. Durfee
L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press.

LVHD:vm

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4741 September 2, 1934.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 25 1934

Terroristic Activities.

1. The present situation in Havana with respect to public order and safety is less satisfactory than it has been in several months. Terrorist activities in the form of bombings have materially increased. The bombs, however, are comparatively small and little property damage has resulted therefrom although several persons have been killed and injured. These bombings are a nightly occurrence and they usually start about 9 P.M., whereas formerly, the A.B.C. bomb squads operated only after midnight in order, so they said, to reduce casualties.

2. During the evening of September 20th, one bomb exploded in a street car, injuring two passengers, and another exploded in a bus, also injuring several passengers. One bomb was thrown over a fence into a small but crowded amusement park near the Malecon, but, miraculously, no one was injured; however, the patrons of the park left immediately.

3. Colonel Batista, Chief of Staff, is convinced that the communists intend to assassinate both himself and Lieut.Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of Police of Havana, because of the energetic efforts of both officers to suppress communism. It is believed that the communists would attempt to assassinate the American Ambassador if it were not that his home and the Chancery are heavily guarded and he is accompanied by a strong escort of technical police in plain clothes, and soldiers, in two automobiles.

4. Political unrest and terrorist activities seem to be confined entirely to Havana, except for some minor demonstrations in Manzanillo. Business conditions in Havana show little improvement, due, it is believed, to local political unrest and terrorist activities, while, on the other hand, in the provinces where the political situation is comparatively quiet, and there seems to be little, if any, terrorism, business conditions are much better than in years.

5. Although there is nothing definite upon which to base the supposition, it seems probable that a crisis will develop with the communists in the near future, and this belief is shared by the Ambassador. It is probable that the communists will attempt to take over the Government in the near future by means of a general strike, combined with major acts of terrorism. This seems to be the opinion of the Ambassador and Colonel Batista, and the latter is unusually well informed with respect to the situation.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Observation

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4755 Sept. 21, 1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2657-g-330
6-1 OCT 299
WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 2 1934

Havana Police Arrest Radicals.

1. On September 25th the Havana police arrested between forty and fifty radicals, some of whom are alleged to be communists and the remainder members of the so-called Autentico Party. At the headquarters of the Autentico Party in the Maximo Gomez Building, six of the leaders of the party were arrested, charged with writing and distributing anti-government propaganda. Among those arrested were the well-known local newspaper woman, Maria Blanca Sabas Alcoma, and Colonel Aurelio Alvarez. Later in the day, the police raided the CMKD radio station, arresting the owner and twenty-six men who are charged with broadcasting violent anti-government speeches.

2. Several members of the Sarra drug store strike committee were arrested in a room on Corrales Street, where a quantity of arms and explosives were found. Several communists were arrested for alleged connection with the bombing of an automobile earlier in the week, in which a bride on her way to church to be married was seriously wounded.

3. It is expected that the cases will be tried by the Court of Urgency, which was established under a recent Decree, and if sufficient evidence is established, sentence from two to six months is mandatory - neither fines nor bail is permitted.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Official
Documents.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4757 September 26, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 2 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1 2657-S-330
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3700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 2 1934

Dr. Grau San Martin leaves Cuba.

1. On September 27th, 1934, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin accompanied by his family, departed from Havana by regular Pan American airplane for Miami. The former revolutionary President did not announce his destination nor the length of his absence from Cuba, merely stating that he was leaving for his health and that he would remain some time in the mountains of the United States.

2. Several days ago, Colonel Batista withdrew the soldiers who had guarded Grau's residence since his return to Cuba from Mexico last Spring. It is probable that this, in connection with the wholesale arrest of members of the Autenticos (radical revolutionary party) of which he is the head, may have had something to do with his leaving Cuba.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4760 Sept. 28, 1934.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 2 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 2 1934

Communists and Autenticos Arrested.

1. During the past several days, approximately 175 communists and radical revolutionaries (Autenticos) have been arrested by the Cuban Army and Havana police, and have been confined in Las Cabanas prison. Mario Labourdette, who for some time was Chief of Police of Havana during the Grau San Martin regime, was among those arrested. He was, however, released later in the day.

2. A small yacht loaded with sixty cases of dynamite, each weighing 50 pounds and marked with the name of the Atlas Powder Company of Wilmington, Delaware, also a large quantity of fuse and 100,000 detonator caps, was confiscated by the Army at Cojimar on September 26th. It is the opinion of Army Headquarters that this yacht had transported the dynamite from somewhere along the Florida Keys. Among those arrested for alleged complicity are Mayor Gerardo Hevia of Cojimar; Chief of Police Roberto Ponce, and several members of the police force of that town, and also Dr. Alfredo Nogueira, who holds a high position in the Department of Labor. Dr. Nogueira, who is a member of the Grau San Martin (Autentico) Party, was one of the members of the Cuban delegation to the Pan-American Conference in Montevideo last year. He was also one of the organizers and leaders of the A.B.C. radical society, which broke off, during the latter days of the Machado regime, from the A.B.C. society, and under ultra-radical leadership, identified itself with the Communist Party.

3. The Army and Havana police are making an active and concerted drive to suppress militant radicalism, and it may be added that this is the most encouraging sign in the Cuban political situation that has developed in many months. It is understood that President Mendieta, who has been severely criticised by foreigners and conservative Cubans for his weak and vacillating policy toward radicalism, contemplates a number of changes in his Cabinet. It is believed that the President and three or probably four Cabinet members have decided to adopt sterner measures to maintain public order and safety, notwithstanding the dissent of the majority of the Cabinet.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4761 Sept. 28, 1934

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Student Council of University warn Undergraduates against Communism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 2 1934

1. The Student Council of the University of Havana addressed a manifesto to undergraduates on September 27th, warning them that it will not allow communistic doctrines to be preached within the University. It criticises the action of the Left Wing (communists) faction of the student body for allowing their academic duties to be subordinated in order to carry out the political ideals of communistic agitators. The manifesto also states that the Student Council would protect all students from threats made by the communistic Left Wing, which is accused of attempting to force students to join the communist party, and particularly the poor students who have been threatened that they will lose their free tuition, unless they join the Left Wing group.

2. The student body also expressed themselves as openly against communism. This is the most positive action taken by the Right Wing students against radicalism, and the manifesto has been published in all the local papers.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4762 Sept. 28, 1934

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism.

Government's Attitude toward Radicalism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 15 1934

1. The Chief of Police of Havana and the Chief of Technical Police (under the Department of the Interior) informed me on October 10th that within the last several days a large number of alleged communists have been arrested in Havana, and that they will be charged with acts of terrorism and labor agitation, in connection with the frustrated general strike which was called by the National Confederation of Labor for midnight, October 7th. No exact figures were given on the number arrested, but it is believed that the number will exceed 400. The majority of those arrested will appear before the Courts of Urgency for trial.

2. The position of the Mendieta Government has been so strengthened by the failure of the radical elements to create a general strike, and its knowledge that the people of Cuba in general are in sympathy with the Government's attitude toward radicalism, that it would not be surprising if sterner and more effective measures are taken in the immediate future in suppressing communistic activities.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4771 October 11,1934.

DECLASSIFIED
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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3700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political

Subject: Political Parties and Groups.

2657-G-330/299

Information on Colonel
Aurelio Alvarez.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 16 1934

1. Reference evaluation of reports dated October 3, 1934, report No. 4757, I. G. No. 2700, the only information we have on Colonel Aurelio Alvarez is as follows:

Under President Zayas he was President of the Senate; he was a leading Conservative from Camaguey; it is not known when he changed parties, but he now appears to be an active member of the Autentico Party.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M.A., Havana No. 4773 October 12, 1934.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups.

Attitude of Political Parties
toward Terrorism, Etc. 2657-g-330/301

1. Reference evaluation of reports dated October 5, 1934, report No. 4761, I. G. No. 2700, with regard to the question "have you any recent information on how such groups as the A.B.C., the Menocalistas, and the former Army officers stand regarding use of terroristic methods to gain political ends?" This is difficult to answer. During the last two years of the Machado regime and throughout the Grau San Martin regime the A.B.C. and the Menocalistas employed terroristic methods against the Government principally by means of bombs.

2. Most of the ex-officers are taking no part in Cuban politics, and I feel sure they are opposed to acts of terrorism. They all, except a few, seem to be following the advice of ex-General Julio Sanguily and ex-Colonel del Real of the Navy to keep out of politics. Although many are still without employment, the number that have obtained jobs is continually increasing. Many of them have not as yet received their small pensions. Most of them feel, I think, that with their pensions and a modest job they can get along. All of them, of course, hope that eventually conditions may change whereby they can return to the Army. Of course, Batista will not use them in the Army and the majority of them would not serve under him.

3. At present, the A.B.C. although withdrawn from the Mendieta Government seems to be marking time, as are the Menocalistas. I am convinced that neither group is at present engaged in terrorist methods to gain political ends.

4. Current rumor has it that there will probably be a new line-up of political parties, grouping them under two heads, as follows: The Radicals, consisting of the Autenticos under Grau, allied with the A.B.C. and the Conservatives, consisting of Nacionalistas, Marianistas, Menocalistas, and other old-line political parties. It is too early to verify or disprove these rumors. A prominent A.B.C. member several evenings past hinted to me that the A.B.C. and the Autenticos might ally themselves to fulfill, as he expresed it, certain necessary revolutionary policies. Others have also mentioned it as a possibility. The press announce this date a new political party named the Constitutional Socialist Party, headed by Dr. Manuel de la Cruz, former president of the Cuban Council of State, Fausto Menocal (the brother of General Mario Menocal), and Martinez Fraga.

5. As to any special significance to be attached to the presence of Grau and Menocal in the United States at present; had the general strike scheduled for October 7-8th become a serious reality, a certain amount of disorder and chaos would have followed, in which case Batista might have arrested Grau and confined him in prison for real or imaginary reasons. In other words, if anything serious occurred, it was wiser for Grau to be out of Cuba. A day or two before the threatened general strike, Martinez Saenz left by commercial airplane for Miami, where, I believe, he still is. It would not require a stretch of the imagination to believe that he also might have been arrested by Batista had general disorder and chaos existed in Havana as a consequence of the threatened general strike, so he probably also left for reasons of "safety first."

From M.A., Havana No. 4776 October 16,1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Menocal has been in the United States for some weeks. Our information, such as it is, is to the effect that Menocal is not plotting the overthrow of Mendieta. We believe that Menocal has lost so much political prestige and power that he no longer occupies a position of prominence in the Cuban political arena.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4776 October 16,1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 22 1934

G-2 Report 2700 1

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Radical Manifesto issued by Communist Party of Cuba.

1. The following is a translation of a manifesto sent by mail to the Havana newspaper El Pais-Informacion, which was issued by the Action Section of the Communist Party of Cuba;

"The presses of the newspaper AHORA have been destroyed, for it was 'yellow', selling itself to the Government and especially to Miguel Mariano Gomez; Diario de la Marina will be burned similarly, as monarchical, imperialist, pro-Spanish, and boot-licker of Batista.

"The turn will come of the Fascist ACCION, lackey of Yankee imperialism, and the yellow journals PAIS-INFORMACION and EL MUNDO, dens of the exploiters and politicians of all times.

"Cuba will be communist because such is the hope of the proletariat, and the flag of the citizen of the world.

"When the opportunity comes the bourgeois, of whom not even the seed can remain, should be prepared.

"Everything that smells of bourgeois, men, women, and children, shall be shot; although we have a preference for those journalists sold to the gold of Wall Street.

"For the conquest of the rights of the proletariat!

"For the installation of the Government of workmen, soldiers, and peasants!

"For the division of the land among the laborers!

"For the immediate execution of the assassins in the Government of Caffery-Mendieta-Batista!"

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy records.

From M.A., Havana No.4778 October 16, 1934

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OCT 24 1934
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 27 1934

Robbery of Municipal Treasury

1. At noon on October 19th the Treasury of the Municipality of Havana was robbed of $157,000 in American currency, the denominations of which were five, ten and twenty dollar bills. A large sum in American one-dollar bills and a great amount of Cuban silver money was not disturbed. The municipal treasurer, Segundo Curtis, and two assistants were found about 1 P.M. locked in one of the safes.

2. There appears to be a great deal of mystery concerning the robbery, the opinion of the police authorities being that it was an inside job. Statements made by several employees that they saw the robbers leave the building has been contradicted by others who were on duty at the time and who deny having seen any suspicious characters leave the building at the time the robbery was supposed to have occurred. Segundo Curtis, Municipal Treasurer, and several of his assistants have been suspended by Mayor Gomez while the investigation is proceeding. Since the robbery, all banks and public buildings in Cuba have been placed under special guard.

3. About two weeks ago I was called upon by an American banker of Havana, who told me confidentially that he had been informed that the Autenticos had made plans to hold up and rob several of the branch banks in the suburbs of Havana. The reason given was that the Autenticos were badly in need of money to carry on their campaign. At a meeting attended by a representative from each bank in Havana later that day, it was decided to request no action on the part of the Army or police, but to keep the safes locked and a minimum amount of currency behind the tellers' counters in each of the branch banks. Although no attempt has been made since then to rob any of these banks, there is a very strong and persistent rumor that the recent robbery of the Municipal Treasury was the work of the Autenticos.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4781 October 22, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2657-F-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 6 1934

1. During the past ten days there has been an increase in terrorist activities in Cuba. These activities are in the nature of bomb explosions throughout the City of Havana, and in Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba.

2. On the afternoon of October 31st, at 4 P.M., a bomb exploded in the Casa Grande Department Store, killing Miss Margarita Andreu, daughter of a member of the Cuban Supreme Court. Two other persons who were nearby at the time were dangerously wounded. The property damage, however, was slight. The Casa Grande is a large store just opposite Cuba's largest department store, El Encanto, where a bomb was also exploded several months ago, killing one woman and wounding others. Both of these stores are owned by the Solis family, which is Spanish. The explosion in the Casa Grande occurred during the busiest shopping period when the store was filled with patrons - mostly women.

3. Several other bombs exploded during the night of October 31st., one of which severely injured an employee of a cafe.

4. For the past several weeks, customers entering both the El Encanto and Casa Grande department stores, and also the Woolworth (10-cent) stores, have been searched by soldiers stationed at the doors. Packages which they are carrying are inspected as are also their purses. Mrs. Gimperling informs me that a very thorough search is made for concealed weapons or explosives when entering a number of the local stores; however, the patrons, men and women, accept it with complaisance and good nature, realizing that it is intended for their protection.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4792 November 1,1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2657-F-330
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G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities.

1. At 2 A.M. on November 3rd. a dynamite bomb was exploded in the lobby of the Presidente Hotel in Vedado. The damage is estimated at several hundred dollars. Although many of the windows were shattered, no one was injured.

2. At 11 P.M. on November 3rd. a very powerful bomb exploded near the home of Aquilino Entrialgo in Vedado, one of the owners of Cuba's largest department stores, El Encanto and Casa Grande. The Casa Grande was bombed last week and El Encanto was bombed last summer, as has been reported. In both instances, several innocent shoppers were injured and one or more killed.

3. During the afternoon of November 5th, a Cuban girl of about ten years of age, of the "street Arab" type, was apprehended while carrying a dynamite bomb into El Encanto department store. Upon being questioned, she said she did not know the contents of the package; that a man on the street had given her twenty cents to carry it into the store and leave it "somewhere on the floor." The police released the child.

4. During the night of November 3-4, two yachts anchored in the Almendares River were bombed; one belonging to Pablo Mendieta, brother of the President, which was only slightly damaged, and one belonging to Dr. Jose R. del Custo, the interior of which was wrecked. During the same night a moving picture theatre in Jesus del Monte, a suburb of Havana, was wrecked, and four bombs were exploded in the vicinity of Vedado, but did little damage and caused no casualties.

5. The press reports a renewal of terrorist activities by bombing in Cienfuegos, where a number of bombs have exploded in the last few days. There have been no casualties.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4797 November 6, 1934

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NOV 20 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV - 0 1934

Application for Membership in
Cuban Revolutionary Party.

1. There is attached hereto copy of a questionnaire for enlistment in the Cuban Revolutionary Party "Autentico" Army, the original of which I turned over to the Ambassador at his request. This office is also forwarding six copies of the English translation of the questionnaire.

2. Although along the same lines as the application blank which I recently received for membership in Antonio Guiteras' "Young Cuba" Army, and which I also turned over to the Ambassador at his request, this application is more general in scope and the questions more intelligently presented. 2657-S-361/2

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut.Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
TNG:vm

encl. Spanish and English text
of questionnaire.

From M.A., Havana No. 4307 November 14, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Nov 26 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-g-330
310
WAR DEPARTMENT

PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO

EJERCITO AUTENTICO 2-1

Municipio de la Habana.
Habana.

SOLICITUD DE INGRESO

DISTRITO No. .....

Yo .....

Natural de ..... Ciudadano.....

Estado..... Edad.....

Ocupación .....

Vecino de .....

Identificado con el Programa y la Ideología del Partido Revolucionario Cubano, vengo por el presente documento a solicitar mi Ingreso en el Ejército Auténtico y juro solemnemente cumplir y hacer cumplir el Reglamento y demás Disposiciones que emanen del Ejército Auténtico o del Partido Revolucionario Cubano.

(A LA VUELTA)

C U E S T I O N A R I O .

Ha pertenecido a algún Sector Revolucionario?.....

A cual? .....

Con quién ha trabajado.,.....

.....

Ha pertenecido a alguna Institución Militar?.....

A cual?.....

Conoce el manejo de las armas?..... Cuales?.....

Posee título de driver, Piloto Aereo o Marino?..... Cual?.....

Conoce usted la manipulación de explosivos?..... Cuales?.....

Posee finca o casa, propia para guardar material de guerra, propaganda?.....

(Sigue en la pág. 2)

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Posee armas? ..... Cuales?.....

.....

Posee automóvil, camión o lancha?.....

.....

Juro por mi honor que los datos personales que he expuesto son ciertos.

_____

Firma del Solicitante.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

NOV 20 1934
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1 2657-G-330
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Translation of -

Application for Membership
Cuban Revolutionary Party
"Autentico" Army
City of Havana

DISTRICT NO.....

I, ...

Native of.....Citizenship.....

Marital State.....Age.....

Address.....

Identified with the Program and the Ideals of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, and by means of the present document, I express my desire to join the "Autentico" Army and I solemnly swear to fulfill and to carry out the Regulations and other orders which may come from the "Autentico" Army or from the Cuban Revolutionary Party.

(Over)

QUESTIONNAIRE

Have you belonged to any Revolutionary Sector?.....

To which?.....

With whom have you worked?.....

Have you belonged to any Military Institution?.....

To which?.....

Do you know how to handle fire arms?.....

Which ones?.....

Do you have a driver's license, aerial or marine.....Pilot's license?.....Which?.....

Do you know how to handle explosives?.....Which ones?.....

Do you own a farm or house where war materiel or propaganda may be stored?.....

Do you own any firearms?.....What kind?.....

Do you own an automobile, a truck, or a launch?.....

I swear on my honor that the personal data given above are correct.

_____
Signature of Applicant.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

6-1 2657-G-330
311

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities.

RECEIVED 8:2 M.I. DEC 1 1934

1. About 6:30 P.M. Saturday evening, November 24th, a group of five or six young white Cubans attacked my residence with rocks and empty bottles. They fled up the street in the darkness as I opened the front door armed with a flashlight and revolver. Upon examining the garden shrubbery for possible bombs, I discovered two red communist banners, on both of which were pasted in large white letters communistic inscriptions in Spanish. The inscription on one was a protest against starvation and famine, with the letters "P. C." at the top and "J. L. C."at the bottom; the other inscription was a protest against the execution of Norris and Patterson at Scottsboro, Alabama. P. C. are the initials of the "Partido Communista" (Communist Party) and J.L.C. are the initials of the "Liga Juvenil Comunista (Young Communist League). Only one pane of glass was broken, but the front door was badly defaced.

2. A short time ago the residence of the British Minister was attacked in the same manner, and one communistic banner was left in the yard demanding "the freedom of the Scottsboro, Alabama prisoners."

3. This morning's mail brought a number of letters addressed to the Ambassador protesting against the execution of Norris and Patterson at Scottsboro, Alabama, signed by various communist cells not only in Havana, but throughout the Island. One unsigned letter received today announces that tomorow night, November 27th, the Embassy Chancery will be attacked by communists.

4. One large bomb exploded last night not far from my residence, but, everything considered, Havana is comparatively quiet.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4814 November 26, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Communistic Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 4 1934

1. The Communist Party of Cuba will hold a second Congress at Cayo Hueso, near Havana, commencing December 3rd. Two delegates from each communist cell in Cuba are accredited to the Congress. These communistic meetings will be closely observed by the Government.

2. There is attached hereto a hand-bill which has been circulated throughout the City during the last several days.

3. There have been a number of large bombs exploded in the City during the last several days; two in El Encanto department store, several in the Vedado residential district, one early this morning in a store in the central part of the City, one at noon in a large office building, and several others not listed as to exact locations.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press.

1 encl.

TNG:vm

RHL

From M.A., Havana No. 4819 November 30,1934.

By NH

For ~~Official Use Only.~~

1 encl
6-2
2657-G-330
31

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

— Communistic Activities.—

1. The Communist Party of Cuba will hold a second Congress at Cayo Hueso, near Havana, commencing December 3rd. Two delegates from each communist cell in Cuba are accredited to the Congress. These communistic meetings will be closely observed by the Government.

2. There is attached hereto a hand-bill which has been circulated throughout the City during the last several days.

3. There have been a number of large bombs exploded in the City during the last several days; two in El Encanto department store, several in the Vedado residential district, one early this morning in a store in the central part of the City, one at noon in a large office building, and several others not listed as to exact locations.

2177

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press.

1 encl.

TNG:vm

Translation of Enclosed Handbill.

Workers occupied, unoccupied, negroes, whites
and to the People in General.

Meet all at the grand Conference on December 1st at 8:00 P.M. in the Labor Exchange, No. 7 Concha St., for the liberty of the 9 young negroes of Scottboro, against the execution of Morris and Patterson.

For the liberty of the Scottboro negroes!
For the liberty of Thaelman!
For the liberty of all worker prisoners!

All at the Conference.

International Workers Defense.

From M.A., Havana No. 4819 November 30,1934.

(Extra copy under 3020-C)

Opn. Br. - route + return

1st Division COM 12/17/34 WPD - route + return

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Obreros ocupados, desocupados, negros, blancos y al Pueblo en General

Concurrid todos a la gran Conferencia el día 1o. de Diciembre a las 8 de la noche en la Bolsa del Trabajo, Concha 7, por la libertad de los 9 jóvenes negros de Scottboro, contra la ejecución de Morris y Patterson.

¡POR LA LIBERTAD DE LOS NEGROS DE SCOTTBORO!
¡POR LA LIBERTAD DE THAELMAN!
¡POR LA LIBERTAD DE TODOS LOS OBREROS PRESOS!

TODOS A LA CONFERENCIA

DEFENSA OBRERA INTERNACIONAL
Local de Jesús del Monte

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For ~~Official Use Only.~~ 6-1 2657-g-330 313

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social) 2657-g-334/308

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 10 1934

Terrorist Activities.

1. Reference evaluation of report No.4792, subject as above, dated November 22, 1934. Subsequent to the submittal of that report, there was a decrease in terroristic activities. However, within the past several days there has been a decided increase in these activities throughout Havana. This increase may be associated perhaps with the assembling of communist leaders for the Second Cuban Communist Congress, as reported on November 30th, and also to the intense communistic activities in protest against the execution of Norris and Patterson at Scottsboro, Alabama. It is probable that the local communists do not know that the execution has been postponed. At any rate, the Ambassador is receiving an increasing number of letters of protest from communists and communist cells throughout the Island. Saturday's first mail brought in over fifty letters on the subject.

2. Our information is that the communists are responsible for most of the terrorist activities; however, the Left Wing of the Autentico Party and the A.B.C. Radicals are responsible for some of it. There is no dividing line between these factions and the Communist Party, as they merge into each other. There is also one (or perhaps more) group of terrorist rackateers that has operated in Havana since the fall of Machado. Merchants have been threatened with bombs unless they paid for protestion. Recently several Spanish merchants were held up on their way to their places of business, between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. in eadh instance, by two men dressed in the uniform of soldiers - one a sergeant and the other a private. The merchants were informed by these men dressed as soldiers that Batista wanted to see them as they were suspected of being communists. Notwithstanding the protests of the merchants, the terrorists forced themselves into the automobiles and drove off with their victims. Upon passing a certain corner, the cars were stopped and two young civilians entered. The victims were then driven out in their own automobiles to the ruins of an old house in the Country Club district and very near Sans Souci night club on the Central Highway running to Pinar del Rio. The Spanish merchants were so intimidated that they met the demands of the terrorists. One of them drove in with one of his captors to a local bank, cashed a check for $4000.00 and gave the money to his captor. He then left immediately for Spain. Exact information on the other two or three cases is not known, but it is understood that the proceedings were about the same. It is understood that the police were not notified of these occurrences for several days. It is difficult to say whether these terrorists were in the employ of Antonio Guiteras or that of rackateers operating independently.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4821 December 3,1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For ~~Official Use Only~~

DEC 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-S-330
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G-2 Report 3600-a 7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 18 1934

Constitutional Guarantees
Suspended for Sixty Days.

1. On December 12, 1934, the President issued a Decree-Law (which has not yet been received in this office) which suspends Constitutional Guarantees for sixty days in the provinces of Habana, Santa Clara and Camaguey.

2. The effect of this suspension will be to place the responsibility of curbing terrorism on the shoulders of the military and police officials. The local press, in commenting upon the Decree, state that it was received with surprise in political circles, although rumors of the possibility of this action had been received in this office more than a week ago. It is believed that the persistent rumors of a general terrorist campaign planned by radical groups, and the criticism of the Government because of the "weak-kneed" attitude of the Courts of Urgency in handling terrorist cases, are the causes of the President's action; although the stiffest sentence as yet imposed by those Courts was given yesterday to two youths, each of whom was condemned to twelve years imprisonment for placing bombs in Havana grocery stores. It is understood that Colonel Batista has on several occasions criticised the inadequacy of sentences imposed by the Civil Courts in the cases of terrorists. He has said that the Army and National Police have captured many of these offenders "red-handed", with sufficient evidence to justify convictions, and in many cases stiff sentences; but that his efforts in many of these cases were useless, because the Courts either released the offenders or imposed ridiculously light sentences. Criticism has been general and severe against the President and the Civil Government for their inability to curb terrorism and because of the inefficiency of the Courts of Urgency which were established for the purpose of handling terroristic offenders.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4831 December 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1933, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 6-24-69

~~Confidential~~: The Military Attache, Havana, Cuba.

6-1

DEC 1 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
2700
MILITARY CENTER OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2657-B-330
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Rumors of Impending Revolution

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 18 1934

1. This office is receiving increasingly numerous and persistent rumors to the effect that the Autenticos, Communists, A.B.C. Radicals and, in fact, also the A.B.C. Society itself, are planning a revolution for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government. Our information, which cannot be verified, brackets the date of the revolution between December 24th and January 31st. It is understood that originally it was planned for December 3rd, then December 8th, and again it was postponed to December 17th.

2. I discussed this subject at some length with Colonel Batista at the Presidential Palace last night. He assured me that practically all of these rumors are originated, without any foundation whatsoever, by the A.B.C. Society. He assured me that he is taking due precautions in the matter and he appears to be not in the least worried. On the other hand, a member of the Technical Police (which is under the Department of Interior) informed me this morning that he conveyed a letter on December 11th from the Secretary of the Interior to Colonel Batista. This letter was on the subject of an impending revolution on the part of the sectors mentioned above. My informant, who was the courier in this instance and who is an American, informed me that Batista remarked when he had finished reading the letter - "Yes, this confirms what we have known all along."

3. Captain Durfee and I both have been advised that the Autenticos and communists plan overt acts of terrorism, probably by firearms, against the funeral procession tomorrow morning when the remains of former Ambassador Marquez Sterling will be conveyed from the cruiser "Trenton" to Colon Cemetery. Our informants say that the shooting will be directed at those participating in the procession, which will include the high officials of the Cuban Government, the diplomatic corps, Cuban military and naval officials and prominent civilians. Our Embassy staff will attend in their individual automobiles.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4833 December 13, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

DEC 22

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 22 1934

Terrorist Activities.

1. On the night of December 17-18, thirty bombs were exploded in the City of Havana and sixteen have been found unexploded. Casualties, however, were very slight, but three persons being wounded, and the property damage was not great.

2. We feel certain that last night's bombing demonstration is purely the work of political oppositionists, most probably A.B.C.'s and Autenticos. Sometime ago we were informed that the revolution against the present Government would start December 17th; later we understood that it would start December 24th. It is our opinion that there will be no armed revolution, but it is quite possible that demonstrations of a serious nature may be made against Americans and their properties, in order, according to the belief of the Oppositionists, that the United States will be forced to intervene. We have heard for over a year of these threats and rumors of forcing intervention by wholesale killing of Americans and destruction of their properties in order to force intervention, but we are all agreed that these rumors and threats today are far more numerous and much more emphatic than in the past. I have been warned by my neighbors, most of whom are A.B.C.'s and Autenticos, that something is bound to happen against Americans very soon.

3. It is useless to attempt to evaluate these rumors; something may, of course, happen, and a reign of terror against Americans is quite possible, but we believe it to be an improbability.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4838 December 18, 1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Severe Sentences Given Terrorists by Courts of Urgency.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 26 1934

1. On December 20th, Court of Urgency No.1 handed down the most severe sentence against terrorists since its establishment several months ago. Upon the identification of one Pedro Fernandez, a Cuban, by a nine year old Havana newsboy, the Court sentenced Fernandez to life imprisonment. Under the Cuban law, life imprisonment is thirty years, at the expiration of which period, the prisoner, if still alive, is released. Fernandez was accused of placing a bomb at the entrance of one of the large Havana department stores, which wounded several passersby as well as Fernandez himself.

2. Another terrorist who was arrested recently while attempting to place a bomb in the business district, was sentenced to four years in jail. The longest sentence given by the Courts of Urgency prior to the case mentioned above, was handed down several weeks ago when a young man was sentenced to serve twelve years in jail for placing a bomb.

3. It is understood that the President and Cabinet discussed several days ago the feasibility of prescribing capital punishment in the case of convicted bomb terrorists.

4. As previously reported, numerous bombs were exploded on the night of December 17-18. Since then there have also been a few bombs exploded every night -- one on the night of December 19-20 destroyed the entrance of the Marianista Party's headquarters in Vedado. A bomb factory was found about daybreak on December 19th, when a police squad searching the Havana Institute found the so-called bomb factory in the basement, which included a large quantity of dynamite, pieces of metal pipe and fuses. The report of this find is causing much criticism against the Director of the faculty of the Institute. It is understood that while the radical student elements of the University are comparatively quiet and more or less submerged by the large majority of the student body which is conservative and by the newly elected Director, Dr. Cadenas, who is a very forceful and conservative man, on the other hand, the radical elements of the Havana High School (Institute) remain almost unchecked.

5. During the past several nights the Havana police have resumed their searching of automobiles. Last night one of the Embassy Secretaries was stopped in his car seven times between the Embassy and his residence and each time the car was searched. On the evening of December 18th, my car was stopped three times by police, who, however, did not search the car when they recognized the license plate marked"American Embassy". It is understood that a large quantity of dynamite was discovered and a number of arrests made by the police in the search of vehicles entering Havana during the last several nights.

6. Information has just been received that this morning a

From M.A., Havana No. 4843 December 21,1934

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

bomb was exploded at the entrance of the Argentine Legation. The Argentine Government leased this fine residence from the Cuban Government, which has resulted in much criticism from the student body of the University, for the reason that the Government of Grau San Martin gave this property, which was the home of and belonged to Orestes Ferrera, Secretary of State under Machado, to the University.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4843 December 21,1934.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 15 1935

General Situation as Sugar Grinding Season Approaches.

1. Havana has been comparatively quiet during the last two weeks, although there have been a few bombs exploded almost every night. Throughout the Island conditions seem to be improving, although there have been sporadic bombings in Cienfuegos, Sagua la Grande, Camaguey, Santa Clara and Santiago.

2. With the approach of the "Zafra" (sugar grinding season) which starts January 15th, undoubtedly considerable damage will be attempted by the radical elements, such as burning of cane and damage of property. In order to forestall sabotage of the fields and sugar properties, the Government has requested the proprietors of sugar mills to submit lists of the agitators and ultra-radicals located on or in the vicinity of their properties - said lists to be considered as confidential. It will be recalled that the Daiquiri Mine strike, after many months of idleness and sabotage, was promptly and peacefully settled by the arrest of several labor agitators who were violently opposed to the resumption of work, although all employees except the fourteen leaders of the Labor Union had voted unanimously to resume work; also that at about this time last year - at the beginning of the grinding season - the United Fruit Company was not certain that it would be able to even start grinding at its large sugar properties in northern Oriente Province, but it was found that among the 14,000 employees there were less than 30 real agitators who were stiring up trouble against the Company. Some 18 or 20 of these agitators were quietly arrested and removed by the police and Army, and the Company completed its grinding season without the slightest labor difficulties.

3. A detachment of 200 soldiers from Havana has been sent to Central Jaronu in Santa Clara Province to assist in the maintenance of order. Other temporary shifts of military detachments will probably be made from time to time and will be reported if the extent of such movements is of sufficient importance to warrant same.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4860 January 11,1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Journals.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 2657-g-330
WAR DEPARTMENT
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2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 29 1935

Terroristic Activities

1. After several days of comparative quiet in Havana with a few bombs exploding nightly in various parts of the City, last night a large number of small bombs were exploded in various parts of Havana. These caused, however, but one casualty, a Cuban passer-by who was struck in the leg by a fragment of a bomb as he was walking in one of the streets of the business district. The property damage was also small. The Anglo-American Hospital, which is maintained by contributions from the local American and English colonies, was bombed, but with slight damage - one bomb exploded and the other did not.

2. During the evening the majority of local radio broadcasting stations went on a 45 minute strike in protest against the attack on station CMBX earlier in the week when a group of armed men alleged to have been members of the Havana Police, although not in uniforms, destroyed the equipment of that station.

3. In Cienfuegos three terrorists were sentenced by the Court of Urgency of Santa Clara Province to twelve years imprisonment for being found with a bomb in their possession.

4. The Diario de la Marina, which is the most responsible and conservative of the Havana Spanish language papers, published an alleged report made by a Sergeant of the Section of Investigation of the National Police to his superiors, referring to the communistic activities in connection with the present "Zafra" or sugar grinding season, which is being made by the National Confederation of Workers of Cuba (which we know is controlled by communists), the Union of Graphic Arts; National Syndicate of Transportation Employees, and others. He also is quoted as stating that in every sugar central there are members of one or more of these communistic controlled labor organizations - the object desired by these organizations through their representatives is the prevention of the harvesting of the current sugar crop.

5. In spite of the activities of the communists, which include a number of incendiary fires in cane fields and some destruction of property by bombs, the grinding season is proceeding with additional sugar centrals commencing operations every day.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4869 January 25, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Celebration of Birth of
Cuban Patriot, Jose Marti.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 4 1935

1. January 28th was celebrated throughout the Island as the 82nd. anniversary of the birth of Jose Marti, Cuban martyr and apostle of freedom, and often referred to as the "Father of his Country".

2. Schools, banks, commercial houses and public buildings throughout the Island were closed. Salutes were fired and thousands of orphan children were given an outing by the Civic Welfare Association and the Rotary Club at one of the large public parks, where a crowd estimated at 10,000 was present. Police surveillance of the parks and centers of festivities was noticeably increased.

3. Although only one bomb is known to have exploded in the City yesterday, the police found 13 milk bottles charged with dynamite and shrapnel and equipped with 12-inch fuses. The seizure was made at a residence on I Street, Vedado, where two persons were arrested, one man and one woman. They are charged with terrorism in connection with the secret Leftist organization known as "Young Cuba." Hoodlums during the night shattered the plate glass windows of the offices of the United Fruit Company on the Prado.

4. The Courts of Urgency have failed, in the great majority of cases, to given sufficiently severe sentences to terrorists. However, the police have summarily shot within the last few days several terrorists who were caught "red-handed" with bombs and while obtaining money from merchants under the "rackateer" threat of bombing the establishment..

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4872 January 29, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 5 1935

Members of A.B.C.Society Arrested.

1. On Tuesday, January 29th, the police arrested a number of prominent members of the A.B.C. secret political society and while doing so, captured a number of rifles, bombs, dynamite, pistols, cartridges, gas masks and other munitions. These resulted from more than 20 raids made by the police during the day. Senora Sanchez Govin Secretary-General of the A.B.C. Society, was among those arrested, but was held but a short time.

2. The more substantial members of the A.B.C. Society are heartily in favor of maintaining a truce with the Government, at least until the completion of this year's sugar crop, because Cuba depends upon its sugar crop for its economic existence and also because many of the members of the Society are being directly benefited by the general improved economic conditions. However, notwithstanding their efforts, the present attitude of the Society is antagonistic to the Government and especially to Colonel Batista, Commander of the Constitutional Army, and to Lieut.Colonel Pedraza, Chief of the Havana Police. Recent efforts on the part of the Government to conciliate this political society and to bring it again to support the provisional government of President Mendieta have failed.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4875 February 1,1935

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

[redacted]

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Important Problems and Issues Requiring Governmental Recognition and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 14 1935

2657-G-330
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Continued Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees.

1. Although as yet unconfirmed by published decree, it is understood that President Mendieta intends to continue the suspension of Constitutional Guarantees for 65 days longer in the Provinces of Havana, Camaguey and Santa Clara. As reported in report No. 4831, index as above, dated December 12, 1934, Constitutional Guarantees were suspended for 60 days in these three provinces, which suspension expires at Noon today.

2657-G-31/80

2. As stated in report No.4867, index 2700, dated January 18, 1935, the Government suspended Constitutional Guarantees on January 15th for a period of 90 days in the other three provinces, to wit, Pinar del Rio, Matanzas and Oriente.

3. The reason for this action on the part of the Government is to better safeguard the cane cutting and grinding operations during the current sugar season. In this connection, it may be stated that while some sabotage of cane fields and sugar properties is being reported from the interior, the destruction, so far, this year is very much less than during the similar period last year, and it is confidently expected that there will be no serious interruption during the remainder of the season.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4879 February 8, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Riot in Vicinity of
Havana High School.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 14 1935

1. During the evening of February 11th, a riot occurred in front of the Havana High School (Instituto) near Central Park. Following a collision between a street car and automobile, which derailed the former, a crowd estimated at about 200 congregated in the vicinity of the accident. Because of the widely different versions as to what started the shooting, it is as yet not possible to say whether it was started by students or by police. At any rate, a number of shots were fired, which resulted in the killing of one young man said to be a high school student, and the wounding of several by-standers. The incident occurred just at the time the atudents were leaving night classes.

2. During the same evening, Idelfonso Triana, Secretary-General of the "United Front" of the revolutionary organization, was gravely wounded in a pistol duel with a police officer in the Cerro, a suburb of Havana. A bomb exploded in a political club in the same suburb during the evening, damaging the building, but causing no personal injuries. The bomb was evidently placed by an opponent of the present Government, as the founder and head of the club, Panchito Diaz, is Assistant Secretary of Public Works in the Mendieta Government.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4880 February 12, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba

MIL. INTEL. DIV.

6-1 2657-J-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Attempt to Overthrow Present Government

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 16 1935

1. President Mendieta recently informed Ambassador Caffery that the Chief of the Cuban Navy, Commander Gonzalez, informed him that Dr. Martinez Saenz and Dr. Santovenia of the A.B.C. Society had approached him with a proposition to enter into a plan to overthrow the present Cuban Government.

2. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that last June, a few days before the A.B.C. concentration and parade in Havana, I was informed by a prominent A.B.C. member that Dr. Martinez Saenz had informed him and several other members that he had asked the Government for guarantees of protection to the marchers in the parade, but that he expected much bloodshed and that if the A.B.C. marchers were attacked, it would mean that the Mendieta Government would have to withdraw; that he realized that he could not overthrow Batista, but expected to align Batista with the A.B.C. Dr. Saenz was correct in believing that the paraders would be attacked as more than a dozen were killed and between 50 and 60 wounded. At about the same time, or just prior to the parade, Martinez Saenz visited Batista on several occasions.

2. These two incidents indicate that the head of the A.B.C. Society has attempted to enter into negotiations first with the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Batista, last June, and now with the Commander of the Navy, in an effort to win their support to overthrow Mendieta.

3. Incidentally, the information which I conveyed to the Ambassador last June as to the designs of Martinez Saenz, enabled him to warn President Mendieta and Colonel Batista.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts,
Embassy records.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4881 February 12, 1935.

EXEMPT from Declass
Exec. Order, Sec. 3(E
Nov. 1, 1939

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1 2657-9-330
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2700

7

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities Against the "Zafra".

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 27 1935

1. Since the commencement of this year's "zafra", or sugar grinding season, terrorist activities against the railroads have shown a marked increase.

2. On the night of February 20th, a very powerful bomb exploded underneath a United Railways' bridge, a few miles from Cienfuegos, but the extent of damage is not reported. At Jovellanos in Matanzas Province, incendiaries set fire to 100 freight cars on a siding; however, railway workmen and the city fire department were successful in saving all but eight of the cars. During the present "zafra", terrorist activities in Matanzas Province have been proportionately greater than in any of the other five provinces, considering that the sugar grinding activities are much greater in Oriente, Camaguey and Santa Clara.

3. This office was informed last week by several fairly reliable sources that the activities of communists among the farm and plantation workers were very intense in Matanzas, more so than in any other province, excepting, of course, the larger cities such as Havana, Santiago, Manzanillo, Camaguey and Cienfuegos.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4890 February 21, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

G-1 2657-S-330
326
WAR DEPARTMENT
2340

G-2 Report

CUBA (SOCIAL)

Subject: Strikes.

Strike of Students and Teachers in Protest against Police, Etc.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 27 1935

1. The strike of the students in Havana which has been going on intermittently for several weeks, received a new impetus on February 15th, when the students voted again to walk out in support of the strike movement which was recently initiated in more than a score of public schools as a protest against police violence.

2657-S-330/32 3

2. As reported in Report No.4880, index 2700, dated February 15, 1935, a street car was derailed near the Havana High School as a result of a collision with a truck. No one was injured in the actual collision, but during the ensuing confusion, students who were on the car at the time, led apparently by agitators, attempted further to add to the confusion by removing the trolley from the wire, etc., and when the police intervened to restore order, several shots were fired; one student being killed, several wounded and others arrested. The arrest of these students further increased the bitterness and the strike spread to other schools in protest of the so-called "police persecution".

3. The strike has now spread to include the teachers in Havana schools who complain of lack of adequate school rooms and material with which to carry on their work. One issue of the Diario de la Marina published a photograph of several maps, all of which were in very dilapidated condition, which the investigating committee found in Santiago de Cuba. It is plain that the teachers have practically no facilities with which to carry on their work, and one of the demands made by them and the students, before the strike can be settled, is a 50 per cent increase in the portion of the Budget allotted for school work, as well as better conditions and improved buildings.

4. In connection with the teachers' strike, more than 200 teachers, almost half of them women, were arrested on Saturday when the police broke up a meeting of the Teachers' Association, basing their action on the fact that the meeting was held without permission. The women teachers were sent to the womens' jail at Guanabacoa and the men were lodged in Principe prison.

5. Precisely at the time this was going on, the Secretary of Education was in conference with President Mendieta. As a result of this conference, the number of free breakfasts for school children was increased by 1700, bringing the total to 10,000. This breakfast consists of coffee with milk, sweet cookies and chocolate, and it is given free to the poorer school children. The Secretary of Education also took up the question of freeing those students who have been arrested and of a general amnesty for all at present attending school.

6. It is apparent that the Government is taking certain steps to alleviate the poor condition of the schools, at least as regards material, for certain essential supplies have just been received for distribution among the various schools, and it is stated that more are on the way. The supplies received to date include 70,000 blocks of grade "A" paper; 10,000 boxes of pen points; 216,000 pen holders; 8000 gross of pencils, and sufficient chalk for 7000 classrooms. This material will be trans-

From M.A., Havana No. 4886 February 18, 1935.

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ferred as soon as possible to the various schools, in addition to such books as are now on hand in the warehouses.

7. Needless to say, President Mendieta and the Secretary of Education, Dr. Capote Diaz, are doing all in their power to bring about a solution satisfactory both to the Government and to the students and teachers.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

LVHD:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4886 February 18, 1935

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

2657-9-330/327

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 27 1935

1. Supplementing report No. 4886, index as above, dated February 18, 1935, Havana teachers moved yesterday to solidify their strike along lines designed to support striking scholars, and the student body of Havana University swept the movement into a national issue by voting to continue their walkout indefinitely until vital changes are made in the administrative policies of President Mendieta.

2. The demands of the University students are as follows:

1. They asked the immediate abolition of military power.

2. They demanded guarantees for individual rights.

3. The immediate freedom of political prisoners.

4. The suppression of the Government's Urgency Courts.

5. Credits for primary schools.

6. They demanded that immediate attention be given the demands of high schools, normal school and other institutions, for better treatment.

7. They asked the regulation of professional courses for students of engineering, public notaries and diplomacy.

8. They demanded the founding of a station of agronomy at Santiago de las Vegas for University students.

2. At their general assembly held on the afternoon of February 18th, the University students openly expressed their disapproval for Secretary of Education, Capote Diaz, and Secretary of Commerce, Santos Jimenez, engendering the belief that a demand would shortly be presented for the removal of the two officials.

3. All teachers of Havana's public schools, meanwhile, remained away from their classrooms and employees of the Department of Education were observing a "dropped arms" strike, refusing either to work or leave their posts. The teachers' strike has spread rapidly and is reported to be steadily gaining strength

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source : Press.

From M.A., Havana No. 4887 February 19, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 4

Teachers' and Students' Strike

1. The strike of the students and teachers, which was previously reported by this office, is rapidly spreading to all public educational institutions throughout the Island, and is now reported to have swept into the Cuban rural districts.

2. The strike, which started with the accidental killing of a young man who was reported to have been a student but was subsequently found to have not been one, in front of the Institute during disorderly demonstrations by students, as previously reported, spread into the University and, as stated above, is spreading throughout the schools of the Island. It is believed that the students and teachers are being not only supported, but urged on, by the A.B.C. Society and the Autenticos, in an effort to overthrow the Mendieta Government. The situation is frankly admitted to have serious possibilities.

3. The local press report that a large assembly of students has been called to meet at the University at 9 A.M.February 25th. The purpose of this meeting is for an interchange of ideas among student leaders and to further define the position and aims of the students.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4892 February 23, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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MAR 15 1935
WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

Students and Teachers Strike

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 4 1935

1. The strike of the students and teachers of the public schools, which has been previously reported by this office, is developing hourly into a more serious situation, and it is quite probable that Cuba is approaching a more serious crisis than it has had since the coup d'etat of September 4, 1933.

2. All the radical labor factions, the communists and also the Autenticos and A.B.C.'s are making every effort to bring about a general strike in Cuba, for the purpose of overthrowing the Mendieta Government. One of the main issues demanded by the strikers is the immediate abolition of military power, and this is interpreted to mean that they want no interference by the military or the police with their demonstrations. The radical students who now seem to be in control of the student situation, as well as the communists, Autenticos and A.B.C.'s, are bitterly opposed to Batista and the Army, Navy and National Police.

3. The only two political parties that appear to be neutral at the present moment are the Menocalistas, under General Mario Menocal; and the Marianistas, under Miguel Mariano Gomez. It is understood that both of these parties, in the final analysis, would swing their support to Mendieta, but prefer, if possible, to remain neutral.

4. At the mass meeting of the students and teachers at the University yesterday, many prominent communists and labor leaders took the floor and received much applause. The squatters of Realango 18, Oriente Province, sent a delegate to the meeting, and when introduced from the platform, he was applauded and cheered for several minutes, the students and others present standing during the applause. The recent trouble in the Realango 18 District has been previously reported by this office.

5. Meanwhile, the Government is pursuing a "hands off" policy with regard to the strikers and their supporters.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4896 February 26, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 5 1935

Terrorist Activities.

1. On the night of February 26th, a large number of bombs exploded throughout the City of Havana. It is understood that the number was in excess of thirty. However, there was no report of personal injuries resulting therefrom, and the property damage was small.

2. In the larger cities of the provinces there has been an increase of terrorism recently. Several days ago, a bomb exploded in the doorway of the U.S. Consulate at Santiago de Cuba, damaging the entrance doorway, the stairs and the bath, which are on the first floor. The Consulate offices are on the second floor and were not damaged, except for some broken window panes.

3. The reports received from the interior indicate that the activities in connection with cutting and grinding sugar cane are progressing without interference. There are now 130 sugar mills operating throughout the Island.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy.

TNG:vm

From M. A., Havana No. 4897 February 27, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Per authority letter of Dec. 18, 1969, from TAGO to Archivist
By [illegible] Date 6-24-69

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 5 1935

Strike Situation Grave.

1. The strike of the students and teachers of the public schools, as previously reported, continues to be a source of grave concern to the Government.

2. Urged on by the communists, Autenticos and a part of the A.B.C. Society, efforts are being made to create a general strike throughout the Island. A strike of the Havana truck drivers is called for tomorrow morning, which, if carried out, will suspend the transporting of food and other supplies from the docks and the wholesale establishments. It is planned to have the bus and taxi drivers and street car employees follow suit. One local newspaper reports that the cigarmakers and a large number of factory workers are planning to strike also.

3. One fairly reliable contact has just informed me that there is a large amount of munitions, including some .50 calibre anti-aircraft machine guns, in the hands of the students and also concentrated at the University; that the students hope to carry out a plan which they had prepared against Machado, that is, to cut off Havana by destroying bridges and crippling transportation routes entering the City. The plan, it is understood, has been worked out in considerable detail, and is to be put into effect in case a general strike in the City becomes effective.

4. It is understood that the ex-officers, with the possible exception of a very few, are not connected with this present movement, which has for its purpose the overthrowing of Mendieta and Batista.

5. If the Government can stave off a strike of transportation and other workers, every day that it does so will decrease the potency of the movement which is being attempted, as Cuban enthusiasn wanes rapidly when confronted with delay.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts,
and Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4899 February 27, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH CORPS AREA
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

Please Refer
To File:

SECRET

FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS
October 30, 1930.

Major W. H. Simpson, G.S.C.,
Executive Officer, A. C. of S., G-2,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Major Simpson:

If consistent with the policy of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, it is requested that you forward, at your convenience, a copy of any available SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL estimate of the present situation in Cuba.

Owing to the possible influence of conditions in Cuba upon other areas in which we are interested, it is believed that an estimate on the Cuban situation may be of considerable value to these headquarters.

Very sincerely,

ROBERT J. HALPIN,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

RJH/jh

Copy retained in L. G. Lee.
11/4/30 GP

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

November 4, 1930.

Major Robert J. Halpin,
A. C. of S., G-2,
Headquarters Eighth Corps Area,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

My dear Major Halpin:

With reference to your letter of October 30, in which you request information upon the situation in Cuba, I am inclosing a copy of the current political estimate of that country. A resume of political developments with particular reference to the stability of the present administration appears in the War Department G-2 Bi-Weekly Summary of Intelligence for October 24, 1930. These two documents indicate the extent of the information of interest which we have upon the subject.

Very sincerely,

W. H. SIMPSON,
Major, G.S.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

cp
1 incl.

MAILED G-2 W. D. NOV 6 - 1930

Registered #960450

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MAR 11 1935
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6-1 2657-J-330
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2700
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Terrorist Activities:

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 11 1935

1. Although Havana was comparatively quiet last night, it is reported that a number of bombs exploded in Guantanamo, with heavy property damage but no casualties. Three bombs were reported in Santiago de Cuba and others in Santa Clara, Placetas, Manzanillo and Guanajay.

2. Lieut.Colonel Julio Velasco, Chief of Operations of the Cuban Army, informed me last night that the Army feels very proud of its accomplishments in connection with the "Zafra", or sugar cane grinding season; that the troops, mostly Rural Guard detachments, stationed in and around the 132 mills now operating, are working very hard to prevent sabotage and that so far they have been very successful; that these troops notwithstanding their strenuous duties, are quite content. Although I cannot confirm Lieut.Colonel Velasco's statement as to the contentment of the troops, we do know that, so far, this season has been the quietest in many years in connection with the "Zafra".

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4905 March 5, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.

4-1 DEC 2657-g-332 1930

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Cabinet.

WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 18 1930

1. On December 8, 1930, President Machado announced a radical change in his present cabinet. While this change involved the loss of only two men from his present cabinet, the shake-up was so complete that it affected all but four of the department heads. The changes that have been made are as follows:

Secretary of State, Dr. Francisco Maria Fernandez.
Secretary of Interior, Sr. Jose Clemente Vivanco.
Secretary of Sanitation and Charities, Sr.Victoriano Rodriguez Barahona.
Secretary of Communications, General Manuel Delgado.
Secretary of Justice, Dr. Octavio Averhof.
Secretary of Public Works, Sr. Jesus Maria Barraque.
Secretary of Public Education, Dr. Carlos Miguel de Cespedes.

All of the above named men have now taken their oath of office in the new cabinet with the exception of Dr. Fernandez, who will be sworn in on December 15th.

2. The changes in the cabinet are not especially pleasing to the Cuban people, as the Cabinet remains practically the same in slightly different roles. It is believed that most of the changes were made for the purpose of removing Dr. Averhof from his embarrassing position as Secretary of Public Education, but at the same time the President wished to hold him in his cabinet. His appointment as Secretary of Justice is considered a very good one, as he is a man of considerable legal ability. but his presence in the cabinet will be regarded by the students as "a thorn in their side." Another reason advanced for the change was to place Dr. Carlos Miguel de Cespedes in such a position as would cause him embarrassment and force his resignation. Although he took the oath of office, he never actually assumed the office, and was granted a month's leave of absence with permission to leave Cuba. It is believed that his successor in office will be named in the near future. Until his successor is named, his duties are being performed by General Molinet, the Secretary of Agriculture.

3. Dr. Martinez Ortiz, the Secretary of State, has been named Minister to France, a position which he has sought for sometime. The appointment of Dr. Francisco Maria Fernandez, former Secretary of Sanitation and Charities, as the new Secretary of State is especially pleasing to the American Embassy, as he has shown his friendship for the Embassy on many occasions, and for the past few months has been the liason officer between the Government and the Embassy.

4. Considerable speculation has been offered for the reason of the ousting of Dr. Rafael Sanchez Abbali, Secretary of Communications, but it is generally believed that this was done as a result of a personal quarrel between him and the Governor of Oriente Province as to who should be the Liberal leader in that Province, the President siding with the latter.

J. J. O'HARE,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy, Press and
Personal Observation.

From M.A. Havana No. 3425 Date: December 12,1930

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

6-1 2657-G-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes

Students and Teachers
Strike Continues

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 11 1935

1. The strike of students and teachers continues. However, notwithstanding press reports which state that all the teachers and students in all of the public schools throughout the Island are on strike, we know definitely that a number of the rural public schools are not on strike.

2. The threatened strike of Government employees of the Departments of Labor and Communications has not materialized, and although the CNOC (Cuban National Confederation of Labor), headed by communists, is desperately striving to force out employees of the transportation companies operating in Havana, and the taxi drivers, they have accomplished almost nothing up to the present time.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4906 March 5, 1935.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: STRIKES.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAR 12 1935.

Strike Situation and
Disorderly Incidents.

1. Several incidents on March 6th combine to intensify the seriousness of the Cuban situation.

2. A group of assassins armed with sub-machine guns, attempted to take the life of Ramon Vasconcelos, President of the Liberal Party of Cuba, the party which formerly had as its leader ex-President Machado.. The attack occurred shortly after Vasconcelos with his bodyguard had left his home and entered his automobile. As the car drew away, it was approached by the attackers' car and several shots from sub-machine guns and pistols were fired. Vasconcelos and his chauffeur escaped with one wound each, but the bodyguard was mortally wounded in the attack.

3. Shortly after noon yesterday, the Customs officials' strike was initiated, and almost simultaneously powerful bombs placed in the Customs offices on the water front wounded seven persons, including Captain Oscar Hernandez, Chief of the Port Police. An hour later, two persons were wounded when a bomb exploded in the National Treasury building on Obispo Street. Shortly after the Customs officials walked out, employees of the Treasury, Labor and Education Departments also struck, and it was rumored that other government departments would join in the strike later on, in sympathy with the strike of the teachers and students, which has lasted now for sixteen days.

4. The striking teachers have issued a manifesto, serving notice on the Government that they will not return to work until certain demands are met. These demands now include:

1. That the national issues involved in the school strike be granted.

2. That all government departments be purged of "Machadista" elements.

3. That all employees be guaranteed their jobs.

4. That minimum salaries of $50.00 per month be fixed.

5. That back salaries owed by Machado be paid.

5. Serious trouble threatened in the vicinity of Havana University last night when students and teachers sought refuge there and declared themselves in a "state of siege," but later they left the grounds unmolested by police who had been sent there to prevent disorder. Police were also sent to reinforce the Port Police along the water front. No crisis occurred in the harbor as no ships arrived yesterday.

6. Havana University was taken over early this morning by forces of the Cuban Army, and the members of the University Council were escorted from the grounds. No resistance on the part of the persons in the University was met by the Army. This is the first time that the forces of law and order have actually entered the University since President Mendieta took office in January, 1934. The reason for this

From A.M.A.,Havana No. 4908 March 7, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

action was the knowledge that in the University had been stored a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. I was informed that almost 1500 Krag and Springfield rifles; 40 sub-machine guns and two .30 cal. machine guns with plenty of ammunition had been collected at the University.

7. As a result of these incidents, Colonel Batista issued a statement that he had given orders to his military supervisors in all the provinces to appoint "permanent" customs chiefs, in the event that vacancies are created in the tentative Customs strike.

8. At the conclusion of the Cabinet session at 3 A.M. this morning, the Government dictated an ultimatum to striking teachers, giving them until Monday, March 11th, to return to their classes, on the threat of losing their jobs permanently. It was also announced that public employees who fail to appear for work would be automatically discharged. It was also officially stated that the Havana University had been seized because it had become a center of insurrection and that war materials were stored there.

L. V. H. Durfee.
L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

LVHD:vm

(In the absence of the Military Attache)

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4908 March 7, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

265-g-330 / 334
RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 12 1935

Progress of Strike

1. Supplementing report No. 4908, index as above, dated March 7, 1935, the strike in protest against the Mendieta Government appears at the present writing to be gaining headway. Several Departments of the Government have ceased functioning, namely, Justice, Education, Labor, Agriculture and Commerce.

2. Payment of prizes won in the National Lottery of Wednesday, March 6th, was made up until noon yesterday, at which time payments were suspended due to the lack of personnel in the Lottery offices to make said payments. Ships entering the harbor discharged passengers, who had no trouble passing through the Customs, as the Customs work was done by members of the Port Police assisted by the Navy. However, there was practically no movement of merchandise from the docks. Outgoing ships were dispatched with their cargo by the Port Police and the Navy. The docks continue to be well guarded against possible efforts at sabotage. Customs collections yesterday dropped to zero, a new all time low for Havana.

3. At about midnight last night, street car operators having agreed with bus drivers to walk out, refused to take their street cars on the usual run; later in the morning, before daybreak, service was again continued since the street car operators claimed that the bus drivers had not lived up to their promises. At the present time, street cars and busses are functioning normally.

4. After a meeting of the Cabinet, which ended at about 2 o'clock this morning, a bulletin was published declaring the strike movement to be decidedly "Leftist" in character and guided by enemies of Republican government and the social system, and urged citizens not participating in the movement to remain alert regarding their own interests and to call upon the Government for aid when such was required to check any plans for disturbance. The bulletin also contained a statement that the Government was disposed to begin the reorganization in the various Departments by designating a new permanent personnel which would definitely substitute that which had, without justification, left its post.

5. Havana University is still occupied by the military forces, who, after their search yesterday which revealed the presence of quantities of arms and ammunition, are today making a more intensive search in order to be sure that they have found all the weapons which may be stored there.

6. A small number of bombs exploded last night, but the destructive effect was practically nil. Two unexploded bombs were found just outside the entrance to the offices of the Secretary of Education as the employees were leaving their work, which led to considerable commotion when it was recalled that several bombs had exploded the day before when the Customs officials left their work. Many employees of the Department of Justice

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

state that they do not want to strike but are coerced by a few, under threats of personal injury if they fail to walk out. The same is probably true of the majority of organizations now on strike.

L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press.

LVHD:vm

(In the absence of the Military Attache)

From A.M.A., Havana No. 4909 March 8, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1953, from TAGO to Archivist
By [illegible] Date 6-4-29

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~Confidential~~ The Military Attache
Havana, Cuba.

G-2 Report

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2657-S-330
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CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

2657-S-330/335

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 18 1935

Resume of Situation

1. Supplementing report No. 4909, index as above, dated March 8, 1935, the strike situation in Havana became actually severe over the week-end; all newspapers, with the exception of Diario de la Marina, suspending publication rather than submit to strict military censorship. The Diario de la Marina, pursuing its very conservative policy, appeared on Saturday and Sunday and has been published this morning (there being no Monday edition). However, distribution has been very difficult due to the fact that the usual distributors have been menaced and in some cases actually attacked, in the effort to keep the papers off of the streets.

2. Lieut.Colonel Pedraza, Chief of Police of Havana, on Saturday was named Military Governor of Havana. His appointment and the placing of Havana under Military Law removes the administration of justice from the Courts and places it in the hands of the military. At the same time, a General Order was issued by the Commander of the Army, calling into active service the Military Reserve, as defined in Decree-Law No. 671. (See report No.4815, I.G.No. 6010, dated November 25, 1934). The reason for this Order apparently was to provide all civilians who are receiving pay from the military budget with weapons with which to defend themselves in case an attempt is made to force them to go on strike. To date, the Department of National Defense is functioning practically normally.

3. On Monday morning it had become apparent that the Government, either through orders of the President or through the initiative of Colonel Batista, had finally assumed a firm stand with regard to the strike situation. On Saturday and Sunday nights several persons known to be leaders in the strike movement, or general agitators, were found killed. The exact number cannot be ascertained, but it is known that the Army and the police force are pursuing the leaders of the "syndicatos", and, if found, these leaders are severely dealt with. It is known that the chief aide of Antonio Guiterras was killed yesterday afternoon and also that a man by the name of Feto, who was a known agitator, has also been killed. It is very probable that radio announcements in the United States greatly exaggerate the number of casualties. A conservative estimate would be that approximately ten to thirteen agitators have disappeared or been killed. It is known that political leaders, such as Jorge Manach of the A.B.C., and those of the other parties opposed to the Government, have admitted that they were the instigators of the strike, but that by Sunday, March 10th, it had gotten beyond their control and was now in the hands of the communists. They also admitted that they were frightened and, at the present time, they are in hiding in the effort to avoid being found by the Army or the police force.

4. Last night a bomb exploded right near the house in which I reside, and seconds later, a considerable fusillade of shots was heard. It is not known whether the person who loosed the bomb was captured or killed, of if he escaped, but this morning's Diario de la Marina published in headlines a notice that the death penalty will be imposed upon any person caught in the act of setting off bombs or "petarditos". (These latter are very small bombs which do very little damage, but make a terrific noise).

From M.A., Havana No. 4912 March 12, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. Yesterday afternoon, while standing in front of the American Club on the Prado, I noticed an Army Sergeant who was walking down the center of the Prado. Every now and then he would stop an individual, searching him for weapons, and then without any noticeable provocation, would draw his revolver and use it as a club on the person whom he had just searched. It is very probable that the Sergeant recognized these individuals as agitators or disturbers of the peace. In any event, his action had the effect of scattering those people who were lounging on the benches placed along the Prado. This incident proves that orders have been issued for the Army to take a firm stand in the maintenance of order, although it also has the effect of making the Army more thoroughly hated than it was before.

6. While the Customs officials are still on strike, the dock workers are not, so ships are unloaded and loaded as usual, although, of course, no merchandise is being cleared from the docks in the City of Havana. Efforts are being made to hire persons for positions in the Customs offices, but the type of individual who applies is very low and it is doubtful that anyone hired at the present time will be retained permanently in spite of the Government's statement that all persons hired during the present time will be permanent.

7. Buses and street cars are being run, in some cases with Army personnel and in all cases with Army guards. On orders from the Military Governor of Havana, the police and Army are taking buses from garages with or without the owners' consent, and are putting them on the streets, since they have stated that this is a public utility and that service must be continued. In several instances, the owners of the buses who are not in sympathy with the strike, are operating them themselves. Some drivers of rent cars are refusing to take their cars on the street, but the majority are operatin as usual.

L. V. H. Durfee.
L. V. H. Durfee,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Source: Press, personal observation
and contacts.

LVHD:vm

1st. Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, Havana, Cuba, March 12, 1935: To the Chief, Military Intelligence Division.

1. Approved.

T. N. Gimperling
T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

From M.A., Havana No. 4912 March 12, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service
Journals

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 19 1935

Measures Taken to Preserve Peace.

1. Cuba's new Constitution, approved on February 3, 1934, soon after the provisional government of President Mendieta was established in Cuba, was suspended throughout the Island on March 8, 1935.

2. The Decree-Law which authorizes the suspension states that the Constitution of Cuba will be suspended throughout national territory while there exist the present conditions of strikes and seditious and revolutionary propaganda intended to disturb order and destroy peace with the object of overthrowing the present government. This suspension, however, does not indicate reestablishment of previous Constitutional measures.

3. Suspension of the Constitution shall be in effect until a new ruling is promulgated by the Executive Power and the Council of State jointly. The Executive Power, that is the President of Cuba and his Cabinet, is authorized, meanwhile, to dictate and direct whatever measures are deemed opportune for preserving public order, maintaining peace and assuring and guaranteeing the life and property of citizens. Supreme Government powers are invested in the President, the Cabinet, President of the Council of State, the Municipal Mayor of Havana, the Secretary of the Administration and the Secretaries without portfolio. The Executive Power is authorized to abrogate laws and decree-laws which have been previously promulgated; also to approve and place in vigor measures and laws deemed opportune, and to modify the penal code and processes of law, with the object of reestablishing normal life in Cuba in the briefest possible period. The Council of State will continue its study and preparation of electoral laws, as well as others considered pertinent. The President alone or together with his Cabinet, will dictate measures for the conservation of public order. The Government will respect and comply with agreements of international character, contracted legitimately by previous governments, as well as treaties now in effect.

4. The above measures will rule as long as abnormal conditions continue. However, all legal procedures, as well as special laws promulgated to date, are in effect, if they do not conflict with measures contained in this resolution and others which may be promulgated as a sequance to it.

5. A law signed by President Mendieta on March 11th, declares Cuba in a state of war and provides that all those guilty of alterations of public order will be court-martialed.

6. The Cabinet approved also on March 11th a law regulating court martial for civilians who are found guilty of the following crimes and offenses:

(a) Acts with explosives or inflammable materials, or possession of these substances without authorization. Punishment to be death.

From M.A., Havana No. 4917 March 14, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

(b) Firing at authorities, their agents or Government employees if injuries result. Punishment to be death.

(c) Firing in the air to cause alarm. Punishment from two to five years imprisonment.

(d) Acts of sabotage the object of which is to cause lack of food, water or light. Punishment death.

(e) Progressive and combined strikes of employees of the Government, Province or Municipality, and acts of sabotage to maintain the existing strike. Punishment from two to five years imprisonment.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4917 March 14, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 19 1935

Military Order No. 2

1. A translation of Military Order No.2, dated March 11, 1935, issued in order to meet the present Government crisis, is as follows:

1. Beginning March 12th and until the Order is revoked, passing through the streets of Havana and all towns of Havana Province is prohibited after 9:00 P.M., at which hour transit of vehicles and pedestrians will stop automatically.

2. Transit is authorized from 5:00 A.M. until 9:00 P.M. Nevertheless, suspicious appearing vehicles will be halted and searched by the armed forces, who will use fire arms if necessary when the signal to stop is not obeyed.

3. Exempted from provisions of preceding paragraphs are trucks engaged in delivery of milk, ice and bread; also electric light company laborers, public works and sanitation departments, clinics, hospitals and similar establishments. All of these must secure proper authorization from either police or Rural Guard authorities. Those who because of sudden illness require medicine or doctors, may, accompanied by a member of the armed forces, secure written authorization at a Police Station.

4. Omnibuses and other vehicles leaving Havana must procure authorization from the Police Station in the district from which they depart. They must procure authorization also when entering Havana Province. Consequently, Police Stations and Rural Guard quarters throughout the Province are authorized to issue permits.

5. Vehicles seized by authorities in the City of Havana as a result of infringement of these provisions, will be sent to the Ambulance Department of the National Police, at the disposal of the Chief of Police. If the vehicles are seized in towns throughout the Province, they will be sent to the corresponding Army Posts or Police Stations, at the disposal of the Chief of the National Police.

6. Drivers of vehicles must have with them always licenses and other documents exacted by the Municipal Ordinances.

7. Beginning March 12th, all public amusements in Havana proper and towns throughout the Province will suspend automatically at 9:00 P.M. Owners or operators of amusements will be held responsible for any infractions of this regulation.

8. Public establishments, such as hotels, restaurants, cafes, bars, etc. will be open during the hours specified in Municipal Laws and Ordinances, but not before 5:00 A.M. nor later than 9:00 P.M. Owners or operators will be held responsible for any infractions of this provision.

9. Private or public meetings or gatherings of any kind are prohibited, unless authorized by the Military Chief of Havana Province. Infractors of this provision will be arrested and taken to Principe Prison at the disposal of the Chief of Police.

10. Groups of more than three persons are not permitted to walk in Havana streets or in towns throughout the Province. Groups of two or more standing in the streets will not be permitted.

From M.A., Havana No. 4918 March 14, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

11. Due to existing conditions of public agitation, the Government will not guarantee lives of pedestrians who violate the above regulations.

12. Infractors of any of the above provisions will be sent to Principe Prison (if male) or to the Guanabacoa jail (if female) at the disposal of the Chief of Police.

13. Military Order No. 1, of March 10, 1935, is annulled.

2. The provisions contained in Decree-Law No. 3 of February 6, 1934 (regulating strikes), and Decree-Law 292, of June 15, 1934 (New Law of Public Order) will be under jurisdiction of the Military authorities. In regard to Article 1 of Decree No. 1, dated March 8, 1935, authorities and employees of the Government, province or municipality are reminded of the authority granted them by said Article 1, which reads:

"Officers or employees of the Government, province or municipality, who are attacked in any form whatsoever as a result of fulfillment of their duties, may repel assaults upon themselves or their rights, and will be exempted from any responsibility, regardless of whatever injury was caused to their assailants."

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4918 March 14, 1935

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MAR 24 1935
WAR DEPT. MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Strikes.

Settlement of Strike, Etc. RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 19 1935

1. An agreement has just been reached between the Government and the striking school teachers which will reopen the schools within a day or so. President Mendieta has promised to pay the striking teachers their salaries for the entire month of February, although during a large part of the month, most of the teachers have been on strike, but not all of them, as many of the rural schools have continued to function without interruption.

2. The Government has arrested and imprisoned hundreds of alleged communists, strike leaders, agitators and some members of the A.B.C. Society, as well as a large number of the striking Government employees. It is expected that most of these will be released very soon after investigation by Military Tribunals. However, it is understood that at least twelve strike leaders and agitators will be tried by Military Tribunal in Havana, charged with offenses listed in Military Order No. 2 (see report No. 4918, I.G. 2700, dated March 14, 1935), which offenses call for the death sentence in case guilt is established by the Tribunal.

3. On the afternoon of March 14th, the Military Governor of Havana changed the curfew hour from 9:00 P.M. to midnight, when all civilians must be off the streets and all stores closed. This enabled the moving picture theatres to give performances last evening, which, however, were attended by but very few people.

4. The Government has very definitely and satisfactorily solved the present critical situation by the use of forceful measures on the part of the military authorities. There is naturally some criticism heard on the streets to the effect that the Army has been unnecessarily harsh during the past few days; however, under the circumstances, these criticisms are considered to be unfair, and the better element of Cubans, as well as foreigners, are strongly in accord with the measures that have been adopted.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 1920 March 15, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 26 1935

Aftermath of Strike Movement.

1. On March 15th, the military authorities again searched the grounds and buildings of Havana University and found a large quantity of dynamite and approximately 100 rifles, 60 revolvers, a large amount of ammunition and 30 uniforms for Army officers and enlisted men.

2. It is understood that a number of additional arrests have been ordered. Arrest warrants include one for Joaquin Martinez Saenz, President of the A.B.C. Society, who is now said to be in Miami, Florida. It is also understood that several refugees left on yesterday afternoon's Pan-American plane for Miami, among whom were Lincoln Rondon, ex-Chief Inspector of Prisons; Pablo Torriente Bru of the newspaper AHORA, and others whose names have not been obtained by this office. Some of these refugees had been in hiding in foreign Legations in Havana for the past several days.

3. It is reliably reported that there were nine persons killed in Havana during the recent revolutionary activities; of this number one was an enlisted man of the Army, one of the Navy and one Havana policeman, who were killed by snipers and in the execution of their duties in maintaining public order. The other six persons were civilian labor agitators and communist leaders. It is also reliably reported that there are more than 800 prisoners being held by the military authorities awaiting investigation in connection with the recent general strike movement.

4. During the last 24 hours, the Army and Navy personnel have been recalled to their proper barracks and stations, from guard and patrol duty in the City of Havana. The Havana police are again in charge of the task of maintaining public order in the City.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No.4922 March 16, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 26 1935

General Situation at Present

1. From a standpoint of public order and safety, as well as from a standpoint of labor and business activities, Cuba is practically normal at the present time. With the failure of the communists, Autenticos and A.B.C.Society to paralyze the Island by a general strike, coupled with the firm hand shown by the Government in meeting the crisis, the tenseness which was evident everywhere has materially lessened.

2. It can be conservatively stated that a majority and probably a large majority of Cubans were opposed to a change of Government, and the forceful action on the part of President Mendieta and Colonel Batista has strengthened the Government and the Army very materially. The only criticism heard is that not enough communist agitators were killed or imprisoned. It is understood that approximately 200 of the more than 800 men and women recently imprisoned for acts of terrorism and in connection with the strike, have been released. Three Military Tribunals , or Courts-Martial, are functioning day and night at Camp Columbia in connection with the more serious cases. Similar Military Tribunals are disposing of similar cases at the regimental headquarters in the several provinces. In addition to a number of communists, Autenticos and Government strikers imprisoned, quite a number of A.B.C. members have also been imprisoned, although a number of the more prominent members managed to leave Cuba by boat and airplanes, under assumed names, before the Government started its active search for them.

3. As stated above, the tenseness of the situation has lessened, but subversive activities have not ceased. 250 pounds of dynamite were found yesterday by soldiers on the outskirts of Country Club Park, and it was reported that the seizure followed a tip given by one of the terrorists recently arrested. Military officials also announced the discovery of a "bomb factory" in the laboratory of one of the large hospitals, situated on the University grounds, and fifteen rifles were seized at the same time in one of the University buildings. The seizures mentioned came as a result of a new series of bomb explosions which caused eleven casualties. Five motormen were also injured yesterday morning when a bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Havana Electric Company.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Obversation

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4925 March 19, 1935.

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G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety

Events in Wake of Strike Movement

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 28 1935

1. It is understood that the Government is considering the promulgation of a general amnesty which would release several hundred political prisoners and strikers who were connected with the recently attempted general strike.

2. I have just been informed that the A.B.C. Society is seriously considering dropping Martinez Sanez and other pronounced anti-Goverbment leaders, with a view to the establishment of a new program which will be in accord with and in support of the present Provisional Government.

3. The situation in Havana is very quiet at the present time, with very few acts of terrorism reported. The curfew which was put into effect on March 12th, requiring everyone to be in their homes by 9 P.M., was extended a few days later to midnight, and on March 20th, the curfew hour was again extended to 2 A.M. At present, as the order reads, everyone must be off the streets between 2 A.M. and 5 A.M.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4928 March 22, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 8 1935

Commutation of First Death Sentence

1. The first case in which a Cuban court has pronounced the death sentence was given in the case of Manuel Fonseca Bellido de Luna. This case has received an enormous amount of publicity in the Cuban press. Fonseca is a terrorist who was arrested during the general labor disturbances in early March. His trial was one of a number of trials for alleged terrorism before one of the Military Tribunals at the 5th Military District, and took place at the present headquarters of the regiment and district, the former police station on 23rd. Street near the Almendares River.

2. It was proved that Fonseca had in his possession several suitcases filled with terrorist munitions, including some 50 dynamite bombs. His record seems to have been well-known by the police, and it is understood that two deaths were caused as a result of the explosion of a bomb for which Fonseca was responsible. The Military Tribunal tried the case under the jurisdiction of Lieut.Colonel Garcia Pedroso, Military Commander of the 5th Military District, and sentenced Fonseca to be shot by a firing squad at 7:00 A.M. on March 30th. The only official in Cuba who had the power of commuting the sentence was Lieut.Colonel Pedroso. Five minutes before the execution was to have occurred, the acting Chief of the 5th District received a paper signed by Pedroso, commuting the sentence to life imprisonment. Life imprisonment, under the Cuban law, amounts to thirty years. The prisoner was then sent to the Model Prison, Isle of Pines, to serve his sentence.

3. Undoubtedly a great deal of pressure had been brought to bear upon Lieut.Colonel Garcia Pedroso to commute the sentence. It is said that a number of officials, some holding high rank in the present Cuban Government, were directly involved in terrorist activities (bomb making and throwing) against the government of Machado and, in some cases, against the government of Grau San Martin.

4. The sentiment among the American business men and probably to a large extent among the more conservative Cubans, is that the Government displayed weakness in commuting the sentence. The local press states that the death sentence has not been carried out in Cuba since the foundation of the Republic.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4940 April 2, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Penalties For Terrorist Activities.

2657-9-330/343
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 13 1935

1. Reference report No.4940, index as above, dated April 2, 1935, the President and Cabinet approved, on March 29th, a law which effects certain modifications in court martial procedure, and which establishes penalties for specific crimes.

2. The Courts Martial will henceforth have jurisdiction over the following cases:

(a) Terrorists using explosives or inflammables; (death penalty).

(b) Terrorists convicted for manufacturing, transporting, selling or distributing bombs and explosives; (life imprisonment).

3. With respect to attacks on Government officials and public employees, involving the use of fire-arms or other weapons and constituting attempts to bring on strikes, agitation, or public disorders, the following penalties will be imposed:

(a) If anyone is killed, the death penalty.

(b) When wounds or injury are caused, imprisonment up to life imprisonment.

(c) Acts of sabotage involving or endangering the public food or water supplies, or public lighting system, punishable by death.

(d) Various terms of imprisonment, depending upon the offense, will be imposed on public employees for strike agitation, sabotage against public offices, strike propaganda, et cetera.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy files

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4943 April 8, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Execution of Terrorist

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 18 1935

1. On the morning of April 11, 1935, Jose Angulo Terry, Cuban terrorist, 26 years of age, was executed by a firing squad on the Army rifle range just outside Moncada Barracks, Santiago de Cuba.

2. Terry was condemned to death by Military Court-Martial on charges of recently placing a bomb, which exploded in the Custom offices at Puerto Padre, Oriente Province. Lieut.Colonel Diego Rodriguez, commanding the 1st. Regiment, Cuban Army, who alone had power of commuting the sentence, took no action to prevent the execution.

3. This is the first legal execution in Cuba since the first American occupancy. Colonel Batista, when asked to comment upon the execution, said: "Terry's case is regrettable, but it is the Cuban Army's answer to radical terrorism." It is understood that he hinted that there are other cases awaiting trial which may, if found guilty, receive the death sentence.

4. The public reaction to this execution, so far as is known, is highly favorable.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 4950 April 12, 1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD RESERVE AREA
UNITED STATES ARMY
444 FEDERAL BUILDING

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
April 9, 1935.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
Washington,
D. C.

Dear Sir:

I take the liberty of forwarding to you confidentially and direct a very frank opinion on the Cuban situation which I have just received from E. F. Lores, the last chief of staff of the Cuban Army, whom I have known for many years.

Very sincerely,

A. J. Dougherty

A. J. DOUGHERTY
Colonel of Infantry.

1 Incl:
Let. Cuban Situation.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

N. Orleans, La., Abril 2/935

Confidential

Para Dougherty.

2657-S-330
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Mi nueva predicción.

El problema de Cuba es insoluble. Sólo una intervención podía resolverlo. Esta vendrá tarde o temprano, sino con este gobierno del Nuevo Deal con otro que tenga otro Nuevo deal, o un Viejo deal.

Ahora lo que ocurrirá en Cuba es lo siguiente:

Un interregno de paz hasta llegar a las elecciones y hasta poco después, si el gobierno no gusta el dedo del gatillo (trigger) y se

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By AMF NA Date 05/04/89

mantiene firme, enérgico y
sereno. Si no entra en pour-
parlers y besuguee con
los revoltosos a lo que es
muy dado Mendieta.

Gracias a Batista, al desfe del
Ejército, vencieron la huelga
revolucionaria. Ahora el go-
bierno tiene que dejarlo actuar
y apoyarse en una fuerza política,
que tiene que ser el Partido
Liberal del que fué fundador
Mendieta.

— Después de las elecciones
surgirán rivalidades entre
el Ejército, la Policía y la
Marina. Primero entre la
Policía y el Ejército, luego entre
aquella y la marina unidas
contra el Ejército. Entonces vendrá
el choque armado.

La Policía hoy cuenta
con más de 3000 hombres con

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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elementos de guerra poderosos: fusiles, ametralladoras, cañones y automóviles blindados, cartuchos, gases etc. etc. La Marina, su probable asociada, cuenta con todo ésto y además cañoneros y 2000. hombres.

La rivalidad entre la Policía, la marina y el Ejército no tardará en manifestarse. El vencedor en la Habana, será el vencedor en toda, porque las fuerzas del Campo se sumarán al vencedor, que es lo que ha ocurrido siempre. En la actualidad no hay rivalidad porque tienen el enemigo común: la oposición soltosa y seguirá encubierta tegiendo y destegiendo hasta que llegue Ulises, la intervención, y arroje de la casa a los que la perturban, y restablezca el

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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Orden al rescatar la autoridad
En Cuba no habrá más
nunca paz moral y material
hasta que resulte lo que
arriba digo.-

El problema mas difícil a
resolver hoy, y en lo futuro,
es lo referente a la subordina-
ción del Ejército al poder civil. Sobre lo
do después de las elecciones,
dado que actualmente el que
está dando muestras de energía
es Batista y, por tanto, debe
Continuar con cierta inde-
pendencia del poder Central
en todo aquello que se relacione
Con el orden público.

Pudiera evitar la intervención de este país el advenimiento al poder de un verdadero dictador, que actúe con talento serenidad y constancia, pero con mano firme y recia. Lo cual no creo factible.

Un abrazo Lores

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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Confidential

B-8753

New Orleans, La.,

April 2, 1935.

For Dougherty,

My New Prediction

The problem of Cuba is still unsolved and it cannot be solved without intervention. This will come sooner or later; if the present New Deal Government does not intervene, then another New Deal ----or Old Deal----- will have to do so.

Now, what will happen in Cuba is this:

There will be an interim of peace until the elections and for a short time thereafter, if the Government will keep its finger on the trigger and maintain a calm, firm and energetic attitude. Otherwise it will fraternize with the revolutionaries, something which Mendieta is inclined to do.

Thanks to Batista, the Chief of the Army, they broke the revolutionary strike. Now the Government must let him act and depend for support upon a political force and this political force will be the Liberal Party founded by Mendieta Himself

After the elections rivalries will spring up between the Army, the Police and the Navy. First, between the Police and the Army, then between the Police and the and the Navy united against the Army.

Then there will be an armed clash.

The Police now numbers more than 3000 men and is well supplied with war material: rifles, machine guns, trucks, armored cars, ammunition, gases, etc. The Navy, its possible associate, has all this and, in addition, cannon and 2000 men.

The rivalry between the Police, the Navy and the Army will not be long in declaring itself. The one that conquers in Habana will be the victor throughout the Island, because the provincial forces will join hands with the victor just as

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

they have always done. At the present time there is no rivalry because all have a common enemy: the revolutionary opposition.

And Penelope will continue to weave and unravel what she has woven until Ulysses(intervention) arrives and expels the disturbers from the house, resumes authority and reestablishes order.

Cuba will never have any moral or material peace until what I have said above takes place.

The most difficult problem at the present time(and will continue to be so in the future) is the subordination of the army to the civil authority. This is especially true after elections. At the present time it is Batista that is acting energetically and he should continue, independent to a certain degree of the central authority, to act in this way in everything pertaining to the public order.

Intervention could be avoided by the advent of a real dictator, one with talent, serenity, firmness and constance, but I do not think this would be feasible

Yours truly,

Lores

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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G-2/2657-Q-330

CONFIDENTIAL

April 17, 1935.

Colonel A. J. Dougherty,
Hqrs. Third Reserve Area,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Dear Colonel Dougherty:

Thank you very much for your letter of April 9, 1935, to the Chief of Staff, enclosing General Lores' letter to you on the Cuban situation.

The ex-officers of the Cuban Army form an intelligent group of observers of events transpiring in Cuba, and General Lores, as former Chief of Staff, is especially competent to appreciate the difficulties with which the present Government is faced. Evaluated in the light of reports received from various sources, this letter helps to form a well-rounded view of the situation.

Sincerely yours,

Mailed G/2 W.D. APR 18 1935

H. E. KNIGHT,
Brigadier General, General Staff.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For ~~Official Use Only.~~

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MAY WAR DEPARTMENT MIL. INTEL. DIV.

G-2 Report 2700

7

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Military Court Sentences
Terrorist to Life-Imprisonment.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 11 1935

1. The Military Court of the 1st.Regiment, located at Moncada Barracks, Santiago de Cuba, tried and sentenced to life-imprisonment the Cuban terrorist, Eduardo Galvez. The Court, in announcing its verdict, stated that Galvez was guilty of conspiracy, but that he was not the direct author of the bombing in Puerto Padre some weeks ago, for which Jaime Greinstein was convicted and executed on April 11th at Moncada Barracks by a firing squad. (Reported in No. 4950, index as above, dated April 12, 1935).

2657-g-330/345

2. Although Greinstein was tried and executed under the alias, Jose Angulo Terry, presumably a Cuban, it was later determined that his name was not Terry but Greinstein, and that he was not a Cuban but a Polish Jew.

3. It may be stated that the Cuban military authorities have informed this office on several occasions during the past year and a half that the percentage of Polish Jews is higher than that of any other nationality among the communist agitators in Cuba, with the percentage of Spanish communist agitators second in numbers and activity.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

TNG:vm

g 114

From M.A., Havana Report No. 4969 Date: May 6, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

For Official

JUL 12 1935
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible]
Date 6-24-69

New York Radicals Refused
Entrance into Cuba.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 11 1935

1. Seventeen radicals arrived from New York on the evening of July 2nd., on the Ward Line steamship "Oriente". The Cuban port police, however, refused to grant them permission to land and they were taken from the boat to Tiscornia Detention Camp, in which are isolated professional beggars and undesirable aliens.

2. Clifford Odets, a young radical playwright, appeared to be the leader of the delegation, which designates itself as "The Commission to Investigate Social and Economic Conditions in Cuba." President Mendieta referred to it as "The Commission to Agitate Social and Economic Conditions in Cuba."

3. The American Embassy will probably be blamed as being the cause for their not being able to land in Cuba; however, the Embassy had nothing whatsoever to do with it. In fact, the U.S.Consul General interceded for two of the women members of the delegation who had steamship tickets for Mexico from New York, and they were permitted to continue their voyage to Vera Cruz. The other fifteen were sent back to the United States on the Ward Line ship "Oriente" on the evening of July 3rd. These fifteen American radicals, most of whom are supposed to be writers, upon leaving Cuba made the statement - "we'll be back 100 strong within two weeks." This statement was probably braggadocio.

4. Cuba, under the present government, has no patience with or tolerance for social agitators. There appears to be no reason why the Cuban Government should tolerate the visit of foreign radical agitators who have come to Cuba without invitation and whose visit herewas certainly for the purpose of meddling in the internal affairs of a foreign country, even if they refrained from attempting to stir up trouble with the laboring classes.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5005 Date: July 5, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential.~~ The Military Attache.
Havana, Cuba.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date 6-24-69

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Important Activities of Political Agitators and Organizations Affecting the Stability of the Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 29 1935
2657-g-330/345

1. Reference report No. 4950, index 2700, dated April 18, 1935, the investigation and trial of participants in the kidnapping of Sr. Falla Bonet confirms the opinion expressed by the officials and included in the above report, that the ransom money was to be placed in the "Young Cuba" party's war chest, under the direction of the late Antonio Guiteras, leader of that party.. It is understood that the major portion of the ransom money is now in the possession of four Cubans who are believed to be in Mexico, to wit: Fernandez de Velasco, Reinaldo Jordan, Pedro Pablo Torrado and Evaristo Ulloa. It is understood that most of this money has already been spent and that no part of it will be expended in the purchase and shipment of munitions for revolutionary purposes.

2. Since the kidnapping of Falla Bonet, a number of extortionist letters have been received by wealthy Cubans, Spaniards and two Americans, demanding sums ranging from $40,000 to $5000. In the case of the two Americans, one was directed, by an anonymous letter, to turn over $40,000, in a package, to his chauffeur who would follow a prescribed route, starting at a given point and time and travelling at a specified rate of speed. This American informed me ,and as he was ill, I took his son to Camp Columbia and turned the case over to the Chief of Criminal Investigations of the Cuban Army, who is handling the case. A plan was arranged to trap the extortionists, but they did not show up along the route.

3. I reported the matter to the Ambassador, requesting secrecy, and he approved my action. Colonel Batista is particularly interested in this case.

4. The other American mentioned resides in Santiago de Cuba, and extortionists have demanded from him $25,000. He does not propose to pay it and in any case he could not raise $25,000, as his available assets are probably not more than a small fraction of that sum.

5. Most of the letters received state emphatically that the writers are not ordinary criminals, but that the money is to be used to further a forthcoming revolution. In several instances, members of the gang, or gangs, have been apprehended and, according to the authorities, these men are all followers of the late Antonio Guiteras. While it is most probable that the "Guiteristas" intended to and in several instances did obtain funds by kidnapping, extortion and the robbing of banks and the Municipal Treasury for the purpose of financing a new revolution, nevertheless, it is believed that most of the money which has been received from these acts of robbery and terrorism has not gone into the war chest, but has been dissipated by the terrorists themselves and by their friends in Mexico, Havana and the United States.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source:Personal Observation
Embassy and Press.

TNG:vm
From M.A.,Havana No. 5009 Date: July 18,1935.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
WAR DEPARTMENT 351
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Disruption of Liberal Party Meeting by Gangsters.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 29 1935

1. During a well-attended open-air meeting of the Liberal Political Party in the City of Santa Clara on the evening of July 18th, a number of shots were fired into the crowd by terrorists, who escaped towards Havana by automobile.

2. Although no one was killed, there were a number wounded by the shots and others injured in the ensuing panic. Several women and one man are said to be in a very serious condition.

T. N. Gimperling,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5011 Date:July 19, 1935.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety

Havana University turned over to a Commission

MID 6/2 W. S. AUG 10 1935

1. Havana University,which was closed last Spring,and which has been occupied by the Army from March 11 to July 2,has been turned over to a Commission of professors and alumni by the Cabinet,and it is expected that it will be opened in September.

2. A recent Decree-Law,published in the Diario de La Marina,but not as yet published in the Official Gazette,provides for the transfer of the University to such a commission as named above,and names the members thereof. Article I names the members and provides that they shall elect a president from among themselves. Article III grants the Commission all of the powers and attributes conferred on the principal and special governing boards of the University,including the power to amend and revoke its resolutions and to adopt all administrative and jurisdictional measures which it may deem necessary. Article IV provides that the commission as the constituent body of the University shall draft new statutes therefor which,after approval by two-thirds of the commission,shall be submitted to the government in the form of a decree-law for promulgation. The commission is authorized (Article V) to revise the list of professors,to dismiss them,and to provide for competetive examinations for the filling of vacancies;professors who are members of the faculty by virtue of competetive examinations are exempt from the provisions of this article.

3. The University is to enjoy complete academic,educational, and administrative autonomy (Article VI) and the President of the Commission (Article VII) will be the legal representative of the University which,as a corporation of public interest,is a legal entity,with all the rights and obligations and thereof. According to Article X the Government shall suspend any measures of the Commission which violate the Constitution,treaties,or laws of the Republic.

4. The temporary articles provide that the Commission shall present within thirty days draft regulations for the effective application of the decree-law;that the Secretary of Education shall transfer the University to the commission;that when the Commission takes possession thereof,all powers and attributes of other University authorities and boards shall cease;and that all measures inconsistent with the new decree-law are repealed.

L.V.H.Durfee
Captain,Infantry
Acting Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Press.
LVHD

From: M.A.Havana Report No.5018 August 6,1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OCT 18 1935
GENERAL STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

Latin American Section.

October 4, 1935.

Your attention is invited to dispatch No. 850 from the American Charge' d'Affaires, a.i., Riga, dated August 30, 1935, subject: Communist Policies in Cuba. A copy of this dispatch was furnished the Embassy at Havana.

For the Chief of Division:

C. K. NULSEN,
Lieut. Col., General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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AMERICAN EMBASSY

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA, CUBA.

October 9, 1935.

No. 5054

Subject: Dispatch on Communist Policies in Cuba.

To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division,
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED 8/2 W. D. OCT 17 1935

1. Reference note on Evaluation of Reports dated October 1, 1935, which invites the attention of this office to dispatch No. 850 from the American Charge d'Affaires at Riga, dated August 30,1935, subject: Communist Policies in Cuba, this dispatch was, at the time of its receipt, read with much interest by both Captain Durfee and myself.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG:vm

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

DEC 10 1935
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 10 1935

Alleged Terrorists Arrested

1. Within the last week a number of alleged terrorists and communists have been arrested in various parts of Havana. Searches have disclosed communistic propaganda, military uniforms and munitions. Among those arrested was the terrorist, Carlos Duque Estrada, when he arrived in Havana by airplane from Mexico. Search of his luggage disclosed correspondence concerning the activities of anti-Government elements in Tampa, New York and Mexico, as well as plans to prevent the holding of elections on December 15th, and the coming sugar harvest.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Embassy records.

TNG: vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5099 Date: November 27,1935

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Executive.

Resignation of Mendieta
and Appointment of Barnet.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 18 1935

1. Provisional President Carlos Mendieta resigned early this morning and Dr. Jose Barnet, Secretary of State, has been sworn in as Acting President, until a new Provisional President may be designated by the joint action of the Council of State and the Cabinet.

2. Colonel Mendieta resigned in order to remove the criticism of General Menocal and his supporters that his occupancy of the Executive office would prevent harmonious elections. Several days ago, Menocal announced his withdrawal from participation in the elections unless Colonel Mendieta resigned.

3. In a brief statement to the Press, Colonel Mendieta said that he accepted the Presidency in January 1934, against his own wishes, but because he was urged to do so as a patriotic duty to his country. Now he resigns because he is requested to do so for the same reason. He found many difficult conditions which he earnestly strove to overcome and, in most cases, he succeeded. It is a fact that Colonel Mendieta did not want to take the Executive office. He believed that it would ruin his political future, and he looked with disfavor on the peculiar situation which gave the President very little, if any, control over the Army and Navy.

4. Colonel Carlos Mendieta is one of the few honest men in Cuban politics. He is perhaps somewhat stubborn, but he has had the courage to live up to his convictions. He is criticised by many for lacking astuteness and intelligence. Undoubtedly, he has been frequently deceived by some of his advisers, and he has approved many unwise measures at the suggestion of individuals close to him. However, in most such cases, he has very readily rectified the mistakes. Cuba has just lost the most honorable, dependable and courageous President it has ever had, with the exception of Estrada Palma. I have great respect and admiration, as well as a very warm personal regard for Colonel Mendieta.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation
and Press.

TNG:vm

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/15/74

From M.A., Havana Report No.5112 December 11, 1935.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Forwarded to
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2)
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WAR DEPARTMENT

B-8265
Spanish.

From EXITO diario de la mañana, Sept. 18, 1934. 357

THOSE SENTENCED TO DIE WERE TRIED BY COURT MARTIAL.

Interesting Aspects of the Court Martial Held Night Before Last.

We shall know today the verdict of the court of last appeal.

An accusation---A search---A capture.

It was learned that in grotto number 58 of West Street a man was manufacturing explosive bombs. A search made eight days ago confirmed the terrible suspicion; bombs, packages of dynamite, powder and explosives, correspondence, and Communist books were found. In the grotto, whose peaceful appearance was not in keeping with this warlike material, the police captured Marcelino Ortega Fajardo, a rather tall man, of copper complexion, slightly grey, lean bony face, as well as the diabolical material which he had in his possession.

Other syndicates and more terrorist material.

The active investigation that was made revealed that Efrain Aguilar Fuentes (attorney), Juventino Sanchez (attorney), Jacobo Sanchez, brother of the latter, and Humberto Molina, were also implicated in this bomb plot.

What did they intend to do with the bombs?

As it appears from their behavior they wanted to use the bombs in assassinating the President of the Republic. The plotters intended to attack the President's car with the bombs. They had selected two points to carry out the hideous plan: the Penitentiary bridge and the garden of "La Concordancia", the part on which 6th Ave. opens. They had already made dates and changed them; the last had been Wednesday of last week. They also intended to bomb churches, warehouses, and private homes, as evidenced by the fact that this warlike material was founf in ten different parts of the city.

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The bombs found.

Each one of them weighed about four pounds, without the explosive material on the inside, and was constructed with lining of zinc strips, twenty centimeters high and four centimeters in diameter. On the inside they had steel splinters, shots, buckshot, heavy steel balls, dynamite and powder.

Exper'ts who passed on their death-dealing properties declared that "their effects would be fatal and destructive both for persons and things and that the smallest lesion produced by them on any part of the body would be fatal".

The prisoners before the court martial.

Sunday night the prisoners appeared before the court martial, composed of generals and ordinary officers and divided for the purpose into two groups: those who were graduates of military schools to go before the first group and the others before the second group. The first group was made up of the following: Lieut. Col. Luis Ortiz Guzman, a tall corpulent, broad shouldered man, who, during the court martial, held a towel over his shoulders and mouth; Capt. Meri Ortiz Morales, a small man, slightly bald, and a bit stoop shouldered; Rodolfo de Leon Calderon, a tall, lean brunette with a black mustache which stood out upon his lip with that same firmness shown by the pupils of his eyes; and Lieut. Felix Colindres, who was conspicuous for his side whiskers and a face which seemed to project forward from his neck.

The second group of accused was made up of Efrain Aguilar Fuentes (attorney), dressed in a dark suit with the coat collar turned up, and with a scanty beard; Juventino Sanchez (attorney), pale complexioned, bloodshot eyes and dischevelled hair; Humberto Molina (university graduate), dressed in a light suit with a dark hat in his hand; Rafael Estrada Cuiles, wrapped in a raincoat which rendered conspicuous his long face, severe in appearance because of his abundant eyebrows; and Marcelino Ortega Jajardo, Jose Luis

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Guzman Hernandez, Juan Rios Cardona, Gilberto Morales and Maria Molina Quinones, the latter with a shawl on her shoulders, hair done into two small tresses, very small and apparently very young.

The prisoners were seated in chairs prepared for this purpose and at 10:25 p.m., the judge advocate began to read the indictment which included both soldiers and civilians; the reading ended about 12:30 a.m.

In the courtyard the falling rain could be heard. Major Hector Marroquin Barrios helped the judge advocate read the indictment.

After the reading the president of the officers council, made up of generals, asked the prisoners if they had anything to say and the latter said that the services they had rendered their country, their large families, and the fact that they had been instruments in the hands of others should come in to mitigate the punishment, but none of them denied participation in the plot of which they were accused.

The officer's council was made up of the following generals: Enrique Aris, general of division, president; and Doroteo Monterroso, Manuel Gomez Ponce, Rafael Aldana E. and Felipe Samayoa L., assistants.

Col. Rafael Alvarado Tinoco, who acted as prosecutor, stood up to read his requisition. At 12:30 a.m. the prosecutor asked the death penalty for the military prisoners. The official defender, Col. Francisco R. Prado C. stepped to the bar of the court and read the defense.

When Col. Prado finished, the officer's council of generals retired and began the ordinary court martial with Col. Pedro Vidal Cifuentes as president and captains Eduardo Flores Barrios, Jose Luis Rojas, Felipe Lopez A. and Carlos Lazo Morales as assistants. After reading the proceedings in the military prosecution in the case against the civilians prisoners, the prosecutor, Lieut. Benjamin Martinez, read his requisition and asked the court to give the death penalty to those on trial. The president of the council asked the prisoners if they had anything to say. Attorney

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Efrain Aguilar Fuentes arose and said that he did not deny participation in the plot but would ask that he be judged not for the deed consummated but for the attempt they had made. After this attorney Juventino Sanchez arose and repeated to the court the request of Efrain Aguilar Fuentes. The other prisoners spoke also: Molina (the university graduate) said that according to law his confession of the facts should be considered as an attenuating circumstance.

The official defender of the prisoners, Col. Guadalupe Lopez Ochoa, read this defense and declared that the defendants having been proved guilty by their own confession there remained nothing for him to do except to ask for mercy and a correct application of the law.

At about two o'clock in the morning the ordinary court martial retired to deliberate.

Sentence.

At 3:20 a.m., the court martial, whose officials were composed of generals, returned to the court room and the prisoners were made to face those who were to read the condemning sentences.

Later, about 3 in the morning, the ordinary court martial also made known its condemning sentence.

The twelve participants in the plot were given the death penalty, with the exception of Maria Molina Quinonez, who was given the next penalty, 15 years imprisonment.

One prisoner killed.

When Jacobo Sanchez was caught, he had some bombs in his possession and said he had more in the Barillas section; the police who captured him, in company with the justice of the peace, led him to this place, but at twilight he fled across fences and mountains in an effort to escape and was killed.

The Court Martial.

The trial, in accordance with the procedure outlined by the Code, was

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

carried for deliberation to the Third Court of Appeals, functioning as a court martial and was composed of the magistrates Rafael Muila (attorney), president; Rosalio Reyes and Teodoro Diaz Medrano and by the assistants generals Juan B. Alonso and Julio H. Cerzantes. Attorney Pedro Contenti acted as prosecutor and Eleazaro Urrenota as attorney and Alfredo Valle Calvo (attorney) as secretary.

The decision as to the sentences will be given to the press today. In case they are confirmed by the court martial they should be executed within 24 hours after the prisoners are notified, unless the latter or their attorney appeal to the President of the Republic for clemency.

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DEC 19 1935
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Executive.

Inauguration of New
Provisional President.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 19 1935

1. At 12:30 P.M. on December 13th, Dr. Jose A. Barnet y Vinagres took oath of office as Provisional President of Cuba, succeeding Colonel Carlos Mendieta who resigned on December 11th. Dr. Barnet has filled the office of Secretary of State since last March, replacing Dr. Cosme de la Torriente.

2. The oath of office was administered in the main salon of the Presidential Palace by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, assisted by the associate justices. On the right, in order of rank, was the Diplomatic Corps, and on the left were Colonel Batista, Lieut.Colonel Gonzalez, Chief of Staff of the Navy, and Lieut.Colonel Pedraza,Chief of Police of Havana, with their numerous staffs. Below them, was the Cabinet,and next beyond, in order of precedence, were the four presidential candidates standing side by side - General Mario Menocal, Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez and Dr. Carlos Manuel de la Cruz. The far end of the hall was completely filled with officers of the Army and Navy, business men and politicians.

3. Dr. Barnet is a man of no more than ordinary ability, but he is dependable, conservative, and not unfair to foreign interests, so, therefore, the appointment, which was made by the members of the Electoral College which consists of the Cabinet and Council of State, is quite acceptable.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5114 Date: December 14,1935

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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APR 1936 WAR DEPARTMENT

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2700

G-2 Report

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 21 1936

Bombing of American Consulate at Santiago de Cuba.

1. About 9:00 P.M. on April 10th, a bomb exploded in the doorway of the American Consulate at Santiago de Cuba, causing some damage to the building. The next day, a bomb exploded in a vacant lot in Santiago, killing two Cuban boys who were playing in the vicinity.

2. On the morning of April 10th, the U.S. Consul received a threatening letter from the Society of Radical Students. The present aim and activities of this society seem to be to further the movement for the independence of Porto Rico. The Consul, with the undersigned, during a visit to the Army barracks at Santiago, showed the letter mentioned above to the Military Commander. Following the explosion of the bomb that same evening at the Consulate, suspicion naturally pointed to the writers of the threatening letter, i.e. the society of radical students. However, police investigations absolved this organization, in placing the responsibility for the bombing on the "Joven Cuba Society," which is the terrorist organization composed of communists, who had as leader Dr. Antonio Guiteras, who, as reported by this office, was killed about a year ago in an old abandoned fort near Matanzas, by a detachment of Cuban troops.

3. The bombing referred to above occurred during the visit to Santiago of the Provisional President of Cuba, Dr. Jose Barnet, and his official party. It is understood that a number of arrests have been made by the police and military authorities.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

TNG:vm

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Assistant
By
Date 6-24-69

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5169 Date: April 16,1936

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] 6-24-69
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MAY 13 1936 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2657-Q-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 12 1936

Governmental Policy and Methods in Maintaining Law and Order.

1. Several days ago the bodies of Octavio Seiglie and Agustin Martinez Domenguez were found in the private automobile of Seiglie a short distance from Havana. It is believed that both were killed and then placed in the car, which was saturated with gasoline and set on fire.

2. Seiglie was a close personal and political friend of Dr. Grau San Martin, leader of the Autentico Party; in fact, it is said that Seiglie has been leading member of that party in Cuba during the protracted period of San Martin's self-imposed exile. Opinion at first pointed to the police as being responsible, but it is now believed that the "Joven Cuba" terrorists committed the murders.

3. There have been a number of other assassinations recently, all, or most, of the victims having been identified with terroristic or ultra-radical activities. Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of the Central Division of Police (City of Havana) is blamed by radical elements for these killings, and, it is understood, certain radical organizations have been and probably still are plotting, in retaliation, to assassinate him. A day or so after the finding of the bodies of Seiglie and Domenguez, the Cuban Senate, in a special session, unanimously passed a resolution, calling upon the Government to investigate and determine, if possible, the responsibility for this and other assassinations which have occurred recently. Senator de la Pina, a Liberal, who is one of Colonel Batista's closest friends, called the special session of the Senate and presented the resolution. These killings, ten or twelve in number, so far as is known, have been openly criticised by American press representatives in Havana and, of course, also by elements opposed to the Army and Civil Government, but comments recently published in some of the American newspapers have been grossly exaggerated. The Civil Courts have been disgracefully delinquent in punishments imposed against terrorists, many of whom, although caught in acts of terrorism and sabotage, have been acquitted by the Civil Courts.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and
Personal Observation.

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5182 Date: May 6, 1936.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

~~Confidential~~: The Military Attache,
Havana, Cuba. 6-1
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JUN 1936 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 13 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By:
Date 6-24-69

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Exercise of Governmental Power.

Regime of Provisional
President Barnet.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 3 1936

1. In order to obtain a clear understanding of the government of Provisional President Barnet and the exercise of governmental power during his regime, it is deemed advisable to set forth a brief resume of the many changes in the Constitution and governmental basic laws which have been effected within the past eight years, as follows:

(a) In 1928, the Machado Government amended the Constitution of 1901. Title VII, Article 66 of the 1928 Constitution changed the term of office of the President from four to six years, but limited the number of terms to two consecutive ones, whereas, under the 1901 Constitution, the President was limited to three consecutive terms of four years each. In the Constitution of 1928 there was no provision for a Vice President, but it was provided that in the temporary absence of the President, the Secretary of State would exercise the Executive power. In the event that there would be no Secretaries of the Cabinet who should hold the office of temporary President, it was provided that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would become temporary President. It was further provided that in the case of a vacancy in the office of President, a presidential election should be called sixty days following the time of vacancy. There were other less important changes, but it has been generally understood that the chief reason for the adoption of the 1928 Constitution was to extend Machado's term of office to six years.

(b) Upon the fall of the Machado regime in August, 1933, General Alberto Herrera, Secretary of National Defense and who was Machado's choice for President, assumed that office for a few hours, having been appointed Secretary of State at the last minute preceding Machado's withdrawal, in order to succeed to the presidency. However, being unacceptable to the Cuban Army and many of Machado's opponents, who insisted upon Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as President, Herrera appointed Cespedes as Secretary of State and then immediately resigned and left Cuba. The Cespedes Government lasted 22 days, being overthrown by the mutiny of the enlisted men on September 4, 1933. However, during the short time he was in office, Cespedes restored the Constitution of 1901. On September 5th there was established a "Revolutionary Junta" composed of five members, which acted in the Executive capacity, and on September 9th this "Junta" appointed Dr. Grau San Martin as Revolutionary President. On September 14th, the Grau Government adopted seven governmental provisions, under which - with subsequent amendments - his government operated.

(c) Grau San Martin was required to resign by Batista and his officers in January 1934, and on January 15th, Carlos Hevia was appointed Revolutionary President by the "Junta" at Camp Columbia, but when he was informed that his government would probably not be recognized by the U.S. Government, he resigned three days after taking office. The "Junta" then appointed Colonel Carlos Mendieta as President, and he adopted the Constitutional Law of February 3, 1934, which was subsequently amended many times. The Mendieta Government, on June 12, 1935, adopted the Constitutional Law of the Republic (translation of this Law forwarded June 19, 1935, I.G. No. 3000), which, while providing for a Legislative branch,

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5192 Date: May 27, 1936.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

as well as other provisions for a constitutional government to be elected, really operated under that part of the new Constitution designated "Constitutional Provisions for the Provisional Regime"(page 20 of translation of the Law forwarded June 19th). These provisions provided that the public power be vested in the President, the Cabinet, the Council of State, the Judiciary power and other organisms and authorities established by law. The executive power was exercised by the Provisional President and his Cabinet. The Cabinet consisted of thirteen members with portfolio and such Secretaries without portfolio as might be appointed; also the President of the Council of State and the Mayor of Havana.

(d) During the above period and, in fact, since the fall of the Machado regime and until the assumption of office by candidates elected in January, 1936, the offices of Governors of provinces and Mayors of municipalities have all been appointed by the President. These appointees were frequently changed, from time to time Army officers being appointed to replace the civil incumbents. Mendieta's Cabinet, which approved the Constitution of June, 1935, consisted of thirteen members with portfolio, two without portfolio, and also the President of the Council of State and the Municipal Mayor of Havana.

(e) The Council of State consisted of fifteen members. Its chief functions were to form with the Cabinet the Electoral College for the purpose of appointing the Provisional President, in case of vacancy; to advise the President and Cabinet on certain Legislative matters; to have cognizance of all laws which affected taxation and which amended the Codes in force and the organic laws of the governmental departments, as well as those which referred to retirements and pensions and to social or educational matters, and, in addition, any other functions that might be expressly vested in it by law. With the opening of Congress on April 6, 1936, the need for the Council of State ceased and it was abolished by Decree-Law in April,1936.

(f) On December 11, 1935,Provisional President Carlos Mendieta resigned because of pressure brought to bear in the form of public criticism by General Mario Menocal, who was presidential candidate of the Partido Conjunto Nacional Democratico (Menocalista Party) in the January 10,1936 elections. General Menocal demanded the resignation of Mendieta, stating that fair elections could not be held in Cuba so long as Mendieta was President. Mendieta was and still is the most popular politician in Cuba with the present Cuban Army, and it is possible that Menocal feared that Mendieta might exercise undue influences during the elections upon the military, or it may have been simply a campaign gesture to embarrass Mendieta.

2. Upon the resignation of Mendieta, Dr. Jose Barnet, provisional Secretary of State, became Provisional President and continued in that office until he relinquished it on May 20th to the constitutionally elected President, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez. Barnet and his government exercised the governmental power through the applicable provisions of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of June 12, 1935, these being chiefly those designated "Constitutional Provisions for the Provisional Regime (page 20 of translation of the Law, I.G. 3000, forwarded June 19, 1935). Barnet's regime lasted from December 13, 1935 to May 20th,1936, slightly more than five months. His government was faced by two important problems, one of which had to be immediately solved -- the conducting of the national elections on January 10,1936. It was desirable to prevent, by one means or another, the withdrawal of General Mario Menocal and his party (Conjunto Nacional Democratico) from participation in the elections. Menocal had threatened on several occasions to withdraw not only himself but his party candidates and to take no part in the elections. It is obvious that the withdrawal of this major political party would have created a feeling that the elections were not a real expression of the people's will, thereby weakening the political prestige of the successful presidential candidate. Numerous decisions were passed by the Superior

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Electoral Tribunal prior to the elections, as to the eligibility of certain candidates, and afterwards the Tribunal was called upon to decide upon numerous cases, all of them minor in character, consisting of alleged election frauds. Undoubtedly, there were some cases of fraud at the polls, although such frauds could not have affected the final results, except possibly in the case of a few mayors of cities and possibly a few seats in the Lower House of Congress. It may be said that the recent Cuban election was held almost without bloodshed and it is considered one of the most honest elections ever held in Cuba. This was one of the major problems which the Barnet regime faced, and it was accomplished in a very impartial and successful manner.

3. The other important problem was one which neither Mendieta nor Barnet felt capable of solving and so it has been passed along to the Gomez Administration -- that is the problem of the Army's interference with and dominance of the Civil Government. Mendieta, who was appointed directly by Batista and his committee of officers and enlisted men of the garrisons of Havana, called the "Revolutionary Junta of Camp Columbia," needed the Army to restore order in Cuba. It responded loyally, succeeding in its task. However, while doing so, it recognized, and quite naturally, its own power and the impotence of the civil authorities without it. It has exerted influences, however, in civil governmental matters which were far beyond its proper jurisdiction. Batista is known to have been the power behind the Provisional Governments of Mendieta and Barnet. Proposed governmental measures depended finally upon his decision. He felt perhaps that as he had made the first provisional government - Mendieta's - he could at least dominate it - which he did. During Barnet's regime, Army domination continued with equal vigor. Logical thinkers realized that the provisional governments themselves, holding power not by the electorate of the Island, but by the will of the Army, were naturally unable to prevent dictation from the force that had not only installed them but that was maintaining them in office. However, the intelligent people of Cuba, regardless of their political affiliations, bitterly resent the domination of the Army over civil affairs. They hope and many of them believe that the youthful President of Cuba, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez, having been fairly elected as the people's choice, should and will, with the backing of Congress also elected by the people, restore to the Civil Government its full power under the Constitution. The majority of Cubans realize that Batista saved Cuba from anarchy and chaos and they looked upon his influence over the Civil Administration during the provisional governments with complacence; however, they may be expected to support the new President in his efforts to purge his government of unwarranted military influence which, according to general opinion, is no longer necessary.

4. During the regime of Mendieta, a period of nearly two years, public order and safety was restored. The Platt Amendment, which for years had been the cause for irritation to the pride of Cuba, was abrogated; the U.S. Government granted Cuba a substantial sugar quota with a material reduction in U.S. Customs tariff. This tariff was subsequently considerably reduced by the application of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, which also reduced mutual tariffs on many American and Cuban commodities. The results of these tariff reductions were manifest almost immediately in greatly increased trade between the United States and Cuba. It has been said that Cuba's problem is economic and it may at least be confirmed to this extent - with the reduction of tariffs, Cuban trade and Cuban purchasing power increased almost immediately; unemployment, and with it radicalism,

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5192 Date: May 27, 1936.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

decreased correspondingly. The Mendieta Government almost completely suppressed communism by the deportation of prominent foreign agitators and the punishment of Cuban agitators, but the most effective remedy for the seething unrest of Cuban labor was the restoration, to a certain degree, of economic prosperity, which brought with it reemployment of labor at considerably increased wages. Sugar mill common labor, which had been receiving from 18 cents to 20 cents a day, had their wages increased four-fold. Other substantial increases were decreed by the Government to practically all wage earners. Labor unions which had been controlled by communistic agitators were disbanded, or the control of such unions was again taken over by less radical elements of labor.

5. The surge of nationalism demanded the replacement of foreigners by Cubans in professional and technical positions, as well as in the lower classes of wage earners. This brought about the enactment of the Fifty Percent Law by Revolutionary President Grau San Martin. (Various reports on this Law have been forwarded, I.G.No. 2300-a). This Law was enforced with such suddenness that its hardships were felt by thousands of Spaniards, Chinese, West Indian negroes and even Americans. It so disrupted the orderly administration of business that the Mendieta Government was compelled to ameliorate many of its more unreasonable provisions. The two largest public utilities, both American-owned, had been taken over by the employees during the Grau regime, with the ousting of the American managements and the subordinate officers. It required several months by the Mendieta Government to fully restore these properties to their rightful owners. It may be said, therefore, that Mendieta with the assistance of Batista brought order out of a situation which bordered on anarchy, and when he turned over the Executive office to Barnet in December 1935, there remained but two major political problems to be solved, which have been described in preceding chapters of this report. One required immediate and tactful consideration - the forthcoming elections - and this was managed very satisfactorily by Barnet, with the assistance of the Army, Navy and Police. The other problem - that of the Army - could not be solved by a provisional government, and, very wisely, no action was attempted. It is the major problem facing the new constitutional government.

6. The personnel of the Barnet Government was as follows:

Members of the Cabinet

Secretary of State..... Jorge L. Echarte.
Secretary of Justice..... Dr. A. Domingo Morales.
Secretary of Interior..... Dr. Maximiliano Smith.
Secretary of Treasury..... Dr. Ricardo Ponce.
Secretary of Communications.. Francisco Gomez.
Secretary of National Defense Dr.Maximiliano Smith (ad interim)
Secretary of Commerce..... Dr. Ricardo Ponce (ad interim)
Secretary of Public Works.... Jorge L. Echarte (ad interim)
Secretary of Labor..... Dr. Emilio Gaspar Rodriguez.
Secretary of Sanitation..... Dr. Anaya Murillo (ad interim)
Secretary of Education..... Dr. Anaya Murillo
Secretary of Agriculture..... Dr. Jose L. Garcia Baylleres.
Secretary of Presidency..... Dr. A. Domingo Morales (ad interim).
* President Council of State... Federico Laredo Bru.

Members of Council of State.

Federico Laredo Bru.....President.
Pablo Desvernine.....Vice President.
Grosman Viamontes.....Members
Miguel A. Suarez Fernandez..... "
Candita E.Gomez de Bandujo..... "
Oscar G. Edreira..... "

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Members Council of State (Cont'd)

Nicasio Silverio.....Member
Sebastian Repilado..... "
Ricardo Delz.....Vice Pres.
Mario Lamar.....Secretary.
Guillermo Alonso Pujol.....Member
Rafael Mario Angulo..... "
Manuel Jimenez Lanier..... "
Antonio Martinez Fraga..... "
Rafael A. Mora..... "

Members of Supreme Court

Chief Justice: Juan Federico Edelmann y Revira.

Criminal Chamber

President: Gregorio de Llano y Raymat.
Magistrates: Francisco Llaca y Argudin.
Ricardo R. Duval y Fleites.
Angel Mestre y Diaz.
Juan Carlos Andreu y del Junco.
Luis Leon y Merconchini.
Gaston Mora y Verona.
Diego V. Tejara y Garcia.

Civil Chamber

President: Manuel Martinez Escobar

Magistrates: Guillermo de Montaga y Vivero.
Melchor Fernandez y Fernandez.
Julian de Solorzano y Tabernilla.
Gabriel Pichardo y Moya.
Guillermo Chaple y Suarez.
Jose F. Perera y Trujillo.
Carlos M. de la Torre y Llorente.

Governors of Provinces who were in Office up to March 25,1936.

Habana Province.....Celestino Baizan
Matanzas " .....Dr.Lorenzo Delgado Diaz.
Santa Clara.....Gabino Galvez Borges.
Camaguey.....Gonzalo del Cristo.
Oriente.....Angel Perez Andre.
Pinar del Rio.....Jose A. Navarro.

Governors of Provinces who took office March 25th, 1936.

Habana Province.....Celestino Baizan.
Matanzas " .....Dr.Lorenzo Delgado Diaz.
Santa Clara .....Gabino Galvez Borges.
Camaguey .....Roberto Perez Lara.
Oriente .....Angel Perez Andre.
Pinar del Rio.....Juan F. Argudin.

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Officials of the Senate.

Justo Luis del Pozo:	President.
Lucilo de la Pina:	First Vice President.
Wilfredo Albanes:	Second Vice President.
Jose M. Guiterrez:	First Secretary.
Guillermo Alonzo Pujol:	Second Secretary.

Prominent Members:

Alfredo Hornedo:	President Foreign Relations Committee.
Lucilo de la Pina:	Pres. Committee on Military Affairs - also 1st. V.P. of Senate as stated above.
Enrique Recio:	President Tariff Commission.
Carlos Saladrigas:	Former Secretary of Justice during Mendieta's regime.
Ramon Zaydin:	Prominent Member of Congress during Machado's regime.

Officials of the House of Representatives.

Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling:	President.
Jose Andreu:	First Vice President.
Joaquin Pedraza:	Second Vice President.
Radeo Cremata:	Majority Secretary
Raul Menocal:	Minority Secretary.

Prominent Members

Raul de Cardenas -- Who was Secretary of Justice during the Mendieta regime.

Manuel Jose Estrada Palma -- Who is the son of Cuba's first President.

Gabriel Landa -- Who was Secretary of Treasury during the Mendieta regime.

Attention is invited to the fact that with the fall of Machado, his Congress was dissolved - not by governmental decree or law, but the entire Machado governmental structure, including Congress, was overthrown by the people. In the interim between August, 1933 and April,1936, the several governments, revolutionary and provisional, functioned without a legislative branch.

(*Note: The acting Mayor of Havana, during Barnet's regime, Major Aristides Sosa, Cuban Army, was not a member of the Cabinet, and there were no cabinet members without portfolio.)

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Official Documents,
Personal Contacts and
Observation, and Embassy
Records.

TNG: vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5192 Date: May 27, 1936.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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MID 2657-G-330
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA, CUBA.

May 27, 1936.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible] Date 6-24-69

No. 5193.

Subject: Regime of Provisional President Barnet.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 3 1936

1. Reference Evaluation of Reports dated May 13, 1936, requesting a report covering the exercise of governmental power during the Barnet regime, the attached report No. 5192, I.G. No. 3010-a, covers the subject in detail, setting forth the machinery of government, provisions of the basic laws under which it operated, its personnel, important problems and accomplishments.

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T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By [illegible]
Date 6-29-69

December 16, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Current Situation in Cuba.

1. The numerous differences between President Gomez and Colonel Batista, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, evident since the former was inaugurated in May, 1936, appear to be crystallizing into a definite issue.

2. A serious disagreement has suddenly developed concerning the passage of a bill by the Cuban Congress providing for an additional tax of nine cents per bag on Cuban raw sugar. The annual proceeds from this tax (approximately $2,000,000) would be devoted to the maintenance of the Civic-Military Rural School System recently organized by the Army in conjunction with the Department of Education and now operating under Army instructors and administration. This bill, sponsored by Colonel Batista, was introduced in and passed by the Cuban Senate on December 4, 1936.

3. Following the Senate's passage of the bill, Colonel Batista left Havana, on December 5, with a body of troops to maneuver in Pinar del Rio until December 20.

4. President Gomez, on December 9, without consulting Colonel Batista and apparently ignoring his friends and advisers, organized his political adherents in the House of Representatives for the purpose of defeating the bill, openly stating that if it was passed he would veto it.

5. Colonel Batista, upon learning of the President's attitude, made preparations to return to Havana at once, an action which might have precipitated a crisis. He was prevailed upon by General Montalvo, Minister of War, to remain in Pinar del Rio.

6. On December 14 the bag tax measure, upon being introduced in the House of Representatives, caused so much confusion and opposition, principally from President Gomez's adherents, that the session was adjourned without action on the bill.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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7. Developments since December 14 are unknown to this office and to the State Department but our Military Attache in Havana has been asked for an air mail report on the situation.

8. Comments.

a. While the Army-sponsored Civic-Military Rural School movement is a laudatory effort and one which has been received with great enthusiasm among rural Cubans, it appears that it, and the resulting legislation for its financial support, are not within the normal province of the Army's administration and that it impinges upon the prerogatives of another Governmental Department (Education). It is apparently on this premise that President Gomez resents such interference at a time when he is bending every effort to return the Cuban Government to a constitutional basis.

b. Colonel Batista, on the other hand, appears to be intensely interested in the Civic-Military Rural School System and contends that the constructive service rendered by the Army is a worthy activity which is of national benefit to Cuba. Incidentally, this extra legal function now being performed by the Army provides an excuse for maintaining its present strength of approximately 15,000 men - the largest peace strength in its history.

c. It appears that both President Gomez and Colonel Batista are ready for a show-down on this and the issues which have gone before.

F. H. LINCOLN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

JUL 14 1936 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV
WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Exercise of Governmental Power.

2657-9-330/361

Regime of Provisional President Barnet.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 14 1936

1. The following changes are forwarded as a supplement to report No. 5192, I. G. No. 3010-a, dated May 27, 1936, referred to in Evaluation of Reports dated June 29, 1936.

Paragraph 1 (a) of report No.5192 should read as follows:

In 1928 the Machado Government amended the Constitution of 1901. Title VII, Article 66 of the 1928 Constitution states "the term of office shall be six years, and no one may discharge the office of President for two consecutive terms," whereas, the 1901 Constitution states "the term of office shall be for four years, and no person shall be President for three consecutive terms." The Constitution of 1928 did not provide for a Vice President but did provide that in the temporary absence of the President, the Secretary of State would exercise the Executive power. In the event that there would be no Secretaries of the Cabinet who should hold the office of temporary President, it was provided that said temporary office be held by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It was further provided that in the case of a vacancy in the office of President, a presidential election should be called sixty days following the time of vacancy. There were other less important changes, but it is understood that the chief reason for the adoption of the 1928 Constitution was to extend Machado's term of office by six years.

The next to last sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 of the report should read as follows:

A Presidential Decree issued on August 24, 1933, by President ad interim Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, restored the Constitution of 1901, and declared the Constitution of May 11,1928 as null and void. Other salient features of the Decree declared Machado an usurper, and that all elections held and office holders appointed under the Constitution of 1928 were illegal. One of the effects of this Decree was to officially dissolve Congress, which, however, had ceased to function in fact with the fall of Machado.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Legal Documents.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5220 Date: July 8, 1936.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date 6-24-69

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 21, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Current Situation in Cuba.

1. Further developments in the controversy now raging between President Gomez and Colonel Batista, Army Chief of Staff, indicate the firm determination of the latter to assert his dominance in Cuban affairs even if impeachment of President Gomez has to be resorted to.

2. On December 18, the 9¢-bag tax bill, referred to in a memorandum of this office dated December 16, was passed at a special session by the House and has been sent to the President for signature. Gomez has stated that he will veto it, but it is indicated that if the bill is reenacted over the veto he (Gomez) will naturally respect such a constitutional procedure and continue to carry on his duties as President.

3. In the meantime, certain political leaders in conference with Batista's adherents have drawn up plans for impeachment of President Gomez hoping to oust him from office by constitutional means rather than by violence. The impeachment charges were to be introduced in the House of Representatives on Sunday, December 20, or Monday, December 21, and accuse President Gomez of "interfering" with the legislative powers of Congress by declaring his action (veto) on a measure prior to its passage and also of unduly influencing the votes of certain House members. Apparently, Colonel Batista believes that the Vice-President (Laredo Bru) would head a regime more favorable to the Army. Impeachment proceedings on December 22 are now indicated.

4. United States Ambassador Caffery, in Havana, is of the opinion that Gomez is determined to pursue his course and carry out his declared intention to veto the 9¢-bag tax bill, thus increasing the tenseness in the situation. Colonel Batista has recently assured Ambassador Caffery that he would allow no military violence to take place and that whatever action he (Batista) took would be constitutional. Ambassador Caffery left Havana late on December 18 for Pinar del Rio to confer with Colonel Batista.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. Comment.

a. It is indicated that Batista's supporters are confident that they can muster more than the required number (108) of votes necessary to institute impeachment proceedings.

b. It appears that Batista is inclined to support the plan for impeachment of President Gomez regardless of the latter's action on the tax measure in question in the hope that as a result of such action a government may be established which will recognize his supremacy and that of the military over the regularly constituted civil authorities in Cuba.

F. H. LINCOLN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

meb

Deld. by Col. Lincoln
DEC 21 1936
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DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

SEP 29 1936 WAR DEPARTMENT MIL. INTEL. DIV.

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

2657-B-330
365

G-2 Report

2700

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

Bombing of Newspaper Plant by Radicals.

1. At 6:10 A.M., September 20th, just as the Spanish language newspaper EL PAIS was preparing to issue its Sunday morning edition, a heavy charge of dynamite, which had been left in a truck alongside the building, wrecked the plant and ruined the interior of the Catholic church across the street. Windows were broken within a radius of several blocks. Four persons were killed at the time and twenty-seven were injured, nine of whom are in a critical condition, and one, a policeman has since died. Among the five dead are two policemen, two newsboys and a peddler. Many of the injured were newsboys awaiting their papers.

2. A number of arrests have been made, chiefly from among the Spanish Socialist Republican Circle, which is a radical Spanish club, and which has until recently been issuing pro-Spanish Government and very radical broadcasts. The Cuban Government has now closed these two broadcasting stations.

3. A few minutes after the explosion, a truck which was parked at the side of the building of the newspaper DIARIO DE LA MARINA, was searched and found to contain 1200 wired-up sticks of dynamite. The explosive expert of Police Headquarters arrived promptly and disconnected the wiring. The explosion had been timed for a few minutes later. The Diario de la Marina is the leading newspaper of Havana and decidedly against the present Spanish Government. However, EL PAIS, which is the second most important newspaper in the City, was quite impartial in its attitude toward the Spanish civil war. This latter paper resumed publication on Tuesday.

4. It is understood that the authorities are certain that Spanish radicals are responsible in both instances for the placing of the dynamite.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5267 Date: September 23,1936.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

OCT 6 1936
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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2657-9-330
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G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 6 1936

Subversive Activities:

1. The driver of the dynamite truck used in connection with the wrecking of the plant of the Spanish language newspaper EL PAIS (see report No. 5267, index as above, dated September 23, 1936), causing five deaths and twenty-seven injured, has been apprehended by the military authorities, and, through him, are being obtained the identities of a number of his associates in this plot and the frustrated attempt to wreck Cuba's largest newspaper - DIARIO DE LA MARINA. Several Spanish communists and anarchists, as well as a number of Cuban terrorists belonging to the radical "Joven Cuba" society, are, apparently, implicated. "Captain" Ara, leader of the "Joven Cuba" society, was arrested several days ago. Ara was for a short time, during the Grau San Martin regime, assistant chief of the Havana Police. He has been a notorious radical leader for several years. Prior to the overthrow of Machado, Ara was one of the Leftist leaders of the University students.

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By authority letter of Dec. 13, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist.
By
Date 3-24-69

2. Several amendments are being made to the Cuban Penal Code, which will reestablish the death penalty for crimes such as the above mentioned.

3. Thirty members of the so-called "A.B.C. Steel Helmet Society" were acquitted by the Havana Urgency Court of charges of sedition against the Government. This group was not charged with being implicated in the El Pais bomb affair, but of general seditionary efforts against the Government.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Press.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5270 Date: Sept.30,1936

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
Date 1-23-69

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

2657-Q-330/365
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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 22 1936

Bombing of Newspaper EL PAIS

1. Supplementing reports No. 5267 and 5270 (index as above),dated September 23rd and 30th, respectively, it has now been definitely established that the two most radical elements of the "Joven Cuba" society, known as the "Legion Revolucionaria" and the "Ejercito Insurreccional", were responsible for the bombing of the Spanish-language newspaper EL PAIS and the attempted bombing of another Spanish-language newspaper, DIARIO DE LA MARIANA - Cuba's most important newspaper, on September 20th. The authorities have stated that the Spanish radicals were not connected with these activities.

2. The dynamite used was brought into Cuba via the American Railway Express Company, in containers marked "glassware and automobile parts," and the manager of the Havana branch of the American Express Company and several employees were arrested but later released. However, a Customs broker of the Company and one or more Havana Customs inspectors are alleged to have been involved, one of these also being implicated in connection with the shipment of a number of rifles and some ammunition seized in his home. He was arrested and later committed suicide. The cache captured in his home included 50 rifles, 20 pistols, three large aerial bombs weighing 200 pounds each, 25 cases of dynamite, etc. The shipments of dynamite via the American Railway Express Company were made in three lots, two of these being transported from Florida on the steamships FLORIDA and CUBA of the Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Company, and,as stated, were carried on the ships' manifest as "glassware and automobile parts."

3. Another cache of dynamite was captured in a cave near Jaimanitas (a few miles from the City of Havana), and also other munitions. The large amount of dynamite captured to date is sufficient to have caused an enormous amount of damage if used for the purpose of bombing buildings, etc., but the number of rifles, pistols, ammunition, etc., which have been found is not sufficient to have equipped more than a very small number of revolutionists.

4. Among those who are implicated in the bombing plot are Guillermo Ara (as previously reported) and Enrique Giraud Carreno, who are considered two of the most radical and dangerous agitators in Cuba; Luis Garcia Quibus, formerly an explosive expert of the Havana Police Department and who is said to be responsible for preparing the bombs. This man was killed in a fight with the police while trying to escape from his hiding place, and two of his companions - one a former police Sergeant - were also killed, and two policemen were injured in the fight. Others captured include former Police Lieutenant Manuel Romero and Nicanor Menendez, both members of the "Joven Cuba." Romero admitted to police that he had attended meetings in Mexico as delegate of that organization, whose leaders he said included Guillermo Ara, Rene Moreno, Mario Salabarria, Francisco Castells and Evaristo Fernandez. He also stated that these men were responsible for the San Miguel kidnaping.

5. Among the numerous arrests of members of the "Joven Cuba" society, it is understood that five are definitely implicated in the EL PAIS bombing,

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5272 Date: October 14,1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

and others have been identified as being responsible for the murder several months ago of the Chief of Police of Guanabacoa, Lieutenant Ramon Pena, as well as most or all of the kidnapings which have occurred in Cuba since the revolution.

6. A member of Congress, Grau Aguero, was arrested several days ago (but later released) in connection with an attempt to effect the escape from Cuba of two of the prisoners held in connection with the bombing, namely, former Police Captain Antonio Borgas and Jose Maria Garcia. During the interrogation of these prisoners several references to Pedro Pablo Torrado were made. This man was Secretary of Justice during the Grau San Martin regime and subsequently leader of "Joven Cuba." Borgas and Garcia accused Torrado of having misappropriated funds of the "Joven Cuba" which they obtained from kidnaping and blackmail plots during the last year and a half. Reference was made to Torrado in confidential letter from this office No.5204, dated June 17,1936. He was one of the group who negotiated with Mr. R. L. Dinely in San Francisco, California some months ago, for the purchase of arms, munitions and equipment to be shipped to Mexico. He was also referred to as"Dr. Tovar" in several reports forwarded from your office and from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Justice.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy Files.

TNG:vm

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 2700

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

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RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 27 1936
2657-7-330/36

Bombing of Newspaper EL PAIS

1. Supplementing reports Nos. 5267, 5270 and 5272, index as above, regarding the above subject, four more Cubans were arrested on October 20th in connection with the bombing of the newspaper EL PAIS. One of those arrested, Julio Miranda Lopez, is said to be the "right hand man" of Guillermo Ara, ex-police Captain who is awaiting trial charged with being the leader of the group of "Joven Cuba" terrorists that have committed numerous acts of terrorism and several kidnapings in Cuba within the last two years. The other three arrested on October 20th apprently are all involved, one in disseminating communistic propaganda,and the others, according to reports, in smuggling dynamite into Cuba. Guillermo Ara and the others involved in the El Pais bombing will probably be tried in the Courts during the present week.

2. Public opinion, as might be expected, is very bitter against these men. The unanimous opinion which the undersigned has heard expressed by Cubans and foreigners is to the effect that the men should be speedily tried and if found guilty of participation in the crime, the death sentence should be imposed and promptly carried out. Colonels Batista and Pedraza have been highly commended for their prompt and efficient action in the matter, and with the capture of these terrorist leaders and many of their followers, it is hoped and expected that the City will be quiet, at least for some time.

3. "Joven Cuba's"policies have never been popular with the intelligent class of Cubans, and since the EL PAIS outrage has been definitely traced to the more radical elements of this organization, it has undoubtedly lost much of the former sympathy of the Cuban lower classes also. In its role as a revolutionary body, this organization did build up a certain sympathy from the illiterate Cubans, but the atrocity of the EL PAIS bombing, causing five deaths and serious injuries to many others, all of them innocent, has brought these radicals into public print and notice in their true characters.

T. N. Gimpeling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy and Personal Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5274 Date: October 21,1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.
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NOV 1936 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV.

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G-2 Report

2657-9-330/368

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 3 1936

Bombing of Newspaper EL PAIS.

1. Supplementing the last report on this subject - No. 5274 dated October 21, 1936, in the interval since the forwarding of that report the police and military authorities have discovered and confiscated at least two small caches of arms, munitions and dynamite, which have been identified with the "Legion Revolucionario", a branch of the JOVEN CUBA. Several prominent members of this organization have been arrested, as they are alleged to have been connected with the bombing of EL PAIS and probably with one or more of the kidnapings of prominent Cubans which have occurred during the past two years.

2. The leaders of the group charged with the EL PAIS bombing have not yet been brought to trial, although many of the less important individuals who were rounded up in the drive against terrorists which immediately followed the bombing have been brought to trial, but, as yet, the results of the trial are not known.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy Records.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5277 Date: October 29,1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.
DEC 1936
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Social)

Subject: Public Order and Safety.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 1 1936

EL PAIS Bombing

1. Supplementing previous reports on this subject, the Justices of the Urgency Court of Havana rendered a unanimous verdict of "guilty" in the case of Ramon Garcia Pujol and Mario del Torro, both of whom were sentenced to death by the Court. However, their lawyers have stated that an appeal will be made to the Supreme Court.

2. With respect to the other ten prisoners accused of participation in the bombing affair, the prosecuting attorney withdrew the charges against them and they were duly acquitted. However, eight of them are being held for trial on other charges and but two have been released from custody. A woman, Consuelo Gonzalez Hernandez, has been arrested recently near Santiago de Cuba, in connection with the bombing. The police have searched for her for several weeks, as she is accused of having rented the house on "Avenida de Acosta," Habana, where the bomb was made which was used at the"El Pais"newspaper plant, and also where the similar bomb was made which was discovered in front of the"Diario de la Marina" building on the same date.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy Records.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5288 Date: Nov. 25, 1936.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date 6-21-69

December 16, 1936.

12-17-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Cuban Political Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that a cablegram, (in secret code), substantially as follows, be sent to the Military Attache, Havana, Cuba:

153 Report by air mail your views on present political situation, including executive, legislative, and military aspects.

F. H. LINCOLN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

fk

DEC 17 1936 MILITARY EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 W. D.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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AIR MAIL

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. DEC 19 1936

Present Political Situation

1. Complying with instructions contained in cable No. 153, dated December 17th and signed by "Conley", the views of the undersigned on the present Cuban political situation are submitted:

2. The present critical situation may be summarized as a "showdown" of the dispute between the President of Cuba and Colonel Batista over the question of placing an additional tax of 9 cents per bag on sugar produced in Cuba, which, it is estimated would total 1,575,000 pesos during the coming sugar season, to be applied toward the maintenance and expansion of the Army rural school scheme.(See report No. 5294, index as above, which was forwarded in the diplomatic pouch of December 17th).

3. Prior to Colonel Batista's recent departure for an inspection of military posts in Pinar del Rio Province, from which he has not yet returned, he expressed to the President and certain members of Congress the necessity of maintaining and expanding the Army rural school system by funds raised by special taxation. His first request was that these funds be raised by setting aside a portion of the Government's profit from the Cuban national lottery, which was disapproved by the President. He then demanded that the necessary funds be raised by placing an additional tax on sugar to be produced from the forthcoming and future crops. Several days ago, a bill to this effect was passed by the Senate, and it is expected that the Lower House will pass the measure today or tomorrow. Several days ago the Association of Sugar Cane Growers (colonos) went on record as approving the measure,and yesterday the Association of Sugar Mill Owners (Hacendados) also went on record as favoring the proposed measure. The reasons given by these Associations are that the Army rural school system (Escuelas Civico-Militar) are greatly benefiting the population of the rural districts of Cuba and that both the Associations are in favor of the objectives and the successful operation and results so far accomplished. The attitude of these two powerful Association adds greatly to the strength of the proposed measure.

4. On the other hand, the President is decidedly opposed to the proposed tax. Under the present plan the total tax per bag for the ensuing season will amount to 17 cents, as provision is made for material reduction of the existing tax which is provided for the Sugar Stabilization Fund. It is understood that the President has indicated definitely that he will veto the proposed bill if it passes the Lower House. It is believed that the majority vote in favor of the bill in the Lower House will be sufficient to over-ride the veto. It is understood also that the President has no intention of resigning and it is not probable that Colonel Batista will force him out of office by violence. However, he may initiate steps towards impeachment.

5. Since his inauguration the President has had but little support from the Legislative branch. This has been primarily due to jealousies and quarrels among the "fusion" members and opposition of the strong Menocalista minority and also, in the present sugar tax case, to a strong alignment of Legislators supporting, for one reason or another, Colonel Batista. Contrary to Lowell Thomas' statements in broadcast last evening, so far as is known, no group or groups of cane cutters or others are marching on Havana. A demonstration of peasants which it was rumored would be staged before the Capitol yesterday did not occur.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5295 Date: Dec. 18,1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority of Dec. 18, 1963, Issued by JAGO to Archivist
By R-24-69
By Dougherty

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Hwy. - 12/17/36 Friday

G-2 Report 3020-b 7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 22 1936

RUMORS

1. There appears to be concrete evidence, although deep under the surface, that political dislike and jealousy and violent differences of opinion respecting policies do actually exist between President Miguel Mariano Gomez and Colonel Batista, who commands the Cuban Army, and also evidence that at the present moment this feeling between the two has reached a point where it may endanger the political stability which Cuba has enjoyed for several years, and, indeed, it may, if unchecked, develop into a political crisis. However, in view of the strong influence of the American Ambassador with both parties, it is unlikely that a dangerous situation will be permitted to develop.

2. On December 16th, an American who was a former non-commissioned officer in the U.S. armed forces and is now employed by the Cuban Government in the department of secret police, who has been of help to me occasionally in various ways, called on me and asked my opinion on a number of political matters. He was evidently sent by Maximiliano Smith, now holding a rather minor post in the civil government, but who held under Mendieta and Barnet the important Cabinet posts of Secretary of National Defense and Secretary of Interior. Smith was and, I believe, still is Batista's closest civilian adviser. He is a man of fairly sound common sense and very much more friendly to Americans than most Cubans, but he has one weakness which on several occasions caused him some embarrassment while a Cabinet member - this fault is that he is given to talking too freely about important matters which should not be discussed openly. Smith and the American mentioned above left this morning for Pinar del Rio to visit Colonel Batista, who is making a tour of that Province, the only one that he has never visited. Further, in this connection, his visit is one of political rather than military significance, as he stops for receptions and greetings and makes a speech in all the important and most of the secondary towns in the province. In other words, bringing himself before the civilian population, telling them of his Civic-Military Institute; his Army rural school system; his plans for provincial hospitals; improvement of the life of the farmer, etc., all of which tends to popularize him with the rural population of the Island.

3. Referring again to the American that Maximiliano Smith sent to me yesterday - boiled down, it amounted to this: Smith wanted to feel out indirectly what the American Government's attitude would be if Batista took over the Government. Naturally, the questions asked me were indirect and often vague, with the intent to conceal the motive actuating them. Of course, I expressed no opinion whatsoever at any time during the conversation, but I did ask a number of questions and finally obtained what I wanted to know and the point at which Smith was driving.

4. I already knew that Batista had demanded of Congress and the President that an additional tax amounting to 9 cents per bag be placed on each bag of sugar exported from Cuba. This would increase the tax on bags of sugar to 26 or 27 cents each, a very heavy tax to be borne by the producers. Batista wants this additional 9 cents tax in order to meet the expenses of his Army rural school project; the Civic-Military Institute and perhaps other philanthropic plans which he wants to initiate. The Senate passed the bill, approving this tax, but the House did not, and the President, so I understand, is bitterly opposed to it. Among other questions asked me yesterday was - "what would be the American Government's and the American people's reaction to a socialist government in Cuba and also to a Fascist government, taking into consideration President Roosevelt's speech during the campaign in Philadelphia and his recent address in Buenos Aires," neither of which I am conversant with. Another point brought out in our conversation was that Batista says that five members of the Cabinet must be removed and these are the Secretary of Labor, who, incidentally, is antagonistic to foreigners

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5294 Date: Dec. 17,1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

employed in Cuba, including Americans,and his policies have created much criticism on the part of foreign business concerns operating in Cuba; the Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Agriculture, who is the very wealthy and prominent sugar producer, Gomez-Mena; the Secretary of National Defense, General Rafael Montalvo, and one other who's name I could not obtain. Apparently, Batista's dissatisfaction with Montalvo is of very recent origin and, in view of the fact that the latter is a prominent sugar mill owner, he would naturally be personally opposed to the additional tax, which may or may not be the reason.

5. My informant quoted Smith as saying that President Gomez absolutely refused to resign or be forced out of office by Batista, but throughout the whole conversation there was discernible the thread which lead to the main question as to what would be the attitude of the American Government, the American Ambassador and the American people if Batista took over control of the Government. I transmitted the above information to the Chief of Mission immediately. Upon the return of Smith and his associate from their visit to Batista at Pinar del Rio, I expect to receive another visit and perhaps more information on the subject.

6. Last Sunday, Dec. 13th, I came in contact with a man whom I have rarely seen in the past two years, but who prior to the fall of Machado and during the disturbed conditions following the revolution was a frequent visitor to my office. His information was in the main exaggerated or incorrect, but, occasionally, it was not only correct but important. Several months ago he informed me that there was a plot already approved to assassinate the Chief of Police of Havana, Colonel Pedraza, but that the date had not been decided upon. I transmitted this to the Chief of Mission for what it was worth. I could not confirm a later rumor that the plot had been attempted but that the police had prevented its being carried out. However, my opinion is that the information was correct. This man told me Sunday that there is developing a movement in the Cuban Army to overthrow Batista; that fully fifty per cent of the Army is supposed to be in the Movement, the leader being a Lieutenant Colonel who demonstrated at the siege of the Hotel National and the battle of Fort Atares his ability as the real leader of Batista's troops. I know that shortly thereafter Batista became distrustful of this officer, and while he has been promoted, he does not hold a command, but a staff position where he is out of direct touch with the troops. I refrain from mentioning the man's name because it might do him a grave injustice. However, I know him personally and consider him the most courageous and efficient officer of the Cuban Army. My informant also stated that the ABC Society is building up and reorganizing rapidly and that certain important political groups are entering into the movement with the alleged Army group mentioned above to remove Batista,in order that the President may control the armed forces, in accordance with the provisions of the Cuban Constitution. According to my informant, the President is more or less conversant with this alleged movement. However, the Chief of Mission agrees with me that the whole thing is fantastic and most probably without any foundation, and he feels certain that President Gomez would not, under any circumstances, be a party to or permit any such movement. The "coup" or attempt is supposed to be made sometime during the middle of the sugar grinding season. Unquestionably, there are and have been for some time certain officers in the Cuban Army who dislike Batista and who, if they could, would remove him, but I do not believe that this feeling is sufficiently widespread to constitute a menace. Information from other sources points to Batista's popularity with the troops, especially with the enlisted men and junior officers. I attach considerable weight to the Maximiliano Smith matter but, for the present, very little, if any weight to the rumored plot regarding Batista's removal.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5294 Date: Dec. 17,1936

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By b-24-69 61
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G-2 Report ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

J.W.S. - 12/19/36

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 24 1936

Political Situation

1. Supplementing report No.5294, index as above, dated December 18th, early this morning by a vote of 106 to 43 the Lower House of the Cuban Congress passed the Bill which had already been passed by the Senate, establishing a production tax of .9 cents per bag on each bag of sugar produced during the forthcoming "Zafra" (sugar season). This tax is intended for the support of the Army rural schools, hospitals (to be constructed) and orphan asylums, which have been established and are sponsored by Colonel Batista and the Army.

2. President Gomez has repeatedly stated that he would veto the Bill if passed by Congress. As previously reported, Colonel Batista organized the Army rural school system and the Civic-Military Institute, and also the hospital project by Decree-Law during the Barnet Administration. Since the inauguration of President Gomez on May 20th last, his attitude toward these projects has changed from antipathy to bitter opposition. It is true that Batista is usurping prerogatives of the Civil Government in carrying out these projects; however, the Army is the only institute available for and capable of carrying out these undertakings. The school project fills a great need of the more isolated rural sections where but a bare sprinkling of people are even able to read and write.

3. Colonel Batista's temperament is such that he has to keep busy. His military knowledge is but slight, and, while he desires to improve the efficiency of his Army, he leaves his military duties to subordinates in whom he has confidence. Whether this is because he is not especially interested or whether it is because he realizes his lack of military knowledge and training, I do not know. However, during the period of almost three years - between the resignation of Cespedes and the inauguration of Gomez, most of Batista's time and interest were occupied with political matters which, strictly speaking, were outside of his real duties. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that he was the controlling factor in those several governments, removing and appointing revolutionary and provisional Presidents, his meddling in and usurpation of power in the Civil Government was not resented. Moreover, he listened willingly to and almost invariably followed the sound advice of the American Ambassador in such matters as were of sufficient importance to justify the Ambassador's interest, and this gave stability to those governments. Since the inauguration of Gomez, Batista has withdrawn all of his officers who formerly were holding Civil Government posts, and he has turned most of his attention and interest to the Army rural schools, Civic-Military Institute, hospital projects, etc., as previously reported by this office.

4. When Batista left Havana recently to inspect the military posts in Pinar del Rio Province, it appears that he understood that the President would offer no objection to the enactment of the law establishing a 9-cent tax per bag on sugar, for the purpose of carrying on his (Batista's) "pet" projects mentioned above. However, during his absence, the President bitterly assailed not only Batista but also the proposed tax. This angered Batista, who returned to Camp Columbia yesterday, suffering from a severe attack of grippe. Feeling in the Army against the President runs high - so high, in fact, that they want Batista to immediately remove him. However, Batista has promised the Ambassador that he will prevent this, if possible, but that he will be forced to give his full support to the movement now being formed to have the President impeached.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5296 Date: Dec. 19, 1936

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

5. Batista's rural school project has made him a much more popular figure in the rural districts than is the President. However, in Havana it is probable that the President is more popular, especially among the more intelligent classes.Batista feels that the maintenance of his prestige in the Army is vital to him, and especially that it must be maintained at this time, or he will face the danger of being removed by his own officers. It is unfortunate that this clash has come to a crisis at this time, but sooner or later it would have had to be met. When Gomez accepted the presidency he must have known that he could not force Batista out of certain participation in matters which, under the Constitution, were prerogatives of the Chief Executive. The President is undoubtedly honest and sincere, but he is stubborn and "sulky" in the face of opposition. He could have made a friend of Batista and the Army by a policy of tact and forbearance, and eventually he might have restored all of his prerogatives. However, his attitude towards Batista has been such as to widen the breach and force a showdown. Batista has many weaknesses, among them being his intense desire for popularity and his temperament of riding a hobby to the exclusion of more important matters. On the other hand, the President has lost much of the sympathy and support of the middle and better classes of Cubans, largely because of his ill-concealed and often open demonstration of childish, petulant traits of jealousy, irritability, tactlessness and sulkiness. He confided to me two years ago that he was resigning as Mayor of Havana and that he was withdrawing his Party from support of President Mendieta. This was at a time when Mendieta needed the support of every patriotic Cuban. I believe that his intention to withdraw at a time when his friend, Mendieta, needed him most was because of his disappointment at not receiving more political offices for members of his small Party, and because he feared that further connection with the Mendieta Government would injure his future political career.

6. It is most probable that Gomez will be removed by impeachment, instigated by Batista and the Army and the President's numerous opponents in Congress. The Chief of Mission has been in constant cable communication with our State Department regarding this matter, and President Roosevelt is much interested in the situation.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation and
Contacts.

TNG:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5296 Date: Dec. 19,1936.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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LATIN AMERICAN SECTION, G-2, W. D.

December 16, 1936.

NOTES: Current Cuban Situation.

1. Air Mail despatch from U. S. Embassy in Havana states: (See attached memorandum.)

2. About December 5, after the Senate's approval of the 9¢ Bag Tax, Colonel Batista left for Pinar del Rio on maneuvers. President Gomez arranged a bloc in the House to oppose measure.

3. General Montalvo, Cuban Minister of War, upon learning of Batista's intention to return to Havana, went to Pinar del Rio. Montalvo feared an open clash should Colonel Batista return to Havana at this time.

4. State Department is of the opinion that Gomez(having made an issue of 9¢ bag tax designed to support the Army School System activities) precipitates a declared break between the President and Batista.

5. State Department advised Mr. Welles in Buenos Aires, Argentina, of the above.

6. December 4, bill for 9¢ bag tax (325 lb.) on raw sugar introduced in Senate proceeds of which to be devoted to maintenance and improvement of the Civic-Military Rural Schools. Sugar industry admitted it could bear the tax.

7. Senate unanimously approved it on December 4th and sent it to House for approval.

8. Colonel Batista's report on "Civic-Military Rural Schools" says: " * * * in spite of scanty resources which the Army has at its command, by taking funds from its own budget, and from its action and from the initiative of a private nature these schools have been provided with all necessary details, etc." (State Department, Date: November 17th).

E. M. Almond

E. M. ALMOND,
Major, General Staff,
Chief of Section.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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LATIN AMERICAN SECTION, G-2, W. D.

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MEMORANDUM: G-2 Notes from ~~Copy of~~ State Department Despatch.

(Air Mail Letter dated December 12, 1936, Havana,

U. S. Embassy, Received State Department (L.A.),

December 15, 1936, PM. Noted by G-2, W.D.

December 16, 1936.)

Subject: Disagreement between President Gomez and Colonel Batista over Tax Bill for Civic-Military Rural Schools.

1. A serious disagreement has suddenly developed.

2. Cause: Disagreement between President Gomez and Colonel Batista over 9¢ bag tax bill, which would be devoted to maintenance and improvement of Civic-Military Rural Schools.

3. Colonel Batista sponsored the Bag Tax Bill after consultation with sugar interests in Cuba.

4. The sugar interests appeared to recognize the enthusiasm with which the native Cubans had received the school idea and indicated that they could stand the tax.

5. Following passage of the Bag Tax Bill by the Senate, Batista left Havana on December 5th with a body of troops for a cross-country march far into Pinar del Rio, to be gone until December 20.

6. Gomez did not discuss the tax matter with Batista prior to the latter's departure; however on December 9th, without consulting his friends and advisors he (Gomez) sent for his House leaders and asked them to defeat the bill, stating he would veto it if passed. (So he told Montalvo, Minister of War.)

7. During past few days Gomez has been bringing pressure on House members to defeat the Tax Bill and in addition is insisting that his own bloc of Accion Republicana meet and announce (on Monday, December 14) their opposition. He also openly expressed himself very definitely as being against the bill.

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8. Colonel Batista on the other hand is intensely interested in the bill because he contends the schools are a constructive improvement in rural communities.

9. Upon learning of the President's attitude he was on the point of returning to Havana, which would have precipitated a crisis. General Montalvo dissuaded him from this course, but Batista feels that he has a sufficient number of votes to have the measure passed and that Gomez would not dare to veto it. Batista like Gomez is anxious for a "show-down."

10. Meanwhile, thru the parliamentary mechanics of breaking a quorum, the question has not come to the floor of the House and all party leaders seem most anxious to avoid a conflict. Even the Menocalista minority is too alarmed at the seriousness of the situation and its possible repercussion to attempt to derive political advantage from the present impasse.

11. Friends of both sides are endeavoring to reach a compromise, possibly thru insertion of a provision in the bill granting a portion of the proceeds of the tax for establishment of juvenile courts, a matter in which Gomez is interested, and for the maintenance of various government hospitals, asylums, etc.

12. Fortunately, as yet the "crisis" has not come in for discussion in the press and the general public is still unaware of it.

(Signed) Jefferson Caffery

The above notes were copied from State Department's Despatch by:

E. M. Almond
Major, General Staff,
Chief of Section.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from TAGO to Archivist
By
Date 6-24-69

December 16, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Current Situation in Cuba.

1. The numerous differences between President Gomez and Colonel Batista, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, evident since the former was inaugurated in May, 1936, appear to be crystallizing into a definite issue.

2. A serious disagreement has suddenly developed concerning the passage of a bill by the Cuban Congress providing for an additional tax of nine cents per bag on Cuban raw sugar. The annual proceeds from this tax (approximately $2,000,000) would be devoted to the maintenance of the Civic-Military Rural School System recently organized by the Army in conjunction with the Department of Education and now operating under Army instructors and administration. This bill, sponsored by Colonel Batista, was introduced in and passed by the Cuban Senate on December 4, 1936.

3. Following the Senate's passage of the bill, Colonel Batista left Havana, on December 5, with a body of troops to maneuver in Pinar del Rio until December 20.

4. President Gomez, on December 9, without consulting Colonel Batista and apparently ignoring his friends and advisers, organized his political adherents in the House of Representatives for the purpose of defeating the bill, openly stating that if it was passed he would veto it.

5. Colonel Batista, upon learning of the President's attitude, made preparations to return to Havana at once, an action which might have precipitated a crisis. He was prevailed upon by General Montalvo, Minister of War, to remain in Pinar del Rio.

6. On December 14 the bag tax measure, upon being introduced in the House of Representatives, caused so much confusion and opposition, principally from President Gomez's adherents, that the session was adjourned without action on the bill.

NOTED BY W. P. D.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

7. Developments since December 14 are unknown to this office and to the State Department but our Military Attache in Havana has been asked for an air mail report on the situation.

8. Comments.

a. While the Army-sponsored Civic-Military Rural School movement is a laudatory effort and one which has been received with great enthusiasm among rural Cubans, it appears that it, and the resulting legislation for its financial support, are not within the normal province of the Army's administration and that it impinges upon the prerogatives of another Governmental Department (Education). It is apparently on this premise that President Gomez resents such interference at a time when he is bending every effort to return the Cuban Government to a constitutional basis.

b. Colonel Batista, on the other hand, appears to be intensely interested in the Civic-Military Rural School System and contends that the constructive service rendered by the Army is a worthy activity which is of national benefit to Cuba. Incidentally, this extra legal function now being performed by the Army provides an excuse for maintaining its present strength of approximately 15,000 men - the largest peace strength in its history.

c. It appears that both President Gomez and Colonel Batista are ready for a show-down on this and the issues which have gone before.

F. H. LINCOLN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority letter of Dec. 18, 1963, from JACO to Archivist.
By
Date 6-21-89

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WAR DEPARTMENT

December 21, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Current Situation in Cuba.

1. Further developments in the controversy now raging between President Gomez and Colonel Batista, Army Chief of Staff, indicate the firm determination of the latter to assert his dominance in Cuban affairs even if impeachment of President Gomez has to be resorted to.

2. On December 18, the 9¢-bag tax bill, referred to in a memorandum of this office dated December 16, was passed at a special session by the House and has been sent to the President for signature. Gomez has stated that he will veto it, but it is indicated that if the bill is reenacted over the veto he (Gomez) will naturally respect such a constitutional procedure and continue to carry on his duties as President.

3. In the meantime, certain political leaders in conference with Batista's adherents have drawn up plans for impeachment of President Gomez hoping to oust him from office by constitutional means rather than by violence. The impeachment charges were to be introduced in the House of Representatives on Sunday, December 20, or Monday, December 21, and accuse President Gomez of "interfering" with the legislative powers of Congress by declaring his action (veto) on a measure prior to its passage and also of unduly influencing the votes of certain House members. Apparently, Colonel Batista believes that the Vice-President (Laredo Bru) would head a regime more favorable to the Army. Impeachment proceedings on December 22 are now indicated.

4. United States Ambassador Caffery, in Havana, is of the opinion that Gomez is determined to pursue his course and carry out his declared intention to veto the 9¢-bag tax bill, thus increasing the tenseness in the situation. Colonel Batista has recently assured Ambassador Caffery that he would allow no military violence to take place and that whatever action he (Batista) took would be constitutional. Ambassador Caffery left Havana late on December 18 for Pinar del Rio to confer with Colonel Batista.

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noted by WPD (Embassy)

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5. Comment.

a. It is indicated that Batista's supporters are confident that they can muster more than the required number (108) of votes necessary to institute impeachment proceedings.

b. It appears that Batista is inclined to support the plan for impeachment of President Gomez regardless of the latter's action on the tax measure in question in the hope that as a result of such action a government may be established which will recognize his supremacy and that of the military over the regularly constituted civil authorities in Cuba.

F. H. LINCOLN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF DEC 22 1936

NOTED - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report ~~Restricted~~ 3020-b 7

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 29 1936

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Date 1-27-37

Government Crisis

1. Supplementing reports No. 5295 and 5296 on the above subject, dated December 18th and 19th, respectively, the President, on December 21st, vetoed the bill providing for a 9-cent tax on each bag of sugar produced in Cuba. On December 22nd., the Senate passed the bill for the second time, over-riding the President's veto by a vote of 26 to 6. It is understood that feeling in the Senate was extremely tense - several Senators drew their revolvers and bloodshed was narrowly avoided.

2. On the same day, the Lower House of Congress by a vote of 111 to 45 passed a bill to impeach the President. The bill was immediately sent to the Senate where the President will stand trial. (The impeachment charges which were submitted by the House to the Senate are being translated and will be forwarded in next pouch).

3. Had the President shown a more tactful consideration of the Army, and especially of Batista's Army rural school project, this crisis would undoubtedly have been prevented. As explained in previous reports, these projects (schools, hospitals, etc) are legal and, while the President approves of them,as does practically everyone else in Cuba, he stated to Congress when explaining his veto of the tax measure that they pertain and should be administered by the Departments of Education and Sanitation, and that the Army has overstepped its proper prerogatives under the Constitution in administering them. This is, of course, a fact, but the President either does not know or will not admit that in these matters he has been facing an actual condition and not a theory.

4. Education and sanitary conditions have become more and more neglected in the rural sections of Cuba since the American Occupation. These deplorable conditions have been much discussed but nothing has been done to correct them until Batista opened his rural schools. It is probable that no action would have been taken by the Civil Government to rectify these conditions because of the prohibitive cost of the projects if administered through the Department of Education without the assistance of the Army Rural Guard detachments, and also because of lack of efficiency on the part of the Departments of Education and Sanitation. Some sympathy is expressed among intelligent Cubans and Americans for the President. However, his loss of prestige among these elements of society, because of the recent controversy, has been great. The hope was guardedly expressed at the time of his inauguration that he might be able to eventually restore his full Constitutional prerogatives, but this hope has now changed to an expression of severe criticism, because he has - through tactlessness and stubbornness - created a feeling of bitterness against him on the part of the Army, which has threatened the peace of Cuba and the stability of the government. As stated above, had the President met the Army situation with a reasonable degree of toleration and tact and had he supported Batista instead of attempting to block him and openly criticising him with respect to the Army rural school project, he would have gained the widespread support of Cubans and, undoubtedly, he would eventually have been able to transfer much of the administration of the project in question to the proper civil government departments.

5. The House of Representatives has not as yet cast its second vote on the sugar tax, but it is expected that a vote will be taken today which will override the President's veto.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation and Press.

From M.A. Havana Report No.5298 Date: Dec. 23,1936

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Present Executive.

Impeachment of President Gomez

1. Supplementing recent reports regarding the governmental crisis (index No.3020-b), the Cuban Senate, during the evening of December 23rd. impeached President Miguel Mariano Gomez by a vote of 22 to 12, on charges which had been passed on and submitted to that body by the Lower House. Under the present Constitution, only a bare majority is necessary to pass impeachment charges in the Senate. A translation of the draft of impeachment charges is attached hereto. Dr. Gomez moved from the Presidential Palace to his private residence on the Prado, Havana, during the same night.

2. At noon on December 24th, Vice President Federico Laredo Bru took the oath of office as President. The ceremony was hastily arranged and there were present only the personnel of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of which administered the oath to Dr. Laredo Bru; former Provisional Presidents Mendieta and Barnett, all of whom were grouped, together with the new President, behind a table at one end of the long and spacious Hall of Mirrors in the Palace; and on the right side in line according to rank were the Chiefs of Missions of the Diplomatic Corps, each accompanied by only one or two of his staff - the American Ambassador being accompanied by the First Secretary and the Military Attache; on the other side were two ranks of Army officers, perhaps sixty in all, and behind them were a few members of Congress. It was perhaps significant that the ceremony was attended only by, as stated above, the personnel of the Supreme Court, two former Provisional Presidents, the Diplomatic Corps (with reduced staffs), a large number of Army officers and perhaps thirty members of Congress who occupied inconspicuous positions behind the solid double ranks of Army officers. Neither Colonel Batista nor Colonel Jose Pedraza (the latter Chief of Havana Police) were present nor any members of the Cuban Navy, although a large body of Naval and Police officers called upon the new President after the ceremony.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Embassy records
and Personal Observation.

TNG:vm

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From M.A., Havana Report No.5299 Date: December 29,1936

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

TRANSLATION

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RESOLUTION OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST THE
HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Being fully aware of the gravity of the historical moment through which the Republic of Cuba is passing, and of our responsibility as mandataries of the people thereof, we, the undersigned Representatives, address the Honorable House of which we form part in fulfillment of the disagreeable but ineludible duty of submitting for its analysis the facts which have brought about the constitutional crisis which confronts the country at the present moment, with the object of procuring a solution, in order that, by removing the obstacles which the Republic has encountered at the very time when its normalcy is being restored, and its welfare is being reestablished, it may continue its progress toward the holding of the Constitutional Assembly which should give the Cuban people their definitive Fundamental Charter and facilitate the putting in order of the new social-economic orientation which will permit them to enjoy pacifically and continuously social freedom and well-being.
Soon after the Cuban people had emerged from the great convulsion which in 1933 forced it to have recourse to an extreme measure to dislodge the authorities who prevented the free development of the nation, and after the several constitutional experiments which brought as a consequence the derogation of the 1901 Constitution and of the Reform of 1928, it seemed that, on the basis of the agreement of the political parties in March,1935, the promulgation of the Constitutional Law of June 11 of that same year, and the elections on January 10 of the year ending, an adequate formula had finally been found to give the nation a stable constitutional status, in spite of its transitory character, and (to give it) authorities who, deriving their power from the will of the people, would permit the nation without further difficulties to reach complete political, social, and economic normality.

The assumption of office of the authorities popularly elected on January 10, 1936, under the terms of the Constitutional Law of 1935, allowed all to hope that, through the fulfillment of its provisions (inspired in the 1901 Constitution) and through the experience gained during its operation, the strengthening of the principle of authority, the maintenance of order, and the growth of economic activities necessary to make lasting the well-being which the people of Cuba began to experience under the most favorable auspices would be achieved.

However, it is painful to confess that the President of the Republic, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez Arias, instead of profiting from the fruitful lessons of our recent history and himself maintaining a strict respect for constitutional standards, has deviated therefrom, insensibly at first (and) in a violent manner during the past few days, toward the arrogant "personalismo" which has so harmed this society, and by invading the sphere of action of Congress has created so serious a situation that it endangers not only the stability of our institutions, but darkens the smiling horizon which was opening to the hopes of the Cuban people.

By virtue thereof, we, the undersigned Representatives, have the honor and the duty of presenting to the consideration, discussion and approval of the other members who compose this Honorable House, the following -

MOTION OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC BEFORE THE SENATE

Occurrences of which all the Representatives are aware have placed the Congress of the Republic in the difficult dilemma of either renouncing its constitutional powers in favor of the President of the Republic or of fulfilling the bitter duty of accusing the official who, not because he is the highest is less obligated than is the most humble citizen of our democracy to obey the Fundamental Charter and the laws, of acts which, preventing the free functioning of the legislative power and violating constitutional provisions, make him responsible before the Senate of the Republic for the

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crimes specified and punishable under Article 48 of the existing Constitutional Law.

From the very moment of taking office, the President of the Republic deviated from the democratic line of political "compenetracion" which brought him to power, and formed his Cabinet, save in exceptionally honorable cases, of persons totally foreign to the political forces which predominate in the country, guided exclusively by his desire to impose his will not only upon those forces which represent the axis of the Government, but on all the nation, with the object of exercising a personal rule.

From this very instant his government has become characterized by an absolute contempt for the free authority of Congress, passing from a lack of personal consideration for the majority of its members to the commission of acts which constitute the crime ("delito") of a constitutional character against the free functioning of the legislative power, and against the sanctity of constitutional precepts, which acts are specified and punishable under the existing Constitutional Law.

The inertia of the Executive Power in the governing of the nation is a matter of extraordinary seriousness. Since May 20, when he took office, to this date the President of the Republic, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez, has not carried on a constructive labor of an economic, political, or social character, nor has he shown any creative initiative which might improve the welfare of the country, develop its wealth, or increase its economic capacity.

Converting the general character of these affirmations to concrete cases in view of facts which are fully known to public opinion,

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ACCUSES THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC BEFORE THE SENATE.

First: Of having impeded the approval by the House of Representatives of the law establishing a nine-cent tax upon every bag of sugar, which was approved by the Senate at its session of the 4th instant, by 29 votes in favor and two against, notwithstanding the large majority which such approval has in the House, because not only has he personally summoned some Representatives admonishing them to vote against the same, but in some cases he has threatened them with expulsion from the Parliamentary Committees on which he controls a majority, as occurred in the case of the Accion Republicana and Liberal Parties, bringing about as a consequence of his incitement the disagreeable events which occurred during the session of the House on the 14th instant, which are known to every one.

This action on the part of the President of the Republic not only constitutes a violation of Article 60 of the Constitutional Law, but involves directly the offense of a constitutional character of preventing the free functioning of the legislative power, which (offense) is referred to in the first paragraph of Article 48 of the same law.

And Second: Of directly coercing Congressmen by threatening them not to sanction the laws which Congress enacts in the exercise of its proper authority. The President of the Republic has the constitutional right to sanction or reject the laws enacted by Congress, after they are approved by it and within the time referred to in Article 63 of the Constitutional Law; but to wield the right of not sanctioning them as a threat to prevent free legislation constitutes not only an infringement of Articles 60 and 63 of the aforesaid Constitutional Law, but involves the offense of preventing the free functioning of the legislative power, specified in and punishable under paragraph first of Article 48 of the same constitutional text.

THEREFORE:

The House of Representatives, in the exercise of the right granted it in Article 51 of the existing Constitutional Law, accuses before the Senate the

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

President of the Republic, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez Arias, of the perpetration of the acts mentioned in the body of this Resolution, which constitute offenses against the free functioning of the legislative power, and of the infringement of the constitutional provisions cited, which offenses are specified in and punishable under paragraphs first and third of Article 48 of the Constitutional Law.

The Senate, being competent by express provision of said Article 48 to take cognizance of and to judge the acts mentioned and the person accused, is hereby requested to apply to this accusation the procedure referred to in Article 39 of the Law of Relations between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The House reserves the right to amplify the facts, present the evidence, and take other steps in the accusation, as soon as it has knowledge of the procedure decided upon by the Senate.

Hall of Sessions, House of Representatives, December 22, of the year 1936.

(s) JOAQUIN PEDRAZA,
President ad interim

(s) JESUS PORTOCARRERO,
Secretary ad interim

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AMERICAN EMBASSY 1/19/37 JWS.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA. CUBA.
January 19, 1937

JAN 27 1937 STATE DEPT. OF STATE MIL., INTEL. DIV.

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No. 5308

Subject: Additional Information Concerning Report No. 5294.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 26 1937

1. Reference Evaluation of Reports dated January 11, 1937, the officer referred to in the 6th paragraph of report No. 5294 (3020-b) as being in my opinion the "most courageous and efficient officer in the Cuban Army," is Lieut.Colonel Gregorio Querejeta y Valdes.

2. Querejeta is a negro and apparently a full-blooded one. He was a Captain on duty at Camp Columbia under former Presidents Machado and Cespedes -- the only negro officer in the garrison. A few days after the Sergeants mutiny of Sept. 4, 1933, Captain Querejeta was one of the few officers of garrisons in and around Havana to return to duty with his command. Since that date, I have been informed by a number of the former officers who did not return at Batista's request that Querejeta was one of the most efficient officers in the Cuban Army prior to the revolt, and that he is, from a military standpoint, the most efficient in the present Army. During and subsequent to both the Hotel National and the Fort Atares fights, information came to me from many reliable sources of contacts (some ex-officers, some ABC's who participated in the Atares fight, and later from officers of the present Army) that Querejeta planned and directly commanded Batista's troops in both actions, or, in other words, that he was the actual leader on the field, moving about cooly from group to group of Batista's more advanced units, and it was remarked at the time that he was the only officer who did this. He made quite a reputation for efficiency and bravery during those episodes. As stated above, he is absolutely black, with brilliant "beedy" and steady eyes that look the individual with whom he is conversing directly in the eye.

3. For some reason which has never been clear, Batista either did not like Querejeta or he distrusted him - perhaps it was just dislike due to the fact that Querejeta was very popular with the enlisted personnel. For the past two and a half years he has been relegated to duty away from troops and is now one of the assistants of the Quartermaster General.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG:vm

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report 3020-b

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

2657-9-330/376 RECEIVED G-2 W.D. FEB 5 1937

Political Situation

1. Reference Evaluation of Reports dated January 11, 1937, report No. 5296 (3020-b), while it is true, as stated in the Evaluation, that "the greater part of this report would have been enhanced in value had it been received prior to the recent incident over the sugar tax measure--", it would have been difficult for this office to have anticipated the recent events which culminated so rapidly in the impeachment of the President. I had reason to believe, from several confidential conversations with the Chief of Mission on the subject a few days before Gomez attacked the tax measure, that Gomez and Batista had, to a certain extent, patched up their difficulties.

2. Regarding my statement that "Batista's military knowledge is but slight," I referred more specifically to technical and tactical knowledge. He is a leader of ability, as was demonstrated during the mutiny and has been demonstrated since, and there has been considerable improvement in discipline and obedience in the Cuban Army under his command. However, there was much room for improvement, and, while he is entitled to credit in this respect, more credit is due to his principal subordinates, especially the regimental commanders. It is my opinion that the commander of a military organization as large as that of the Cuban Army should spend more time in connection with duties pertaining to his command. Batista's time is mostly taken up with politicians and matters not connected with the Army. In conversations with him from time to time, I have gained the impression that he is not as interested in military training, etc. as he should be considering his position.

3. I concur in the remaining comments on this report (5296) as contained in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, pages 2 and 3 of the Evaluation, with the exception of the statement on page 3 that "it seems doubtful that he could have made a friend of Batista and the Army by a policy of tact and forbearance and that eventually he (Gomez)" might have restored all of his prerogatives." This is, of course, a matter of opinion. My opinion, as expressed in the report, seems to be the general opinion of the Mission. Several well-informed Americans and representatives of foreign governments have expressed similar opinions confidentially, such as - "it is unfortunate that the President is deliberately antagonizing the Army." "Why is he not more tolerant - he seems to forget that this island has just emerged from a very distressing condition, etc." It was, of course, the hope of the Mission that the President's Constitutional prerogatives would be fully restored, but it would have involved much time, patience and tact on the part of the Chief Executive, and perhaps full restoration might not have been achieved. Confidentially, I can say that Batista wanted to be friendly with Gomez and, undoubtedly, he would have been responsive and susceptible to certain gradual changes, but Gomez lacked both the inclination and temperament to carry out such a program. He fully understood the Army situation when he chose to be a candidate for President, and he must have known that the solution could not be approached except with much tact and patience. As matters stand, Batista is triumphant and Gomez's successor enters office as hardly more than a puppet. I have tried, as is proper, to look at this matter without prejudice, but I had hoped and expected, as did most everyone else, that Gomez would do a better job, instead of setting the situation back to about where it was under Mendieta. In this connection, it is probable that some of Gomez's bitterness toward Batista's school project was created or at least intensified by Dr. Mencia, Secretary of Sanitation in the Gomez Cabinet, as they are brothers-in-law and close friends. Of course, Batista's school project was an usurpation of the Department of Education's prerogatives under the Constitution.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5311 Date: January 27, 1937

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

4. With reference to evaluation of report No. 5298 (3020-b), it is possible that I have "somewhat underestimated Batista's desire for greater power and security," as stated in the evaluation. Batista does desire popularity and power, which is clearly indicated by his actions. He realizes that he must maintain the present status quo of Army prestige if he is to maintain himself in office, otherwise, the small group of officers that surround and advise him might remove him. He is the chief power in Cuba, but, considering what Cuba has been through during the past few years, his semi-dictatorship has been used mildly and, in general, with benevolence.

5. Regarding evaluation of report No. 5299, as soon as I return to the office (am at present recovering from a surgical operation) I will try to obtain further details of the trial of Dr. Gomez, personalities involved, defense of the accused, etc. The Mission has made no translation of the sugar tax law, but I shall forward at least the general text of the measure upon my return to the office. There is attached hereto a translation of the statement made by Dr. Gomez to the people of Cuba, after his impeachment by the Senate.

6. As to my pertinent comments on the situation, legally and theoretically Dr. Gomez's attitude was correct, as I see it. I read his speech with interest some days ago. However, Gomez could not have expected to have assumed all of his official prerogatives because of the mere fact that he was elected President. He could not get Congress to act on any measure and his impatience toward the Army was very noticeable and, to a great extent, unnecessary. Gomez is one of Cuba's few honest Presidents, but he lacks intelligence and diplomacy. In my opinion, the new government is quite stable. Batista has promised the Chief of Mission that he will not disturb the present civil government. My very frank opinion on this is that more legislative progress will be possible under Bru than under Gomez. The policy of the Labor Department towards foreigners and foreign business interests has greatly changed, and the handicaps placed on these interests and individuals under Gomez has been relaxed to a great extent. I think American business men, on the whole, are happy at the change, for I believe that they feel that the President, Batista and Congress will now be working in harmony, and will be able to accomplish much for the betterment of Cuba. I do not believe that Batista is interferring as much in presidential and legislative affairs as most of our American news correspondents have stated in their press reports. Most of these correspondents do not like Batista. I would like to advise your office, as I did several years ago, that the only American press correspondents in Cuba who have tried to be fair and not exaggerate the situation, especially during disturbed times, is the local Associated Press Bureau. The representatives of the New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune (also correspondent for TIME magazine) have grossly exaggerated the situation, and the same applies to the local "Havas" agency. The United Press has been guilty of exaggeration from time to time, but less so than those just mentioned. Naturally I have not read all of the Associated Press reports, but I know the staff here does make an honest effort to investigate before submitting communications under the head of facts, and that is the only press bureau here which has a record above reproach in that respect. The Chief of Mission and I have extended the same courtesies to all of the above mentioned press representatives. I am very grateful for the assistance that has been given me during the past four years, but the Associated Press Bureau is the only one that seems to have shown any gratitude for the helpfulness given them by our Mission. I would like to give a typical incident comparing these press bureaus. During the Grau regime, I received word from a very reliable contact that five senior ex-officers, prisoners in La Cabana, had been shot. It happened that all the press representatives were in my office at the time, and I gave them the

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information for what it was worth - not guaranteeing it. I understand that all of them except the A.P. representative forwarded this information to the United States. The chief of the A.P. service here, said nothing, but went at once over to La Cabana and visited the prison. He identified all five of the ex-officers as alive and well, and came back to my office at once and told me. I mention all this merely to emphasize my belief that the Cuban situation has been greatly exaggerated at times by press representatives.

T. N. Gimperling,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

TNG:vm

1 Incl.

Source: Personal Observation

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5311 Date: Jan. 27,1937

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TRANSLATION

TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA

Farewell Address of Miguel Mariano Gomez

Upon assuming the presidency I addressed to Congress, believing it to be (as it was my duty to believe, there being no proof to the contrary) the most genuine and worthy representation of the Cuban people, my first message, in which I set forth the noble and lofty purposes which I entertained for the discharge of the duties of Chief Magistrate of the Nation. Therein was set forth my spirit, anxious for the collective welfare, and the document, in synthesis, takes up the general lines and objects of a Government program inspired by the purest patriotism. The confidence in the necessary cooperation of the other two Powers of the State, the faith in the proper support and harmonious cooperation of other valued elements upon which the Republic likewise rests, and the deep love for Cuba permeating my spirit with beautiful illusions for its improvement and aggrandizement, inspired and guided what I then said, hoping, I repeat, for the solidarity of those factors essential to the normal functioning and unrestricted development of our institutions.

And I commenced my governmental activities guided by the standards I had outlined, and for those lofty ends, trying to bring to all my acts the best will leading to success, through the study, reflection and prudence which are indispensable, and which appertain to the responsibilities of this high office, ready to make such sacrifices as might be demanded of me for the assurance of constitutional stability by the cooperation of all those co-workers in the consolidation of the Nation and the State, with the object that the Republic might overcome all its crises, either active or latent, and in order that the environment of optimism under which I assumed power might be consolidated.

On this day in which I leave that power as a consequence of the unjust destitution decreed by the Senate in response to the incredible accusation of the House of Representatives, I want to address myself directly to the Nation to tell it that in retiring from this arduous office, I do so with a clear conscience that I have fulfilled my duties as Chief of State, because I have fulfilled the promises I made, and possessed of the anxieties I then expressed, my Message being as a decalogue for my conduct as Executive, to the extent that circumstances permitted me, and even forcing those circumstances, showing a constant decided effort to respond to the confidence that had been placed in me, and in wakeful nights of patriotic solicitude, with eager zeal, in incessant work, I have tried to serve the general interests and to solve all difficulties, for the proper progress of the Administration and the full restoration of moral peace.

And we were achieving this slowly, against the inevitable obstacles of such deep transformation following sudden radical changes, but going forward without hesitating, toward the goal of all the great aspirations for "renovation," progress and social equity. Those who did not perceive this were far from contact with the results with which I was daily faced in official reports, and above all, in the palpitations of public life.
There is a revealing fact which proves our progress, and it is the joy which accompanies me in this bitter hour, believing that it is my most precious inheritance: human life is respected,-which constitutes a sign of civilized society.

M.A.,Havana

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However, I had also issued the warning in my cited first message of my Administration, which I read personally on May 20th before the Congress in an act of courteous homage. "I am not blind to the stones in the path," I stated, although I never imagined that the demands of cupidity, the struggle of ambitions, the ambush of intrigue, were so many that they converted this supreme direction (which is so greatly cherished when its bitterness, its disillusionment, its overwhelming work, and its infinite worries, are unknown, if discharged with a clear conscience, feeling for and thinking of Cuba) into genuine torment and constant repugnance; and neither could I have ever believed that elements upon whom I had necessarily to count as efficient collaborators in the conservation of order and the defense of the integrity of our institutions, would grow to the extent of considering themselves co-participators in the government of the Nation, even in matters traditionally and essentially foreign to those which constituted their sole and highly important task, sufficient to employ all their activity: (invading) spheres of action forbidden them, no matter how great may be (as undoubtedly they are) the rights and merits contracted with the Nation through their eminent services to the Republic during the past chaotic times.

Out of a special justified consideration and the natural ties of an official and personal relation, I treated the demands which were made with the respect and the tolerance recommended by circumstances and antecedents insofar as they were not detrimental to the general welfare, nor diminished my powers, thus damaging the system (of Government). This has been the only limit to the broad-mindedness with which I desired in all cases to attend to such demands, by reason of their legitimate and logical influence: and I have always, a guide to my conduct, taken care not to experience stupid or childish susceptibility, carrying my transigeance to the extent permitted by decorum. This has all been useless. They wanted more: to rival, and to give orders to the Palace from Camp Columbia (perhaps because of established custom). The invasion of a field which belongs only to the Executive Power went on increasing, and it was intended, either secretly or openly, to penetrate into the Civil Administration, through inspections or interferences with which to intervene and control, belittling and depressing it, and seizing from its functions which by nature belongs to it, and using revenues of the Treasury, which it was authorized only to distribute and apply. It is useless to try to deny this which I have just stated, since it is publicly known, and many and daily were the acts in which it was evidenced in the majority of the public offices.

It was a matter of full patriotic necessity and foresight to put a stop to such action, which was dissolving the political structure and administrative organization, and to check depressive interference and the vanity of spectacular propaganda which, through special laws, led to and culminated in the striking from the Organic Law of the Executive Power provisions which are inherent in the civil character of the Republic, (resulting in) disarranging the Budget Law, and transferring public funds: the net result being the growing preponderance of the Armed Forces and the ensuing decrease in the authority and resources of the Civil Power. In such notorious circumstances, alarmed by the danger which it entailed for the conservation of the civil character given our State by the Constitution of democratic bases and standards which exclude fascist tendencies, there arose the Law which I had the duty and unpleasantness of returning to Congress, for the reasons set forth in my recent veto, which indicates the powerful motives of a juridical and patriotic order which constrained me to do so; to summarize, the violation of certain constitutional provisions, and the diminution of the sphere of action of the Executive Power in transferring what remained (as had been done by the recent laws of the Provisional Government) to the Instituto Militar, as if it were another Power of the State.

I could not, without abdicating from my convictions and being disloyal to patriotic duties, without disregarding the principles of the liberal creed which I profess and which inspires our policies, accept that this growing process should continue, since it would lead to an intolerable

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domination, incompatible with our present status, and which only force or complicity may change, reducing it to a simple appearance and gross simulation. Thus the said veto, in which, recognizing the merit of the protection of the "campesino" (rural population) I limited myself to the exercise of my rights and the fulfillment of my duties, and which in use of its powers the Senate had reconsidered; and later, perhaps, if a controversy arose, the Supreme Court could have decided as between our respective opinions, thus carrying into effect the equilibrium of the Powers, without any conflict, which only arises when the exercise of legitimate powers is obstructed, prevented or coerced, and haughtiness, overstepping its bounds, damages the rights of others.

The people of Cuba are aware of what has occurred. The genesis of the plan of assault upon my investiture is an open secret. My strictly constitutional attitude has provoked wrath, and hasty meetings, and peremptory orders, which swiftly cristalized into the sessions of the past few days in the submissive Congress, which first unjustly accused me and then condemns me capriciously, without any basis either serious or even worthy of consideration. May they not have to repent the injury done against me (and more than against me, against the Republic, according to the unprejudiced opinion of the Nation) committed on that already unlucky December 23, 1936, when a dismal precedent was set for the first time in our history, by a decision which undoubtedly those foreign to this controversy and free of passion, will interpret as a "pertubacion" of the Law, and the beginning of the downfall of our institutions, mortally wounded by this unaccustomed, arbitrary procedure, sower of unrest; and normal life is once again broken and interrupted, although on the intimidated surface, all appears quiet and serene.

I know that I have not been led to these sane and firm views by any petty spirit of silly rivalry, nor by the childish pride of maintaining in a proud or exaggerated manner prerogatives which of course should be intangible. I know that an excess of zeal is not possible through anti-patriotic opportunism. All that I could have possibly assigned, I assigned as a pledge and sacrifice to the prudent compromise of the present hour, which are easily covered by the word "realities," and which is an expression so much in use and much generalized by accommodating temperaments; but the susceptibility and the ambition were too great, as is amply proven by the pretext seized for the outbreak of hostilities and the rupture. Let it be another who shall take responsibility of consenting to the permanence and development of the confusion and usurpations which I denounce and which cost me my office, the direct corollary of which shall be the eclipse, weakening and degeneration of popular sovereignty, enervated and enfeebled, which is involved in the subordination of the mandataries of suffrage, Executive and Parliamentary to other powers of the Nation.

If, after the general election of January 10th, the Chief of the Army continues removing and appointing Presidents and disposing of Congressmen (and this is what the assault which has sacrificed me means, a shameful but true reality) then it is preferable, more expeditious, more logical, perhaps more effective, and of course more frank and sincere, and surely more propitious and adequate for the reformist apostolate of the new epoch of full redemptions, which is now being preached, that it be proclaimed that he who has the strength governs, by installing him in the Presidency, although I presume without clairvoyance nor mistrust that he does not desire (and very wisely) to remove himself far from General Headquarters and the camp wherein reside the disciplined militia, beloved and faithful; and if this is what we are coming to, let us fall into that regime as quickly as possible, thus experimenting and scanning its results, and obtaining as the first advantage the saving of those congressional expenditures, excessive in an opulent State, in contrast with Offices of Chiefs of Sanitation which receive $20.00, and with hospitals lacking in the most indispensable material, without attendance,

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nor asylums for the destitute sick, the people completely abandoned, all of which I could not prevent since such credits were beyond my reach, and since the Army and Navy absorb almost one-third of the Budget.

I do not share this opinion;however, if that is the honest conviction, what I ask is logic and sincerity for the valiant decision of carrying this out, permitting us at once to test this system, which is not a new one. The Romans had their "Magistradara Dictatorial" for abnormal times. If it is believed that we are still in such a situation, requiring omniscient and omnipotent guardianship, let the hydrid and disgraceful fiction cease, and let govern the conceptions and the procedure of him who believes he can achieve the regeneration and the welfare of our unfortunate and exhausted people, and do not hypocritically make use of the ballot box for the election of powerless officials, but appoint an Advisory Council, properly remunerated, of capable persons identified with the plan that is to lead to those objectives.

Even though the adaptation is a violent one at times, and perhaps in the long run that might be our case due to the pugnacity of inborn rebelliousness, its undertaking might be instigated by the observation that contemporaneously a reaction from dictatorial (cesaristas) regimes is being accentuated elsewhere. As a Cuban and as a revolutionist I would deplore the intimation, as well as that this should be the end of the struggle which we began with other ideals, and that oppressions and monopolies that we censured in the regime which was overthrown on August 12, 1933, should be reacted. I would regret this for Cuba, and for those who might uphold the satisfaction not only of the success of having freed ourselves of the anarchy, but of the triumph over egoism,declaring a disinterestedness and renunciation which were the title of the greatest glory and of the most solid security of guarantee for political struggles of the future. I would like Cuba peaceful and properly guided, and without a threat of being despoiled, and what has occurred, which proves that there is an all-powerful will, is the sinister admonition that suffrage will not be pure nor free, a painful presage which disturbs my spirit.

With regard to my recent position and decisions, I could not resign because a man of honor could not do so under the threat which was known to everyone. I could not resign, although I clearly saw the outcome of events, knowing the actors of this manoeuvre, which I would regret, because I subordinate everything to the peace and concord of the Cubans, and who knows what form the drama will take, or in what form or through what initiative, even that which would cause the greatest surprise, the sad precedent already having been set. It has not been possible to present a single criticism against the management of the public funds, nor has anyone cast any doubt upon my honor and probity. The laughable charges are an imposture of political vagueness to outline a pretended infringement sanctioned by Article 48 of the Constitution. Necessarily, believing myself innocent of the absurd and fantastic imputation, I had to bear the trial and the verdict serenely, honoring candid hypothesis, the judges as having scruples of conscience.

In taking this farewell of my fellow-citizens, I have nothing else to say in justification of my acts. I can add, in retiring to my home, certain healthful final considerations which I deem opportune, applicable to all of those who represent public force, to all of us who respect and appreciate it, and to those who support and detest it. Force is essential in our times and circumstances for the existence of the Republic, and the peaceful life of our citizens. Force at all times has been the indispensable coercive element which sustains right and law. It is the human condition which at times does not obey spontaneously. In the eyes of everyone these truths should not allow these

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others which experience has placed before us to be likewise forgotten; no regime is sustained solely by force, because it does not enter into the heart and the will of those under its sway, who at the end, rebel and for this reason, force which is useful, respected and loved, when it serves its true purposes, is execrable if it becomes unruly, clouding its action and its glory and risking its civic efficacy. I desired for my country conciliation and harmony, and the mutual cooperation of the Civil Power and the Constitutional Army, each within its scope and dignity, intact, in a reciprocal and cordial bond. This has not been possible, and I am free from blame in the development of the unqualified spectacle which we are giving to the world. Holding myself to all the considerations to which I have referred, I nevertheless proposed, because it was my duty within the degree norms of our public life, accustomed thereto since the inauguration of the Republic, to redeem the supremacy of the Civil Power, not fully and hastily, but in a gradual and slow manner, since it would have been imprudent and unskillfull to have attempted to do so immediately and at once, due to the excusable customary pressure and the preceding laxity, to a certain extent justified during previous times of imperative display of sternness; but out of place and obnoxious when the rythm of a return to constitutional methods has been recovered; and understanding it thus, I being opposed to an increase of this equivocal situation, was my error in the opinion of my adversaries. Let it be said openly that my sin consisted in my really trying to be President of the Republic, and not an echo or a figurehead; I defended my honor refusing the annulment (of my rights) and the perversion of what I represent. I have wanted to protect and vindicate the prestige and privileges of the civil element on which I believe rests the credit and the permanent peace of Cuba.

That is all. I am saying nothing new. It is the unanimous comment; it is the truth!

Respecting all opinions, I consider and hold up to public judgment the truly pernicious campaign which helps us and erects as providential men who have had the valor, the fortune and the sagacity, plausible and subject to appreciation, of emerging in domination of difficult and hard situations, the service never having been great enough to consecrate them as gods in a servile gesture, and self-defeating in purpose if it prepares them for and raises them to dictatorships, because history is full of lessons of the damage done to the idol himself (and we have a recent example in the exile at Bermuda), and how unfortunate the result is in the end in the majority of cases, when it brings about the loss of "civilidad" and with it the enjoyment of freedom, the only environment of self-government born from the will of the people. This is the real situation as I look upon it; that is the serious problem that has been created in which the high decision of which I have become a victim has already been pronounced, and which has been received with great indignation, made patent everywhere, and deaf is he who does not hear it. It is a consolation and a hope. Society and the peoples' protest against being enslaved and degraded. The desire to regain civil independence is seen and heard. And in this struggle in which I symbolize the fullness of citizenship, and fall holding that banner, I have the sympathy of many who formerly were hostile or indifferent. In hundreds of ways and channels the encouraging echo of support and applause reaches me, and in my fall I feel comforted and encouraged by the noble battle in which I have engaged. The wrathful dismissal honors me and renders me great.

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I desire all happiness for Cuba. Even for those who have thrown me out with a violence worse than that of physical force, because it wounds (also) them, I ask wiseness and reflection to protect and dignify our community. I hope that the destiny of the Republic does not fall into hidden, unlimited tyrannies which might thwart our institutions and destroy our universal conception of a Democratic Republic. Saddened by these doubts and fears which emerge from this treacherous blow to legality, I write these lines, and may God permit my fellow-citizens to choose for the high Legislative bodies men worthy of the august delegation of authority, conscious of their historic responsibility, and that the possible complications of the future may not lead them to the abjection of submission.

MIGUEL MARIANO GOMEZ.

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M.A., Havana

Jan. 21,1937

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 6 1937

Subversive Rumors.

1. During the past weekrumors that the present political set-up cannot endure have been growing in insistence. These rumors are caused by the frequent changes of Cabinet Ministers, political realignments, the rebirth of the Public Works debt situation, the imminent return of Grau San Martin, and the growing feeling that the American Government has changed its attitude and policy toward the Cuban Republic. (Normally well-informed Cubans attribute the pending American sugar legislation and the future of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement as punitive action on the part of the U.S. Government because of the removal of President Gomez.

2. This atmosphere has seriously affected commerce and the economic life of the nation. Business, I am reliably informed, has reached a point of stagnation that would have seemed impossible six months ago, and this at the height of the grinding season, usually a period when the country is most prosperous.

3. The Government itself is seriously preoccupied, and Colonel Batista, Secretary of State Dr. Juan J.Remos, and other Cabinet Ministers are issuing frequent optimistic statements to the effect that all is well and that the current rumors coming from the Opposition are absurd. The effect of these manifestos has been contrary to that desired, and a skeptical public merely interprets these statements of optimism as confirming the imminence of some important development.

4. The key to the situation, as I see it, is the strength of Batista and his Army. Based upon three weeks of constant contact with the Army, I believe it to be sound and loyal to Batista. The constant changes in the Cabinet are efforts by Colonel Batista to get things done, as well as to heal old political wounds, and are relatively unimportant. The return of Grau San Martin, while dangerous, will not prove disastrous to the equilibrium of the present Government.

5. There is no change, as far as I know, in the attitude of the U. S. Government towards the Cuban nation, and rumors to that effect circulated by the Opposition are merely indicative of the "wish being father to the thought."

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Embassy records
and Contacts.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5342 Date: April 1,1937

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Loyalty of Local Governments to Central Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 21 1937

Trip to Interior of Island

1. Upon the invitation of Colonel Batista, who knew that I was planning a trip around the Island, and upon the advice of our Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Matthews, who believed that my presence might refute to some extent a subversive rumor that the United States had withdrawn its tacit support from the Cuban regime (which rumor was badly rocking the Cuban Ship of State), I attended the review and banquet at Camaguey, April 2, 1937, celebrating the visit of President Laredo Bru and Colonel Batista to that City.

2. This mission lent itself readily to my plan for visiting the eastern part of the Island, and looking over the 1st, 2nd. and 3rd. Regiments stationed in Oriente, Camaguey and Santa Clara, respectively.

3. Leaving Havana at 4:00 A.M. on April 1, 1937, and preceding the Presidential party by some 24 hours, I noted that each bridge and culvert on the Central Highway between Havana and Camaguey, a distance of some 355 miles, was heavily guarded; that the 40 odd towns passed through enroute to Camaguey were decorated with palms, bunting, triumphal arches, etc. etc., and crowded with country people.

4. After inspecting the 3rd. Regiment in Santa Clara on April 1st., and the 2nd. Regiment in Camaguey on April 2nd., I joined the President and Colonel Batista in the reviewing stand at Camaguey at 3:00 P.M. on April 2nd., and witnessed a very impressive military-civilian review. The initial phase of this review included mounted elements from the 1st., 2nd., and 3rd Regiments, and approximately 10,000 uniformed school children from all towns in the Province of Camaguey. This obviously prepared demonstration was followed by an impromptu parade by a mob of at least 15,000 wildly enthusiastic "sons of the soil" from Camaguey and Oriente, who milled by hysterically shouting the praises of Colonel Batista, and utterly ignoring the President. The police at first tried to stop this demonstration, but upon the orders of Colonel Batista, allowed it to proceed for more than an hour.

5. The Presidential party immediately thereafter attended a banquet given by a thousand of the leading professional and business men of Camaguey. This banquet had all the enthusiasm of a football rally and lasted for four hours, wherein all preliminary speakers were drowned out by cries for Batista, who eventually promised "dos palabras" and then talked enthusiastically and well, without notes, for 45 minutes. In this speech he emphasized the following points:

(a) His desire that all men and women exercise their suffrage to elect delegates for a free and sovereign Constituent Assembly.

(b) That he was neither a communist nor an extreme conservative but leaned heavily to the right; that he was friendly to all efforts to establish a balance between the classes.

(c) That his primary object was to improve the social position of the Cuban people.

(d) That while Cuba was nominally a free and independent country, its economic welfare depended upon the export of one crop - sugar - and that while Cuba has at present a good economic position because the United

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States and its governing authorities are well disposed towards Cuba, someday the contrary might be the case; he emphasized that Cuba must be prepared for such a change by the diversification of crops.

(e) He deplored the credence given to wild rumors regarding the stability of the present regime, stating that he, Batista, might fall by the bullet of an assassin, but that he would never "desert the ship."

(f) That he was working hard on sanitary and educational problems, to insure himself that the Cuban people received full value for each peso expended, as he desired to prepare them for a social and economic order based on equity and justice.

(g) He closed by an eloquent plea for all citizens to get behind the Constituent Assembly, and to this end he pledged that the armed forces would guarantee an attitude of fairness and impartiality.

6. This speech was wildly applauded. As I was seated on Colonel Batista's left during the banquet, I had an excellent opportunity to talk with him during the preliminaries to his speech. He interpreted my presence correctly, although the matter was not brought up directly. Aided by the stimulus of the atmospheric enthusiasm and one complete bottle of red wine, Colonel Batista unbosomed himself to me to this effect: That he had no background for meeting the various political problems, except the practical experience of the past three years, when he found that if he did not take a hand in politics, no one else would or could lead Cuba out of the morass: That the necessity for the December, 1936, impeachment of Gomez had crystallized more quickly than he had expected, and that the Cabinet chosen at that time was in the nature of a stop-gap; that recently he had been trying to improve the Government's hand by replacing incompetent with competent men and, at the same time, heal old political wounds; that in so doing, he was greatly handicaped, due to the fact that the best men of Cuba (and none were too good) were either too rich, too proud, too unpatriotic or too cowardly to accept positions in the Cabinet. I gathered that he desired above all else a real Secretary of the Treasury - what with the 1938 Budget staring him in the face and lacking the 12,000,000 pesos seigniorage on silver coinage that had come in so handy in 1937.

7. Following the banquet, I met some thirty odd American mill managers, plantation owners and business men from Oriente, Camaguey and Santa Clara. These men were unanimous in praising Batista's work, several of them stating that he was the only honest Cuban in power since Estrada Palma, the first President. Others stated that while their concerns were called upon by the Army for donations of cement, lumber, steel and other construction materials (never money), they had willingly supplied these materials, as they knew from actual observation that the material was immediately put into the construction of roads and buildings badly needed; that they looked upon any such contribution as cheap insurance, and declared that the past two years' peaceful grinding of the sugar crop and the fact that they had any cane to grind or mills to grind it in, was due solely to Batista; that between the alternative of Batista or certain chaos without him, he was by far the lesser of the two evils.

8. I continued on my trip April 3rd., visiting Oriente and the 1st Regiment at Santiago. On my return trip to Havana, I witnessed, on April 5, 1937, from the sidelines at Santa Clara, another demonstration for Colonel Batista, similar in every respect to that given him in Camaguey, and was again impressed with the sincereity of the country people's feeling toward Batista.

Encl: Map showing route of trip.

Source: Personal Observation and Contacts.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5347 Date: April 15, 1937

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3600

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 4 1937

Tendency of Existing Parties to
Adopt Opposition to the Government.

1. There has recently developed in the councils of the existing political parties represented in Congress (Conjunto Nacional Democratico; Partido Liberal; Partido Union Nacionalista, Partido Social Democratico-Independientes, and the Accion Republicana) a tendency on the part of their leaders to advocate, ostentatiously and openly, opposition to the Government. This action is apparently based upon the political leaders' inability to obtain sufficient patronage to satisfy their constituents, and, by declaring their official opposition to the Government (Executive branch), they thus relieve themselves of their private political obligations. Further elements in the situation are the lack of popularity of the Government, due to alleged loss of U. S. support, and growing doubts of numerous politicians as to its permanency.

2. The so-called "Coalition Group" of parties (Accion Republicana, Partido Union Nacionalista and the Partido Liberal) has, of course, long ceased to exist in practical reality since the impeachment of President Gomez. However, the small Accion Republicana group has been from the first in open opposition. The Liberal Party is, at present, a divided element, as are the Nacionalistas. There is a divergence of opinion in the usually cohesive and highly disciplined Menocalista camp, and whether present sporadic attempts to reunite the party will be successful, remains to be seen. Consequently, the Executive Branch of the Government is considerably worried, and, while the opposition of the parties concerned, should they actually adopt such a course, may prove more nominal than real, nevertheless, the legislative program has been virtually paralyzed due to lack of quorums, and the prestige of the Government correspondingly lowered. Various senators and representatives who have been most prolific in issuing proclamations in favor of holding a "free and sovereign" Constituent Assembly, have displayed little actual desire to work or concentrate on the necessary legislation, and on the contrary, have welcomed any delay that might prolong the fruits of the political victory of December, 1936.

3. The only group that has shown both cohesion and organizing ability recently is the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Grau's Autenticos), who, under the local leadership of Sr. Aurelio Alvarez, have not only elected their delegates - six from each province and six from the City of Havana, to that party's national assembly, but have hold this assembly. They have invited Dr. Grau San Martin to return to Cuba as soon as possible, and have made all preparations for his reception by the masses. They have, in addition, amalgamated the Grau Autenticos, the A.B.C.'s, the Izquierdos (Left) Revolucionario, and other "revolutionary sectors" into a single so-called "Revolutionary Party." This situation implies that the elections for the Constituent Assembly (should they be"free and sovereign") will result in a substantial victory for the Grau San Martin Autenticos, a prospect most unpleasant to the present regime. The Government is accordingly using every means to prevent the leaders of the various parties, especially the Menocalistas and Liberals, from entering the opposition camp.

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5350 Date: April 23,1937

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

4. In accordance with this policy and as a result of personal intervention of Colonel Batista, on April 15th, a quorum was obtained, so that the opening session of the Third Section of the Sixteenth Congress (already ten days late) could be held and the presidential message (dictated by Batista) read to the Congress. (This message advocates the reorganization of political parties, early enactment of the legislation necessary for the holding of the Constituent Assembly, as well as other routine legislation).

5. Colonel Batista states that he realizes that there has been too much delay in preparing the ground for party reorganization and the Constituent Assembly elections. He says further that he will exert his influence to reconstitute the existing parties, to initiate action that the necessary legislation for the new Constituent Assembly be promptly prepared and passed, and that he is determined that the elections to the Constituent Assembly will be held not later than November of this year. There is every reason to believe that the present legislative deadlock will be broken, now that Colonel Batista has put his shoulder to the wheel, and the Constituent Assembly held sometime this Fall.

6. However, there is no doubt in my mind that should recent developments, as above outlined, materially threaten the security of the present regime, the elections for the Constituent Assembly will not be strictly open and above-board. Colonel Batista has no intention of turning over the fruits of three years of conscientious effort or the lives of himself and his followers to Dr. Grau San Martin - free and sovereign exercise of suffrage under the principles of democracy to the contrary notwithstanding.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Embassy files.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5350 Date: April 23,1937

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Appeal of Former President
Miguel Mariano Gomez against
his Impeachment.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 4 1937

1. Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez, former President, has, since his impeachment last December, made sundry abortive attempts to regain his place in the political limelight.

2. One of these, a legal appeal based on the unconstitutionality of his impeachment, after having passed through the Lower Courts, was submitted to the Senate as a final court, on April 19, 1937. The Senate (strongly pro-Batista) immediately rejected Dr. Gomez's appeal from its decision of impeachment, by a vote of 20 to 14, holding the appeal inadmissable on the grounds that such a decision cannot be appealed.

3. It is believed that Dr. Gomez knew from the first that his appeal was doomed, but submitted it in the forlorn hope of arousing interest in the United States, as well as in an effort to harass the present Cuban regime.

4. The action of the Senate on April 19, 1937, should clear the record and write "finis" to this Chapter.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5352 Date: April 26, 1937

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JUN 8 1937 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.

2657-9-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA, CUBA.

May 31,1937

AIR MAIL

No. 5373.

Subject: Rumors as to Instability of Present Government.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 2 1937

1. The Cuban Congress has been deadlocked for the past three months and, with few exceptions, legislative activities have been brought to a standstill by members refusing to form quorums for reasons hereinafter stated:

(a) Struggle between the Executive and the legislative branches of the Government over the insatiable demands of the latter for political patronage.

(b) Opposition by majority leaders (presently enjoying fruits of the December victory) to the Executive's attempt to lay the groundwork and formulate necessary legislation for the Constituent Assembly.

(c) Opposition to the Executive's attempt to liquidate the Public Works debt.

(d) Opposition to the continued encroachment of the military into the machinery of government.

(e) Insistence of the party leaders that Congress give primary consideration to matters of highly controversial personal interests (such as the fiscal and personnel Amnesty Bill; settlement of personnel to remain in office for two or four year terms; 80 Per cent Labor Bill, and various other labor bills) to the exclusion of constructive legislation.

(f) Obstructionist attitude of the Opposition and internal dissension within the councils of the majority parties.

2. Throughout the above embroglio, Colonel Batista's attitude, despite avowals to the contrary, has apparently been to provide Congress with sufficient latitude to demonstrate their own futility and general incapacity to handle the tools of democratic government, to both the Cuban people and the American government. Colonel Batista has been holding up in comparison his efficiently directed Civic-Military projects. In addition, it is my opinion that Colonel Batista has never been personally overly enthusiastic on the Constituent Assembly or Public Works bonds liquidation ideas, and may be seeking to discredit both this legislation and the activities of the present Congress.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

3. Matters were brought to a head on May 27, 1937, when Secretary Remos frustrated an attempt by Congress to force the Government into granting sixty additional consular offices. Congress immediately demanded Secretary Remos' resignation on threat of permanent legislative stalemate. Secretary Remos, at Colonel Batista's instigation, forthwith and immediately called in the various party leaders and informed them that their continuation as a legislative body was "a matter of hours," unless they got down to work on the Constituent Assembly and other highly important legislation. This threat of Secretary Remos' together with statements of opposition party leaders on May 29th, that they would stand "pat," has filled Havana over the week-end with reports that Congress would be dissolved, the present form of government abrogated and a form of Fascist government substituted therefor. I have at this moment, 11:30 A.M. May 31, 1937, been reliably informed that in a Cabinet meeting held early May 31, 1937, the consequences of dissolving Congress (both locally and in Washington) were considered and, as a result, an arbitrary legislative time schedule was prepared for the Congress, carrying a further threat of dissolution.

4. It is the belief of the undersigned, concurred in by the Charge d' Affaires, Mr. Matthews, that the above threats are merely an attempt to frighten the various Legislators into performing their proper functions, and that no further action will be taken, provided that end is attained. Colonel Batista is far too wise to take such precipitate action at this time, knowing, as he does, that with the sugar quota and reciprocal trade treaty in the balance, such action would almost immediately result in economic strangulation for Cuba -- a condition directly responsible for Machado's downfall. On the other hand, there is an outside chance that Colonel Batista, having committed himself to a certain line of action through Secretary Remos' threats, and flushed with rapidly growing approval of his Civic-Military projects, may take this opportunity to dissolve Congress by quasi-constitutional means, and seek to model the government nearer to his heart's desire by establishing a form of provisional government, giving as an excuse his ardent desire to facilitate and expedite action toward the Constituent Assembly. Such an expedient may come in time, but, as Colonel Batista's outstanding characteristics are patience and silence (all his actions being carefully planned and on the verge of fulfilment before he announces them), it can hardly be conceived that he will take the above precipitate action at the present time and under the present circumstances.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

EWT:vm

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAY 8 1937
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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F/w 2657-Q-330/385.

See 2610-Q-25/9 for letter of April 30-37 from G2(JBC)to Maj. E.W.Timberlake,M/A,Havana, cautioning him against intimate associations with any particular individuals or groups. (50

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JUN 1937 WAR DEPARTMENT MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA. CUBA.

June 2, 1937

Air Mail

No. 5375

Subject: Resumed Legislative Activity and Adoption of Minimum Program.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2657-9-330 388 RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 3 1937

1. Thoroughly frightened by threats made by the Executive, as covered in letter No. 5373 dated May 31,1937, both Houses met Monday, May 31st., in secret sessions, deliberated the matter, and after a few impassioned face-saving speeches, adopted permanent session resolutions, and buckled down to work with full memberships.

2. The House passed the Electoral Code Bill for the Constituent Assembly on Tuesday; started work on the President's budget message and other Legislative projects that have been demanding attention for some time. The Senate cleared the decks for action on Monday by receiving the resignation of its President, Senator Arturo Illas (which, among other things, had been holding up quorums for the past month), and on Tuesday, elected Dr. Lucilo de la Pena, ardent supporter of Colonel Batista, as its President. It immediately thereafter began to function in its required sphere.

3. I was most confidentially informed by Captain Belisario Hernandez, Aide to Colonel Batista, late on June 1st., that Colonel Batista had no intention of carrying out his threat to dissolve Congress. From the above, it would appear that the bluff (if it was a bluff) of the present regime has worked; that the legislative crisis has been safely passed and that both Houses, actuated by personal fear of the members thereof, will proceed to perform their legislative duties for the time being.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

EWT:vm

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JUN 16 1937
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Potential Consolidation of Executive and Legislative Branches of Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 14

1. After some three months of legislative deadlock (see letters Nos. 5373 and 5375, dated May 31st and June 2nd. respectively, also reports 5336 (3210-b) dated March 20th, 1937, 5349 (3210-b) dated April 22nd., 5350 (3600) dated April 23rd and 5356 (3700-b) dated May 3, 1937), Secretary of State Remos, on May 28th and 31st., at the instigation of Colonel Batista, thoroughly frightened Congress into renewing legislative activity by threatening to dissolve both Houses. How long this activity will continue is highly problematical, as Congress is already beginning to show signs of balking at the minimum legislative schedule imposed. I have no doubt that both Secretary of State Remos and Colonel Batista have in the backs of their respective minds the idea of permanently correcting the frequently demonstrated incapacity of Congress by eliminating the present unwieldly mass of Legislators and substituting therefor a modified form of government wherein both the Executive and Legislative functions are performed by a small executive organism, the restraining influence to such being the attitude of the U.S. Government. Colonel Batista, I believe, has a well thought out plan of action ready for execution at the psychological moment, looking to what he would deem a more efficient and economical government. Whether this change of Government will precede the Constituent Assembly, or come as a result thereof, I am unable to say, as this depends largely upon the action of Congress in the near future, but I sincerely believe such a transformation to be inevitable.

2. From various remarks of Colonel Batista and his officers over a course of time, it would appear that the Army is thoroughly disgusted with the present Congress. The following remarks of Colonel Batista at a luncheon in the Palace on May 29th, attended by Mr. Matthews and myself, may serve to shed some light on his governmental ideas. Colonel Batista in an unusually jovial mood, challenged me to a game of billiards, in the course of which, in answer to my question as to whether he thought the Fascists or Communists would win in Spain, he said in effect -- that the outcome in Spain means nothing to Cuba, for while those theories are apparently effective for the time being in the countries that gave them birth, a transfer of these ideas, without great modification, to a nation of different traditions and economic and political background would be fatal -- that while Fascism and Communism have much that is good and efficient, they have more that is bad, and that it would be most unwise to adopt either of these governmental theories to Cuba's high ideals of democracy, without first shaping them to the country's needs. In Cuba, he said, what is needed is to put into practice the philosophy of authority, as the term "liberty" to the mass of Cuban people means licentiousness, and these people can only be brought toward social stability by education leading to an eventual government fitted to the economic and geographic status of Cuba, as well as the personal characteristics of the Cuban people. Above all, he stated, what is needed is discipline and more discipline.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.
EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5379 Date; June 5,1937

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

No Objection to Publication in Serv. Journals.

JUL 13 1937 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Appeal of Former President Gomez against his Impeachment.

2657-G-330/387 RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 13 1937

1. Reference Evaluation of Reports dated June 23, 1937, report No. 5352, dated April 26, 1937, index as above, it appears that an appeal to the Supreme Court by Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez against his impeachment by the Senate, in early April, 1937, was referred to that body (Senate) and was rejected by it. The Senate then sitting as a Tribunal, April 19, 1937, rejected Dr. Gomez's appeal from its decision of impeachment. However, Dr. Gomez has made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Senate in rejecting his appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court, on July 2, 1937, set the date of September 14, 1937, to hear Dr. Gomez's objections.

2. However, there are no legal means in Cuba for the Supreme Court to reverse a decision by the Senate in matters of this nature, and the action of the Senate in this case is final.

3. I am reliably informed that this last effort to revive the name of Gomez will be no more successful than any of his previous attempts.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5421 Date: July 8, 1937

DECLASSIFIED
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Radicalism.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 10 1937

Present Strength of Communism in Cuba.

1. Communistic influence entered Cuba shortly after the Russian Revolution. During the succeeding years its growth was small and in 1929 it numbered not more than 200 members, resident in Havana and the interior towns of Cardenas, Cienfuegos and Manzanillo, the last named town being its birthplace on Cuban soil.

2. Although predominantly workers, its members were in great part foreigners, who were employed in the light industries rather than the fundamental sectors of Cuban economic life. In 1931, under the impetus of the depression and the lash of Machado, the party made a systematic endeavor to penetrate into the basic divisions of the working classes, particularly the sugar workers. Membership increased from 350 in 1931 to 6000 in 1934, when the first communistic conference in Cuba was held. Other gains followed this advance; the party extended its organization over the entire Island, established groups in all the provincial capitals and penetrated into the basic industries of the Island - sugar, tobacco, transport, railroads, port and telephone workers. Its internal organism was reconstructed and its cells organized by factories or plantations rather than be crafts or syndicates. The Junior Communist League of 3000 members was created. It maintained and reinforced its control of the International Confederation of Labor; organized and extended the S.N.O.I.A., and organized the Cuban branch of the Anti-Imperalistic League, and an internal labor defense league of some 5000 members.

3. One of the party's most active allies was the student "Left Wing," in Havana University, numbering 300 militant members. It also enlisted a large proportion of the students of various provincial normal schools. Its propaganda was well organized and penetrated the minds of a great many teachers in government institutions. In April, 1934, the Second Congress of the party was held, and realizing that the party's membership was melting away, due to the rising sun of Batista, it outlined an aggressive program for the future, but, with the return of improved economic conditions, the rapidly increasing prestige of the law and order forces, and the dismissal of communistic teachers in the schools, the communistic party rapidly lost strength and membership, and, today, there are no more than 1500 communist sympathizers in Cuba, of which about ten per cent, or 150, are real dyed-in-the-wool communists.

4. Thus it may be truly said that communism in Cuba increases directly with hunger. The mass of Cubans do not understand communistic doctrines, and only follow its teachings because of bad economic conditions.

5. The leading active communists of Cuba at the present moment are badly scattered, not only because of police persecution, but the leaders themselves are planning to reform the party and are seeking funds in the United States and Mexico.

6. Herewith list of present day communist leaders in Cuba:

Blas Roca - General Secretary of the party; at present in New York enroute to Mexico for the 6th International Communist Conference to be held in August.

Dr. Juan Marinello: Former University of Havana professor, writer and publisher of radical papers. Has studied in Russia, but is at present in Mexico.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5446 Date: August 4, 1937

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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Dr. Jorge Vivo; Sugar and transport organizer in Oriente Province; at present in Guantanamo collecting funds and organizing the Grau party. This man studied in Russia.

Dr. Sandulio Juaco: Organizer of the baking industry, and various Spanish communistic groups. Has studied in Russia, but is now in Mexico, as an order is out in Cuba for his arrest.

Joaquin Odorqui: Railroad and transportation organizer. He is considered the worst of the anarchist group. Was the leader in the ABC massacre. Is now in Mexico.

Dr. Ernesto Chelala: One of the original workers of the communist party in Manzanillo, towhich place he brought communistic teachers from Russia. He is now in Santiago working with Vivo.

Miguel Montero Garcia. He was sentenced by the Cuban Courts to serve a term in prison, but escaped and is now at large. He is considered one of the most intelligent and dangerous of the anarchists.

Cesar Vilar: Labor organizer in Manzanillo. Is in direct contact with Russian leaders. He is now in Mexico.

Pablo Biola: General collector of funds for the party. In touch with leaders. Is now in Havana.

Pablo Caballero: Leader of the metal workers and meat packing groups. In charge of the distribution of communistic literature.

Senorita Carmen Grandio: Most intelligent of the women workers. Is now in Havana, but expects to to go Mexico for the Communistic Conference.

Lola de la Torriente: Educated and a well known member of Havana's demimonde, having lived with some of the well known Cuban politicians.

Senorita Leonor Ferrera: Daughter of the Chief of Havana Police during the regime of Grau San Martin.

Antonio Aleman Roque: Organizer of mine workers. At present at the Matahambre Copper Mines, Pinar del Rio Province.

Guillermo Estrada: Chief contact man of the Cuban communists with the outside leaders.

7. Mr. Leon Trotzky, seeking to rehabilitate his version of communistic doctrine in the New World, has been in constant contact with leaders here, and at the coming 6th International Communist Conference to be held in Mexico in August, he hopes to bring together the Intellectual Groups of the United States, Cuba and Mexico, Central and South America. However, at the present time, Cuba has little to fear from communistic influence. Its international position is a serious obstacle to a large scale success of the movement. Communists in Cuba will triumph when and only when the communists in the United States take control and overthrow that capitalistic system. Should the leaders of present day Cuba or the United States permit the Cuban masses to fall into the state of starvation and desperation of the Machado regime, the Cuban communist party will again become

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5446 Date: August 4, 1937

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

AUG 1937 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV.

CONFIDENTIAL 8-9-37

WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report

a major issue.

8. The Cuban National Police keep a constant check on all communists and their activities in Cuba, with the result that their leaders have as much privacy as the average goldfish. Colonel Batista recently informed me that he is greatly interested in the subversive activities of the communists,and he undoubtedly had them in mind when he promulgated his recent Triennial Plan.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

EWT:vm

Source: Records of Nat'l
Secret Police;personal contacts.

EWT:vm



BIAS ROCA



JORGE VIVO



PABLO BIOLA



Guillermo Estrada



Carmen Grandio



Montero Garcia



Sandulio Junco

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5446 Date: August 4, 1937

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

NOV 29 1937
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AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA, CUBA.

November 26, 1937

AIR MAIL

No. 5495

Subject: Reported Resignation of President Laredo Bru.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 29 1937

1. Mr. Walter Armsby, General Manager of the Altagracia Sugar Company of Cuba (a close friend of Mr. Sumner Welles), and a usually reliable source of information, reports that President Laredo Bru tendered his resignation at 12 Noon this date. It is reported that this resignation was due to an altercation between the President and various important politicians over the Electoral Code now before Congress. I am informed that Colonel Batista refused to accept the resignation, and that the status quo of the Cuban Government remains unchanged, although, at the time of writing, Secretary of State Remos and Colonel Batista are closeted with the President in the Palace. The Ambassador has been informed.

2. I am also advised by Mr. Armsby that Colonel Batista, on November 25th, refused to approve the present monthly Congressional payroll.

3. I am unable at this writing to confirm the above, but will cable as soon as the situation crystallizes.

E. W. Timberlake

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache

EWT:vm

The use of Mr Armsby's name is restricted
E-lake

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

NOV 29 1937
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AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA. CUBA.

November 27, 1937

Air Mail

No. 5496.

Subject: Reported Resignation of President Bru.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. NOV 29 1937
2657-G-330/393

1. With reference to letter No. 5495, dated November 26, 1937, would report that the President, various Cabinet members and political leaders met at Colonel Batista's farm on the outskirts of Havana the night of November 25, 1937, and in the altercation that arose regarding the Electoral Code, the President was informed of his true status in no uncertain terms by a politician present. At noon, November 26th, the President still boiling with indignation, tendered his resignation to Colonel Batista. This action on the part of the President is believed to have surprised Colonel Batista, who, for reasons best known to himself, refused to permit his "figurehead" President to resign, and smoothed out his ruffled feelings.

2. The following excerpt from the Constitution of 1935 is quoted:

"ARTICLE 60: The following are powers of Congress, which it may not delegate:-

"Par. 13: To designate by means of a special law who shall be President of the Republic in case of removal from office, death, resignation or incapacity of the President and Vice President thereof."

There being no Vice President, it can be seen that the surprise resignation of President Bru would seriously embarrass the present regime until such time as Colonel Batista could align the necessary Congressional votes to fill the vacancy with a man sympathetic to the present regime.

3. It has been noted recently that the President is taking himself and his job more seriously daily, as he has "feathered the nest" of himself, friends and family, and is undoubtedly cognizant of the Constitutional situation. It is the belief of the undersigned, however, that he will be kept in office until such a time as plans for the constitutional appointment of his successor can be consummated.

E. W. Timberlake

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

EWT:vm

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Freedom of Speech and Action.

RECEIVED G-2 W.D. DEC 8 1937

Government Toleration of Adverse Opinion.

1. On November 27, 1937, the anniversary of the death of eight Cuban students at the hands of a Spanish firing squad in 1871, a demonstration in front of the Students Memorial on the Malecon by some 20,000 persons was followed by a parade which was participated in by 15,000 students of various categories; 4000 Spanish Republicans (Reds); 2000 Autenticos and 1000 representatives of the supposedly defunct ABC organization - the latter bearing their bloodstained green and white banners. This is the first time in history that "Students' Day" - universally celebrated throughout Cuba - has been utilized for political purposes, and also marked the first official participation of the Spanish Government, including the Spanish ~~Minister~~ Chargé, in the demonstration at the Students' Memorial.

2. The above mentioned representatives of the "outs" took advantage of the demonstration,and combined the demands of the students for amnesty to their members now imprisoned as a result of criminal offenses with a sweeping denunciation of Colonel Batista and all his works. The various banners and placards carried, the numerous impromptu soapbox speeches made, etc. were most virulent in their attacks against members of the present regime. (It was noted that the 4000 Spanish Republicans used the Communistic "clenched fist" salute repeatedly).

3. The undersigned, who was attending a Spanish lesson in a studio overlooking the Malecon, was surprised to see the pacific attitude of the numerous policemen on duty, in face of such rabid attacks on the Government. There were no manifestations of violence, no arrests made, and the police had evidently adopted a policy of letting the crowd blow off steam and exhaust itself in a vociferous contest with the tumult of the high surf beating against the Malecon. It is understood that the "outs" expected this demonstration to rival that of the Saturday before at the Tropical Stadium, but this demonstration resulted in a show of weakness rather than strength.

4. While the tolerant attitude displayed towards the Opposition by the present regime in this instance (as well as many others including the Triennial Plan rally) has been looked upon as weakness in certain quarters, the Military Attache does not concur, and believes it to be an example of Batista's keen knowledge of psychology. In other words, he did not deign to give this meeting the importance of his official displeasure.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and
Personal Observation.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5500 Date: December 2, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAR 17 1938
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No Objection to Publication in Service Journals.

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Freedom of Speech and Action.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 16 1938

Government Restriction of Leftist Activities.

1. The quarters of the Spanish Centro Republicano, a Spanish loyalist organization, at San Lazaro Street No. 137, Havana, were raided by members of the Secreto Inteligencia Militar on February 26, 1938, and fifteen Spanish communists were arrested on the charge of possessing and disseminating banned Leftist propaganda matter and collecting funds for the present Spanish government. Of the fifteen men arrested, four were freed from Principe Prison by presidential decree on Christmas Eve, 1937. (See report No. 5514, index 3600, dated Dec. 29, 1937). These four were sentenced by the Fifth Chamber of the Court of Appeals (formerly Urgency Tribunal - see report No. 5471, par. 18, index 3210-c, dated Oct. 2, 1937), for one year in prison. The remaining eleven were acquitted for lack of evidence. It is interesting to note that in the search for details relating to the raid on the quarters of the Spanish Centro Republicano, various American newspaper reporters uncovered and published information dealing with a real plot against the life of Batista and the overthrow of the Government. (See report No. 5544, index 3020-d, this date).

2. Following the November 27, 1937, celebration of the anniversary of the death of eight Cuban students at the hands of a Spanish firing squad in 1871 (see report No. 5500, index 3520), various radical elements became unduly emboldened by governmental tolerance, and proceeded to exploit fully their fancied freedom of speech and action, with the result that all radical organizations - either Rightist or Leftist - seeking to embarrass the Cuban Government, were outlawed by a presidential decree issued late in December, 1937. It is the opinion of the undersigned, however, that there is no connection between the arrest of Spanish Leftists and the attempt against the life of Colonel Batista.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Personal Contacts.

EWT:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5545 Date: March 9, 1938

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Interview with Dr. Grau San Martin.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 22 1938

1. When the undersigned returned from his recent leave in the United States, he made tentative arrangements, through Captain Alexander Roberts, MI-Res., to talk with Dr. Grau San Martin, ex-President of Cuba, and now in self-imposed exile in Miami, Florida. At the last moment, however, it was decided to have Captain Roberts handle the interview. Herewith resume of conversation between Captain Roberts and Dr. Grau, the principal political threat to the present regime.

2. Dr. Grau appeared to have aged considerably since his departure from Cuba in January, 1934 - the ravages of chronic tuberculosis are most apparent. He shakes hands with his left hand, claiming that his right hand is in bad condition due to excessive writing of propaganda matter for newspapers, magazines, etc. He was, at the time of the interview, greatly depressed and discouraged about the immediate future of Cuba. He is homesick and desires to return to Cuba, but states that inasmuch as he represents an idealistic cause, he will not surrender his position and return to Cuba until he is given certain guarantees whereby the people of Cuba "can freely express their political views and feelings at the polls." He is certain that if given these guarantees and if a free and impartial election is held, he will be elected President of Cuba by an overwhelming majority.

3. Dr. Grau plans, if and when elected, to "nationalize Cuba," by securing legislation which will ensure a pure democracy; this to be accomplished by placing all matters of importance directly in the hands of the Cuban voters. He advocates a Cuban banking system which will make Cuba absolutely independent of American bankers and American capital. He objects to the "interference of Wall Street in the affairs of Cuba," which he blames for practically all of Cuba's ills. He advocates strongly the adoption of the American system of practically independent municipal government, in comparison with the strong dictatorial central government in effect in Cuba today. He advocates more schools and less soldiers, stating that there is no necessity for the present large Army in Cuba nor the interference of the armed forces in the government of Cuba. (When Grau was President he used more force and killed more civilians than any President in the last twenty years).

4. It is the belief of the Military Attache that Grau's disinclination to return to Cuba (for reasons best known to himself) has seriously affected his popularity, but that were he given a fair election he would gain the majority of votes from the masses. At the present time, however, I am reliably informed that Grau's demands for guarantees are so drastic that their accomplishment would mean Colonel Batista's practically turning Cuba over to him in acceding to his requests. Furthermore, in the event of Grau's being elected President, not only would the present system of graft and corruption in politics be amplified, but all semblance of law and order would disappear under his regime.

E. W. Timberlake

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

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From M.A., Havana Report No 5547 Date: March 15, 1938.

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G-2 Report

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L-1

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Propaganda of Foreign Origin.

Extremist Organizations in Cuba.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 22 1938

1. During the last half of the year 1937, the apparent tolerance of the Cuban Government to extremist demonstrations, propaganda and organizations lead to the growth of such organizations, both Rightist and Leftist, and brought to the surface their activities in Cuba. However, late in December, 1937, all such foreign political organizations of semi-secret character were outlawed by presidential decree, and in the case of the Spanish communist organization "Centro Republicana," the law was strictly enforced (see report No. 5545, dated March 9,1938, index 3520), while it was not so strenuously applied to extreme Rightist organizations. However, it has been the habit of the communists to hold their meetings with a great deal of publicity, while the meetings of the Fascist and Nazi organizations are private in nature and the activities resulting therefrom have been free from police interference.

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2. At the present time, there are the following extremist foreign organizations in Cuba:

Italian Fascists: Leader "Prince" Rustoli, a recent importation from Italy. Membership consists of some 600 men of Italian blood or sympathy. It is understood that "Prince" Rustoli works hand in glove with the Italian Minister, Signor Giovanni Persico, in spreading the idea of Fascism among the proletariat of Cuba. Frequent local radio broadcasts are made, both in Spanish and Italian, extolling the benefits of Fascism and decrying the cumbersome machinery of democracy. Articles are published in the local press and members of this organization are most voluble in personally expressing their ideals.

Spanish Fascists: Known as "La Falange." Leader Sr. Alexander Villanueva. Membership consists of some 4000 men of Spanish blood or sympathy. The activities of this organization are similar to the one outlined above, with the addition that the main effort at the present moment is to collect funds for Franco and to popularize his government with the Cuban people. Although the present Cuban Government has not recognized Franco, it is strongly sympathetic to him, particularly the military element of Cuba. It has been stated that Villanueva has far more influence in Cuba than the recognized Spanish Minister, Sr. Jaime Montero. It is said that Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of Police, is most sympathetic to this organization.

Spanish Loyalists (Reds): Known as "Centro Republicana". Leader the present Spanish Minister, Jaime Montero. Membership consists of some 4000 Spaniards sympathetic to the Loyalist Government, and most active in fomenting labor troubles in Cuba. Communistic propaganda is spread by newspapers, manifestos, "soap-box" orations and public mass meetings. This organization is most unpopular with the present Cuban regime and is under constant police surveillance.

German Nazis: Leader the German Minister to Cuba, Herr Hans Hermann Voelckers. There are at present approximately 300 members of this organizations in Cuba, the majority of Teutonic blood. Their aim, as far as can be learned, is to further the political and commercial interests of Germany, and Germans, in Cuba. There is some apprehension on the part of the local Jewish colony over an alleged plan to conduct a typical anti-semitic campaign in Cuba. A German Nazi by the name of Reimann recently arrived from Nuremberg (Germany), meets regularly with some forty or fifty other Nazis in semi-secret conferences at Calle Habana No. 59. The Nazis also boast of Colonel Pedraza's support and that of Senator Alfredo Hornedo, owner of the Spanish language newspaper "El Pais." The Diario de la Marina

From M.A., Havana Report No.5550 Date: March 17, 1938

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

the oldest, best known and most conservative newspaper in Cuba, frankly Spanish Nacionalist in sentiment and most friendly to Germany and Italy, has refused several articles containing Nazi propaganda material. A member of the German Legation boards all German steamers arriving in Havana and secures Nazi propaganda matter for distribution. There are plans under way to broadcast Nazi propaganda locally from the Galiano Street radio station. Signor Persico, Prince Rustoli, Sr. Villanueva and Herr Voelckers are far above the average caliber of foreign representatives in Cuba. They have apparently unlimited funds for entertainment, and the Italian and German Ministers have made quite an impression on local society. They are persuasive, eloquent and "on their toes" constantly.

3. The various leaders and sub-leaders of the above described Fascist and Nazi organizations meet frequently at both the German and Italian Legations, where, it is understood, the fullest cooperation between the two parties is insisted upon, while, at the same time, soft-pedaling too vociferous interference with the governmental policies of the United States in Cuba. The Italian and Spanish Fascists cooperate with the closest accord, but recognize the domination of American ideals in Cuba, and are very careful in both words and actions when promulgating the doctrines of Mussolini and Franco.

4. All the above organizations, both Rightist and Leftist, provide the members of their organizations with an identification card bearing his name, number, fingerprints, and picture, together with other pertinent data concerning his previous and present condition of servitude. Members of "La Falange" wear a rosette containing a minature of the old Spanish flag; the Italian Fascists wear a small minature of the Fascist emblem, and the Germans wear a minature Swastika. The communists wear a minature hammer and sickle.

5. It is believed that while Colonel Batista, the motivating influence in Cuba today, is predominantly Fascist in his leanings, owing to the apparent efficiency of that form of government, he agrees completely with no parties or creeds, and having no original political or social theories, endeavors to select from those presented that which he considers best and most applicable to conditions in Cuba.

6. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the effect of extremist propaganda of foreign origin on the Cuban people is of minor importance; that these organizations carry little weight in the political situation of Cuba, due, primarily, to the geographic proximity of Cuba to the United States, and that Cuba is too closely aligned with the policies of the United States, politically, socially, and economically, for radical ideas to gain a foothold. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Cuban is of an indolent and complacent nature, and as long as his stomach is kept filled, he will adhere to the principles and teachings of his benefactors.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5550 Date: March 17,1938

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 31 1938

Present Political Situation in Cuba.

1. The following observations, gleaned largely from Embassy files, but not necessarily the opinion of Embassy officials other than the Military Attache, may assist the Department in obtaining a perspective of the political situation in Cuba at the present moment.

2. The public mind with respect to political development at the present time is one of extreme apathy. The state of lassitude which developed after the two Houses of Congress held their "sorteo" last December and the elections for renewal in March, still prevails, with little interest being shown by the masses in activities of political parties. There are, of course, as always, undercurrent trends which work to fundamentally affect the political situation, but these relate mostly to the personalities of military and civil leaders, their private ambitions, their desire for graft and their divergence of opinion respecting basic social, economic and political issues. There is no doubt that important events are going on under the surface which cannot be readily appraised or described in routine reports.

3. The most predominant political trend in Cuba today is the development of a highly centralized military-civil-political regime, headed by a military leader of great initiative and force and who dominates the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.

4. Out of a widespread popular revolt of the masses in 1933-34, has come military dominance, more or less benevolent at this time, but complete in its authority and capable of stern and arbitrary action when necessary. This situation is new in the Republic of Cuba, and is repugnant to the mass of Cubans, who are, in general, impatient of restraint and all too individualistic. However, the strength of the military and the satisfactory economic conditions prevent outward manifestation of this feeling. The achievements of this military-civic regime under Colonel Batista are omnipresent, although there is a tendency to exaggerate them by interested parties. While Batista manifests devotion to the Cuban people, and in many ways appears to be making a genuine effort to assist them, he is surrounded by a group of unprincipled sycophants who apply their best thought to means of exploiting the Cuban people. Several of Batista's military aides have gained notoriety through various gambling enterprises, legal and otherwise. The acceptance of graft by them and other high officers of the Army is now taken for granted, and is a condition tending to increase. However, in several cases, when the offenses were too blatant, Batista has dealt severely with the offenders. Colonel Jose Pedraza, second in the military hierarchy of Cuba (Chief of Police) and Major Jaime Marine, principal aide to Batista and the "Jim Farley" of Cuba, are constantly at swords point over the proceeds from gambling. It may be stated here, however, that it is the opinion of the Military Attache that Pedraza desires to devote such proceeds to official matters, while Marine applies them to his own personal well being. These activities do not set a good example for the rest of the Army and do not tend to encourage discipline, honesty and loyalty among other officers.

5. Jealousy of the "have nots" for the "haves" is everywhere apparent throughout the rank and file of the Cuban Army. However, it must be remembered that graft is considered a normal accompanyment to leadership in Cuba, and except in time of severe economic depression does not arouse popular indignation.

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5553 Date: March 24, 1938

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6. In estimating future developments, it must be recognized that their direction will be dominated by Batista. He continues to stress the importance of the Three Year Plan in elevating the social and economic condition of the masses of the Cuban people. He states that his role in the Government of Cuba is limited to making "suggestions," which no one is under compulsion to follow; that he has never considered assuming the role of dictator; that the Cuban Government is now and will continue to be essentially a democracy. However, the undersigned believes that this democracy is only a stage setting with a "Charley McCarthy" President, and the Executive, Legislative and Judicial bodies under the control of the military.

7. From his statements, there is some evidence that Batista would like to return Cuba to a normal democratic government, for, as a matter of fact, during recent weeks his responsibilities have borne heavily on him and he is at the present time retired to his "finca" for recuperation. However, there are too many difficulties at present for Batista to step down. The normal executive and legislative bodies in Cuba have little or no prestige and spend most of their time in special-privilege legislation and the general impression is that if given a free hand they would lead Cuba into political and economic chaos. In addition, the military, from the highest to the lowest, have become accustomed to rule, and frankly like it. Therefore, they would resist any attempt to deprive them of their power, financial and otherwise. It is certain that several officers, namely, Pedraza, Benitez and Rodriguez, consider themselves fully capable of filling Batista's "shoes," should he step down. It is my belief that should Batista suffer an acute attack of lead poisoning, Colonel Pedraza is fully capable of cominating the situation. Should Pedraza fall, it is my belief that no other military leader could so function, and various military factions would struggle for supremacy among themselves, leaving the great mass of Cuban people to their own unbridled passions. This latter condition, however, must be accompanied by desperate economic depression.

8. With few exceptions, Batista has little aid from competent Cabinet Ministers or political leaders. However, the Secretary of Agriculture, Sr. Lopez Castro, largely responsible for the salient points of the Three-Year-Plan and other constructive legislation, is outstanding among present members of the Cabinet. He has an excellent reputation for honesty and sincerity even among interests directly affected by the application of his plans. Next to the Secretary of Agriculture in prestige, is the Secretary of the Treasury, Jimenez Lanier, who appears to be doing a sincere and able job, especially in the light of his previous inexperience in fiscal affairs. Secretary of State Remos has recently permitted illusions of grandeur to go to his head and has lost much "face" with Batista. No other cabinet members are outstanding, and are considered "square pegs in round holes." The Secretaries of Commerce and Communication have cast much discredit upon the Government by their questionable acts and attitude.

9. Political parties are loosely organized and dominated from above by the military. They have not been active long enough for the delicate imponderables of democracy to bring elements of real value to the top. Present leaders are largely opportunists, and while the President has recently announced that a Constituent Assembly would be held this year, it is feared that if the Constituent Assembly should be held that the constitution adopted under such leadership would be an "opportunist" constitution. The necessary broad base of popular interest and discussion appears to be entirely lacking among the masses. While the holding of a Constituent Assembly is the logical next step if Cuba is to return to a normal constitutional government,, it is extremely doubtful whether such an Assembly called at this time could perform

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its tasks adequately, as little preparation has been made, and it is a known fact that the electors would be emasculated by their subjection to the present military regime.

10. The masses of the Cuban people, being by nature indolent, do not appear to look upon the future with either fear or trepidation. Economic conditions are relatively good; the tourist trade is thriving; tobacco exports show substantial gains over last year, and while the price of sugar is falling, it is still satisfactory. The Sugar Coordination Law of the Three Year Plan will mean increased prosperity to many thousands of laborers and "colonos," and with characteristic Latin propensity of not worrying about the future, little active concern is expressed except by a few intelligent observers, most of whom have isolated themselves from politics for their own and their families' good.

11. While the idea of military domination is repugnant to the Cuban masses, it is interesting to note that most successful governments of a people are based on tradition, and the four hundred years of traditional military leadership by the Spanish Captain-Generals is engrained deep in the consciousness of generations of Cubans.

12. It is the belief of the Military Attache that so long as economic conditions remain satisfactory, with the resulting money to "make the mare go," the present regime will continue more or less indefinitely. However, should Cuba, for example, be deprived of its lucrative preferential sugar market in the United States, a crisis might develop, and the revolution which many consider has been interrupted through the dominance of the military, might continue on its course.

E. W. Timberlake

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy files, Press, and
Personal Observation.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5553 Date: March 24,1938

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 18 1938

Present Political Situation

1. On May 10, 1938, over two months after the partial elections to renew one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives, sufficient members were finally accredited to form a quorum, and the first semi-annual session of the 17th Cuban Congress was finally opened to hear the President's message, which included nothing of importance other than the advocation of various public works, legislation under which foreign oil companies will operate in Cuba, and a blanket endorsement of the necessity for the holding of the oft-delayed Constituent Assembly in 1938.

2. At the present time, all political parties appear to be endeavoring to effect coalition groups for participation in the Constituent Assembly without, at the same time, destroying their own composition. Difficulties are being experienced in satisfying all party demands with respect to the distribution of preferential posts in such coalitions as might be formed. It is generally reported that the following groupings may be effected:

RIGHT
Partido Liberal.
Conjunto Nacional Democratico.
Union Nacionalista.

CENTER
Partico Democratico Republicana
Accion Republicana.

LEFT
Partico Revolucionario Cubano (Grau's Autenticos).
Partico Agrarian Nacional.

3. Rumors persist that the three Rightist or governmental parties as they exist today will carry Colonel Batista's name as a candidate for the presidency in the next general election. However, according to Batista's statement on May 3rd., with respect to a proposal advanced by various Liberal party leaders in Pinar del Rio, suggesting his name for President, he will not commit himself one way or the other as to his candidacy, stating that the most important thing at the present time for all Cubans is the holding of a "free and sovereign" Constituent Assembly, and that with this in view he is willing to sacrifice his "most cherished desire," the immediate development of the Three-Year-Plan.

4. In relation to Batista's candidacy for the presidency, it is the opinion of the Military Attache, based upon conversations with Army officers close to Batista, that he considers conditions are not yet ripe for bringing into the open any presidential aspirations he may have, if any, but that he has devoted considerable study to the possibility. It is my opinion that in his present position and under existing conditions in Cuba, he believes that he can do a better job and prove of greater and more lasting benefit to his country as Chief of Staff of the Army. However, I am certain that he is most anxious to adopt a more efficient governmental set-up than at present exists in Cuba owing to the many difficulties of handling and financing same. In this connection,

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5575 Date: May 11, 1938

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Sr. Antonio Martinez Fraga, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and brother of the present Cuban Ambassador to Washington, also official spokesman of Camp Columbia (seat of the real government of Cuba), recently issued a statement advocating a modified corporate government for Cuba along the lines of the present Italian Government. He stated, after a eulogy to Fascism and Mussolini, that the Duce had been able to lift Italy to its present high position in the world due to the facilities afforded by its present governmental system.

5. The temporary shelving of Batista's Three-Year-Plan is undoubtedly due to the economic depression in Cuba. However, a great many political leaders believe that the carrying out of its provisions should be delayed until after the Constituent Assembly is held.

6. There is a strong rumor in political as well as military circles that in accordance with an alleged agreement made by the original leaders of the Sergeants' revolt in September, 1933, wherein each was to serve as Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army for two years, that pressure is being brought to bear upon Batista to turn over his job as Chief of Staff of the Army, in accordance with the agreement, and accept oblivion as President of the Republic. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that this rumor is absurd. However, there has been a marked demand in all circles for the immediate calling of a Constituent Assembly, and Batista's acceptance of this demand may indicate a desire to return to the normal form of government and the submission of Cuba's many problems (chiefly economic) to the people.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts,
Press and Embassy files.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5575 Date: May 11, 1938.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 14 1938

Conference of Civic-Military Leaders.

1. On May 30, 1938, President Laredo Bru, at the instigation of Colonel Batista, gathered together at his farm outside of Havana, the leaders of the present civic-military regime in Cuba, for the purpose of discussing the solution of important economic and political problems. This gathering included, in addition to the President, the following: Colonel Batista, Chief of Staff of the Army; Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of the National Police, Colonel Angel Gonzalez, Chief of the Navy; Colonel Julio Velasco, Adjutant General of the Army; Secretary of State, Dr. Juan J. Remos; Secretary of the Treasury, Dr. Gimenez Lanier; Secretary of Agriculture, Sr. Amadeo Lopez Castro; Secretary of Education, Dr. Fernando Sirgo; Secretary of Justice and Defense, Dr. Enrique Alonso Pujol; President of the House of Representatives, Antonio Martinez Frega, President of the Senate, Dr. Guillermo Alonso Pujol, and various and sundry lesser lights.

2. The principal object of this meeting was an attempt to lay the economic ghost that has recently made its reappearance and which had previously so effectively lead to the downfall of Machado. I am reliably informed that after some eight hours of discussion, eating and drinking, it was decided that additional taxes at this time would be unwise and that retrenchment in governmental expenses would be most dangerous due to political reasons. A proposal to issue twenty million dollars in silver coinage, from which it is estimated some twelve million dollars profit would accrue to the Government, was approved. Other than this dangerous expedient, no constructive ideas were adopted, the consensus of opinion being that the matter of financial rehabilitation (through the increase on price of sugar sold to the United States) rests in the "lap" of the U.S. Government.

3. Ways and means of hastening the draft of an electoral code for the Constituent Assembly were discussed and approved.

4. There is no question that the necessary finances to continue the present tremendous governmental setup are paramount in Colonel Batista's mind at the present time. He casually mentioned to the undersigned last Saturday at a polo match that unless the United States did something to improve the price of sugar, the present status quo would be seriously endangered. Numerous Army officers have asked my opinion in this matter, but needless to say I gave none.

5. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the solution to the present situation, other than increase in the price of sugar, is for the present regime to realize that Cuba is a poor country, the principal products of which are agricultural; that Cuba is growing crops in competition with other Latin-American countries where the standard of living is far below that of Cuba; that the present top-heavy machinery of government must be greatly curtailed; that graft must be eliminated as far as possible; that laws must be observed and special privileges eliminated. In short, that Cuba will have to operate as an efficient self-supporting country, selling its products in the world market. The present situation in Cuba is not due to the fact that there are "not enough oats to make the mare go," but that half the oats are being stolen by the stable boys.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5583 June 8, 1938

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Population and Social)

Subject: Propaganda.
(c) Propaganda of Foreign Origin.

Mexican Communistic Propaganda in Cuba.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUN 22 1938

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1. With reference to report No. 5587, dated June 10, 1938, index as above, a mass meeting to render homage to Mexico and to enlist Cuba's (and other Latin American Countries') sympathy and "pesos" on behalf of Mexico's social and economic policies, was held at Polar Stadium at 10:00 A.M. on June 12, 1938. It is estimated that between two and three thousand dollars was collected for Mexico at this meeting.

2. In spite of waiving the admission price of ten cents and the repayment of bus fares to encourage attendance, it is estimated that only approximately ten to twelve thousand of the Cuban rabble were present. Of the diplomatic corps only Sr. Octavio Reyes Spindola, Mexican Chargé d'Affaires and Sr. Tchou Che-Tsien, Chinese Chargé d' Affaires, were present.

3. Colonel Batista published orders on June 11th, prohibiting any members of the armed forces from attending the meeting and required that all unit commanders address their men some time prior to this meeting, to the effect that the Cuban Army and the Cuban nation owed its existence to the people of the United States - propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding. The Cuban State Department forbade all government employees from attending.

4. The Mexican Charge d'Affaires, Sr. Reyes Spindola, reinforced by a special Mexican cultural and propaganda mission of some forty members, and five officers of the Mexican Army (who flew to Havana in three Mexican Army planes), had their show stolen by local revolutionary political leaders, who, seeking to embarrass the present civic-military regime, turned the meeting into a "Red" demonstration against "Yankee" and British imperialism. In addition to Spindola, Dr. Rodolfo Mendez Penate, vice president of Grau's Autenticos; Dr. Carlos Prio Sacarras, Partido Agrario Nacional; Lazaro Pena, Union Revolucionario, and leaders of the A.B.C. and Joven Cuba, addressed the meeting on the general theme that all troubles in Latin-America were due to "Yankee" and British imperialism -- that Mexico's recent policy of expropriating foreign capital was an example for all Latin-America, and marked a step toward liberation from foreign imperialism. All the speakers indicated that Cuba should follow Mexico's example. Colonel Ignacio Beteta, Aide and special representative of President Cardenas of Mexico, stated that he was a member of a "real army," which represented, uniquely in Latin America, its nation's people -- that he had flown to Cuba on a mission of peace, but that he could just as easily fly over on other missions. (After Colonel Beteta's speech the radio announcer made the statement "and he is a real Colonel," a remark greatly resented by Colonel Batista, who, although not present, was listening to the broadcast of the speeches and having stenographic notes made of same).

5. Sr. Spindola spoke guardedly and briefly -- appealing to the bonds of blood, language and ideals for Cuban backing of the Mexican cause. President Cardenas' speech broadcast from Mexico was not completed due to poor recepcion.

6. The reaction to this meeting among the better class of Cubans was universal in deploring the entire incident. An amusing repercussion has been the formation of committees of leading Cubans throughout the island to celebrate July 4th in homage to the United States. The Spanish-language

From M.A. Havana Report No.5590 Date: June 16, 1938

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press, with the exception of Patria and La Prensa (Leftist sheets), united in attacking the Mexican propaganda. Dr. Botet, Collector of Customs, in accordance with Cuban law, held up the bales of communistic propaganda matter. The Nazi and Fascist organizations in Cuba, however, distributed handbills immediately after the conclusion of the meeting without interference. (See copies attached).

7. Raul de Cardenas, a leading member of the Conjunto Nacional Democratico, introduced a bill in Congress on June 11th, requesting the Cuban State Department to declare Reyes Spindola "persona non grata" in Cuba.

8. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that from the Mexican standpoint the meeting was a failure. General feeling seems to be that Cuba has enough trouble of its own without espousing those of Mexico in its indefensible expropriation policies.

E. W. Timberlake,
Major, GS., CAC.,
Military Attache.

Incl.Clippings and translation.

Source: Capt. A. Roberts(M.I.Reserve)
Press and Personal Contacts.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5590 Date: June 16, 1938.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS, NARS Date 7/15/74

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

Sentiments Expressed in
Speeches of Colonel Batista.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 28 1939

1. Colonel Batista returned from his visit to Mexico on February 16, 1939. Speeches made by the Colonel while in Mexico and after his return have given considerable concern both to the American Embassy and American business men in general. Following are some of the remarks made during the course of his speeches:

(a) On February 10th, Colonel Batista spoke before a joint session of the Mexican Congress, and among other things, he said "Cuba will stay with Mexico by standing by Spain's legitimate government," and added that "as long as Cardenas or Batista rules, that solidarity (support of Socialist Spain) shall be kept." He then went on to describe himself as the "moving soul and leader of the Cuban revolution of 1933," endeavoring to convey the idea that he was the leader of a great and just social movement - rather than the opportunist which he actually was.

(b) During the same speech, he also said "Cuba is in a difficult position - its economy depends upon foreign markets - we have only one product-sugar. We are going to take steps, without hurting those markets, to save Cuba's economy and try to make it national. At an opportune moment we will do what we must do, and it can be done."

(c) On February 13th, at Vera Cruz, Batista was asked about the revalorization of mortgages law, which, of course, is of interest to the United States, as a great many of the mortgages are held by Americans. Batista said "the law will deal not only with the revision of the mortgages, but will include common debts, those against salaries, and those for installment purchases. It is designed to prevent sugar - the backbone of our national economy - from passing into the hands of foreigners. The law helps put our internal economics on a proper basis."

(d) When asked about the objective of the unification of the proletariat of Cuba in one central workers' alliance, Batista said it was "to privide defense for just cases, at the same time respecting the rights of all, in order that the rights of workers might thereby be respected."

(e) On February 16th, speaking in Havana before a great crowd composed largely of Leftist elements of the poorer class, Batista said - "Cuban capital need not fear the future - organization of the people does not signify danger to the stability of a nation - it is the basis of peace and progress. We wish to tell our adversaries of the capitalist class, those that think and act in an unfair manner, that an organized mass here will always know how to act in justice and discipline to protect the interests of all and the national credit."

2. The Military Attache has the following comments to make on the above quotations:

(a) Obviously, on the face of it, this was a declaration of support for Leftist ideas. Being uttered at the moment that Leftist Spain is in its last throes apparently, it seems a foolish thing to say.

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(b) This statement - while not any too clear - was taken by a great many people to imply confiscation.

(c) This statement was a further confirmation of Batista's determination to push through the Revalorization Bill, which further alarmed Cuban business circles.

(d) This was taken by many as a further indication of Leftist tendencies.

(e) This statement was taken by some to mean a guarantee of protection for capital, and by others as a threat against capital.

3. The Military Attache believes that considering these statements as a whole, they have had a bad effect on business men, in general, in Cuba, and have further shaken their confidence. The Military Attache believes, however, that it is too early to judge whether or not Batista will swing to the left at this time. Like all Latins, he wishes to be popular with everyone, and, I believe, that the speeches made in Mexico and upon his return to Cuba were more in the nature of oratorical flourishes to gratify his Mexican hosts than ~~what of~~ a declaration of future policy.

4. It will be noted that in statement (a) Batista frankly calls himself the ruler of Cuba. This was read with a great deal of resentment in Cuba, because, although all classes of people realize perfectly that he is the dictator, they do not like to have him say so publicly. Many Congressmen, especially, were incensed. In general, the feeling among the people is that the trip to Mexico was an anti-climax and a mistake. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that Batista has lessened rather than enhanced his position by making the trip, and by his utterances while on the trip and after his return.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Observation.
Press.

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Incl.Newspaper clippings.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Stability of Present Administration.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 19 1939

Present Political Course Pursued by Colonel Batista.

1. Colonel Batista, in recent speeches at Camaguey on February 24th, and later in Havana, severely censured Congress for failure to pass what he called necessary legislation, and stated that he, himself, was on the "sidelines," and would have nothing further to do with pushing the legislation through Congress.

2. The Military Attache, in discussing this matter with Captain Owen Parr, personal aide to Colonel Batista, was told that "all those Congressmans are sons of bitches, except a few." Captain Parr went on to say that Colonel Batista was giving Congress enough rope to hang itself, and that the Colonel could get along quite well without Congress.

3. As has been previously reported, the Rent Reduction Law was passed by Congress on March 25th. This law, favoring as it does the working man and poorer classes in its provisos concerning tenement houses and the like, is one of Colonel Batista's pet projects.

4. Congress recently passed a national electoral law, which had among its provisos one to the effect that anyone running for the presidency or vice-presidency must relinquish any government position which he held four months before the date of the election. This law was vetoed by the President, whereat Colonel Batista expressed great pleasure in a public statement. The law was then returned to Congress by President Laredo Bru, with various suggestions for its improvement, notably the elimination of the above mentioned clause concerning relinquishment of office before running for election to the presidency or vice-presidency. It was then passed by Congress, incorporating the President's suggestion, but has not yet been signed by the Chief Executive.

5. In a recent conversation with Mr. Martinez, an agent for various military equipment - who is quite familiar with the high ranking officers of the Cuban Army, the Military Attache was told by Mr. Martinez that in his opinion, Colonel Batista would run for President when he considered that the time was ripe.

6. The Military Attache has the following opinions to express concerning the foregoing data:

(a) Colonel Batista's statement that he is on the "sidelines" regarding Congress is more of a pose than an actuality. As a pose it has the advantage of showing up congressional inactivity and of giving Colonel Batista a chance to disown the revalorization of mortgages bill which, contrary to his expectations, has not proved popular.

(b) The passage of the Rent Reduction Law - undoubtedly at Colonel Batista's instigation - shows that he still controls Congress when he wants to do so, and also shows that he is continuing his bid for popularity with the lower classes.

(c) It will be noted from the above that Colonel Batista is no longer pressing the Revalorization of Mortgages Law, while on the other hand, he has obtained the passage of the Rent Reduction Law. This leads the Military Attache to believe that, as previously reported, Colonel Batista is neither a Rightist nor a Leftist, but an opportunist, charting his course according to the varying aspects of the situation.

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(d) In view of the conversation with Mr. Martinez, and the fact that Colonel Batista, in any speeches concerning his aspirations for the presidency, has never denied that he might someday run for that office, the Military Attache is of the opinion that Colonel Batista is feeling his way cautiously toward the presidency. There is little doubt that he would like to occupy that post, but he is well aware of the dangers and difficulties involved, and has not yet decided whether to engineer the passage of an electoral law favorable to himself, and run for the presidency, or to continue in his present position as the "power behind the throne."

Henry A. Barber, Jr.
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and
Observations.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5697 Date: April 13,1939

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Status of Relations with Foreign Countries.

Attitude of Colonel Batista toward United States and Mexico.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 19 1939

1. Since Colonel Batista's visit to the United States in November, 1938, and to Mexico in February, 1939, the following events have transpired:

(a) The Military Attache has had the opportunity to talk several times with Colonel Batista and with his personal aides, and on several occasions they have spontaneously given an expression of their great satisfaction with their trip to the United States and their great admiration of many aspects of our country.

(b) Negotiations are being carried on between the U.S. State Department (in part through the Embassy in this country) and the Cuban Government concerning a new reciprocal trade treaty. In this connection, the Ambassador of the United States has for the first time frankly stated to the Cuban authorities that unless the public works debt is cleared up, Cuba cannot hope for any credit to be extended by the Export-Import Bank, nor for any special favors under the reciprocal trade treaty. To date, the Cuban Government has not taken definite steps to clear up the public works debt, although they express their firm intention to do so.

(c) Colonel Batista has not been pushing the passage of the revalorization of mortgages measure, which measure has aroused a storm of protest among both Cuban and American business men, and has not proven particularly popular with the people.

(d) As previously reported, the Military Attache has been told by several of Colonel Batista's aides that the Colonel was not favorably impressed with the social conditions as he saw them in Mexico on his recent trip. The attitude on the other hand of both the Colonel and the aides was one of contempt for the Mexican Army and the poor condition of the Mexican people in general

2. The Military Attache has the following opinions to express concerning the two voyages made by Colonel Batista:

(a) His trip to the United States gave him a much greater knowledge than he ever had before of the extent and power of the United States. He realizes much more clearly than before that any government of Cuba must get along with the United States. However, he also realizes our difficulties and knows that since the repeal of the Platt Amendment, we have got to protect our interests in Cuba by diplomacy rather than by force, and that even a threat to decrease the advantages now enjoyed by Cuban sugar might do as much harm to American interests in Cuba as to the Cuban Government. In consequence, his attitude is one of cooperating with the United States, while, at the same time, bargaining to get as much as he can out of us for his country.

(b) His trip to Mexico - coming after that to the United States - was an anti-climax - and served to lessen rather than increase the prestige of Mexico in his eyes. He now merely wishes to maintain ordinarily friendly relations with that country.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and Press.
HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5698 Date: April 14, 1939.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Resume of Political Situation as of May 10,1939

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 17 1939

1. As has been previously reported, the law providing for the election of a Constituent Assembly was passed on April 22, 1939.

2. This law provides for the election of eighty one delegates on the basis of one for each 50,000 inhabitants of Cuba, who shall convene with the full authority to draw up a Constitution for the Republic of Cuba. The law also provides regulations for the elegibility of candidates to the Constituent Assembly, and regulations to which political parties must conform if they are to campaign to elect candidates from their party to this Constituent Assembly. The law further provides that the Supreme Court and the Superior Court of the Province of Habana shall appoint from among their own members five persons who shall be the Superior Electoral Tribunal whose duty it is to enforce the provisions of the Electoral Law, and to set dates for the elections to the Assembly and for the election of the President and Vice President and other officers. This Tribunal has been formed and is composed of the following members:

Dr. Llaca Argudin, President of the Tribunal.
Dr. Cainas Ponzoa
Dr. Ricardo Duval
Dr. Delio Silva
Dr. Juan Carlos Andreu.

The Tribunal has set the date for the election of members of the Assembly as of August 30,1939, and February 15, 1940 for the general election of President and other officers.

3. This law clears the stage upon which the following important factors will make their appearance:

(a) Colonel Batista.

As far as Colonel Batista is concerned, all information points to the supposition that he wishes to retain control of the Government of Cuba. It appears more and more likely that he wishes to be legally elected President of the country. For this reason, he has for some time been courting the good graces of as many political parties as possible - more especially those representing the under-privileged classes. He has been endeavoring to get Congress, who, for the most part, are either in his favor or under his control, to liquidate the remaining part of the Public Works debt, in order that a loam may be obtained from the Export-Import Bank, so that by spending this loan he may give work to the people and still further consolidate himself with them. Some well-informed people are of the opinion that Batista hopes that when the Constituent Assembly with its comprehensive powers is elected, it will in turn elect him for provisional president, so that he may thus retain his powers with a color of legality for a considerable period of time. Others are of the opinion that he is building up his power so that his election by the people in the general elections will be a foregone conclusion.

(b) Present Cuban Congress

Insofar as Congress is concerned, inefficient and venal as ever, it has endeavored to maintain itself in power and has been reluctant to pass a Constituent Assembly law for fear of losing itself in the new scheme of things. It would appear that Batista has finally compelled them to pass this law, and that they will now, as individuals, endeavor to squirm back into place and power under whatever electoral laws the Constituent Assembly may set up.

(c) Present Political Parties

As to the political parties, no matter what their avowed creeds, their actual purpose is simply to obtain as much as possible of the political apoils. The two largest parties are the Partido Revolucionario

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Cubano, headed by Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, which is against Batista, and the A.B.C., headed by Dr. Joaquin Martinez Saenz, which is, in general, for him. The following is a list of political parties now active in the country, listed according to whether they favor Batista or are against him, or are undeclared:

In Favor of Batista
Partido Liberal....Leader, Enrique Recio.
Partido Union Nacionalista...Leader, Colonel Carlos Mendieta.
Partido Conjunto Nacional Democratico..Leader,Santiago Verdeja.
Partido Comunista...Leader, Blas Roca.
Partido Union Revolucionaria...Leader, Juan Marinello.
Partido A.B.C....Leader, Dr. Joaquin Martinez Saenz.
Revolucionario Cubano Autentico...Leader, Sergio Carbo.
Partido Laborista Cubano...Leader, Sr. Matias.
Partido Agrario Nacional...Leader, Alejandro Vergara.

Undeclared (or on the fence).
Partido Social Democrata...Leader, Justo Luis del Pozo.
Partido Popular Cubano...Leader, Carmelo Urquiaga.

Against Batista.
Partido Revolucionario Cubano...Leader, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin.
Partido Accion Republicana...Leader, Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez.
Partido Democrata Republicano..Leader, General Mario Menocal.

(d) In the Electoral Law is one provision to the effect that all political parties must guarantee to respect the rights of minorities, and recently when representatives of the various political parties appeared before the Tribunal to obtain legal authorization to participate in the elections, the following parties were thrown out for failure to comply with the above mentioned provision:

Partido Comunista.
Partido Union Revolucionaria.
Partido A.B.C.
Partido Laborista Cubano
Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autentico
Partido Agrario Nacional.

Colonel Batista thereupon made a statement that if these parties had been rejected for some technical reason, this reason must be removed and that the parties must legally be allowed to participate. Congress then passed an amendment which, in effect, authorizes these parties to compete.

4. The Military Attache has the following opinions to offer concerning the foregoing political situation: It becomes more and more apparent that Colonel Batista is paving the way for his election to the presidency of Cuba. In view of the fact that for the last five years, Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of Police and Inspector General of the Cuban Army (and logical successor to Colonel Batista), has been conspicuous in his loyalty to Batista and outspoken in his desire to keep the Army and the police out of politics, it would appear that Colonel Batista has a good chance of becoming a real President of Cuba rather than a puppet under control of the next Chief of Staff.

5. As far as the political parties are concerned, it would appear that the vast majority - both in numbers of parties and in numbers of individuals - are in favor of Batista. The reason for their being in favor of him is more because they think he is the coming man and they want to

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climb on the bandwagon, that it is for any particular admiration they may have for him. However, the fact remains that as the situation is at present, the best informed people believe that Batista can and will make himself President of Cuba. The Military Attache is not prepared to prophesy whether Batista will become President of Cuba, but he does wish to state that at the present time, conditions strongly indicate that he will.

6. The present situation is one of jockeying for position on the part of everybody involved, and the details of the picture will be constantly changing.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.
Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Observation

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5709 Date: May 11,1939

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 27 1939

Recent Political Developments
Affecting Constituent Assembly.

2657-Q-330/406

1. As stated in report No. 5709, index as above, dated May 11, 1939, the Cuban Congress passed the Constituent Assembly law on April 22, 1939. In the above mentioned report, it was inaccurately stated that after the Superior Tribunal of the Constituent Assembly had rejected certain political parties, Congress had passed an amendment permitting the rejected parties to participate. The actual status of this affair is that the Senate passed an amendment which would permit the rejected parties to participate, but the House has failed to agree on the Senate's amendment, and, at the present time, the following political parties still stand rejected:

Partido Comunista.
Partido Union Revolucionaria.
Partido Laborista Cubana.
Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autentico.
Partido Agrario Nacional.

The Partido A.B.C. which had been included among the rejected parties, revised its constitution and gained admittance under the original law.

2. During the past two weeks, the following Cabinet members have resigned:

Dr. Enrique Bringuier.....Secretary of the Presidency.
Dr. F. Fernandez Concheso....Secretary of Education.
Dr. Manuel Costales Latatu...Secretary of Sanitation.

It is probable that Dr. Oscar Garcia Montes, Secretary of the Treasury, will also resign.

3. The above mentioned resigned Secretaries have given out as the reason for their action the statement that they propose to become candidates for membership in the Constituent Assembly.

4. After having consulted various military and civilian contacts who are abreast of the situation, and considering various statements of Colonel Batista's in the past, concerning his possible candidacy for the presidency, the Military Attache is of the opinion that the real reason for these resignations is as follows: All the Secretaries who have resigned are prominent men and personal friends of Colonel Batista, and the Colonel, by having them members of the Constituent Assembly, will thus be in a position of having to influence only these eighty-one members of the Constituent Assembly, instead of the entire population, towards making him provisional President of the Republic. He can also govern the country through this Constituent Assembly until such time as a Constitution is agreed upon and adopted.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts
and Press.

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From M.A., Havana Report No. 5713 Date: May 23, 1939.

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G-2 Report ~~Restricted~~ 6-1 2657-B-330

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Probability of Colonel Batista becoming Candidate for President of Cuba.

1. On May 25th, 1939, the Military Attache made a visit to the 8th Regiment at Pinar del Rio. He was received by the Commanding Officer at the head of his assembled officers at the Headquarters. The Cuban and American National Anthems were played. The Military Attache was then tendered a review of the Cavalry Squadron stationed at Headquarters; was escorted around the barracks and stables, and given a luncheon. In other words, he was received with the greatest cordiality.

2. During one period of the visit when Colonel Benitez, his Adjutant, and the Military Attache were alone in the Colonel's office, the conversation turned upon Colonel Batista. In consequence of the Military Attache having made certain complimentary remarks about Colonel Batista, Colonel Benitez made the following statement, which is considered of importance:

> "Batista realizes that he must become President -- he told me this. He must take the position or there will be a revolution. He is the only man for the job. He will be President and will be able to devote his entire time to politics. Pedraza will be Chief of Staff. We are all Batista's friends; thus he will be able to accomplish more. He is coming to fish with me here on my yacht next week, and talk things over."

3. In view of the fact that Colonel Benitez is one of the eight regimental commanders, and one of Colonel Batista's inner circle, the Military Attache is of the opinion that this statement is ample confirmation of the much muted question as to whether or not Colonel Batista proposes to run for the presidency.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5716 Date: May 27, 1939.

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 21 1939

Relations Between the United States and Cuba.

1. Since the rendition of report No. 5733 (Comments on Current Events, No.8, dated July 28,1939, paragraph 3), several interesting developments have occurred. Before going into details, the Military Attache wishes to state that, in his opinion, the general situation in Cuba is unintelligible without knowledge of the conduct of the United States Government with respect to Cuba. Also, it should be stated that this report is sent up with the knowledge of the American Ambassador and by permission of the Embassy.

2. On July 20, 1939, the Ambassador of the United States handed the Cuban Government a note firmly written, in which it was stated that the Cuban Government could not count on the economic cooperation of the United States for a revision of the reciprocal trade treaty, or credit for the execution of public works in Cuba (the so-called forty million dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank) unless the Cuban Government would --

(a) Balance its budget.
(b) Modify the moratorium or revalorization of mortgages law to such an extent that it would not be confiscatory in respect to American finances.
(c) Pay the Morris claim. (A claim decided in favor of an American citizen by the Supreme Court of Cuba).
(d) Pay the remainder of the Public Works Debt.

The note further stated that should the Cuban Government fail to give assurances of doing these four things, the Government of the United States would announce, on August 2nd., that all negotiations for the reciprocal trade treaty had been indefinitely postponed.

3. On Sunday, July 23, the Cuban Government presented to the Ambassador a note which was unconciliatory and haughty. Shortly thereafter, Sr. Martinez Fraga, Cuban Ambassador to the United States - who was in Havana at the time - had a conference with Colonel Batista, and then returned to Washington by airplane, and notified the State Department of the United States that upon second thought, the government of Cuba deemed it advisable to comply with all four requests of the United States Government. He requested that no publication be made of suspension of negotiations for the reciprocal trade treaty, and also requested that both the United States' note to Cuba and Cuba's note in reply thereto be withdrawn. The reply given him was that additional time would be granted the government of Cuba to comply with the requests; that the announcement of the suspension of negotiations with respect to the trade treaty would be postponed for a reasonable time, but that neither note would be withdrawn, and that should the government of Cuba fail to comply with its promises, both notes would be published.

4. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the government of Cuba (which, of course, largely means Batista) has had a bad scare, and has seen the necessity of improving the situation of the country. It is the opinion of several members of the Embassy staff that should the interchange of notes be published, public sentiment against Batista would be so great that his regime would come to an end.

5. None of the above mentioned events have appeared in the press, and the whole proposition is highly confidential. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the Cuban Government - having recovered from its first shock - will comply with its promises as little as possible, and will continue as long as it dares, the much more enjoyable occupation of robbing the national treasury and of milking the United States Government whenever possible.

Henry A.Barber, Jr.
Major, GS.,Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Embassy
HAB:vm

From M.A. Havana Report No.5739 August 10, 1939.

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G-2 Report 3610-a

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Pre-Election Activities.

Colonel Batista's Candidacy for President. RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 26 1939

1. On Sunday, August 13, 1939, the Partido Union Nacionalista held a meeting in La Comedia Theatre, and amid scenes of wild enthusiasm, nominated Colonel Batista as its candidate for the presidency in the coming elections. This, apparently, is the opening gun of the coming political campaign, and may be considered the first derinite public indication that Batista will stand for the presidency.

2. The newspaper INFORMACION, about a week ago, carried an analysis of the political set-up. According to this paper, the strength of the various political parties was as follows:

FOR BATISTA		OTHERS	
Liberals	366,146:	Democrata Republicano	215,374
Union Nacionalista	269,726:	Revolucionario Cubano	202,260
Conjunto Nacional Democratico	186,758:	Accion Republicana	116,340
Nacional Revolucionario	74,259:	Partido A.B.C	56,126
Union Revolucionaria	46,167:	Popular Cubano	21,693
Partido Comunista	43,838:	Agrario Nacional	12,628
Total	986,894:	Total	624,421

From these figures - out of a total of 1,611,315 votes, Colonel Batista should have 986,894, and his opponents 624,421.

3. Colonel Batista's candidacy for President again gives rise to speculations as to conditions after the election. Information has been obtained from many Army sources that Colonel Jose Pedraza will, of course, be Chief of Staff of the Army. Colonel Pedraza is receiving an enormous income from the lottery, the gambling houses in Havana City and the houses of ill-repute in Havana City. According to the most conservative estimate, he is getting at least $150,000 a year from these sources. He is apparently a man who does not believe in sending his income North, but believes himself capable of enjoying and protecting it here in Cuba. Thus, when he becomes Chief of Staff, he will be a very rich man, and probably conservative. He will probably not enter politics because it does not appeal to him, but he will certainly command the Army in no uncertain manner. He is a much stronger man than is Colonel Batista, and is without scruples or pity.

4. Colonel Batista's plans allegedly call for many and varied reforms throughout the Island, which reforms, in the last analysis, must be carried out through the force of the Army. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that when Colonel Pedraza is indifferent to Colonel Batista's recommendations, or favorable to them, he will cooperate, but that should any difference of opinion arise between the two men, Colonel Pedraza will most decidedly do what he himself thinks best. In other words, it is the opinion of the Military Attache that if Colonel Batista succeeds to the presidency, his power will be decidedly limited.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Press and
Personal Contacts.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5742 Date: August 16, 1939.

DECLASSIFIED
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: Pre-Election Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 26 1939

Batista's Campaign for the Presidency.

1. As has been previously reported, it is the opinion of many people in a position to know, that Colonel Batista will endeavor to have himself elected President by the Constitutional Assembly rather than going through a regular election by the people as a whole.

2. After recent conversations with several good Cuban contacts, the Military Attache has been informed of a simple plan whereby this could be accomplished, which plan is considered by those in the know as the one Batista is following.

3. The present Constitution calls for the renewal of one-half of the House of Representatives every two years, and one-half of the Senate every four years, and the date for the next renewal is on or about April 7,1940.

4. If the Constitutional Assembly is elected on the first of October, 1939, or shortly thereafter, as the law now requires, by December, 1939, this body will be organized and sitting, so that in the month of April, 1940, there will be two legislative bodies in existence in Cuba -- the Congress and the Constitutional Assembly.

5. When one-half of the House and Senate lose office in April,1940, through expiration of term of service, Congress, lacking its proper quota of members, will no longer be able to qualify as a constitutional governing body. This leaves the Constitutional Assembly as the only legitimate governing body. If Batista then is able to suspend the elections for Congress, on the plea that, as the Constitutional Assembly may completely change the form of government - may even abolish, for instance, the Senate, there is no need to elect the missing members of Congress -- he can prolong the power of the Constitutional Assembly indefinitely. Then he can have the Constitutional Assembly elect him President ad interim.

6. Obviously, the foregoing is simply an estimate of one way in which Batista can obtain the presidency, but it is so like his way of doing things and so simple and easy, that the Military Attache is of the opinion that this course of action may well transpire.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Contacts.

HAB*vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5744 Date: August 18, 1939.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GRS NARS Date 7/15/74

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

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2657-9-330

Subject: Foreign Relations.

SEP 1939 WAR DEPARTMENT

Relations Between the
United States and Cuba.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 1 1939

1. The Military Attache is informed by the American Ambassador that on August 16th a note was presented in the name of the United States Government to the Cuban Government, which stated that the American Government felt compelled to designate the date of August 31, 1939, for the publication of the notice to the effect that all negotiations for a supplementary trade treaty between the United States and Cuba had been suspended, unless, before that date, the Government of Cuba should have --

1. Paid the residue of the Public Works Debt.
2. Paid the Morris claim.
3. Modified the Moratorium Law.
4. Taken steps to balance their budget.
(See report No.5739, index as above, dated Aug.10, 1939).

2657-9-330/409

2. Colonel Batista has apparently been losing power to a certain extent recently, and it is a question whether, even if so disposed, he can force these measures through Congress in the allotted time.

3. It is the opinion of the Ambassador and the Secretaries of the United States Embassy that if Batista fails to comply with the request of the United States Government, the resulting howl of indignation at the breaking off of the negotiations for the supplementary trade treaty will be so great as to preclude any possibility of Batista becoming President of Cuba. They believe that the result may even be the end of Batista as a political power.

4. The Cuban opposition is hailing this situation as a Heaven-sent opportunity, and will gladly oppose compliance with the request of the United States Government, purely in order to discredit Batista.

5. The United States Embassy is somewhat complacent about the whole thing, because they consider that if Batista conforms, certain immediate ends will have been accomplished in the payment of claims, and, if he does not conform, the country will have a chance to have a really representative government instead of a semi-dictatorship, which would be much easier to deal with than the present set-up.

6. This latter idea can be readily understood when it is realized that Batista, in his present status, can interfere when he likes, but when he runs across a situation that he does not like and which he thinks would make him unpopular no matter how he acted, he is able to say that he is "only a simple Colonel," and has nothing to do with the matter. In other words, at the present time, he has authority without responsibility, and the Embassy finds it very hard to deal with him.

7. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that no sudden turn-over of power will occur on August 31st., although at a later date the effect of the conditions above described will be felt one way or another. There is a possibility that a certain percentage of the Cuban people will welcome Batista's stand as one of patriotism and of defiance to a "bullying" northern power. This attitude can scarcely last when cold common sense is brought to bear on the matter, and it seems probable that eventually Batista must either comply or lose his position.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Embassy
HAB:vm

From M.A.,Havana Report No.5748 August 22, 1939

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Combat-Army)

Subject: Distribution of Troops.
Territorial Commands.

2012-132/3

Batista Losing Power.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 1 1939

1. Reference "Comments and Suggestions on Reports," dated August 11, 1939, regarding report No. 5728, index as above, dated July 24, 1939.

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2. As indicated in report No. 5747 (6180-a) dated August 22, 1939, the Military Attache is of the opinion that Colonel Batista has lost power in the last six months. Answering the specific question in the above mentioned "Comments and Suggestions," -- "does this rather careful treatment of his subordinates by Colonel Batista indicate that he is losing power, and hence is forced to act with caution?"-- the Military Attache is of the opinion that Colonel Batista's conduct arises from two reasons:

1. That Batista is losing power and has not the ability to enforce his commands, and -

2. That he is so interested in obtaining the presidency that he is particularly careful at this time not to offend anyone, if he can possibly avoid it, and especially anxious not to have dissension in the military family.

3. His loss of power other than in the Army is evidenced by his inability to get certain bills passed which he has been supporting; for instance, the Moratorium Bill; and, if on account of pressure from the United States, he should decide to quash this bill, he might find it equally difficult.

4. Nevertheless, it is also true that Colonel Batista, at the present time, appears to have gained sufficient influence with the majority of political parties to insure his successful candidacy for the presidency.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Observation

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana No. 5749 Date: August 25, 1939.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS, NARS Date 2/15/74

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 12 1939

2657-9-331/412

Cuban-American Relations.

1. Reference is made to confidential report No.5748, index as above, dated August 22, 1939. The Military Attache is now informed by the American Embassy that President Laredo Bru personally requested the American State Department to delay announcement of the breaking off of discussions for a supplementary trade treaty, from August 31 to September 9, 1939. Such a request from the head of a friendly nation, I am given to understand, must be complied with, if possible, and, hence, the United States Government agreed to the postponement.

2. Apparently, the Cuban authorities (meaning largely, Colonel Batista), are endeavoring to comply with the requirements laid down by the United States, but have been unable to get the necessary bills through Congress by August 31st. Apparently, one senator - whose vote is badly needed by the government party - took this poor time for a holiday in the United States, and is being sent for in haste.

3. The Military Attache is doubtful whether by September 9th, the Cuban Government, even if willing, will be able to execute the various projects required.

4. The above information was submitted in paragraph 4 of Current Events, dated September 2, 1939, but it was thought advisable to forward this additional report for filing under the index number shown above.

Source: Embassy.

HAB:vm

Henry A. Barber, Jr.
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5755 September 7, 1939.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations. 330/+14

2657-Q RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 19 1939

Cuban-American Relations.

1. Referring to report No. 5755, index as above, dated September 7, 1939, it will be noted that the Cuban Government was given until September 9th to comply with certain requests of the American Government, under penalty of having the American Government suspend negotiations on the supplementary trade treaty.

2. This situation has now been complicated by the proclamation of the President of the United States, temporarily doing away with sugar quotas, under which proclamation the duty on Cuban sugar automatically rises from $0.90 per 100 pounds to $1.50 per 100 pounds. This means, of course that the Cuban exporters will get less for their sugar, but it also means that they can sell as much as the market will take in the United States, without legal restrictions. Moreover, they still enjoy the advantage of paying 20 per cent less duty than other foreign countries.

3. The news of the President's proclamation has been received among Cuban sugar circles with consternation, as it is, of course, an immediate blow to have the tariff raised, and local sugar people are afraid that Cuban sugar may not be able to compete in the open American market with Porto Rican, Hawaiian, and other sugars.

4. The American Department of State, in transmitting the notice of the proclamation to the Cuban Government, also stated that the Government of the United States would not publish a notice of suspension of negotiations on the supplementary trade treaty, in order to be able -- when quotas are again in force -- to reduce the tariff to its present figure of $0.90.

5. It is thus clear that the United States Government has made this proclamation for the benefit of its own sugar consumers, and not with a view to hurting Cuba. On the other hand, they have taken what precautions they could to put Cuba back on its former advantageous plane when conditions warrant.

6. This news will have a decided political effect, which it is impossible to analyze at present. The immediate blow to Cuban economics may result in unpopularity of Colonel Batista and his regime, and may be instrumental in under-mining him. On the other hand, many Cubans will take the attitude that the United States has proved how she will act whenever the price of sugar goes up, and that, consequently, Cuba should have no faith in her.

7. The Military Attache is of the opinion that it is impossible to analyze the results of this proclamation at present, but that it will undoubtedly have important and far-reaching effects - both economically and politically, in Cuba.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press, Personal Contacts
and Embassy.

HAB:vm

From M.A.,Havana Report No.5760 Date: September 12, 1939.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations.

Cuba's Reaction to President Roosevelt's Abolition of Sugar Quotas.

1. The Cuban Government, as well as all business men interested in sugar, continue to be greatly concerned over President Roosevelt's action in abolishing sugar quotas, and, consequently, raising the United States tariff on sugar. On September 14, 1939, the Cabinet heard an appeal from mill owners and sugar planters, which read, in part, as follows:

> "At this time the Reciprocity Treaty has ceased to be reciprocal, and functions exclusively in favor of one of the contracting parties. President Roosevelt's proclamation is a terrible blow to our economic organization, which could be superseded only by the total banishment of Cuban sugar from the United States. We fail to understand why the quotas were suppressed instead of enlarged, which would have served just as well without causing a drop in prices and increase of tariff."

2. Cubans in general and even the Cuban Government are inclined to believe that the President's action is punitive in nature, on account of the Cuban Government having failed in its numerous obligations to the United States. However, instead of taking any constructive action, such as paying the remaining Public Works Debt, they rail at the United States for having raised the tariff on sugar, in spite of the fact that Cuban sugar still pays only $1.50 cwt., as against $1.87 on all other foreign sugars.

3. It is announced that the delegation to the Panama Conference will be headed by Secretary of State Campa, and that Martinez Fraga, Cuban Ambassador to the United States; Sr. Lopez Castro, Secretary of Agriculture; and Senator Jose Manuel Casanova, head of the Sugar Stabilization Institute, will be members. The Military Attache has been informed from a source considered reliable that Martinez Fraga, in private, has shown himself most bitter towards the United States, and that Colonel Batista, in forming the delegation, called it the "Comite de Combate," and urged the delegation to do all in its power to hamper the United States in the coming neutrality conference. In other words, he directed them to exploit Cuba's nuisance value in any effort the United States may make to coordinate neutrality in Central and South America. This information, received three days ago, appears to be confirmed by a statement in the Havana Post of Saturday, September 16th, in which Ambassador Martinez Fraga says -"we go to Panama confident that Cuba will obtain what she demands in defense of her highest interests." (Highest interests meaning sugar).

4. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the antagonistic and non-compliant frame of mind of the sugar committee is true at this time and exactly the reaction that might be expected. It is possible, however, that before the delegation proceeds to Panama, a saner view of the situation may develop.

5. It must be borne in mind when discussing Cuban-American relations that the average Cuban believes that practically every citizen of the United States is eagerly waiting for Cuba's next move in any matter, and they cannot possibly realize that scarcely one American in ten thousand even knows or cares where Cuba is.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts and
Press.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5763 Date: Sept. 16, 1939

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

SEP 27 1939
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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Exercise of Governmental Power.

Official Declaration of Colonel Batista's Position in Cuba.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 26 1939

1. On September 2, 1939, General Mario Menocal, head of the Partido Democrata Republicano, addressed a manifesto to the President of Cuba, which was in the nature of an attack on Colonel Batista.

2. The manifesto views the existing electoral situation as a struggle between the "defenders of permanent militarized Government...maintained by coercion or bribery"..and the defenders of political liberty. It accuses Colonel Batista of "violating military law, the Electoral Code, and the Constitutional Law". It refers to his "freely disposing of important Government funds for political purposes." It says that the Army itself cannot be satisfied with the work of its leader, for the reasons set forth.

3. The manifesto says that the party, far from fearing Colonel Batista's individual participation in the political life of the nation urges him to participate as a civilian, saying at the same time that the Colonel's self-respect should demand that he return to civil life if he wants to engage in politics.

4. The President is pointedly reminded that he is a high officer of the Cuban revolutionary army and that he is also a distinguished lawyer and an experienced politician. He is told that he should fully exercise his Constitutional powers and that his Cabinet should be strictly accountable to him.

5. The Congress is reminded of its duty to act in accordance with national opinion and to decline to subordinate its will to that of the Chief of the Army. The judiciary is likewise reminded of its obligation to maintain its independence.

6. An appeal is made to businessmen not to submit in a cowardly manner to real or imagined coercion on the part of the military.

7. Specific criticism is made of Felix del Prado, who, although recently elected head of the Conjunto Nacional Democratico, continues to function as Secretary of Gobernacion, the Cabinet officer having most to do with the electoral process.

8. The party "rejects in advance all legislation emanating from military influence and principally that legislation which may be promulgated without any other object than to satisfy the aspirations, ambitions or convenience of the head of the army or the political parties which have submitted themselves to him."

9. In summary, the manifesto appeals to all elements in the country, including Colonel Batista, the President, Congress, the Judiciary, the Army, and the people, to put an end to Colonel Batista's intervention in the civil affairs of Cuba while he remains head of the Army, and insists upon his resignation from the Army as a condition to his further engaging in politics. The facts recited in the manifesto need no substantiation. The language is unusually frank and especially critical of Colonel Batista. Although it is assumed that the party desires to give its manifesto wide publicity, only ACCIÓN, the ABC paper, so far is known to have published it. The HAVANA POST referred to it briefly in a news item.

10. On September 15th, President Laredo Bru replied formally to the manifesto, and his reply - in contra-distinction to the manifesto - was

From M.A., Havana Report No.5764 September 18, 1939.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

published in all newspapers. The President stated that the government was forced to reply to the manifesto because it attacked the government in its efforts towards patriotism, order, and respect for the rights of all. He stated that it was natural as this manifesto came from the Opposition, it endeavored to bring out all the bad points of the government and all the good points of the Opposition. He further stated that the government could not accept discrimination among the political parties and that all must have the guarantee of the law and respect of the nation. He claimed that as President, he had fulfilled all his constitutional duties, acting in each case, in accordance with the law. He then went on to answer point by point the statements made in General Menocal's manifesto:

11. He said, first, "my government has kept itself separated from politics, except for a natural coordination with the governmental parties. Secretaries of my government have only entered in politics to the extent of becoming candidates for the Constituent Assembly, and when accepting, gave up the positions they held in the government. In the concrete case of the Secretaries of Government, Public Health, and Labor, which you specifically bring up, an investigation will be made to see if there is any truth in the charge."

12. The second point of President Bru's answer was particularly illuminating. He said - "with full responsibility for my words, I cannot put any obstacles in the way of Colonel Batista, who is the Chief of the Revolution of the Fourth of September, and who has been responsible for all the governments which we have had since that time. When Colonel Batista, as Chief of the Army, utilizes the Army to safeguard the rights of the citizen and the man to coordinate the forces of the Opposition, permitting it to have full liberty of action, then the Partido Democrata Republicano may feel sure that the President of the Republic can guarantee the execution of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic."

13. The answer to the third point was as follows: "The President of the Republic will not accept any legislation which does not emanate from the public powers of the nation, or does not satisfy public order and the good of the country."

14. The answer to the fourth point was: "The government does insist that the Constituent Assembly shall be an expression of the free will of the people, without interference either from the Army or the Government.

15. The remainder of the President's document was not pertinent. It will be noted that the President's reply to the second point raised by the manifesto amounts to a statement that Batista is above the law and can do what he likes with the Army, and the whole reply seems to indicate that the government has given up any pretense of democracy, and frankly admits that Batista is the dictator.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Press and Embassy.

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From M.A., Havana Report No.5764 September 18, 1939

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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WAR DEPARTMENT 3610-a

G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: National Elections.
Pre-Election Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 26 1939

Reports that Batista Will not Run for Presidency.

1. The Military Attache was told by Captain Manuel Larrubia, General Staff, Cuban Army, that in the latter's opinion, Colonel Batista would not be a candidate for President in the coming elections. He made this statement without any urging on the part of the Military Attache, who was quite surprised to hear it, as it was the first indication he had received on the subject. Captain Larrubia could not think of any reasons for the change of course, but was obviously convinced that it was true, as he had heard several other officers around Headquarters discussing the matter.

2. Later the Military Attache was told by Mr. Martinez, Agent for airplanes and other supplies, and who sells to the Cuban Government, that Colonel Batista would not run for the presidency either because he would prefer to retain control of the Army during the unsettled conditions caused by the European War; or because he found himself unable to fulfill the promises which he had made to the American Government on his trip to the United States, and felt that if he became President, he would find himself in a very uncomfortable situation for that reason; and also on account of the present difficult sugar situation caused by President Roosevelt's recent proclamation.

3. The Military Attache was also informed that various enlisted men had stated in public places that they would follow Batista as a military leader, but that they did not feel bound to follow him if he entered politics.

4. The Military Attache is not yet ready to declare himself certain that Colonel Batista will not run for President, but believes that it is quite possible the Colonel may decide to retain his present position.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS., Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5766 Date: September 19, 1939

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By GBS NARS Date 7/15/74

G-2 Report

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CUBA (Political)

Subject: National Elections
(a) Pre-Election Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 9 1939

Colonel Batista as Candidate for President.

1. On November 29, 1939, the Military Attache entertained Colonel Batista at a dinner in commemoration of the first anniversary of the Colonel's trip to the United States.

2. The Colonel informed the Military Attache that it was his last public appearance as Chief of Staff; that he would retire in two weeks, and that he hoped to accept the Military Attache's next invitation as President of Cuba.

3. The retirement bill, permitting "certain officers" to retire after comparatively brief service, and framed for Batista (see report No.5733, dated July 28, 1939 - Comments on Current Events No.8), has been passed by Congress and sent to President Laredo Bru for signature.

4. The result of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, in which the "Administration" (i.e.Batista) parties obtained thirty-five representatives, and the "Opposition" forty-one representatives, precludes the possibility of Batista having himself proclaimedprovisional president by the Assembly; and he has been quick to announce that the Constituent Assembly's only task is to frame a Constitution.

5. Batista's chances for the presidency cannot be analyzed with certainty, but all concede that unless the opposition can combine for one candidate only (a difficult matter), the Colonel may well be elected.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache.

Source: Personal Contacts,
Press, Embassy files.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5790 Date: December 2,1939

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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December 5, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Cuban Situation.

1. The political and economic situations are combining in Cuba to cause considerable unrest.

2. A "Constituent Assembly" was elected on November 15, 1939, for the purpose of revising the Constitution of Cuba. Fair elections were held, with the surprising result that the administration elected 35 delegates, but the opposition elected 41. This augurs trouble in case Colonel Batista decides on remaining in power as dictator and forcing through his own program.

3. The next Presidential election is scheduled to be held on February 28, 1940. If the "Constituent Assembly" is still in session at that time, it is doubtful if this election will be held. This postponement will probably result in a great deal of political confusion. This confusion may be used as a "means to an end" by certain political opportunists, including Colonel Batista.

4. The economic situation in Cuba is bad. When President Roosevelt lifted the quotas from sugar imports to the United States on September 11, 1939, he automatically raised the duty on Cuban sugar from 90¢ to $1.50 per hundred pounds. This dealt the Cuban sugar industry a severe blow. Now in Cuba, high sugar prices mean: (1) prosperity, (2) full stomachs, and (3) tranquility; low sugar prices -- if maintained for a considerable time -- mean: (1) depression, (2) empty stomachs, and (3) trouble. In spite of the European war, sugar prices in Cuba are low. If this condition remains unremedied, trouble might reasonably be expected.

5. Colonel Batista wants to become President, legally. One very serious difficulty exists, however. Before he can become a legal candidate he must resign or retire as Chief of Staff of the Army. This may be dangerous, and no one realizes this more than Colonel Batista. In spite of this danger a dispatch from Havana

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

dated December 3d stated that he had retired from the Army to become the presidential candidate for the Liberal and Nationalist Parties. The dispatch added that the Communist Party also would support him. Colonel Batista is trusting his career (and his safety) to the loyalty of his former Chief of National Police, Colonel Jose Pedraza, who now becomes Chief of Staff of the Army.

6. Colonel Batista's power as dictator is slipping. Many of his former military subordinates are grafting. The Colonel, in attempting to increase his own popularity, has sacrificed discipline in both his military and political machines. His opponents are gradually losing their fear and are becoming more articulate. There are indications that, since his visit to Mexico, Colonel Batista has swung considerably to the left and has become somewhat anti-American.

7. Conclusions: The economic and political situations in Cuba indicate approaching squalls, with possibilities of a serious storm.

E. R. W. McCABE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

DEC 15 1939
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WAR 420 3610-a

G-2 Report Restricted 6-1

CUBA (Political)

Subject: National Elections
(a) Pre-Election Activities.

Campaign for the Presidency

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 15 1939

1. On December 7, 1939, Colonel Fulgencio Batista relinquished his command as Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army to Colonel Jose Pedraza, and in a colorful ceremony at Camp Columbia, Colonel Batista performed his last military act by pinning the new insignia of rank on Colonel Pedraza and certain others who were promoted. He then witnessed a review of the 6th and 7th Regiments and detachments from the National Police and Navy, at the conclusion of which he addressed the assembled troops. He was obviously considerably moved. His statements may be divided into three main parts: First, he took an affectionate and emotional farewell of his troops; second, he stated that he was going to conduct himself as a private citizen, demanding no more than the rights of a private citizen, and that under those rights he would become a candidate for the presidency, because he felt it was necessary for the good of the country. He added that he hoped that if his regime would be for the good of the country that God would grant him victory, but if, on the other hand, his regime would be detrimental to the country, he hoped that the fates would cause him to lose. Third, he stated that he begged his fellow-soldiers to see to it that the elections for the presidency were fair and square with advantage to no one, in the same way that they had seen to it that the elections for the Constituent Assembly were fair and square.

2. At the conclusion of his address, Batista was borne amid cheers on the shoulders of the men to the Military Club where a large luncheon was given him by his comrades in the service. Colonel Pedraza was also borne on the shoulders of the troops to the Club, but during the whole episode he did not change the expression of his face nor the coldness of his demeanor.

3. After the luncheon, Colonel Batista changed into civilian clothes and proceeded to his private residence where he interviewed the heads of the parties that are to support him for the presidency, and immediately launched his campaign.

4. The Communist Party has already nominated Batista as its candidate, and the Union Nacionalista, Conjunto Nacional Democratico, and the Liberals are expected to do so within a day or so. Meanwhile, the Opposition parties - General Menocal's Partido Democrata Republicano; Grau San Martin's Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autenticos); and Miguel Mariano Gomez' Partido Accion Republicano and Martinez Saenz' Partido A.B.C., are endeavoring to combine on one candidate. Grau San Martin seems to have the best chance of becoming the candidate.

5. As previously reported, the "Opposition" has a greater numerical strength than the parties supporting Batista, but they are divided, while his are united, and, according to the statements of Batista's personal aides, he counts heavily on the effect of the fair and square Constituent Assembly elections to cause many people formerly affiliated with other parties, to vote for him.

6. It cannot be doubted that Batista has a good chance to be elected.

Henry A.Barber, Jr.
Major,GS. Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Contacts
and Press.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5793 Date: December 8,1939.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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G-2 Report

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.

Inauguration of Constituent Assembly. RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 8 1940

1. In compliance with suggestion contained in "Comments and Suggestions on Reports," dated February 19, 1940 (concerning report No. 5813), the following report is submitted on the above subject:

2. On February 9, 1940, the Constituent Assembly met for the first time. It is composed of 76 members -- 41 belonging to the so-called opposition parties and 35 to the government parties. (For details see report No. 5789, index 3610-b, dated December 2, 1939).

3. After the ceremonies of the opening were concluded, the Assembly chose Dr. Grau San Martin as Chairman, and organized itself on a parliamentary basis with various sub-committees.

4. The first difficulty encountered was the fact that Colonel Batista insisted that the presidential elections be held, as provided for by existing law, on March 28, 1940, believing that he had a better chance to win at an early poll. The majority of the members of the Assembly being of the opposition and the opposition stating that it would not compete in presidential elections unless they were held after the Constituent Assembly had done its work, the stage was set for a political battle and consequent delay on any work of drawing up a Constitution. However, to the surprise and gratification of everyone, Batista had a personal conference with the heads of the opposition, and agreed to the postponement of the presidential elections.

5. In consequence, Congress, which of course has the majority of the government parties, agreed to pass a bill proclaiming May 18, 1940, as the date of the presidential elections, and the Assembly, in turn, agreed to go about drawing up a Constitution on a non-partisan basis.

6. The next problem arose from an attempt on the part of those Senators and Congressmen whose term expires on April 1,1940, to prolong their term of office on the theory that after that date there would remain only one-half the Senate and one-half the House in office and no legal legislative body would be in existance. In order to force their point, they refused to appropriate money for the expenses of the Constituent Assembly. This difficulty was ironed out on February 29th, when the short-term Congressmen finally abandoned their claims and Congress agreed to appropriate $30,000 for the expenses of the Assembly, which, in turn, agreed to proclaim that the "half Congress" which would exist after April 1,1940, should be the legal legislative body of the country until such time as its ranks could be filled by proper elections.

7. During these difficulties some work has been done on a new Constitution, but nothing definite has as yet been announced.

From M.A., Havana . Report No.5832 Date: March 2,1940

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

8. After analyzing the platforms of all the parties involved, it is found that they are similar to each other and to the present Constitution. The main outstanding differences are as follows:

9. The Partido Accion Republicana would incorporate in the Constitution the government's right to confiscate private property under certain circumstances, and does not provide for prior indemnity. It also would authorize creation of taxes for a "just and equitable distribution of wealth, and would nationalize public services. The Partido A.B.C., alone of all the parties, would replace the Senate by a "functional Senate" of 18 members elected by economic corporations, with Representatives of the working classes.

10. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that the above-mentioned radical ideas will not survive in the new Constitution and that, generally speaking, a comparatively conservative Constitution, not unlike the present one, will be agreed upon without undue delay.

11. The meetings of the Assembly and the political situation generally had been marked by good order and lack of violence until March 1st., when Dr. Orestes Ferrara, delegate to the Constituent Assembly from the Liberal Party, and Secretary of State in the Machado regime, was wounded by gunmen in an attempted assassination.

12. This action was publicly condemned by all parties, and though it shows the continued presence of unscrupulous elements in politics, it is still the general opinion that the Constituent Assembly will be able to do its work without undue interference and that the national elections will be held peaceably. This opinion is substantiated by reliable information to the effect that Dr. Ferrara was shot on account of his participation in the Machado regime and not on account of any present day politics.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Press and Personal
Contacts.

HAB:vm

Restricted

From M.A., Havana Report No.5832 Date: March 2,1940

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JUN 10 1940
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G-2 Report 6-1

CUBA (Political)

Subject: Pre-Election Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 18 1940

Campaign for the Presidency.

1. On December 6, 1939, Colonel Batista retired, giving up his position as Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, and announced his candidacy for the presidency. The political situation was then as follows:

Colonel Batista was supported by four important parties, namely, Liberales, Union Nacionalistas, Conjunto Nacional Democraticos, and the Union Revolucionaria, and by two very small ones, the Realistas and the Popular Cubanos. He was opposed by four parties, the Democrata Republicano, the chief of which is General Mario Menocal; the Revolucionario Cubano (Autenticos), of which the leader is Dr. Grau San Martin; the Accion Republicana and the A.B.C. These parties, known as the "Opposition," had at that time not designated a candidate. The elections for the Constituent Assembly had already been held, and, judging from their results, it appeared that the opposition which had elected 41 members to the Constituent Assembly as against 35 for the Batista parties, had the greater voting strength, but was internally unorganized.

2. The date for the presidential elections had been announced for February 28, 1940, and Colonel Batista, believing that his political strength would lessen rather than improve with the passage of time, and desirous of taking advantage of the lack of coordination in the opposition parties, made every effort to have the elections held as proposed. The opposition held that the Constituent Assembly should meet and frame a constitution before the presidential elections were held, insisted upon a postponement of date and refused to designate a candidate, in an endeavor to hamper Colonel Batista, because the law requires that there must be at least two candidates for any presidential election. Batista, in order to counter this move, caused one of his minor parties, Realistas, to put up a dummy candidate, one Dr. Oscar de la Torre, and contested the election of about ten proposed members to the Constituent Assembly, in order to delay the meeting of this body.

3. On January 15, 1940, President Laredo Bru signed a bill postponing the elections to March 28,1940, due to the fact that with customary inefficiency, the mechanics of the election had not been arranged.

4. Believing that it was now too late for the Constituent Assembly to draw up a constitution before March 28,1940, Batista withdrew his opposition to the 10 Opposition candidates and they were confirmed in their seats on January 27,1940.

5. On February 9,1940, the Constituent Assembly met, and paying no attention to the constitution, proceeded to wrangle about the political situation. The Opposition majority in the Constituente was a menace to Batista's plans, because, for instance, they could conceivably, force through a provision in the constitution that the President must be forty years of age, which would automatically throw Batista out.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5862 Date: June 10, 1940

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6. Whether for this or other reasons, Batista decided to compromise and took the initiative by approaching the leaders of the opposition and agreed to a postponement of the elections.

7. On March 18, 1940, it was announced to the surprise of all that General Menocal had deserted the opposition and come out in support of Batista. This move technically was a political deal in which Menocal's party was promised certain positions in case of Batista's victory, but the underlying motive was probably the fact that Menocal, knowing that he held the balance of power, felt that Batista was the lesser of two evils and that he, Menocal, with a majority in Congress, could control Batista to a certain extent even after Batista became president. Moreover, he could see that his own group of parties were by no means assured of victory over Batista's machine, whereas, if he joined Batista, he would be assured of being on the winning side. There was some internal disagreement in Menocal's Democrata Republicano Party, but the majority followed their leader.

8. Subsequent to the above event, the remaining opposition parties declared Grau San Martin their candidate for the presidency.

9. On April 2,1940, the terms of one-half of the Congress expired, and the Constituente was left as the only legal legislative body in Cuba, although its activities were supposed to be confined to the drawing up of a constitution.

10. On April 4,1940, the matter now having become no longer a point of issue, the President signed the bill postponing the elections to July 14, 1940, and about the same time, Batista, Menocal and Grau San Martin persuaded President Laredo Bru to consent to serve until the new President could take office - October, 1940. His term would normally expire May 20, 1940.

11. After the above events, the Batista movement progressed favorably, whereas Grau ran into difficulties. In endeavoring to consolidate his parties and apportion the hoped-for spoils of the elections among them, he ran into an impasse when the parties refused to come to an agreement as to who should get which "plums." Grau thereupon, on April 26th, resigned his candidacy, thus bringing home to his parties the fact that without him they were nothing. The party heads then hastily composed their differences and persuaded Grau to withdraw his resignation, which he did on April 30, 1940, the very date on which all presidential candidates had to be registered.

12. The Constituent Assembly completed its work on June 8, 1940, drawing up a constitution on which a full report will be rendered, and also authorizing the half Congress which still exists to exercise legislative powers to a limited extent; that is, they may enact economic legislature proposed by the President, or electoral legislature proposed by the Supreme Electoral Court.

From M.A.,Havana Report No.5862 Date: June 10,1940

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

13. As the situation now stands, Colonel Batista has the strongest machine, while Grau San Martin is more popular with the people. The general opinion is that Batista will be elected. Report No. 5806 (Comments on Current Events No.17) dated January 6, 1940, gives a resume of Colonel Batista's platform. It is an optimistic and ambitious proposal to reform everything, and does not reflect his radical tendencies, such as his desire to force the passage of a bill for the revaluation of mortgages.

14. Grau San Martin has not announced a platform, as such, and his speeches are merely political broadsides from which little can be gathered. In any case, the platforms are less important than they might be in other countries, as there is no outstanding political bone of contention, and as the object of each candidate is largely to enjoy the spoils of war once he gets in.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache

Source: Personal Observation,
Contacts, and Press.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5862 Date: June 10,1940.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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None Enclosures

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Record Section File No.

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 5 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CUBA

Country Reported On

Subject Communistic Propaganda
Brief Descriptive Title

I. G. No 2900-b

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Embassy files - reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Recent Communistic Propaganda against the United States:

1. Herewith is forwarded extract copy of a report sent up by the American Ambassador on June 15,1940, on the subject of communistic propaganda. The Military Attache considers that it is so sound and so apt at this time that it should be brought to the notice of the War Department direct. The extract follows:

"In view of recent world events, by far the most dangerous and most significant manifestation of Communism in Cuba is the anti-American and pacifist campaign which the leaders of the Communist Party are carrying on through public speeches and pamphlets, and through the Communist paper HOY.

"The Communist Party, the C.T.C., and Juventud Cubana, a Communist controlled youth organization, issued manifestos condemning the attitude of our Government with regard to the Mexican petroleum dispute on the ground that the United States was violating the sovereignty of Mexico. Leaders of the same organizations have attacked the defense program of the United States, stating that the United States was determined to enter the European war and planning to pull Latin America in with it.

"In the celebration of International Labor Day on May 1, a demonstration was held under the auspices of the C.T.C., in which some 80,000 laborers participated. Although Communist banners were not displayed, and it is probable that the majority of the participants in the demonstration were not Communists, it had a definitely Communist and anti-American character. The Mexican Ambassador participated in the celebration and presented the C.T.C. with the Mexican flag and with that of the Mexican Workers Confederation as a symbol of solidarity between the Mexican and Cuban peoples. In his speech of acceptance Lazaro Pena, Secretary General of the C.T.C., and a leader of the Communist Party, promised the support of the Cuban proletariat in Mexico's struggle "against the extortionate ambitions of Yankee Imperialism which is attempting to enslave the Mexican people." He added that "while we sleep the nearby Imperialists and their agents are engaging in the manufacture of guns, the imprisonment of the

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From M. A. Havana Report No. 5873 Date June 24,1940
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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

best friends of the people, and the transfer of their economy to a war basis. For this reason, it is necessary that we give our aid to the people who struggle for liberty, for self-improvement, and to keep out of the Imperialists' war.

"At a recent meeting of Juventud Cubana, Severo Aguirre, leader of that organization and Communist candidate for Representative from the Province of Habana, in the course of his address, denounced the British and the French as the oppressors of millions of subject people throughout the world, and likewise denounced American imperialism for attempting to aid their fellow Imperialists in Europe. He urged thatCuban youth organize for the purpose of thwarting the plans of Imperialism, and constituting a democratic and completely independent Republic.

"Juventud Cubana has announced that it will carry on a national plebiscite through the columns of HOY on the question of whether Cuba should enter the European war under any circumstances. The purpose of this plebiscite, it states, is to refute certain sections of the Cuban press and radio which are trying to make it appear that Cuba has certain vital interests, such as democracy and culture, to defend, and that Cuba's geographical and economic situation might require her to enter the war should the United States do so.

"The same organization recently sent toy guns to a number of Cubans, prominent in public life, who have advocated that Cuba should cooperate fully with the United States in the solution of problems resulting from the European war, with the message that if they want to drag Cuba into the war they should go and fight themselves.

"The Communist organ HOY, in almost daily articles, has accused the United States of attempting to embroil Latin America in the World War. It contends that the Germans and the Allies are tarred with the same brush of imperialistic ambitions and that the only satisfactory outcome of the war would be for the peoples of Germany, France and England to rise simultaneously against their oppressors. It maintains that Russia is the only nation which is pursuing a policy of peace, and has published articles from the Moscow press to the effect that the present war will result in the overthrow of capitalism throughout the world. It has accused the United States of manufacturing evidence, through the Dies Committee and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of Communist plots in Latin American countries with a view to ultimate intervention in those countries. It has given prominence to Daily Record Service reports of protests of American labor and other organizations against President Roosevelt's defense program in such a manner as to give the impression that the masses of the people in our country are against the program. It has also emphasized reports of dissentions in France and England and in their colonies in the West Indies.

"In recent editorials, HOY has stated that the Yankee Imperialists are using all their instruments of propaganda in order to create an hysterical and chauvinistic public opinion in Cuba, as well as in the United States, which would lead to entry into the war on the side of the Allies. It has maintained that the European war is a struggle between groups of powers both of which pursue objectives which have nothing to do with

From M.A., Havana Report No.5873 Date: June 24, 1940.

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democracy or liberty but envisage the enslavement of peoples. Such being the case, it contends that the present war can have no interest for oppressed peoples, since the only wars which such peoples should wage are wars of liberty against their oppressors. It has, therefore, called upon the people of Cuba to unite in resisting the alleged efforts of the United States to involve them on the war.

"It would appear obvious that the above propaganda is inspired, in whole, by the Communist International, on account of its similarity with that disseminated by Communists of other countries. While there is no evidence of a rapprochment between Communists and Nazi elements in Cuba, and while the Communist leaders claim to be anti-Nazi, it is clear that propaganda of this sort is well calculated to serve Nazi ends."

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:vm

From M.A., Havana Report No.5873 Date: June 24,1940

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 10 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CUBA
Country Reported On

Subject Pre-Election Activities I.G. No. 3610-8
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Personal Contact - reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Activities Preceding Presidential Election

1. The Military Attache has been reliably informed that the Grau party is stronger numerically than the Batista party, and that if honest elections were held, would win by a considerable majority. As a result, the Batista party is using all means, including the armed forces, to insure its own victory. Among methods employed, or to be employed, are intimidation of municipal judges, municipal election control boards, the control of transportation for the purpose of hampering members of the Grau party in getting to the polls.

2. The Grau party shows considerable determination, and as far as can be judged now, no matter which side wins, disorder may be expected during and after the elections.

3. The local provincial regimental commanders are stated to have brought pressure to bear on mill owners and other prominent people to secure votes for Batista, on the threat that should Grau win, the Army will first bring about a situation of anarchy and disorder and then suppress it and establish some form of military dictatorship.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache.

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From M. A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5879 Date July 3, 1940
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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

Cuba
Country Reported On

Subject Pre-Election Activities I. G. No. 3610
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Personal Contacts-Reliable

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

2657-G-330/42

Activities Prior to Presidential Election

1. Reference is made to note report no. 5862, dated June 10, 1940, subject, "Pre-Election Activities."

2. Since the submission of the above-mentioned report, the participation of the army in the pre-election activities has become more clear. All regimental commanders in varying detail have used their commands in order to further the cause of Batista.

3. In particular, Ferer was sent to Camaguey to swing the province for Batista, presumably because Major Diaz Caledron refused to do so. Colonel Ferer was so open in his methods as to cause considerable out-cry from the opposition. Señor Grau San Martin complained to President Laredo Bru, who apparently has been sincerely endeavoring to give the country a fair election. As a result, President Laredo Bru demanded of Colonel Pedraza, Chief of Staff, Cuban Army, that he relieve Ferer. President Bru threatened to resign if his commands were not obeyed, and in consequence, Ferer was relieved.

4. In general, however, the army succeded in aiding the Batista machine, partly by intimidation, partly by persuasion, and partly by preventing opposition candidates from getting to the polls.

5. The plans were so well laid except in the case of Ferer that on the surface the election proceeded in a very orderly manner.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, G.S. Infantry,
Military Attache.

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Cuba
Country Reported On

Subject Election Results. I.G. No 3610
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Press and Personal Contacts-Reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Presidential Election of July 14 1940

1. The Presidential elections were held on July 14, 1940 in a very orderly manner insofar as surface indications are concerned.

2. Two or three deaths and several wounded from shooting were reported throughout the island, but on the whole, excellent order was maintained.

3. To date the vast majority of votes have already been counted, and announced, and those still to be heard from cannot change the results.

4. Colonel Batista was elected over Dr. Grau San Martin by 378,765 votes against 262, 102 votes. An analysis by party and province follows on the second page of this report.

5. The defeated Grau San Martin parties are making the expected cry of injustice and coercion at the polls which assumes some basis of fact. However, it does not seem possible that their protests will be of any avail.

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PARTIES	P. Rio	Hab.	Mat.	Sta.Cla.	Cam.	Oriente	TOTAL
Liberal	29, 369	39,167	18,742	841	3,958	15,066	107,143
Democrata Rep.	11, 947	18,568	9,182	12,969	3,144	11,828	67,638
U. Nacionalista	31, 270	30,861	4,625	11,167	2,316	9,629	89,868
U. R. Comunista	1, 214	18,460	2,801	2,645	1,165	6,806	33,091
Conjunto N. Democ.	1, 410	22,950	12,216	4,696	1,541	8,588	51,401
Popular Cubano	-------	4,449	430	83	-----	4,225	9,187
Nac. Rev. Real	839	6,547	6,472	1,155	238	5,186	20,437
Rev. Cub. Autentico	903	55,533	20,851	18,728	4,751	26,485	127,351
Accion Republicana	28, 723	23,917	15,113	4,620	953	11,578	84,904
A. B. C.	12, 431	17,818	6,800	3,885	697	8,216	49,847
Agrario Nacional	129	2,053	185	213	26	1,296	3,964
		240,323		61,002		108,903	
TOTAL	118, 235		97,517		18,851		644,831

6. The first seven parties were Batista parties and were known as the Coalicion Socialista Democratica, and polled 378,765 votes. The next three parties were known as the Oposicion, polling 262,102 votes. The difference in favor of the Coalicion Socialista Democratica was 116,663 votes. Agrario Nacional was the lone independent party and it polled 3,964 votes.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, G.S. Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:rs

From M.A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5887 Date July 17, 1940

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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RECEIVED G-2 W. D. SEP 20 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Cuba
Country Reported On

Subject Stability of Government I.G. No. 3020
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Personal Contact, and Embassy Files.
Reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Same Headings Here

Effect of Economic and Political Factors.

1. Cuba's previous history has indicated that the stability of her government depends largely on the economic condition of the island, and that this condition depends almost entirely on her sugar trade. As is said here, "when sugar is up, the Devil can remain president, but when sugar is down, they would kick out the Angel Gabriel, himself." It is believed that during the present world crisis the United States is especially interested in having domestic quiet in Cuba, and that a report on the situation at present will be of value.

2. Cuba's sugar market is composed of (a) the "World Market" (exclusive of the United States) of which, heretofore, the needs of Great Britain have formed the greater part, and (b) the United States Market, governed by quota, and affording Cuba a preferential tariff.

3. (a) With respect to the "World Market," the studies of the Cuban Sugar Institute reveal the following:-
(note: all figures are in Spanish long tons. One United States long ton equals .9861 Spanish long tons)

The estimated requirements for 1941 (considerably reduced, due to rationing of sugar) for Great Britain and Canada are 2,119,000 tons.

From past experience and present conditions Great Britain and her Colonies are expected to produce 2,190,000 tons. In other words, there will be no British market for Cuba. Moreover, the greater part of the rest of the world market is cut off from Cuba or anyone else by the British blockade, and to

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From M. A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5906 Date September 9, 1940
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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

all intents and purposes, there remains only the United States market. This condition has already had the effect of leaving Cuba with a reserve of about 276,000 tons, which she would normally have sold to Great Britain prior to 1941, but which now becomes surplus.

(b) With respect to the United States market, Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, on Aug. 27, 1940, reduced the United States quota, which meant a reduction for Cuba of 110,850 tons, which, with the amount of sugar not sold to date as expected, results in a surplus of about 179,000 tons, which she expected to dispose of to us before 1941.

4. Cuba's 1940 crop was 2,753,903 tons. Based on the situation described in the foregoing paragraphs, and assuming that in 1941 the United States quota is the same as it was in 1940 (i.e. without the reduction of Aug. 27, 1940) the Sugar Institute figures that the Cuban crop for 1941 can only be 2,081,560 tons. This means a reduction of 672,343 tons from 1940. Should the United States quota for 1941 be the 1940 reduced quota, the reduction will have to be 825,534 tons, or nearly 30 % of last year's crop.

5. The sugar-producing countries, other than the United States and the British Empire, involved in what is left available of the world trade are Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, Peru, Santo Domingo and Java.

6. If a workable plan for the sugar trade for 1941 is to be made, all these countries will have to voluntarily restrict their crops, as previously indicated for Cuba. But while the South American countries will probably agree, no one is sure that Java can be brought into line. If she refuses to limit her crop, greater hardship will result for all the others.

7. The one bright spot in this situation is the possibility that an increased market may be found in the United States and Great Britain, for high test molasses, from which acetone for explosives can be made. At present, however, this idea is only in the "wishful thinking stage."

8. It is obvious that unless sugar prices go up beyond any present expectation the year 1941 may see the beginning of an economic depression eventually causing suffering among the people, and consequent disorders, which can only be avoided by aid from the United States, in the form of the purchase of surplus Cuban sugar.

9. However, the United States Government takes the stand very decidedly that no loans will be made to Cuba until the residue of the Public Works debt (mainly that

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owed to Warren Brothers and Purdy and Henderson Co. for the Central Highway and the Capitol Building) be paid. Colonel Batista promised to affect this "at once" while he was in Washington in November, 1938. It is only recently that he managed to get the bill through the Senate. The fact that he is now president-elect, and need not worry about the unpopularity of the measure, and that as president-elect the probable bad economic situation will affect him personally, combined to make him use every effort (as stated to the Military Attache by Lt. Col. Marine, retired, Batista's "general manager") to get the measure passed.

10. As stated, the Senate passed the bill Sept. 3, 1940 authorizing issue of $8,664,000 Republic of Cuba bonds, with provision for payment of interest and amortization. It then appeared that the House, in due course, would pass the bill, and the way would be open for aid from the United States. But in typical Cuban fashion, President Laredo Bru (almost certainly at Batista's instigation) requested authority of Congress to negotiate a loan of fifteen million dollars. Any such loan would have to be negotiated in the United States and our Government is decidedly interested in any such move. Nevertheless, our Ambassador here was not consulted as to this loan, although the Cuban authorities have been dealing directly with him (and his predecessor) in the matter of the settlement of the Public Works debt, and a subsequent United States loan, for years.

11. In other words this last move is premature, and in a sense a breach of faith on the part of the Cubans if it is an attempt to get a loan without paying their debts to us. It may influence the House against passing the Public Works payment bill, if the House gets the idea that the United States has "softened" once again and that a loan is to be had without debts being paid.

12. In brief summation, it is the opinion of the Military Attache that:-

(a) Present world conditions are forcing an increasingly difficult economic situation on Cuba, which may jeopardize the stability of the Government.

(b) The only thing that can prevent this situation is financial aid from the United States.

(c) The United States is willing and ready to render such aid <u>if</u> Cuba pays her debts.

(d) Batista's willingness and ability to get the necessary legislation for the payment of Cuban debts are necessary for the economic good and tranquillity of his country, unless the United States changes its attitude.

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(e) If the United States changes its attitude and awards a loan before Cuban debts are paid, a quiet Cuba will result, but there will be resentment at such procedure in the United States and may well create difficulties for us in other South American countries. Also the Cuban government will be more difficult and demanding than ever before in its relations with the United States.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Major, G.S. Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:rs

From M.A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5906 Date Sept. 9, 1940

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

JUN 19 1941
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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Federal Bureau of Investigation 2-1
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 20, 1940

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier-General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Miles:

As of possible interest to you, there is transmitted a memorandum concerning Totalitarian Penetration in Cuba.

This information was obtained from a confidential source believed to be reliable.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC'D Executive Office G 2, W.D. U.S. SEP 25 1940

Enclosure

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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JUN 19 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

September 20, 1940

MEMORANDUM

RE: TOTALITARIAN PENETRATION IN CUBA

Every popular movement has some reason behind it. The campaign which is being carried on by the organization of native Cubans, known as the "Committee of the Acera del Louvre" (Friends of the Americans), owes its existence to the results of a careful study of the geographic, historical, commercial, economic and military factors of Cuba and the United States of America, as also to the necessity of counteracting the effect of the efforts which have been, and still are being carried on among us by the "Fifth Column" against both Cuba and the United States.

The activities of the Fifth Column which are dangerous to Cuba and the United States do not consist of the sheets of printed propaganda which, under the seal of the Nazi consulate in Havana, are circulated throughout the country, but to the constant and un-interrupted activity of two organizations which are agreed on one point: hatred of everything genuinely Cuban and American. We refer to the Communist Party and Spanish "Falange."

HOW THE COMMUNIST PARTY PROCEEDS

It hastens to justify all the acts of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini and Japan in various ways. The Communists blame England for causing the present war, which they refer to as the "imperialistic war" in order to deceive the working classes.

Nevertheless, they do not waste their time in seeking adherents for Hitler but devote their efforts principally to exciting hatred of the United States, accusing that nation of being the cause of our present commercial and economic situation and maintaining that the United States strangles us by preventing us from trading with other nations and at the same time refusing to purchase our products, in which campaign, as in other activities, they are in full accord with the Falange.

In the sentimental order they are carrying on a campaign of non-belligerency, their favorite slogan being, "Keep Cuba out of the War," and they endeavor to combat all efforts for the preparation of defense. They oppose obligatory military service. They make use of racial prejudice to stimulate the hatred of the negroes against the whites, both Cuban and American, by publishing both truths and falsehoods with respect to the situation of the negro in the United States.

The Communist Party enjoys official support. The "National

REC'D Executive Office G-2, War Dept. U.S. SEP 25 1940

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Association for the Restoration of Cuban Credit" has stated, "In Cuba not only are these destructive doctrines declared legal, but prominent personalities, acting from the highest political position, stimulate, protect and aid their propagation, even to the extreme that the president himself of the Confederation of Economic Corporations, Sr. Jose Casanova, forms a part and occupies a prominent position in a group of associated political parties in which Communism forms the most important part and enjoys a prominent standing."

According to the informant, the Communist leader in Cuba is Lazaro Pena, a negro, who is the present Secretary of the Fourth International, Cuban Section. The informant states that approximately 95% of all Communists in Cuba are negros, the organization being very strong and well organized in the Republic. Among the leaders of the Communist movement may also be listed the following names: JUAN MARINELLO, an influential politician, HORTENSIA GOMEZ, SALVADOR GARCIA AGUERO, LEOVIGILDO VICENTE, MARIA JOSEFA BOLANOS, EDUARDO CANAS, TERESA GARCIA, JOSE LUIS PEREZ, EDITH GARCIA BUCHACA, FRANCISCO MALPICA, ANDRES A. FONSECA, and MANUEL SALGADO y ANTONIO OVIEDO.

Among the many Communist organizations prevalent in Cuba and the City of Habana the following are listed: Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba, (the CTC), or Confederation of Workers of Cuba, probably the leading Communist Labor organization; Comite Nacional de Ayuda a las Victimas de la Guerra de Espana, (National Committee for Aid to the Victims of the Spanish War; Comite Nacional Femenino, (National Womens' Committee); Gobierno de la Juventud, (Government of the Youth); Federacion de Estudiantes de la Escuela San Alejandro, (Federation of Students of the School of Saint Alexander); Partido Union Revolucionarias-Comunista, (Union Party of Revolutionary-Communists); Hermandad de los Jovenes del Pueblo, (Brotherhood of the Youths of the Town); Asociacion Protectora del Preso, (Protectorate Association of the Press); Comites de Desocupados, (Committee of Unemployment); and the Comite Nacional Por Cuba Fuera de la Guerra, (National Committee for Cuba outside of the War), the organizer of which is its Secretary General, Carlos Fernandez.

The official Communist daily newspaper in Havana is the "Hoy" edited by Anibal Escalante, with offices at Obrapia No. 359, Habana, Cuba. This newspaper is the official document of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba, (CTC), leading Communist Labor Movement, as above related.

HOW THE SPANISH "FALANGE" PROCEEDS

It creates the belief among the Spaniards, and the Cubans who are united to them by family ties, or who have titles of nobility, that it is possible for Spain to re-conquer America, and establish again the old Spanish empire. They have succeeded in deceiving many white Cubans who, observing the campaign of racial discrimination against the whites carried by the Communist Party and by some negro leaders, have sought the

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help of the "Falange," in the belief that this organization is the "Only support of the whites in Cuba." In this manner, the Falangistas, the same as the Communists, contribute to the creation of antagonism, anarchy and a lack of self confidence among the Cuban people. The Spanish "Falange" is made up for the most part of wealthy elements, with certain rare exceptions.

HOW FUNDS ARE RAISED FOR SPAIN

This is done by means of the so-called Auxilio Social (Social Aid), consisting of dining rooms where meals are given to Spaniards out of work and to their children, as also to some Cubans and, latterly, to a limited number of negroes. This Social Aid in reality is nothing more than a pretext to conceal the collection of funds from some 125,000 contributors, Spanish and Cuban, throughout the Republic. These funds are used to increase the treasury of Franco and to carry on propaganda in the countries which are opposed to the Nazi-Spanish penetration. Also the dining rooms constitute in themselves excellent propaganda.

It is the informant's opinion that Jenaro Riestra, the Leader of the Phalanx in Cuba, is a member of the Gestapo stationed in Havana. The informant based his opinion on the fact that it was rumored that Riestra, upon landing at Havana, gave the Nazi salute to the Captain of the particular vessel on which Riestra arrived. The informant also expressed the opinion that it would be more fitting to place a Spaniard in charge of the Gestapo in Cuba, employed directly under Franco, as an agency of Adolf Hitler, than a German, because of the domination of Spanish elements in Cuba and the strength of the number of members of the Phalanx, estimated at 125,000 in Cuba.

With further regard to Riestra, the informant stated that at the present time, there is a current rumor to the effect that Riestra has skipped the country with all the funds belonging to the Auxilio Social. The informant has not been able to verify this rumor and is of the opinion that this rumor is false. It is recalled that Riestra formerly worked in Mexico City, from which place he was compelled to flee because of his strong anti-Democratic activities. The informant at the same time related that rumors are to the effect that Riestra is contemplating a trip either to Germany or Spain via New York City. The informant is quite confident that Riestra will deposit the funds of the Falange movement with someone in New York, which city according to the informant is the central headquarters for the financial end of the activities in the Western Hemisphere. As soon as something definite can be obtained concerning the movements of Riestra, the informant will relay this information to us. The informant is of the opinion that the Spanish Consul in New York City would be the individual to whom Riestra would give such funds.

It was further related by the informant that the Spanish Falangistas are very strong, having the support of the officials of the Government,

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most of the so-called Cubans, who are persons of definite Spanish background and also the full support of the Catholic church. The informant advised that the Southern Methodist church has endeavored to conduct anti-totalitarian activities, but has met with strong opposition in Cuba from the Catholic church, the latter contending that the Methodist church symbolizes "Yankee imperialism" in Cuba; that there is at the present time a conflict between these two elements. It was related that practically all of the wealth in Cuba is controlled by the Spaniards, or so-called Cubans of Spanish nobility background, comparable to the Jewish control of wealth in the United States.

MUTUAL MEANS OF COLLECTING FUNDS USED BY COMMUNISTS AND FALANGISTAS

The principal industrialists of the country, with a few exceptions, have been paying a subsidy to both groups on account of the fear of violence from one or the other. Between two well known breweries a debate was carried on for some time in the press and on the radio in which each accused the other of sending funds to Franco. We have information that a prominent industrialist contributed to furnishing the offices of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba (CTC), which is not Communist in itself but which is controlled by the Communist Party, and it is known that the same industrialist is a member of the Spanish "Falange."

The informant advised that in his opinion, there is no question of a definite Communist and Falangist alliance between the President-Elect Batista and the officials of those organizations; that Batista, by virtue of his office, must cater to the purse-strings and desires of the Spanish nobility and Communist elements which assisted in electing him.

THE COMMITTEE OF THE ACERA DEL LOUVRE (Friends of the Americans)

This organization was founded two years ago as a result of a press campaign carried on by its president in the columns of different publications, beginning in the year 1935, the purpose of the campaign being to awaken the Cuban people to the deceit of which they had been the victims with regard to their proper relations with the United States.

This group is concerned principally with the qualifications of its members. It does not make use of theatrical effects. It only takes as members persons who have a full consciousness of our situation. The organization is cellular in order to make its control more simple.

Our struggle is hard and difficult, since we are obliged to combat organizations which are powerful on account of their economic means, while we carry on our campaign solely with the contributions of some members of the Committee and with the product of the few advertisements which are obtained for our official organ as well as subscriptions to the same. In order for the reader to form an idea of what we have asserted, it will suffice to relate one fact, after giving a rapid account of the work carried on by Communists and Falangistas.

On July 22, 1939, Dr. Ramon J. Martinez, at a Rotary Club

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dinner and speaking in the name of Sr. Jose Manuel Casanova, president of the Confederation of Economic Corporations, said: "The United States made a profit with our sugar of more than $40,000,000, which have been used to subsidize the sugar planters of Louisiana and Florida... In the judgment of the speaker and in that of the Confederation of Economic Corporations, Cuba should direct its economic policy along diametrically opposite lines to those followed up to the present... In the problem of the Reciprocity Treaty, two important factors should be kept in mind: First, the Reciprocity has never existed in previous treaties which have been made... If we were to expose the real treatment we have received and just what is our real situation with the United States, they would have to break off their relations with Latin America. This would not suit American politics... To show the benefits for Cuba, the United States speak always of the quantity of sugar they have bought from us, but they say nothing of the price, when what is really important for Cuba is not the quantity shipped but the amount of money we receive for same."

The Acera del Louvre (Friends of the Americans) expresses its activities with three "slogans": BUY FROM THOSE WHO BUY FROM US, ALWAYS FRIENDS, and FOR THE AMERICANS TO THE END. "We combat all anti-American propaganda, even though it is backed by the Confederation of Economic Corporations. We are using our efforts to the end that an economic, political and military alliance, treaty or act, be made between Cuba and the United States, and we are doing our best to have the Cubanpeople prepared for the time when such an alliance shall be made, in spite of all the forces which are opposed to it."

OUR ATTITUDE REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAS

The present condition of the people of Cuba is one of disintegration, of disruption, as a result of the anti-American propaganda which has been carried on in Cuba. The people see the danger, but they do not know how to avert it. They have lost faith; they trust no one.

Nevertheless, in face of the confusion which exists in the world today, and in view of what has happened to small countries who were much better prepared than Cuba, Cuba has no hesitancy in saying that 90% of thinking Cubans do not consider that the establishment of naval and air bases, etc., in Cuba, as a means of preparation for future or present contingencies would mean the loss of their independence nor a danger to their sovereignty, nor do they regard as an aggression the possibility of the United States military authorities finding themselves obliged to occupy the Island in order to adequately defend the Caribbean area (including Cuba), even though this step were taken without previous authorization by the respective governments. They are sure that the case of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium will not be repeated in the Caribbean area because the Americans would not permit it and Cuba would be with them in the defense of this hemisphere.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Cuba

Country Reported On

Subject (Brief Descriptive Title) Present Chief Executive **I. G. No.** 3110

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Press and Personal Contacts
Reliable

Summarization of Report (When Required)

(In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here)

Inauguration of Col. Batista

1. On October 10th, 1940 Colonel Fulgencio Batista, ex-Chief of Staff, Cuban Army, was sworn in as President of Cuba.

2. (a) His political affiliations outwardly are indicated by his being chief of the "Coalicion Socialista Democratica," which contains conservative, liberal and radical elements. Actually Batista is an oportunist, with socialistic leanings.

(b) His prestige is not great except perhaps with the enlisted personnel of the army, as he is considered an upstart by conservative elements, and his own associates know him too thoroughly to be greatly impressed.

(c) His influence is great, as he has accumulated a considerable personal fortune, and is loyally backed by the present army due to his leadership of the revolution of 1933, and to the many benefits he conferred upon it during his years as Chief of Staff.

3. His expressed views on foreign relations are gratifying at this time, as he has publicly declared for a united North and South America, to protect the ideals of democratic government.

4. His attitude towards the United States is in general friendly. He will undoubtedly favor and aid military cooperation. In the economic field, on the other hand, he will endeavor to work the United States for all he can get, in the way of trade concessions and financial aid, repaying, if possible, with promises only.

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5. General Mario G. Menocal is the most prominent of his personal advisers and his influence will be towards conservatism. He has also many other confidants, such as Lt. Col. Jaime Marine, retired, who are self-seeking, unscrupulous and uneducated, who will have a bad effect on him.

6. In general, it is the opinion of the Military Attache that Batista will endeavor to give Cuba a good government according to his ideas of a good government, but that in view of his background and advisers, little change for the better may be expected.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Lieut. Colonel, G.S. Infantry,
Military Attache.

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From M. A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5936 Date Oct. 15, 1940

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CUBA
Country Reported On

I.G. No. 3020

Subject Stability of Government.
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Personal Contacts-reliable. Personal Observation.

Summarization of Report
When Received

In Connection with Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Ousting of Colonel Pedraza, former Chief of Staff, by President Batista.

1. The sudden quarrel between President Batista and Colonel Pedraza, which resulted in the ousting of the latter from his position as Chief of Staff, started with a minor incident. On January 28th, Mrs. Lopez Castro, wife of the Minister of the Presidency, held a fiesta in the town of Consolación del Sur, at which there was considerable gambling. The National Police informed Colonel Bernardo Garcia, then Chief of Police, of this event. Bernardo Garcia then informed President Batista and stated that he had orders from Colonel Pedraza to prevent all gambling in that area. Batista replied that this gambling was with his permission, and when Garcia continued to protest, stated that he would relieve Garcia as Chief of Police. Batista then called Lieut.Colonel Manuel Benitez, then commanding the 4th Regiment at Matanzas, to Havana, announcing that he intended to make him Chief of Police.

2. When Colonel Pedraza got word of this, he alerted the 6th Regiment (Camp Columbia) on the night of Jan.31-Feb.1st., and held a meeting with Colonel Gonzalez, then Chief of the Navy; Lieut. Colonel Bernardo Garcia; Colonel Ignacio Galindez, commanding the 6th Regiment, and certain other regimental commanders, and satisfied himself that he had their support before proceeding further.

3. At this point it is necessary to digress and state that for sometime previous to this, the most important military news was the rumored ousting of Colonel Gonzalez, Chief of the Navy, by Batista and Pedraza together. A decree was published on January 30,1941, removing from the Chief of the Navy the control of Captains of Ports, lighthouse service, and, in fact, everything except strictly military and naval matters, and placing them under the control of the Treasury and certain other Departments. This decree lent color to the matter of the ousting of Gonzalez as Chief of the Navy. In consequence, the Military Attache at the time deduced that the meeting was for this purpose. Ordinarily reliable contacts

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substantiated this deduction which later proved erroneous.

4. Having, as he thought, made sure of his ground, Pedraza called Batista on the 'phone and in the most bitter and profane language reprimanded him for daring to appoint a Chief of Police without consulting him, Pedraza. (In this connection, it should be noted that Colonel Pedraza personally organized and trained the National Police, and considered that he still retained control of it with Bernardo Garcia acting merely as his deputy). Pedraza further stated to Batista that he would go down and take over command of the Police Force himself, and that if Batista interfered, he would "shoot him in the belly."

5. In consequence, on February 1, Pedraza publicly took over command of the National Police from Bernardo Garcia, who resigned "on account of ill health," and who was immediately taken under Pedraza's wing at Camp Columbia.

6. At this stage, apparently Colonel Pedraza was in command of a loyal army and Batista was practically without support. His condition seemed precarious, and Dr. Ramos, Minister of National Defense, stated personally to the American Ambassador that he expected Pedraza to force Batista out within a few days.

7. It may be noted at this point that neither Pedraza nor Batista expected events to go as far as they did. Batista, who would obviously have been doing some tall talking, bribing, and testing out of loyalties during the day of February 2nd., waited until Pedraza had left Camp Columbia for his house about two miles west of the Camp on the afternoon of Feb.3., and late on that date Batista went out to Camp Columbia, escorted by his personal bodyguard, and won over the support of Galindez and the other regimental commanders. He then published a decree suspending Constitutional Guarantees for a period of fifteen days, and a second decree dismissing Pedraza and Gonzalez from the service.

8. The Military Attache was informed of the proceedings by a reliable contact at 3 o'clock in the morning of February 4th, and having gotten in touch with Colonel Velasco, Adjutant General of the Army, proceeded to Camp Columbia and verified the state of affairs. He then interviewed President Batista who was at that time at the headquarters of the 6th Regiment. Batista, in an exultant mood, stated that he was in complete control and requested the Military Attache to notify the Ambassador that his watchword in this "revolution" was "order, discipline and no bloodshed." The Military Attache, accompanied by the Naval Attache, then visited Colonel Ferrer at the headquarters of the 5th Regiment, where he noted Lieut.Colonel Guiterrez Velasquez in arrest. This officer was the only regimental commander (1st.Regiment) who remained loyal to Pedraza.

9. The Military Attache then proceeded to the residence of the Ambassador, and at 4 A.M.,Feb.4th, informed him of the situation. He then visited Police Headquarters and Navy Headquarters, in Havana, and found the troops fully alerted and armed, but all quiet.

From M.A., Havana Report No. 5993 Date: Feb. 4, 1941

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

10. At 7 A.M. on Feb. 4th, the Military Attache was called on the telephone by Colonel Pedraza who requested an interview. Proceding to the Colonel's finca, the Military Attache was told by Colonel Pedraza that he had received the sworn loyalty of all the regimental commanders as late as the afternoon of February 3; that their complete about-face was a total surprise to him. Pedraza then requested the Military Attache to assist his departure to the United States, and stated that Lieut.Colonel Bernardo Garcia and Major Serra of the Police; Captain Owen Parr, his chief aide, and their families, would accompany him. Left 2.30 P.M

11. This request was relayed to the Ambassador, who highly approved the idea as tending towards peace in Cuba, provided President Batista would approve it. Acting under the Ambassador's instructions, the Military Attache proceeded to Camp Columbia and obtained Colonel Batista's hearty approval, and then facilitated documentary arrangements for the party with the American Consul General. Pedraza and his party are endeavoring to charter a plane to leave today or tomorrow. Colonel Gonzalez, ex-Navy Chief, is at present still in arrest at Camp Columbia.

12. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that President Batista is in complete control of the situation, and that no disorder need be expected. It is further believed that insofar as the Army is concerned, this change is for the worse. Colonel Lopez Migoya, former Quartermaster General, is now Chief of Staffof the Army, and it is believed that Colonel Pedraza's efforts towards efficiency and discipline will be allowed to elapse. It is further considered that the placing of the venal and unscrupulous Manuel Benitez in charge of the Police will tend to undermine control and encourage vice. The only bright spot in the picture is the appointment of Lieut.Colonel Jesus Gomez Casas as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Nearly anyone would be an improvement over Gonzalez, and Casas has the reputation of being honest and able. It is further believed that this "coup" will not interfere materially with the present good relations between the United States Government and the Cuban Government.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Colonel, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:vm

(Original and 2 copies
airmail).

From M.A., Havana . Report No. 5993 Date: February 4,1941

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
February 10, 1941

FEB 12 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, I am transmitting herewith a memorandum containing information concerning the Communist party in Havana, Cuba.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

CC - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CC - Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

FEB 11 1941

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 12 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.

1-1 2657-g-330
#31

February 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM

Information has been received from a reliable confidential source to the effect that there are a number of individuals in Cuba who believe there is an understanding between the Cuban Government and the Communists which will protect the Communist party from suppression and persecution.

It is reported that an interview was recently held between Premier Saladrigas and the outstanding leaders of Cuba's Communist party in which the party's representatives strongly opposed any intention on the part of the Cuban government to take action against their organization. It is further reported that the Communists were instructed to abstain from attacking the United States in their oral and newspaper campaigns and were assured that in the event of war, Cuba would take the side of the United States.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.I.B. FEB 11 1941

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

NOLG 2 Enclosures
2657-Q-330
432
Record Section File No.
Copy No. 6-1
For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CUBA
Country Reported On

Subject Stability of Government I.G. No. 3020
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Personal Contacts-reliable. Personal Observation.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 14 1940

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Commands on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Ousting of Colonel Pedraza,
former Chief of Staff,
by President Batista.

1. On the morning of February 4,1941, immediately after the "coup" of the night of February 3,1941, in which Colonel Jose Pedraza, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army; Colonel Angel Gonzalez, Chief of the Navy, and Lieut.Colonel Bernardo Garcia, ex-Chief of Police, were arrested and dismissed, President Batista made a radio speech to the public in which he gave his version of the affair.

2. This speech, as printed in the newspaper "Havana P.M.", is forwarded herewith. It has been checked as to the translation and is found to be correct, although abbreviated, and no essential points are omitted. Certain paragraphs have been numbered for convenient reference.

3. In paragraph 3, Batista states that Pedraza was dissatisfied when Benitez was appointed head of the Police Department, and that Pedraza assumed the post himself (which was, of course, an unconstitutional act); but what Batista does not say is that there had always been an understanding between Pedraza and Batista that the appointment of any new Chief of Police would be with the approval of Pedraza who had organized and trained this force from its beginning and commanded it personally for over six years. From Pedraza's point of view, therefore, this was a traitor's act.

4. In paragraph 4 of the speech, Batista called attention to the horrible state of affairs of the police under Garcia. The same state of affairs existed under Pedraza when Batista was Chief of Staff of the Army.

5. Also in paragraph 4 Batista states that "Colonel Gonzalez was dissatisfied because I had taken away from him the perquisites of certain civil departments." This has reference to the decree law recently reported whereby control of Captains of Ports among other

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,
Copy No. 1, R/S; 2, L/C; 3, Section File

From M. A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 5994 Date February 6,1941
This line to appear on all succeeding pages

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

things, was taken away from Gonzalez. Gonzalez is reported to have said, when Batista announced his intention of publishing this decree,"I'll not play Christ and be crucified for the rest of you. You are getting your graft and I'll get mine. Leave me alone."Whether he said this or not, it actually describes the real state of affairs and what would naturally be his reaction, because the graft that is obtained by Batista through his general factotum, Lieut.Colonel Marine, would certainly make Gonzalez' efforts seem small by comparison.

6. In paragraph 9 of the speech, Batista states that "he (Pedraza) merely wished me to agree that the office of the General Staff of the Army should be supreme and that the President of the Republic should become a nonentity, a zero to the left." When it is recalled that Batista as Chief of Staff forced the impeachment of the then President, Miguel Mariano Gomez, because Gomez would not agree to the sugar tax Batista wanted for his rural schools, and when it is recalled that Batista as Chief of Staff dominated former President Laredo Bru for practically his whole term, it will be realized that Batista can hardly, at heart, believe in the supremacy of the civil power over the military. He merely realized that he had gotten himself in the same position in which he had once held Gomez, for instance.

7. In other words, Batista has very cleverly made what was actually a "falling out among thieves" appear as a triumph of a president with democratic ideals over unscrupulous military men who were endeavoring to dominate him. This should be borne in mind if a clear picture of Batista,as he really is, is desired.

8. Turning now to the physical execution of the "coup;" the fact that Pedraza - a hard and fearless man - was so easily ousted from his position has been a surprise to practically everyone in Cuba. Highly reliable information is now at hand to show how it was done. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of his speech, Batista speaks of a conference which was held with Pedraza the evening before the "coup," and implies that Pedraza was allowed to depart from that conference and later was arrested at Camp Columbia under dramatic circumstances. (See par.11 of the speech). Actually, the conference did take place, and Pedraza, Gonzalez and Bernardo Garcia came to the Palace as a result of a previous agreement to arrange for a final settlement of their various differences, among which, by the way, was Pedraza's demand that Lieut.Colonel Marine (whom he has always hated) be dismissed. Batista had given Marine the job of arresting the three of them when they came into the Palace. Therefore, instead of walking into a conference, they walked into a solid wall of sub-machine guns. Pedraza and Garcia were then taken under guard to their respective homes and Gonzalez was escorted later to Camp Columbia. Colonel Galindez was present at this episode, and, presumably, up to that moment, was with Pedraza. Under the circumstances, it did not take him long to realize that he had been for Batista all along.

9. Once the opposing leaders were arrested, there was little danger in the next move, although Batista makes it seem very heroic. He went out to Camp Columbia, not merely with Benitez and Galindez (see par. 10 of the speech), but with a well armed guard, and proceeded to the headquarters of the 6th Regiment, where, under the circumstances, he had no difficulty in "taking command of the troops" and dominating the situation. In this connection it should be remembered, as previously reported, that the discipline in the Cuban Army from Captains down is on a reasonably military basis, and that it is only in the higher ranks that chicanery and politics takes its place. In consequence, when Batista with Galindez and the Majors of the Regiment at his side, issued his orders, the troops docilely obeyed, and, as the 6th Regiment goes, so goes the Army.

From M.A., Havana Report No.5994 Date: Feb. 6,1941.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

10. Two more events may be noted. On February 6th, Batista restored the Constitutional Guarantees and ended the holding of troops under arms (showing his confidence in his position), and he also permitted Gonzalez to depart for Miami.

11. The Military Attache has the following opinions to express in connection with this affair:

(a) Batista is still an opportunist, as he has always been, but his role at present is that of a President upholding the democratic ideals.

(b) Batista is neither cruel nor bloodthirsty, for once he obtained his ends, he allowed his opponents to withdraw without difficulty.

(c) Batista's prestige, which was low previous to this event, has been tremendously enhanced, and his control now is well nigh absolute.

(d) In view of the fact that this event will be presented to the world as a triumph of democracy over military domination, it is a good thing for the United States.

(e) Batista, having assumed the role of upholder of democratic ideals, will have to cooperate more willingly with the United States in order to maintain that role.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Colonel, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache

HAB:vm

Incl. 6
(newspaper clipping as stated)

From M.A. Havana Report No. 5994 Date: February 6, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6-1 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPT.
Encl 1
2657-9-330
433



Col. M. LOPEZ MIGOYA.
New Chief of Staff



COL. GOMEZ CASAS
New Navy Chief

High-lights of the radio address of President Batista to the Cuban people:

"This morning's sun seems more brilliant because it shines on a situation which up to midnight last night was dangerous to the interests of Cuban nationality, but which has cleared up without many people even knowing of the dangers that menaced them.

What was happening? Everywhere people were discussing rumors that awakened fear and alarm in their hearts. It was being said on the streets that here was division in the armed forces and that the man who occupied the Palace as President of the Republic was lacking in authority.

During twenty or thirty days I have been deeply worried. I have wondered whether it is worth while to remain in the presidency without authority, or whether it would be better for me to resign. This problem came at a time when I needed all my faculties to consider grave matters of social national and international import.

People will ask why is he President of the Republic appearing before us today, in direct contact with us, thowing aside the stars and other symbols of his high office to address us and to appeal to us?

Why? you ask, is the President here before you, after a sleepless night and hours of intense action.

Has the President failed in his duty? Has he violated the Constitution or denied the people their their rights?

No. The President has merely vindicated his rights which had been challenged improperly, and reaffirmed his authority which had been set at naught, and he has done this with decorum and dignity.

2* The past five days I have spent attending to the normal affairs of government in spite of a constant number of interviews with people who had been baldly ordered "choose between the President and me".

I have argued with infinite patience, adducing patriotic reasons against the urgings of pride, egotism and selfish interest.

I have been faced with this difficult condition wherein a man whom I had placed in a certain post for which I thought he was fitted, instead of assisting in this moment of national need became a menace and a danger to us all.

* Note the suddenness of this affair.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 17 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6-1 2657-Q-330
432

The international situation is positively a very dangerous one at this time. Cuba is a small country and lacking in resources. Resources cannot be had without work, and labor is unfruitfil without decorum.

I must say that most of these chiefs and officers who came to see me were men of serene judgment. They realized that the pride and vanity of three men was endangering the entire existence of the republic as a sovereign nation. But they begged me to be patient and try to handle the problem without bloodshed in order to save the lives of soldiers who through the glorious movement of September 4 put in my hands the command of the Cuban army.

3 The chief of police was removed by presidential decree but the chief of the army was not satisfied and when I appointed Colonel Benitez to head the police deartment, Colonel Pedraza assumed the post and Colonel Benitez was not allowed to take possession.

4 Now comes the worst part. Colonel Pedraza, knowing that Colonel Gonzalez was dissatified because I had taken away from him the perquisites of certain civil departments, joined forces with him and, calling together all their officers put the issue squarely up to them: Batista or us.



COL. MANUEL BENITEZ
New Chief of Police

This is the direct excuse given for the incident. Because [illegible] cific anomalies in the service I was obliged to decree the return to the civil government of services which constitutionally pertain to it.

Then there was the problem of the Chief of Police. Everyone knows that Havana had become a public and collective gambling dive. Colonel Bernardo Garcia, whose personal affairs appeared to be prosperous was never to be found when needed by me, as he spent most of his time in Varadero or Miami. When I asked him about certain matters, he never had time to attend to them or know about them. He felt that he was so solidly upheld by the Chief of the Army as to reclude the need of worrying about his duties.

The Chief of the Army called together his subordinates and made them sign a document. They carried this document to me and I scratched a match and burned it to a cinder.

I realized my mistake. I had

(Continued on Page 22)

entrusted a valuable bibelot to a spoiled child and he had smashed it to pieces.

The Chief of Police mobilized his forces and organized.

The Chief of the Navy got up steam on his ships and took the covers off his cannon. He event put patrols outside the Palace where I sat watching them from the balcony, but not worrying because I knew I could count on the loyalty of the Navy.

Yesterday, however, the situation became unbearable. I assure you that if it had lasted another day I would have become one more madman.

Colonel López Migoya came with a message from Colonel Pedraza who wished to talk with me.

9- What for? I will tell you. He merely wished me to agree that the office of Chief of the General Staff of the Army should be supreme and that the President of the Republic should become a nonentity, a "zero to the left".

I replied that I would consider his demand and answer him in 24 hours. I begged him to be calm and to wait before bringing on conflict between his men and mine, because more than his or mine the men are Cuba's. I told him that no blood would be shed because of caprice or intransigence of mine.

Then [illegible] most loyal colonels, among them Galindez I telephoned Tabernilla and instructed him not to move from his post, pending overt happenings. I called in Colonel Benitez, and with him acting as chauffeur and with Galindez at my side, thus, in disguise in the back seat of my car I went to Columbia and called together the forces, all of whom responded to my appeal.

When I called for for the arrest of those who had endangered the public peace and many cries of "Never" were heard I answered "NOW" and the guilty men were arrested and taken to their homes where they will enjoy in the bosom of their families all the guarantees to which they are entitled.

I am sure that if fate had been against me I would not have been so fortunate as they, but would have been murdered from behind.

I wish to assure their wives and families whom I love as though they were my own, that the entire Cuban Army is here to watch out for their lives and tranquility. I am not seeking gratitude for this. The good name of those who participated in the movement of the Fourth of September, demands no less than this.

I have been proud to be able to reward conduct, valor and loyalty in the persons of the following persons:

Colonel López Migoya is now the chief of the army. A man who has no private interests. A man who never recommends friends for preferment. A man lacking in exaggerated personal vanity.

To assist López Migoya I appoint Colonel Ignacio Calindez Inspector General of the Army. But I wish Galindez to stay at his post for the time being at Columbia, and Tabernilla to remain at Cabañas.

The Army administration I leave to Colonel Querejeta, a man whose soul is as white as his skin is dark.

The command of the Navy I entrust to Colonel Gomez Casas and I appoint Inspector General of the Navy Lieut. Col. Aguila no less a mariner because of his youth. The administration of the Navy I put in the hands of Major Arguelles, my aide de camp until today, who will see that the enlisted men are fed and clothed as they are entitled to be.

The Central Police Department will be commanded by Colinel Manvel Batista whose loyalty and valor we all know.

I feel sure that the Republic will have constitutional guarantees with the assistance of these men in key positions.

I do not congratulates the Republic nor my government for the triumph achieved.

Members of the Armed forces I congratulate you.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 21 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-Q-330
433
WAR DEPARTMENT

3-1

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
HAVANA, CUBA
Feb. 15, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 6001

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 20 1941

Subject: General Stability, Cuba.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. This is weekly letter No. 1, in compliance with G-2 letter 2657-277, dated Jan. 21, 1941, subject, "Information."

2. Political Stability

President Batista was elected under as honest circumstances as any president of Cuba, except Estrada Palma, the first president. Batista recently suppressed an attempt on the part of the Chief of the Army to dominate him. His political opponents, except for the Communist Party, show no inclination to combat him by other than legal means, and the Communist Party, except for engineering strikes in a few sugar mills, has done nothing dangerous. In consequence, Cuba is politically stable.

3. Economic Conditions

a. Sugar is the key to Cuban economic conditions. Two thirds of Cuba's sugar is sold to the United States, and constitutes one third of U.S. consumption. In consequence, Cuba's economic welfare depends on the United States.

b. One third of Cuba's crop goes to the world market; at present there is practically no world market. Negotiations are under way for the U.S., through the Export Import Bank, to loan Cuba $12,000,000, to enable Cuba to produce this year (and sell later, as may be possible) 400,000 tons more than market conditions would otherwise justify. This move tends to relieve economic conditions, which, while not good, are no worse than last year, and are not dangerous. Recent strikes in several mills, probably Communist inspired, have been settled.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

4. Loyalty of the Armed Forces to the Government.

a. When Batista had Pedraza as Chief of Staff, there always existed the possibility of a split between these two men, with the armed forces divided between them. Batista has eliminated Pedraza. No other man in the army is a potential threat. The principle of the subordination of the armed forces to the civil authority has been established. Moreover, Batista is more popular with the rank and file than ever.

b. The armed forces are loyal to the government.

5. Subversive Activities

a. German Nazi agents, working under the local German Legation, continue active in propaganda, attempts to convert various officials of the government and the armed forces, and attempts to use the Communists and Spanish Falangistas to their own ends. Little success has been achieved. There is no evidence of sabotage.

b. Italian and Japanese activities are minor, though present.

c. The Spanish Falangista organization is the most serious potential threat, but has done nothing but spread propaganda.

d. The Communist Party continues its usual program of stirring up labor troubles and fomenting strikes. Its efforts have not resulted in any serious disturbances.

e. The Cuban Government is alive to the situation, though few steps have been taken to combat it.

f. Subversive activities are in the preparatory stage in Cuba, and not serious, though they probably would become so in the event, for instance, of the invasion and defeat of England.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

6. General Stability.

It is the belief of the Military Attache that Batista's recent domination of the Military, and the good offices of the United States in the economic set-up have produced a general stability in Cuba greater than has existed for the past five years.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S., Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:rs

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 24 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-Q-330
435
WAR DEPARTMENT

COMMUNISM IN CUBA

CONFIDENTIAL

ONI

2657-Q-330

Reliable information received from Havana discloses that a leaflet distributed by so-called "National Committee to Keep Cuba Out of Imperialist War" advances as reasons (1) the killing and mutilitation of Cuban youth for the benefit of bankers and arms manufacturers; (2) Cuban agriculture would suffer; (3) Cuban labor reduced by compulsory military service would be forced to work 10 and 12 hours daily at lowest wages; (4) the rights of democracy would be denied the people; (5) "with the occupation of ports, roads and railways by the army of the U. S." they would be the object of bombardment by enemy aviators,; and (6) youth would die and cities would

be destroyed in order that capitalists and great arms manufacturers could augment their profits by millions of pesos.

ND-1-3-4-5-6-7-8-10-15-FBI-MID
Jan. 6, 1941.

FEB 24 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-Q-330
435
WAR DEPARTMENT

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

FEB 24 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-0-330
436
WAR DEPARTMENT

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CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN MEXICO AND CUBA ONI

A reliable report states that 3 large parcels containing printed matter and correspondence were recently received by the local postal authorities from J. Quintana, B. Dominguez, 3D16, Mexico, D. F. Two of them were addressed to Don Mariano Larraz, Calle F No. 54 entre 3 y 5, Vedado, Havana; and the other to Eugenio Boler, "Hoy", Compostela, No. 508, Havana. The parcels were confiscated by the authorities. Sixteen parcels of printed matter recently arrived in Havana addressed to Editorial Pacinas and sent by BECNOPTHAS SECNEBUNN, Mocaba 17, ASEPTLINNECKNN, UEP, Moscow. It is not known if the latter shipment was seized by Cuban

FEB 24 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-0-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

authorities.

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ND1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,15,FBI,MID.
Jan. 6, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

1-1

MAR 5 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-0-330
437
WAR DEPARTMENT

September 10, 1940

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Miles:

There is transmitted herewith a memorandum dated August 28, 1940, setting forth information concerning Communist activities in Havana, Cuba. This information has been obtained from a confidential source believed to be reliable.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D. U.S. SEP 12 1940

Enclosure

Copy of encl. to M. A. Cuba 9/18/40
" " L.A. files

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAR 5 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-Q-330
437
WAR DEPARTMENT

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August 28, 1940

MEMORANDUM

RE: CUBA -
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

Following is a list of offices in Havana, Cuba, of the Partido Comunista Cubano (Cuban Communist Party):

Main Office	Carlos III No. 609, Havana, Cuba.
A Apolo Section	San Mariano No. 52, Havana, Cuba.
A Naranjo Section	Calsada de Bejucal No. 53, Havana, Cuba.
Arsenal Section	Cardenas No. 109, Havana, Cuba.
Belen Section	Amargura No. 363, Havana, Cuba.
Ca yo Hueso Section	San Martin No. 975, Havana, Cuba.
Colon Section	Aguila No. 205, Havana, Cuba.
Guanabacoa Section	Marti No. 9, Havana, Cuba.
Jesus del Monte Section	Santa Ana No. 113, Havana, Cuba.
Juvenil Section	Agramonte No. 360, Havana, Cuba.
Luyano Section	Luyano No. 513, Havana, Cuba.
Marianao Section	Quijano No. 5, Havana, Cuba.
Mons errate Section	San Martin No. 632, Havana, Cuba.
Pueblo Nuevo Section	Avenida Menocal No. 862, Havana, Cuba.
Pueblo Nuevo Section	Subirana No. 168, Havana, Cuba.
Puntos Grandes Section	Ayuntamiento No. 205, Havana, Cuba.
Regla Section	Mansana de Gomez No. 76, Havana, Cuba.
San Miguel del Pa dron Section	Beltran No. 44, Havana, Cuba.
Sitios Section	Carmen No. 117, Havana, Cuba.
Tacon Section	Barcelona No. 106, Havana, Cuba.
Tejas Section	Romay No. 115, Havana, Cuba.
Cerro Section	Tulipan No. 153, Havana, Cuba.
Pr[illegible] Section	Acosta No. 68, Havana, Cuba.
Vedado Section	Calle 12 No. 301, Havana, Cuba.
Universitaria Section	Espada No. 372, Havana, Cuba.

The office of the Communist Revolutionary Union Party (Political) is: Princesa No. 9, Havana, Cuba.

Other offices of the Communist Party in Cuba are as follows:

Camaguey, Cuba	Paseo Olallo No. 153
Cardenas, Cuba	Cespedes No. 255
Matanzas, Cuba	Jovellanos No. 9
Moron, Cuba	Marti 267
Santa Clara, Cuba	Candelaria No. 42
Santiago, Cuba	E. Palma 359

REC'D Executive Office G-2 WDGS SEP 12 1940

* * * *

(From a confidential source believed to be reliable.)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

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MAR 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPARTMENT
22

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 5, 1940

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Miles:

As of possible interest to you I am transmitting herewith a memorandum dated August 27, 1940, concerning the national assembly of the Communist Revolutionary Union at Havana, Cuba. A letter from President-Elect Fulgencio Batista addressed to this assembly is quoted therein. This information was obtained from a confidential source believed to be reliable.

ARH.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D. U.S. SEP 9 1940

Copy of encl. to M.A. Cuba 9/16/40
" retained in L.A. Sect.

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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1-1
MAR 20 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-G-330
437-A
WAR DEPARTMENT

August 27, 1940

MEMORANDUM

RE: COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY UNION

During the three days, August 24, 25 and 26, 1940, there was held a National Assembly of the Communist Revolutionary Union in the Club Campestre Siboney de San Francisco de Paula, in Havana, Cuba.

Candidates of the Communist Revolutionary Union Party who were elected in the Cuban political elections of July 14, 1940, as well as Communist leaders and representatives from all parts of Cuba attended. The attendance at this reunion was approximately 350 persons.

The reunion was opened by Dr. Juan Marinello Vidaurreta, President of the Communist Revolutionary Union, following which a letter from President-Elect of Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, was read. This letter reads as follows:

"August 23, 1940

"Senores Dr. Juan Marinello and Blas Roca
President and Vice President of the Communist
Revolutionary Union Party

"My esteemed friends:

"I sincerely regret that the invitation extended to me to be present on August 24 to witness the course of events at the reunion of the National Executive Committee of your party and its branches from all of the cities of the Republic has reached me at a time at which I am prevented from attending. At the same time that I am writing this letter I am preparing to leave the city for a period of three or four days on urgent business.

"Believe me, had it been possible to cancel my trip, I would have been very glad to accept the honorable invitation of the Communist Revolutionary Union Party because of the valient support which it has given me and I would be present at your reunion.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D. U.S. SEP 9 1940

"I recognize and foresee the important subjects which are going to crowd this reunion with business which might be very important to me as President-Elect of the Republic, in view of the magnificent support which the Communist

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Revolutionary Union Party together with other parties have given me. I fully appreciate the resolutions which must be the object of the questions submitted for consideration by the fine organization which you direct and carry on.

"I must content myself not alone with going where I would like to go but also going where my presence is required. I ask you to communicate to the assembly my most courteous and respectful greetings and my hope that your work may be crowned with the noble courage and the high purpose which are your aims for it, with beneficial results to the public and the National interests.

"I am your attentive and cordial friend,

F. Batista"

The following committees were appointed: Committee to analyze the problem of the Imperialist War and its consequences for Cuba, Chairman, Anibal Escalante; Committee to study the procedure in electing candidates and matters related thereto such as the mobilization of the masses in the different electoral divisions - Chairman, Joaquin Ordoqui; Committee for the revision of the thesis, "Economic Situation and National Recovery", which was compiled by the National Officers - Chairman, Cesar Vilar; Committee to consider the attitude of the Communist Revolutionary Party toward the mayors of the various municipalities and the governors of the various provinces throughout Cuba which were elected in the July 14, 1940, elections by or with the help of this party - Chairman, Ladislao Gonzalez Carbajal; Committee of Women - Chairman, Mrs. Edith Garcia Buchaca; and the Committee on Organization - Chairman, Fabio Grobart, Vice Chairman, Salvador Garcia Agiiero. Fabio Grobart, mentioned above, is Secretary of Organization and is a member of the political bureau of the Communist Party. Anibal Escalante, mentioned above, is presently an executive in the Communist Party with the title of Director. Cesar Vilar, mentioned above, formerly held the title of Director.

Speakers at the reunion included the following:

Juan Marinello, President of the Communist Revolutionary Union Party

REC'D Executive Offices G-2, W.D. U.S. SEP 9 1940

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

Blas Roca, General Secretary of the Communist Party
Fabio Grobart, Secretary of Organization for the Communist Party
Anibal Escalante, Director
Cesar Vilar
Ramon Nicolau, Treasurer of the National Committee of the Communist Revolutionary Union
Dr. Gerardo Plasencia, Mayor-Elect of Victoria de las Tunas, Cuba, a candidate of the Liberal Party, but who was elected with the help of the Communist Revolutionary Union Party.
Lazaro Pena
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
Francisco Rosales, Mayor-Elect of Manzanillo, Cuba, who was the first Communist mayor of Cuba.
Joaquin Ordoqui
Consuelo Silveira.

Justo Salas, Mayor-Elect of Santiago, Cuba, was present and received a great ovation from the assembly although he did not make a speech.

* * * * * *

(Transmitted to G-2, W.D. Leg 7133, 9/5/40)

NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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Classification

None Enclosures
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438
Record Section File No.
Copy No. 6-1
For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

CUBA
Country Reported On

Subject Stability of Government
Brief Descriptive Title

I.G. No. 3020

Source and Degree of Reliability:

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 5 1941

Personal Observation

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Possible Future Influence of
ex-Colonel Pedraza and his Followers.

1. Due to his character as a harsh disciplinarian, Pedraza (ex-Chief of Staff Cuban Army) was respected rather than liked even by his intimates in the National Police Force.

2. He had none of the personal graces or expansive nature so loved by Cubans, which would have made them warm to him. In consequence, it is the opinion of the Military Attache that Pedraza and his followers are not dangerous as forces of disorder.

Henry A. Barber, Jr.,
Colonel, GS. Infantry,
Military Attache.

HAB:vm

G-2 Distribution: 4, ... 5, ... 6, ...
Copy No. 1, R/S; 2, L/C; 3, Section File

From M. A. Havana, Cuba Report No. 6017 Date February 26, 1941
This line to appear on all succeeding pages

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

MAR 12 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

March 6, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

3020 Com.

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source to the effect that Lazaro Peña is the Communist leader of the C.T.C. in Cuba. Otto Molley alias Fabio Grobart is the agent for the Third International in Cuba, and Carmelo Garcia and one Tellechea are reported to be distributing Communist propaganda among port laborers.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

Who's Who
E.S.

CC Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. MAR 8 1941

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
March 15, 1941

MAR 22 1941
WAR DEPARTMENT
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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, there is transmitted herewith memorandum containing information received from a reliable confidential source concerning the organization in Cuba of a committee known as "Por Cuba Fuera de la Guerra" (Keep Cuba Out of War).

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

cc - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

cc - Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. MAR 19 1941

By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

MAR 28 1941
WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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March 15, 1941

M E M O R A N D U M

Information has been received that there have been considerable rumors circulated throughout Havana, Cuba to the effect that Batista himself intends to put through obligatory training service in Cuba. The Communists have talked against this procedure for a number of months. There has been a committee organized which is known as "Por Cuba Fuera de la Guerra" (Keep Cuba Out of War), which appears to be of considerable magnitude. A meeting of this committee was held on February 28, 1941, at which Carlos Fernandez, President of the committee, and Blas Roca, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, spoke.

In addition to Blas Roca and Fernandez, there were at the speakers' table the following individuals:

Juan Marinello, President of the Communist Revolutionary Union;
- Mrs. Edith Garcia Buchaca, representative of the National Feminine Congress;
- Leovigildo Vicente, representative of the Federation of Workers of the Province of Havana;
- Dr. Raul Barrios;
- Jose Luis Perez, representative of the Brotherhood of Young Cubans;
- Mrs. Nila Ortega, a member of the Municipal Council of Havana;
- Mrs. Ordina Callejas, of the Federation of Workers;
- Pedro Luis Padron;
- Angel Gattorno, of the Syndicate of Merchandise Transport.

During the meeting approval was obtained for the sending of a telegram to President Batista in protest against obligatory military service.

Information has also been received that Ramon Leon Renteria, one of the organizers of the new Socialist Party of Cuba, who is President of the Federacion Obrera Maritima Nacional (National Maritime Workers Federation), is associated with Edward Gordon and is a member of the House of Representatives. He also is a member of the Executive Committee of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba (Confederation of Workers of Cuba).

It is also reported that representatives from thirty-six different workers organizations were present at this meeting.

RECD Executive Office 62 MAR 19 1941

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By IRH Date 07/04/69

APR 9 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV. 2657-Q-330 441 WAR DEPARTMENT

FILE UNDER NO. 2657-Q-330/441

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Apr.2-41.UA2-6043(Col.Barber)to G-2.Subj:Additional Info.as called for by Comments and Suggestions on Repts.fr.M/A,Cuba,dated March 12/41. .....%.Rept.No.6017(2657-Q-330/438),I.G.No.3020,Stability of Govt. (Possible Future Actives.of Pedraza). The M/A concurs that Pedraza is a dangerous man,and he has money w. whch.to work. It is also agreed that he shld.be watched. He is being watched by Batista's agents in Miami. However, the M/A blvs.,for reasons already given, that Pedraza lacks a following, either in the army or in the police, and for that reason is not as dangerous, for instance, as Batista wld.be,had he been the exile instead of Pedraza.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

1c recorded on 2012-119/47; 2056-250/33; 2012-168/33; 2271-Q-25/152.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 3—0642

Q. M. C. Form 351 (Old Form 480)
Revised July 26, 1918

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

MAY 1 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

265-7-Q-330
442

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

April 29, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable confidential source to the effect that Rogelio Marinello, the brother of Juan Marinello, who is President of the Communist Revolutionary Union and a Communist leader in Cuba, has been appointed Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the Province of Oriente. Recently Juan Marinello was appointed Director of Education in private schools in Cuba by the Batista Administration.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director, Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc - Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECD Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. APR 29 1941

2657-Q-330
443

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

MAY 19 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

1-1

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
May 14, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable confidential source to the effect that there was a huge demonstration in Havana, Cuba, on May Day, 1941.

It is reported that the Communists have stated that there were over one hundred thousand individuals taking part in the parade and that this was the largest demonstration ever held in Havana.

The Confederation of Workers of Cuba, which is reported to be controlled by Communists, took charge of arranging the details. The Executive Committee of the C.T.C. (Confederation of Workers of Cuba) headed the parade. This Executive Committee is made up of the following individuals:

Lazaro Pena (colored), General Secretary of the C.T.C.;
Ramon Leon Renteria, President of F.O.M.N. (National Federation of Maritime Workers) and, associate of Eddie Gordon;
Ignacio Gonzalez Tellechea, of the F.O.M.N.;
Ricardo Rodrigues;
Francisco Malpica;
Angel Cofino;
Oscar Llero;
Antonio Oviedo;
Teresa Garcia;
Jose Luis Amigo;
Juan Arevalo, head of the Socialist Party of Cuba and associate of Ramon Leon Renteria and Eddie Gordon;

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. MAY 15 1941

Name, Date 05/04/89

Eduardo Morell;
Manuel Santalla;
Jose M. Arriete;
Jose Manuel Espino.

It is noted that some of the banners carried in the parade read as follows:

WE ASK APPROVAL OF THE ROCA LAW WHICH WILL RESTORE OUR PENSIONS;

LIBERTY FOR BROWDER (Committee for the Liberty of Political Prisoners of America);

DOWN WITH OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE;

WE DEMAND ENERGETIC ACTION AGAINST ABUSIVE HIGH PRICES OF ARTICLES OF PRIME NECESSITY (Workers Syndicate of Electric Gas and Water Plants of Havana);

WE ASK RECOGNITION OF THE C.T.C. AND COMPLEMENTARY LAWS;

DIVISION OF LAND (Farmers Federation);

It is reported that the parade took approximately four hours to pass and that President Batista and his entire Cabinet reviewed the parade. The Executive Committee of the C.T.C. formally presented President Batista with the following demands:

"On this International Day of Work, the First of May, the national proletariat, represented by the Confederation of Workers of Cuba, comes before you to present those most fundamental demands which the workers of the country are demanding, in the hope that in the name of social justice, they will be satisfied.

I

"That effective and energetic measures be put into effect against the abusive high prices of articles of prime necessity, control of prices be established and that profiteering and speculation in the foods and medicines be stopped.

By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

II

"That Congress consider the immediate passing of the Complementary Laws, that the sugar workers be included in the benefits of the forty-four hour week with pay for forty-eight hours, that Congress consider the recognition of the federations and confederations, workers' retirement, social security against unemployment, and other social rights covered in the Constitution of the Republic.

III

"That rotative lists be established in the port of Havana, that the set salaries be complied with by the shipping enterprises, and that the National Merchant Marine be established.

IV

"That measures of protection for the national tobacco industry be established, that new commercial treaties be made which will open markets for tobacco, that new taxes on the national cigarette industry not be imposed, that the Agricultural Financing Bank be established and that a minimum price for tobacco be fixed and that a tobacco law be passed which meets the requirements of all the branches of this industry.

V

"That the lowering of salaries of sugar workers in the honey industry be stopped and that one month vacation for each eleven months of work for the sugar workers and agricultural workers be ordered.

VI

"That confirmation be made by the President of the resolution signed by the Minister of Labor for the speeding up of the unification of the organizations of the food business and that excursion boats be prohibited while they are in port from serving as floating hotels because they are establishing ruinous competition for the hotels and for the workers that are employed in hotels.

VII

"That a scale of service priority be established among motormen and conductors of Havana and that Resolution #467 signed by

By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

the Minister of Labor in the case of the transportation industry be approved.

VIII

"That the employers in the graphic industry be made to comply with the forty-four hour week with pay for forty-eight hours and that the dismissed employees of P. Fernandez and Company be rehired.

IX

"That the employers of the textile industry be made to comply with the recognized salary scale and that the work done in homes which lowers the salaries and conditions of work of workers in this industry be prohibited.

X

"That Resolution #469 signed by the Minister of Labor concerning vacations which is not being complied with by employers be approved by the President.

XI

"That the workers arrested for struggling for compliance with the Constitution and the social laws be released and that the dismissed sugar workers of the Baragua, Estrella, Isabel, Los Canos, Cascocun, America, Santa Maria, Punta Alegre Sugar Centers be released and also others who struggled against the lowering of salaries.

XII

"That the Law of Obligatory Military Service not be approved, that the Cuban neutrality from actual conflict be maintained and that a plan of true national defense be developed against any possibility of aggression of independence and national sovereignty."

Sincerely yours,

Ed. Hoover

CC - Captain Alan G. Kirk
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

JUN 12 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-R-230
444

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source to the effect that the closing session of the National Conference against War and Obligatory Military Service took place in Havana, Cuba, on May 15. The conference was attended by delegates from all parts of Cuba and was one of the demonstrations instigated by the Communists and their fight against the military compulsory service bill which is presently before the Cuban Congress. It is pointed out, however, that the conference was attended by some workers and labor leaders who are not Communists, at least openly.

Lazaro Pena, a colored Communist, who is the General Secretary of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba, acted as president of the conference. Leon Renteria, president of the National Federation of Maritime Workers and an associate of Edward Gordon, acted as vice president. It will be recalled that Renteria resigned from the Communist Party last fall and joined the Socialist Party of Cuba of which he and his associates are the leaders.

It is also reported that the following is a translation of a message sent to Earl Browder by the presiding body of the conference:

> "One thousand eight hundred delegates representing more than one million citizens, in the Popular National Conference against Obligatory Military Service and the War, greet on the fiftieth anniversary the great leader and friend and defender of the Latin-American people, Earl Browder."

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

CC - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

CC - Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Liaison Office G-2 W.D.G.S. MAY 29 1941

Copy made for A. A. Berle

BM.

NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

May 29, 1941

JUN 3 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-Q-330
445
WAR DEPARTMENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable confidential source to the effect that Cuban Senator Eddy Chibas, the leader of the Autentico Party, has stated that the Communist Party in Cuba is not ruled by either Blas Roca or Juan Marinello but by Fabio Kubas, who is either a Russian or a Pole.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director, Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc - Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department, Washington, D. C.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. MAY 31 1941

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

JUN 4 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
June 2, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source to the effect that Angel Aurelio Gonzales, former chief of the Cuban Navy, who was removed by President Batista on February 4, 1941, and took refuge in the United States, returned to Havana, Cuba on May 23, 1941.

According to the information received, Angel Aurelio Gonzales, upon arrival in Havana, reported his presence and explained that he came to be at the bedside of his son who is ill.

It is reported that he will be guarded at his home until he again leaves for Miami, Florida, which he was expected to do within a day or two.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

CC - Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

REC'D EXECUTIVE REGISTRY JUN 3 1941

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 3, 1941

JUL 5 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received to the effect that the police at Havana, Cuba on June 27, 1941 raided the building in Vedado, Havana, Cuba in which the Auxilio Social, affiliate of the Spanish Falange, is located.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. JUL 3 1941

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 5, 1941

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JUL 8 1941
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable, confidential source that Jaime Marine, confidential aid and adviser to President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, has developed an intimate friendship with Edward Gordon, General Secretary of the Secretariado Maritimo Pan-Americano and also the International Representative of the Maritime Committee of the C.I.O.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. JUL 7 1941

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NND 740058
By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

JUL 15 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
July 11, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable, confidential source to the effect that women workers of the Falange of Havana, Cuba, the headquarters of which are located at L and 19th Streets, Vedado, Havana, leave each morning with boxes of soap and perfume, apparently for the purpose of selling these articles. This source advised, however, that the workers never sell these articles and merely carry them as a blind for daily distributing information and correspondence to Falangist members.

According to this source, the following workers are so engaged in delivering the daily information and correspondence to the Falange members in Havana:

Leopardina Castroverde
Teresa Lipileira
Ester Santiesteban
Eladia Villarin
Estervina Robclesa
Adolfina Gutierrez Vazquez

Sincerely yours,

E. Hoover

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Received Office G-2, W.D.G.S. JUL 12 1941

Noted by GNB.

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

JUL 15 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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2657-G-330
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
July 11, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a reliable, confidential source to the effect that secret correspondence for Fascist Agents in Cuba has been concealed in great amounts of merchandise shipped to Spanish merchants in Cuba.

According to this source, one of the principal business houses which has received such correspondence is Brazo Fuerte Caliano, Post Office 560, Havana, Cuba. This source advised that among the customs brokers who dispatch merchandise to the individual Spanish merchants are Fascist Agents named Rose O. Alvarés and Faustino Galban, and that these Agents are instructed by the senders of the merchandise as to which particular lot, destined for a certain merchant, contains the secret correspondence.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

REC'D Executive Office G-2, W.D.G.S. JUL 12 1941

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By AMF NARS, Date 05/04/89

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Classification

None Enclosures
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Record Section File No.
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Cuba
Country Reported On

Subject (Brief Descriptive Title) Political Issues and Problems (Other than National Defense). I.G. No. 3600

REC'D-G-2 JUL 17 1941

Source and Degree of Reliability: Press, Commercial Attache, Official Gazette. Reliable.

Summarization of Report (When Required)

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Rumored Cabinet Changes and Budget Deficit.

1. President Batista will convoke Congress in Special Session on July 14, 1941, to consider certain political and economic problems confronting the Government. The two main problems to be considered are:

(1) Demand by Congress for Cabinet changes.

(2) Measures to balance the Budget.

2. The strained relations existing between Congress and Cabinet members can, in the main, be attributed to "political patronage." During the past few months Cabinet Ministers have made wholesale dismissals of old government employees in order to provide jobs for their own personal political friends. Members of Congress, naturally, have resented the fact that they were completely ignored in the deal, and felt that their political prestige had suffered from such high-handed action. The situation was also aggravated somewhat by the fact that various Cabinet members have openly criticized Congress for its failure to pass remedial legislation to balance the Budget.

3. Congress, feeling itself aggrieved, has been demanding that changes be made in the Cabinet. However, in spite of these insistent demands, it is rumored that no changes will be made until Congress heeds President Batista's request and enacts tax measures to provide funds to take care of the present Budget deficit. Congress, of course, should first concentrate its efforts on finding a solution to Cuba's economic problem before making an attempt to solve the political problem.

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4. In considering the economic problem Congress, in its Special Session, must either make drastic reductions in Government expenditures or increase revenues by new taxes.

5. The 1940 Budget, the provisions of which were continued until June 30, 1941, has now been extended until September 30, 1941.

6. On June 25th, the Council of Ministers agreed to reduce salaries of Government employees on a sliding scale of 3 % on first 30 pesos, up to 18 1/2 % on that portion of salaries over 300 pesos. Veterans' pensions and other special pensions were subject to the same cuts. "Official autos," "secret expenses," "unforseen expenses" were cut 50 %. These reductions, which are effective July 1st, this year, will result in a saving of 200,000 pesos per month in Government expenses during the remainder of the year.

7. This saving will not cover the entire deficit of approximately 7,000,000 pesos, and is only a partial remedy. Other measures must be adopted, and a proposal has been prepared by the House Tariff and Tax Committee which will be considered by Congress during the Special Session. These proposals are:

(1) A fiscal emergency law, which will increase present taxes 20 %. If passed, this law repeals the decree which reduced Government salaries.

(2) Authorization to the President to issue Treasury Obligations up to 6,000,000 pesos during the present year. The Obligations to mature no later than December 31, 1944, with interest not over 4 %.

(3) A law providing new taxes, which would not begin to be collected until June 1st, 1942, but which would serve as a basis for the 1942 Budget.

(4) Creation of a commission, which would have under its control restriction of the Cuban tax system until a new fiscal code can be promulgated.

(5) Congressional authorization to accept the $25,000,000.00 loan from the Export and Emport Bank for agricultural development and public works.

8. Of the above listed measures to increase revenues, the 20 % increase in present taxes appears to be the one most favored by members of Congress. This, of course, is only an "emergency measure" to meet the present deficit, and Congress must revamp the entire tax system in order to provide for sufficient revenue in 1942 to meet Government expenditures.

Observations.

1. Although it is rumored that no Cabinet changes will occur until after Congress settles the economic problem, there is still the possibility that Congress might refuse to pass new legislation until President Batista agrees to make certain Cabinet changes.

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2. The 20 % "emergency tax" increase is the measure most likely to receive immediate attention.

Robert E. Cummings,
Colonel, AGD.,
Military Attache.

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14

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Cuba

Country Reported On

Subject Stability of Government I.G. No. 3020
Brief Descriptive Title

REC'D-G-2 JUL 23 1941

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Subversive Police Squad, Personal Contact. Reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Falangism.

1. 140,000 Spanish Falange propaganda medals and instructions for distributing them were seized by the Cuban police on July 10th and 11th. The 52 wooden boxes which contained the medals were all consigned to Antonio Garcia Gil, Spanish Consulate, Havana, and were sent by the Propaganda Bureau of the Ministry of Interior at Madrid, Spain. However, they have been held in the warehouse of the Cuban Mail Steamship Line (old Ward Line) for the past nine months without a claimant.

2. The Spanish Consulate has issued an official note declaring that it had no knowledge whatsoever of the shipment of these medals to Cuba, and that it had "Cooperated" with Cuban police in the clearing up of the matter.

3. Antonio Garcia Gil and Jenaro Riestra, former Consul General of Spain in Cuba, are being sought by the police. However, both, now, are not in Cuba.

4. Undoubtedly, the sale of the medals was for the purpose of raising money for Falange Propaganda and activities in Cuba. The medals, themselves, commemorated Franco's victories in 1939.

Robert E. Cummings,
Colonel, AGD.,
Military Attache.

REC:rs

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File with: ~~MID~~ 2657-Q-330 (Old File)

Subject: Translation of newspaper article concerning retirement of Col. Fulgencio Batista from Cuban Army. 2plc

For related material see File No. MID 000.1 Cuba

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Date: 30 May 44

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